CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent G.R. No.

191240 | July 30, 2014 THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information.
Upon their arraignment, Phillip and Ramon pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. The RTC rendered a Decision
finding Phillip guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered him to pay Castillo,
US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency. Ramon was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence. Phillip appealed his conviction to the CA, which
overturned the RTC decision. Castillo filed a petition for review on certiorari on
the civil aspect of the case, arguing that the Court should have at least retained the
amount of damages to her.
ISSUE: Whether the acquitted accused remains liable for damages.
RULING: Yes. His acquittal was only based on failure to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
RATIO: [I]n Manantan v. CA, we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on
the civil liability of the accused as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x
x x.
A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [S]ince the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt, [Phillip] is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,
we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows: o
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which
 is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.
In discrediting [Castillo's] allegation that she gave [Phillip] US$100,000.00 in May
2002, the CA found that: (1) [Castillo] failed to show how she was able to raise the
money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the
source of the same; (2) [Castillo]failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she
could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the
money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) [Castillo's] claim of trust as
reason for not requiring [Phillip] to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she
conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) [Castillo's] behavior after the
alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of
someone who had been swindled.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO

and EMILIO LA'O y GONZALES, Respondents. G.R. No. 168918 March 2,
2009 THIRD DIVISION
FACTS: Herein respondents Dumlao and Lao, Aber P. Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave,
Roman A. Cruz, Jr. and Fabian C. Ver were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 Dumlao filed an MD on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense.7 o He stated that the prosecutions main
thrust against him was the alleged approval by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) Board of Trustees -- of which he was a member -- of the Lease-
Purchase Agreement entered into by and among the GSIS, the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and respondent Lao. He argued that the
allegedly approved Board Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board of
Trustees, contrary to the allegations in the information. Since the signatures of
Fabian Ver, Roman Cruz, Aber Canlas and Jacobo Clave did not appear in the
minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982, he said it was safe to conclude that
these people did not participate in the alleged approval of the Lease-Purchase
Agreement. This being the case, he maintained that there was no quorum of the
board to approve the supposed resolution authorizing the sale of the GSIS property.
There being no approval by the majority of the Board of Trustees, there can be no
resolution approving the Lease-Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution, he
added, proved his innocence. He further contended that the person to be charged
should be Atty. Luis Javellana, who sold the subject property to respondent Lao
without the proper authority. He likewise wondered why he alone was charged
without including the other two signatories in the minutes of the meeting held on 23
April 1982. SB granted the MD People filed a Rule 45 before the SC o
Petitioner argues it was denied its right to due process when the court a quo
dismissed the case against respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it could
present its witnesses and formally offer its exhibits. The court a quo deprived it of
the opportunity to prove its case that the Resolution dated 23 April 1982 was
passed by the GSIS Board of Trustees and that the Lease-Purchase Agreement was
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
ISSUE: Whether SB correctly dismissed the case.
HELD: NO.
Respondent Dumlao was charged, he being one of the members of the GSIS Board
of Trustees who allegedly approved the lease-purchase of the subject GSIS
properties consisting of three parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters,
together with a five-storey building, in favor of respondent Lao, which lease-
purchase agreement was deemed by the Office of the Ombudsman to be grossly
disadvantageous to the government. A review of the Motion to Dismiss/Quash
filed by respondent Dumlao reveals that the ground he invoked was that "the facts
charged do not constitute an offense." He contends that the alleged approved Board
Resolution was not approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees, contrary to the
allegation in the information. Since the signatures of four out of the seven members
of the board did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982,
there was no quorum present or no majority that approved the supposed resolution.
This being the case, he asserts that there was no resolution adopted by the GSIS
Board of Trustees approving the sale of the subject properties to respondent Lao.
The Sandiganbayan, basing its resolution on the Pre-trial Stipulation entered into
by the prosecution and respondent Dumlao, dismissed the case against the latter,
since it found that the GSIS Board of Trustees failed to approve or validly pass the
Lease-Purchase Agreement, because only three out of the seven members of the
Board signed the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982. It explained that,
"no amount of evidence can change the fact that the Resolution dated April 23,
1982 was not validly passed by the Board of Trustees of GSIS since it was only
signed by three members of the Board. Thus, it never had the force and effect of a
valid resolution and did not in effect approve the Lease and Purchase Agreement
subject matter hereof. Therefore, the prosecution has no cause of action against
herein movant-accused Hermenegildo C. Dumlao."
The ground raised by respondent Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments of an information is whether the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements
of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the
Information, are not be considered.11 The elements of the crime under Section
3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.12 After examining the information, we find that the facts
alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of Section
3(g) as against respondent Dumlao.
It can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did consider the
ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense);
otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlaos motion. From the reasoning
given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the case because of
insufficiency of evidence.
Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, are as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
or justification;
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the

prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case,
the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against
respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to
due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and
to prove the accuseds culpability. It was therefore erroneous for the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider
the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground
not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without
basis and untimely.
DAVID TIU, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO POSTANES,
Respondents. G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009 FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight
physical injuries filed by respondent Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio
Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal
charge for grave threats against Postanes. Consequently, an Information for
Slight Physical Injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-412, and an Information
for Grave Threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-413, were filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City. Upon motion of Pasion, Criminal
Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC
of Pasay City, Branch 44. MeTC dismissed both charges; denied Tius ensuing
MR Tiu filed a Rule 65 before RTC o RTC granted This case is remanded to
the Court of origin for reconsideration of its Decision RTC then declared void
the MeTCs judgment Postanes filed an MR before RTC o RTC denied
Postanes filed a Rule 65 before the CA Court of Appeals directed respondents
(Tiu and Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of RTC Pasay, Branch 115) to file their
Comment on the petition. The Court of Appeals found no reason to justify the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Meanwhile, Tiu, through his counsel, filed with the MeTC a Motion for Compliance
asking the MeTC to enforce the RTC decision. He also filed a motion to inhibit MeTC
Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas. Postanes, on the other hand, filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings and an Opposition to the motion for compliance o MeTC
granted Postanes motion to suspend the proceedings. o Presiding Judge Estrellita
M. Paas also inhibited herself from further hearing the case. Tiu filed with CA
an MD the petition on the ground of forum shopping. o CA issued a Reso stated
that "action on the Motion to Dismiss Petition filed by the private respondents,
together with the petitioners Opposition thereto, and private respondents Reply to
Opposition shall be included in the preparation of the decision in the present
petition. CA then reversed RTC; denied Tius ensuing MR o n annulling the RTC
decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC "has granted upon the State,
through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of
acquittal which right the government does not have." o The Court of Appeals stated
that the prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due process.
Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having been
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion, thereby denying Postanes of his
Constitutional right against double jeopardy. o The Court of Appeals opined that the
MeTC evaluated and passed upon the evidence presented both by the prosecution
and the defense. The MeTC, however, believed that the evidence of the prosecution
was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of
Postanes, thus acquitted him based on reasonable doubt. Tiu filed a Rule 45
before the SC

ISSUE: Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC
HELD: NO. At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was
not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule
that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before
this Court and the Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No.
96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents
the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must
fail. However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy to finally
put an end to this controversy. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the
complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and
had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.21 These elements are present here: (1)
the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty
plea;22 and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be
had.23 Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider
its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the
Constitutional proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense."24 Further, as found by the Court of Appeals,
there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process
resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have
allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal
case.25 Tiu also contends that since the defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413
failed to submit a formal of evidence, the defense in effect had no evidence to
dispute the charge against Postanes. Tiu insists that though Criminal Case Nos. 96-
412 and 96-413 were consolidated, the MeTC should not have considered the
evidence offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 to dismiss Criminal Case No. 96-413.
In doing so, the MeTC allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion rendering its
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413 (grave threats case) void. Tius arguments
fail to convince us. There is nothing in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
prohibiting the MeTC from appreciating the evidence presented and formally offered
in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving Criminal Case No. 96-413, inasmuch as
these two criminal cases were properly consolidated and jointly tried. In fact, the
MeTCs act of assessing the evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in deciding
Criminal Case No. 96-413 is consistent with the avowed objective of the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure "to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases" covered by these Rules. Besides, the testimonies of
Postanes, Aynaga,26 and Samson27 were properly offered at the time when these
witnesses were called to testify.28 Hence, while the affidavits as documentary
evidence were not formally offered, there were testimonial evidences supporting
Postanes defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413. Contrary to the RTCs finding,
there is nothing capricious or whimsical in the act of the MeTC of considering the
evidence formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving the consolidated
Criminal Case No. 96-413. Therefore, the MeTC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-413 for insufficient evidence. In
view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the forum shopping issue.