Professional Documents
Culture Documents
[1998] SGCA 55
Facts
Sharifah Shaikah bte Syed Omar bin Ali Aljunied, the testatrix, made a will,
dated 21 November 1911, directing that either a shop or a house be purchased
out of her estate, and the income thereof be used for religious and charitable
purposes specified therein. Following her death in 1912, her executors
purchased two properties in 1913. In 1978, one of the properties was acquired by
the State.
From 1991 to 1992, the respondent, the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura
(Majlis), made repeated requests to the trustees of the remaining property
(and their solicitors) for a copy of the will to determine if it was a wakaf
property. The requests were not acceded to, with the solicitors for the trustees
replying that they had not been able to find it.
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On 9 July 1993, one of the trustees executed an agreement to sell the property to
LS Investment Pte Ltd, the appellant, without informing the other trustees or the
Majlis. On 2 September 1993, the trustees obtained an ex parte order under
s 59(1) of the Trustees Act (Cap 337, 1985 Rev Ed) empowering them to sell the
property and to purchase another property with the proceeds thereof. Following
the completion of the sale on 29 November 1993, the deed of assignment to the
appellant was lodged with the Registry of Deeds on 1 December 1993.
The Majlis lodged a caveat on the property on 2 December 1993 on the basis that
it was the lawful owner of the property pursuant to s 59 of the Administration of
Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 1985 Rev Ed) (AMLA), but only came to know of the
sale on or about 4 December 1993. The Majlis then sought further information
on the will and the trust accounts.
Claiming that the existence of the caveat had only come to its notice in February
1995 when it attempted to sell the property, the appellant applied in March 1995
for the caveat to be expunged, but failed.
[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 371
in deciding to buy the property, had the appellant relied on the list of wakaf
properties vested in the Majlis which the Majlis was required by s 66 of the
AMLA to publish (and which, at the material time, could not have included the
subject property). Therefore, the appellants claim based on proprietary
estoppel, estoppel by representation and estoppel per rem judicatum failed: at
[39] to [49].
(4) Although the Majlis came to know of the sale of the property to the
appellant, it did not inform the appellant about its interest in it. Instead, it stood
idly by and let the appellants carry on with redevelopment works to the
property. Accordingly, an estoppel arose in favour of the appellant, giving rise to
an equity in its favour which would only be satisfied if it was reimbursed in full
for all expenditures actually incurred by them on account of the redevelopment
works: at [50] to [53].
(5) There was no cause for a retrial under s 39 of the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed, 1993 Reprint) as it was clear at all times
that the parties were prepared to let the matter be decided on the basis of the
affidavit evidence: at [54] to [56].
Case(s) referred to
Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Yunoos v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura [1995] 2
SLR(R) 394; [1995] 2 SLR 705 (folld)
Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 (refd)
Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] Ch 179 (refd)
Haji Embong bin Ibrahim v Tengku Nik Maimunah Hajjah binte Almarhum
Sultan Zainal Abidin [1980] 1 MLJ 286 (refd)
Sir J W Ramsden, Bart v Lee Dyson and Joseph Thornton (1866) LR 1 HL 129
(folld)
Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96 (folld)
Legislation referred to
Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 1985 Rev Ed) ss 58, 59 (consd);
ss 62, 63, 66, 114
Trustees Act (Cap 337, 1985 Rev Ed) s 59(1) (consd)
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed, 1993 Reprint) s 39
(consd)
K Shanmugam SC and Ronald Choo (Allen & Gledhill) for the appellant;
Mizra Namazie and Tan Teng Muan (Mallal & Namazie) for the respondent.
[Editorial note: The decision from which this appeal arose is reported at [1998] 1
SLR(R) 530.]
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Background
2 We will first set out the facts giving rise to this action. On
21 November 1911 one Sharifah Shaikah bte Syed Omar bin Ali Aljunied
(the testatrix) made a will, the relevant part of which reads as follows
(translation in English is not in dispute):
She [ie the testatrix] directs to distribute her estate according to Islamic
law and after settling her debts, if she is indebted, to purchase with the
balance of the one third of her estate a house or a shop and apply the
net income of same for payments for holding celebration of the
memorials of her, her father the late Syed Omar bin Ali Aljunied, her
mother the late Sharifah Alaweyyah bte Abdullah Alkaff and her
daughter Sharifah Baheyyah bte Ali Aljunied, free supply of ten vessels
of zamzam water in the holy mosque of Mecca, furnishing a mat for
Koran reciters every night for the period between the third and the
fourth prayers and engaging annually somebody to perform the
pilgrimage and al-omrah (homage) on her behalf.
She directs that dollars three hundred only $300 out of the nett income
of her trusted property in Singapore be added to the nett income of the
property purchased for the balance of the one third mentioned above if
the latter income is not sufficient to carry all her said directions and the
balance after the fulfillment of such directions is to be applied for
charity and benevolence in general.
3 It will be noted that the will referred to her trusted property. That was
in reference to a settlement made by the testatrix on 4 June 1903 where a
number of her properties were placed on trust. Nothing in the present
action concerns that.
4 The testatrix died on 11 September 1912. In compliance with her
testamentary directions, her executors in 1913 purchased two leasehold
properties to be held on trust for the purposes directed in her will. One of
them was acquired by the State in May 1978 and the other, which is located
at No 49 Temple Street (hereinafter called the property or the Temple
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[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 373
Street property as the context may require) formed the subject of the
present dispute.
5 In 1990 the trustees of the property were two brothers, Syed Salim bin
Junid Aljunied (Salim) and Syed Hamid bin Junied (Hamid) and they
are distant relatives of the testatrix. On 16 January 1991 the solicitors for
Majlis wrote to the two trustees to ask, inter alia, for a copy of the will to
ascertain whether the property was wakaf property. Apparently at the time
Salim was away in Saudi Arabia. There was some doubt if that
communication reached Hamid. The request was repeated to Hamid on
4 June 1992 and 28 July 1992, followed by further reminders. On
20 November 1992 Hamids solicitors, M/s Bernard Rada & Lee (BRL)
replied stating that Hamid did not have a copy of the will and was making
inquiries about the will. On 18 December 1992, BRL informed the Majlis
solicitors that their client could not find the original Will or obtain a copy.
BRL also stated that they had searched the records of the High Court for the
years 1912 to 1916 without success and had also written to the previous
solicitors for a copy of the Will and were waiting for a reply. In spite of
further reminders, BRL never reverted thereafter.
6 Then on 16 June 1993, unknown to the Majlis, Hamid by deed
appointed Syed Hashim bin Abdulkader Alhadad (Hashim) as the new
trustee in place of Salim on the ground that Salim had since 1982 left the
Republic of Singapore to reside permanently abroad.
7 On 9 July 1993 Hamid and Hashim, as trustees, entered into a sale
and purchase agreement (the agreement) to sell the property to the
appellant with vacant possession for a sum of $800,000. A deposit of 5% of
the purchase price was required to be paid upon execution of the
agreement. The agreement referred to the will of the testator and the fact
that the executors/trustees were to utilise a third of her residual estate to
purchase a house or shophouse for the purposes set out in the will. The sale
to the appellant was expressly stated to be subject to the sanction of the
court.
8 On 2 September 1993, by way of an ex-parte application, Hamid and
Hashim applied to the High Court under s 59 of the Trustees Act (Cap 337)
that they be empowered to sell the property and to purchase another
property with the proceeds thereof. A copy of the translation of the will of
the testatrix was exhibited in the affidavit filed in support of the application.
An order in terms was granted by the High Court on 11 October 1993. The
sale to the appellant was completed on 29 November 1993. The deed of
assignment was lodged with the Registry of Deeds on 1 December 1993.
9 On 2 December 1993, the Majlis lodged a caveat against the property
claiming as lawful owner of the property under s 59 of AMLA.
10 On or about 4 December 1993 the Majlis came to know of the sale of
the property effected by Hamid and Hashim to the appellant. Subsequently
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Decision below
13 In the court below Judith Prakash J ruled, following this courts
decision in Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Yunoos v Majlis Ugama Islam
Singapura [1995] 2 SLR(R) 394, that although the trust was created in 1912,
as the dispute arose in 1995 it had to be construed in the light of s 63(1) of
AMLA which provides that where any question arises as to the meaning of
any instrument creating or affecting any Muslim charitable trust such
question shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Muslim
law. She held that there was in this case a valid Muslim charitable trust or
wakaf and that in view of ss 58 and 59 of AMLA the property automatically
vested in the Majlis without any conveyance, assignment or transfer
whatever. As the trustees no longer had any right or title to deal with the
property, other than to carry out the trusts as directed by the testatrix in her
will, the purported sale to the appellant was void. The fact that the trustees
obtained an order of court under s 59(1) of the Trustees Act empowering
them to sell the property did not confer title in the trustees if they did not
have any. Section 59(1) of the Trustees Act only applied [w]here in the
management or administration of any property vested in trustees. She said
that the plaintiff (the appellant) could probably have a claim against the
other property which the trustees had bought with the proceeds of sale, but
she was not expressing a firm view on that.
14 The learned judge also held that the doctrine of bona fide purchaser
for value had no application in the circumstances of this case as it only
protects a purchaser of a legal interest in a property from claimants to a
beneficial interest in the same property when such purchaser can show that
he bought the legal estate in good faith for value and without knowledge of
the beneficial interest (LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam
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[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 375
Singapura [1998] 1 SLR(R) 530 at [26]). In any case she also found on the
evidence that the appellant was not a bona fide purchaser. If the appellants
solicitors had done a proper tracing of title the appellant would have
noticed that the property was purchased for the purposes of trusts declared
in the will of the testatrix. Furthermore, in a April/May 1993 issue of the
Law Societys circular, attention of members of the Society was drawn to the
provision of AMLA regarding the Majlis interest in properties subject to
any Muslim charitable trust or wakaf. Thus she held there was constructive
knowledge on the part of the appellants solicitors and accordingly of the
appellant. Enquiries should have been made by the appellant with the
Majlis.
15 For these reasons the learned judge refused to grant any relief to the
appellant and instead declared that the leasehold interest in the property
vested in the Majlis and ordered that the registration of the deed of
assignment lodged by the appellant on 1 December 1993 be expunged.
Issues before us
16 Two main questions are canvassed before us. First, what is the nature
of the trust created by the will of the testatrix. If it is a wakaf then following
s 59 of the AMLA, legal title in the estate vests automatically in the Majlis
and the trustees would have had no title whatsoever to pass to the appellant.
Second, is the appellant entitled to relief as against the Majlis on the ground
of estoppel. We shall now examine each of these in turn.
17 Although AMLA only became law in Singapore in 1968, it applies to
all wakafs which existed as of that date. This is not disputed by the
appellants counsel and cannot really be disputed: see ss 58(2) and 63(1) of
AMLA and Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Yunoos v Majlis Ugama Islam
Singapura ([13] supra) which decided this very point. But he raised the
following arguments to submit that in this instance there was no valid
wakaf
(a) The testatrixs directions were primarily for private and not
charitable purposes.
(b) Only the income, and not the capital, was directed to be applied
for the purposes set out in the will.
(c) Its constitution was dependent on contingencies.
(d) The property was not vested in the testatrix at the time of her
death.
same, the Majlis shall administer all wakaf, whether wakaf am or wakaf
khas, all nazar am, and all trusts of every description creating any
charitable trust for the support and promotion of the Muslim religion
or for the benefit of Muslims in accordance with the Muslim law to the
extent of any property affected thereby and situate in Singapore.
19 It will be noted that s 58(2) refers to all wakaf whether wakaf am or
wakaf khas and AMLA has defined wakaf am and wakaf khas as
follows:
wakaf am means a dedication in perpetuity of the capital and income
of property for religious or charitable purposes recognised by the
Muslim law and the property so dedicated;
wakaf khas means a dedication in perpetuity of the capital of property
for religious or charitable purposes recognised by the Muslim law, the
income of the property being paid to persons or for purposes specified
in the wakaf, and the property so dedicated;
It differentiates between religious and charitable purposes and more
importantly in relation to wakaf khas the income of the property need not
be given to charitable purposes as it could be paid to persons or for
purposes specified in the wakaf.
20 Counsel for the appellant argued that the words creating any
charitable trust etc in s 58(2) qualified not only the expression all trusts of
every description, which is not disputed, but also the words before that
expression, namely, all wakaf, whether wakaf am or wakaf Khas, all nazar
am. We should add that nazar am is also separately defined in AMLA. In
our opinion, this construction of s 58(2) is wholly untenable as a matter of
plain language. To construe it in the way contended by counsel would be
inconsistent with the separate and distinct definitions of wakaf am,
wakaf khas, and nazar am provided in the Act and would render those
definitions redundant.
21 It is clear that the concept of wakaf is quite different from that of the
English law of trust as the following statements in Outlines of
Muhammadan Law by AA Fyzee (4th Ed) at pp 280281 will show. Under
ss 63(3) and 114 of AMLA, this book is one of seven authorities on Muslim
law on which the court can rely upon.
The essentials of wakf may now be summarized. The motive in wakf is
always religious; in trust, it is generally temporal; this is the first
characteristic.
Secondly, wakf is a foundation endowed in perpetuity. In the eye of the
law the property belongs to God, and as such, the dedication is both
permanent and irrevocable. The property itself is detained or, to use
the expressive language of French lawyers, it is immobilized and no
further transfers can be effected. In a trust, permanency is not an
essential condition; a trust of property for the benefit of A and
thereafter absolutely to B is a valid trust terminable on the death of A.
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[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 377
(c) furnishing a mat for Koran reciters every night for the period
between the third and fourth prayers;
(d) engaging annually somebody to perform the pilgrimage and al-
omrah (homage); and
(e) the balance, after the fulfillment of such directions (which if
insufficient is to be supplemented by a sum of $300 from her trust
property in Singapore), for charity and benevolence in general.
Objects (b) and (c) are clearly religious and generally charitable. Objects (a)
and (d) are religious though private. Object (e) would of course be
charitable as it says. We do not see how it could be contended that any of
these objects are bad under Muslim law and would endorse the decision of
the Legal Committee of the Majlis that the wakaf created by the testatrix is
good.
[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 379
give so much out of the income of this my house to buy bread with for
the poor, that is sufficient to create a wakf.
In the thirteenth section of the Jamaa-ul-Fusulain, it is stated that if a
person were to say, this room or this house is for lighting such a
mosque, and add nothing further, it would constitute a valid wakf, for
such a purpose is sufficient.
27 A similar view was adopted in Abdul Rahman ([13] supra) where
income from a half share in a house was directed to be utilised for certain
purposes as set out in a will. There the court stated (at [19]):
Obviously the undivided half share in 34 Arab Street was also
dedicated to the wakaf declared by the testator for without such
dedication there would be no income to perform the wakafs.
28 We would reiterate the views expressed in Abdul Rahman and declare
that in relation to the present case as the income from the property is
dedicated in perpetuity it must follow that the testatrix intended a similar
dedication of the property which is to produce the income.
Contingencies
29 The argument of the appellant under this sub-head is that a wakaf
cannot validly be constituted if its constitution is dependent upon a
contingency. The appellant says that here there were three contingencies
upon which the constitution of the wakaf depended:
(a) the testatrix must have property at the time of her death;
(b) there must be moneys remaining after payment of her debts;
and
(c) the moneys remaining must be sufficient to purchase a shop or a
house.
30 While it is not disputed that a wakaf cannot be validly constituted if it
depends on a contingency which may or may not occur, the real question is,
are the three alleged contingencies truly contingencies. The appellant does
not dispute that a wakaf can be created by a will so long as the wakaf does
not encompass more than one-third of the testators assets. The authorities
are clear on that. But we do not see the three alleged contingencies being
truly contingencies as if they were events which could or could not have
happened. Upon the death of the testatrix what assets were hers and what
debts were hers were objective matters which could be ascertained. They
did not depend upon events which had yet to happen. In Ameer Alis
Mohammedan Law (5th Ed) the learned author states the following as an
example of a contingency (at p 545): Nor can a wakaf be made dependent
upon a contingency which may never occur, as for example, I make a wakaf
on condition that Zaid should come. In our present case what would be
the sum available to carry out the objects of the testatrix was capable of
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31 The appellant contends that for there to be a valid wakaf, the property
dedicated must belong to the settlor/testatrix. In the present case, the
property was purchased by the trustees after the death of the testatrix and it
did not belong to the testatrix at the time of her death. Reliance was placed
upon Baillie on Digest of Moohummadan Law (another recognised work)
where the learned author stated at p 562:
It is also a condition that the thing appropriated be the appropriators
property at the time of the appropriation; so that if one were to usurp a
piece of land, appropriate, and then purchase it from the owner it
would not be a wakf.
32 It seems to us clear that what the learned authors are saying is that a
person cannot create a wakaf out of a property which does not belong to
him but to others. This is obvious. You cannot create wakaf out of other
peoples things. But that is not the position in our case here. The wakaf
created by the testatrix was in respect of the balance one-third of her estate
and the property was acquired by the trustees with that sum pursuant to the
testatrixs explicit direction in the will. The testatrix did not seek to create a
wakaf out of property which did not belong to her. In our opinion, this
argument is without merit. The comparison is wholly inappropriate.
[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 381
36 The net effect of these provisions is that legal title to wakaf properties
vests in the Majlis; that the Majlis shall hold the documents of title relating
to wakaf properties; that it is for the Majlis to prepare any cy prs scheme;
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and that it is for the Majlis to refer to court for an opinion if the meaning or
effect of any instrument creating a wakaf is obscure or uncertain. In our
opinion, in the light of the scheme of things laid down in AMLA, we do not
think that it falls within the province of the trustees, as managers, to apply
to court to approve the sale under s 59 of the Trustees Act. The trustees did
not hold the title to the wakaf property. They were no longer trustees in the
English law sense, viz, someone who holds the legal title for the benefit of
another or for certain specified objects. As managers, the trustees (in
Muslim law they are called mutawallis) functions are only to manage the
wakaf property and to apply the income as directed in the trust instrument.
Under AMLA, control of all wakafs vests with the Majlis. It must be borne
in mind that under s 58(4) the Majlis is empowered to remove the trustees
of a wakaf when it appears to the Majlis that the wakaf has been
mismanaged or it would be to the advantage of the wakaf to appoint a
mutawalli.
37 While it is true that in this case the trustees, pursuant to s 59(1) of the
Trustees Act, did apply and obtain an order of court empowering them to
sell the property, that was an ex parte order and the courts attention was
not drawn to s 59 of AMLA. Such a court order empowering sale cannot
confer title upon the party where that party does not possess title to the
property in the first place. Section 59(1) of Trustees Act only applies where
in the management or administration of any property vested in trustees .
Here the property did not vest in the trustees but in the Majlis.
Estoppel
39 We now turn to the second main argument based on estoppel. The
appellant relies upon the following:
(a) The Majlis knew of the sale of the property by the trustees to the
appellant before completion and yet did not intervene to stop the sale.
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[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 383
(b) The Majlis was probably aware of the application made to the
High Court in OS 849/1993 to obtain the sanction of the court for the
sale.
(d) The Majlis had failed to fulfil its statutory duty under s 66 of
AMLA by not listing or gazetting the property as a wakaf. The
appellant could not have known that the property was affected by a
wakaf. While the appellant knew the existence of the will, a will is not
a part of the title. There was no reason for the appellant to look
behind the grant of probate and the order for sale. The Majlis had
taken no steps to make their claim known to the appellant.
41 The only allegation made that the Majlis knew of the matters as
aforesaid was contained in an affidavit of Hamid filed on behalf of the
appellant on 27 July 1995. This was what Hamid deposed:
I also wish to state that most of the members of Aljunied family were
aware of my intended sale of the subject property and to purchase a
property with the proceeds of sale thereof.
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42 The secretary of the Majlis, one Syed Haroon bin Mohamed Aljunied,
is a cousin of Hamid. It is of significance to note that Hamid did not state
explicitly that Haroon knew or was informed of the intended sale. Instead
Hamid used a vague expression most of the members of the Aljunied
family. Who are the people who come within the term most? As Hamid
was replying to an affidavit filed by Haroon wherein the latter explicitly
stated that he did not know, why was Hamid afraid to point the finger
directly at Haroon, if the latter did in fact know of the position?
45 We, therefore, hold that the Majlis did not know of the proposed sale
of the property by the trustees to the appellant, nor of the application to
court for sanction, until after the completion thereof, for these reasons:
(a) The appellant had not tendered any evidence that the Secretary
of the Majlis in fact knew; whatever evidence was based on
supposition.
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[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 385
(b) The reliability of the assertion of Hamid that Haroon must have
known of the sale is suspect since it was clear that he did not want the
Majlis to interfere in the property. It is of interest to note that the
solicitors who acted for the trustees in the sale and purchase were not
BRL but another firm, M/s S Nabham.
(c) The Majlis only knew of the sale after the completion thereof
and this is evidenced by the letter of 4 December 1993 from the
Majlis solicitors to M/s S Nabham complaining about the conduct of
the trustees. Hamids letter of 13 January 1994 where he stated that
we are of the view that your clients have no jurisdiction over the said
property speaks volumes. Hamid wanted to keep the sale away from
the Majlis.
46 Estoppel is an equitable remedy. The rationale for the intervention of
equity was put by Denning MR in Crabb v Arun District Council [1976]
Ch 179 at 187 as follows:
The basis of this proprietary estoppel is the interposition of equity.
Equity comes in, true to form, to mitigate the rigours of strict law. The
early cases did not speak of it as estoppel. They spoke of it as raising
an equity. If I may expand what Lord Cairns LC said in Hughes v
Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439, p 448: it is the first
principle upon which all courts of equity proceed, that it will prevent a
person from insisting on his strict legal rights whether arising under
a contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute when it would be
inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have
taken place between the parties.
Short of an actual promise, if he, by his words or conduct, so
behaves as to lead another to believe that he will not insist on his strict
legal rights knowing or intending that the other will act on that
belief and he does so act, that again will raise equity in favour of the
other; and it is for a court of equity to say in what way the equity may
be satisfied.
47 In the light of our finding that the Majlis had no knowledge of the sale
or the application for sanction, the appellants claim based on proprietary
estoppel and estoppel by representation must necessarily fail. As mentioned
above, the application by the trustees for sanction of the sale to the
appellant was made ex parte. Similarly we do not see how estoppel per rem
judicatum could ever apply.
Section 66 of AMLA
48 We now turn to the argument based on s 66 of AMLA. This section
requires the Majlis to publish yearly a list of all wakaf properties vested in
the Majlis. Two points may be made here. Firstly, from 1992 up to early
1993 the Majlis was trying to ascertain the exact status of the property
although the Majlis felt that the property was a wakaf property. Until they
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see the will and the directions therein, there was no way the Majlis could
know the true position. The Majlis obtained no assistance at all from the
trustees. Even as late as 2 December when the Majlis lodged its caveat it did
not obtain a copy of the will. This was explained by Haroon as follows:
8 After much exhausted fruitless attempts on the part of the
defendants to obtain a copy of the last will of the testatrix which Syed
Hamid failed to furnish, it was then decided that the defendants should
nevertheless lodge a caveat against the property. This was done on
2 December, 1993, and the said caveat was registered at the Registry of
Deeds in Vol 2641 No 198.
49 Thus, even on the basis of this caveat lodged by the Majlis, the earliest
conceivable time at which the Majlis could have included the property in
the list to be published in the Gazette would be in 1994, by which time the
sale and purchase had already been completed. Secondly, there is no
assertion by the appellant that it had relied upon any list gazetted by the
Majlis under s 66 before entering into the contract of purchase or before
completing that transaction. Quite apart from the question as to the object
behind s 66 in requiring an annual gazetting of wakaf properties, the simple
truth is that the appellant did not rely upon any list published by the Majlis
in deciding to purchase the property. In our opinion, the omission of this
wakaf in any list published by the Majlis was wholly irrelevant.
Redevelopment works
50 The appellant stated that upon completion of the purchase, it
proceeded with the redevelopment works on the property. At the time of
commencement of this originating summons in April 1995, the
redevelopment works were almost completed. The appellant contended
that as the Majlis permitted the works to continue, estoppel applies.
51 As mentioned above, the Majlis lodged its caveat on 2 December
1993, a day after the appellant lodged its deed of assignment for
registration. More importantly, on or about 4 December 1993 the Majlis
came to know of the sale of the property by the trustees to the appellant.
Yet, thereafter, the Majlis never wrote to inform the appellant about its
interest in the property. The appellant only learned of the caveat lodged by
the Majlis in or about February 1995 when it sought to re-sell the property.
The appellant then commenced the present proceedings to remove the
caveat of the Majlis. In our opinion, upon being aware that the appellant
had bought the property from the trustees, the Majlis should have given
immediate notice of its interest in the property to the appellant. The Majlis
would have known that the appellant, having bought the property which is
an old shophouse, would undertake renovation or other works to
modernise it, either for its own use or for resale. Yet the Majlis stood idly by
and let the appellant carry on with the works. In the circumstances, estoppel
would apply: see Sir J W Ramsden, Bart v Lee Dyson and Joseph Thornton
paginator.book Page 387 Sunday, September 20, 2009 2:22 AM
[1998] 3SLR(R) LS Investment Pte Ltd v Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 387
Retrial
Judgment
57 In the result this appeal is allowed only to the limited extent that the
respondent shall reimburse the appellant for all expenditures actually
incurred in the redevelopment works. As the appellant has substantially
failed in this appeal it shall bear the costs. We would award costs to the
respondent at 90%. The security for costs shall be paid out to the
respondents solicitors to account of the respondents costs. It seems to us
that the remedy of the appellant lies elsewhere. The Majlis has clearly set
out in its affidavit that it is not claiming any interest in the flat which the
trustees subsequently bought with the proceeds of sale of the Temple Street
property.