Page 1 of 86

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

1. People v Pinlac 165 SCRA 675 (1988)

Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery
with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting
his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and
intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance
of counsel.

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the
accused.

Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was
violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the
charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during
custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial
confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided
therein are merely circumstantial and subject to rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

2. People vs. Rous [GR 103803-04, 27 March 1995]

Third Division, Melo (J): 4 concur

Facts: At around 3:30 a.m. of 15 December 1987; the victim Pastor Pasahol in his car driven
by Rolando Laygo who was only his companion, and left Candon, Ilocos Sur bound for
Meycauayan, Bulacan. When they reached Barangay Santiago, Bauang, La Union, 2 armed
men who, according to Rolando Laygo, alighted from a red car which stopped beside the
victim's car, and then the 2 shot the victim. Thereupon, one of the assailants took the clutch
bag from the compartment of the victim's car which, according to the victim's wife, Selwyn
Pasahol, contained gold coins, earrings with diamond and refined gold worth more than
P600,000.00. Thereafter the hold-uppers took the victim's car a Mitsubishi Lancer bearing
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Plate DEF 888, which was found abandoned by the peace officers at Barangay Urayong,
Bauang, La Union, about 2 kilometers away from the place at Barangay Santiago, where the
crime was committed. 2 days thereafter or specifically on 17 December 1987; the victim died
in the Lorma Hospital at San Fernando, La Union where he was brought by Rolando Laygo, as
a result of the inflicted gun shot wounds. Sgt. Gaddi invited Laygo to the CIS Office in the
afternoon of 15 December 1987, and interviewed the latter, who denied knowledge of the
incident. On the next day, Sgt. Gaddi again invited Laygo to the CIS Office and after
questioning him for 30 minutes, Laygo broke down and he admitted that he and Socrates
Rous were parties to the conspiracy of the original plan to commit Robbery and not to inflict
harm on Pastor Pasahol. With Laygo's revelation, Sgt. Gaddi took his sworn statement
denominated as "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 16 December 1987 with the assistance of Atty.
Abraham Datlag, which is a confession of his participation in the commission of robbery and
implicated

Socrates Rous in the commission of the crime. Laygo, on the same date, also executed a
document entitled "Kusang Loob na Kahilingan" also assisted by Atty. Abraham Datlag who
assisted him in the custodial investigation and witnessed by spouses Fely Laygo and Tiburcio
Laygo. Both documents bear the signatures of Ally. Abraham Datlag who assisted him in the
custodial investigation and witness a by spouses Fely Laygo and Tiburcio Laygo. Rolando
Laygo also executed another "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 22 December 1987 without the
assistance of a lawyer. On December 29 or 30, 1987, Socrates Rous alias Bobby was arrested
by Sgt. Gaddi when he accompanied Capt. Luvimindano Garcia in the latter's appearance
before the CIS District Commander, Lt. Col. Pimentel, in the CIS Office at San Fernando, La
Union. With Laygo's confession, Sgt. Gaddi also investigated Rous who, on 7 January 1987,
executed the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" with the assistance of Atty. Roberto Ferrer who affixed
his signature thereon. Subsequently, on the basis of the affidavit of the victim's wife, Selwyn
Pasahol, the affidavit of Sgt. Roberto Gaddi and the sworn statements of Rolando Laygo, the
Provincial Fiscal filed on 17 December 1987 the case (Highway Robbery with Homicide)
against Rolando Laygo, Bobby Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe, and on 21 December 1987, the
case for Carnapping was filed against Bobby Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe. Later, the original
Information in both cases were amended after the identities of the other Does were known as
Primitivo Pradis and Celestino Rabina. After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the
other accused were never arrested and have remained at large, the trial court rendered a
decision acquitting Rous of the charge of carnapping, but finding both Rous and Laygo guilty
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under the charge of Highway Robbery and sentencing each to an imprisonment term of
reclusion perpetua, aside from the payment in solidum of civil indemnity. From said decision,
Laygo and Rous appealed, with both of them ascribing as error the admission of their
extrajudicial confessions.

Issue: Whether Laygos and Rous extra-judicial confessions, signed in the presence of the
counsel, are admissible as evidence even if the counsel arrived shortly after the custodial
investigation has started and left before the last 3 questions were asked.

Held: The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed Laygo of his right to
counsel and categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the assistance of counsel, to which
inquiry, Laygo expressed his desire to be so assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating
officer, Sgt. Robert Gaddi, brought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Laygo and Atty.
Datlag conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and Laygo returned to the CIS Office of
Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt. Gaddi started the investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived soon after the
investigation started and left before the last three questions were asked, instructing them to
follow him to his office. After the extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and
Laygo went to the office of Atty. Datlag, after which, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and
then advised Laygo to sign. Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed. Thus,
there was more than substantial compliance with the constitutional requirement that a
person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel,
(Section 12 (1), Article III, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The very
purpose of said constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in extracting a
confession from a suspect. Nowhere in the evidence is it shown that coercion was ever
employed by the investigating officer in obtaining the confession of Laygo. The investigation
was even witnessed by the relatives of Laygo. The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after
the investigation of Laygo had begun and left before the confession was concluded does not
negate the validity and admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the
confession was put down in writing, Laygo and the investigating officer proceeded to the
office of Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferred with Laygo and then
advised Laygo to sign the confession. It will be readily seen that the confession was voluntary
and the signing thereof by Laygo was done upon advice of counsel. The constitutional
requirements were thus fully complied with. Moreover, the presence of Rolando's uncle,
Tiburcio Laygo, and the latter's wife, Fely, clearly precluded the use of coercion in extracting
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the confession. A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is admissible until the
accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or
promise of reward or leniency. There is not a speck of evidence to show that the confession
of Laygo was extracted by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag would not have affixed his
signature to the extrajudicial confession of Laygo as counsel for Laygo had he known or had
he been informed by Laygo of any infirmity in its execution. Said confession is, therefore,
admissible in evidence. The same ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession of Rous.
Note: Compare Rous ruling with other cases, especially People vs. Morial; as per aspect on
partial absence of counsel during custodial investigation, where the affidavit of the accused
was subsequently signed in presence of counsel.

3. People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980]

En Banc, Aquino (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: At around 10:00 a.m. of 14 January 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national
penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital,
went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. Jose Tampus y Ponce and
Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, who were tubercular patients in the
hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted
him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed him nine times.
Saminado died upon arrival at 11:00 a.m. on that same morning in the prison hospital. After
emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives.
They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The motive of the killing
was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of
Eduardo Rosales (also a member of the Oxo gang) in December 1975 by a member of the
Batang Mindanao gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang. Saminado was a member of the
Batang Mindanao gang. The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his
written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated
that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was
seated in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the
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victim on the chest and neck. Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison
guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein
they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. Tampus and Avila were charged for murder
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch 36 (Criminal Case 18510). After
trial, the court convicted Tampus for murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to
pay the heirs of the victim, Celso Saminado, an indemnity of P12,000.00. In the same
decision, Rodolfo Avila, the coaccused of Tampus, was convicted of the same offense and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the same indemnity. Avila
did not appeal. (Avila was sentenced to death, together with Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala,
in another case, Criminal Case 1187. The death sentence is under review in GR L-38141). The
present automatic review involves Tampus' conviction.

Issue: Whether the custodial investigation pursued by Lahoz, where allegedly Tampus was
not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent, negates the extra-judicial
confession made by Tampus in the killing of Saminado.

Held: As the confession in the present case was obtained after the 1973 Constitution took
effect, section 20 of Article IV applies thereto. There is no doubt that the confession was
voluntarily made. Investigator
Buenaventura de la Cuesta in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to
comply with section 20. Even considering that Vivencio C. Lahoz investigated the killing two
days before the confession was taken by investigator de la Cuesta on 16 January 1976 and
that allegedly during said custodial interrogation Tampus was not informed as to his rights to
have counsel and to remain silent, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after
coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio,
the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed
an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part
of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that; the
two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without
any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel.
That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony
in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. It is further contended that
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after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called
upon Tampus to testify, the trial court should have advised him of his constitutional right to
remain silent. That contention is not well-taken considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and
had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to
apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim
that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then
he waives that right. It should be stressed that, however, even without taking into account
Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

4. People v. Tan
G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-
appellant.

FACTS: Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he
will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time
that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with
fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in
connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in
Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what
actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were
responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover,
he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit,
Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a
team to retrieve the same.

Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder
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Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their

headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter
that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases
allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the
police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to
writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator
upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD: No. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or

admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in
evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate
protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which
reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation
of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the
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accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible
must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel."

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,

in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain
of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The
evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the
police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not
suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the
same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome
investigative and prosecutory powers of government."

SECTION 13.

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
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5. People v. Nitcha

Facts: An indictment for murder was filed against herein accused-appellant who, after trial,
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on account of the positive identification made by
the People's witnesses, the defense of accused-appellant anchored on denial being found
unavailing.

Jose Belmonte, Agustin Sibayan, and Joselito Sibayan collectively pointed an accusing finger
at accused-appellant whom they witnessed firing his .38 caliber firearm towards the
direction of May Villa Rica Sibayan who was then negotiating an earthen dike about three to
four meters from the position of accused-appellant. In parrying the inculpatory thrusts of the
prosecution, accused-appellant ventured to develop the theory that it was not he but one of
the companions of Jojo Belmonte who pulled and fired the gun. According to accused-
appellant, the bullet missed the head of his brother who was then astride Jojo Belmonte
while the latter and accused-appellant's brother was engaged in a scuffle, and that
unfortunately, the bullet hit the head of May Villa Rica Sibayan.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant is entitled to bail.

Held: As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the record of the case
indubitably shows that accused-appellant's counsel opted not to cross examine Agustin
Sibayan (p. 323, Record) which deliberate omission obviously negates the so-called hearsay
nature of said witness' testimony. Similarly wanting in substance is accused-appellant's claim
relative to the alleged bias of the trial judge considering that mere apprehension that a
magistrate is partial is inefficacious to sustain a charge of breaching the tenet of "cold
neutrality" normally expected of a judge. And even on the assumption that accused-
appellant's arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation, such a hypothesis was
nonetheless negated by accused-appellant's act of posting a bail bond thereafter, apart from
the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty which is tantamount to foregoing the right to
question the assumed irregularity (People vs. Hubilo, 220 SCRA 389 [1993]).
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Too, accused-appellant's submission that there is absence of physical evidence showing that
he fired a gun simply because the paraffin test yielded negative is unacceptable, for as held
by this Court in People vs. Manalo (219 SCRA 656 [1993]):

. . . even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it
cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a
gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before
the test (People vs. Talingdan, 191 SCRA 333 [1990]; People v. Roallos, 113 SCRA 584 [1982]).
The Court has even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on
the hand if, as in the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol (People vs.
Rebullar, 188 SCRA 838 [1990]).

The subsistence of a bail bond is also no legal obstacle to accused-appellant's immediate

incarceration after promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion
perpetua following the principle enunciated in People vs. Fortes (223 SCRA 619 [1993]) this:

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of a s amended, that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right

when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To
that extent the right is absolute.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes
a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion id limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . .

The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty,
bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of
Page 11 of 86

the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of
guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it
would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the
judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People
vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of
right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

6. Cardines v. Rosete

Facts: Respondent Judge Gregorio L. Rosete of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Moncada-San Manuel-Anao, Tarlac, is charged with misconduct and ignorance of the law for
allegedly granting bail to Erlie U. Claro and Emilio B. Claro in conspiracy with Julieta Villanos
who is his Clerk of Court and Reiner Antonio, Criminal Docket Clerk of the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac, Br. 67, knowing fully well that the charge of illegal recruitment was
punishable with life imprisonment hence non-bailable.crala

Issue: Whether it is proper to grant bail to the accused considering that he is charged with a
crime punishable by life imprisonment.

Held: The law existing at the time of the alleged illegal recruitment, which was sometime in
May to July 1993, and when the accused applied for bail was the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which took effect 1 October 1988. Particularly. Sec. 3 of Rule 114, the rule at that
time was that a person under detention shall before conviction be granted bail as a matter of
right. Two exceptions however were recognized: (a) when the person was charged with a
capital offense, or (b) when the offense charged was punishable with reclusion perpetua in
Page 12 of 86

both instances when the evidence of guilt was strong. Interestingly, "life imprisonment" was
not among the exceptions, which leads us to the conclusion that persons accused of crimes
punishable with "life imprisonment" were entitled to bail as a matter of right.

7. Paderanga v CA

KEY TAKE-AWAY: Right to bail is accorded to persons constructively arrested even though
they have not been physically arrested
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.
PETITIONER: MIGUEL P. PADERANGA
RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition for certiorari on the CAs decision denying the motion for reconsideration on
his petition for bail.
Factual Antecedents:
Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of multiple
murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant
of Arrest could be issued by the lower court.
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed
medical attention. His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the
person of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing, he considered being in the custody
of the law.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on his right to
bail
Statute Involved:
Art. 3, Sec. 12
Sec. 1 of Rule 114
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o Section 1. Bail defined. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter
specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond,
cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)
Position of Respondent/s:
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in the
custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition.

ISSUE:
W/N it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner is not yet in custody of law

HELD/RATIO:
NO
Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been arrested, detained,
or otherwise deprived of their freedom
A person is considered to be in the custody of the law:
o when he is arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless
arrest
o when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities
In the foregoing facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally
under custody
o Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over
his person:
firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court
secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts;
thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court.
o for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the
jurisdiction of the trial court
Page 14 of 86

an arrest is made either by:

o actual restraint of the arrestee or
o merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (house
arrest)
Final Ruling
Decision of CA is reversed. Petitioner is granted bail.

8. Yap v. CA
Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed
Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of
the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against
excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel.

Held:
 Page 15 of 86

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an

effective denial of petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to
the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the
impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is
charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate
court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is
simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence.
Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented
from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

9. Narciso v. Sta Romana Cruz

1. JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Page 16 of 86

Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his wife
Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for reconsideration was
both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor found no
reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and trial. Thereafter, he filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte to allow him to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection
and said motion was granted on the same day. It was opposed by respondents herein, then
they moved for the postponement of the hearings because no witness was available, Not
obtaining any resolution on her Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail private
complainant (respondent herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition.
Hence this case. Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right
to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially
when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after
assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.

Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.

Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore,
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no
hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by
the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient
for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Page 17 of 86

Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the
application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in
bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the
judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of
familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty
of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional
liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed
upon the prosecutor."

Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character of a
hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the trial
judge in such petition:

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for
the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
Page 18 of 86

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as
to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would
amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or
awareness thereof."

Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary
thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of
discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him

10. People v. Cabral

In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. As such, bail is discretionary and
not a matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore, dependent
on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a
hearing called for the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong,
in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court would never be
deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would
unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of
discretion.

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident
or the presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or Evident proof in this connection has
been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate
judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is
the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered.
Page 19 of 86

Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of
guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased
judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there
is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the
presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.
(Emphasis and Italics supplied)

In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable
doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the
court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which
would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.

11. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan

SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR Numbers 148468, 148769, and 149116
January 28, 2003
Art. III

FACTS:
The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio which assailed resolutions
of the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan in denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder
case against him.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation. He received a Php200 million donation from Chavit Singson. He received the
donation and turned it over to the treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to the
account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against
Estrada. Petitioner was among the persons included in the criminal charges.
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations against Estrada and other
persons and no bail was recommended for the provisional released of the accused.
Page 20 of 86

Ombudsman found probable cause for plunder and petitioner filed an MR. It was denied
because the information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants
of arrests for the accused, including petitioner. Petitioner was detained at Camp Crame for
the said charge. Arraignment was set and petitioner filed a petition for Bail. Several other
bail meetings did not push through.
Even before the Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari praying that the issued Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be declared void because he was denied due process.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the law.

HELD:
No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a
right conferred by a statute. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the
charges against him during the preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the
Court do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of preliminary
investigations. It was enunciated in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the
task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans discretion is paramount. The lack of
a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed before the
court.
The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to
due process because there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner.
Petitioner has voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas corpus does not lie
because there was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the hearing of the bail cannot
be solely pinned upon the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is
not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail.

12. Leviste v. CA

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
Page 21 of 86

suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive
rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave
abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of
the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the
Page 22 of 86

other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if
none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming
the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion,
the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the
grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs where,
between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more
than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision
maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end
of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that
tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six
years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction by
Page 23 of 86

the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964
Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were
modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in
the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated
August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with
grave caution and only for strong reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Page 24 of 86

13. Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and

Fundamental Fairness in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was
ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it
reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001,
the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for
his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court
ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take
cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
Page 25 of 86

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request
for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law
could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
Page 26 of 86

not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To

determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a
prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the
petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency
of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as

well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not
Page 27 of 86

at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds
application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion
in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as
a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when
it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States
was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against
his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of

Page 28 of 86

bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would
also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding
basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities
that may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will
stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters;
that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard
is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding
ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing
Page 29 of 86

crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its
trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as
well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve
a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered
extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a

person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best
claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition
Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Page 30 of 86

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.

14. Rodriguez v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17

GR. NO. 157977 Feb. 27 2006
QUISUMBING, J

Lessons: Notice and Hearing for Cancellation of Bail in Extradition

FACTS:

After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. They posted cash
bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the
grant of bail which was denied. The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled
Govt of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the
Page 31 of 86

matter of bail guided by this courts ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The
lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and
ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the
reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied. Hence, this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond
and issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER
RODRIGUEZ.

The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already
exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and
laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.

Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on

voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each;
that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA
undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the
authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order
against her; and that she is now in her 60s, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe
that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their
grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and
without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior
notice and hearing, the bails cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
Page 32 of 86

15. Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia
G.R. No. 153675

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia

FACTS:

Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of
the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized
by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face
jail terms.

On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.

On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for his extradition.

Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.

Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied
by the same judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the
Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.

HELD:

The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty.
Page 33 of 86

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due
process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

16. ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin

Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of
the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the
primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development
Page 34 of 86

Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued,
leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Senator Enrile
(Source: wikifilipinas.org)

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is
not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its
assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he
will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail.
Page 35 of 86

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no
higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not

bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt
is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the
discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Page 36 of 86

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion

perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should
primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

Page 37 of 86

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore
have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Page 38 of 86

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post
bail].

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT

17. People of the Philippines vs Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas

November 17, 2010

Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion

Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged
together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a
petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was
later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that
he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face
trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas
corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato
approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the
prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has
waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of
agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for
the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in
Page 39 of 86

custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His
waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

EXCESSIVE BAIL

18. De la Camara vs. Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971]

Resolution En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part

Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on
7 November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation
in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato,
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated
murder and another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14 January
1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the lower court, premised on
the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August
1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of
de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July 1969. The
Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara
would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the
excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. On 12 August
1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent
a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion
for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained adamant. De la
Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la
Camara had escaped from the provincial jail.
Page 40 of 86

Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the amount of bail,
excessive enough to discourage the accused from fleeing.

Held: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right
to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a
guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United
States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the
latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment."
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing
the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the
sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being 12
victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there
being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the Department of
Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at
rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an
accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post
such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would
apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious
avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is
reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances
be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to
a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his
reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right
could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. De
la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled
to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation
from the Supreme Court.
Page 41 of 86

19. Yap v. CA
Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed
Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure
a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of
the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant. He
sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure
a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against
excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to
travel.

Held:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an

effective denial of petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to
the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the
impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is
Page 42 of 86

charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is
simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence.
Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented
from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001)

SECTION 14

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
Page 43 of 86

notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been

duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

20. Scotys Department Store v. Micaller (Bautista-Angelo, 1956)

Pet: Scotys, in Escolta Manila, Manager:Yu Ki Lam, Owners:Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao,
Helen Yang, employedRes: Nena Micaller as a salesgirl.

discharge of employee Court of Industrial Relations, no criminal jurisdiction

Facts:
1.Nena was the best seller of Scotys for three years (1950-52) She was earning 4.8 a day
and was given abonus of P180-200 at the end of 1952, as compared to other employees
who only got P60.

2. Oct. 5, 1952: Nena organized a union, which later affiliated with National Labor
Union(NLU).

3. NLU sent a petition to Scotys containing 10demands; because of this Nena and other
employees weresubjected to the following: (Interrogation)

a. After the NLUs petition was received by Scotys, Nena was called for questioning,
asking her whothe members of the union were. Nena pretended not to know.
b. Oct18 Owner/Managers of Scotys went to Nenas house, again questioning her about
her unionmemebership.

c. Oct19 (morning) Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel Atty
Yuseco,where she was again questioned re:her union activities. She was even made to sign a
paper of withdrawal from the union.

d.Oct19 (evening) Store manager Yu Ki Lam asked each employee whether they were
members of the union.

4.Oct 31: The union gave a notice of strike. Upon receipt of this notice Scotys hired
temporary employeesequal in number to the old (union members). The new employees were
affiliated with another labor union.
Page 44 of 86

5. A series of criminal cases were filed against Nena, 1st Threats=dismissed. 2nd
Slander=pay fine but is on appeal. 3rd Slander.

6. Nov. 30: Nena was dismissed for (1)insulting the owner of the store, Yu Ki Lam.
(2)talking to the girlsinside the store during office hours.

7. Nena FILED: Unfair labor practice, alleging that she was dismissed because of her
membership in the union+ prior to her separation, her employers were questioning
their employees re:membership in the union.

8. Scotys ANSWER: Denied charges. Nena was allegedly dismissed because of her
misconduct and seriousdisrespect to management so much so that several criminal
complaint were filed against her.

9. CIR: After due hearing, held Scotys Manager and owners liable.

Issue: w/n Petitioners are guilty of Unfair Labor practice in interrogating their employees an
dismissing Nena.Decision: YES guilty, but penal fine is deleted since that is not within the
jurisdiction of the CIR.

1.That Scotys subjected their employees to a series of questioning re:membership in the

union is a questionof fact which the SC cannot look into.

a. CIR made a careful analysis of the evidence and found these facts to be true. Which
incontemplation of the law are deemed acts of ULP under RA875 4 (a)(4).

2.Since law on ULP is recent in the Phil, SC used a US case which in their opinion is on all
fours with this case.NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co.:

a.In that case there was also abundant evidence of questioning of employees as to
membership inthe union.

b.There was also anti-union expressions by the cos superintendent.

Page 45 of 86

c. And that as held in NLRB v. Norfolf-Southern Bus Co: Questioning of employees

concerningunion membership and activities and disparaging remarks by supervisory
employeesmade in such away as to hamper the exercise of free choice on the part of
theemployees, have been uniformly condemned as a violation of the Act.

d.There a certain Edna Edler was also discharged at the time when question of
unionrepresentation was becoming acute.
e. Edna Edler was dismissed despite also being a competent and efficient employee with
along record of service. She was also dismissed merely to pre-empt the labor union
activities.

3.However the CIR is not justified in imposing penal sanctions on the petitioners.

a. CIR law (RA 875) 25 provides: Penalties- Any person who violates the provisions of 3
this actshall be punished by a fine of not less than P100/imprisonment of 1mo-1yr or
both in thediscretion of the Court.

b. 25 does not specifiy as to what Court it relates to. (whether CIR or regular courts)

c. SC after mature deliberation concludes that 25 refers to regular courts, for to hold it to
mean asthe CIR would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed by our consti to the accused
since:

i.Procedure laid down by law for CIR in dealing with ULP cases negates the guarantee
ii.It provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in the (regular) courts cannot be
controlling
iii.CIR in hearing shall use every reasonable means to ascertain facts speedily andobjectively
without regards to technicalities of law of procedure.

d.As compared to the Court of Agrarian Reform (CAR) which can impose penal sanctions, CIR
cannot.
Page 46 of 86

i.CARs law contains penal sanctions AND a procedure to be followed in cases involvingthese
penal sanctions: 10 Criminal proceedings should be prosecuted as in ordinary cases

ii. CIRs law on the other hand only contains the provision for penal sanctions. It is silent
onthe procedure to be followed in the prosecution of the offense.

4.Power to impose penalties under 25 is lodged in the ordinary courts not CIR,
notwithstanding definition of Court in 2(a) of the act.

WHEREFORE decision of CIR MODIFIED, penal sanction in the form of P100 fine is deleted.
Civil liab is affirmed.

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

21. Olaguer etal. v. Military Commission, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed
in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1)
unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate
President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco,
Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980,
the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time
the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military
confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of
Page 47 of 86

habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot
and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their
confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military
court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to
subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to
try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or
tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are
open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

22. US v. LULING
G.R. No. L-11162; Aug. 12, 1916; Johnson, J
.Digest by Reinerr

Facts:
A complaint was filed in the CFI of Manila charging appellant F. Luling with a violation of
Section316 of Act No. 355 of the United States Philippine Commission. The complaint alleged
that:
O The accused was a employed as a customs officer of the Government of the Phil. Islands.
O Using such capacity, he solicited from one Rufino Elord the sum of 100 pesos in order to
secure the importation of certain rolls of paper in which a large quantity of opium was
hidden.
Page 48 of 86

The defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty, and convicted by the lower
court.

In his appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that Section 316 of the said
act was unconstitutional in that the State is without right or authority to enact a law by
virtue of which certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt.

O The said provision provides in part:

And evidence of such soliciting, demanding, exacting, or receiving, satisfactory to the

court in which such trial is had, shall be regarded as prima facie evidence that such
soliciting, demanding, exacting, or receiving was contrary to law, and shall put upon the
accused the burden of proving that such act was innocent and not with unlawful intention.
The reception of gift by any officer or employee in the Philippine customs service from any
importer or exporter, either directly or indirectly, shall prima facie be deemed to be a
violation of the provisions of this section.

ISSUE:
Whether the said provision was unconstitutional

HELD:
No. Judgment of conviction was affirmed.

RATIO:
No rule has been better established in criminal law that every man is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In criminal prosecution,
therefore, the burden is upon the state to prove every fact and circumstance constituting
the crime charged, for the purpose of showing the guilt of the accused.
While that is the rule, many of the States have established a different rule and have provided
that certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is
put upon the defendant to show or to explain that such facts or acts are not criminal.
(Sanders v. State, Fuller v. State, US v. Gooding,)

Commonwealth v. Minor
Page 49 of 86

: In case of statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing

that proof by the state of some material fact/s shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt,
and that the burden is shifter to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or
acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.

Unlike common law offenses, in the Phils., no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute.
The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined
limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what
proof shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and then put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act/s
are innocent and are committed without any criminal intent.

Hence, Sec. 316 of Act No. 355 does not violate any of the provisions of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902. With regard to the defendants guilt, the Supreme Court held that the lower
court committed no error in finding that the offense had indeed been committed.

US v. Luling

customs; wharf watchman

Presumption of innocence; The state has the right to declare what acts are criminal, within
certain well-defined limitation and also a right to specify what acts or acts shall constitute a
crime, as well as what proof shall constitute as PRIMA FACIE evidence of guilt, and then to
put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and were
not committed with any criminal intent.

23. People v. Mingoa

malversation of public funds There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence.
Page 50 of 86

It is now contended, however, that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the
trial court convicted defendant on mere presumptions, that is, presumptions of criminal
intent in losing the money under the circumstances alleged and presumptions of guilt from
the mere fact that he failed, upon demand to produce the sum lacking. The criticism as to
the first presumption is irrelevant, for the fact is that trial court did not believe defendant's
explanation that the money was lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual
misappropriation. That is why the court said that "whether or not he (defendant) is guilty of
malversation for negligence is of no moment . . . " And as to the other presumption, the
same is authorized by article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.
The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. The question of the
constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the court below, it may not be
considered for the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People, 68 Phil., 320.)
In many event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now
settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vo. I, pp. 639-
641says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumption founded upon the
experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome
such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United
States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of
proof provided there be rational connection between that facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. (See
annotation on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact presumptive
or prima facie evidence of another, 162 A.L.R. 495-535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838,
with reference to embezzlement.) The same view has been adopted here as may be seen
from the decisions of this court in the U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil.,
725; and People vs. Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489, promulgated June 28, 1951.
Page 51 of 86

The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved.
It makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demaand, any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate fact presumed is that officer
has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made
to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them
forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from
the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the
two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the
accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and
will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.

There being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs.

24. Dumlao v COMELEC

G.R. No. L-52245.
January 22, 1980

Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65
Page 52 of 86

years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who
was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie
nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as

authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art.
XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also
attacked the term of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6,
and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial
review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
Page 53 of 86

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his
disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the
issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be
dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the
imminent elections.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of

equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65
years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable

classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged
provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for
the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again.
Page 54 of 86

It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it
permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid
"even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts
of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime
with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Page 55 of 86

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted

for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

25. Marquez vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for
certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for
quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that
country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992
resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible
post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for
cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40
(e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith,
petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before
the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and
to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant
for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of
the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases
here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity
and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted
by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private
respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied
in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC
outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of
Page 56 of 86

facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.

26. People v. Holgado

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." On may 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as
follows:
Court: Is this the case ready for trial?
Fiscal: I am ready, your honor.
Court: to the accused.
Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will
plead guilty.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was
asked this question.
Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with
the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.
Court: Sentenced reserved.
Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
[Criminal Case No. V-118]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-
appellant.
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
SENTENCE
The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention in the following
INFORMATION
That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion,
Province of Romblon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused being a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
Contrary to law.
This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded
guilty to the information above described.
The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic
Act No. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death.
Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its
maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum, or ten
years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of his
preventive imprisonment.
Page 57 of 86

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above
quoted, the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the
judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses
Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information
are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping
and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since the accused-
appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party,
the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the
information.
Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was
unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a
serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such
a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute
any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in
our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is
his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time
must be allowed for procuring attorney.
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney,
the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to
procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that
said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he
desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to
employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio.
The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his
right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so
framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that
he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due
process clause contained in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly
in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is
so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the
aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so
desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded
guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The
Page 58 of 86

trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not
show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened
by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the
voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's
information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do
with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere
statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But
above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially
because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be
capital by the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a
new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be
assisted by counsel. So ordered.

27. United States vs. Ash

Brief Fact Summary. A number of informants were asked to identify a number of suspects in
connection with a bank robbery. The respondent, Ash (the respondent), challenged the
identification because counsel was not present at what was arguably a critical stage of the
prosecution.
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to
resolve the split in the circuits as to the issue of whether an accused has the right to counsel
at a post indictment photographic lineup. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
at a display at which the defendant himself was not entitled to be present was not embodied
in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Court of
Appeals reversed.
Issue. Whether the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants an accused the right to have
counsel present at a post indictment photographic identification procedure?
Held. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution does not grant an accused the right to
counsel during a post indictment photographic identification procedure because the accused
himself is not entitled to be present, rendering it impossible that the accused will be
confused or overpowered by the proceedings.

28. People vs. Liwanag

Facts: This appeal revolves primarily on the issue of whether accused-appellant was denied
his constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by himself and counsel. He argues that his
right to be heard through his counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel
throughout the proceedings, from the time he was arrested up to the time judgment is
rendered.
The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the trial court, accused-
appellant was represented by counsel de officio, Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys
Office. In the middle of the trial, accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de
parte Atty. Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered the
judgment of conviction, Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on behalf of accused-
appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to file the appellants brief because of the refusal of
accused-appellants mother to transmit the entire records of the case to him. Thus, accused-
appellant was required to manifest whether he still desired to be represented by Atty. Brioso
in this appeal. Upon accused-appellants failure to reply, Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed
counsel de officio.
Page 59 of 86

There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a counsel de officio who
assisted him during the arraignment and conducted the cross examination of all prosecution
witnesses as well as his direct examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined
up to the presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a counsel of his choice.
Accused-appellants citation of People v. Holgadoi and Powell v. Alabama,ii insofar as the
right to be heard by counsel is concerned, is misleading. Both cases only defined the right to
be heard by counsel as the right to be assisted by counsel. It cannot be inferred from these
cases that the right to be heard by counsel presupposes the right to an intelligent counsel.
The requirement is not for counsel to be intelligent, but to be effective.
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of effective counsel only in the light of Article III,
Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which refers to the right of persons under custodial
investigation. In People v. Lucero,iii the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated
by this Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a
crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel
because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible.
In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same case that when the Constitution
requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant
counsel. The requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage before
arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of duress and other undue
influence in extracting confessions which may taint them and render them inadmissible.
(Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution requires that the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the right to be assisted by
counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due
process, a fundamental right which cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for
due process is the concept of fairness, without which there can be no justice. In other words,
there can be no due process accorded an accused if he is not given the right to be heard
through counsel or assisted by counsel. It follows that in order to be heard, and therefore be
accorded due process, the assistance given by counsel must be effective as implied in the
rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this Court subscribes to American
jurisprudence when it held that [t]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a
fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other
words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. iv
In the light of the above ratiocination, accused-appellant contends that the right to be
heard by counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. Citing Strickland v.
Washington,v accused-appellant contends that the assistance rendered by counsel is
ineffective or is defective if the following elements are present: (1) that counsels
performance was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel was not functioning as the
counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsels errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial which result is reliable. Accused-
appellant claims that the assistance afforded him by his counsel during the course of the trial
was ineffective since the counsel de officio failed to safeguard his rights necessary for the
Page 60 of 86

reversal of his conviction.

The pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes would show that appellants counsel de
oficio, Atty. William Uy, cross-examined the private complainant extensively as well as two
other prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Sevilla and Edith Hernandez). That said counsel opted not
to cross-examine the prosecution expert witness, Dr. Louella Nario, is of no moment because
said witness merely explained in court her findings and conclusions that she had arrived at
after conducting the medical examination on the private complainant [Exhibit C] (TSN, March
30, 1993, pp. 10-12). In fact, at one point, Atty. Uy raised an objection to the private
prosecutors question on how private complainants genital injuries were sustained for being
incompetent to answer, which objection was impliedly sustained by the trial judge (Ibid., p.
13).
In assessing the effectiveness of counsels assistance, the Strickland standard invoked by
accused-appellant is too stringent for application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only
seeks to ensure that the adversarial testing process is present in a case by requiring that the
assistance rendered by counsel be effective. The presence of an adversarial testing process,
in other words, ensures that the trial is fair by according the accused due process through the
effective assistance of counsel.
While fairness is likewise the object of Article III, Section 14 (2) of the Philippine
Constitution, the assistance afforded by counsel to an accused in light of the Philippine
constitutional requirement need only be in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an accused is presumed to be providing all
the necessary legal defense which are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with
said norms.
In this regard, a counsel assisting an accused is guided by the following provisions of
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. -- It is the duty of an attorney:
x x xx x x xxx
(c)To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(d)To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
xxx xxx xxx
(h)Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense
that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by
due process of law. (Italics supplied)
The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, likewise, provide:
Canon 2 -- A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
Page 61 of 86

xxx xxx xxx

Canon 12 -- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 17 -- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 -- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 19 -- A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Lastly, the Canons of Professional Ethics provide:
4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused
for any trivial reason and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf.
5. It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise, innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken
such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense
that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty
but by due process of law.
15. xxx xxx xxx
The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to
the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that
the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law.
The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and
not that of his client.
The above-cited norms are more than adequate to guide a counsels conduct in the
performance of his duty to assist a client in an effective manner as required by Article III,
Section 14 (2). Said constitutional provision is patterned after the Sixth Amendment of the
American Constitution. As in Article III, Section 14 (2), the Sixth Amendment refers simply to
counsel, not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the
legal professions maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the laws presumption that
counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. The
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms

29. People vs. Larranaga

Page 62 of 86

FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come
home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a
cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled
down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was
a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson
Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the
sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in
the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to
ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James Anthony and James
Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed
where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car.
Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal
where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They
traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later,
they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the
ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and
became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found
the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The
appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there
was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes
were committed.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.
HELD: 1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such
point to a joint design and community of interest. The appellants actions showed that they
had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial
courts finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes
charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from complex crime to special
complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing
acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is
the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the
imposable penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James
Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death,
the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the
penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death.
One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating
Page 63 of 86

and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With
regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be
imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing two (2) reclusiones perpetua.
30. People vs. Simben
Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of
violating paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit
cinematographic films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant
which is a place open to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered
a plea of guilty to the information without the aid of counsel.
The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was
called for trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and
asked if he desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was
agreeable to have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His
answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to him in the
local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he
knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as provided for by law would be
imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea
of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of
P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6
months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.lawphi1.net
What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected
and safeguarded. The Court complied with its duly when it informed the appellant that it
was his right to have the aid of counse. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took
pains to ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered.
Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel
and entered a plea of guilty to the information.
Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only
a fine would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon
the appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does
not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to
recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court
ignores the recommendation and metes out to the defendant a penalty which is provided by
law.
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.

31. DELGADO vs CA

Facts:
Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and
Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was charged with
estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda
Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States.
Page 64 of 86

All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on
the merits ensued. Herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by her
counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On December 13, 1973, the date set for the
continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and
previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground
allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal
objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous
postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's
objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence,
and considered the case submitted for decision.

The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to herein accused-
petitioner Emma R. Delgado and reversing the judgment as to Celia Capistrano.

On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the
newly discovered fact that petitioner came to know for the first time only on May 19,
1977 that Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed
that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be
defended by competent counsel.

Held: SC granted the petition and the assailed judgement was set aside.
The Court granted the petition. This is so because an accused person is entitled to be
represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger
that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a
denial of due process.

31. DELGADO vs CA
Page 65 of 86

Facts:

Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and
Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was charged with
estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda
Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States.

All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on
the merits ensued. Herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by her
counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On December 13, 1973, the date set for the
continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and
previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground
allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal
objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous
postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's
objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence,
and considered the case submitted for decision.

The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to herein accused-
petitioner Emma R. Delgado and reversing the judgment as to Celia Capistrano.

On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the
newly discovered fact that petitioner came to know for the first time only on May 19,
1977 that Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed
that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be
defended by competent counsel.

Held: SC granted the petition and the assailed judgement was set aside.

The Court granted the petition. This is so because an accused person is entitled to be
represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger
that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal
Page 66 of 86

perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a
denial of due process.

32. PEOPLE vs MALUNSING

Facts:

Manuel Villegas together with Malunsing et al were charged for murder. At the opening of the
trial, Manuel Villegas was appointed a counsel de oficio, Atty. Geronimo Pajarito. Villegas
however intimated to Geronimo and the trial court that he has his own lawyer. However, the
court proceeded without giving Villegas the opportunity to present his own lawyer. The court
then asked Atty. Pajarito if he wants to confer with his client but Pajarito replied I think I
know the case. Thereafter, trial began where the prosecution presented evidence against
Villegas. No evidence was presented in behalf of Villegas and he was not even called to the
witness stand to prove his innocence. The trial court did not even bother inquiring why the
appellant Manuel Villegas did not take the witness stand Consequently, Villegas was
convicted of the crime charged.

Now, Atty. Pablito Pielago [presumably Villegas true lawyer and supposed lawyer from
the onset?] questioned the conviction as he presented the above irregularities. He said that
Villegas is an unlettered man and he does not know the intricacies of court proceedings
hence Pajarito should have been vigilant in representing him in court. Pielago now wants the
reversal of the conviction.

Held:

There is a gross violation of Villegas constitutional rights. The Supreme Court noted
that it is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here, where the
accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted moreover
by the fact that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to
manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with
the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his
Page 67 of 86

exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly be
distinguished from pure travesty.

In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction but considering the gravity of the offense charged, it ordered a new trial.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

33. PEOPLE vs REGALA

Facts:

Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder
with assault upon an agent of a person in authority in an information filed on June 27, 1964
by the provincial fiscal of Masbate with the Court of First Instance of Masbate which reads:

That on or about the 13th day of June, 1964, at the Magallanes Gate in the poblacion
of the Municipality of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring together and helping each
other, with deliberate intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and
taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
Page 68 of 86

feloniously attack and stab with. a knife (cuchillo) one Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., a
member of the Philippine Constabulary while he was then in the performance of his
official duty, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds at the mid-
epigastric region penetrating abdominal cavity and perforating cordial and cardiac
regions which injury directly caused his instantaneous death.

The crime of assault was definitely demonstrated by the evidence of the People
because it showed that the victim (Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.) while maintaining peace and order
at the exit gate of the Plaza Magallanes where the crime took place, was in complete PC
uniform at the time the accused attacked him by reason of the latter's act of pushing the
accused and his co-accused so as to prevent them from entering the plaza through its exit
gate. In the aforesaid Rodil case, it was stated that "[L]ike a qualifying circumstance, such
knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the
absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the
attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered
only as aggravated by being 'in contempt or with insult to the public authorities' (par. 2, Art.
XIV, Revised Penal Code) or as an insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party
on account of his rank ..."

Held:

Appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent
of a person in authority because the information filed against appellant did not allege the
essential elements of assault that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the
assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority.

The fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution
without any objection on the part of the accused cannot likewise cure the aforestated
defect in the information so as to validly convict the accused thereof; because to do so
would be convicting the accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the
information in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Page 69 of 86

Furthermore, as in the Rodil case, the subject information cannot be cured or validated by
the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), because unlike in
the latter case, there are no allegations of facts from which it can be implied that the
accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a
person in authority.

Appellant can therefore be convicted only of the crime of homicide, aggravated by the
circumstance of "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (par. 2, Art. XIV,
Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party
on account of his rank ..."

SC convicted the appellant of the crime of Homicide aggravated by recidivism and by

contempt for or insult to a public authority or disregard of the respect due the offended
party on account of his rank, without any mitigating circumstances.

34. ENRILE vs SALAZAR

Facts:

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor
Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo
Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period
of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was
taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon
Page 70 of 86

City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

Held:

The Court rules that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an
offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple
rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information

against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under
such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH;
and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not
be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal
Code: simple rebellion.

Wherefore, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
Page 71 of 86

35. PEOPLE vs LEGAZPI

Facts:

This is an appeal from the consolidated Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124,
Kalookan City, in Criminal Case No. C-28760(87) for double murder and Criminal Case No. C-
28761(87) for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act), finding appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double homicide.

The information in Criminal Case No. 28760 (87), charging the accused with double murder,
reads as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of January, 1987 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously hogtie and stab the persons of RONALDO ABALES y LEONES
and ARIEL HELOMA y AYALA, thereby inflicting upon said victims serious physical
injuries which injuries caused their death (Rollo, p. 6).

The information in Criminal Case No. 28761 (87), charging the accused with violation of R.A.
No. 6539, reads as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of January, 1987, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aboved-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain
and without the knowledge and consent of one JOSE ABALES y DIRAIN, the owner
thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry and drive
away one (1) PUJ type jeepney bearing Plate No. PGY 381, belonging to said JOSE
ABALES y DIRAIN, to his damage and prejudice (Rollo, p. 7).

All the appellants claimed that the trial court erred in finding a conspiracy to
commit the complex crime of robbery with double homicide and in convicting them
merely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

Held:
Page 72 of 86

Appellants were charged with two separate informations, one for double murder (Criminal
Case No. C-28760 [87]) and the other for violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Criminal Case No. C-
28761 [87]). Their conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily
included in the allegations in the separate informations. What controls is the description
of the offense, as alleged in the information. While the trial court can hold a joint trial of
two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the
accused of a complex crime constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two
informations. Thus, the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellants are found guilty
of: (1) double murder and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and (2)
violation of R.A. No. 6539 and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment. They are directed to
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Ronaldo Abales and the heirs of Ariel Heloma the
amount of P50,000.00 each.

36. PEOPLE vs DE LA CRUZ

Facts:

On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant in the
RTC of Baguio City. The informations alleged:

Criminal Case No. 15163-R -

That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his
daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 11 years of age, against her will
and consent.

Criminal Case No. 15164-R -

Page 73 of 86

That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a
minor, then 16 years of age, against her will and consent.

On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against accused-appellant charging him
with violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information stated:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter
either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN
DELA CRUZ as a human being.

The RTC found the accused-appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R and
15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty of two (2) counts of rape
and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.

Held:

The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts
of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as
required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts. The information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the accused-appellants
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this Court
regarding the defects of the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court may motu
proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its ruling in Suy Sui vs. People,
Page 74 of 86

because the information is a patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of the basic principles of due
process. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review, and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as might be found in
the appealed decision, whether these errors are assigned or not.

37. PEOPLE vs ESPERANZA

Facts:

The information in Criminal Case No. 3680[3] alleges that Nelson committed the crime of
rape as follows:

That on June 16, 1997, at about 4:00 oclock in the morning, at Brgy. Balinad,
Municipality of Polangui, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, thru force and intimidation, and
with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with his niece, IRMA P. ESPERANZA, who is of tender age, she being only
13-years old, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

During the trial, the trial court gave full faith and credence to Irma's testimony. It declared
that Irma's inability to prevent the appellant from committing the crime by shouting or
forcibly resisting could not be taken against her. Nelson, being her uncle, definitely exercised
moral and physical ascendancy over her, which could be sufficient to cow her into submission
to his bestial desire. It disregarded Nelson's defense of denial and alibi not only for being
self-serving, but also for lack of proof of physical impossibility for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission. It then convicted Nelson of eight counts of rape and
imposed upon him the death penalty for each count, considering the relationship of Nelson
as uncle within the third civil degree of consanguinity and the fact that Irma was only 12
years old at the time the rapes were committed.

Held:
Page 75 of 86

In these cases, the allegation that Irma is Nelsons niece is not specific enough to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship. If the offender is merely a relation - not a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim
the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by
consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree. The informations
in these cases merely allege that Irma is the niece of Nelson. She could be a niece beyond
the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity. Hence, the informations are fatally
defective in this respect.

And even granting that the relationship within the third civil degree either of
consanguinity or affinity was duly proved during the trial, still such proof cannot be
appreciated against Nelson to justify the imposition of the death penalty because he
would thereby be denied of his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nelson cannot be charged with committing
the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified
form.

The Court also take note of the fact that while the informations allege that Irma was 13
years old at the time she was raped, her birth certificate reveals that she was only 11 years
old at the time, having been born on 29 November 1985. Thus, these cases could have been
cases of statutory rape. But, Nelson cannot be convicted of statutory rapes.

In People vs Capinpin, the SC ruled that an accused cannot be convicted under paragraphs 2
or 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in an information charging him with rape under
paragraph 1 (by using force or intimidation) because none of these modes of committing rape
(i.e., when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the woman is
under twelve years of age) were alleged in the information. The rationale for this rule is that
[t]o convict him under either of these statutory provisions is to deprive him of the
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 14 (2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accusedshall enjoy the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

However, conformably with People v. Bayya[52] and People v. Escao,[53] SC may

appreciate as an aggravating circumstance the victims minority, which was pleaded in the
informations and proved by her birth certificate. In those cases, we held that when either
Page 76 of 86

one of the twin special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or
lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence, like the
complainants minority in these cases, may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Nonetheless, the presence of an aggravating circumstance cannot serve to raise the penalty
to be imposed on Nelson. Since simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua, that penalty shall, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, be imposed regardless of any modifying circumstance that might have
attended the commission of the crime.

For the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
Nelson may be sentenced to suffer prision correccional in its medium period, there being no
modifying circumstance that attended the commission thereof. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he may be meted an indeterminate penalty of three months of arresto mayor
as minimum to three years of prision correccional as maximum.

The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC as follows:

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3680 and 3682-3687, appellant NELSON ESPERANZA is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. He is also ordered in each case to pay the
victim Irma P. Esperanza P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and
P25,000 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 3681, the appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years of
prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the victim the amount of P30,000 as
moral damages.
Page 77 of 86

38. PEOPLE vs PURAZO

Facts:

Solomon Purazo was found guilty by the trial court of rape perpetrated against his own
twelve (12)-year old daughter ROWENA. He was sentenced to death and ordered to
indemnify his victim P100,000.00 for moral damages.

The information alleged that the rape happened sometime in the month of March
1997. For his part, Solomon Purazo professed innocence, gave an alibi, and said that only a
fool would ravish his own kin.] He claimed that the rape tales were concocted by his
rebellious daughter to get back at him after he had been imposing corporal punishment on
her for staying out late at night, and at times, for not going home at all for several days - at
her very young age of eleven (11). At one time Rowena apparently disappeared from 12 to 20
March 1997 only to be found out later that she was in the company of a man in his early 20s,
presumably her boyfriend. Rowena would also occasionally leave and return home very late,
without asking permission. The accused also testified that he could not have raped his
daughter because he was always at work, from four oclock in the morning until ten oclock in
the evening, seven (7) days a week.

The accused now seeking his exoneration laments his conviction and draws our
attention to the criminal complaint filed arguing that (it) charged no specific instance when
the offense was committed.

Held:

It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which
the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the
act may be alleged to have been committed at anytime as near to the actual date at which
the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.

In explaining the provision, we said that the time averred in the complaint or
information would only need, unless the precise time of commission of the offense is an
essential element thereof, to meet two (2) criteria: (a) it is as near to the actual date of
commission of the offense as the complaint or information of the prosecuting officer will
Page 78 of 86

permit; and, (b) the time ultimately proved should be as so alleged in the complaint or
information.

SC have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the crime
of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time
or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we
already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the
crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place
alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior
to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of
limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, in prosecutions for rape,SC have sustained complaints and informations which
merely alleged: sometime before and until October 15, 1994, for a rape committed in 1993;
on or about May 1998, for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998; on or
about May 1994, for a rape committed on 11 May 1994; sometime in 1992 and subsequent
thereto in 1994, for two counts of rape committed in August and September 1994; sometime
in the month of April 1993, for a rape committed sometime in 1993;sometime in the month
of September 1998, for a rape committed one night in September 1998; sometime (in)
January 1992, and many times thereafter, for a rape committed during the first week of
January 1992; and on or about the year 1990, for a rape committed in 1990.

SC find no reason to deviate from these precedents. Accordingly, SC hold that the
allegation in the instant complaint, i.e., sometime in the month of March 1997, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, is sufficient to uphold the conviction of the accused for a rape
he had committed one Sunday of April 1997. Simply, that one Sunday of April 1997 is not so
remote from sometime in the month of March 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto,
as to surprise and prejudice the accused.

39. GARCIA vs PEOPLE

Page 79 of 86

Facts:

Petitioner Yolanda Garcia was charged with estafa in an information which reads:

That on or about and during the period comprised between June 20, 1995, and August
15, 1995, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which she made to said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to the
effect that accused has three (3) checks which according to her have sufficient funds
and if encashed, the same will not be dishonored; and by means of other deceits of
similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to
accept the following checks:

Name of Bank Check No. Amount Date Payable to

Phil Natl Bank 046884 P28,000.00 6-20-95 Cash

-do- 047416 34,000.00 8-15-95 -do-

Pilipinas Bank 60042087 25,000.00 7-25-95 Garcia

Vegetable Dealer

as payments of assorted vegetables which accused purchased and received from said
DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the total amount of P87,000.00, said accused knowing fully
well that the said manifestations and representations were all false and untrue as said
checks when presented to the bank for payment were all dishonored for the reason
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining,
as in fact she did obtain assorted vegetables in the amount of P87,000.00; which once
in her possession and with intent to defraud, she willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said assorted vegetables or the value
thereof to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount of P87,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Page 80 of 86

On December 29, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, Sec. 2(2) (sic) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.

Petitioner basically claims that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her was violated because, although she was charged with
estafa under Article 315, Section 2[a], as amended, which penalizes false manifestations or
fraudulent representations in defraudation of another, she was instead convicted of estafa
under Article 315, Section 2[d] which penalizes the issuance of postdated checks that were
not funded or were insufficiently funded.

Held:

Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts and omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8
thereof provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime
charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that
every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined
by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.

A careful reading of the Information clearly shows that petitioner was charged with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that
petitioner by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations x x x to the
effect that accused has three checks which according to her have sufficient funds and if
encashed the same will not be dishonored; x x x induced x x x Dolores S. Apolonio to accept
the following checks x x x as payment of assorted vegetables x x x in the total amount of
P87,000.00.

There is no basis on the conclusion og the petitioner. Whether petitioner was charged
under either paragraph 2(a) or 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, she would
Page 81 of 86

still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements of the
offense, have been established with satisfactory proof. The fraudulent act was
committed prior to or simultaneous with the issuance of the bad check. The guarantee
and the simultaneous delivery of the checks by petitioner were the enticement and the
efficient cause of the defraudation committed against Apolonio who suffered damage
amounting to P87,000.00 as a result of the fraud committed by petitioner in paying him
underfunded checks drawn by three different persons.

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including
all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidences justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious
means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated. Deceit is a specie of fraud.

40. PEOPLE vs ORTEGA

Facts:

This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia from the Decision, dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio,
finding them guilty of murder.

Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an Information dated

October 19, 1992, as follows:

That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior strenght (sic) and
Page 82 of 86

with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the
different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.

Held:

The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of attack[ing], assault[ing],
and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one
ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA The prosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had
nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His
responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting
drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint
or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right.

If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he
violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not
have been possible under the criminal complaint as worded. This described the offense as
having been committed by Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a scythe, by means of
violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibaez, 15 years of age, against her will. No
mention was made of the second circumstance.

Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while
she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason -- and not through force and
intimidation, which was the method alleged -- would have violated his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[Article IV, Sec. 19,
Constitution of 1973; now Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the
Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge
against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense
against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was, of
course, available to the herein accused-appellant.
Page 83 of 86

The SC ruled as follows:

Premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is
found GUILTY of homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as indemnity and P31,790.00 as actual damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is
ACQUITTED. His immediate release from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for
some other valid cause.

41. ALMEDA vs VILLALUZ

Facts:

The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five
others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre Villauz. The
amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and
this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in
cash.

At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post
a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was
an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed
habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda.

At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral
motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include
allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The
latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was premature since no
copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend should
have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the proposed
Page 84 of 86

amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had already pleaded not
guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless granted the respondent fiscal's motion
in open court.

Held:

Right to be Informed

The amendment of the information to include allegations of habitual delinquency and

recidivism, after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is valid and in no way violates his
right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against him.

Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow
amendments to the information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and
during the trial when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
What are prohibited at this stage of the proceedings are amendments in substance. And
the substantial matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters
are merely of form.

The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect
of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a
motor vehicle) contained in the information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect in
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case. The said new
allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event
of conviction. They do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case nor possibly prejudice
the form of defense the accused has or will assume. Consequently, in authorizing the
amendments, the respondent judge acted with due consideration of the petitioner's rights
and did not abuse his discretion.

Double Jeopardy

Anent the petitioner's claim that the amendment of the information by the State places him
in double jeopardy, it should be remembered that there is double jeopardy only when all the
following requisites obtain in the original prosecution; (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant
Page 85 of 86

was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent.

It is clear that the petitioner Almeda has not yet been convicted nor acquitted of the charge
of qualified theft of a motor vehicle contained in the original information. Neither has the
case against him been dismissed or otherwise terminated. The mere amendment of the
information to include allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism does not have
the effect of a dismissal of the criminal action for qualified theft alleged in the original
information.
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