Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

*
On official leave per Special Order No. 520 dated September 19, 2008.
**
No part. Justice Nachura participated in the present case as Solicitor General.
THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of

Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that2[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al.
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 10643[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

1[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), pp. 37-43. CA-G.R. CV No. 71118, promulgated on December 9, 2004.
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M.
Bato, Jr., concurring.
2[2]
Id. at 47-54; Annex C. Spl. Civil Case No. 5403. Penned by Judge Niovady M. Marin, RTC, Kalibo,
Branch 5.
3[3]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 101-114. Annex F. Classifying Boracay Island Situated in the
Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan Into Forestland (Protection Purposes) and Into Agricultural
Land (Alienable and Disposable) Pursuant to Presidential Decreee No. 705 (Revised Forestry Reform
Code of the Philippines). Issued on May 22, 2006.
 Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4[4] who live in the bone-
shaped islands three barangays.5[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.7[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 18018[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves
and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants

4[4]
As of the year 2000. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/boracay.htm.
5[5]
Manoc-Manoc, Balabag, and Yapak. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru6/boracay.htm.
6[6]
Under Survey Plan No. NR-06-000001.
7[7]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 49.
8[8]
Id. at 21-23; Annex B. Declaring Certain Islands, Coves, and Peninsulas in the Philippines as Tourist
Zones and Marine Reserves Under the Administration and Control of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
9[9]
Id. at 24-27. Rules and Regulations Governing Activities at Boracay Island Tourist Zone.
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its

implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since
the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.
Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code,11[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the

following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels
of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees
and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12[12]

10[10]
Records, pp. 13-32; Annexes A to A-18.
11[11]
Issued on May 19, 1975.
12[12]
Records, p. 148.
 The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to
the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13[13]

The RTC took judicial notice14[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay
Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15[15] The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-

claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the
petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the
land.

SO ORDERED.17[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands

titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular
No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands.19[19] The trial court cited Sections 8720[20] and 5321[21] of the Public Land Act
13[13]
Id.
14[14]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 2.
15[15]
Records, p. 148.
16[16]
Id. at 177, 178.
17[17]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 54.
18[18]
Id. at 51.
19[19]
Id.; PTA Circular No. 3-82, Rule VIII, Sec. 1(3) states:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.
as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23[23] The
Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.24[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25[25]

Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426[26] classifying Boracay

20[20]
Sec. 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the President are not registered under the
Land Registration Act, the Solicitor-General, if requested to do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of section fifty-three of this Act.
21[21]
Sec. 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the opinion of the President the
public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or
occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapter or of
the Land Registration Act, stating in substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or
occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has not been brought into
court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to such land be settled and
adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the right to
occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in
accordance with the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
22[22]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 51.
23[23]
Id. at 211-121.
24[24]
Id. at 42.
25[25]
Id. at 45-46.
Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27[27] Wilfredo

Gelito,28[28] and other landowners29[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
1064.30[30] They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class
resorts on their lots.31[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32[32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not

have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public

26[26]
Supra note 3.
27[27]
Owner of Waling-Waling Beach Resort and Chairman of the Board of Boracay Foundation, Inc.
28[28]
Owner of Willys Beach Resort.
29[29]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 20; Annex A.
30[30]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 173775 claim that they are also petitioners in the declaratory case filed in
November 1997 before the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan, docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. 5403 and now before this
Court as G.R. No. 167707.
31[31]
Rollo (G.R No. 173775), pp. 4-5.
32[32]
Id. at 4.
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of
Boracay Island.33[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly
situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,
SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON
NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF
BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED
YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-

33[33]
Id. at 143.
34[34]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 26.
 REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF
RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF
THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?35[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-

claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have
a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other
pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36[36] in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA
No. 141;37[37] (b) Proclamation No. 180138[38] issued by then President Marcos; and
(c) Proclamation No. 106439[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We

35[35]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 280-281.
36[36]
An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the
Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes. Issued on July 1, 1902.
37[37]
An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain. Approved on
December 1, 1936.
38[38]
See note 8.
39[39]
See note 3.
shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber.40[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following
divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by
law,41[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.42[42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.43[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44[44] Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.48[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the

40[40]
CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
41[41]
CONSTITUTION (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10.
42[42]
Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 830.
43[43]
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3.
44[44]
Id.
45[45]
Zarate v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 322; Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998).
46[46]
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
47[47]
Zarate v. Director of Lands, supra; Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002,
390 SCRA 343; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219
SCRA 339.
48[48]
Republic v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 157306, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 265; Zarate v. Director of
Lands, supra.
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.49[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50[50] The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.51[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the
Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic
registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53[53] partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory
information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under
certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54[54] Under Section 393 of
the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55[55]
when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of
ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession
which must be actual, public, and adverse,56[56] from the date of its inscription.57[57]
However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
49[49]
De los Reyes v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-47331, June 21, 1983, 122 SCRA 652, citing Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381.
50[50]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra.
51[51]
Id., citing separate opinion of then Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, and Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, supra note 46.
52[52]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
53[53]
Effective February 13, 1894.
54[54]
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, 13 Phil. 159 (1909).
55[55]
A valid title based upon adverse possession or a valid title based upon prescription. Noblejas, A.H.
and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 39, citing Cruz v. De Leon, 21 Phil.
199 (1912).
56[56]
Ten (10) years, according to Archbishop of Manila v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593 (1915).
57[57]
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra at 8.
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands
would revert to the State.58[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or
royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado
or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion
posesoria or possessory information title.59[59]

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines
under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60[60] By this law,
lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3)
grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61[61] The
act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). 62[62] It also provided the
definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.63[63] Interpreting the meaning
58[58]
Id. at 9; Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 36827, 56622 & 70076, December
10, 1990, 192 SCRA 121, 137.
59[59]
Id. at 5-11.
60[60]
See note 36.
61[61]
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 601.
62[62]
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra note 55, at 347.
63[63]
The provisions relevant to the definition are:
Sec. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and
except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and
productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and
regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the
approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him
to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or
amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and
effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed
sixteen hectares in extent.
Sec. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to
enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and
royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to
secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents,
without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not
more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied
by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in
Mapa v. Insular Government:64[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act

No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber
or mineral lands. x x x65[65] (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system. 66[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act

No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.67[67] Under the Act, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the
next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.68[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive

Sec. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered,
on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale
and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts
and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in
said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the
sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any
corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether
the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual
and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of
not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or
encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of
rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.
64[64]
10 Phil. 175 (1908).
65[65]
Id. at 182.
66[66]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
67[67]
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra note 55.
68[68]
Sec. 54, par. 6.
law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70[70] and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.71[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874
of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial
or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,72[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,73[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74[74]

The issuance of PD No. 89275[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use
of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76[76] Under the
decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77[77] shall be

69[69]
Sec. 45(b); Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112172, November 20, 2000, 345
SCRA 96; Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 78.
70[70]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, see separate opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v. Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 51, and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note
46.
71[71]
Sec. 2.
72[72]
An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty-Eight of Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Forty-One, Otherwise Known as the Public Land Act. Approved on June 22, 1957.
73[73]
Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain
Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years
Commencing January 1, 1977. Approved on January 25, 1977.
74[74]
Republic v. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 359.
75[75]
Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as
Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings (Issued February 16, 1976).
76[76]
Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, supra note 58, citing Director of Lands v. Rivas, G.R.
No. L-61539, February 14, 1986, 141 SCRA 329.
77[77]
Lands which were not recorded under the Maura Law and were not yet covered by Torrens titles.
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various
laws relative to registration of property.78[78] It governs registration of lands under
the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In

keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,80[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.81[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.82[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of

the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.83[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.84[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85[85] The applicant may also secure a

78[78]
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Preamble; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra
note 47.
79[79]
Pea, N. and Pea, Jr., N., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 9.
80[80]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48227, August 21, 1991, 201 SCRA 1; Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989, 178 SCRA 708.
81[81]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, G.R.
No. 151312, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 209; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra
note 47, citing Director of Lands v. Aquino, G.R. No. 31688, December 17, 1990, 192 SCRA 296.
82[82]
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
83[83]
Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003; 405 SCRA 291; Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing Director of Lands v. Aquino, supra.
84[84]
Republic v. Lao, supra; Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 377, 389-390 (2002).
85[85]
Republic of the Philippines v. Muoz, G.R. No. 151910, October 15, 2007.
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.86[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already
an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)88[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until
the contrary is shown.90[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These

cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions
of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,

86[86]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,
supra; Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 54472-77, September 28, 1989, 178 SCRA 37.
87[87]
Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 585.
88[88]
40 Phil. 10 (1919).
89[89]
Supra note 54.
90[90]
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra at 16.
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91[91] This was the Courts
ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda.
De Palanca v. Republic,92[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna,
viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be

formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to
private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.

Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission
on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it
was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved
the dictum in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.94[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to

an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902

and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable

91[91]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, supra
note 81.
92[92]
Id. at 76.
93[93]
Id. at 219-223.
94[94]
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra note 88, at 16.
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land

registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly
cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them,
their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute.
Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the
land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a
mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-

General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to
one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have
just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and
mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some
trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as
forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or
mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present
or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the
lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
 question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that
the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to
one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what
portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests
have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the
land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No.
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set
aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95[95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.96[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive
prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.97[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,98[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the
land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was
no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision99[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko
v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No.

95[95]
Id. at 15-16.
96[96]
Act No. 2874, Sec. 8; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155450, August 6, 2008; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127245, January 30, 2001.
96-a
Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37995, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 351, 357.
97[97]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, supra
note 81.
98[98]
The records do not show the manner in which title was issued to the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol.
99[99]
Records, p. 179.
141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public
domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102[102] and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands.103[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally

different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were
included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an
alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko
was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104[104] from acquiring agricultural land,
which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the
public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko

relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including
Ankron and De Aldecoa.105[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority
to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926106[106] ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

100[100]
79 Phil. 461 (1947).
101[101]
Supra note 64.
102[102]
Supra note 54.
103[103]
Supra note 88.
104[104]
Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
105[105]
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, supra note 100, at 468-469.
106[106]
Act No. 926, Sec. 54, par. 6 states:

SEC. 54. The following described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying lands in the
Philippines, or claiming to own any such land or interest therein but whose titles to such land have not
been perfected may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit

xxxx

(6) All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of
 A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court
of Appeals.107[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a
ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein,
for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The

Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except
when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
107[107]
Supra note 47.
107-a
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128.
108[108]
Collado v. Court of Appeals, id. at 356.
DENR109[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110[110]
certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of

the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed
for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign
tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso

beach resorts on the island;111[111] that the island has already been stripped of its
forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large
tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do

109[109]
Records, p. 101; Annex A.
110[110]
Id. at 106; Exhibit 1-a.
111[111]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 5.
112[112]
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3; CONSTITUTION (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10, as amended; and
CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
113[113]
Republic v. Naguiat, supra note 87.
114[114]
G.R. No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69.
 not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered
by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.115[115] (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and

forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the
other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116[116] At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole
of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-
82 to private lands117[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable118[118]
does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-

115[115]
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, id. at 75.
116[116]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56948, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 476, 482-483.
117[117]
Sec. 3 provides:
Establishment of or low-density human settlements in private lands, or subdivisions, if any,
subject to prior approval by the Ministry of Human Settlements, PTA and local building
officials; Provided, that no structures shall be constructed within 30 meters from the
shorelines.
118[118]
Sec. 5 states:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the

Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does
not address the areas alienability.119[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island,
but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to
name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned

119[119]
Pars. 3-4.
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of

Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7
of CA No. 141120[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands.121[121]

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands
is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so.122[122] Absent such classification, the
land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved

forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.

120[120]
SEC. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to time classify
lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
And may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
121[121]
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47; Manalo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64753, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 795.
122[122]
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995, 244 SCRA 537; Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47.
123[123]
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing Yngson v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-36847, July 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 441; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-45202, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 742.
 Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island
made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority
to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates
the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall

cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island
still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.

Republic,124[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified
lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or

124[124]
Supra note 81.
 timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.125[125] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a

reclassification of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the
case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law.
We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in

Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for
purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the
Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak
of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting
the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code,
which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the
occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
125[125]
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, id.
at 222-223.
126[126]
Reconsideration of DOJ Opinion No. 169, s. 1993, on the DOJ affirmative stand on whether the prohibition
against the reclassification of forest lands applies to unclassified public forest.
127[127]
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 139.
128[128]
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No. 158449, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188; Republic v. Lao,
supra note 83.
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on

the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land.
Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129[129] Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.130[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for

declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of
possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to

prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent
dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants

do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is

129[129]
Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b).
130[130]
Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69.
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously.
This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural.
Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead131[131] or sales patent,132[132] subject to the conditions
imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to

acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill133[133] now pending in the House
of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be
131[131]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, Chapter IV.
132[132]
Id., Chapter V.
133[133]
House Bill No. 1109. Declaring Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Within Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan as Agricultural Land Open to Disposition.
sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover
and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their

promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists.
These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets
prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in
1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written
much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for
forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of
serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas
become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants.
With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives.
Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans
decalogue.135[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
134[134]
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, cited in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung,
G.R. Nos. L-31666-68, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 532.
135[135]
Director of Forestry v. Muoz, id. at 1214.
 EN BANC
[G. R. No. 3894. March 12, 1909.]
JUAN IBAEZ DE ALCOA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT,
Respondent-Appellee.
DECISION
TORRES, J.:
On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibanez de
Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent,
situated in the town of Surigao, a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his
application.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles
opposing the request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing
dated March 21, 1905, objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in question
was the property of the Government of the United States, and is now under the control of the
Insular Government; that the title of ownership issued by the politico-militar governor of
Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibanez de Aldecoa, antecessor
of the Petitioner with respect to the land in question, was entirely null and void, for the reason
that said grant had not been made in accordance with the laws then in force on the subject, and
because the said governor had no authority to make such a grant; he prayed the court below to
dismiss the application with costs.
As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, amended his former petition,
and, relying upon the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that
at the time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised in the plan then
submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the latter affords better facilities
for securing titles to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in question, the
applicant, availing himself of the benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be
applied to the inscription of his land, inasmuch as it was included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of
section 54, Chapter VI, thereof, and prayed the court to take into consideration the amendment to
his petition.
Evidence was adduced by the Petitioner at the trial of the case, and on February 2, 1907, the
judge of the Court of Land Registration entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the
opposition offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs, and ordered the
cancellation of the entry made of the said property in the record under No. 408, folio 206 of
volume 2 of the municipality of Surigao.
The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his motion was overruled to
which he also excepted and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved
and submitted to this court.
The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan
Ibanez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and,
ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal
provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of
private individuals or corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest of this
Archipelago the occupation or material possession together with the improvement and
cultivation for a certain number of years, as fixed by the laws of the Indies, or given portions of
vacant Government lands, was the method established by the Government to facilitate the
acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by the royal decrees of June 25, 1880, and
December 26, 1884, the system of composition with the State and that of sales by public auction
where instituted as the means for acquiring such lands.
In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the proceedings instituted for
this purpose, the royal decree of February 13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under
certain conditions which were set out in said decree.
After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No. 926, relating to public lands,
in accordance with the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress of the
United States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926) is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary

Sec. 54. The following-described persons of their legal successors in right, occupying
public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of
Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit: chanrobles vir tualawlibrary

xxxxxxxxx
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have
received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under
the provisions of this chapter.
All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four, and five of this
section must be establish by proper official records or documents that such
proceedings as are therein required were taken and the necessary conditions
complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to
chanrobles virtualawlibrary

the fact of adverse possession.

Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record, it is seen that the land, the
registration of which is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or public land which the
Senate could alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time
the person in possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he might do so in the same
manner that he had made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the said Act
of Congress, as well as the provisions of the above-cited section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of
Act No. 926, for the reason that the said land is neither mining nor timber land.
We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of the land whereon was built
the greatest cities of the world; and confining ourselves to that on which the cities and towns in
these Islands were erected, it cannot be denied that, at the commencement of the occupation of
this Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the time of the distribution of lands, the latter were
rural and agricultural in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle and foundation of
the present cities and large towns of the Philippines, and as the inhabitants increased, and added
to the number of their dwellings, the farms gradually became converted into town lots.
In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to be seen that are erected on
lots that form part of land used for agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and to the
advantage of the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural lands, they may
later on again become transformed into farming land and, by the industry of the owner, again be
made to yield fruit.
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into
a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or
forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land,
not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress
contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots
or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government, No. 3793
(10 Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in force was interpreted in a similar sense.
It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign powers that have successively
promulgated the said laws, to place those in possession of building lots under title of ownership
in an anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible for them to obtain legal
titles to the lands appropriated by them, and denying them the care and protection of the law to
which they were certainly entitled on account of the efforts they have made, both in their own
behalf, and for the benefit of the cities and towns in which they reside, contributing to the wealth
and increase of the country.
In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after almost all the towns of this
Archipelago were established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the
supposition that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had been duly
acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a
lot situated within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply
thereto the laws in force and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior
to its conversion into a building lot, and is subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation;
moreover, it does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of the 25th of June, 1880, says:
In the Philippine Islands, all vacant lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private owner,
chanrobles virtualawlibrary

or, which have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be alienable crown lands for
the effects of the regulation, and in accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novisima
Recopilacion; that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th February, 1894, states: Vacant chanrobles virtualawlibrary

lands, soils, grounds, and mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable
Crown lands, provided they are not included within the following exceptions: (1) Those of
chanrobles virtualawlibrary

private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those comprised in the communal
laws, or within zones reserved for the use in common by residents of the community; and (4)
those lands which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of composition or
possessory information; and that although section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
directs the Government of the Philippine Islands to classify public lands that are neither forest
nor mining lands according to their agricultural character and productiveness, section 14
authorizes and empowers the said Government to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who,
prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or same of
the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the
acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title, etc. ; and section 15
authorizes and empowers the said Government of the Philippine Islands on such terms as it may
prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public
domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands, as it may deem
wise, etc.
From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the exception
of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined
to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they
may be acquired by any private or juridical person; and considering their origin and primitive
state and the general uses to which they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urban
lands or building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural
and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is
no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural
estates.
If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land, and on the other land is
susceptible of cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision whatever that would exclude
it from being classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that classification,
the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, must forthwith be applied for the reason
that it has been fully proven that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than 13 years
prior to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect. Furthermore, there is no legal
reason or cause to exclude urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the
interpretation that urban real estate, that is not mineral or forestal in character, be understood to
fall within the classification of agricultural land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to
public interests.
Therefore, the view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be
reversed, and that it should be, as it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in general default all
such persons as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of the same shall
be granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No special ruling is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.

MORAN, C.J.:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December
of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish
said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an
alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch
of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.

There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.

It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw
the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down
by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in
this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to
decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we
have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to
avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal
only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should
not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was
filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and
the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever,
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the
new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the
registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been
maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not
by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while
this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now
immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow
interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced,
and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences
that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be
taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may
never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but
to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to
disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a
future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent
offense to the Constitution.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days
and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.

The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental
policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber
and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification
existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural
lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.

As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been
followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593;
Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.,
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40
Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral
nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs.
Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:

Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining
or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural
land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was
originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act
of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect
to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.

In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is
not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural,
mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those
lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed,
therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.

Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their
technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1
Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)

It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be

given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning
in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in
a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E,
581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed
to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires
that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they
have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the
words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)

Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision
is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly
revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations
controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning,
as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad
meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public
agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.

It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land
Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes,
but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but
after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.

Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in
answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII
(now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial
lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:

Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands'
and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent case. . . .

Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch
vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to
cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it
is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
 Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends
to use it as a site for his home.

This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became
the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the
late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the
Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration,
and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.

It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and
executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is
included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to
insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the
persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under
section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to
aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a
word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a
different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference
between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But
such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both
sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class
of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No
reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced
for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an
integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this
so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would
become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed,
the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will
come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost
all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.

It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used
and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the
second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for
no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first
draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands,
and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the
same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with
section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and
mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural
lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than
"private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to
make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that
could have arisen from the first draft.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit
of the Constitution is beyond question.

One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and
which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands
and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and
other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity."
(2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the
Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the
privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the
Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the
Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said:
"With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our
God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural
resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we
shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of
independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of
foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the
Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and
nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice
Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own
a pieace of land.

This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized
therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent
improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner
and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.

SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands,
terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to
do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the
countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements
thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the
extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor
to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used
for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred
by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire
the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the
contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which
had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as
follows:
 SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.

SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire
land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not
legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall
revert to the Government.

These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens,
grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the
Constitutional Convention.

It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public
domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the
sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.

And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage
of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural
and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have
been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible
under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by
the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify
that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it
even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes
and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner.

Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I,
dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070
entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without merit. 1

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents
Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos.
P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations
furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan,
respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey
plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the
Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds
of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant.

The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 196 l. 2

The defendants filed their respective answers. 3

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated
February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases 4 which were granted. 5
The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is within the
intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on
June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. 6

The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the
complaint in intervention. 7 The said amended joint answer was admitted in an order dated September
10, 1972. 8

Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3)
criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359
and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan,
private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free
patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended
pending the outcome of the criminal cases.

After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense
filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal
requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and
that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents.

In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and
dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain
the conviction of the three (3) accused. 9

Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos.
1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the
extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the
crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to
order cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in
question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the
subject matter in litigation. 10

The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because:

After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil
cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO
DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of said
Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the office of
the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122
of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private
properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these
titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands
vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that
OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible
and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone
cancel the same.

The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of
Benguet Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain
 Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based
on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall squarely under Sec. 3
of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. 11

They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor,
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order
dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. 12 Both motion for reconsideration were denied by
the trial court. 13 Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant
petition.

The petitioner assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE

OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY
BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE
FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE
FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 14

Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public
Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:

Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but
timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act
provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration
and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being
privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at
present in force or which may hereafter be enacted.

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

 and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and
certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving
evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the
free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the
private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens
title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now
indefeasible.

In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said,

On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to dispose of
the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act No.
3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its
second paragraph states:

A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously

occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable
or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he
files his free patent application, he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public
Land Law.

The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent issued
to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands has the
jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This provision of law,
certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and could
very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads:

'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian

brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited
by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an
exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from their
ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the
wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of
agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest
zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural
minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the
more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who
have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been
harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and
imprisonment.
 The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the Public
Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance to
acquire lands of the public domain' ...

It is for this reason that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were
driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public
domain that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government policy on
liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more
consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities,
which our courts of justice must uphold. 15

The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the
benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:

SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth

Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows:

SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more
than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or
prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or through
his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has,
not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision of this
chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to
exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts
of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files
his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or
disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law.

There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities;
that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of
any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor,
petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private
respondents applied for free patents thereon.

It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded
to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void
when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title
issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
cancelled. 16 In Director of lands vs. Abanzado 17 this Court said:

4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly
opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muoz, a 1968 decision. After a
review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law thus: 'If a
Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land,
is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests
 have intervened, the government may decide for i what Portions of the public domain
shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He reiterated the basic state
objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court takes
of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with
respect to forest lands. many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation. protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse
or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and
lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results.
With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives, ...'

The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil
cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there
was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had committed the acts of
falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are
timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of
Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case.

There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or
not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents
belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents
on said lands.

WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin
and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos,
67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio
presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded
on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the
11
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and
land sought to be registered.
12
In other words,
recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims
of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug
mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14,
1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the
required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings,
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June
Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.

The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots
6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of
Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines
of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under

consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United
States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands
had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public
domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to

segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator."
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650;
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right
of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right
of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as
after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
 It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in
the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner
is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good
as though secured by patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements
of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even
the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is
obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
deprived thereof without due process of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or
the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had
the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is
not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was
not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave
abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did
not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely
mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly
so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.
 SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from
all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously
by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of
the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Coudert Brothers for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

Mateo Cario, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together
with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as
follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cario,
H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the
land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters
and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20
decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cario and Mayengmeng.

By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a
small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of
land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion from the State.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its
judgment in these terms:

Therefore the court finds that Cario and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively
and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cario constructed the
house now there that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cario held possession
for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions
are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions,
p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:

From the testimony given by Cario as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cario erected and utilized as a
domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question,
 property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property
belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cario sold said house to one
Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the
adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega
and Minse, had lived . . ..

In or about the years 1898 Cario abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the
property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house
thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is
indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of
the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial
extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such
extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence
accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof
consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of
the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein
described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of
Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or
running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the
other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory
information mentioned.

2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said
possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.

3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively
belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of
such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State.
And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish
Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under
agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or
legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands:
First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of
the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in
an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation
up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such information;
or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more
years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony
given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because
the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish
Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of
adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which
is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory
informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right
of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land
together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the
said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general
title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following
the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the
ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."

5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be certain that
he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government
or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example,
if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as
appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession
as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to
show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty
years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of
the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law that is to say, civil law remains at
all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when
pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is
reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the
purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could
at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of
February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and
particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands
then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was
reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2 herein
mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon
which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act
No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period
of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use
thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose
of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec.
6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cario is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his
petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that
can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now
appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same,
according to the testimony of Cario, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not
determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of
this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in
favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cario. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the
intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cario and his
children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown
in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could
only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new
laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:

1. In finding that Mateo Cario and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;

2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN,
MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER
N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA,
ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES,
FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO
MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA,
SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her
father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN
TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.i[1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to
the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is
an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon,
et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree
with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray
that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
 Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.ii[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.iii[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.iv[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely,
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
 disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.v[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.vi[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners
of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.vii[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground
that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7
(a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he
believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 150327. June 18, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS., represented by the Secretary of

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Regional Executive Director, (DENR Region XI) and MARION V.
ABUNDO, SR., Conservation Officer (DENR Region XI),
petitioners, vs. MARILYN A. PERALTA, ROSIE A. LAVALAN,
GRACE A. REYES, ALBERTO B. ALONDAY, MERCY B.
ALONDAY, RICHELIEU B. ALONDAY, AZUCENA B. ALONDAY
AND JANETA A. BALURAN, and the Register of Deeds of Davao
City, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision136[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53440 which upheld the orders, dated February 5, 1999 and May 6,
1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13.137[2]

The Antecedents

On September 26, 1994, Marilyn A. Peralta, Rosie A. Lavalan, Grace A. Reyes,

Alberto B. Alonday, Mercy B. Alonday, Rochelieu B. Alonday, Azucena B. Alonday,
Benedicto B. Alonday, and Janeta A. Baluran filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership of real property with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 13, against the defendants Republic of the Philippines, the Regional Executive
Director of Region XI of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Conservation Officer in said region. The plaintiffs alleged therein, inter alia, that
they are the heirs of Benedicto B. Alonday who applied for and was granted Homestead
Patent No. V-11244 by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(DENR) over Lot 3561 with an area of 237,898 square meters; the said lot was a portion
of Lot 2988 of the Guiang Cadastre located in Guiang, Davao City and that on the basis
of said patent, Benedicto Alonday was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-275 over
the said property by the Register of Deeds; they purchased the said property from their
father Benedicto and were issued on April 25, 1988 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
134231 in their names; the property was allegedly alienable and disposable property
within Project 1-B, certified on January 13, 1931 as per LC Map No. 1412 approved by
the Director of Bureau of Forestry, as confirmed by the letter of the petitioner Regional
Director, dated February 15, 1994; they had been in possession of the said property as
owner thereof since November 1965 and that some time in 1969, officers of the Bureau
of Forest Development (BFD) sought his permission to use a portion of said property
with an area of five hectares; the BFD caused the construction of a big concrete building
on said portion of the property; on June 28, 1971, Benedictos lawyer wrote a letter to
the BFD demanding that it vacate the said portion of his property on which the building
was constructed but said letter was ignored; on February 24, 1979, Forest Conservation
Officer Marion Abundio, Sr. asked permission from Benedicto to allow the BFD to install
on a portion of the subject property consisting of twenty-five square meters a small
generator to provide electricity to the existing building and compound of the Philippine
Eagles Acclimatization and Breeding Center; Benedicto did not give his assent to these
requests of the aforenamed government officials despite which they still caused the
construction of the building and installation of the generator unit; the plaintiffs demanded
that the defendants vacate the property on July 14, 1994 but the latter refused. The
plaintiffs prayed that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor and that
the defendants be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay the plaintiffs damages
and litigation expenses.
The plaintiffs appended as annexes to their petition copies of the aforesaid title and
letters of the BFD officials. In their answer to the complaint, the defendants, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the special and affirmative defenses
that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause of action against them; (b) the building
constructed by the defendants was within the perimeter of the Mt. Apo National Park, a
forest reserve under Proclamation No. 59, as amended, of the President of the
Philippines, and not on the plaintiffs property; (c) the installation of a generator unit did
not push through; (d) Project 1-B, under which the subject property was declassified as
alienable and disposable property per Land Classification Map No. 1412, should not
prevail over Proclamation No. 59, as amended; (e) the suit was against the State which
cannot be sued without its consent; (f) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing their complaint.138[3] The defendants prayed that the complaint be
dismissed.
The parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs. After the requisite pre-trial
conference, the RTC issued an Order, dated August 29, 1995, constituting a panel of
commissioners composed of Engineer Roderick R. Calapardo, as Team Leader, and
Gregorio Cenabre and Engineer Rogelio Zantua, as members, to conduct a relocation
survey and determine if the respondents property is part of the Mt. Apo National Park.
After the survey, the panel submitted its report to the trial court, dated November 7,
1995, stating that: the land in case is 92,216 square meters within the certified
Alienable and Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of 145,682 square
meters is within the Mt. Apo National Park Reservation.139[4]
In their comment on the report, the plaintiffs claimed that the survey team altered
the boundary line of their property in the course of the survey and that the team did not
take into account Project 1-B per Land Classification Map No. 1412 approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Forestry. The defendants, on the other hand, insisted that the
survey team did not alter the boundary line of the property and that it took into account
Project 1-B and Land Classification Map No. 1412 in conducting the survey and
preparing its report. On motion of the plaintiffs and with the conformity of the
defendants, through Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortez, the RTC issued an
order on March 7, 1997 declaring that there were no factual issues involved in the case
and that it would decide the case on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda of the
parties as well as the commissioners report.
On May 6, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants finding and declaring that the property occupied by the defendants was
part of the plaintiffs property. The RTC ordered the defendants to vacate the property,
restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs and remove all the improvements thereon
made by them. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the validity and
legality of the plaintiffs right of ownership and possession over that parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 of the Registry of Davao City.
Defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the portion of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-134231 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City alluded to by
the plaintiffs and to restore peaceful possession of the same to them. Defendants are
further ordered to remove all the improvements they have introduced thereon.140[5]
The RTC declared that the report of the panel did not take into account Property 1-B
for LC Map 1412; hence, the said report had no probative weight. According to the RTC,
the torrens title of the property prevails over the relocation survey of the panel of
commissioners and that the Director of Forestry declassified the respondents property
pursuant to Section 1827 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.
On May 30, 1997, five days before the expiration of the period to file an appeal, the
defendants filed, through registered mail, a motion for the reconsideration of the RTC
decision. On June 11, 1997, the RTC issued ex parte an order expunging the said
motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a mere scrap of paper for failure of
the defendants to incorporate any notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Unaware of the June 11, 1997 Order of the RTC, the
defendants filed on July 14, 1997 a Manifestation with Notice of Hearing on Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 7, 1997 appending thereto a notice of hearing of their May
30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration.
In the meantime, on July 18, 1997, the defendants received a copy of the June 11,
1997 Order of the trial court expunging their motion for reconsideration. On July 22,
1997, the defendants filed their notice of appeal from the decision of the court. The
plaintiffs, for their part, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the defendants on the
ground that their May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper;
hence, the motion did not toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus,
the defendants allegedly failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the court
within the reglementary period. On August 11, 1997, the RTC received the defendants
notice of appeal.
Meanwhile, the presiding judge of Branch 13 retired, and for a time, the said RTC
branch remained vacant. On January 28, 1999, the RTC, through the newly-appointed
judge, issued an order giving due course to the defendants appeal declaring that they
still had a period of five days from July 18, 1997 when they received a copy of the order
expunging their notice of appeal or until July 23, 1997 within which to perfect their
appeal from the June 11, 1997 Order. Since the defendants filed their notice of appeal
on July 22, 1997, they had perfected their appeal within the reglementary period. The
RTC further declared that although the defendants May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration was defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed. The
RTC forthwith directed the branch clerk of court to forward the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals.
On February 5, 1999, however, the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the
defendants appeal on its finding that in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention,
they failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period. When the defendants
received the February 5, 1999 Order of the RTC, they filed a motion for reconsideration
thereof, set for hearing on February 19, 1999. On February 8, 1999, the RTC issued an
order declaring that the hearing set on February 19, 1999 was mooted by its Order
dated February 5, 1999 which dismissed the defendants appeal. The plaintiffs filed on
February 10, 1999 a motion for execution, claiming that the RTC decision had become
final and executory. On February 18, 1999, the RTC issued an order granting the
plaintiffs motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 1999 of the February 5, 1999 Order of
the RTC dismissing their appeal and their opposition to the issuance of a writ of
execution. The defendants were unaware that in the interim, the RTC had already
granted the plaintiffs motion for a writ of execution on February 18, 1999. The plaintiffs
opposed the defendants Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26, 1999.
On May 6, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying the defendants motion for
reconsideration and at the same time denying the plaintiffs motion for execution on the
ground that public policy prohibited the issuance of a writ of execution against the
government. The RTC recalled the writ of execution it earlier issued.
Thereafter, the defendants, now the petitioners, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, for the
nullification of the February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999 Orders of the RTC alleging that
the:
I
 RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER
DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999 AND ORDER DATED MAY 6, 1999.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE
VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER A
PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
134231.141[6]
On April 27, 2001, the CA rendered its decision denying due course and dismissing
the petition for certiorari. The appellate court held that petitioners May 30, 1997 Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC decision did not comply with Section 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, as amended; hence, a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the
running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the RTC decision had already
become final and executory. According to the appellate court, the RTC did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners appeal therein. As such,
they were not entitled to a writ of certiorari. The CA further held that the petitioners,
through the negligence of the OSG, failed to perfect their appeal. The CA opined that to
nullify the title of respondents over the subject property, the petitioners should have
instituted a petition for reversion, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court, as amended.
The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision of the CA. The petitioners allege that the appellate court
committed reversible error in finding and declaring that they failed to perfect their appeal
from the decision of the trial court within the reglementary period. The CA likewise
allegedly erred when it held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the petitioners appeal via
its February 5, 1999 Order. The petitioners contend that by dismissing their petition, the
CA thereby sustained the validity of the respondents title despite strong evidence that
the said property is part of the public forest and, therefore, inalienable. The petitioners
further argue that even if their notice of appeal was belatedly filed, the rule on perfection
of appeals should be suspended and that their appeal should be given due course on
grounds of equity and substantial justice. They submit that if their appeal is not
reinstated, the Republic of the Philippines will be deprived of a part of the Mt. Apo
National Park consisting of no less than 145,682 square meters. The petitioners cite the
ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals.142[7]
The petition is meritorious.
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30,
1997 the defective motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in
writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served
by the movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4
and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice
of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties concerned at
least three days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the
notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being merely technical
and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due
process.143[8]
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file
his reply or opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether the
adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his
objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its
motion.144[9] The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro
forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and
which the court has no authority to act upon.145[10] In cases of motions for a new trial or for
the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by
the mere filing or pendency of said motion.146[11]
In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the
decision of the RTC; hence, they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion
for reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse
decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30,
1997 within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that the respondents were actually
served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing
the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to comply with Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo M.
Padilla that his omission was sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy pressure of work in
preparing numerous pleadings and in the almost daily attendance in court for
naturalization cases and those for nullity of marriage, among others. Other than the
barefaced allegations of Solicitor Padilla, he offered no specific details as to what
pleadings he prepared and the hearings he attended which prevented him from
complying with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, if Solicitor
Padilla was able to prepare within the reglementary period the May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration, he offered no valid justification for his failure to incorporate in said
motion or append thereto a simple one-paragraph notice of hearing which could have
been accomplished in a few minutes. What is so nettlesome is that the May 30, 1997
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners was signed not only by Solicitor Padilla but
also by Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortes. Even if Solicitor Padilla, through
his negligence, failed to incorporate in said motion for reconsideration the requisite
notice of hearing, the Assistant Solicitor General should have noticed the omission
before she affixed her signature thereon and sought the immediate rectification thereof
by Solicitor Padilla before said motion was filed. She did not. She offered no valid
explanation for her faux pas either. The general rule is that the clients are bound by the
mistakes and negligence of their counsel.147[12]
In a case of recent vintage, the Court took to task the OSG for its lackadaisical
attitude and complacency in the handling of its cases for the government and reminded
the OSG that:
just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the Code of Professional
Responsibility apply with equal force on lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks. These ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them
because, as government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy of
the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Furthermore, it is
incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the government bureaucracy, to perform and
discharge its duties with the highest degree of professionalism, intelligence and skill
and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public.148[13]
Trite to state, this Court is impelled to do so anew in this case. The CA cannot be
faulted for ruling that having lost their right of appeal through the negligence of the OSG
the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of 1987 Rules of Civil
Procedure.149[14]
However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners
plea that it suspend its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the
reopening of the trial of the case for the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The
Court excepts this case from the said rule in the interest of justice, to avert a grave
miscarriage of justice to the State through the negligence of the OSG. The State has the
right to adduce its evidence, testimonial and documentary. Courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of this right but, instead, afford every party litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of its cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.150[15] The trial court no less declared in its January 28, 1999
Order that although the petitioners May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was
defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed only to make a volte face and
issue ex parte an order dismissing the appeal of the petitioners and canceling the
hearing on the petitioners motion for reconsideration set on February 19, 1999.
What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting of no less than 145,682
square meters or less than fifteen hectares which they claim is part of the Mt. Apo
National Park as shown by the relocation survey of the panel of commissioners. The
case is one of public interest. If the aforesaid property is, indeed, part of the forest
reserve as claimed by the petitioners but their right to adduce their evidence is
foreclosed by the dismissal of the present petition, the said property would be forever
lost to the prejudice of the State. In Republic v. Imperial,151[16] this Court held that:
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of
petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause
for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to
file appellants brief. Petitioners appeal presents an exceptional circumstance
impressed with public interest and must then be given due course.152[17]
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents as it ordered the
petitioners to vacate that portion of the subject property occupied by them and to return
possession thereof to the respondents, without requiring the parties to adduce evidence
on the factual issues of (a) whether or not the property covered by the title of the
respondents is part of the Mt. Apo National Park (a forest reserve); (b) whether or not
the building constructed by the petitioners is inside the forest reserve; and (c) whether
or not the petitioners installed a generator unit in the respondents property.
It bears stressing that the trial court formed a panel of commissioners to conduct a
relocation survey of the subject property. The panel of commissioners found that
145,682 square meters which is a portion of the Mt. Apo National Park had been
included in the respondents title to the subject property. The trial court ignored this and
did not even bother to receive the parties respective evidence on the said report. The
panel of commissioners was not even called to testify on its findings. The appellate
court will be able to review on appeal the decision of the trial court and ascertain
whether there has been a travesty of justice to the gross prejudice of the State.
The respondents will not suffer substantial prejudice if the trial is reopened. The
records show that the trial court denied respondents motion for a writ of execution
although the trial court had dismissed the appeal of the petitioners. The respondents did
not even assail the order of the trial court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 53440 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 13, dated February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in Civil Case
No. 23,168-94 are SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to reopen
the trial to enable the parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Office of the
Solicitor General is hereby directed to represent the petitioners during the trial. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 83290 September 21, 1990

STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo for petitioner.

CORTES, J.:

This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court.

In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land Registration) of Zambales, through
Judge James Ostrand, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of Justo de
Perio over two (2) parcels of land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912, Decree No. 9328 was issued by
the court ordering the registration of the two (2) parcels of land in the name of De Perio. On
December 6, 1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of Zambales was
issued to De Perio. Parcel No. 1 consists of an area of eleven thousand six hundred ninety-seven
square meters (11,697 sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2 consists of three hundred forty thousand eight
hundred twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a portion consisting of ten thousand four
hundred square meters (10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold to the Province of Zambales. The
sale was annotated at the back of OCT No. 48. In 1954, OCT No. 48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
1369 was issued to Mercedes de Valencia pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's
estate. In 1962, De Valencia sold Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was issued TCT No. T-7696
in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia subdivided Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-
1369 was cancelled and TCT Nos. 11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were issued to De Valencia.
TCT No. 11 868, corresponding to the portion previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was
issued to the Republic of the Philippines. In 1970, De Valencia sold the lots covered by TCT Nos.
11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. TCT Nos.
11865 and 11866 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-12055 were issued to petitioner.
Petitioner consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and subdivided them into five hundred thirty-six
(536) residential lots which it sold to individual buyers.

In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of
Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48 (issued to De
Perio), TCT No. T-1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to Baloy). Respondent
alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land
was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within the forest zone in 1912, having been
released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as
private property. Named defendants were De Valencia and her husband, Baloy and his wife and the
Register of Deeds of Zambales. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.

The Baloy spouses filed their answer to the complaint.

With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an answer-in-intervention. Later, petitioner filed its
first motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata, which the Court of
Appeals denied. Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof.

Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its evidence, consisting of a land classification map
prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became alienable and disposable
only in 1961, and rested its case. Petitioner then proceeded to present its evidence. This was,
however, cut short when the Republic moved to amend its complaint to include as party defendants
all the other transferees of the land and, thereafter, filed its amended complaint. Petitioner again
moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata in an effort to shorten the
proceedings.

The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be invoked as a bar to an action for
annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition.

After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave due course to the petition and, as required,
the parties filed their respective memoranda.

On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May 7, 1990 because, as stated in the
resolution:

...after deliberating extensively on it, the Court finds the need to hear the oral
arguments of the parties on issues which are considered determinative of the case,
including the following:

1. the nature and classification, under the pertinent laws traced back to the turn of
the century, of the two parcels of land decreed and originally titled in 1912 to De
Perio; and

2. the legal considerations that compelled the Government to seek the annulment of
the decree of the Court of Land Registration issued in favor of De Perio, his title, and
the titles of his successors-in-interest.

The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter they were required to submit their
memoranda in amplification of their arguments.

The question presented before the Court is whether or not respondent CA committed reversible error
of law in denying petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata.

As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites must concur for a prior judgment to
constitute a bar to a subsequent case: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, Identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281 (1940);
Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963,
9 SCRA 72; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, G. R. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589;
Aroc v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-39674, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA
350; Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. 66807, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano G.R.
No.
L-25660, February 23, 1990].
In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be annulled because the land registration
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the respondent Republic puts in issue
the presence of the second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue before the Court is whether or not
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land claimed by De Perio, the
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein.

Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the nature of the subject parcels of
land in light of the laws prevailing at the time the judgment in the land registration case was
rendered.

Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its memorandum, was as follows:

17. It must, therefore, be presumed that in LRC Case No. 6431, the court found from
the evidence adduced by the parties that (1) the two parcels of land in question were
agricultural lands as the phrase is used in Act No. 926, (2) Justo de Perio had been
in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof for at least 10
years, before July 26, 1912, and (3) his possession of the said parcels of land was in
the concept of owner; and thus the court confirmed Justo de Perio's title thereto and
ordered their registration in his name. If the Attorney General, the Director of
Forestry, the Director of Lands and the Director of Public Works opposed the
application, then it must be presumed that the court declared the said two parcels of
land to be agricultural lands over their opposition. If they did not oppose, then it must
be presumed that they agreed with the court that the said lands were really
agricultural lands. It must be pointed out that the question as to whether the two
parcels of land in question are agricultural lands and not timber lands is a question of
fact and the finding of Judge Ostrand that they are agricultural can not be reviewed
by this Honorable Court at this point in time [Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9;
Rollo, pp. 211-212].

Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the two parcels of land, as described in Decree
No. 9328, debunk the contention that they are forest lands. The parcels of land were bounded by
privately owned property. Moreover, they were described in the notice published in the March 1912
issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766-767 as "lying within the Civil Reservation, town site of
Olongapo, situated in the municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, P. I." [Annex "A" of
Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].

On the other hand, the public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contended:

Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11, 1908, then
Governor-General James F. Smith reserved for naval purposes certain lands of the
public domain in Subic, Zambales which included the parcels of land embraced
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in 1912. It was
only in 1961 that such Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent issuance,
Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on February 2, 1961 and
such portions already classified as alienable and disposable and not needed for
government purposes were declared open for disposition under R.A. No. 274, in
relation to C.A. 141 and Act No. 3038. This means that the lands, subject matter of
the case, were portions of the U.S. naval reservation and were declared open for
disposition only on February 2, 1961 [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo,
p. 230].
Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time Original Certificate of Title No. 48 was issued on
December 9, 1912, the parcel of land covered by the title was still within the forest zone and it was
not until January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest Development as
alienable and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2427" [Ibid].

It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated June 7, 1927 ... shows that the parcels of
land covered by OCT No. 48 were still part of the unclassified public forest at the time of the
registration" [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231].

Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the Republic has failed to make out a
convincing case for the annulment of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been
established that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land, and that
OCT No. 48 and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from OCT No. 48 are valid.

Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but
which took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of
his title to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided:

SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right,

occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may
apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received
the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.

xxx xxx xxx

In other words, a person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious session and
occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904
could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and occupied.

The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2) parcels of land after due notice
and hearing. From this, the following conclusions may be derived:

1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by law, i.e., that they are neither timber
land nor mineral land [Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 (1908)];

2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the two (2) parcels of land for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904;
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide claim of ownership; and

4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904, although it was confirmed only later in
1912.

These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other conclusions determinative of the case.

If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not have
been forest land as claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land classification map
notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two (2) parcels of land were in the
Olongapo townsite and were bounded by privately-owned land.

If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then it could not have been
prejudiced by the proclamation of Governor-General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval
purposes land in Subic, Zambales. Said proclamation recognized the existence of private rights,
thus:

xxx xxx xxx

...por la presente exceptuo de venta o colonizacion hasta nueva orden y separo para
reserva naval, salvo los derechos privados, todos y cada uno de los terrenos
publicos comprendidos dentro de los siguientes limites, a saber: [Proclamation del
Gobernador General de las Islas Filipinos, 11 Noviembre 1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885
(2 December 1908)].

Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden interest in the annulment of the
decree and the certificate of title issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to his
successors after some seventy-three (73) years of inaction and after a portion of the land has been
developed by petitioner into a subdivision and hundreds of residences have been built thereon. At
this point in time, that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area wherein the two (2) parcels of land are
found, were released from the unclassified public forest and the territory comprising the Subic naval
reservation way back in 1961.

Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in 1961. In a few more
months, the possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess
through acquisitive prescription, without need of title or of good faith, pursuant to the Civil Code [Art.
1137].

Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving
the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings were originally filed by the
Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De
Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable
public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several
years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual
classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates
said 'contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales
as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These, for
reasons discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's
regularity, more so when we consider that notice of the application for registration and the date of
hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public
Works and the Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the Official Gazette and that
Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of Appeals is ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R. SP
No. 06259.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 127245.January 30, 2001]

REP. OF THE PHILS vs. CA, et al.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 30
2001.

G.R. No. 127245(Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.)

G.R. No. 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, et al.)

Before us are (1) two (2) motions for reconsideration of our decision dated September 2,
1999 filed by petitioner Republic in G. R. No. 127245 and by petitioners Firestone
Ceramics, et al. in G. R. No. 127022, (2) private respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss
dated September 15, 2000.

We shall first rule on the procedural issue. Private respondent Peltan filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the Republic's petition was filed one day late, thus the judgment
appealed from has become final and executory. We find the same to be unmeritorious
since it is already too late to raise the issue at this stage of the proceedings and we rule
that justice will be best served if these cases will be decided on their merits rather than
on mere technicality.

We now consider the merits of these cases.

(1) G.R. No. 127245

In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for reconsideration on the following

grounds:

I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASES;

II. ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RES

JUDICATA MAY BE APPLIED, THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE
WHICH IS HIGHER AND MORE COMPELLING THAN RES
JUDICATA WARRANTS THE EXEMPTION OF THIS CASE FROM
THE RULE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS;
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IS THAT UNLESS
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE,
UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE NOT ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE; AND
 IV. IF THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IS NOT RECONSIDERED PETITIONER
STANDS TO LOSE VAST TRACK (SIC) OF PRIME LAND NOW
VALUED AT ABOUT P27,892,900,000.00.

Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court in Margolles et al. vs. CA
1
230 SCRA 97., Peltan Development Corporation et. al. vs. CA 2 270 SCRA 83., and
Goldenrod, Inc. vs. CA 3August 10, 1994 resolution.do not constitute a bar to the present
case based on the rule of res judicata, as the said cases pertained to the superiority of
conflicting titles of the parties therein whereas the present case resolves on the validity
of the judgment covering a vast parcel of land rendered at the time when the land was
still forest land; that the subject matter of the present case is the entire parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 4216 with an area of 996,175 square meters, whereas the cited
Margolles case involved only a 188,254 square meter portion of the land covered by
OCT No. 4216. Petitioner insists that it was not a party in the Margolles case and that its
cause of action in the present case is based on the inalienability and indisposability of
the subject land and consequent lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over
the same. Thus there is no identity of parties or of subject matter, or of cause of action
that would justify application of the rule of res judicata.

Petitioner Republic further contends that land not classified as alienable and disposable
remain so and it is the private claimant who bears the burden of showing that the
Executive Department has in fact classified the land as disposable and alienable; that
under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State, thus, whatever title issued before such
classification is considered null and void ab initio. It contends that during the oral
argument, the Solicitor General stated that initially it is the government which has the
burden of proof to show that the title of the Spouses Gana is invalid or not legal but the
burden is shifted to private respondents once the government has established the fact
that the title was issued before the land had been declared as alienable and disposable;
that since the land covered by OCT No. 4216 was still part of the unclassified forest
land in 1927, the then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court, which took
cognizance of the land registration case and all the proceedings conducted therein
including but not limited to the issuance of the published notice of initial hearing in the
1927 issue of the Official Gazette were invalid, that land registration courts at the time
the Ganas filed their application, had no power nor authority to determine whether the
land applied for was forest or agricultural land subject of registration since the authority
to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926
(1903) and 2874 (1919).

Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents' reliance on Section 45 of Act
No. 2874 at this final stage of the proceedings, which only indicates that the Gana
spouses instituted their application for land registration on confirmation of imperfect
title supposedly grounded on their alleged "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation" is fraught with untenable implications since OCT No. 4216
was not evidenced by any judicial record, decision or decree; thus private respondents
invocation of "private rights" is hearsay and self serving.

On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and Peltan argue that this case
must be decided on the basis of the law and jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929
covering the time when the application for registration was filed in LRC Case No. 672
(GLRO Record No. 30406) and when OCT No. 4216 was issued; that it is not correct to
say that no valid torrens title to land can be obtained by individuals and entities in a land
registration case unless the land was previously covered by an executive proclamation
declaring the land as alienable and disposable. Respondents claim that property that was
already privately owned or under private ownership at the time the Spanish crown ceded
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands to the United States remained private property,
even if the owner had not obtained a muniment of title to his property; thus, such person
who has held the property under color of title may institute a land registration case to
have the property brought under the torrens system and have a title issue in his name;
that even assuming that a particular piece of property was not yet privately owned when
the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty, private individuals or entities who held
"agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously, in the
concept of owners "for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July
1904 were conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
"government grant" and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title to such land, 4 Section 54 (6) Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission
otherwise known as the Public Land Act.as a qualified possessor of "agricultural public
land"; that there was no requirement under Act No. 926 that the land subject of a
government grant must have been previously declared as alienable and disposable by the
Governor General. Respondents claim that it was under Act No. 2874 that the Governor
General was given for the first time the authority upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into alienable and disposable, timber
and mineral, and to transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their government and disposition. 5Section 6 Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that
under Act No. 2974 just as in Act No. 926, such power of the Governor General did not
affect lands that may have already become "private property" or have become impressed
with a "private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law"
6
Section 8 Act No. 2874.and the fact that such properties were not previously covered
by a declaration by the Governor General that these lands are alienable and disposable
does not affect the validity of the titles of the owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda
de San Pedro Macati, the Tuason Entail, the Hacienda de Maricaban, Hacienda de
Navotas, the Piedad Estate, which were issued before World II. The ownership of these
parties who owned property during the Spanish regime was not affected by Act No. 926
or Act No. 2874, which referred only to public lands. They further contend that under
the laws and jurisprudence in force at the time the proceedings in LRC Case No. 678
(GLRO Record No. 30406) were conducted, and insofar as the confirmation of
imperfect titles is concerned, the determination of whether land is "agricultural public
land" susceptible of registration in the name of a private party, or "forest land" which is
not susceptible of private ownership, is a question of fact that the land registration court
has the power and/or jurisdiction to determine on the basis of the judicially prescribed or
formulated test i.e., whether the land is "more valuable for the forestry or the mineral
which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes?".

We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and were duly considered in our
decision and we reiterate that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition to
annul judgment in view of the decision of this Court in the Margolles case. Petitioner's
contention that it was never a party to the Margolles case is not decisive of the issue. We
have stated that absolute identity of parties is not required but only substantial identity
of parties for the application of the rule on res judicata. We agree with the respondent
Court of Appeals that although petitioner was not a party in the Margolles case, its claim
in the instant case and that of the losing parties in the Margolles case raised exactly the
same argument and relied on the same evidence to justify invalidation of OCT No.
4216, namely, that said title supposedly covers unclassified public land (forest land) so
that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in 1929, did not acquire
jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject property in favor of the original applicants, the
Gana spouses. Such a shared identity of interest as shown by the identity of the relief
sought by one person in a prior case and the second person in the subsequent case, i. e.,
to declare the nullity of OCT No. 4216, is sufficient to make them "privy in law"
7
Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, 184 SCRA 80; Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 486;
Santos vs. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 289; Widows and Orphans Associations v. CA, 212 SCRA
360.for purposes of the operation of the rule on res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment.

The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking annulment of the decision of the
then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO
Record No. 30406) was that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because the
property subject matter thereof was "forest land" since at the time the land registration
case was filed in 1927, the Governor-General had not issued a proclamation declaring
the subject property as alienable and disposable.

Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court which
rendered the judgment in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) that became
the basis for the issuance of OCT No. 4216 seventy (70) years ago relies on the very
same evidence (FAO 4-1141 [1968] implementing LC Map No. 2623 Project No. 13-
A), (namely land classification maps), that was judicially determined by this Court as
insufficient to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1929 and to
overcome the overwhelming documentary evidence adduced to support the validity of
OCT No. 4216, we are compelled to affirm the dismissal of the petition to annul the
judgment which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 4216.

We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a presumption lies in favor of state
ownership and it is the individual who claims that the land is alienable and disposable
who must present clear, positive and absolute evidence to over the presumption of state
ownership. While it may be true that an applicant for original registration of a parcel of
land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of public domain, compliance with this burden should be proven in
the original proceedings instituted by the Gana spouses in 1927, and must be legally
presumed to have been satisfied as a decree was issued in favor of the petitioners-
spouses. Thus where a petition is filed to annul the said judgment on the ground that it is
fatally void, the burden of proving the nullity rests with the petitioner.

In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 8189
SCRA 792.this Court emphasized "that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of
proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner, and the petitioner must establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective." 9In that case,
the petitioner contended in the proceedings filed by the Republic in the Court of
Appeals, that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912
the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.However, petitioner's
case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of
the decree in 1912 which maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of
the land in 1912 and the years prior to that.Before this Court, petitioner reiterated said
contention and referred, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in
Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts
thereof.The Court held that these maps are insufficient to overcome the legal
presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.The Court held that land classification
maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912 fail to conclusively
establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that, and are
insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the decree's regularity.

Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the filing of the action. 10 Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 1, 1995 edition, p. 55.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled or not to recover upon the claim asserted therein, a matter that can be
resolved only after and as a result of the trial. 11 Ibid.It bears stress that what the
petitioner sought to annul was the 1929 decision of the land registration court which
became the basis for the issuance of OCT No. 4216. The law prevailing at the time the
original land registration was sought, Act No. 2874 (1919) entitled "An act to amend
and compile the laws relative to lands of public domain, or better known as "the Public
Land Act" pertinently provides:

"Section 6. The Governor General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into-

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their government and disposition.

xxx

Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession

which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and
which have not been reserved for public or quasi public uses, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or
which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain
open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition until
they are again declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly
published or by Act of the Legislature.

xxx

Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement

(2) By sale
(3) By lease.
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By administrative legalization (free patent)
(b) By judicial legalization.

Section 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United
States, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except
as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by way of force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title, under the provisions of this chapter."

We are inclined to agree with the respondents that it is legally doubtful if the
authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would
apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with
a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express
declaration of section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public-domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since
July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued
a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of
title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was
agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land
registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for
was agricultural, forest or timber 12In Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos
instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered but opposition was entered
by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from
the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first
parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the oppositors and excluded parcel
no. 1. This Court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court to register parcel
no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as follows:

'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the
government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can
be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to
the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agriculture than forest
purposes. Great considerations, it must be stated, should and undoubtedly will be, paid
by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on
forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney General for
the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts
from giving title to the claimant." taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. 13 Ankronvs. Government of Philippine Islands, 40 Phil 10.

Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of judgment in the respondent

Court of Appeals contended that the decree in favor of the Gana spouses was issued at
the time when the subject land was still forest land, (unfortunately no copy of the 1929
decision is available) and rested its case solely on the land classification map No. 2623
Project 13-A which failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land
in 1929 or earlier. Moreover, FAO No. 4-1 141 signed by then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr, on January 3, 1968, which provides:

"1, Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised

Administrative Code, (hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place
the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and
disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private
rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified, the portions
of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of xxxxxxxx Las Pias
Province of Rizal which are designated and described as alienable or
disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC 2623 approved on January 3,
1968."

categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights and this pronouncement
necessarily includes the issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929; "otherwise, certificates of
title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified." 14 Margolles vs. CA, supra.

True, prescription does not run against the State. However, probably due to bureaucratic
constraints, vast tracts of land acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the city
of Manila and Quezon City were released from classification as forestland belatedly, or
long after their residential character as private property had become a matter of judicial
notice. It appears that the City of Manila was declassified as forest land only in 1955 15
Republic vs. Alano, CA-G.R. SP No. 08376.and Quezon City only on October 24, 1989.
16
See Comment to Motion for Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as 1961, this
Court stated that an attorney-at-law "should have known that no property around the
City of Manila or in Quezon City is as yet not covered by torrens title". 17 Republic vs.
Aricheta, 2 SCRA 469.In this case defendant claimed that he was a possessor in good
faith From petitioners-movants' own submission, 18Reply, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 835-
836.a part of Las Pias comprising 1200 hectares was declared as alienable and
disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:

"The map showing the area included in the 1200 hectares was destroyed during
the Second World War, and it was in view of the loss of the map indicating the
1200 hectares that then Sec. Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the
entire Las Pias as well as part of the adjacent municipalities as alienable and
disposable on January 3, 1968."

The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to confirm or reiterate the earlier
declaration and serves to affirm that indeed parts of Las Pias, albeit the map indicating
this area has been lost, were already open to disposition to private claimants long before
the issuance of FAO 4-1141. Since there are extant numerous titles covering various
portions of Las Pias, 19 Attached to respondents' Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration is a list given by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of at least thirty
three (33) original OCTs to lands in Las Pinas, issued before World War II indicating
that there are numerous titles other than OCT No. 4216 which covers parcels of land in
Las Pinas, most of which were issued earlier than 1929.any conflict or overlapping of
titles should be litigated by the interested parties, as what happened in the Margolles,
Peltan and Goldenrod cases.

In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only seriously undermine the
principle of res judicata, an old axiom of law, "dictated by wisdom and sanctified by
age" 20 Carandang vs. Venturaza, 133 SCRA 344.and a fundamental component in every
jural system 21 Ibid.that prohibits relitigation of questions already settled by final
judgment of the court, in this case, the highest court. Worse, considering that there are
numerous certificates of titles now in the hands of successors-in-interest of the original
awardees of OCT No. 4216, it will imperil the rule on the indefeasibility of titles which
is a basic underpinning of the torrens system of land registration, and which was
precisely instituted to quiet title to land. Again, contrary to the submission of the
petitioner that the obtention of OCT No. 4216 has caused "property rights (to be)
unsettled and destabilized, and the integrity of the torrens system compromised", the
relitigation of the question on the validity and genuineness of OCT No. 4216 would
open the floodgates or pave the way for the assertion of numerous conflicting claims to
13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and Cavite covered by FAO-4-1141 22This covers an
appropriate area of 13, 495,22 hectares, situated in Taytay, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa,
Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros, province of Rizal, and in Bacoor and Imus, Province of
Cavite.which were already titled prior to 1968.

Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 hectares situated in six

municipalities of Rizal and two municipalities of Cavite. Pursuing the petitioner's theory
that possession before January 3, 1968 could not have ripened into ownership, the State
would have to take action to cause the reversion of the innumerable parcels of lands
which were titled earlier than 1968. An attempt at this time to single out OCT No. 4216
for cancellation and resurrect the contention that it is spurious and irregularly obtained,
despite the pronouncement of this Court positively and categorically vindicating that
very same title in three cases, betrays an unbecoming disregard for the final judgment of
the highest court and does not elicit sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the validity of OCT
No. 4216 is put to rest.

One final note, our reluctance to give overriding significance to the Republic's
invocation of the regalian doctrine stems from a consideration of the salient fact that we
are here dealing with land which although allegedly to be originally of the public
domain was eventually, if belatedly, released for disposition to private claimants. Thus
the parties who have sought to assert their own title in this case (by way of intervention)
and in the cases of Peltan and Goldenrod (in petitions to cancel title) are private parties
who purportedly acquired subsequent certificates of title to, or interests in, the same
land. In short, the land in question has been the subject of overlapping or conflicting
claims of private parties. Had the Republic's cause of action been one to cause reversion
to the State of public land illegally titled because it cannot be alienated at all, e.g.
military reservations, public parks, or other lands devoted to public use, and for that
reason absolutely insusceptible of private ownership, the government's plea would have
compelled concurrence. As it is, petitioners Firestone, et al., the losing parties in the
Margolles case, have asserted their "legal interest in the success of the instant
Government's action" (Motion for Reconsideration) to annul the 1929 judgment of the
land court on the basis of its subsequent title obtained in 1969 covering a portion of the
property earlier titled in the name of the Gana spouses.

Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and amended petition, the State does
not stand to be deprived of its patrimony, as the entire municipality of Las Pias has
already been declared as alienable and disposable and if there is any reversion to be
caused in favor of the Republic, the land recovered would not be for public use, but for
eventual disposition to other private persons. With the classification of the land in
question as alienable and disposable in 1968, and in view of the failure of the State to
institute reversion proceedings before 1968, any action to cause the cancellation of
subject title at this time should be subjected to assiduous scrutiny in the light of the
existence of numerous titles covering lands within the coverage of FAO-4-1 141 which
encompasses 13,495 hectares in Rizal and Cavite. In Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng
Giap and Sons 23 96 Phil. 447; See also Arsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113
SCRA 547., this Court upheld the title of an alien who subsequently became a
naturalized Filipino before the State commenced escheat proceedings on the ground that
the "State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of
the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to
him". The court rationalized that "if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve
the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim would not be thwarted by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who become naturalized citizens
before the State commences forfeiture proceedings." By parity of reasoning, even
assuming that it was convincingly established that the subject land was indeed still
classified as forest land at the time of the registration proceedings in 1929, the fact that
the same was eventually released or classified as alienable and disposable should stay
the hand of the Government in bringing an action to question the title issued by a court
of land registration, an action which is in rem, considering that the same basic issue was
already resolved with finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul existing torrens titles
derived from OCT No. 4216 which was issued seventy years ago, only to enable the
government to dispose anew the lands covered thereby to new or subsequent applicants
would betray a subservience to technicality that will not be in the public interest nor
serve our declared national land policies any useful purpose. This is a simple matter of
equity and good sense.

(2)G.R. No. 127022

In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. filed their motion for
reconsideration with the following assigned errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS' TITLES (DERIVED FROM
OCT No. A-S-47) BEING ADVERSE TO OCT NO. 4216, WERE
DECLARED "AS NULL AND VOID" BY THE DECISION
RENDERED IN G.R. NO. 109490 (MARGOLLES CASE).
II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT PETITIONERS, AS MOVANTS-INTERVENORS IN
 THE CASE BELOW, "HAVE NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST
IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING IN THE
PROCESS, THAT PETITIONERS' LEGAL INTEREST THERETO IS
BASICALLY ANCHORED IN THE SUCCESS OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT ACTION.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS' TITLES LOST IN G.R. NO.
109490 (MARGOLLES CASE), "MAY NO LONGER BE REVIVED
REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE MAIN PETITION OF
THE PETITIONER REPUBLIC", EVEN AS THE OBJECT OF
PETITIONERS' INTERVENTION IS TO AVOID MULTIPLICITY OF
SUIT, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.
IV. THIS HON. COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT
CONSOLIDATED CASE "ARE BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN
THE MARGOLLES AND PELTAN CASES".

Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al., contend that there was nothing in the three (3)
cases cited in our decision which declared petitioners' titles as null and void although
petitioners' titles were, in effect, set aside in the Margolles case on the ground of
superiority of titles. They further allege that their intervention is based on their legal
interest in the success of the government's action which is of direct and material
character because <="">"either gain or lose" by the direct operation and effect of the
judgment. They also contend that in the event that the government succeeds and the
mother title as well as the derivative titles of the private respondents are voided, the
Margolles group had no valid cause to litigate upon the issue of superiority of title in G.
R. No. 109490 and petitioners' derivative titles become the only title to the extent of the
188,424 square meters; that the intended revival of petitioners supposed nullified titles
in the instant proceedings, by way of intervention, is imperative in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits, otherwise, without said intervention, petitioners will have no other
recourse but to commence an entirely new action for the recovery of the subject land or
possibly to institute an action to reopen the Margolles case thereby incurring
unnecessary waste of time, money and effort while, in the meantime, the voided titles of
the private respondents will have to be reverted and consolidated in the name of the
Republic to the extreme prejudice of petitioners.

We cannot sustain the above arguments which are a mere rehash of the arguments raised
in their petition , and which we have already passed upon in our decision. Moreover,
Firestone Ceramics, et al., were the private respondents in G. R. No. 109490 (Margolles
case), which filed a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and
quieting of titles against Patrocinio Margolles et al. (private respondents in present
petition). What petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. sought to annul in that case was
OCT No. 4216. With the ruling of this Court upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216
the necessary consequence of such decision would be the nullification of the titles
adverse to OCT No. 4216. There is no question that intervention is only collateral or
ancillary to the main action. Hence it has been held that final dismissal of the principal
action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action. We find no reason to dwell on the
other issues raised in view of the fact that we are dismissing the principal action of
petitioner Republic.

WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is DENIED. The motions for

reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic and petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are
DENIED for lack of merit with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner

vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore
not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in
1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the
classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has
4
been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141.
Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified
as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or
manglares were defined by the Court as:

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also,
to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot
be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains.

xxx

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.

Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation
and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English
means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree
in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.

More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
 'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that
the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of

1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on
March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice
Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think
this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.

No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with
Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are
not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.

Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated
the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.

But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.

In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.

Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when
it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
 The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted
and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'

The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with
the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are
agricultural lands or forest lands.

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is
now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer
our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed'
and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the
rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they
are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with
each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.

In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:
 (a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Lumber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or

disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.

With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.

As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:

Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public
lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and
the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered,
sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.

The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.

Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
 purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.

With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.

Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much
later classified as timberland.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of
the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code.

The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director
of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural
land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp

lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can
be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion
posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the
informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as
required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be established
with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor
of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of

Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

1 2 3
This is a petition for review of the 21 May 2001 and 25 September 2002 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The

21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) amended complaint
for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September
2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

4
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928 in
favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of
private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters
(subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the
5
Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the
name of spouses Carag.

On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree
6
No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, issued
in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and
7
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278, issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot
2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the
ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which
was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.

The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:

 A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag,
and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within
the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and
disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on
27 May 1994.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and
occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472
8
Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.

Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable
and disposable on 22 February 1982."

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau
recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its
derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.

On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court
9
of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the
ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property,
which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly
still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not
alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable
and disposable.

10
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Private respondents alleged that
petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint
was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but
failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true
copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was
11
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. Private
respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals
for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party in interest
12
was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private respondents.

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation
13
and declaration of nullity of titles.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which
this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint
contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be
divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only
on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in
the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and
Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of
timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of
 the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T.
No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such
adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio
under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to
dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with
14
Section 101 of the Public Land Act. (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer
available;

2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;

4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a
tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;

5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings
changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance
over the land;

6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and

7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the
petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or
15
lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the
Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public
 domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in
favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of
timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the
Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such
adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void
ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.

xxxx

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of
the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland
area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register
of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court
and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction
to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently,
16
the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever. (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree
No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the
disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and
disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure to allege
that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available."

17
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, we ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final
order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it
18
is invoked, unless barred by laches.

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner
need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.

Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in nature and
19
should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.

Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a
trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or
a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and
proper determination of the case.

However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall
decide the case on the merits.

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed
portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber
land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect,
petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the
disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only
the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify
lands of the public domain.

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
20
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
21
is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.

22
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government, we
ruled:

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable
and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
23
person x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public
purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest
zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or
24
thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in
1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained
25
no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.

26
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into -

(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber and

(c) Mineral lands

 and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject
property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared
alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which
have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.
However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the
public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established
or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition
by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a
private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8
for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown
lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had
jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion
had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged
that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at
that time.

27
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for
land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also
alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or
agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided
28
in Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled:

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of
the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands
that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right
authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of
Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894
may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision
for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to
the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural
and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of
the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration
 court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930,
the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion,
applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was
agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title.
The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did
not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now
final and beyond review.

The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
29
Constitution." When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution,
spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant
to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines complaint for
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.