Tan Tiah Vs Yu

On May 14, 1923 petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of lease in the fifth clause of which
provides: "5th. That upon termination of the period of this contract, namely, ten years, the lessor shall
have the option to buy the building or improvement which the lessee may have built upon the lots,
reimbursing the latter ninety per cent (90%) of the original net cost of the construction; but should the
lessor be unable or unwilling to buy said building or improvement, the income or rent derived therefrom
shall be equally divided between said lessor and lessee, and the latter shall no longer have the obligation
to pay the rent agreed upon for the lots in the second paragraph of this contract; provided, however, that
the present contract, with the modification just mentioned, with respect to the income from the building
and the rent from the lot, shall continue in force until the lessor buys the building or improvement or the
lessee buys the land."

whether plaintiff, as lessee, has a right to compel defendant, as lessor, to sell to him the land on which he
built his house in accordance with said contract.

According to article 1451, "a promise to sell or buy, when there is an agreement as to the thing and the
price, entitles the contracting parties reciprocally to demand the fulfillment of the contract." And article
1447 of the same Code provides that in order that the price may be considered certain, it, shall be
sufficient that it be 90 in relation to some certain thing, or that its determination be left to the judgment of
some particular person, and should the latter be unable or unwilling to fix the price, the contract shall be
inoperative. And according to article 1449 of the same Code, the designation of the price can never be
left to the determination of one of the contracting parties.

The price of the leased land not having been fixed and the lessor not having bound himself to sell it, the
essential elements which give life to the contract are lacking. It follows that the lessee cannot compel the
lessor to sell the leased land to him.

Ong v. Ong

on February 25, 1976 Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of One (P1.00) Peso and other valuable
considerations, executed in favor of respondent Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim Deed
whereby she transferred, released, assigned and forever quitclaimed to Sandra Maruzzo, her heirs and
assigns, all her rights, title, interest and participation in the ONE-HALF (1/2) undivided portion of the
parcel of land.

On November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and donated the property to her son Rex. On June
20, 1983, Sandra, through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an action to recover the land and to
declare the donation to Rex null and void. In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that the
quitclaim is equivalent to a donation which requires acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra was a
minor, there was no valid acceptance. The trial court ruled that the quitclaim is equivalent to a sale.

WON the insufficiency of price amounts to lack of consideration

The major premise is based upon the fact that the consideration stated in the deeds of sale is P1.00. It is
not unusual, however, in deeds of conveyance adhering to the Anglo-Saxon practice of stating that the
consideration given is the sum of P1.00, although the actual consideration may have been much more.
Moreover, assuming that said consideration of P1.00 is suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not
necessarily justify the inference that purchasers were not in good faith and for value. Neither does this
inference warrant the conclusion that the sales were null and void ab initio.

Indeed, bad faith and inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render a conveyance inexistent,
for the assignor's liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract (Article 1350, Civil Code), whereas
fraud or bad faith may render either rescissible or voidable, although valid until annulled, a contract
concerning an object certain entered into with a cause and with the consent of the contracting parties, as
in the case at bar."

Donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if said
donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not
important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything
nor assumes any obligation.
Aguilar vs Rubiato

Juan Rubiato is the owner of various parcels of land and was desirous of obtaining a loan. He was easily
induced to sign a power of attorney provided that Manuel Gonzales Villa shall have the authority to obtain
a loan not exceeding P1,000 to be secured by the lands in question.On April 29,1915, Manuel Gonzales
Villa formulated the document by which the land were purportedly sold to Hilaria Aguilar for the sum of
P800 with a right to re-purchase and Rubiato was to remain in possession of the land as lessee. Upon
the expiration of the pacto de retro, Aguilar failing to receive any part of the lease rents filed a case
against Rubiato and Villa praying for the consolidation of the parcels of land in her name. The TC ruled
that the POA onlyauthorized Villa to obtain a loan subject to a mortgae, hence Rubiato shall only be liable
toAguilar in the sum of P800 which is the principal loan plus interest.

R, the owner of land valued at P26,000, was induced through the connivance of two or three other men to
sign the second page of a power of attorney in favor of one of them, G, which purported to authorize G to
sell the property with right of repurchase for a sum not to exceed P1,000. G sold the property to A for
P800 under a pacto de retro. R having failed to pay the rent, A endeavors to obtain possession of the
land.

WON Rubiato is only responsible to the plaintiff for a loan.

That the so-called power of attorney was a sham document, and that R is only liable for the loan which he
received. Where the inadequacy of the price in an agreement is so great that the mind revolts at it and is
such as a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly be likely to consent to, a strong reason
exists for annuling a contract. It is an agreement which a reasonable man would neither directly nor
indirectly be likely to enter into or to consent to.

National Bank vs. Gonzales (45 Phil., 693), the property worth P45,950 was sold for P15,000;

We have it as an established doctrine that inadequacy of the price alone, unless shocking to the
conscience of the court, will not be sufficient to set aside the sale. if there is no showing, as in the instant
case, that in the event of a resale a better price can be obtained, or that there was fraud, collusion,
mistake, surprise, unfairness or irregularity in the conduct of said sale.

de leon vs salvador

There was an execution of two parcels of land registered in the name of Bernabe. The city sheriff sold the
said properties to herein petitioner, Aurora (sister of the judgment creditor) as the highest bidder; the
property then being subject to an existing mortgage lien. The sheriff executed the corresponding
certificate of sale in her favor.

on February 7, 1968 two weeks before the expiration of the redemption period B sought to set aside the
execution sale and to have a new auction sale ordered, on the grounds that the sheriff had allegedly sold
the two parcels of land jointly instead of separately, and that the total sales price of P30,194.00 was
shocking to the conscience, alleging that the two parcels, if sold separately, could easily be sold at
P235,000.00 and P150,000.00.

WON there is a need for a new auction sale because of inadequacy of price.
However, while in ordinary sales for reasons of equity a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of
inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one's conscience as to justify the courts to
interfere, such does not follow when the law gives to the owner the right to redeem, as when a sale is
made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the owner to effect the
redemption. And so it was aptly said: 'When there is the right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not
be material, because the judgment debtor may reacquire the property or also sell his right to redeem and
thus recover the loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the auction sale.' "

Heirs of Ureta vs Heirs of Ureta

Alfonso begot 14 children. The children of Policronio (Team P) are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos
children and their descendants (Team A). Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in
order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his
lands to his children. Alfonso executed 4 Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale was
executed in favor of Policronio covering six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this
case.

Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given. Alfonso
continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. Policronio died on Nov 22, 1974.
Except for the said portion of parcel 5, noone took possession of the subject lands.

Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of EJP, which included all the lands that were covered by the 4 deeds of
sale. Conrado, Policronios eldest son, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his
co-heirs.

After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six
parcels of land. They obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father as such, excluded from the Partition,
they sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso.

Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed an action against against the Heirs of Alfonso.

#1: won the Deed of Sale is valid

The Deed of Sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated. 2 veritable legal presumptions bear on
the validity of the Deed of Sale:

o (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and

o (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction.

If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transactions validity, except that it must yield
to the evidence adduced. The Deed of Sale was not a fair and regular private transaction because it was
absolutely simulated. It was made only for tax purposes. Even Policronio did not disclose the sale to his
heirs.

Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and
enforceable contract.

Deed of Sale: ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED based on the testimony of Amparo Castillo.

Art 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to contracts with an
illegal cause or subject-matter. This Art presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious
or simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent.

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former

takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the

parties conceal their true agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not
prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

Romero vs ca

Facts:

Virgilio Romero decided to put up a central warehouse inMetro Manila. He visited a lot suitable for a
central warehouse except for the presence of squatters in the area. Flores called on petitioner with a
proposal that should he advance the amount of P50,000.00 which could be used in taking up an
ejectmentcase against the squatters and he agreed. Later, a "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed.
An ejectment suit was then filed by the private respondent against the squatters. Although successful,
private respondent sought the return of the downpayment she received because she could not get rid of
the squatters.

Issue:

WON there was a perfected contract of sale?

Held:

It would be futile to challenge the agreement here in question as not being a duly perfected contract. A
sale is at once perfected when a person (the seller) obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to
transfer ownership of a specified thing or right to another (the buyer) over which the latter agrees. From
the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping
with good faith, usage and law. Under the agreement, private respondent is obligated to evict the
squatters on the property. Private respondent's failure "to remove the squatters from the property" within
the stipulated period gives petitioner the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that
condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code. This option clearly belongs to petitioner and
not to private respondent.

If the condition is imposed on an obligation of a party which is not complied with, the other party may
either refuse to proceed or waive said condition. Where, of course, the condition is imposed upon the
perfection of the contract itself, the failure of such condition would prevent the juridical relation itself from
coming into existence. In contracts of sale particularly, Article 1545 of the Civil Code allows the obligee to
choose between proceeding with the agreement or waiving the performance of the condition. Here,
evidently, petitioner has waived the performance of the condition imposed on private respondent to free
the property from squatters.

Guiang vs CA
FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence
of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely
voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.

Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment (with the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot
on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back to
the subject property. Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable
settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, respondent filed
an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the
declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and
her husband, null and void.

ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is void

HELD:
Yes. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Respondents consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent.
To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.

Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events
is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed before the
MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell
the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

Facts:

Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking
employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of
their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return to
Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a
complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between the parties. Feeling that
she had the shorer end of the bargain, respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband
and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved
the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.
Issue:

Whether the sale was void or merely voidable and was ratified by the amicable settlement

Held:

Respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent.
To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events
is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the
MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell
the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

CHING vs. GOYANKO, JR. GR No. 165879November 10, 2006

FACTS:

The respondents are the seven children out of the legal union of JosephGoyanko, Sr. and Epifania
dela Cruz.

Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a real property inCebu which was first
registered in the name of their aunt as their parents wasstill Chinese citizens this time.

In May, 1993, their aunt executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subjectproperty in favor of their
father. In turn, on October 1993, respondents fatherexecuted a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
petitioner, Maria Ching, hiscommon-law wife.

After Goyanko Sr.s death, the respondents discovered that the property hadbeen transferred to the
name of the petitioner.

Thus, the respondents filed a Complaint for the recovery of the property anddamages against
petitioner and they prayed for the nullification of the deedof sale and the issuance of a new one in
favor of their father.ISSUES:

Whether or not the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Spouses Joseph Goyanko
and Epifania dela Cruz.

Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein petitioner wasvoid and
inexistent.HELD:1)YES. The subject property was part of the conjugal property of theSpouses. As it
was acquired during the existence of a valid marriagebetween Joseph Sr. and Epifania. Moreover,
there was no decree of dissolution of marriage, nor of their conjugal partnership.2)YES.

Supreme Court held that the contract of sale was null and void forbeing contrary to morals and public
policy. The sale was made by ahusband in favor of his concubine.

According to Article 1409: Contracts whose cause, object orpurpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order orpublic policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.

Article 1352, NCC, also provides that: Contracts without cause orwith unlawful cause produce no
effect whatsoever. The cause isunlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public orderor
pubic policy.
o
Moreover, the sale of the property in favor of herein petitioner also fellunder the prohibition of sale
of property between the spouses providedfor by Art. 1490, NCC. This provision also applies to
common lawrelationship.
o
To rule otherwise would mean that the condition of those whoincurred guilt would be better than
those in legal union

This is so because if transfers and conveyances areallowed between spouses during marriage would
destroythe system of conjugal partnership.

This is also designed to prevent the exercise of undueinfluence of one spouse over the other and to
protect theinstitution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of familylaw.
o
Therefore, sale of the property made by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. infavor of his common-law wife is null
and void.

In line with the policy of the State, the law emphatically prohibits the sale of properties between spouses.

Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of
property and damages against Maria Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of
transfer certificate and the issuance of a new one. Goyanko et al. aver that they are the real owners of the
property involved. They further contend that it was after their fathers death that they found out that a contract of sale
involving the same property has been executed by their father and common-law wife Ching. However, Ching claimed
that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed the
complaint against Ching, declaring that there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and
void, fictitious and simulated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declarednull and void the questioned deed
of sale and TCT No. 138405.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No. 138405, in favor of the Maria Ching, was null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy

HELD:

The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid marriagebetween Joseph Sr. and Epifania
dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to theconjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the court find no evidence on record to
conclude otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and
that he and defendant-appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband and wife,
there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of hismarriage to Epifania nor
their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that the property located at Cebu City belongs to
the conjugal partnership. Assuming that the subject property was not conjugal, still the court cannot sustain the
validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming
evidence on records that they have been living together as common-law husband and wife.

The court therefore finds the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant Maria Ching null and void for being
contrary to morals and public policy. The purported sale, having been made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine,
undermines the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy vigilantly protects.