Zoe is the dynamic, self-organizing structure of life itself (60), of which anthropos

or bios is just a thin segment. Braidotti points to a zoe-centric worldview, or a

worldview that values generic life in all of its iterations, as the central tenant of the
post-anthropocentric turn, in that it effectively decentres bios as the measure of all
things. A posthuman theory of the subjective, therefore, could emerge as an
empirical project that aims at experimenting with what contemporary, bio-
technologically mediated bodies are capable of doing (61).

Braidotti offers another interpretation of Spinoza, influenced by the previous

rereadings offered by Deleuze and Guattari: [c]ontemporary monism implies a
notion of vital and self-organizing matter, as we saw in the previous chapter, as well
as a non-human definition of Life as zoe, or a dynamic and generative force (86).
That is, Spinoza does not call his infinite substance God because it is something to
be worshiped; he calls it God because it is the vital and animating force of the
entire universe. For this reason, a posthuman notion of subjectivity has less to do
with flattening out all species to the organs of a planetary animal, and more to do
with empathetic recognition of an inter-species goal of keeping the planet, as the
only known habitable environment for all known iterations of zoe, alive.

the posthuman subject is able to account for the increasingly technologically-

mediated environment in a manner that is experimental and not exclusively profit-
driven. The playful and mutually beneficial relationship between human and
machine, then, is reimaged not as a relationship between product and consumer,
but as two distinct and nonhierarchically ordered species experimentally pursuing a
common ethics (which, again, should be the zoe-centred ethics outlined above).
This would inherently require empathetic understanding of the evolution of
machines outside of their relationship to humans, which Braidotti identifies as an
important aspect of the posthuman turn: the point of the posthuman predicament
is to rethink evolution in a non-deterministic but also post-anthropocentric manner
(94).

In blurring the distinction between Man and his naturalized others, Braidotti draws
attention to the dynamics of power that exist in society. Power, understood in the
Foucauldian sense, functions on a grid that the posthuman subject can
experimentally resist. As Braidotti observes: power is not a static given, but a
complex strategic flow of effects which call for pragmatic politics of intervention and
the quest for sustainable alternatives (99).
As Braidotti explains: [b]ecause genetic informationis unevenly distributed, this
system is not only inherently discriminatory, but also racist at some basic level of
the term (117). In this way, the political policy is designed specifically to promote
the sustained life of those who are deemed to be the healthy normative core of
society and implicitly necessitates the death of those deemed unhealthy. The necro-
political aspect of this model inherently embeds the corpse within the embodied
self, as individuals come to understand nonconformity to normative societal values
as synonymous with their own death. For this reason, a central insight of Foucaults
bio-power remains valid in todays technologically bio-mediated society: bio-power
also involves the management of dying (119).

Achille Mbembes observation that Bio-power and necro-politics are two sides of
the same coin (122).

Braidotti observes, [m]any contemporary wars, led by Western coalitions under the
cover of humanitarian aid are often neo-colonial exercises aimed at protecting
mineral extraction and other essential geo-physical resources needed by the global
economy (123)

The dominant trend amongst these technologies is non-locality, as they are

generally monitored by remote human operators, but, crucially, Braidotti points out
that by-passing the human decision maker is already technologically feasible
(12526). Increasingly, technological advancement is changing the way we think
about death and accountability

The death of the individual, then, cannot be seen as the teleological end of life,
because life is not an inherent property of the individual, but rather the opposite:
the mortal individual is best understood as a kind of temporary echo chamber for
zoe, the temporality of which inherently means that death has always already
occurred. That is to say, because the individual is tethered to her mortality, death is
not a limit that she approaches, but rather a threshold that she transgresses. For
this reason, death as a constitutive event is behind us; it has already taken place
as a virtual potential that constructs everything we are (132).

For this reason, Death is the becoming-imperceptible of the posthuman subject and
as such it is part of the cycles of becoming, yet another form of interconnectedness,
a vital relationship that links one with other, multiple forces (137). That is to say,
both life and death are impersonal, generic expressions of zoe, and understanding
them as such has the potential to, ultimately, transgress ego and dissolve the
boundaries between subjective individuals, such that the primary focus of each
individual becomes the sustained existence of Zoe.

As Braidotti opines: Sustainability does assume faith in a future, and also a sense
of responsibility for passing on to future generations a world that is liveable and
worth living in (138).