Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Rodolfo

ordering defendants Rodolfo A. Bedania and Rodolfo

de Silva, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs, as follows:
G.R. No. 162987 May 21, 2009
1. The sum of P508,566.03 representing the damage/repair costs of the Toyota to plaintiff
Genaro M. Guillang.
SOFIA M. GUILLANG, represented by SUSAN GUILLANG-CABATBAT, REYNALDO,
GERARDO, BIENVENIDO, DAWNA, and NELLIE, all surnamed GUILLANG, GENARO
GUILLANG, JOSE DIGNADICE, and ALVIN LLANILLO, Petitioners, 2. The sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Antero Guillang plus P185,000.00 for his burial
vs. expenses, to the heirs of Antero Guillang.
RODOLFO BEDANIA and RODOLFO DE SILVA, Respondents.
3. For hospital and medical expenses as reflected in Exhibits E, E-1 to E-30 to plaintiffs
DECISION Genaro M. Guillang, Jose Dignadice and Alvin Llanillo.

CARPIO, J.: 4. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages for the heirs of the deceased Antero
Guillang.
The Case
5. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages each to plaintiffs Jose Dignadice, Alvin
Llanillo and Genaro Guillang.
This is a petition for review1 of the 3 June 2003 Decision2 and the 23 March 2004 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. The 3 June 2003 Decision set aside the 5 December
2000 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila (trial court). The 23 March 2004 6. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration.
7. The sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fess.
The Facts
8. The costs of the suit.
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was
driving his brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along
SO ORDERED.6
Emilio Aguinaldo Highway (highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose
Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, Dasmarias,
Cavite, and were on their way to Manila. At the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Bedania (Bedania) was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck)
towards Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva). On 3 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision provides:
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn.
When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the right portion of the IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
truck. The truck dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road. complaint of the herein appellees in Civil Case No. 95-73666 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The
appellants counterclaims in the instant case are likewise DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical cost.
Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred
to the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he SO ORDERED.7
sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On 23 March 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the
On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero 5 instituted a motion.
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva.

Hence, this petition.

On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found
Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the
highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
declared de Silva grossly negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. The
dispositive portion of the decision provides:
According to the trial court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.8 In this case, the trial
court found that the Traffic Accident Investigation Report (report),9 corroborated by the testimonies of
the witnesses, showed that the truck committed a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without
signal lights. The trial court also declared that Bedania violated Sections 45(b),10 48,11 and 5412 of
Republic Act No. 413613 when he executed the sudden U-turn. The trial court added that Bedania
violated another traffic rule when he abandoned the victims after the collision.14The trial court
concluded that Bedania was grossly negligent in his driving and held him liable for damages.
Moreover, the trial court found that Bedania did not make the U-turn at an intersection. According to
the trial court, vehicles trying to maneuver to change directions must seek an intersection where it is
safer to maneuver and not recklessly make a U-turn in a highway. The trial court said Bedania
should have observed extreme caution in making a U-turn because it was unexpected that a long
cargo truck would execute a U-turn along the highway.
The trial court also said that Bedanias gross negligence raised the legal presumption that de Silva,
as Bedanias employer, was negligent in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial
court said that, under Articles 217615 and 218016 of the Civil Code, de Silvas liability was based
on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of his employees,
subject to the defense that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employees. The trial court ruled that de Silva failed to prove this defense and,
consequently, held him liable for damages.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and said that the trial court overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion and alter the results of the case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the testimonies of the witnesses and declared that they were
"contrary to human observation, knowledge and experience." The Court of Appeals also said that
the following were the physical evidences in the case:
1. It was not yet dark when the incident transpired;
2. The four-lane highway the appellees were cruising on was wide, straight, dry, relatively
plain and with no obstructions to the drivers vision;
3. The point of impact of the collision is on the lane where the car was cruising and the car
hit the gas tank of the truck located at its right middle portion, which indicates that the
truck had already properly positioned itself and had already executed the U-turn before
the impact occurred;
4. Genaro Guillang was not able to stop the car in time and the cars front portion was
totally wrecked. This negates appellees contention that they were traveling at a moderate
speed; and
5. The sheer size of the truck makes it improbable for the said vehicle to negotiate a U-
turn at a sudden and fast speed as appellees vigorously suggest without toppling over
on its side.17 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals concluded that the collision was caused by Genaros negligence. The Court of
Appeals declared that the truck arrived at the intersection way ahead of the car and had already
executed the U-turn when the car, traveling at a fast speed, hit the trucks side. The Court of Appeals
added that considering the time and the favorable visibility of the road and the road conditions,
Genaro, if he was alert, had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road. The Court of
Appeals found no reason for Genaro not to be prudent because he was approaching an intersection
and there was a great possibility that vehicles would be traversing the intersection either going to or
from Orchard Golf Course. The Court of Appeals said Genaro should have slowed down upon
reaching the intersection. The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaros failure to observe the
necessary precautions was the proximate cause of Anteros death and the injuries of the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the testimony of Police Traffic Investigator Efren Videna
(Videna) that the car was running at a fast speed and overtook another vehicle just before the
collision occurred.18 The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaro did not see the truck as the other
vehicle temporarily blocked his view of the intersection. The Court of Appeals also gave weight to
Videnas testimony that it was normal for a ten-wheeler truck to make a U-turn on that part of the
highway because the entrance to Orchard Golf Course was spacious.19
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals decide a question of substance in this case in a way probably
not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court?
2. Did the Court of Appeals depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings particularly when it revised, and recast the findings of facts of the trial court
pertaining to credibility of witnesses of which the trial court was at the vantage point to
evaluate?
3. Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it rendered the palpably questionable Court of Appeals Decision that
tampered with the findings of fact of the trial court for no justifiable reason?
4. Is the Court of Appeals judgment and resolution reversing the decision of the trial court
supported by the evidence and the law and jurisprudence applicable?20
The issue in this case is who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. The trial court held
Bedania and de Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable because the proximate cause of the collision
was the sudden U-turn executed by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of
the collision was Genaros failure to stop the car despite seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.
The Ruling of the Court
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court.21
However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate
court are contrary to those of the trial court.22 Findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals may also be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the
lower courts conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts. 23 Such is the situation in this
case and we shall re-examine the facts and evidence presented before the lower courts.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relations between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain
a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.24
There is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of the collision. However, the issues
on negligence and proximate cause are disputed.
On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith,25 we held that the test of negligence is whether the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence
on record. In ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to
Videnas testimony. However, we find that Videnas testimony was inconsistent with the police
records and report that he made on the day of the collision. First, Videna testified that the car was
running fast and overtook another vehicle that already gave way to the truck.26 But this was not
indicated in either the report or the police records. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should
have been skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the collision. But
the sketch of the accident showed no skid marks made by the car.27 Second, Videna testified that
the petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to smell liquor.28 But in the
report,29 Videna indicated that the condition of Genaro was "normal." Videna did not indicate in the
report that Genaro "had been drinking liquor" or that Genaro "was obviously drunk." Third, Videna
testified that when he arrived at the scene, Bedania was inside his truck.30 This contradicts the
police records where Videna stated that after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the
victims.31 The police records also showed that Bedania was arrested by the police at his barracks in
Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned over to the police only on 26 October 1994.32
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle
is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report33 showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation
of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and
abandoned the petitioners and his truck.34 This is another violation of a traffic regulation.35 Therefore,
the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had fully
made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear.36 If the truck had already negotiated even half of
the turn and is almost on the other side of the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the
middle portion of the trailer or cargo compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of
Appeals even declared, that the car hit the trucks gas tank, located at the trucks right middle
portion, which disproves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed
the U-turn when it was hit by the car.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car was
cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over
the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it
suddenly made the U-turn.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is
not supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch37 does not indicate an intersection and
only shows that there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision.
Furthermore, U-turns are generally not advisable particularly on major streets.38 Contrary to Videnas
testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the trial court
that if Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to
maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the
highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred is also not
supported by the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of the
collision was "darkness."39
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not make it
improbable for the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial courts decision did not state that the
truck was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a
"sudden" U-turn, meaning the U-turn was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the
fact that the trucks signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of
Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.40 The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of
Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would
not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to
oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn
triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the
injuries of petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is also liable for the damages
suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
On the Award of Damages and Attorneys Fees
According to prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict is pegged 2. Hospitalization Expenses of P27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero Guillang, P10,881.60 to
at P50,000.41Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is also awarded to the heirs of the deceased Alvin Llanillo, P5,436.77 to Jose Dignadice, and P300 to Genaro Guillang; and
taking into consideration the pain and anguish they suffered.42 Bienvenido Guillang (Bienvenido),
Anteros son, testified that Sofia, Anteros wife and his mother, became depressed after Anteros
3. Moral damages of P30,000 each to Alvin Llanillo, Jose Dignadice, and Genaro Guillang.
death and that Sofia died a year after.43 Bienvenido also testified on the pain and anguish their
family suffered as a consequence of their fathers death.44 We sustain the trial courts award
of P50,000 as indemnity for death and P50,000 as moral damages to the heirs of Antero. SO ORDERED.

As to funeral and burial expenses, the court can only award such amount as are supported by
proper receipts.45In this case, petitioners proved funeral and burial expenses of P55,000 as
evidenced by Receipt No. 1082,46P65,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 114647 and P15,000 as
evidenced by Receipt No. 1064,48 all issued by the Manila South Cemetery Association, Inc.,
aggregating P135,000. We reduce the trial courts award of funeral and burial expenses
from P185,000 to P135,000.

As to hospitalization expenses, only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to
have been genuinely incurred in connection with the hospitalization of the victims will be recognized
in court.49 In this case, the trial court did not specify the amount of hospitalization expenses to be
awarded to the petitioners. Since petitioners presented receipts for hospitalization expenses during
the trial, we will determine the proper amounts to be awarded to each of them. We award
hospitalization expenses of P27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero,50P10,881.60 to Llanillo,51 P5,436.77 to
Dignadice,52 and P300 to Genaro53 because these are the amounts duly substantiated by receipts.

We affirm the trial courts award of P508,566.03 for the repair of the car. The Court notes that there
is no dispute that Genaro was driving a brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan and that, after the
collision, the car was a total wreck. In this case, the repair order presented by Genaro is sufficient
proof of the damages sustained by the car.541avvphi1.zw+

Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.55 However, in

accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the award of moral damages from P50,000
to P30,000 each to Llanillo, Dignadice, and Genaro since they only suffered physical injuries brought
about by the collision.56

In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.57 While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.58 In this case, Bedania was
grossly negligent in suddenly making a U-turn in the highway without signal lights. To serve as an
example for the public good, we affirm the trial courts award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000.

Finally, we affirm the trial courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000. Under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in this case, exemplary damages
are awarded.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the 3 June 2003 Decision and 23 March 2004 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. We REINSTATE with MODIFICATIONS the 5 December 2000
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. We ORDER Rodolfo Bedania and Rodolfo
de Silva, jointly and severally, to pay the following amounts:

1. Funeral and Burial Expenses of P135,000 to the heirs of Antero Guillang;

 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION railroad warning signs, or watchmen, or other responsible persons manning the crossing. In fact, the
bamboo barandilla was up, leaving the railroad crossing open to traversing motorists.
G.R. No. 157917 August 29, 2012
At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing, PNR Commuter No. 302 (train),
1 operated by Jhonny Alano (Alano), was in the vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange travelling
SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners,
northbound. As the train neared the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the van eastward across the
vs.
railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His view of the oncoming train was blocked
SPOUSES TERESITA PHILIPPINE NICOLAS and L. ZARATE, NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and the
because he overtook the passenger bus on its left side. The train blew its horn to warn motorists of
COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.
its approach. When the train was about 50 meters away from the passenger bus and the van, Alano
applied the ordinary brakes of the train. He applied the emergency brakes only when he saw that a
DECISION collision was imminent. The passenger bus successfully crossed the railroad tracks, but the van
driven by Alfaro did not. The train hit the rear end of the van, and the impact threw nine of the 12
BERSAMIN, J.: students in the rear, including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which
dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him. Alano fled the scene on board
the train, and did not wait for the police investigator to arrive.
The operator of a. school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the law. He is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He is presumed to be negligent when
death occurs to a passenger. His liability may include indemnity for loss of earning capacity even if Devastated by the early and unexpected death of Aaron, the Zarates commenced this action for
the deceased passenger may only be an unemployed high school student at the time of the damages against Alfaro, the Pereas, PNR and Alano. The Pereas and PNR filed their respective
accident. answers, with cross-claims against each other, but Alfaro could not be served with summons.

The Case At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the facts and issues, viz:

By petition for review on certiorari, Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Perefia (Perefias) appeal the A. FACTS:
adverse decision promulgated on November 13, 2002, by which the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
with modification the decision rendered on December 3, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), (1) That spouses Zarate were the legitimate parents of Aaron John L. Zarate;
Branch 260, in Paraaque City that had decreed them jointly and severally liable with Philippine
National Railways (PNR), their co-defendant, to Spouses Nicolas and Teresita Zarate (Zarates) for
the death of their 15-year old son, Aaron John L. Zarate (Aaron), then a high school student of Don (2) Spouses Zarate engaged the services of spouses Perea for the adequate and safe
Bosco Technical Institute (Don Bosco). transportation carriage of the former spouses' son from their residence in Paraaque to
his school at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Makati City;
Antecedents
(3) During the effectivity of the contract of carriage and in the implementation thereof,
Aaron, the minor son of spouses Zarate died in connection with a vehicular/train collision
The Pereas were engaged in the business of transporting students from their respective
which occurred while Aaron was riding the contracted carrier Kia Ceres van of spouses
residences in Paraaque City to Don Bosco in Pasong Tamo, Makati City, and back. In their
Perea, then driven and operated by the latter's employee/authorized driver Clemente
business, the Pereas used a KIA Ceres Van (van) with Plate No. PYA 896, which had the capacity
Alfaro, which van collided with the train of PNR, at around 6:45 A.M. of August 22, 1996,
to transport 14 students at a time, two of whom would be seated in the front beside the driver, and
within the vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines;
the others in the rear, with six students on either side. They employed Clemente Alfaro (Alfaro) as
driver of the van.
(4) At the time of the vehicular/train collision, the subject site of the vehicular/train
In June 1996, the Zarates contracted the Pereas to transport Aaron to and from Don Bosco. On collision was a railroad crossing used by motorists for crossing the railroad tracks;
August 22, 1996, as on previous school days, the van picked Aaron up around 6:00 a.m. from the
Zarates residence. Aaron took his place on the left side of the van near the rear door. The van, with (5) During the said time of the vehicular/train collision, there were no appropriate and
its air-conditioning unit turned on and the stereo playing loudly, ultimately carried all the 14 student safety warning signs and railings at the site commonly used for railroad crossing;
riders on their way to Don Bosco. Considering that the students were due at Don Bosco by 7:15
a.m., and that they were already running late because of the heavy vehicular traffic on the South
Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to an alternate route at about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow (6) At the material time, countless number of Makati bound public utility and private
path underneath the Magallanes Interchange that was then commonly used by Makati-bound vehicles used on a daily basis the site of the collision as an alternative route and short-cut
vehicles as a short cut into Makati. At the time, the narrow path was marked by piles of construction to Makati;
materials and parked passenger jeepneys, and the railroad crossing in the narrow path had no
 (7) The train driver or operator left the scene of the incident on board the commuter train
involved without waiting for the police investigator;
(8) The site commonly used for railroad crossing by motorists was not in fact intended by
the railroad operator for railroad crossing at the time of the vehicular collision;
(9) PNR received the demand letter of the spouses Zarate;
(10) PNR refused to acknowledge any liability for the vehicular/train collision;
(11) The eventual closure of the railroad crossing alleged by PNR was an internal
arrangement between the former and its project contractor; and
(12) The site of the vehicular/train collision was within the vicinity or less than 100 meters
from the Magallanes station of PNR.
B. ISSUES
(1) Whether or not defendant-driver of the van is, in the performance of his functions,
liable for negligence constituting the proximate cause of the vehicular collision, which
resulted in the death of plaintiff spouses' son;
(2) Whether or not the defendant spouses Perea being the employer of defendant Alfaro
are liable for any negligence which may be attributed to defendant Alfaro;
(3) Whether or not defendant Philippine National Railways being the operator of the
railroad system is liable for negligence in failing to provide adequate safety warning signs
and railings in the area commonly used by motorists for railroad crossings, constituting the
proximate cause of the vehicular collision which resulted in the death of the plaintiff
spouses' son;
(4) Whether or not defendant spouses Perea are liable for breach of the contract of
carriage with plaintiff-spouses in failing to provide adequate and safe transportation for the
latter's son;
(5) Whether or not defendants spouses are liable for actual, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees;
(6) Whether or not defendants spouses Teodorico and Nanette Perea observed the
diligence of employers and school bus operators;
(7) Whether or not defendant-spouses are civilly liable for the accidental death of Aaron
John Zarate;
(8) Whether or not defendant PNR was grossly negligent in operating the commuter train
involved in the accident, in allowing or tolerating the motoring public to cross, and its
failure to install safety devices or equipment at the site of the accident for the protection of
the public;
(9) Whether or not defendant PNR should be made to reimburse defendant spouses for
any and whatever amount the latter may be held answerable or which they may be
ordered to pay in favor of plaintiffs by reason of the action;
(10) Whether or not defendant PNR should pay plaintiffs directly and fully on the amounts
claimed by the latter in their Complaint by reason of its gross negligence;
(11) Whether or not defendant PNR is liable to defendants spouses for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.2
The Zarates claim against the Pereas was upon breach of the contract of carriage for the safe
transport of Aaron; but that against PNR was based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, Civil Code.
In their defense, the Pereas adduced evidence to show that they had exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro, by making sure that Alfaro had
been issued a drivers license and had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior to the
collision; that their own son had taken the van daily; and that Teodoro Perea had sometimes
accompanied Alfaro in the vans trips transporting the students to school.
For its part, PNR tended to show that the proximate cause of the collision had been the reckless
crossing of the van whose driver had not first stopped, looked and listened; and that the narrow path
traversed by the van had not been intended to be a railroad crossing for motorists.
Ruling of the RTC
On December 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,3 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants ordering them to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs as follows:
(1) (for) the death of Aaron- Php50,000.00;
(2) Actual damages in the amount of Php100,000.00;
(3) For the loss of earning capacity- Php2,109,071.00;
(4) Moral damages in the amount of Php4,000,000.00;
(5) Exemplary damages in the amount of Php1,000,000.00;
(6) Attorneys fees in the amount of Php200,000.00; and
(7) Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On June 29, 2000, the RTC denied the Pereas motion for reconsideration,4 reiterating that the
cooperative gross negligence of the Pereas and PNR had caused the collision that led to the death
of Aaron; and that the damages awarded to the Zarates were not excessive, but based on the
established circumstances.
The CAs Ruling
Both the Pereas and PNR appealed (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68916).
5 from age of 21 (the age when he would have graduated from college and started working for his own
PNR assigned the following errors, to wit:
The Court a quo erred in:
1. In finding the defendant-appellant Philippine National Railways jointly and severally
liable together with defendant-appellants spouses Teodorico and Nanette Perea and
defendant-appellant Clemente Alfaro to pay plaintiffs-appellees for the death of Aaron
Zarate and damages.
2. In giving full faith and merit to the oral testimonies of plaintiffs-appellees witnesses
despite overwhelming documentary evidence on record, supporting the case of
defendants-appellants Philippine National Railways.
The Pereas ascribed the following errors to the RTC, namely:
The trial court erred in finding defendants-appellants jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees with the other defendants.
The trial court erred in dismissing the cross-claim of the appellants Pereas against the Philippine
National Railways and in not holding the latter and its train driver primarily responsible for the
incident.
The trial court erred in awarding excessive damages and attorneys fees.
The trial court erred in awarding damages in the form of deceaseds loss of earning capacity in the
absence of sufficient basis for such an award.
On November 13, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision, affirming the findings of the RTC, but
limited the moral damages to P 2,500,000.00; and deleted the attorneys fees because the RTC did
not state the factual and legal bases, to wit:6
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260
of Paraaque City is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of Actual Damages is reduced
to P 59,502.76; Moral Damages is reduced to P 2,500,000.00; and the award for Attorneys Fees is
Deleted.
SO ORDERED.
The CA upheld the award for the loss of Aarons earning capacity, taking cognizance of the ruling in
Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Manila Railroad Company,7 wherein the Court gave
the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing the loss of the deceaseds earning capacity despite Cariaga
being only a medical student at the time of the fatal incident. Applying the formula adopted in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality:
2/3 x (80 - age at the time of death) = life expectancy
the CA determined the life expectancy of Aaron to be 39.3 years upon reckoning his life expectancy
livelihood) instead of 15 years (his age when he died). Considering that the nature of his work and
his salary at the time of Aarons death were unknown, it used the prevailing minimum wage
of P 280.00/day to compute Aarons gross annual salary to be P 110,716.65, inclusive of the
thirteenth month pay. Multiplying this annual salary by Aarons life expectancy of 39.3 years, his
gross income would aggregate to P 4,351,164.30, from which his estimated expenses in the sum
of P 2,189,664.30 was deducted to finally arrive at P 2,161,500.00 as net income. Due to Aarons
computed net income turning out to be higher than the amount claimed by the Zarates,
only P 2,109,071.00, the amount expressly prayed for by them, was granted.
On April 4, 2003, the CA denied the Pereas motion for reconsideration.8
Issues
In this appeal, the Pereas list the following as the errors committed by the CA, to wit:
I. The lower court erred when it upheld the trial courts decision holding the petitioners jointly and
severally liable to pay damages with Philippine National Railways and dismissing their cross-claim
against the latter.
II. The lower court erred in affirming the trial courts decision awarding damages for loss of earning
capacity of a minor who was only a high school student at the time of his death in the absence of
sufficient basis for such an award.
III. The lower court erred in not reducing further the amount of damages awarded, assuming
petitioners are liable at all.
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
1.
Were the Pereas and PNR jointly
and severally liable for damages?
The Zarates brought this action for recovery of damages against both the Pereas and the PNR,
basing their claim against the Pereas on breach of contract of carriage and against the PNR on
quasi-delict.
The RTC found the Pereas and the PNR negligent. The CA affirmed the findings.
 We concur with the CA.
To start with, the Pereas defense was that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro, the van driver, by seeing to it that Alfaro had a
drivers license and that he had not been involved in any vehicular accident prior to the fatal collision
with the train; that they even had their own son travel to and from school on a daily basis; and that
Teodoro Perea himself sometimes accompanied Alfaro in transporting the passengers to and from
school. The RTC gave scant consideration to such defense by regarding such defense as
inappropriate in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
We find no adequate cause to differ from the conclusions of the lower courts that the Pereas
operated as a common carrier; and that their standard of care was extraordinary diligence, not the
ordinary diligence of a good father of a family.
Although in this jurisdiction the operator of a school bus service has been usually regarded as a
private carrier,9primarily because he only caters to some specific or privileged individuals, and his
operation is neither open to the indefinite public nor for public use, the exact nature of the operation
of a school bus service has not been finally settled. This is the occasion to lay the matter to rest.
general community or population, from one offering his services only to a narrow segment of the
general population.
Nonetheless, the concept of a common carrier embodied in Article 1732 of the Civil Code coincides
neatly with the notion of public service under the Public Service Act, which supplements the law on
common carriers found in the Civil Code. Public service, according to Section 13, paragraph (b) of
the Public Service Act, includes:
x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for
hire or compensation, with general or limited clientle, whether permanent or occasional, and done
for the general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway,
subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and
whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service,
steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation
system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system,
wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar
public services. x x x.17

Given the breadth of the aforequoted characterization of a common carrier, the Court has
A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to transport or convey goods or persons from
considered as common carriers pipeline operators,18 custom brokers and warehousemen,19 and
one place to another, gratuitously or for hire. The carrier is classified either as a private/special
barge operators20 even if they had limited clientle.
carrier or as a common/public carrier.10 A private carrier is one who, without making the activity a
vocation, or without holding himself or itself out to the public as ready to act for all who may desire
his or its services, undertakes, by special agreement in a particular instance only, to transport goods As all the foregoing indicate, the true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of the
or persons from one place to another either gratuitously or for hire.11The provisions on ordinary business actually transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used in the activity,
contracts of the Civil Code govern the contract of private carriage.The diligence required of a private but whether the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to
carrier is only ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good father of the family. In contrast, a common the general public as his business or occupation. If the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part
carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or of the general business or occupation engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general public,
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering such the individual or the entity rendering such service is a private, not a common, carrier. The question
services to the public.12Contracts of common carriage are governed by the provisions on common must be determined by the character of the business actually carried on by the carrier, not by any
carriers of the Civil Code, the Public Service Act,13 and other special laws relating to transportation. secret intention or mental reservation it may entertain or assert when charged with the duties and
A common carrier is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to obligations that the law imposes.21
have acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects of passengers, or the death or injuries to
passengers.14
Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is no question that the Pereas as the
operators of a school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a
In relation to common carriers, the Court defined public use in the following terms in United States v. business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over established
Tan Piaco,15viz: roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee.
Despite catering to a limited clientle, the Pereas operated as a common carrier because they held
themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living
"Public use" is the same as "use by the public". The essential feature of the public use is not
within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite or
unrestricted quality that gives it its public character. In determining whether a use is public, we must
look not only to the character of the business to be done, but also to the proposed mode of doing it.
If the use is merely optional with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental, it is not a
public use, authorizing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the public utility commission. There must
be, in general, a right which the law compels the owner to give to the general public. It is not enough
that the general prosperity of the public is promoted. Public use is not synonymous with public
interest. The true criterion by which to judge the character of the use is whether the public may enjoy
it by right or only by permission.

In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court noted that Article 1732 of the Civil Code avoided any
distinction between a person or an enterprise offering transportation on a regular or an isolated
basis; and has not distinguished a carrier offering his services to the general public, that is, the
The common carriers standard of care and vigilance as to the safety of the passengers is defined
by law. Given the nature of the business and for reasons of public policy, the common carrier is
bound "to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case."22 Article 1755 of
the Civil Code specifies that the common carrier should "carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
due regard for all the circumstances." To successfully fend off liability in an action upon the death or
injury to a passenger, the common carrier must prove his or its observance of that extraordinary
diligence; otherwise, the legal presumption that he or it was at fault or acted negligently would
stand.23 No device, whether by stipulation, posting of notices, statements on tickets, or otherwise,
may dispense with or lessen the responsibility of the common carrier as defined under Article 1755
of the Civil Code. 24
And, secondly, the Pereas have not presented any compelling defense or reason by which the
Court might now reverse the CAs findings on their liability. On the contrary, an examination of the
records shows that the evidence fully supported the findings of the CA.
As earlier stated, the Pereas, acting as a common carrier, were already presumed to be negligent
at the time of the accident because death had occurred to their passenger.25 The presumption of
negligence, being a presumption of law, laid the burden of evidence on their shoulders to establish
that they had not been negligent.26 It was the law no less that required them to prove their
observance of extraordinary diligence in seeing to the safe and secure carriage of the passengers to
their destination. Until they did so in a credible manner, they stood to be held legally responsible for
the death of Aaron and thus to be held liable for all the natural consequences of such death.
There is no question that the Pereas did not overturn the presumption of their negligence by
credible evidence. Their defense of having observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their driver was not legally sufficient. According to Article 1759 of the
Civil Code, their liability as a common carrier did not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. This was the
reason why the RTC treated this defense of the Pereas as inappropriate in this action for breach of
contract of carriage.
The Pereas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact that their driver might have acted
beyond the scope of his authority or even in violation of the orders of the common carrier.27 In this
connection, the records showed their drivers actual negligence. There was a showing, to begin with,
that their driver traversed the railroad tracks at a point at which the PNR did not permit motorists
going into the Makati area to cross the railroad tracks. Although that point had been used by
motorists as a shortcut into the Makati area, that fact alone did not excuse their driver into taking
that route. On the other hand, with his familiarity with that shortcut, their driver was fully aware of the
risks to his passengers but he still disregarded the risks. Compounding his lack of care was that loud
music was playing inside the air-conditioned van at the time of the accident. The loudness most
probably reduced his ability to hear the warning horns of the oncoming train to allow him to correctly
appreciate the lurking dangers on the railroad tracks. Also, he sought to overtake a passenger bus
on the left side as both vehicles traversed the railroad tracks. In so doing, he lost his view of the train
that was then coming from the opposite side of the passenger bus, leading him to miscalculate his
chances of beating the bus in their race, and of getting clear of the train. As a result, the bus avoided
a collision with the train but the van got slammed at its rear, causing the fatality. Lastly, he did not
slow down or go to a full stop before traversing the railroad tracks despite knowing that his
slackening of speed and going to a full stop were in observance of the right of way at railroad tracks
as defined by the traffic laws and regulations.28 He thereby violated a specific traffic regulation on
right of way, by virtue of which he was immediately presumed to be negligent. 29
The omissions of care on the part of the van driver constituted negligence, 30 which, according to
Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 is "the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do,32 or as Judge
Cooley defines it, (t)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury."33
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case has been aptly
stated in the leading case of Picart v. Smith,34 thuswise:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to
be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against
its consequences. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the Picart v. Smith test of negligence, the Pereas driver was entirely negligent when he
traversed the railroad tracks at a point not allowed for a motorists crossing despite being fully aware
of the grave harm to be thereby caused to his passengers; and when he disregarded the foresight of
harm to his passengers by overtaking the bus on the left side as to leave himself blind to the
approach of the oncoming train that he knew was on the opposite side of the bus.
Unrelenting, the Pereas cite Phil. National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 35 where the
Court held the PNR solely liable for the damages caused to a passenger bus and its passengers
when its train hit the rear end of the bus that was then traversing the railroad crossing. But the
circumstances of that case and this one share no similarities. In Philippine National Railways v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, no evidence of contributory negligence was adduced against the
owner of the bus. Instead, it was the owner of the bus who proved the exercise of extraordinary
diligence by preponderant evidence. Also, the records are replete with the showing of negligence on
the part of both the Pereas and the PNR. Another distinction is that the passenger bus in Philippine
National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court was traversing the dedicated railroad crossing
when it was hit by the train, but the Pereas school van traversed the railroad tracks at a point not
intended for that purpose.
At any rate, the lower courts correctly held both the Pereas and the PNR "jointly and severally"
liable for damages arising from the death of Aaron. They had been impleaded in the same complaint
as defendants against whom the Zarates had the right to relief, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, in respect to or arising out of the accident, and questions of fact and of law were
common as to the Zarates.36 Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates (i.e., breach of
contract of carriage) against the Pereas was distinct from the basis of the Zarates right to relief
against the PNR (i.e., quasi-delict under Article 2176, Civil Code), they nonetheless could be held
jointly and severally liable by virtue of their respective negligence combining to cause the death of
Aaron. As to the PNR, the RTC rightly found the PNR also guilty of negligence despite the school
van of the Pereas traversing the railroad tracks at a point not dedicated by the PNR as a railroad
crossing for pedestrians and motorists, because the PNR did not ensure the safety of others through
the placing of crossbars, signal lights, warning signs, and other permanent safety barriers to prevent
vehicles or pedestrians from crossing there. The RTC observed that the fact that a crossing guard
had been assigned to man that point from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. was a good indicium that the PNR was
aware of the risks to others as well as the need to control the vehicular and other traffic there. Verily,
the Pereas and the PNR were joint tortfeasors.
2.
Was the indemnity for loss of
Aarons earning capacity proper?
The RTC awarded indemnity for loss of Aarons earning capacity. Although agreeing with the RTC
on the liability, the CA modified the amount. Both lower courts took into consideration that Aaron,
while only a high school student, had been enrolled in one of the reputable schools in the Philippines
and that he had been a normal and able-bodied child prior to his death. The basis for the
computation of Aarons earning capacity was not what he would have become or what he would
have wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the minimum wage in effect at the time of his
death. Moreover, the RTCs computation of Aarons life expectancy rate was not reckoned from his
age of 15 years at the time of his death, but on 21 years, his age when he would have graduated
from college.
We find the considerations taken into account by the lower courts to be reasonable and fully
warranted.
Yet, the Pereas submit that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity was speculative and
unfounded.1wphi1 They cited People v. Teehankee, Jr.,37 where the Court deleted the indemnity for
victim Jussi Leinos loss of earning capacity as a pilot for being speculative due to his having
graduated from high school at the International School in Manila only two years before the shooting,
and was at the time of the shooting only enrolled in the first semester at the Manila Aero Club to
pursue his ambition to become a professional pilot. That meant, according to the Court, that he was
for all intents and purposes only a high school graduate.
We reject the Pereas submission.
First of all, a careful perusal of the Teehankee, Jr. case shows that the situation there of Jussi Leino
was not akin to that of Aaron here. The CA and the RTC were not speculating that Aaron would be
some highly-paid professional, like a pilot (or, for that matter, an engineer, a physician, or a lawyer).
Instead, the computation of Aarons earning capacity was premised on him being a lowly minimum
wage earner despite his being then enrolled at a prestigious high school like Don Bosco in Makati, a
fact that would have likely ensured his success in his later years in life and at work.
And, secondly, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should not be taken against
his parents and in favor of the defendants whose negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his right
to work and earn money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and his services
as well. Our law itself states that the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased shall be the liability
of the guilty party in favor of the heirs of the deceased, and shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court "unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death."38Accordingly, we emphatically
hold in favor of the indemnification for Aarons loss of earning capacity despite him having been
unemployed, because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or earnings but for
loss of the deceaseds power or ability to earn money.39
This favorable treatment of the Zarates claim is not unprecedented. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company and Manila Railroad Company,40 fourth-year medical student Edgardo Carriagas
earning capacity, although he survived the accident but his injuries rendered him permanently
incapacitated, was computed to be that of the physician that he dreamed to become. The Court
considered his scholastic record sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished the
medical course and would have passed the medical board examinations in due time, and that he
could have possibly earned a modest income as a medical practitioner. Also, in People v.
Sanchez,41 the Court opined that murder and rape victim Eileen Sarmienta and murder victim Allan
Gomez could have easily landed good-paying jobs had they graduated in due time, and that their
jobs would probably pay them high monthly salaries from P 10,000.00 to P 15,000.00 upon their
graduation. Their earning capacities were computed at rates higher than the minimum wage at the
time of their deaths due to their being already senior agriculture students of the University of the
Philippines in Los Baos, the countrys leading educational institution in agriculture.
3.
Were the amounts of damages excessive?
The Pereas plead for the reduction of the moral and exemplary damages awarded to the Zarates in
the respective amounts of P 2,500,000.00 and P 1,000,000.00 on the ground that such amounts
were excessive.
The plea is unwarranted.
The moral damages of P 2,500,000.00 were really just and reasonable under the established
circumstances of this case because they were intended by the law to assuage the Zarates deep
mental anguish over their sons unexpected and violent death, and their moral shock over the
senseless accident. That amount would not be too much, considering that it would help the Zarates
obtain the means, diversions or amusements that would alleviate their suffering for the loss of their
child. At any rate, reducing the amount as excessive might prove to be an injustice, given the
passage of a long time from when their mental anguish was inflicted on them on August 22, 1996.
Anent the P 1,000,000.00 allowed as exemplary damages, we should not reduce the amount if only
to render effective the desired example for the public good. As a common carrier, the Pereas
needed to be vigorously reminded to observe their duty to exercise extraordinary diligence to
prevent a similarly senseless accident from happening again. Only by an award of exemplary
damages in that amount would suffice to instill in them and others similarly situated like them the
ever-present need for greater and constant vigilance in the conduct of a business imbued with public
interest.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRM the decision promulgated on
November 13, 2002; and ORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further
treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007 was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents. thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed
G.R. No. 126467 January 31, 2007 about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
NATIVIDAD (Substituted by her children MARCELINO AGANA III, ENRIQUE AGANA, JR.,
EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and ENRIQUE Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek
AGANA, Petitioners, vs. treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected
JUAN FUENTES, Respondent. the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in
width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive
G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007 organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to
remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.
MIGUEL AMPIL, Petitioner, vs.
NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents. On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a
complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
DECISION Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged that the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and
malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
Hospitals, having undertaken one of mankinds most important and delicate endeavors, must
assume the grave responsibility of pursuing it with appropriate care. The care and service dispensed Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
through this high trust, however technical, complex and esoteric its character may be, must meet administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes,
standards of responsibility commensurate with the undertaking to preserve and protect the health, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1690. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with
and indeed, the very lives of those placed in the hospitals keeping. 1 respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the
United States.
Assailed in these three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals
Decision2 dated September 6, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 affirming On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was duly
with modification the Decision3 dated March 17, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, substituted by her above-named children (the Aganas).
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43322 and nullifying its Order dated September 21, 1993. On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and
The facts, as culled from the records, are: Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice, the decretal part of which reads:

On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs ordering the defendants
Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., DR. MIGUEL AMPIL and DR. JUAN FUENTES to pay to the
medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering plaintiffs, jointly and severally, except in respect of the award for exemplary damages and the
from "cancer of the sigmoid." interest thereon which are the liabilities of defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes only, as follows:

On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff4 of the Medical City Hospital, performed 1. As actual damages, the following amounts:
an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had a. The equivalent in Philippine Currency of the total of US$19,900.00 at the rate
spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained of P21.60-US$1.00, as reimbursement of actual expenses incurred in the
the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. United States of America;
No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy on her.
b. The sum of P4,800.00 as travel taxes of plaintiffs and their physician
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and daughter;
closed the incision.
c. The total sum of P45,802.50, representing the cost of hospitalization at
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation dated April Polymedic Hospital, medical fees, and cost of the saline solution;
11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks:
2. As moral damages, the sum of P2,000,000.00;
"sponge count lacking 2
3. As exemplary damages, the sum of P300,000.00;
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."
4. As attorneys fees, the sum of P250,000.00;
On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital. Her hospital and medical bills, including
the doctors fees, amounted to P60,000.00. 5. Legal interest on items 1 (a), (b), and (c); 2; and 3 hereinabove, from date of filing of the
complaint until full payment; and
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted
both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of 6. Costs of suit.
the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous
nodes which were not removed during the operation. SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 42062.
Incidentally, on April 3, 1993, the Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for a partial execution of its
Decision, which was granted in an Order dated May 11, 1993. Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon
certain properties of Dr. Ampil and sold them for P451,275.00 and delivered the amount to the
Aganas.
Following their receipt of the money, the Aganas entered into an agreement with PSI and Dr.
Fuentes to indefinitely suspend any further execution of the RTC Decision. However, not long
thereafter, the Aganas again filed a motion for an alias writ of execution against the properties of PSI
and Dr. Fuentes. On September 21, 1993, the RTC granted the motion and issued the
corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32198. During its
pendency, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution5 dated October 29, 1993 granting Dr. Fuentes
prayer for injunctive relief.
On January 24, 1994, CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 was consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 42062.
Meanwhile, on January 23, 1995, the PRC Board of Medicine rendered its Decision 6 in
Administrative Case No. 1690 dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes. The Board held that the
prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside
Natividads body; and that he concealed such fact from Natividad.
On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision jointly disposing of CA-G.R. CV
No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198, thus:
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the case against defendant-appellant Dr. Juan
Fuentes is hereby DISMISSED, and with the pronouncement that defendant-appellant Dr. Miguel
Ampil is liable to reimburse defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount the
latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant appeal DISMISSED.
Concomitant with the above, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein defendant-
appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes in CA-G.R. SP No. 32198 is hereby GRANTED and the challenged order
of the respondent judge dated September 21, 1993, as well as the alias writ of execution issued
pursuant thereto are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The bond posted by the petitioner in
connection with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 29, 1993 is
hereby cancelled.
Costs against defendants-appellants Dr. Miguel Ampil and Professional Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Only Dr. Ampil filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution 7 dated December
19, 1996.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
In G.R. No. 126297, PSI alleged in its petition that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) it is
estopped from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil is not its employee; (2) it is solidarily liable with Dr.
Ampil; and (3) it is not entitled to its counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that Dr. Ampil is
not its employee, but a mere consultant or independent contractor. As such, he alone should answer
for his negligence.
In G.R. No. 126467, the Aganas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes
is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They
contend that the pieces of gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been
negligent.
Finally, in G.R. No. 127590, Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him liable for
negligence and malpractice sans evidence that he left the two pieces of gauze in Natividads vagina.
He pointed to other probable causes, such as: (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing
the hysterectomy; (2) the attending nurses failure to properly count the gauzes used during surgery;
and (3) the medical intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad in the United
States of America.
For our resolution are these three vital issues: first, whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr.
Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice; second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving
Dr. Fuentes of any liability; and third, whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of
Dr. Ampil.
I - G.R. No. 127590
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil
Liable for Negligence and Malpractice.
Dr. Ampil, in an attempt to absolve himself, gears the Courts attention to other possible causes of
Natividads detriment. He argues that the Court should not discount either of the following
possibilities: first, Dr. Fuentes left the gauzes in Natividads body after performing hysterectomy;
second, the attending nurses erred in counting the gauzes; and third, the American doctors were the
ones who placed the gauzes in Natividads body.
Dr. Ampils arguments are purely conjectural and without basis. Records show that he did not
present any evidence to prove that the American doctors were the ones who put or left the gauzes in
Natividads body. Neither did he submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of operation,
particularly the number of gauzes used. As to the alleged negligence of Dr. Fuentes, we are mindful
that Dr. Ampil examined his (Dr. Fuentes) work and found it in order.
The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together, as specified by the Court of
Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party, thus:
First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding
of the patient during the surgical operation.
Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in
their report that the sponge count (was) lacking 2; that such anomaly was announced to
surgeon and that a search was done but to no avail prompting Dr. Ampil to continue for
closure x x x.
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body
of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was performed.
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the
wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon.8 To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an
inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is
negligence per se.9
Of course, the Court is not blind to the reality that there are times when danger to a patients life
precludes a surgeon from further searching missing sponges or foreign objects left in the body. But
this does not leave him free from any obligation. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was
required by the urgent necessities of the case to leave a sponge in his patients abdomen, because
of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to so inform his patient within a
reasonable time thereafter by advising her of what he had been compelled to do. This is in order that
she might seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might
permit. The ruling in Smith v. Zeagler10 is explicit, thus:
The removal of all sponges used is part of a surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon
fails to remove a sponge he has placed in his patients body that should be removed as part of the
operation, he thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and creates a new condition which imposes
upon him the legal duty of calling the new condition to his patients attention, and endeavoring with
the means he has at hand to minimize and avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even
misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had
he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to
remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil
has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To
successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient.11 Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as
gauzes, from Natividads body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty
to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad,
necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampils
negligence is the proximate cause12 of Natividads injury could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still
missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividads vagina established the causal link
between Dr. Ampils negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his
deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
II - G.R. No. 126467
Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving
Dr. Fuentes of any Liability
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on the ground
that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces
of gauze were left inside Natividads body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes negligence.
We are not convinced.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise
a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of
fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.13 Stated differently, where the thing which caused the
injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is
such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendants want
of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and
diligence.14
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the
control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course
of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and
(4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental
is the "control and management of the thing which caused the injury."15
We find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be
wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He
requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found
that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the
surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding
everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed
operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed
him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced
gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period,
Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the
surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders.16 As
stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship."
That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform
a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr.
Fuentes permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was this act
of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained
unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the
thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.17 In other
words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not
by Dr. Fuentes.
III - G.R. No. 126297
Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil
The third issue necessitates a glimpse at the historical development of hospitals and the resulting
theories concerning their liability for the negligence of physicians.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, hospitals were generally charitable institutions, providing medical
services to the lowest classes of society, without regard for a patients ability to pay.18 Those who
could afford medical treatment were usually treated at home by their doctors.19 However, the days of
house calls and philanthropic health care are over. The modern health care industry continues to
distance itself from its charitable past and has experienced a significant conversion from a not-for-
profit health care to for-profit hospital businesses. Consequently, significant changes in health law
have accompanied the business-related changes in the hospital industry. One important legal
change is an increase in hospital liability for medical malpractice. Many courts now allow claims for
hospital vicarious liability under the theories of respondeat superior, apparent authority, ostensible
authority, or agency by estoppel. 20
In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability for negligent acts is Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the rule governing vicarious liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, thus:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. x x x x x x
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. x x x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
A prominent civilist commented that professionals engaged by an employer, such as physicians,
dentists, and pharmacists, are not "employees" under this article because the manner in which they
perform their work is not within the control of the latter (employer). In other words, professionals are
considered personally liable for the fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties,
and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence. In the context of the present
case, "a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in the
treatment or operation of patients."21
The foregoing view is grounded on the traditional notion that the professional status and the very
nature of the physicians calling preclude him from being classed as an agent or employee of a
hospital, whenever he acts in a professional capacity.22 It has been said that medical practice strictly
involves highly developed and specialized knowledge,23 such that physicians are generally free to
exercise their own skill and judgment in rendering medical services sans interference.24 Hence,
when a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to
subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own responsibility.25
The case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital26 was then considered an authority for this
view. The "Schloendorff doctrine" regards a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an
independent contractor because of the skill he exercises and the lack of control exerted over his
work. Under this doctrine, hospitals are exempt from the application of the respondeat superior
principle for fault or negligence committed by physicians in the discharge of their profession.
However, the efficacy of the foregoing doctrine has weakened with the significant developments in
medical care. Courts came to realize that modern hospitals are increasingly taking active role in
supplying and regulating medical care to patients. No longer were a hospitals functions limited to
furnishing room, food, facilities for treatment and operation, and attendants for its patients. Thus, in
Bing v. Thunig,27 the New York Court of Appeals deviated from the Schloendorff doctrine, noting that
modern hospitals actually do far more than provide facilities for treatment. Rather, they regularly
employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of physicians, interns, nurses, administrative and manual
workers. They charge patients for medical care and treatment, even collecting for such services
through legal action, if necessary. The court then concluded that there is no reason to exempt
hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior.
In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is rendered
inconsequential in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals 28 that for
purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This Court
held:
"We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident. The unique practice
(among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting "consultants," who
are allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence
in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is more apparent than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in
the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for consultant slots,
visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational
qualifications, generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of
fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members
of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or
reject the application. x x x.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to
attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents,
moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the
privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients
into the hospital. In addition to these, the physicians performance as a specialist is generally
evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and
feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a
consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer
review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-
employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a
relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing,
we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. "
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSIs liability. Its liability is also
anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of
corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospitals liability for
negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a perfect platform to test the
applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our jurisprudence.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding
out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel,29 has its origin from the law of
agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather
because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing
that the relationship or the authority exists.30 The concept is essentially one of estoppel and has
been explained in this manner:
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly
permits the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The
question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a
situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the
particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular
act in question.31
The applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital liability was upheld long time ago in
Irving v. Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc.32 There, it was explicitly stated that "there does not
appear to be any rational basis for excluding the concept of apparent authority from the field of
hospital liability." Thus, in cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a
particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from
that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the
hospital will be liable for the physicians negligence.
Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept of an agency by implication or estoppel. Article 1869 of the
Civil Code reads:
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack
of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf
without authority.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing all
the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the
public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence." Indeed, PSIs act is tantamount to
holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality
health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of
them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital
or its employees, agents, or servants. The trial court correctly pointed out:
x x x regardless of the education and status in life of the patient, he ought not be burdened with the
defense of absence of employer-employee relationship between the hospital and the independent
physician whose name and competence are certainly certified to the general public by the hospitals
act of listing him and his specialty in its lobby directory, as in the case herein. The high costs of
todays medical and health care should at least exact on the hospital greater, if not broader, legal
responsibility for the conduct of treatment and surgery within its facility by its accredited physician or
surgeon, regardless of whether he is independent or employed."33
The wisdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy to discern. Corporate entities, like PSI, are
capable of acting only through other individuals, such as physicians. If these accredited physicians
do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its mission of offering quality medical services and thus
profits financially. Logically, where negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not
be allowed to escape liability for the acts of its ostensible agents.
We now proceed to the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility.
One allegation in the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-43332 for negligence and malpractice is that PSI
as owner, operator and manager of Medical City Hospital, "did not perform the necessary
supervision nor exercise diligent efforts in the supervision of Drs. Ampil and Fuentes and its nursing
staff, resident doctors, and medical interns who assisted Drs. Ampil and Fuentes in the performance
of their duties as surgeons."34 Premised on the doctrine of corporate negligence, the trial court held
that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty.
We agree with the trial court.
Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate negligence as the judicial answer to the problem
of allocating hospitals liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support
the application of respondeat superior or apparent authority. Its formulation proceeds from the
judiciarys acknowledgment that in these modern times, the duty of providing quality medical service
is no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility of the physician. The modern hospitals have
changed structure. Hospitals now tend to organize a highly professional medical staff whose
competence and performance need to be monitored by the hospitals commensurate with their
inherent responsibility to provide quality medical care.35
The doctrine has its genesis in Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital.36 There, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that "the jury could have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in failing to have a
sufficient number of trained nurses attending the patient; failing to require a consultation with or
examination by members of the hospital staff; and failing to review the treatment rendered to the
patient." On the basis of Darling, other jurisdictions held that a hospitals corporate negligence
extends to permitting a physician known to be incompetent to practice at the hospital. 37 With the
passage of time, more duties were expected from hospitals, among them: (1) the use of reasonable
care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the selection and
retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all persons who practice
medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and
policies that ensure quality care for its patients.38 Thus, in Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v.
Misevich,39 it was held that a hospital, following the doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty
to see that it meets the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the
proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. And in Bost v. Riley,40 the court concluded
that a patient who enters a hospital does so with the reasonable expectation that it will attempt to
cure him. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee
the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians practicing in its premises.
In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the
purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public.
Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted
into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty. The findings of
the trial court are convincing, thus:
x x x PSIs liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the
nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSIs part in the dark conspiracy of silence
and concealment about the gauzes. Ethical considerations, if not also legal, dictated the holding of
an immediate inquiry into the events, if not for the benefit of the patient to whom the duty is primarily
owed, then in the interest of arriving at the truth. The Court cannot accept that the medical and the
healing professions, through their members like defendant surgeons, and their institutions like PSIs
hospital facility, can callously turn their backs on and disregard even a mere probability of mistake or
negligence by refusing or failing to investigate a report of such seriousness as the one in Natividads
case.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the
Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is
reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive
knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two
pieces of gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans,41 it was held that a corporation is bound by the
knowledge acquired by or notice given to its agents or officers within the scope of their authority and
in reference to a matter to which their authority extends. This means that the knowledge of any of
the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the
attending nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts
to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence
committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176. In Fridena,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held:
x x x In recent years, however, the duty of care owed to the patient by the hospital has expanded.
The emerging trend is to hold the hospital responsible where the hospital has failed to monitor and
review medical services being provided within its walls. See Kahn Hospital Malpractice Prevention,
27 De Paul . Rev. 23 (1977).
Among the cases indicative of the emerging trend is Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75,500 P.
2d 335 (1972). In Purcell, the hospital argued that it could not be held liable for the malpractice of a
medical practitioner because he was an independent contractor within the hospital. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the hospital had created a professional staff whose competence and
performance was to be monitored and reviewed by the governing body of the hospital, and the court
held that a hospital would be negligent where it had knowledge or reason to believe that a doctor
using the facilities was employing a method of treatment or care which fell below the recognized
standard of care.
Subsequent to the Purcell decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a hospital has certain
inherent responsibilities regarding the quality of medical care furnished to patients within its walls
and it must meet the standards of responsibility commensurate with this undertaking. Beeck v.
Tucson General Hospital, 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P. 2d 1153 (1972). This court has confirmed the
rulings of the Court of Appeals that a hospital has the duty of supervising the competence of the
doctors on its staff. x x x.
In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs did plead that the operation was performed at the hospital
with its knowledge, aid, and assistance, and that the negligence of the defendants was the
proximate cause of the patients injuries. We find that such general allegations of negligence, along
with the evidence produced at the trial of this case, are sufficient to support the hospitals liability
based on the theory of negligent supervision."
Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be
emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision of the latter. In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under
the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable with
Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also directly liable to the Aganas.
One final word. Once a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes
on him certain obligations. In order to escape liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of
learning, skill and experience required by his profession. At the same time, he must apply
reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his knowledge, and
exert his best judgment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY all the petitions and AFFIRM the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198.
Costs against petitioners PSI and Dr. Miguel Ampil.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173870 April 25, 2012
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY MARJORIE B.
MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD,
LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the registered owner of a motor vehicle challenges the
Decision2 dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held
him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over by the said vehicle.
Factual Antecedents
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse
Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a
Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok
Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-
600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of
petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-103473 for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13, 1997, said court declared Allan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.4
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of
the six minor children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,6 an independent civil action
for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged
employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen
(Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for
the reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the award of attorneys fees, moral
and exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims, and loss of net income
earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public school teacher at the time of her death.7
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the
Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and
that they were never the employers of Allan.8 For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself.
He alleged that Allan and his friends9stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented
house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can
easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but
without any headlights on.10 And implying that this was the manner by which the vehicle was illegally
taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements11 of Jemar Alarcon
(Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of
the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights
were off. Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping
case against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380.12 The case was,
however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.13
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother, Rodrigo
Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver.14 In any event, Allans employment as
conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served as
such conductor only from the first week of December until December 14, 1992.15 In support of this,
Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio "Junior" Baobao
(Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to
Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that
Crecencio started to work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992.16 Cresencio, for his part,
testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and
that Rodrigo was his driver.17 He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he
never bothered to verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his
brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.18
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would be parked
beside Rodrigos rented house19 for the next early-morning operation.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to
December 14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and
Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan every time he would
board the jeep in going to Molave and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on
December 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan
used to park the jeep at the yard of his house.20 Jose likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep
conductor during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-December of 1992.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision22 dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability
for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary
capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a
presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an
injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things, the accident
would not have happened had there been an exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr.,
as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in
whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that
the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have
taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like
Allan. The RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight
constitute negligence making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused
by the same.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Allan
Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering
1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of insolvency, for
defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo Monsalud,
Sr.;
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda Monsalud;
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings.
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and
NORMA DEL CARMEN.
SO ORDERED.23
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration24 contending that the provision on vicarious liability of the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code25 requires the existence of employer-employee
relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the tort
occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a driver
but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove the
jeep.
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at the time of
the accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep could not
have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380
(carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person but by
at least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and the deep canal
which separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a house.26
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order27 dated June 21, 2000 granted the
Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal
acts of his employee, the latter should have committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The
court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the
discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property owner
cannot be made responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts
of another. It then adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved
from all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its July 11, 2006 Decision,29 the CA granted the appeal.
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was an
employer-employee relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in
the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those of
Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness
presented by Geronimo, Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the
place. His testimony was also unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice 30 during
the last two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios testimony, the appellate court found it
puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the jeep was the subject of
an accident when it was his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Oscar
Jr.s asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Cresencio testified that he
replaced a certain Sumagang Jr.31
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on
the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the
injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s
defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his
companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have
given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited
the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees assigned to the said
jeep; after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where Allan also
lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area
was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even
without the ignition key.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21
June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case No.
96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN
MAGLASANG are held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants:
 1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and
Glenda Monsalud in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for the total
amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each
for the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
(collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of Seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00);
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for the death
of the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00);
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Issues
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that
the CA erred in:
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and conjectures;
misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings of the trial court;
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the disposition of
the appeal and [in going] beyond the issues of the case.33
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which
was in accord with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee should
have been done within the scope of his assigned tasks for an employer to be held liable under
culpa aquiliana. However, the CA never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans
driving the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as conductor.
Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a registered
owner of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply to
him. He asserts that although Allan and his companions were not found to have committed the crime
of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly
taken by them from a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle was running without its
headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started without the ignition key.
Our Ruling
Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged
cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his
jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was
indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions,
notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for
insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the
evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required was likewise not met to support Oscar
Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before the police
that when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January
1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with
Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and Joven Orot. 34
xxxx
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on December
31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,]
January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride
together with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.35
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who
was driving the jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigos
testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by at least five people so that it
could start without the ignition key.
On direct examination,36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him
about the accident on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz:
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what did he
carry with him if any and turned over to you?
 A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition key
should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time
Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should
have also returned the key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the
police for reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never
presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan
really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the
key to Allan Maglasang. Is that correct?
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he turned it over
to the police.
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it was driven
by Allan Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily given by Rodrigo
Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
A: I was not there.
Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir, I was not there.38
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-accused x x x
[n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel]
Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992, your jeep
was carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is that
correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the co-accused
of Allan Maglasang, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was carnapped, is
that correct?
A: Yes Sir.39
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep was
stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the
headlights were not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently established during the trial.
Besides, the fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of
ignition key in starting the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems,
broken headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the defense of
unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. The evidence
on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally,
the thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his
vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured area not remote to the watchful
senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the
ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical
explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of
care."40 Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience,
since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof
of negligence."41 It "recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff
to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part."42 The doctrine is based partly on "the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms."43
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.44
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would
suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said
vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the
power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who
may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the
responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same
precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary
action or contribution on their part.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor
can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles
running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to
forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.47
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use48 or that the subject vehicle was stolen49 which are
valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict
resulting from his jeeps use.1wphi1
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the awards made. In
addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,50 an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment
of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount
upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.

The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 11,
against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with further
diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so. MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be
imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave,
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such
implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had expressly imposed restrictions
as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by SO ORDERED.
the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already
mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its
use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles
operation, including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.

The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries
consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owners
vehicle in connection with his employment.

Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his

employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr.
contends that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability
for the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.

The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,45 the car of therein
respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice
president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said
provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor
vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.46 We have already ratiocinated that:
 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION consequently bore a scar as well. About a year after, on April 30, 1993, scar revision had to be
performed at the same hospital.11 The surgical operation left a healed linear scar in Noras left arm
about three inches in length, the thickest portion rising about one-fourth (1/4) of an inch from the
G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007
surface of the skin. The costs of the skin grafting and the scar revision were shouldered by the
hospital.12
DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE, Petitioner,
vs.
Unfortunately, Noras arm would never be the same.1a\^/phi1.net Aside from the unsightly mark, the
SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO, Respondents.
pain in her left arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her movements
now are also restricted. Her children cannot play with the left side of her body as they might
DECISION accidentally bump the injured arm, which aches at the slightest touch.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution2 dated November
19, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58184, which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated March 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, in Civil Case
No. Q-93-16562.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus
Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was
admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992.
Thus, on June 21, 1993, respondent spouses filed a complaint13 for damages against petitioner, Dr.
Abad, and the hospital. Finding in favor of respondent spouses, the trial court decreed:
In view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, directing the latters, (sic) jointly and severally
(a) to pay the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in moral damages;
(b) to pay the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) exemplary
damages;
(c) to pay the sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) nominal damages;

At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at around
(d) to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for and as attorneys fees; and
3:30 a.m., Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which
were not completely expelled from her womb after delivery. Consequently, Nora suffered
hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure to "40" over "0." Petitioner and the (e) to pay Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) litigation expenses.
assisting resident physician performed various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to
restore Noras blood pressure. Her blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a
SO ORDERED.14
sphygmomanometer. While petitioner was massaging Noras uterus for it to contract and stop
bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby.4 Nora remained unconscious until she
recovered. Petitioner, Dr. Abad, and the hospital all appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the trial court decision, thus:
While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gaping
wound two and a half (2 ) by three and a half (3 ) inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed Decision
to the armpit.5 He asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was informed it was a burn. dated March 3, 1997 of Branch 98 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-93-
Forthwith, on April 22, 1992, John David filed a request for investigation. 6 In response, Dr. Rainerio 16562, the same is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
S. Abad, the medical director of the hospital, called petitioner and the assisting resident physician to
explain what happened. Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff caused the injury. 1. Ordering defendant-appellant Dra. Milagros [L.] Cantre only to pay plaintiffs-appellees
John David Go and Nora S. Go the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
On May 7, 1992, John David brought Nora to the National Bureau of Investigation for a physical
examination, which was conducted by medico-legal officer Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr.7 The medico-legal 2. Deleting the award [of] exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of
officer later testified that Noras injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight when placed near litigation;1awphi1.nt
the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn.8 He dismissed the likelihood that the wound
was caused by a blood pressure cuff as the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the
arm.9 3. Dismissing the complaint with respect to defendants-appellants Dr. Rainerio S. Abad
and Delgado Clinic, Inc.;

On May 22, 1992, Noras injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial
Hospital for skin grafting.10 Her wound was covered with skin sourced from her abdomen, which 4. Dismissing the counterclaims of defendants-appellants for lack of merit; and
 5. Ordering defendant-appellant Dra. Milagros [L.] Cantre only to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant
petition assigning the following as errors and issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT, THE LOWER COURT, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF THEIR DISCRETION WHEN, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT BOTH PARTIES
HAVE RESTED THEIR RESPECTIVE CASES, THE LOWER COURT ADMITTED THE
ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS FURTHER OFFERED BY RESPONDENTS NOT TESTIFIED TO BY ANY
WITNESS AND THIS DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WAS UPHELD BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS LIKEWISE COMMITTING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION
WHEN, CONTRARY TO PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER,
IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NOT AMPLY SHOWED THAT THE DROPLIGHT DID NOT
TOUCH THE BODY OF MRS. NORA GO, AND THIS DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WAS
UPHELD BY THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE COMMITTING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION
WHEN, CONTRARY TO PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER,
IT RULED THAT PETITIONER DRA. CANTRE WAS NOT ABLE TO AMPLY EXPLAIN HOW THE
INJURY (BLISTERS) IN THE LEFT INNER ARM OF RESPONDENT MRS. GO CAME ABOUT;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT MADE A RULING ON THE RESPONDENTS INJURY QUOTING THE
TESTIMONY OF SOMEONE WHO WAS NOT PRESENT AND HAS NOT SEEN THE ORIGINAL,
FRESH INJURY OF RESPONDENT MRS. NORA GO;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSING ITS DISCRETION RULED
THAT PETITIONER DRA. CANTRE SHOULD HAVE INTENDED TO INFLICT THE INJURY TO
SAVE THE LIFE OF RESPONDENT MRS. GO;
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT [OF] APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, CONTRARY TO THE DETAILED PROCEDURES DONE
BY PETITIONER, BOTH RULED THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS LEFT TO THE CARE OF THE
NURSING STAFF;
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN, CONTRARY TO THE MEDICAL PURPOSES OF COSMETIC SURGERY, IT RULED THAT
THE COSMETIC SURGERY MADE THE SCARS EVEN MORE UGLY AND DECLARED THE
COSMETIC SURGERY A FAILURE;
VIII.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ABUSE OF (SIC) DISCRETION WHEN,
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENTS CONTRARY TESTIMONIES AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY
TESTIMONY, IT RULED THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AND WHICH WAS UPHELD,
ALTHOUGH MODIFIED, BY THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ABUSING ITS DISCRETION.16
Petitioner contends that additional documentary exhibits not testified to by any witness are
inadmissible in evidence because they deprived her of her constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against her. Petitioner insists the droplight could not have touched Noras body. She
maintains the injury was due to the constant taking of Noras blood pressure. Petitioner also
insinuates the Court of Appeals was misled by the testimony of the medico-legal officer who never
saw the original injury before plastic surgery was performed. Finally, petitioner stresses that plastic
surgery was not intended to restore respondents injury to its original state but rather to prevent
further complication.
Respondents, however, counter that the genuineness and due execution of the additional
documentary exhibits were duly admitted by petitioners counsel. Respondents point out that
petitioners blood pressure cuff theory is highly improbable, being unprecedented in medical history
and that the injury was definitely caused by the droplight. At any rate, they argue, even if the injury
was brought about by the blood pressure cuff, petitioner was still negligent in her duties as Noras
attending physician.
Simply put, the threshold issues for resolution are: (1) Are the questioned additional exhibits
admissible in evidence? (2) Is petitioner liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora Go?
Thereafter, the inquiry is whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in its
assailed issuances.
As to the first issue, we agree with the Court of Appeals that said exhibits are admissible in
evidence. We note that the questioned exhibits consist mostly of Noras medical records, which were
produced by the hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. Petitioners counsel
admitted the existence of the same when they were formally offered for admission by the trial court.
In any case, given the particular circumstances of this case, a ruling on the negligence of petitioner
may be made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the absence of such additional
exhibits.
Petitioners contention that the medico-legal officer who conducted Noras physical examination
never saw her original injury before plastic surgery was performed is without basis and contradicted
by the records. Records show that the medico-legal officer conducted the physical examination on
May 7, 1992, while the skin grafting and the scar revision were performed on Nora on May 22, 1992
and April 30, 1993, respectively.
Coming now to the substantive matter, is petitioner liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora
Go?
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their
patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This
notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because
physicians are not guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their
patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is
proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused.17
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of
an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument
causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.18
As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Noras arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence
in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of
giving birth. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no
moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under
the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for
the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons
control.19 In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in
charge during the delivery of Noras baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the
use of the droplight and the taking of Noras blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the
blood pressure cuff is also within petitioners exclusive control.
Third, the gaping wound on Noras left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could
only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while
in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to
her own injury.
Petitioners defense that Noras wound was caused not by the droplight but by the constant taking of
her blood pressure, even if the latter was necessary given her condition, does not absolve her from
liability. As testified to by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is to deflate
the blood pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can cause injury to
the patient similar to what could have happened in this case. Thus, if Noras wound was caused by
the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of Noras blood pressure must have been done so
negligently as to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm,20 for which petitioner cannot escape
liability under the "captain of the ship" doctrine.
Further, petitioners argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic
procedure, but rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help her case. It does not
negate negligence on her part.
Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner was negligent in the exercise of her
profession stands unrebutted. In this connection, the Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done.
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a
proximate result of petitioners negligence.
We note, however, that petitioner has served well as Noras obstetrician for her past three
successful deliveries. This is the first time petitioner is being held liable for damages due to
negligence in the practice of her profession. The fact that petitioner promptly took care of Noras
wound before infection and other complications set in is also indicative of petitioners good
intentions. We also take note of the fact that Nora was suffering from a critical condition when the
injury happened, such that saving her life became petitioners elemental concern. Nonetheless, it
should be stressed that all these could not justify negligence on the part of petitioner.
Hence, considering the specific circumstances in the instant case, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Further, we rule that the
Court of Appeals award of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000) as moral damages in favor of
respondents and against petitioner is just and equitable.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution dated
November 19, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58184 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.