2. SORIAO V.

PINEDA CA- GR SP NO 31546 aug 10 1994 JOBEN

This is all I have so far with the digest. Gonna try to get the actual case tomorrow through
dads office

Facts:
Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y. 1993
to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school authority during the past years, he
was refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of high school through a
verbal notice not to readmit.

Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter and
thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored
the students plea to reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their
prerogative. Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the
CA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.

Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara
Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he was meted out a
disciplinary action without due process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II,
Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide:

Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible
to all.

Section 2: The State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high
school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary
education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,
subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public
and private schools, especially to the under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as self-
study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.

Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement
in public and civic affairs.

Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.
Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he may only
deprived of such right with due process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.

3. OPOSA V. FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 1993 - ALEX

Facts: The principal plaintiffs are minors duly represented and joined by their parents. They
are joined by Philippine Ecological Network Inc. Plaintiffs are instituting this taxpayers class
suit representing their generation as well as generations yet unborn for the sake of the
Virgin tropical rainforests. They hope to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and cease and desist from approving the same in the future. They aver that in order
to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country must maintain a ration of 54% of
forest cover. Without it, the resulting environmental tragedies will include water shortage,
salinization of water table, massive erosion, global warming, drought spellsetc. Plaintiffs
make these claims on their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and on
the premise that the timber license agreements (TLA) are contrary to public policy, violative
of their rights to self-preservation, and to conserve and promote the nations cultural
heritage and resources.

Issues: Is the complaint presented judicially actionable or does it raise political questions?

Held: It is actionable. The Court finds enough cause of action to show a violation of the
claimed rights. They may thus be granted the reliefs prayed for. What is involved here is the
enforcement of a right vis--vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. It is the DENRs duty to protect and advance said right. What is considered
here is the rhythm and harmony of nature, indispensably including the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present and future generations. Even the non-impairment clause for the effectivity of TLAs
must yield to the police power of the state.

Stonehill vs Diokno 20 SCRA 383

Facts:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against

petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were
officers, to search books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing
all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers), as the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense, which is described in the
applications adverted to above as violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code.

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void
as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged

authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant

against the corporation.

Held: No.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein

have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure ispurely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
J. Malcolm

Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges
against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his
office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found
him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary
justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court
denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of
the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in
this case arose.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform
made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy. It also said the guaranties of a free speech and a free
press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital
public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on
the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any
alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the
result of this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer.
Public policy is the unfettered administration of justice.
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof
of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public officials conduct having
a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may
cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-
seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to
the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence
of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one
of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the
peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable.
But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious
accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the
proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they
were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for
them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but
which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their
seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at
the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were
shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court
granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on
the stipulated date.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held:

The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating
vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to
change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a
sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the
constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such
a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery.

The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty
of abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men."

Human Rights Make Man Human - Diokno

For Senator Jose W. Diokno, no cause is more worthy than the cause of human rights.
Human rights are more than legal concepts; they are the essence of man. They are
what make man human. That is why they are called human rights: deny them and you
deny mans humanity.
In a lecture delivered at a Convocation on Human Rights in 1981, Diokno further
noted that almost everywhere human rights are extolled. Yet almost everywhere they
are violated, and nowhere with less shame than in our country. He described in
concrete existential terms the increasing violations of human rights in the Philippines.
He invited the people to join the fight for their human rights against a cruel and
oppressive government. He admitted that what he was asking was dangerous, but if
we do not struggle with all that we have and do all that we can to vindicate our rights,
we not only condemn our rights to death; we also condemn our hope and our dreams,
our present, and our childrens future.
Jose W. Diokno was a man of many causes. Among his passions were human rights
which he defended at great risk, at a time when championing them was considered
subversive by a militarized state. Thus, Diokno engaged in this struggle on many
fronts: in the defense of political prisoners, in the investigation and analysis of
violations which took him all over the country and overseas, in his speeches, in
deliberations and meetings of cause-oriented groups and in his mission of educating
our people.
His decision to organize the Free Legal Assistance Group (Flag) resulted directly from
his incarceration when martial law was declared. He was a senator, yet he was
imprisoned without charges for almost two years. If a senator of the land could be
stripped of his rights so summarily, then ordinary political prisoners would be more
helpless and powerless to obtain justice. He founded Flag to defend and protect the
oppressed, the weak, the poor, the deprived. To the very end, Diokno never gave up.
His courage inspired other lawyers and professionals to join him. He had launched a
movement which gave hope to the desperate and informed his countrymen and the
world that there was a promise of freedom and justice, however difficult and painful
the struggle.
Dioknos speeches and writings were carefully selected and compiled into a book
entitled A Nation for Our Children published in 1987. This invaluable collection of
Dioknos speeches and articles serve as a monument to his vigilant pursuit and
commitment to securing and protecting the quality of life of the Filipino human
person in a just and humane society. It is essential that his perceptions, insights and
ideas be left behind in his footprints as living sources of inspiration for us and the
future generations who will be judging the present and the future in the context of the
experiences of the past.
His presentations addressed to his three major concerns; respect for human rights,
nationalism and Philippine sovereignty reflect a contagious passion shared objectively
through the use of substantive facts from the causes of our past and present political
and economic circumstances. His presentations are quite impassioned, but he
continuously advocates active nonviolence and appeals to a people with a
conscience, people with a heart and a people with the guts to stand up and defend their
rights. Even as he rejects violence, he insists that only social change, the elimination
of gross inequalities and unjust structures, can save us.
When Diokno died on Feb. 27, 1987, many people feared that the heroic work he had
done for the country would not be completed and still many others regretted that the
service he had rendered to his people would cease abruptly. His unfinished essay
This Land is Ours so movingly forceful in its plea to help enrich and ennoble this
land for our children and childrens children has yet to be finished by those of us left
behind.
Thirty-five years after Dioknos stint, we are faced with more challenges regarding
violation of human rights: abuses on several fronts, exploitation, extrajudicial killings,
violence against women and children. How ironic that the person responsible for all
the atrocities that Diokno and many others fought for would be buried in the Libingan
nga mga Bayani. Protests have been launched against the extrajudicial killings, and
foreign protestors are called meddlers while the local protestors are labeled
temperamental brats. What is appalling is that the violators are supported and
fiercely defended and human rights activists are even threatened to be killed. More
mind-boggling is that many known human rights advocates and activists are
conspicuously absent and silent in the ongoing protests against human rights
violations. Has change really come?

The Kartilya of the Katipunan

1. A life that is not consecrated to a large and holy greatness is a tree without shade, if not a
poisonous weed.
2. Good work that comes from selfish desires and not from a true desire for excellence is
not kindness.
3. Real piety is hard work and love for fellowmen, and measuring each action, labor and
speech by true Reason.
4. Whether ones skin be black or white, all people are equal; it may be that each is superior
in knowledge, wealth, beauty but there is no superiority in human dignity.
5. One who has a high inner spirit, puts honor, goodness and virtue before self-interest; one
who has a lowly inner spirit puts self interest before honor, goodness and virtue.
6. To the person with shame, his or her word is sacred.
7. Do not waste time: wealth can be lost and recovered; but time that already passes will not
pass again.
8. Defend the oppressed and fight the oppressor.
9. The intelligent person is one who is careful in all that he or she says; and learns to keep
secret that which should deb kept in confidence.
10. On the thorny path of life, man is the guide of woman and of children; if the guide leaded
to evil, the destiny of those being led is also evil.
11. Thou must not look upon woman as a mere plaything, but as a partner and sympathetic
companion in the hardships of this life; in your strength, consider her weakness, and
remember the mother who birthed thee and reared thee.
12. What thou dost not desire done unto thy wife, children, and siblings, do not do unto the
wife, children, and siblings of others.
13. The value of a person is not in being sovereign, not in an aquiline nose or in a white face,
it is not in the priestly SUBSTITUTE FOR GOD, nor is it in the high station one has in life.
Pure and truly highly esteemed, beloved and noble is the person even if he or she was raised
in the forest and speaks nothing but his or her own language; who has beautiful behavior, and
only one sentence (which is) honor and virtue; who does not oppress others or allow ones
 self to be oppressed; who knows how to be sensitive and knows how to cherish the land of his
birth.

THE TRUE DECALOGUE

by Apolinario Mabini

First. Thou shalt love God and thy honor above all things: God as the fountain of all
truth, of all justice and of all activity; and thy honor, the only power which will oblige thee
to be faithful, just and industrious.

Second. Thou shalt worship God in the form which thy conscience may deem most
righteous and worthy: for in thy conscience, which condemns thy evil deeds and praises
thy good ones, speaks thy God.

Third. Thou shalt cultivate the special gifts which God has granted thee, working and
studying according to thy ability, never leaving the path of righteousness and justice, in
order to attain thy own perfection, by means whereof thou shalt contribute to the
progress of humanity; thus; thou shalt fulfill the mission to which God has appointed
thee in this life and by so doing, thou shalt be honored, and being honored, thou shalt
glorify thy God.

Fourth. Thou shalt love thy country after God and thy honor and more than thyself: for
she is the only Paradise which God has given thee in this life, the only patrimony of thy
race, the only inheritance of thy ancestors and the only hope of thy posterity; because of
her, thou hast life, love and interests, happiness, honor and God.

Fifth. Thou shalt strive for the happiness of thy country before thy own, making of her
the kingdom of reason, of justice and of labor: for if she be happy, thou, together with
thy family, shalt likewise be happy.

Sixth. Thou shalt strive for the independence of thy country: for only thou canst have
any real interest in her advancement and exaltation, because her independence
constitutes thy own liberty; her advancement, thy perfection; and her exaltation, thy own
glory and immortality.

Seventh. Thou shalt not recognize in thy country the authority of any person who has
not been elected by thee and thy countrymen; for authority emanates from God, and as
God speaks in the conscience of every man, the person designated and proclaimed by
the conscience of a whole people is the only one who can use true authority.

Eighth. Thou shalt strive for a Republic and never for a monarchy in thy country: for the
latter exalts one or several families and founds a dynasty; the former makes a people
noble and worthy through reason, great through liberty, and prosperous and brilliant
through labor.

Ninth. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself: for God has imposed upon him, as well
as upon thee, the obligation to help thee and not to do unto thee what he would not
have thee do unto him; but if thy neighbor, failing in this sacred duty, attempt against thy
life, thy liberty and thy interests, then thou shalt destroy and annihilate him for the
supreme law of self-preservation prevails.

Tenth. Thou shalt consider thy countryman more than thy neighbor; thou shalt see him
thy friend, thy brother or at least thy comrade, with whom thou art bound by one fate, by
the same joys and sorrows and by common aspirations and interests.

Therefore, as long as national frontiers subsist, raised and maintained by the

selfishness of race and of family, with thy countryman alone shalt thou unite in a perfect
solidarity of purpose and interest, in order to have force, not only to resist the common
enemy but also to attain all the aims of human life.

Federalist 51 On Separation of Powers

The only way of assuring the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers
was to contrive such an inner structure of government that the departments might, "by
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."

Each department should have a will of its own, and its members should have no
"agency" in appointing members of the others. Those administering each department
should have the constitutional means and "personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others." Publius continued:

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition . . . It may be a reflection on human

nature, that such devices should be necessary to controul the abuses of government.
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. . . . In framing a government . . . to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the
government to controul the governed; and, in the next place, oblige it to controul itself.

The proposed Constitution did just that by so dividing and arranging the several
offices that "each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every
individual, may be a sentinel over the public rights."
VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, THE
SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA
KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
[1]

Appeals dated January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed
the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners,
and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court from implementing an
alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution of the Court of Appeals
[2]

dated December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by
TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266, in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of
land was adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates,
namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro
under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29, 1964,
Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered
both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided
them into smaller lots.

Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including
herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a
portion of Lot 707-A-2, Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-
42965. The parcel is now #33 Doa Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora,
Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the name of the heirs of
Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.

Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as

Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against
Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot
689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development
Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an
assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial
continued for three decades.

On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and
Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered
them:

(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the
amount of P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;

(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally
constructed by defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;

(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own
expense;

(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
with interest computed from the date of filing of the complaint;

(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly,
Annexes A and B thereof, at the expense of the defendants. [3]

As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed

petitioners, through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they
constructed on the land they were occupying.

On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30,

1998, from the trial court stating as follows:

Before the Court for resolution is the Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of
Demolition, filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order
directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures
on the plaintiffs property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The
defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.

Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and
executory, the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an
alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the
service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject
property, they failed to comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated
February 9, 1998, issued by the Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there
is now a need to demolish the structures in order to implement the said decision.

WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all
constructions, including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on
plaintiffs property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this
Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.

SO ORDERED. [4]

To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City from issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from
implementing the alias writ of execution, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. Petitioners alleged that they bought
[5]

the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties
in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ
of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them
because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process
of law.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held
that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were
considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale
and could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case No. Q-12918.
Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed. [6]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition,

where petitioners aver that:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTIES
THERETO.
II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING

PETITIONERS TITLE DESPITE THEIR BEING BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND
INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR VALUE.
 III.

PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING

THAT THEY STAND TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF
ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE
COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE DEMOLITION OF ALL
THE STRUCTURES ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY IN
COURT. [7]

For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of
execution may be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners
were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.

On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot
be enforced against them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it
relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz in holding that
[8]

petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can

be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918 even though
they were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is
not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different
from the circumstances in the present case.

In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration

Act No. 496 in 1916 and Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was issued in the
name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas
and Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without the PRCs
consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua.Mangahas and
Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the sale and to
compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot
and surrender possession thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final
and executory. When Magbanua had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a
deed of absolute sale in her favor and a new title was consequently issued in
her name. Magbanua then sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case
No. C-120.This was opposed by petitioner Medina who alleged that she
owned the houses and lot subject of the dispute. She said that she bought the
houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while she
purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban. The latter held the land by virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El
Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In opposing the execution, Medina
argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that
she was not a party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be
considered as a person claiming under Ramos and Mangahas.

When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case
No. C-120, which had long become final and executory, could be enforced
against petitioner even though she was not a party thereto. We found that the
houses on the subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who
sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them to Medina. Under the
circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas
and Ramos, and thus Medina could be reached by the order of execution and
writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute, we
sustained Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens
title. We declared that a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that
a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible
against any informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior to the
issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing
with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on its face.

Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the
petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the
dispute after the original action was commenced and became final and
executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the
commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the
disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was
based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion
Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized
Torrens title.Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their
own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of
the land.

We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a
parcel of land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person
dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title;
he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the
[9]

petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the
legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in
the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.

Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith
and for value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. The determination of whether one is a buyer in good
[10]

faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals
failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. The instant case is covered by this
[11]

exception to the general rule. As found by the Court of Appeals and not
refuted by private respondent, petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964
from Mariano Lising. Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in
[12]

1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land
took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words,
the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the
lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title
which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence,
considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners
acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.

The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good
faith? We note that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this
issue. As a general rule, this could not be done. Fair play, justice, and due
process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues
that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, we deem it proper
[13]

that this issue be resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay
in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are
indeed builders in good faith.

A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier
[14]

discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without

knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they
built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of
Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that
they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil
Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners
since they were not impleaded therein as parties.

As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners

have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in
interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have
[15]

impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so,
petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who
did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition
issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata
[16]

Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals dated January 28, 1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. Q-12918
through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners.
Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v.
Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law,
on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of

Mindoro
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered
by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and
to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to
remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been
ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under
certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very
low culture.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later
caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board
of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.

was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this
section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better
position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is
necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or
a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term
non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area,
and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this
case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and
to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can
adapt to the changing times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back
to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Hudgens v. National Labor

Relations Board
Brief Fact Summary. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was
located within a shopping mall. The general manager of the mall threatened the
picketers with arrest for trespassing if they would not leave.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a
town and, therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the
nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb
Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had
been marching for about half an hour, the general manager of the shopping center
threatened to have the strikers arrested if they did not leave.

Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the
public?
Held. Yes. Because a shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town, it may
restrict First Amendment rights based solely on the content of the speech.

Discussion. The majority overrules the holding of Logan Valley and reasserts the
holding of Lloyd. A mall may look like and function as a small town would, yet it does not
have all of the attributes of a town. So, it is not restricted by the prohibition on content-
based speech review that a state actor would be under in the same circumstances.

Evelio Javier vs COMELEC &

Arturo Pacificador
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of
the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of
canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome
of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that
the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further,
Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2 ndDivision but the Constitute
requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency,
Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at
all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.