CSIRO PUBLISHING

Wildlife Research, 2007, 34, 578585 www.publish.csiro.au/journals/wr

Pest or prized possession? Genetically modified biocontrol

from an international perspective

Wendy R. Henderson A,C and Elaine C. Murphy A,B

A
Invasive Animals Cooperative Research Centre, University of Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia.
B
Department of Conservation, PO Box 13049, Christchurch, New Zealand.
C
Corresponding author. Email: wendy.henderson@invasiveanimals.com

Abstract. This article provides an overview of current research, regulations and international issues concerning
genetically modified (GM) organisms for use as biological controls of vertebrates. There is increasing interest in using
biotechnology to solve vertebrate pest problems around the world. A major issue lies in the fact that individual countries
focusing on internal problems of pest management may overlook the potential of transborder entry. Animals considered a
pest in one country may well be prized possessions in another, and research and management strategies should consider
the adverse effects of biocontrol agents entering the wrong country. There is a wealth of guidance in the form of national
and international regulations and ethics guidelines. However, current legislation and agreements may not be adequate to
ensure that all risks of GM biocontrols, particularly disseminating agents, have been considered from an international
perspective. Major issues include concerns of transboundary movement, non-target effects and the need for an inter-
national body to consult with and regulate the use of GM biocontrols. We live in a finite and interconnected world: it is
vital that impacts of potential control strategies are assessed at a local and international level, and from social, environ-
mental and economic perspectives.

Introduction
The introduction of invasive plants, animals and micro-
organisms has caused huge economic and environmental losses
in many countries (Pimentel et al. 2001; Seamark 2001).
Invasive animals, such as rats (Rattus spp.) and feral cats (Felis
catus) have been shown to be directly responsible for the extinc-
tion of native species. Without control or eradication programs
they will continue to cause further declines and extinctions
(Atkinson 1989; Pimentel et al. 2001; Courchamp et al. 2003).
The development of biotechnology, including advances in
genetic manipulation techniques, may provide new opportuni-
ties for vertebrate pest control. Controlling reproduction by vec-
tored immunocontraception is one such technique (Barlow
2000; Seamark 2001). Biotechnology approaches may also
provide answers to problems associated with non-target effects
and innate or developed resistance to current controls (Seamark
2001). Research into genetically modified (GM) biological con-
trols for vertebrate populations has been undertaken in several
countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Spain and the
United States (Torres et al. 2001; Kapuscinski and Patronski
2005; Cowan et al. 2006; Hardy et al. 2006; Angulo and
Brcena 2007; Redwood et al. 2007; Strive et al. 2007; van
Leeuwen and Kerr 2007).
From an international perspective, concerns have been raised
of transborder entry of GM biocontrol agents (Gilna et al. 2005;
Hill and Sendashonga 2006). These concerns highlight the sig-
nificant problem of pest control we face as an international
community: what is considered a pest in one country may be a
prized possession in another. There are concerns that harm to
valued native species may be caused by the introduction of a
GM organism (GMO) originally designed to eradicate or reduce
a species in another country where it is considered a pest (Gilna
et al. 2005; Williams 2007). Similarly, concern has been raised
over the risks of a GMO designed to preserve a species in one
country compromising pest-control programs in another
(Angulo and Cooke 2002; Anon. 2004).
Regulations governing the research and release of such GM
biocontrol agents differ considerably in content and stringency
from country to country. Various levels of regulations and
guidelines also exist, from individual institutions to federal
governments and international agreements. There is currently
some confusion about the relevance and authority of some of
these instruments, and what steps researchers are required to
take during the development of GM biocontrols. There is
growing support for an international authority to deal with these
issues (CBD 2004). The purpose of this article is to outline the
current status of the research, regulations and international
issues regarding GM biocontrols for vertebrate populations.
Some suggestions from an international perspective for a way
forward are also included.
Research and releases of GM biocontrols
Several research projects have investigated GM biocontrol
agents to decrease introduced vertebrate pest populations, or
preserve valued native species (see Table 1). The Australian
research on GMOs for fox (Vulpes vulpes), rabbit (Oryctolagus
cuniculus) and house mouse (Mus musculus domesticus) control
has ceased owing to technical obstacles (Redwood et al. 2007;
Strive et al. 2007; van Leeuwen and Kerr 2007). However,
advanced research continues on transmissible biocontrol agents
for possum (Trichosurus vulpecula) population reduction in

CSIRO 2007 10.1071/WR07062 1035-3712/07/070578

Genetically modified biocontrol Wildlife Research 579

New Zealand and rabbit preservation in Spain. The Spanish GM
virus (conferring immunity to myxomatosis and rabbit haemor-
rhagic disease) has been released on a small scale, in an island
field test (Torres et al. 2001).
The GM rabies vaccine (designated VRG) was the first GMO
for vertebrate populations to be released into environmentally
widespread use 20 years ago. It is interesting to speculate
whether this vaccine would be released in the current regulatory
and political climate. The threat of uncontrolled rabies would be
a major factor in its acceptance, but there is still a mixed reaction
to the use of GMOs per se. While a full risk assessment of VRG
is beyond the scope of this article, it seems probable that release
would still be approved in at least some countries comfortable
with using GMOs. Many safety aspects of VRG were examined
over 10 years of laboratory studies and strictly controlled field
releases. Factors considered at the time include: host virus char-
acteristics, target specificity of virus and baits, field durability,
pathogenicity, transmissibility, possible recombination with
other viruses, and consideration of sites prior to release (Hanlon
et al. 1989; Boulanger et al. 1996; Pastoret and Brochier 1996;
Cliquet and Aubert 2003). As a non-transmissible agent, VRG
would be likely to receive higher support for release than a dis-
seminating agent: both the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) and World Health Organisation have expressed
their concern at using disseminating agents for wildlife man-
agement (see Hinds et al. 2000). In addition, from a transborder
perspective, VRG is unlikely to cause problems with opposing
wildlife-management strategies (in contrast to the Spanish myx-
omatosis/RHD vaccine, for example). Most objections would
probably involve human health issues (such as reactions to vac-
cinia strains; for example, see Omlin 1997; Rupprecht et al.
2001) and political differences.
International instruments
The main international-level instruments (encompassing a
range of agencies and agreements) involved in the development
and release of GM biocontrol agents are: the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC), the OIE, and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organisation.
A brief review of the current status of relevant principles is pro-
vided in Table 2.
There are many other international and regional instruments
relevant to managing the spread and adverse effects of invasive
alien species. Alliances exist between some of these and the
major instruments described in Table 2, recognising overlapping
roles and aiming to reinforce information exchange and
improve coordination (e.g. CBD 2006).
The only international instrument specifically dealing with
transborder movement of GMOs for use with animals is the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which states that participating
parties must ensure that any GMO (including developmental
phases) is used in a way that prevents or reduces the risks to bio-
logical diversity. As of August 2007, 142 countries have
accepted to be bound by this treaty. Australia and the United
States are notable exceptions.

Table 1. Recent or proposed research into GM biocontrols

Area and species GM organism References

Australia
European carp
(Cyprinus carpio)
Cane toad (Bufo marinus)
Wild house mouse (Mus
musculus domesticus)
Rabbit (Oryctolagus
cuniculus)
Fox (Vulpes vulpes)
New Zealand
Australian brushtail possum
(Trichosurus vulpecula)
Spain
Rabbit (Oryctolagus
uniculus)
United States
Exotic fish
United States and Europe
Raccoon (Procyon lotor), Vaccinia virus expressing rabies glycoprotein for non-transmissible
coyote (Canis latrans),
skunk (Mephitis mephitis)
and fox (Vulpes vulpes))
Daughterless technology transgenic approach blocking the expression of the Thresher and Bax (2003)
female-determining aromatase gene
Daughterless technology transgenic approach; and potentially transmissible Molloy and Henderson (2006)
viral-vectored delivery of gene to prevent metamorphosis
Mouse cytomegalovirus expressing mouse zona pellucida (ZP) subunit 3 gene, Redwood et al. (2007),
as transmissible agent to prevent fertilisation Williams et al. (2007)
Myxoma virus expressing ZP glycoproteins, as transmissible agent to prevent Hamilton et al. (2005),
fertilisation; and trypanosome Trypanosoma nabiasi as transmissible Hardy et al. (2006),
immunocontraceptive agent (suggested research) van Leeuwen and Kerr (2007)
Vaccinia virus, canine herpesvirus and Salmonella typhimurium, expressing Bradley et al. (1997), Reubel et al. (2005),
various gamete proteins, to prevent fertilisation Hardy et al. (2006), Strive et al. (2006,
2007)
Possum-specific nematode (Parastrongyloides trichosuri), to produce Cowan et al. (2006), Grant et al. (2006a,
transmissible sterilising agent 2006b), Newton-Howes et al. (2006)
Myxoma virus expressing rabbit hemorrhagic disease (RHD) virus capsid Brcena et al. (2000), Torres et al. (2000,
protein, to confer transmissible immunity against myxomatosis and RHD 2001), Angulo and Brcena (2007)
Triploid or transgenic fish to produce sterile individuals or to disrupt Kapuscinski and Patronski (2005)
development
Brochier et al. (1996), Pastoret et al.
rabies vaccination (1993), Hanlon et al. (1998)
580 Wildlife Research W. R. Henderson and E. C. Murphy

The application of modern international law, as contained in National regulation of GM biocontrols

international instruments, varies from country to country,
depending on their domestic law. For some, a signed treaty is
binding upon their courts. However, for most countries it is per-
suasive only; even if they have signed an international agree-
ment, that agreement still needs to be ratified by the domestic
legislature and, in many cases (as in Australia, New Zealand, the
United States and the European Union) incorporated into a
domestic statute before being truly enforceable.
In the case of the Cartagena Protocol, non-compliance is
dealt with through a Compliance Committee, and may involve:
(a) providing financial and technical assistance to facilitate
compliance; (b) issuing a caution to the concerned party;
(c) publishing cases of non-compliance in the Biosafety
Clearing-House; and (d) taking other measures such as suspen-
sion of trade, and/or suspension of some rights or privileges
accorded to the Party (CBD 2007). To date, there have been no
reported cases of non-compliance.
Different systems of regulation are currently being used by key
countries to control research and environmental release of GM
biocontrol agents. These are briefly outlined in Table 3. In most
countries the regulation is split between several agencies and over
multiple acts of legislation. The degree of enforceability of the
legislation and guidelines also varies considerably from country
to country, particularly with regard to international consultation.
International conferences, issues and implications
International issues concerning the use of disseminating GM
biocontrol agents centre on the rights, objectives and ability of
individual countries to manage pests or endangered species,
global responsibilities to preserve trading arrangements and the
environment, and transparency and availability of information
and consultation.
A symposium on Rabbits and Rabbit Haemorrhagic
Disease (RHD): Disseminating Genetically Modified Organ-

Table 2. International instruments relevant to GM biocontrols

Agency Principle Brief description Reference

Convention on Article 3 Each party has sovereign right to exploit their own resources, but with due United Nations (1993)
Biological regard to the environment of areas beyond their national jurisdiction.
Diversity (CBD) Article 5 Parties should cooperate with each other on biodiversity matters of mutual interest. United Nations (1993)
Article 8 Risks associated with the use and release of GMOs that could have adverse United Nations (1993)
environmental effects should be managed by contracting parties.
Article 14 Requires environmental impact assessments, including consideration of areas United Nations (1993)
beyond national jurisdiction. Also states issue of liability and redress should
be examined.
Decision V1/23 Deals with intentional and unintentional introduction of species and mitigation CBD (2002)
of impacts of invasive alien species.
CBD Cartagena Advanced Preimport information provided before release of GMO. CBD (2000)
Protocol on Informed
Biosafety Agreement
Article 16 Risk assessments should consider international implications; transboundary CBD (2000)
movement should be prevented.
Article 17 Parties should take necessary steps in the event of an accidental release. CBD (2000)
International Plant International Concerned with the import and release of self-replicating plant biocontrol IPPC Secretariat (2005a)
Protection Standards for agents, including consideration of risk to other countries.
Convention Phytosanitary
(IPPC) Measure 3
(ISPM 3)
ISPM 11 Includes plant pest risks posed by GMOs, requiring the risks of the GMO itself IPPC Secretariat (2005b)
to be analysed and the consequences of its genetic material moving to
another organism.
World Trade Sanitary and Trade-related rules concerning sanitary and phytosanitary measures: countries WTO (1995)
Organisation Phytosanitary retain their right to ensure that the food, animal and plant products they import
(WTO) Agreement (SPS are safe, but should not use unnecessarily stringent measures as barriers to trade.
Agreement)
World Organisation Terrestrial Animal International coordination and cooperation on infectious animal diseases, with OIE (2006)
for Animal Health Code regard to trade in terrestrial animals, their genetic material and products.
Health (OIE)A (recognised in
SPS Agreement)
Aquatic Animal International coordination and cooperation on infectious animal diseases, with OIE (2007)
Health Code regard to trade in aquatic animals, their genetic material and products.
(recognised in
SPS Agreement)
A
OIE is considering GMO issues (OIE 2005): has concurred that disseminating agents are not desirable but that GMO research should proceed with extreme
caution (Anon 2004).
Genetically modified biocontrol Wildlife Research 581

isms (GMOs) and Conflicting International Objectives was
held at the 3rd International Wildlife Management Congress
(5 December 2003, Christchurch, New Zealand) (Anon. 2004).
This meeting highlighted the concerns of research projects on
rabbit biocontrol with opposing management strategies (i.e.
eradication of rabbits in Australia versus rabbit preservation in
Spain) (Anon. 2004). The discussion was extended to include
the GM biocontrol of possums in New Zealand and house mice
in Australia. The potential for these biocontrol agents to enter
the wrong country and cause unwanted effects on the same (or
related) species was acknowledged (Anon. 2004). It was noted
that there has been little consideration of this risk to date, or of
the risk of transfer of genetic material from such a GMO to
another wild-type organism (Anon. 2004). However, since that
time, an assessment has been made of the risks of inadvertent
export of the GM immunocontraceptive virus for house mice
from Australia (Williams 2007).
Symposium participants explored whether current regula-
tions are adequate to manage the risks associated with the
development and deployment of disseminating GMOs. It was
concluded that they are not adequate, being limited by rights of
sovereignty and providing guidance only (Anon. 2004). It was
agreed that research should proceed with caution, and that an
international consultation process could help manage the risks
and problems inherent in using GMOs in animal population
management (Anon. 2004).
An online conference on Biosafety Considerations in the
Use of Genetically Modified Organisms for Management of
Animal Populations was hosted by the CBD from 18 October to
15 November 2004 (CBD 2004). A total of 495 participants
registered for the conference from 104 countries (Galloway
Maclean 2005). The emphasis of discussions was on inter-
national consultation processes for development and release of
GMOs. The main points from the discussion threads are sum-
marised in Table 4.
A few participants questioned whether this type of bio-
control research should continue at all in the current precau-
tionary climate, particularly with regard to its cost and possible
pressure by shareholders to release GMOs. However, there was
general consensus that the research should continue, at least in
the biosecure laboratory phase: to explore options for biocontrol
and perhaps come up with unforseen answers to the problems
discussed.
Participants agreed that there was a need for a consistent
framework for international debate, with set standards to make
it clear who is responsible for what, and to what degree. The
process could be guided by existing protocols in the Cartagena
Protocol and other CBD and OIE codes. Serious difficulties in
assessing risks and reaching consensus on a decision to release
GM biocontrol agents could arise from different countries atti-
tudes to the pest or the GMO, perceived national rights and inad-
equate infrastructure capacity. It was pointed out that a database
of experience could be built up to assist decisions on risk and
release this has occurred with other agencies such as the
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator in Australia.
Participants concluded that it is difficult with our current
state of knowledge to guarantee that the use of GMOs can be
limited to any particular region; therefore, the release of GMOs
should be everybodys concern. Currently, it is up to researchers
to inform regulatory and ethics-based agencies of progress, and
it is up to those agencies to consult with each other to approve
or disallow GMO releases. It was generally concluded that a
clearer-cut and more consistent process of consultation and
management is needed, and that both national and international
mechanisms need to be strengthened to adequately deal with
disseminating GM biocontrol agents. It was also acknowledged

Table 3. National regulatory instruments relevant to GM biocontrols

Country Primary legislation/guidelines Level of enforcement

Australia Gene Technology Act 2000, Biological Control Act 1984, Australia New
Zealand Food Authority Act 1991, Therapeutic Goods Act 1989,
Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Code Act 1994, Industrial
Chemicals [Notification and Assessment] Act 1989, and various state
and territory regulatory schemes, Framework for the Development of
Ethical Principles in Gene Technology (GTEC 2006).
New Zealand Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act 1996,
Biosecurity Act 1993, Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary
Medicines Act 1997, Food Act 1981, Medicines Act 1981,
ERMANZ Ethics Framework (ERMANZ 2005).
European Union Individual nations laws (for contained experiments), EU Article 16 of
(EU) Directive 90/219/EC (to consult other member states that could be
affected by an accidental release), Directive 2001/18/EC (for deliberate
releases, requiring submissions that allow any EU member state to do a
risk assessment). May also involve other EU decision-making processes
(e.g. for marketing of all veterinary medicinal products).
United States Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Plant Protection Act, Food Quality
Protection Act, National Institute of Health (NIH) guidelines,
Department of Agricultures (USDA) performance standards for fish,
Indian federal law, invasive species legislation, National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), Endangered Species Act, North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).
National Acts enforceable. No legal requirement to consult
internationally before approving GMO releases (i.e.
Ethical Framework not enforceable by law). International
law considerations of CBD (but not Cartagena Protocol).
National Acts enforceable. Section 6 of the HSNO Act
requires consideration of international obligations.
International law considerations of CBD and Cartagena
Protocol.
National laws enforceable. Directives enforceable by EU
law. International law considerations of CBD and the
Cartagena Protocol.
National Acts enforceable. NIH guidelines and USDA
performance standards voluntary only. NEPA does not
impose substantive requirements on any agency decision
making. NAAEC limited to effects on Canada and
Mexico. International law considerations of CBD
(though not yet ratified), but not Cartagena Protocol.
582 Wildlife Research W. R. Henderson and E. C. Murphy

that less-developed countries would need substantial infra-
structure support in such a process.
Since the online conference, there has been no equivalent
forum to further discuss international consultation or biosafety
issues. Ongoing efforts by the OIE, CBD and other agencies are
attempting to provide further guidance for GMO research and
release. For example, Norway and Canada (endorsed by the
CBD) recently held an expert workshop on assessing risks of
emerging GMOs (Anon. 2007).
International issues raised by the literature
The current literature raises international issues of trade (where
a country restricts imports owing to safety concerns), accessible
pathways for transborder GMO entry (e.g. during humanitarian
or military operations), intellectual property rights, and ethical
issues. Ethical issues include who decides which species to pro-
tect and which to eradicate, rights to intervene in natural
systems and rights to genetically manipulate populations to
become sterile or diseased (Minteer and Collins 2005a, 2005b).
Recent articles have highlighted the need for a consistent and
accessible international approach for the regulation and man-
agement of GM biocontrol agents to prevent a potential politi-
cal and/or environmental disaster (Angulo and Cooke 2002;
Anon. 2002, 2004; Nowak 2003; Gilna et al. 2005; Minteer and
Collins 2005a, 2005b; Messing and Wright 2006). They high-
light the potential dangers of pursuing local biocontrol pro-
grams without regard for conservation values in other countries.
Issues of host specificity of biocontrol agents have also been
raised; they are discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. Louda et al.
2003).
Where to from here?
The development and release of GM biocontrol agents may be
inevitable, given the increasing impacts of vertebrate pests and
the rate of progress in biotechnology. There is an urgent need for
researchers, policy makers and other stakeholders to consider
the international perspective and not focus solely on internal
problems to look outside the national square, from social,
environmental and economic perspectives. The concept of pest
versus prized possession needs to be addressed when deciding
on whether and how to intervene in the management of animal
populations. The recent assessment by Williams (2007) of
export risks of the GM contraceptive virus for house mice pro-
vides one of the first examples of the types of international
issues to be addressed. This assessment acknowledged the dif-
ferent values of mice in different countries (thereby affecting the
consequences of a GM virus release) and recommended further
consideration of the risks. Angulo and Brcena (2007) have also
acknowledged the need for international consultation by taking
an open, transparent approach to the development of the
Spanish rabbit vaccine.
Before New Zealands GM nematode for possum control
reaches a stage where environmental release is technically pos-
sible, Australia should be involved in full consultation and
debate on its risks and implications (Gilna et al. 2005). The con-
sultation to date has been sporadic and informal and should now
be established on a regular and formal basis with relevant
Australian agencies. Discussions should include not only
environmental concerns, but also possible ramifications to
trans-Tasman trade, politics, and tourism. Illegal or uninten-
tional nematode transfer must also be seriously considered, as

Table 4. Summary of the online CBD conference on Biosafety considerations in the use of GMOs for management of animal populations
(CBD 2004)

Thread No. of Summary points

postings

Who and when to consult
with internationally?
How can we make
disseminating
GMOs safer?
GMOs in use of mammalian
population control
New challenge facing
developing countries
such as India
Biocontrol
48 Acknowledged need for an international body to consult and debate on GM biocontrol issues.
Experts from range of disciplines (ecologists, lawyers, molecular biologists, politicians, etc.) would be useful;
possibly acting under auspices of CBD or OIE.
Need to address GM issues from perspective of different research disciplines (e.g. medicine, genetics, ecology).
Consultation should occur early in the research phase, on a case-by-case (or similar-group) basis, and with
standardised processes.
Consultation particularly important for research into disseminating GMOs.
Problems to overcome for international consensus include rights of sovereignty, differing perceptions of pest
and comfort with using GMOs per se.
Capacity to assess GMOs lacking in less developed countries.
25 Safety mechanisms should be built into disseminating GMOs, to confine effects to target species and
target country.
Existing strategies used for GM bioremediation bacteria were explained, including chemical dependence and
suicide functions.
9 GMOs potentially provide new needed control methods but there should be a clear pathway to allow
international consultation and evaluation.
Need policy and strong regulation in biosafety.
8 High proportion of uneducated people in countries like India.
Need education, strong regulations and public participation programs.
Cultural and ethical values also need to be considered.
7 Potential lower-risk options exist for biocontrol designing a Trojan gene (a gene that spreads efficiently
through a population, but reduces biological fitness of the recipients), or engineering male-biased sex ratios
(daughterless technology).
Genetically modified biocontrol
illustrated by the illegal introduction of (non-GM) calicivirus
into New Zealand from Australia (Parkes et al. 2002).
At a national level, jurisdiction/administration of GMO
research and release is often divided between government
departments of environment, health and trade. There are dis-
crepancies in obligations to consult internationally: some coun-
tries have voluntary guidelines only, others are legally bound to
consult with other countries. At an international level, the legal-
ity varies between contracting parties (at different stages of rat-
ification), and different countries are signatories to different
instruments. The legal/guiding framework needs to be improved
and the international procedure clarified.
Risk-assessment processes also need to be addressed.
Further discussions will need to include how each partys
biosafety concerns can be dealt with (e.g. engineering safety
mechanisms into GMOs and developing field-testing proto-
cols), and at what point safe is considered safe enough. laboratively and responsibly. Early assessment from an interna-
Different levels of risk assessment may be appropriate at dif-
ferent stages of research and development (e.g. even before
proof-of-concept stage). A recent CBD-endorsed workshop on
risk assessment of GM viruses (Canada Norway Expert
Workshop on Risk Assessment for Emerging Applications of
Living Modified Organisms, 46 June 2007) acknowledged that
there is insufficient guidance on performing risk assessments on
GM fish and viruses (Anon. 2007). It also acknowledged that
new methodologies may need to be developed to assist in risk
assessments, because the use of field trials is likely to be prob-
lematic (particularly if other countries require information on
the behaviour of a biocontrol GMO in their own environment).
Progress will probably be most effective in the first instance
if national regulators address international issues as fully as pos-
sible. International-level cooperation will also be essential, but
is likely to be a longer-term goal. The path forward should
include the following:
national legislation widened to include international consid-
erations (i.e. such considerations should not just be provided
at a voluntary, guideline level),
national assessment developed with a unified approach, if it
is currently dispersed between different regulatory bodies
(e.g. agriculture, health, trade),
an impartial multidisciplinary task force assigned for risk
assessments (at national and international levels),
readily available guidelines, methodologies, baseline infor-
mation and risk assessments (through the Biosafety Clearing
House and other relevant international databases),
identification of an international body (such as the OIE) to
act as an authority providing clear guidance for development
of research and release of GMOs from an international
perspective.
There are encouraging signs of progress towards a consensus
approach to issues surrounding the development and release of
GM biocontrol agents. However, further international fora will
be needed between researchers, policy makers and other rele-
vant parties, to amalgamate and improve on existing guidelines
and legislation. Questions needing consideration include how
effective an international agreement is if countries involved in
GMO development are not signatories (and how such countries
could be engaged to become signatories). Another question is
what practical and/or legal measures may be appropriate at an
Wildlife Research 583
international level in the event of unauthorised GMO develop-
ment or release. Further social research will probably be
required on the public acceptability of GM biocontrols. Issues
of resource disparities (e.g. between developed and developing
countries) will also need addressing.
Conclusions
It is clear that a single unwanted introduction of a GM biocon-
trol agent could have serious consequences. Once a persisting
transmissible GMO is released (whether intentionally, legally, or
otherwise), it is unlikely that it could be completely removed
from the environment. The scientific community involved in
developing GM biocontrols therefore needs to demonstrate a
highly precautionary attitude. Scientists also have an ethical
responsibility to consider the full implications of the solutions
they are researching: they must be seen to be acting openly, col-
tional perspective of the feasibility of releasing GM biocontrol
agents (considering technical aspects as well as possible ramifi-
cations) may prevent valuable research funds being wasted, and
avert environmental, economic and political repercussions.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Brian Cooke, Robert Henzell, Chris Hardy, Lyn Hinds,
Rod Hay, John Dowding and Greg Sherley for constructive discussions in
this area.
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