Talcott Parsons - On The Concept of Political Power

On the Concept of Political Power
Author(s): Talcott Parsons

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Source: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Jun. 19, 1963), pp.
232-262
Published by: American Philosophical Society
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ON THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL POWER
TALCOTT PARSONS
Professor
ofSociology,HarvardUniversity
(Read November
8, 1963)
POWER is one of the key conceptsin the great ployedor of the statusof "authorization"to make
Westerntraditionof thoughtabout politicalphe- decisionsor imposeobligations.'
-nomena. It is at the same time a concept on The effectof this diffuseness, as I call it, is to
which, in spite of its long history,there is, on treat"influence"and sometimesmoney,as well as
analytical levels, a notable lack of agreement coercionin various aspects,as "forms"of power,
bothabout its specificdefinition, and about many therebymaking it logically impossible to treat
features of the conceptualcontext in which it power as a specificmechanismoperatingto bring
should be placed. There is, however, a core aboutchangesin theactionof otherunits,individ-
complexof its meaning,havingto do withthe ca- ual or collective,in the processesof social interac-
pacity of persons or collectivities"to get things tion. The latteris the line of thoughtI wish to
done" effectively, in particularwhen theirgoals pursue.
are obstructedby some kind of humanresistance Secondly,thereis the problemof the relation
or opposition. The problemof coping with re- betweenthe coerciveand the consensualaspects.
sistancethen leads into the question of the role I am not aware of any treatment in the literature
of coercive measures, including the use of physical whichpresents a satisfactory solution of thisprob-
force,and the relationof coercionto the volun- lem. A major tendencyis to hold that somehow
taryand consensualaspects of power systems. "in the last analysis" power comes down to one
The aim of this paper is to attemptto clarify or theother,i.e., to "reston" commandofcoercive
thiscomplexof meaningsand relationsby placing sanctions,or on consensusand the will to volun-
the conceptof power in the contextof a general tary cooperation. If going to one or the other
conceptualschemefor the analysis of large-scale polarsolutionseemsto be unacceptable,a way out,
and complex social systems,that is of societies. takenforexampleby Friedrich,is to speak ofeach
In doing so I speak as a sociologistratherthan of these as different "forms" of power. I shall
a
as political but
scientist, as one who believes that propose a solution which maintains that both
the interconnections of the principalsocial disci- aspectsare essential,but thatneitherof the above
plines,includingnot onlythesetwo,but especially two ways of relatingthemis satisfactory, namely
theirrelationsto economicsas well, are so close subordinatingeitherone to the otheror treating
thaton mattersof generaltheoryof this sortthey themas discrete"forms."
cannotsafelybe treatedin isolation;theirinterre- Finally the third problem is what, since the
lationsmustbe made explicitand systematic.As Theoryof Games,has widelycometo be called the
a sociologist,I thus treat a central concept of "zero-sum"problem. The dominanttendencyin
politicaltheoryby selectingamong the elements the literature,for example in Lasswell and C.
which have figuredprominently in politicalthe- Wright Mills, is to maintainexplicitlyor im-
ory in termsof theirfitwithand significance for plicitlythat power is a zero-sum phenomenon,
the general theoreticalanalysis of society as a
1 Thus E. C. Banfield, PoliticalInfluence(New York,
whole.
The Free Press of Glencoe,1962), p. 348,speaksof con-
There are threeprincipalcontextsin which it trol as the abilityto cause anotherto give or withold
seems to me thatthe difficulties of the conceptof action,and poweras the abilityto establishcontrolover
power,as treatedin theliteratureof thelast gene- another. Similarly Robert Dahl, "The Concept of
ration,come to a head. The firstof these con- Power,"power Behavioral Scientist2 (July, 1957), says that
"A has over B to the extentthathe can get B to
cerns its conceptualdiffuseness, the tendency, in do somethingthat B would not otherwisedo." C. J.
the traditionof Hobbes, to treatpower as simply Friedrichtakes a similar positionin his forthcoming
the generalizedcapacityto attainends or goals in book,thetentative titleof whichis "Man and his Govern-
social relations,independently of the media em- ment."
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, VOL. 107, NO. 3, JUNE, 1963
232
VOL. 107, NO. 3, 1963] ON THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL POWER 233
which is to say that there is a fixed "quantity" total systemare organizedwith referenceto one
of power in any relationalsystemand hence any of its fundamental functions, namelyeffective col-
gain of poweron the partof A mustby definition lectiveactionin the attainment of the goals of col-
occurby diminishing the powerat the disposal of lectivities. Goal-attainment in this sense is the
otherunits,B, C, D.... There are, of course,re- establishment of a satisfactory relationbetweena
strictedcontextsin which this conditionholds, collectivity and certainobjects in its environment
but I shall argue that it does not hold for total which include both other collectivitiesand cate-
systemsof a sufficient level of complexity. gories of personalities,e.g. "citizens." A total
societymust in these termsbe conceived,in one
SOME GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS of its main aspects,as a collectivity, but it is also
composedof an immensevarietyof subcollectivi-
The initialassumptionis that,withinthe con-
ties,manyof whichare partsnot only of this so-
ceptionof societyas a system,thereis an essen- cietybut of others.3
betweenthe
tial parallelismin theoreticalstructure A collectivity, seen in theseterms,is thusclearly
conceptualschemes appropriatefor the analysis not a concrete"group" but the term refersto
of the economicand the politicalaspects of so- groups, i.e. systematicallyrelated pluralitiesof
cieties. There are fourrespectsin which I wish persons,seen in the perspectiveof theirinterests
to attemptto work out and build on this parallel, in and capacities for effectivecollectiveaction.
showingat the same time the crucial substantive The politicalprocessthenis the processby which
differences betweenthe two fields. the necessaryorganizationis built up and oper-
First "political theory" as here interpreted, ated, the goals of action are determinedand the
which is not simply to be identifiedwith the resourcesrequisiteto it are mobilized.
meaning given the term by many political sci- These two parallels to economictheorycan be
entists,is thoughtof as an abstract analytical extended to still a third. The parallel to col-
schemein the same sense in whicheconomicthe- lectiveaction in the politicalcase is, for the eco-
ory is abstractand analytical. It is not the con- nomic,production. This conceptionin turnmust
ceptual interpretation of any concretelycomplete be understoodin relationto threemain operative
categoryof social phenomena,quite definitely not contexts. The firstis adjustmentto the condi-
those of government,thoughgovernmentis the tions of "demand" whichare conceivedto be ex-
area in whichthe politicalelementcomes nearest ternalto the economyitself,to be located in the
to having clear primacyover others. Political "consumers"of the economicprocess. Secondly,
theory thus conceived is a conceptual scheme resourcesmust be mobilized,also fromthe en-
whichdeals witha restrictedset of primaryvari- vironmentof the economy,the famousfactorsof
ables and their interrelations, which are to be production. Thirdly,the internaleconomicproc-
found operatingin all concrete parts of social ess is conceivedas creativelycombinatorial;it is,
systems. These variablesare, however,subjectto by the "combination"of factorsof productionin
parametricconditionswhichconstitutethe values the light of the utilityof outputs,a process of
of othervariables operatingin the larger system creatingmorevaluable facilitiesto meetthe needs
whichconstitutes the society. of consumingunits than would be available to
Secondly,followingon this,I assume that the themwithoutthis combinatorialprocess. I wish
empiricalsystemto whichpoliticaltheoryin this mostdefinitely to postulatethatthelogic of "value
sense applies is an analyticallydefined,a "func- added" appliesto thepoliticalspherein thepresent
tional" subsystemof a society,not for example sense.4
a concretetype of collectivity. The conception 3 E.g. the American medical professionis part of
of the economyof a societyis relativelywell de- Americansociety,but also it is part of a widermedical
fined.2 I should propose the conceptionof the professionwhich transcendsthis particularsociety,to
polityas the parallel empiricalsystemof direct someextentas collectivity. Interpenetration in member-
relevance to political theoryas here advanced. ship is thusa featureof the relations
among collectivities.
4 For discussions of the conceptionof "valued-added"
The polityof a given societyis composedof the in spheresof applicationbroaderthantheeconomicalone,
ways in which the relevantcomponentsof the cf.Neil J. Smelser,Social Changein theIndustrialRevo-
lution (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe,
Cf. Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser,Economy 1959), chapterII, pp. 7-20,and Neil J. Smelser,Theory
2
and Society (Illinois,The Free Press of Glencoe,1956), of CollectiveBehavior (New York, The Free Press of
chapterI, fora discussionof this conception. Glencoe,1963), chapterII, pp. 23-47.
234 TALCOTT PARSONS [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.
In the politicalcase, however,the value refer- essentiallythe commitment, in value terms,of any
ence is not to utilityin the economicsense but to resourcesto economicproductionin the system
effectiveness,very precisely,I thinkin the sense independent of price.
used by C. I. Barnard.5 For the limitedpurposes In the politicalcase, similarlythe equivalentof
of politicalanalysis as such the givennessof the land is the commitment of resourcesto effective
goal-demandsof interestgroups serves as the collectiveaction, independentof any specifiable
same order of factorin relationto the political "pay-off"fortheunitwhichcontrolsthem.7 Par-
systemas has the corresponding givennessof con- allel to labor is the demandsor "need" forcollec-
sumers'wantsforpurposesof economicanalysis- tiveactionas manifestedin the "public" whichin
and of course the same orderof qualificationson some sense is the constituencyof the leadership
the empiricaladequacy of such postulates. of thecollectivity in question-a conceptionwhich
Finally, fourth,politicalanalysis as here con- is relativelyclear for the governmentalor other
ceived is parallel to economicin the sense that a electoral association, but needs clarificationin
centralplace in it is occupied by a generalized otherconnections. Parallel to capital is the con-
mediuminvolvedin the politicalinteractionproc- trol of some part of the productivity of the econ-
ess, which is also a "measure" of the relevant omy for the goals of the collectivity, in a suffi-
values. I conceivepower as such a generalized cientlydeveloped economythroughfinancialre-
medium in a sense directlyparallel in logical sourcesat the disposalof the collectivity, acquired
structure,thoughvery different to
substantively, by earnings,gift,or taxation. Finally,parallelto
moneyas thegeneralizedmediumof the economic organizationis the legitimationof the authority
process. It is essentiallythisconceptionof power underwhichcollectivedecisionsare taken.
as a generalizedmediumparallelto moneywhich It is most importantto note thatnone of these
will, in the theoreticalcontext sketchedabove, categories of input is conceived as a form of
providethethreadforguidingthefollowinganaly- power. In so far as theyinvolvemedia,it is the
sis throughthe types of historicdifficulty with media rooted in contiguousfunctionalsystems,
referenceto whichthe paper began. not power as thatcentralto the polity-e.g. con-
trol of productivity may operatethroughmoney,
THE OUTPUTS OF POLITICAL PROCESS AND and constituents'demands throughwhat I call
THE FACTORS OF EFFECTIVENESS "'influence."Power thenis themeansofacquiring
controlof the factorsin effectiveness; it is not it-
The logic of the combinatorial processwhichI self one of these factors,any more than in the
hold to be commonto economictheoryand the economiccase money is a factorof production;
type of political theoryadvanced here, involves to suppose it was, was the ancient mercantilist
a paradigmof inputsand outputsand theirrela- fallacy.
tions. Again we will hold thatthelogic is strictly Though the analyticalcontext in which they
parallelto theeconomiccase, i.e. thatthereshould are placed is perhaps unfamiliarin the light of
be a set of politicalcategoriesstrictlyparallel to traditionalpolitical analysis, I hope it is clear
thoseof the factorsof production(inputs) on the thattheactualcategoriesused are well established,
one hand,the shares of income (outputs) on the though there remain a number of problemsof
other. exact definition. Thus control of productivity
In theeconomiccase, withtheexceptionofland, throughfinancingof collectiveaction is very fa-
the remainingthreefactorsmust be regardedas miliar,and the conceptof "demands"in the sense
inputs from the other three cognate functional of what constituentswant and press for,is also
subsystems of the society,laborfromwhatwe call veryfamiliar.8The conceptlegitimation is used in
the "pattern-maintenance" system,capital from essentiallythe same sense in which I thinkMax
the polityand organization, in the sense of Alfred Weber used it in a politicalcontext.9
Marshall,fromthe integrativesystem.6 Further-
more,it becomesclear thatland is not,as a factor 7"Pay-off" maybe a decidingfactorin choicebetween
but particularcontextsof use, but not as to whetherthe re-
of production,simplythe physicalresource, sourceshall be devotedto collectiveeffectiveness at all.
8 I have in factadoptedthe term"demands"fromthe
5 C.I. Barnard,The Functions of the Executive (Cam-
bridge,Harvard UniversityPress, 1938), chapterV, usage of David Easton,"An Approachto theAnalysisof
pp. 46-64. Political Systems,"WorldPolitics9(1957): 383-400.
6 On the rationaleof theseattributions, see Economy 9 Cf. Max Weber,The Theoryof Social and Economic
and Society, op. cit., chapterII. Organization (New York, Oxford UniversityPress,
The problem of what corresponds,for the ness, in the sense in which labor is a factorof
political case, to the economist's"shares of in- production,preciselybecause it is a categoryof
come" is not verydifficult, once the essentialdis- power. It is the point at which the economic
tinction,a veryold one in economictradition,be- utilityof the human factoris matchedwith its
tweenmonetaryand "real" incomeis clearlytaken potentialcontributionto effectivecollectiveac-
intoaccount. Our concernis withthe "real" out- tion. Since the consumerof servicesis in prin-
puts of the politicalprocess-the analogue of the ciple the employingcollectivity, it is its effective-
monetaryhereis outputof power. ness forcollectivegoals, not its capacityto satisfy
There is one, to us criticallyimportantrevision the "wants" of individuals,which is the vantage
of the traditionaleconomictreatmentof outputs pointfromwhichthe utilityof the serviceis de-
which must be made, namelythe bracketingto- rived. The outputof power which matchesthe
getherof "goods and services,"whichthenwould input of servicesto the polity,I interpretto be
be treatedas outputsto the householdas, in our the "opportunity foreffectiveness" whichemploy-
technicalterms,a part of the "pattern-mainte-ment conferson those employedor contractof-
nance" system. The present position is that fers to partners. Capital in the economicsense
goods, i.e., more preciselypropertyrightsin the is one formof this opportunity for effectiveness
physicalobjects of possession,belongin thiscate- whichis derivedfromproviding,forcertaintypes
gory,but that "services,"the commitment of hu- of performances, a framework of effective organi-
man role-performances to an "employer,"or con- zation."
tractingagent constitutean output,not to the The second, particularlyimportantcontextof
household,but to thepolity,thetypecase (though "real" outputof the politicalprocess is the cate-
not the only one) being an employingorganiza- gory which, in accord with much tradition,I
tion in whichthe role-incumbent commitshimself should like to call capacityto assume leadership
to performance of an occupationalrole,a job,'0 as responsibility.This, as a categoryof "real" out-
a contribution to the effectivefunctioning of the put also is not a formof power,but this timeof
collectivity. influence.'2This is an outputnot to the economy
There is, fromthis consideration,a conclusion but to what I shall call the integrativesystem,
which is somewhat surprising to economists, which in its relevanceto the presentcontextis
namelythat serviceis, in the economicsense the in the firstinstance the sector of the "public"
"real" counterpart of interestas monetaryincome whichcan be looked on as the "constituencies"of
fromthe use of funds. What we suggestis that the collectiveprocesses under consideration. It
the politicalcontrolof productivity makes it pos- is the group structureof the societylooked at in
sible, throughcombinatorialgains in the political terms of their structuredinterestsin particular
context,to producea surplusabove the monetary modes of effectivecollectiveaction by particular
fundscommitted, by virtueof whichunder speci- collectivities.It is onlythrougheffective organi-
fiedconditionsa premiumcan be paid at themone- zation that genuine responsibility can be taken,
tarylevel which,thougha resultof the combina- hence the implementationof such interestde-
torialprocessas a whole,is most directlyrelated mands responsibility for collectiveeffectiveness.'3
to the outputof available servicesas an economic
phenomenon,i.e. as a "fluid resource." Seen a 11 In the cases treatedas typicalfor economicanalysis
it becomesnecessaryto make a the collective elementin capitalis delegatedthroughthe
littledifferently, bindingness of thecontracts of loan of financialresources.
clear distinctionbetweenlabor as a factorof pro- To us this is a special case, employment beinganother,
ductionin the economicsense and service as an of the bindingobligationassumed by an organization,
outputof theeconomicprocesswhichis utilizedin whetherit employsor loans,by virtueof whichthe re-
a politicalcontext,that is one of organizational cipientcanItbe more effectivethan would otherwisebe
thecase. is notpossibleto go further intothesecom-
or collectiveeffectiveness. plex problemshere,but theywill, perhaps,be somewhat
Service,however,is not a "factor"in effective- illuminatedby the later discussionof the place of the
in thetheoryof power.
conceptof bindingness
1947), p. 124. Translationby A. M. Hendersonand to be
12 See my paper "On the Conceptof Influence,"
Talcott Parsons; editedby Talcott Parsons. publishedin the Public Opinion Quarterly27 (Spring,
10The cases of servicesconcretelyrenderedto a house- 1963).
holdwill be consideredas a limitingcase wherethe roles 13 Here again Barnard'susage of the conceptof re-
of consumerand employer have notbecomedifferentiatedsponsibilityseems to me the appropriateone. See
fromeach other. Barnard,op. cit.
Again it should be made quite clear that leader- competitiveproblemsin the allocativesense and
is nothereconceivedas an out-
ship responsibility conflictproblems,as well as problemsof enhance-
put of power,thoughmanypoliticaltheorists(e.g. ment of the total effectiveness of the systemof
Friedrich)treatbothleadershipand, morebroadly collective organization. In this case also the
influence,as "forms"of power. The powercate- "structure"of the available resourcesmay not be
gorywhichregulatesthe outputof leadershipin- assumed spontaneouslyto matchthe structureof
fluencetakes this formon the one side of binding thesystemof interest-demands. The increment of
on the otherof
policydecisionsof the collectivity, effectiveness in demand-satisfaction throughthe
politicalsupportfromtheconstituency, in thetype politicalprocess is, as in the economiccase, ar-
case throughfranchise.Policy decisionswe would rivedat throughcombinatorialdecision-processes.
treat as a factorin integrationof the system, The organizational"technology"involvedis notin
not as a "consumable" output of the political the analyticalsense political. The demand-refer-
process.14 ence is not to discreteunits of the systemcon-
Finally,a fewwordsneed to be said aboutwhat ceived in abstractionfromthe systemas a whole
I have called the combinatorialprocess itself. It -the "individual"consumerof the economist-
is of course assumed in economictheorythat the but to the problemof the share of benefitsand
"structures"of the factorsof productionon the burdensto be allocatedto subsystemsof various
one hand, the "demand system"for real outputs orders. The "consumption"referenceis to the
on the otherhand,are independentof each other. interest-unit's place in theallocativesystemrather
"Utility"of outputscan only be enhanced, to say than to the independentmerits of particular
nothingof maximized,by processesof transforma- "needs."
tion of the factorsin the directionof providing
whatis wantedas distinguished fromwhatmerely THE CONCEPT OF POWER
is available. The decision-making aspect of this The above may seem a highlyelaboratesetting
transformative process, what is to be produced, in which to place the formalintroduction of the
how much and how offeredfor consumption,is main subject of the paper, namely the concept
what is meant by economicproduction,whereas of power. Condensedand crypticas the exposi-
the physical processes are not economic but tionmayhave been,however,understanding of its
"technological";theyare controlledby economic main structureis an essentialbasis for the spe-
considerations,but are not themselves in an cial way in whichit will be proposedto combine
analyticalsense economic. the elementswhichhave played a crucial part in
The consequence of successfuladaptation of the main intellectualtraditionsdealing with the
available resourcesto the want or demand sys- problemsof power.
tem is an incrementin the value of the resource- Power is here conceivedas a circulatingme-
stock conceivedin termsof utilityas a type of dium,analogous to money,withinwhat is called
value. But thismeans recombination of the com- the politicalsystem,but notablyover its bound-
ponentsof the resource-stockin order to adapt aries intoall threeof the otherneighboring func-
themto thevarioususes in question. tional subsystems of a society (as I conceive
The same logic applies to the combinatorial them), the economic,integrative,and pattern-
processin thepoliticalsphere. Here theresources maintenancesystems. Specification of theproper-
are not land, labor,capital,and organization,but ties of power can best be approachedthroughan
valuationof effectiveness, controlof productivity, attempt to delineate very brieflythe relevant
structureddemandsand the patterningof legiti- propertiesof money as such a medium in the
mation. The "wants" are not forconsumption in
economy.
the economicsense, but for the solutionof "in- Money is, as the classical economistssaid, both
terest" problemsin the system,includingboth a mediumof exchangeand a "measureof value."
in
thingstoo much,I shall It is symbolic that,
thoughmeasuringand thus
141n ordernot to complicate
not enter into problemof the interchangesystemin- "standing for" economic value or utility,it does
volving legitimation here. See my paper "Authority, not itselfpossess utility in the primaryconsump-
Legitimation, and Political Process," in Nomos 1, re- tion sense-it has no "value in use" but only "in
printedas chapterV of my Structureand Process in exchange," i.e. for possession of things having
Modern Societies (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press,
1960), chapterV, pp. 170-198. utility. The use of moneyis thusa mode of com-
municationof offers,on the one hand to purchase, works as a medium,only withina relativelyde-
on the otherto sell,thingsof utility,withand for finednetworkof marketrelationships whichto be
money. It becomes an essential medium only sure now has become world-wide,but the main-
when exchangeis neitherascriptive,as exchange tenance of which requires special measures to
of giftsbetweenassigned categoriesof kin, nor maintain mutual convertibility of national cur-
takes place on a basis of barter,one item of rencies. Such a systemis on theone handa range
commodity or servicedirectlyforanother. of exchange-potential withinwhichmoneymaybe
In exchangeforits lack of directutilitymoney spent,but on the other hand, one withinwhich
gives the recipientfourimportantdegreesof free- certain conditions affectingthe protectionand
dom in his participation in the totalexchangesys- managementof the unit are maintained,both by
tem. (1) He is freeto spend his moneyfor any law and by responsibleagencies under the law.
itemor combinationof itemsavailableon themar- The firstfocus of the concept of an institu-
ket which he can afford,(2) he is free to shop tionalizedpower systemis, analogously,a rela-
around among alternativesources of supply for tional systemwithinwhich certaincategoriesof
desireditems,(3) he can choose his own timeto commitments and obligations,ascriptiveor volun-
purchase,and (4) he is free to consider terms tarilyassumed-e.g. by contract-are treatedas
which, because of freedomof time and source binding,i.e. under normatively definedconditions
he can accept or reject or attemptto influencein theirfulfillment may be insistedupon by the ap-
the particularcase. By contrast,in the case of propriaterole-reciprocalagencies. Furthermore,
barter,the negotiatoris bound to what his par- in case of actual or threatenedresistanceto "com-
ticularpartnerhas or wants in relationto what pliance," i.e. to fulfillment of such obligations
he has and will part with at the particulartime. when invoked, they will be "enforced"by the
The otherside of the gain in degreesof freedom threator actual impositionof situationalnegative
is of course the risk involvedin the probabilities sanctions,in the formercase havingthe function
of the acceptanceof moneyby othersand of the of deterrence, in the latterof punishment.These
stabilityof its value. are eventsin the situationof the actorof reference
Primitivemoneyis a mediumwhichis stillvery whichintentionally alterhis situation(or threaten
close to a commodity, the commonestcase being to) to his disadvantage,whateverin specificcon-
preciousmetal,and many still feel that the value tentthesealterationsmay be.
of moneyis "really" groundedin the commodity Power thenis generalizedcapacityto securethe
value of themetallicbase. On thisbase, however, performance of bindingobligationsby units in a
thereis, in developedmonetarysystems,erecteda systemof collectiveorganizationwhen the obliga-
complex structureof credit instruments, so that tions are legitimizedwith referenceto theirbear-
onlya tinyfractionof actual transactionsis con- ing on collective goals and where in case of
ducted in termsof the metal-it becomes a "re- recalcitrancethere is a presumptionof enforce-
serve" available for certaincontingencies, and is mentby negativesituationalsanctions-whatever
actuallyused mainlyin the settlement of interna- theactualagencyofthatenforcement.
tionalbalances. I shalldiscussthenatureofcredit It will be noted that I have used the concep-
furtherin anotherconnectionlater. For the mo- tions of generalizationand of legitimationin de-
mentsufficeit to say that,howeverimportantin finingpower. Securingpossessionof an object of
certain contingenciesthe availabilityof metallic utilityby barteringanotherobject for it is not a
reserves may be, no modern monetarysystem monetarytransaction. Similarly,by my defini-
operates primarilywith metal as the actual me- tion,securingcompliancewith a wish, whetherit
dium, but uses "valueless" money. Moreover, be definedas an obligationof the object or not,
theacceptanceof this"valueless" moneyrestson a simplyby threatof superiorforce,is not an exer-
certaininstitutionalizedconfidence in themonetary cise ofpower. I am well aware thatmostpolitical
system. If the securityof monetarycommitments theoristswould draw the line differently and
restedonlyon theirconvertibility intometal,then classifythisas power (e.g. Dahl's definition),but
the overwhelmingmajority of them would be I wish to stickto my chosen line and explore its
worthless,for the simple reason that the total implications. The capacityto secure compliance
quantityof metalis fartoo smallto redeemmore must,if it is to be called power in my sense, be
than a few. generalizedand not solelya functionof one par-
One final point is that money is "good," i.e. ticularsanctioningact whichthe user is in a posi-
tion to impose,15 and the mediumused must be by using some formof controlover the situation
"symbolic." in whichalteris placed,actuallyor contingently to
Secondly,I have spokenof power as involving changeit so as to increasethe probabilityof alter
legitimation.This is, in the presentcontext,the acting in the way he wishes, or, alternatively,
necessary consequence of conceivingpower as withoutattempting to changealter'ssituation,ego
"symbolic,"whichtherefore, if it is exchangedfor may attemptto change alter's intentions,i.e. he
somethingintrinsically valuable for collectiveef- may manipulatesymbols which are meaningful
fectiveness, namelycompliancewithan obligation, to alter in such a way thathe triesto make alter
leaves the recipient,the performerof the obliga- "see" thatwhat ego wants is a "good thing"for
tion,with"nothingof value." This is to say,that him (alter) to do.
he has "nothing"but a set of expectations, namely The second variable then concernsthe type of
thatin othercontextsand on otheroccasions,he sanctionsego may employin attempting to guar-
can invokecertainobligationsof the part of other antee the attainmentof his end fromalter. The
units. Legitimationis therefore,in power sys- dichotomyhere is betweenpositiveand negative
tems,the factorwhichis parallelto confidencein sanctions. Thus throughthe situationalchannel
mutualacceptability and stabilityof the monetary a positivesanctionis a changein alter's situation
unit in monetarysystems. presumptively consideredby alteras to his advan-
The two criteriaare connected in that ques- tage, which used as a means by ego of having
is
tioningthe legitimacyof the possessionand use an effecton alter's actions. A negativesanction
of power leads to resort to progressivelymore then is an alterationin alter's situationto the
"secure"3means of gaining compliance. These latter's disadvantage. In the case of the inten-
must be progressivelymore effective"intrinsi- tional channel,the positive sanction is the ex-
cally," hence more tailoredto the particularsitu- pression of symbolic"reasons" why compliance
ations of the objects and less general. Further- withego's wishesis "a good thing"independently
more in so far as theyare intrinsically effective, of any furtheraction on ego's part, fromalter's
legitimacybecomesa progressively less important point of view, i.e. would be felt by him to be
factorof their effectiveness-atthe end of this "personallyadvantageous,"whereas the negative
serieslies resort,firstto varioustypesof coercion, sanction is presentingreasons why noncompli-
eventuallyto the use of forceas the most intrin- ance with ego's wishes should be feltby alter to
sicallyeffectiveof all meansof coercion.'6 be harmfulto interestsin whichhe had a signifi-
I should like now to attempt to place both cant personalinvestment and should thereforebe
moneyand powerin thecontextof a moregeneral avoided. I should like to call the four types of
paradigm,which is an analyticalclassificationof "strategy"open to ego respectively(1) for the
ways in which,in the processesof social interac- situationalchannel, positive sanction case, "in-
tion,the actionsof one unit in a systemcan, inducement";(2) situationalchannelnegativesanc-
tentionally,be orientedto bringingabouta change tion, "coercion"; (3) intentionalchannel,posi-
in what the actions of one or more other units tive sanction "persuasion," and (4) intentional
would otherwisehave been-thus all fittinginto channelnegativesanction"activationof commit-
the contextof Dahl's conceptionof power. It is ments"as shownin thefollowingtable:
convenientto statethisin termsof the convention
Sanctiontype Channel
of speakingof the actingunit of reference-indi-
vidual or collective-as ego, and the object on Situational
Intentional
whichhe attemptsto "operate"as alter. We may Positive 3 1
thenclassifythe alternativesopen to ego in terms Persuasion Inducement
of two dichotomousvariables. On the one hand
ego may attemptto gain his end fromalter either
Negative Activationof 4 2 Coercion
15There is a certainelementof generalityin physical Commitments
whichgivesit a specialplace
forceas a negativesanction,
in power systems. This will be taken up later in the
discussion.
16There are complicationshere derivingfromthe fact A furthercomplicationnow needs to be intro-
that power is associated with negative sanctionsand duced. We thinkof a sanctionas an intentional
hence that,in the face of severe resistance,their ef-
fectiveness to deterrence.
is confined act on ego's part,expectedby him to change his
relationto alter fromwhat it would otherwise cisionsof complianceversusnoncompliance is also

have been. As a means of bringingabout a a variable. This rangehas a lowerlimitat which
changein alter's action,it can operatemost obvi- the elementof contingencydisappears. That is,
ously wherethe actual impositionof the sanction fromego's pointof view, he may not say, if you
is made contingenton a futuredecisionby alter. do so and so, I will intervene, eitherby situational
Thus a processof inducementwill operatein two manipulations or by "arguments"in suchand such
stages,firstcontingentofferon ego's part that,if a way, but he may simplyperforman overt act
alter will "comply" with his wishes, ego will and facealterwitha faitaccompli. In the case of
"reward" him by the contingently promisedsitu- inducementa giftwhichis an object of value and
ationalchange. If thenalterin factdoes comply, with respectto the acceptanceof which alter is
ego will performthe sanctioningact. In the case givenno optionis thelimitingcase. With respect
of coercionthe firststage is a contingentthreat to coercion,compulsion,i.e. simply imposinga
that, unless alter decides to comply, ego will disadvantageousalterationon alter's situationand
impose the negativesanction. If, however,alter then leaving it to alter to decide whetherto "do
complies,thennothingfurtherhappens,but,if he somethingabout it" is the limitingcase.
decides on noncompliance,then ego must carry The asymmetry just referredto appears hereas
out his threat,or be in a positionof "not meaning well. As contingentit may be said that the pri-
it." In the cases of the intentionalchannelego's mary meaningof negativesanctionsis as means
first-stage act is eitherto predictthe occurrence, of prevention.If theyare effective, no further ac-
or to announcehis own intentionof doing some- tion is required. The case of compulsionis that
thingwhichaffectsalter's sentiments or interests. in which it is renderedimpossiblefor alter to
The elementof contingency entersin in that ego avoid the undesiredaction on ego's part. In the
"argues" to alter,thatif this happens,on the one case of positive sanctionsof course ego, for ex-
hand alter should be expected to "see" that it ample in makinga giftto alter,cuts himselfout
would be a good thingfor him to do what ego frombenefiting fromalter'sperformance whichis
wants-the positivecase-or thatif he failsto do presumptively advantageousto him, in the par-
it it would implyan important"subjectivecost" ticularexchange.
to alter. In the positivecase, beyond "pointing Both, however,may be orientedto theireffect
out" if alter complies,ego is obligatedto deliver on alter'sactionin futuresequencesof interaction.
the positiveattitudinalsanctionof approval. In The object of compulsionmay have been "taught
the negative case, the correspondingattitudinal a lesson" and hence be less disposed to noncom-
sanctionof disapprovalis implementedonly for pliancewithego's wishes in the future,as well as
noncompliance. preventedfromperformanceof a particularun-
It is henceclear thatthereis a basic asymmetry desiredact and the recipientof a giftmay feel a
between the positive and negative sides of the "sense of obligation"to reciprocatein some form
sanctionaspect of the paradigm. This is that,in in thefuture.
the cases of inducementand persuasion,alter's So far this discussionhas dealt with sanction-
complianceobligatesego to "deliver"his promised ing acts in termsof their"intrinsic"significance
positivesanction,in the formercase the promised both to ego and to alter. An offeredinducement
advantages,in the latter his approval of alter's may thus be possession of a particularobject of
"good sense" in recognizingthat the decision utility,a coercivethreat,thatofa particularfeared
wished for by ego and accepted as "good" by loss, or othernoxious experience. But just as, in
alter,in factturnsout to be good fromalter'spoint the initialphase of a sequence,ego transmitshis
of view. In the negativecases, on the otherhand, contingent intentions to altersymbolicallythrough
complianceon alter's part obligates ego, in the communication, so the sanctioninvolvedmay also
situationalcase, not to carryout his threat,in the
be symbolic,e.g. in place of possessionof certain
intentionalcase by withholdingdisapproval to
valuablegoods he may offera sum of
intrinsically
confirmto alter that his compliancedid in fact
money. What we have called the generalized
spare himwhatto him,withoutego's intervention,
would have been the undesirablesubjectivecon- media of interaction thenmay be used as typesof
sequencesof his previousintentions, namelyguilt sanctions which may be analyzed in termsof the
overviolationsof his commitments. above paradigm. The factorsof generalization
Finally, alter's freedomof action in his de- and of legitimationof institutionalization, how-
ever,as discussedabove, introducecertaincompli- cally valuable entityif it is to serve as a general-

cationswhichwe mustnow take up withreference ized mediumof inducement,but it must,as we
to power. There is a sense in whichpower may have said, be institutionalized as a symbol; it
be regardedas thegeneralizedmediumof coercion must be legitimized,and must inspire "confi-
in the above terms,but this formulaat the very dence" withinthe system-and must also within
least requiresvery carefulinterpretation-indeed limitsbe deliberatelymanaged. Similarlypower
it will turnout by itselfto be inadequate. cannotbe onlyan intrinsically effective deterrent;
I spoke above of the "grounding"of the value if it is to be the generalizedmediumof mobilizing
,ofmoneyin the commodity value of the monetary resourcesfor effectivecollectiveaction, and for
metal,and suggested that there is a corresponding thefulfillment of commitments made by collectivi-
relationof the "value," i.e. the effectiveness of tiesto whatwe have herecalledtheirconstituents;
power, to the intrinsiceffectiveness of physical it too mustbe both symbolically generalized,and
forceas a means of coercionand, in the limiting legitimized.
case, compulsion.17 There is a directconnectionbetweenthe con-
In interpreting this formula due account must cept of bindingness,as introducedabove, and
be taken of the asymmetryjust discussed. The deterrence. To treata commitment or any other
special place of gold as a monetarybase rests on formof expectationas bindingis to attributea
such propertiesas its durability,high value in special importanceto its fulfillment.Where it
smallbulk,etc.,and highprobability of acceptabil- is not a mattersimplyof maintenanceof an es-
ity in exchange, i.e. as means of inducement, in a tablishedroutine,but of undertakingnew actions
verywide varietyof conditionswhichare not de- in changedcircumstances, wherethe commitment
pendenton an institutionalized order. Ego's pri- is thus to undertaketypesof actioncontingent on
maryaim in resortingto compulsionor coercion, circumstances as they develop,then the risk to be
however, is deterrence of unwanted action on minimized is that such contingent commitments
alter's part.18 Force, therefore, is in the firstin- will not be carriedout when the circumstances in
stance importantas the "ultimate"deterrent. It questionappear. Treatingthe expectationor ob-
is the means which,again independentof any in- ligationas bindingis almost the same thing as
stitutionalizedsystemof order, can be assumed saying that appropriatesteps on the other side
to be "intrinsically" the mosteffective in the con- mustbe takento preventnonfulfillment, if possi-
text of deterrence,when means of effectiveness ble. Willingnessto imposenegativesanctionsis,
which are dependenton institutionalizedorder seen in this light,simplythe carryingout of the
are insecureor fail. Therefore,the unit of an implicationsof treatingcommitments as binding,
action system which commands control of physical and the agent invoking them "meaning it" or
forceadequate to cope withany potentialcounter beingpreparedto insist.
threatsof force is more secure than any other On the otherhand thereare areas in interaction
in a Hobbesian stateof nature.19 systemswhere there is a range of alternatives,
But just as a monetarysystemrestingentirely choiceamongwhichis optional,in thelightof the
on gold as theactualmediumof exchangeis a very promised advantageousness,situational or "in-
primitiveone whichsimplycannotmediatea com- tentional,"of one as comparedto other choices.
plex systemof marketexchange,so a power sys- Positive sanctionsas here conceivedconstitutea
tem in which the only negative sanctionis the contingentincrementof relative advantageous-
threatof forceis a veryprimitiveone whichcan- ness, situationalor intentional,of the alternative
not functionto mediatea complex systemof or- ego desiresalter to choose.
ganizationalcoordination-itis fartoo "blunt"an If, in theselatterareas, a generalized,symbolic
instrument. Money cannot be only an intrinsi- medium, is to operate in place of intrinsicad-
vantages, there must be an elementof binding-
17 I owe theinsight intothisparallelto ProfessorKarl
ness in the institutionalizationof the mediumit-
W. Deutschof Yale University(personaldiscussion).
18 "Sadistic" infliction of injurywithoutinstrumental self-e.g. the fact that the moneyof a societyis
significance to ego does not belongin thiscontext. "legal tender" which must be accepted in the
19I have attempted to developthis line of analysisof settlement of debtswhichhave the statusof con-
the significance of forcesomewhatmorefullyin "Some tractualobligationsunder the law. In the case
Reflections of the Role of Force in Social Relations,"in
HarryEckstein,ed., The Problem of Internal War (New of money,I suggestthat,
for the typicalacting
Jersey,PrincetonUniversity Press,1963). unit in a market system, what specificunder-
takingshe entersinto is overwhelmingly optional freedomare protected,e.g. in the fieldsof em-

in the above sense, but whetherthe money in- ploymentand of the promotionof interest-de-
volved in the transactionsis or is not "good" is mandsand decisionsaboutpoliticalsupport.
not for him to judge, but his acceptanceof it is This feature of the boundary relations of a
binding. Essentiallythe same is true of the con- particularpolitical unit holds even for cases of
tractual obligations,typicallylinking monetary local government,in that decisions of residence,
and intrinsicutilities,whichhe undertakes. employment, or acquisitionof propertywithina
I would now like to suggestthat what is in a particularjurisdictioninvolve the optional ele-
certain sense the obverse holds true of power. ment,since in all these respectsthere is a rela-
Its "intrinsic"importancelies in its capacityto tivelyfree choice among local jurisdictions,even
ensure that obligationsare "really" binding,thus though,once havingchosen,the citizenis, forex-
if necessarycan be "enforced"by negativesanc- ample,subject to the tax policiesapplyingwithin
tions. But forpower to functionas a generalized it-and of course he cannotescape being subject
mediumin a complexsystem,i.e. to mobilizere- to any local jurisdiction,but must choose among
sourceseffectively forcollectiveaction,it mustbe thoseavailable.
"legitimized"whichin the presentcontextmeans In the case of a "national" politicalorganiza-
that in certainrespectscompliance,which is the tion,however,its territorial boundariesordinarily
commonfactoramong our media, is not binding, coincide with a relativebreak in the normative
to say nothingof being coerced,but is optional. order regulating social interaction.21 Hence
The rangewithinwhichthereexists a continuous across such boundariesan ambiguitybecomesin-
systemof interlockingbindingobligationsis es- volvedin the exerciseof power in our sense. On
sentiallythat of the internalrelationsof an or- the one hand the invokingof bindingobligations
ganized collectivity in our sense, and of the con- operatesnormallywithoutexplicituse of coercion
tractualobligationsundertakenon its behalfat its within certain ranges where the two territorial
boundaries. collectivity systemshave institutionalized theirre-
The pointsat whichtheoptionalfactorscometo lations. Thus travelersin friendlyforeigncoun-
bear are, in the boundaryrelationsof the col- tries can ordinarilyenjoy personal securityand
lectivity,wherefactorsof importanceforcollective the amenitiesof the principalpublic accommoda-
functioning otherthanbindingobligationsare ex- tions,exchange of theirmoneyat "going" rates,
changed for such binding commitmentson the etc. Where, on the otherhand,the moregeneral
part of the collectivityand vice versa, nonbinding relationsbetweennationalcollectivitiesare at is-
outputs of the collectivityfor binding commit- sue, the power systemis especiallyvulnerableto
mentsto it. These "optional"inputs,I have sug- the kind of insecurityof expectationswhichtends
gested above, are controlof productivityof the to be met by the explicitresortto threatsof co-
economyat one boundary,influencethroughthe ercive sanctions. Such threatsin turn,operating
relationsbetween leadershipand the public de- on both sides of a reciprocalrelationship,readily
mandsat the other.20 enterinto a vicious circle of resortto more and
This is a pointat whichthe dissociationof the more "intrinsically"effectiveor drasticmeasures
conceptof polityfromexclusive relationto gov- of coercion,at the end of whichroad lies physical
ernmentbecomes particularlyimportant. In a force. In other words, the danger of war is
sufficiently differentiatedsociety,the boundary- endemic in uninstitutionalized relationsbetween
relationsof the great majorityof its important territorially organized collectivities.
units of collectiveorganization(including some There is thusan inherentrelationbetweenboth
boundariesof government)are boundarieswhere the use and the controlof forceand the territorial
the overwhelmingmajorityof decisions of com- basis of organization.22One centralconditionof
mitmentare optionalin the above sense, though
once made, their fulfillment is binding. This, 21 This, of course, is a relative difference. Some
however,is only possible effectively within the hazards increasethe momentone steps outsidehis own
range of a sufficiently stable, institutionalized home,police protection may be betterin one local com-
normativeorder so that the requisitedegrees of munitythanthenext,and crossinga stateboundarymay
meana considerabledifference in legal or actual rights.
20 Thus,if controlof productivityoperatesthrough 22 Cf. my paper "The Principal Structuresof Com-
monetary funds,theirpossessorcannot"force"e.g. munity,"Nomos 2 and Structureand Process, op. cit.,
prospective employeesto acceptemployment. chapter8. See also W. L. Hurst,Law and Social Proc-
the integrationof a powersystemis thatit should money and power. Money is a "measure of
be effective area, and a crucial value," as the classical economistsput it, in terms
withina territorial
condition of this effectivenessin turn is the of a continuouslinearvariable. Objects of utility
monopolyof controlof paramountforcewithinthe valued in moneyare more or less valuable than
area. The criticalpointthen,at whichthe insti- each other in numericallystatableterms. Simi-
tutional integrationof power systems is most larly,as mediumof exchange,amountsof money
vulnerableto strain,and to degenerationinto re- differin the same single dimension. One acting
ciprocatingthreatsof the use of force,is between unit in a societyhas more money-or assets ex-
territoriallyorganized political systems. This, changeablefor money-than another,less than,
notoriously,is the weakestpointin the normative or the same.
order of human society today, as it has been Power involves a quite differentdimension
almost fromtime immemorial. which may be formulatedin terms of the con-
In this connectionit shouldbe recognizedthat ceptionthatA mayhave powerover B. Of course
the possession,the mutualthreat,and possibleuse in competitivebiddingthe holder of superiorfi-
of force is only in a most proximatesense the nancialassets has an advantagein that,as econo-
principal"cause" of war. The essentialpoint is mistssay, the "marginalutilityof money"is less
thatthe "bottleneck"of mutualregressionto more to himthanto his competitor withsmallerassets.
and more primitivemeans of protectingor ad- But his "bid" is no morebindingon the potential
vancing collectiveinterestsis a "channel" into exchangepartnerthan is that of the less affluent
whichall elementsof tensionbetweenthe collec- bidder,sincein "purchasingpower" all dollarsare
tive unitsin questionmay flow. It is a question "createdfreeand equal." There maybe auxiliary
of the many levels at which such elementsof reasons why the purveyormay thinkit advisable
tension may on the one hand build up, on the to accept the bid of the more affluentbidder;
other be controlled,not of any simple and un- these,however,are not strictly economic,but con-
equivocal conception of the "inherent" conse- cern the interrelations between moneyand other
quences of the possession and possible uses of media,and otherbases of statusin the system.
organizedforce. The connectionbetweenthe value of effective-
It should be clear that again there is a direct ness-as distinguishedfrom utility-and bind-
parallel with the economiccase. A functioning ingness,impliesa conceptionin turnof the focus-
marketsystemrequiresintegrationof the mone- sing of responsibility for decisions,and hence of
tarymedium. It cannotbe a systemof N inde- authority fortheirimplementation.23 This implies
pendentmonetaryunits and agencies controlling a special formof inequalityof power which in
them. This is the basis on whichthe main range turn implies a prioritysystemof commitments.
of extension of a relativelyintegratedmarket The implicationsof havingassumedbindingcom-
systemtends to coincidewith the "politicallyor- mitments, on the fulfillmentof which spokesmen
ganized society,"as Roscoe Pound calls it, over a for the collectivityare preparedto insist to the
territorialarea. Internationaltransactionsre- point of imposingserious negativesanctionsfor
quire specialprovisionsnot requiredfordomestic. noncompliance,are of an order of seriousness
The basic "management"of the monetarysys- suchthatmatchingtheprioritysystemin thecom-
temmustthenbe integratedwiththeinstitutional- mitmentsthemselvesthere must be prioritiesin
ization of politicalpower. Justas the latterde- thematterofwhichdecisionstakeprecedenceover
pends on an effectivemonopolyof institutionallyothersand, back of that,of whichdecision-making
organizedforce,so monetarystabilitydependson agencieshave the rightto make decisionsat what
an effectivemonopolyof basic reservesprotecting levels. Throughoutthis discussion the crucial
the monetaryunit and, as we shall see later,on questionconcernsbindingness. The referenceis
centralizationof controlover thecreditsystem. to the collectivity,and hence the strategicsignifi-
cance of the various "contributions"on the per-
THE HIERARCHICAL ASPECT OF formanceof which the effectiveness of its action
POWER SYSTEMS
23 As alreadynoted,in this area, I thinkthe analysis
A verycriticalquestionnow arises,whichmay
between of ChesterI. Barnard,in The Functionof the Execu-
be statedin termsof a crucialdifference clear and cogentthat
tive,op. cit.,is so outstandingly
ess in the United States (Ann Arbor, Universityof it deservesthestatusof a classicof politicaltheoryin my
MichiganLaw School,1960). specificsense. See especiallychapterX.
depends. Effectivenessfor the collectivityas a by thehighechelonsof authorityand power. The

whole is dependenton hierarchicalorderingof conceptof constitutionalism is the criticalone at
the relativestrategicimportanceof thesecontribu- this level, namelythat even the highestauthority
tions,and hence of the conditionsgoverningthe is bound in the strictsense of the conceptbind-
impositionof binding obligations on the con- ingnessused here,by the termsof the normative
tributors. order under which he operates,e.g. holds office.
Hence the power of A over B is, in its legit- Hence binding obligationscan clearly be "in-
imizedform,the "right"of A, as a decision-mak- voked" by lower-orderagainsthigher-order agen-
ing unit involved in collectiveprocess, to make cies as well as vice versa.
decisionswhichtake precedenceover those of B, This of course implies the relativelyfirmin-
in the interestof the effectiveness
of the collective stitutionalization of the normativeorder itself.
operationas a whole. Within the frameworkof a highlydifferentiated
The rightto use power, or negativesanctions polityit implies,in additionto constitutionalism
on a barterbasis or even compulsionto assertpri- itself,a proceduralsystemforthegrantingof high
orityof a decisionover others,I shall, following politicalauthority, even in private,to say nothing
Barnard,call authority. Precedencein this sense of public organizations,and a legal framework
can take different forms. The most serious am- withinwhichsuch authorityis legitimized. This
biguityhere seems to derivefromthe assumption in turn includesanotherorder of proceduralin-
that authorityand its attendantpower may be stitutions withinwhichthequestionof the legality
understoodas implyingoppositionto the wishes of actual uses of power can be tested.
of "lower-order"echelons which hence includes
the prerogativeof coercing or compellingcom- POWER AND AUTHORITY
pliance. Though this is implicit,it may be that
the higher-order authorityand power may imply The institutionalization of the normativeorder
the prerogativeis primarilysignificantas "de- just referred to thus comes to focusin the concept
finingthe situation"for the performanceof the of authority. Authorityis essentiallythe insti-
lower-orderechelons. The higher "authority" tutionalcode withinwhich the use of power as
may then make a decision which definesterms mediumis organizedand legitimized. It stands
withinwhich other units in the collectivitywill to poweressentiallyas property, as an institution,
be expectedto act, and this expectationis treated does to money. Property is a bundle of rightsof
as binding. Thus a rulingby the Commissioner possession, including above all that of alienation,
of InternalRevenue may exclude certaintax ex- but also at various levels of control and use. In
emptionswhichunits under his jurisdictionhave a highly differentiated institutional system, prop-
thoughttaxpayerscould claim. Such a decision erty rights are focussed on the valuation of utility,
need not activatean overt conflictbetweencom- i.e. the economicsignificanceof the objects, e.g.
missionerand taxpayer,but may rather"channel" for consumptionor as factorsof production,and
the decisions of revenue agents and taxpayers this factorcomes to be differentiated from au-
with referenceto performanceof obligations. thority. Thus, in European feudalism the "land-
There does not seemto be an essentialtheoreti- lord" had both property rights in the land, and
cal difficulty in
involved this "ambiguity." We political jurisdiction over persons acting on the
can say thatthe primaryfunctionof superiorau- same land. In modern legal systems these com-
thorityis clearly to definethe situationfor the ponentsare differentiated fromeach otherso the
landowner is no longer the landlord;thisfunction
lowerechelonsofthe collectivity.The problemof
is takenovermainlyby local politicalauthority.
overcomingoppositionin the formof dispositions
Preciselywith greaterdifferentiation the focus
to noncompliance thenarises fromthe incomplete
of the institutionbecomes more generalizedand,
institutionalizationof the power of the higherau-
while specificobjects of possessionof course con-
thorityholder. Sources of this may well include tinue to be highlyimportant, the most important
oversteppingof the bounds of his legitimateau- object of propertycomes to be monetaryassets,
thorityon the part of this agent. The conceptof and specificobjects are valued as assets, i.e., in
complianceshouldclearlynotbe limitedto "obedi- termsof potentialsof marketability.Today we
ence" by subordinates,but is just as importantly can say that rightsto moneyassets, the ways in
applicable to observanceof the normativeorder whichthesecan be legitimately acquired and dis-
posed of,the ways in whichthe interestsof other It is then essentiallythe institutionalized code
partiesmustbe protected,have come to constitute definingrightsof participationin the power sys-
the core of the institution of property.24 tem whichI should like to thinkof as authority.
Authority,then,is the aspect of a status in a It is this conceptionwhichgives us the basis for
systemof social organization,namelyits collec- the essentialdistinctionbetweenthe internaland
tive aspect,by virtueof which the incumbentis the externalaspectsof powerrelativeto a particu-
put in a positionlegitimatelyto make decisions lar collectivity.The collectivityis, by our con-
whichare binding,not onlyon himselfbut on the ception,the definitionof the range withinwhich
collectivity as a whole and hence its othermem- a systemof institutionalized rightsto hold and
ber-units,in the sense that so far as theirimpli- use power can be closed. This is to say, the im-
cations impinge on their respective roles and plicationsof an authoritative decisionmade at one
statuses,theyare boundto act in accordancewith point in the systemcan be made genuinelybind-
these implications.This includesthe rightto in- ing at all the other relevantpoints throughthe
sist on such actionthough,because of the general relevantprocessesof feed-back.
division of labor, the holder of authorityvery The hierarchicalprioritysystemof authority
oftenis not himselfin a positionto "enforce"his and power,withwhichthisdiscussionstartedcan,
decisions,but must be dependenton specialized by this criterion,only be bindingwithina given
agenciesforthis. particularcollectivity system. In this sense then
If, then,authoritybe conceivedas the institu- a hierarchyof authority-as distinguishedfrom
tional counterpartof power, the main difference the sheer differences of power of other coercive
lies in the factthat authorityis not a circulating capacities-must be internalto a collectivelyor-
medium. Sometimes,speakingloosely, we sug- ganized systemin this sense. This will include
gest thatsomeone"gives away his property." He authorityto bind the collectivityin its relations
can give away propertyrightsin specificposses- to its environment, to persons and to othercol-
sions but not the institutionof property. Simi- lectivities. But bindingness,legitimizedand en-
larlythe incumbentof an officecan relinquishau- forcedthroughthe agency of this particularcol-
thorityby resigning,but this is very different lectivity,cannot be extended beyond its bound-
fromabolishingthe authorityof the office. Prop- aries. If it exists at all it must be by virtueof
ertyas institution is a code definingrightsin ob- an institutionalized normativeorder which tran-
jects of possession, in the firstinstance physical scends the particular collectivity,throughcon-
objects, then "symbolic" objects, includingcul- tractual arrangementswith others, or through
tural objects such as "ideas" so far as they are othertypesof mutuallybindingobligation.
valuablein monetaryterms,and of course includ-
ing moneyitself,whoeverpossesses them. Au- POWER, INFLUENCE, EQUALIZATION,
thority,similarly,is a set of rightsin statusin a AND SOLIDARITY
collectivity,preciselyin the collectivityas actor,
includingmostespeciallyrightto acquire and use It is on thisbasis thatit maybe held thatat the
boundariesof the collectivity the closed systemof
powerin thatstatus. "free" exercise, at the
stability,whichis essentialto priorities is breached by
The institutional
constituency or integrative boundary, of influence.
theconceptionof a code,thenforpropertyinheres to settle
Status in the collectivity gives authority
in the institutional structureof the market. At a with
the termson which power will be exchanged
higherlevel the institutionof propertyincludes this boundary. The wielder of
influence over
rights,not only to use and dispose of particular is not
influencefromoutside,on the collectivity,
objects of value, but to participatein the system in advance to any particularterms,and it
bound
of markettransactions.
is of the essence of use of power in the "foreign
24 Two particularly importantmanifestations of this relations"of the collectivity, that authorityis a
monetization of propertyare, firstthe generallegal un- right,withincertainlimitsof discretion,to spend
derstanding thatexecutorsof estatesare not obligatedto power in exchange for influence. This in turn
retainthe exact physicalinventoryintactpendingfull
statement, butmay sell variousitems-theirfiduciary ob- can, through the offerof accepting leadership
ligationis focussedon the moneyvalue of the estate. responsibility in exchange for political support,
Similarlyin the law of contractincreasingoptionhas replenishthe expenditureof power by a cor-
been given to compensatewith moneydamages in lieu
of thespecific"performance"originallycontractedfor. respondinginput.
By thisreasoninginfluenceshouldbe capable of spheresof "jurisdiction"mustbe definedin terms
alteringthe prioritysystemwithinthe collectivity. of a normativesystem,a body of law, which is
This is what I interpretpolicydecisionas a cate- binding both on governmentand on the non-
gory of the use of power as a mediumto be, the governmental units,thoughin the "last
collectivity
process of alteringprioritiesin such a way that analysis" it will, withinan institutionalized order
the new pattern comes to be binding on the either have to be enforcedby government,or
collectivity.Similarly,the franchisemust be re- contrariwise,by revolutionaryaction against
garded as the institutionalization of a marginal, government.
interpenetrating status,betweenthe main collec- Since independent controlof serious,sociallyor-
tivityand its environmentof solidarygroupings ganized forcecannotbe given to "private"collec-
in the largersystem. It is the institutionalizationtivities,theirultimatenegativesanctionstendto be
of a marginalauthority, the use of whichis con- expulsion frommembership,thoughmany other
finedto thefunctionof selectionamongcandidates typesof sanctionmaybe highlyimportant.
forleadershipresponsibility.In thegovernmental Considerationssuch as these thus do not in
case, thisis the inclusionin a commoncollectivity any way eliminateor weaken the importanceof
systemof both the operativeagencies of govern- hierarchicalprioritieswithina collectivedecision-
mentand the "constituencies" on whichleadership systemitself. The strict"line" structureof such
is dependent,a grantnot onlyin a given instance authorityis, however, greatly modifiedby the
ofpowerto thelatterbuta statusof authority with interpenetration of othersystemswith the politi-
respectto the one crucial functionof selectionof cal, notablyfor our purposes the importanceof
leadership and grantingthem the authorityof technicalcompetence. The qualificationsof the
office. importanceof hierarchyapply in principleat the
In interpreting this discussionit is essentialto boundaries of the particularcollectivesystem-
keep in mind that a society consists,from the analyticallyconsidered-ratherthan internallyto
presentpoint of view, not in one collectivity, but it. These I would interpretas definingthe limits
in a ramifiedsystemof collectivities. Because, of authority. There are two main contexts in
however,of the basic imperativesof effective col- which norms of equality may be expected to
lective action already discussed, these must in modifythe concreteexpectationsof hierarchical
additionto thepluralisticcross-cutting whichgoes decision-systems, namely on the one hand, the
withfunctional differentiation, also have theaspect context of influenceover the right to assume
ofa "Chinesebox" relation. There mustbe some- power, or decision-making authorityand, on the
where a paramountfocus of collectiveauthority otherhand, the contextof access to opportunity
and withit of the controlof power-though it is for status as a contributing unit in the specific
crucial that this need not be the top of the total political systemin question.
systemof normativecontrol,which may for ex- It is essentialhere to recall that I have treated
ample be religious. This complexof territorialitypower as a circulatingmedium,movingback and
and the monopolyof force are central to this, forthover the boundaries of the polity. The
because the closed systemof enforceablebinding- "real" outputs of the political process, and the
ness can always be breachedby the intervention factorsin its effectiveness-inthe sense corre-
offorce.25 spondingto the real outputsand factorsof eco-
The bindingnessof normativeordersotherthan nomic production-are not in my sense "forms"
those upheld by the paramountterritorialcollec- of power but, in the most importantcases, of
tivitymust be definedwithinlimits institution- financialcontrol of economic resources,and of
alized in relationto it. So faras suchcollectivities influence,in the meaningof the categoryof in-
are not "agencies" of the state,in this sense,their fluence,definedas a generalized mechanismof
25 Since this systemis the territorially organizedcol-
persuasion. These are very essentialelementsin
lectivity,the state with its government, these consider- the total political process, but it is just as im-
ations underliethe criticalimportanceof foreignrela- portantto distinguishthem frompower as it is
tions in the sense of the relationsto otherterritorially to distinguishfinanciallyvaluable outputs and
organized,force-controlling since,once in- factorsof productionfrom money itself. They
collectivities,
ternalcontrolof forceis effectively institutionalized,
the
dangerof thiskindof breachcomesfromthe outsidein may, in certain circumstances,be exchangeable
thisspecificsenseof outside. The pointis cogentlymade forpower,but this is a verydifferent thingfrom
by RaymondAron. beingformsofpower.
The circulationof power between polity and the Westerndemocracies.26Equality of the fran-
integrative systemI conceiveto consistin binding chise which,since the consequencesof its exercise
policy decisions on the one hand, which is a are very strictlybinding,27 I classifyas in fact a
primaryfactor in the integrativeprocess, and formof power,has been part of a largercomplex
politicalsupporton the other,whichis a primary of its institutionalization, whichincludesin addi-
outputof the integrative process. Supportis ex- tionthe principleof universality-itsextensionto
changed,by a "public" or constituency, for the all responsibleadult citizensin good standingand
assumptionof leadershipresponsibility, through the secrecyof the ballot,whichservesto differen-
the process of persuadingthose in a positionto tiate this context of political action from other
give bindingsupportthatit is advisable to do so contexts of involvement,and protectit against
in the particularinstance-throughthe use of pressures,not only from hierarchicalsuperiors
influence or some less generalized means of but, as Rokkan points out, fromstatus-peersas
persuasion. In the other political "market" well.
vis-a-vis the integrativesystem,policy decisions Of coursethe same basic principleof one mem-
are given in responseto interest-demands in the ber,one vote,is institutionalized in a vast number
sense of the above discussion. This is to say that of voluntaryassociations,includingmany which
interestgroups,which,it is mostimportant to note are subassociationsof wider collectivities, such as
as a conceptsays nothingabout the moralquality facultiesin a university, or boardsand committees.
of the particular interest,attemptto persuade Thus thedifference betweena chairmanor presid-
thosewho hold authorityin the relevantcollectiv- ingofficer, and an executivehead is clearlymarked
ity,i.e. are in a positionto makebindingdecisions, withrespectto formalauthority, whateverit may
that they should indeed committhe collectivity be withrespectto influence, by the principlethat
to the policies the influence-wielders want. In a chairman,like any othermember,has only one
our termsthis is to persuadethe decisionmakers vote. Many collectivities are in this sense "trun-
to use and hence"spend" some of theirpowerfor cated" associations,e.g. in cases where fiduciary
thepurposein hand. The spendingof poweris to boards are self-recruiting.Neverthelessthe im-
be thoughtof, just as the spendingof money,as portance of this principleof equality of power
essentiallyconsistingin the sacrificeof alternative throughthe franchiseis so great empiricallythat
decisionswhichare precludedby thecommitments the questionof how it is groundedin the struc-
undertakenundera policy. A memberof the col- tureof social systemsis a crucialone.
lectivity we conceiveas notedto have authorityto It derives,I think,fromwhat I shouldcall the
universalistic componentin patternsof normative
"spend" power throughmakingbindingdecisions
order. It is the value-principlethat discrimina-
throughwhichthoseoutsideacquireclaimsagainst tionsamong unitsof a system,mustbe grounded
the collectivity. Its authority,however, is in- in intrinsicallyvalued differencesamong them,
alienable; it can onlybe exercised,not "spent." whichare, for both personsand collectivities, ca-
It has been suggested that policies must be pacitiesto contributeto valued societalprocesses.
hierarchicallyordered in a prioritysystemand Differencesof power in decision-makingwhich
thatthepowerto decideamongpoliciesmusthave mobilizescommitments, both outwardin relation
a correspondinghierarchicalorderingsince such to the environment of the collectivityand inter-
decisionsbind the collectivityand its constituent nally, to the assignment of tasks to its members,
units. The imperativeof hierarchydoes not, are ideally grounded in the intrinsicconditionsof
effectiveness. Similarly, differences on the basis
however,applyto theother"market"ofthepower
of technicalcompetenceto fulfill essentialrolesare
systemin this direction,that involvingthe rela-
groundedin the strategicconditionsof effective
tions between leadership and political support. contribution.
Here on the contraryit is a criticallyimportant These considerationsdo not,however,apply to
fact that in the largest-scaleand most highly the functionsof the choice of leadership,where
differentiated systems,namelythe leadershipsys-
temsofthemost"advanced"nationalsocieties,the 26 See, on thisprocess,Stein Rokkan,"Mass Suffrage,
power elementhas been systematically equalized Secret Voting, and Political Participation,"European
Journalof Sociology2 (1961): 132-152.
throughthe device of the franchise,so that the 27 I.e., theaggregateof votes,evaluatedby theelectoral
universaladult franchisehas been evolved in all rules,determines theincumbency of office.
VOL. 107, NO. 3, 19631 ON THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL POWER 247
thischoicehas been freedfromascriptivebases of characterof the leadership elementswhich as-

right,e.g. throughkinshipstatusor some imputed sume responsibility and which,in exchange,are
"charismatic"superiorityas in such a case as invested,in the typecase by the electoralprocess,
"white supremacy." There is a persistentpres- with authorityto carry out theirresponsibilities.
sure of the sufficientlyhighlyvalued functionsor One centralfeatureof this controlis comingto
outcomes,and underthis pressurethereseems to termswith the hierarchicalelementsinherentin
have been a continual,thoughuneven,process of powersystemsin the aspectsjust discussed. Cer-
erosion of discriminations in this criticalfieldof tain value systemsmay of course reinforcehier-
the distributionof power. archy,but-itwould be my view that a universal-
It maybe suggestedthattheprincipleof univer- isticallyorientedvalue systeminherently tendsto
salistic normativeorganizationwhich is immedi- counteractthe spreadof hierarchicalpatternswith
ately superordinateto that of politicaldemocracy respectto powerbeyondthe rangefeltto be func-
in the sense of the universalequal franchise,is tionallynecessaryforeffectiveness.28
the principleof equality beforethe law; in the There is, however,a crucial link betweenthe
case of the AmericanConstitution,the principle equality of the franchiseand the hierarchical
ofequal protectionofthelaws. I have emphasized structureof authoritywithincollectivities, namely
that a constitutionalframeworkis essential to the all-or-nonecharacterof the electoralprocess.
advanced collectiveorganization,given of course Every voter has an equal vote in electingto an
levels of scale and complexitywhich preclude office,but in most cases only one candidateis in
purely"informal"and traditionalnormativeregu- factelected-the authorityof officeis not divided
lation. The principlein effectputs the burdenof among candidatesin proportionto the numbers
proof on the side of imposing discriminations,of votes theyreceived,but is concentratedin the
eitherin access to rightsor in impositionof obli- successfulcandidate,even thoughthe marginbe
gations,on the side that such discriminations are verynarrow,as in the U. S. presidentialelection
to be justifiedonly by differencesin sufficientlyof 1960. There are, of course, considerable
highly valued exigencies of operation of the possible variations in electoral rules, but this
system. basic principle is as central as is that of the
The principleof equality both at the level of equalityof the franchise. This principleseems to
applicationof the law and of the political fran- be the obverseof the hierarchyof authority.
chise,is clearlyrelatedto a conceptionofthestatus The hierarchicalcharacterof power systems
of membership. Not all livingadults have equal has above been sharplycontrastedwiththe linear
r-ightto influencethe affairsof all collectivities quantitativecharacter of wealth and monetary
everywherein the world,nor does an American assets. This has in turnbeen relatedto thefunda-
have equal rightswitha citizenof a quite different mentaldifference betweenthe exigenciesof effec-
society within its territory. Membershipis in tiveness in collectiveaction, and the exigencies
fact the applicationto the individualunit of the of utilityin providingfor the requirementsof
conceptof boundaryof a social systemwhichhas satisfying the "wants" of units. In orderto place
the propertyof solidarity,in Durkheim's sense. the foregoingdiscussionof the relationsbetween
The equal franchiseis a prerogativeof members, power and influencein a comparabletheoretical
and of course the criteriaof membershipcan be context,it is necessaryto formulatethe value-
very differently institutionalizedunder different standard which is paramountin regulatingthe
circumstances. integrativefunctionwhich correspondsto utility
There is an important sense in whichthe double
interchange system under consideration here, 28 Of course where conditionsare
sufficiently
simple, or
whichI have called the "support"systemlinking where there is sufficientanxiety about the hierarchial
implications of power, the egalitarian element may pene-
thepolitywiththeintegrative aspectofthesociety, trate far into the political decision-makingsystem itself,
is preciselythe systemin which power is most with, e.g. insistence that policy-decisions,both external
directly controlled,both in relation to more and internal in reference,be made by majority vote of
particularizedinterest-elements which seek rela- all members, or even under a unanimityrule. The re-
tivelyparticularizedpolicies-which of course in- spects in which such a system-which of course real-
istically often involves a sharply hierarchical stratifica-
cludes wantingto preventcertainpotentialactions tion of influence-is incompatible with effectivenessin
-and in relationto themoregeneral"tone" given many spheres,can be said to be relativelyclear, especially
to the directionality of collectiveaction by the for large collectivities.
and effectiveness in the economic and political losses-deriving frommemberships, on the other
functionsrespectively. to influencethe processesby whichcollectiveac-
This is, withlittledoubt,the famousconceptof tion operates. This clearlyinvolvessome institu-
solidarityas formulatedby Durkheim.29 The tionalizationof the subordinationof unit-interest
two essentialpointsof referencefor presentpur- to thecollectivein cases wherethetwo are in con-
poses concernthe two main aspects of member- flict,actualor potential,and hencethejustification
ship,as outlinedabove,thefirstof whichconcerns of unit interestsas compatiblewiththe more ex-
claims on executiveauthorityforpolicydecisions tensivecollectiveinterest. A social systemthen
whichintegratethe totalcollectiveintereston the possesses solidarityin proportionas its members
one hand,the "partial" interestof a subgroupon are committed to commonintereststhroughwhich
the other. The second concerns integration of discrete unit interests can be integratedand the
rightsto a "voice" in collectiveaffairswith the justificationof conflictresolutionand subordina-
exigenciesof effectiveleadershipand the corre- tion can be definedand implemented.It defines,
spondingresponsibility. notthemodesof implementation of thesecommon
The principleis the "grounding" of a collective interests through effective agency, but the stand-
system in a consensus in the sense of the above ards by which such agency should be guided and
discussion,namelyan "acceptance" on the part the rightsof variousconstituent elementsto have
of its membersof theirbelongingtogether,in the a voice in the interpretation of thesestandards.
sense of sharing,over a certainrange, common
interests, interestswhichare definedbothby type, POWER AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
and byconsiderations oftime. Time becomesrele-
factorin all human We may now turnto the second major bound-
vantbecauseoftheuncertainty
ary of the polity,at whichanotherorderof modi-
action,and hencethefactthatneitherbenefitsnor
for fications of the internalhierarchyof authority
burdenscan be preciselypredictedand planned
collectivity mustbe comes to focus. This is the boundaryvis-a-vis
in advance; hencean effective
the economy where the "political" interestis to
prepared to absorb unexpectedburdens,and to
secure control of productivityand services,and
balance this,to carry out some sort of just dis-
the economic interest lies in the collectivecontrol
tributionof benefitswhichare unexpectedand/or
of fluid resources and in what we may call op-
are not attributableto the earned agency of any
portunity for effectiveness.I shall not attempt
particularsubunit.
here to discuss the whole interchangecomplex,
Solidaritymay then be thoughtof as the im-
but will confinemyselfto the crucial problemof
plementationof commonvalues by definitionof
theway thatherealso thehierarchicalstructureof
the requisitecollectivesystemsin whichtheyare
power can, under certainconditions,be modified
to be actualized. Collectiveaction as such we
in an egalitariandirection.
have definedas political function. The famous
problem of order, however, cannot be solved Productivityof the economyis in principleal-
withouta commonnormativesystem. Solidarity locable among collective(in our sense political)
is the principleby virtue of which the commit- claimants to its control as facilities,in linear
quantitative terms. This linear quantification is
ment to norms, which is "based" in turn on
achieved through the medium of money, eitheral-
values, is articulatedwith the formationof col-
lectivitieswhichare capable of effective collective locationof fundswith libertyto expend themat
or at least monetaryevaluationof more spe-
action. Whereas, in the economicdirection,the will,
"problem"of effectiveaction is coping with the cific facilities.
scarcityof available resources,includingtrying In a sufficiently developedsystem,servicesmust
to facilitatetheirmobility, in the integrative direc- be evaluated in monetary termsalso, both from
tion it is orderlysolutionof competingclaims,on the point of view of rational budgetingand of the
monetary cost of their employment. In termsof
the one hand to receive benefits-or minimize
theirutilization,however,servicesare "packages"
29 It is thecentralconcept of The Divisionof Labor in of performance-capacity, which are qualitatively
Society. For my own relativelyrecentunderstanding of distinctand of unequal value as contributions to
its significance, see "Durkheim'sContributionto the collectiveeffectiveness.Their evaluationas fa-
Theoryof Integration of Social Systems,"in KurtWolff,
Ed., Smile Durkheim,1858-1917(Ohio, Ohio State Uni- cilitiesmusthenceinvolvean estimateof strategic
versityPress, 1960), pp. 118-153. significancewhich matches the general priority
scale which has been establishedto regulatethe ential competence,both quantitativeand quali-
internalfunctioning of the collectivity. tative.
Services, however,constitutea resourceto be Whereas the equalizationof the franchiseis a
acquired fromoutside the collectivity, as Weber control on differentialpower "from above" in
puts it througha "formallyfree"contractof em- the hierarchyof control and operates mainly
ployment. The contractsthus made are binding throughthe selection of leadership,equality of
on both sides, by virtue of a normativesystem opportunityis (in the correspondingsense) a
transcendingthe particular collectivity,though controlfrombelow, and operates to check par-
the obligationmust articulatewith the internal ticularistictendencieswhich would tend to ex-
normativeorder includingits hierarchicalaspect. clude sources of service which are qualifiedby
But the purveyorsof serviceare not,in advance, competenceto contribute,and/or to check tend-
bound by this internalprioritysystemand hence encies to retain services which are inferiorto
an exchange,whichis here interpreted to operate thoseavailablein competition withthem.
in the firstinstanceas betweenstrategicsignifi- It is the combinationof these two foci of uni-
cance expressedas power-potential, and themone- versalization,the equalitarianismof upper rights
taryvalue of the service,mustbe arrivedat. to controlthroughthe franchise,and of rightsto
Quite clearly,whenthe purveyorof servicehas participatethroughservice on the basis of com-
once enteredinto such a contract,he is bound by petence,which account for the extent to which
theaspectofits termswhicharticulatesthe service the "cumulativeadvantage,"30 whichmightseem
into this internalsystem,includingthe level of to be inherentin the hierarchicalinternalstruc-
authorityhe exercisesand its implicationsfor his tureof power systems,oftenin factfailseitherto
powerpositionin thecollectivity.If thecollectiv- materializeat all, or to be as strongas expected.
ityis makingin any sense a rationalarrangement, Long and complexas it is, the above discussion
this must be tailoredto an estimateof the level maybe summedup as an attemptedsolutionof the
of the value of his strategiccontribution, hence secondof thethreemainproblemswithwhichthis
his performance-capacity. paper began, namelythat of the relationbetween
Since,however,theboundaryinterchange is not the coercive and the consensual aspects of the
integralto the internalsystemof bindingness,the phenomenonof power. The answer is firstpre-
hierarchicalimperativesdo not apply to the op- misedon theconceptionof poweras a specificbut
portunity aspect of this interchangeon the extra- generalizedmediumof the functioningof social
politicalside. This is to say thatthe same order relationshipsin complex, differentiated systems
of pressuresof a higher-order universalisticnor- of social interaction.
mativesystemcan operatehere thatwe suggested Power is secondlyspecificallyassociated with
operatedto bringabout equalityin the franchise. the bindingnessof obligations to performance
Again the principleis that no particularistic dis- withina range of circumstanceswhichmay arise
criminationsare to be legitimizedwhich are not in a varyingand changingsituation. The obliga-
groundedin essentialfunctionalexigenciesof the tions concernedare hence in some importantde-
systemof reference. gree generalizedso thatparticularities underthem
In thecase of thefranchisethereseemsto be no are contingenton circumstances. The binding-
inherentstoppingplace shortof completeequality, ness of obligationsimplies that they stand on a
qualifiedonly by the minimumconsiderationof level of seriousnesssuch that the invokingagent,
competenceattachedto fullyresponsiblemember- ego, may be put in the positionof assertingthat,
ship-excludingonlyminors,"defectives," through since he "means it" thatalter mustcomply,he is
retardationand mentalillness,and those morally preparedto insiston compliance. Partlythenas
disqualifiedthroughcrime. In the service case, a symbolic expression of this seriousness of
on theotherhand,givencommitments to optimum "meaning it" and partly as an instrumentof
performance whichin the presentcontextcan be deterrenceof noncompliance,"'this insistenceis
takenforgranted,thelimitto the equatingof uni- 30 Cf. C. WrightMills, The Power Elite (New York,
versalismand equalitylies in the conceptof com- OxfordUniversityPress, 1956) and my commentary in
petence. Hence the principlearrived at is the Structureand Process in Modern Societies, op. cit.,
chapter6.
famousone of equalityof opportunity, by which 31Cf. Durkheim'sfamousessay, "Deux lois de l'evo-
thereis equalizationof access to opportunity for lution penale," L'Annee Sociologique 4(1899-1900):
contribution, but selectionon criteriaof differ- 65-95.
associated with commandof negativesituational ance with wishes, ratherthan obligations. The
sanctionsthe applicationof which is frequently monetaryparallel is the use of a monetarymetal
contingent on noncompliance, and in certaincases as an instrument of barterwhereas a commodity
deterrenceis achievedby compulsion.We would it ceases to be an institutionalized medium of
not speak of power where situationalnegative exchange at all.
sanctionsor compulsionare in no circumstances In the historyof thoughttherehas been a very
attachedto noncompliance in cases wherea legit- close connectionbetweenemphasison thecoercive
imateagentinsistson compliance. elementin power systemsand on the hierarchical
Thirdly,however,power is here conceivedas aspectof the structureof systemsof authorityand
a generalizedmediumof mobilizingcommitments power. The above discussionhas, I hope, helped
or obligationfor effectivecollectiveaction. As to dissociate them by showingthat this hierar-
such it ordinarilydoes not itselfpossess intrinsic chicalaspect,important as it is, is onlypartof the
effectiveness,but symbolizes effectivenessand structureof power systems. The view advanced
hence the bindingnessof the relevantobligations is that it is an inherentaspect of the internal
to contributeto it. The operativevalidityof the structureof collectivities. No collectivity,even
meaningfulness of the symbolization is not a func- the nation,however,stands alone as a total so-
tion of any one singlevariablebut, we argue, of cietysince it is integratedwithnormsand values;
two primaryones. One of theseis thewillingness subcollectivities can even less be claimed to be
to insist upon compliance,or at least to deter societies. The collectivityaspect of total social
noncompliance,a line of reasoningwhich leads structuremay in a particularcase be dominant
to the understandingof willingnessto resortto over others,but always in principleit impinges
negativesanctions,the natureof whichwill vary, on at least two sorts of boundary-problems,
as a functionof the seriousnessof the question, namelythatinvolvedin its "support"systemand
on the dimension of their progressivelymore that involved in the mobilizationof services as
drasticnature,in the last analysisforce. sourcesof contribution to its functioning.
The other variable concerns the collective refer- In both these cases, we have argued,quite dif-
ence and hence the justifiation 32 of invokingthe ferentprinciplesare operativefromthat of the
obligationsin questionin the situation. This as- hierarchyof authority,namely the equality of
pect concernsthe dependenceof power on the in- franchiseon the one hand,equalityof opportunity
stitutionalizationof authorityand hencethe rights on the other. In both cases I envisagean inter-
of collectiveagents to mobilizeperformances and change of power, thoughnot of authority,over
definethemas bindingobligations. This justifi- theboundaryof thepolity,and in neithercase can
cation inherently restson some sort of consensus the principlegoverningthe allocation of power
among the membersof the collectivityof refer- throughthisinterchange be consideredto be hier-
ence,ifnot more broadly, with respect to a system archical in the line authority sense. The empirical
of norms under which authorityand power are problemshere are, as elsewhere,formidable,but
legitimizedon a basis wider than this particular I definitelyargue that it is illegitimateto hold
collectivityby the values of the system. More that, from serious considerationof the role of
authorityis the institutionalized
specifically, code poweras a generalizedmedium,it can be inferred
within which the "language of power" is mean- thatthereis a generaltrendto hierarchization in
ingfuland, therefore, its use will be accepted in the total empiricalsocial systemsinvolved.38
the requisite community,which is in the first
instancethe community of collectiveorganization THE ZERO-SUM PROBLEM
in our sense. We are now in a positionto take up the last of
Seen in this lightthe threatof coercivemeas- thethreemainproblemswithwhichthediscussion
ures, or of compulsion,withoutlegitimationor started,namelywhetherpoweris a zero-sumphe-
justification,should not properlybe called the nomenonin the sense that,in a system,a gain in
use of powerat all, but is the limitingcase where
33 Failure to see thisseemsto me to be a major source
power,losing its symboliccharacter,mergesinto
utopianstrainin Marxisttheory,expressedabove
an intrinsicinstrumentality of securingcompli- all the
of
by the expectationof the "witheringaway of the
32 Cf. my paper "On The Conceptof Influence," op. con-
state." There is perhapsa parallelto the confusion
and
cit.,for a discussionof the conceptof justification nectedfor manycenturieswiththe Aristotelian doctrine
fromlegitimation.
its distinction of the "sterility"of money.
powerby a unitA is in the natureof the case the by the quantityof new bank depositscreatedby
cause of a correspondingloss of power by other the loans outstanding.35
units,B, C, D. . . .The parallel with moneyon Perhaps the best way to describewhat happens
which we have been insistingthroughoutshould is to say thattherehas occurreda differentiation
give us clues to the answer,whichclearlyis, un- in thefunctionsof moneyand hencethereare two
der certaincircumstancesyes, but by no means ways of using it in the place of one. The ordi-
underall circumstances. nary depositis a reservefor meetingcurrentex-
In the monetarycase it is obvious that in penses, whether"private" or "business," which
budgetingthe use of a fixedincome,allocationto is mainlyimportantwith respectto the time ele-
one use mustbe at the expenseof alternativeuses. mentof the degreesof freedommentionedabove.
The questionis whetherparallellimitationsapply From the pointof view of the depositorthe bank
to an economyconceivedas a total system. For is a convenience,giving him safekeeping,the
long this seemed to many economiststo be the privilegeof writingchecksratherthanusingcash,
case; thiswas the main burdenof the old "quan- etc.,at a cost whichis low because the bank earns
titytheoryof money." The mostobviouspolitical interestthroughits loaningoperations. From the
parallelis thatof thehierarchyof authority within pointof view of the borrower,on the otherhand,
a particularcollectivity.It would seem to be ob- the bank is a source of otherwiseunavailable
vious that,if A, who has occupied a positionof funds,ideallyin the economist'ssense,forinvest-
substantialpower, is demoted,and B takes his ment,for financingoperationspromisingfuture
place, A loses power and B gains it, the total in increments of economicproductivity,whichwould
the systemremainingthe same. Many political not otherwisehave been feasible.
theoristslike Lasswell and C. WrightMills, gen- The possibilityof this "miracle of loaves and
eralized this to politicalsystemsas a whole.34 fishes"of course restson an empiricaluniformity,
The mostimportant and obviouspointat which namelythat depositorsdo in fact,under normal
the zero-sumdoctrinebreaks down for moneyis circumstances, keep sufficient
balances on hand-
that of credit-creation throughcommercialbank- thoughtheyare not requiredto-so thatit is safe
ing. This case is so importantas a model thata for the bank to have substantialamountsout on
briefdiscussionhere is in order. Depositors,that loan at any given time. Underlyingthis basic
is, entrusttheirmoneyfundsto a bank, not only uniformity is the factthatan individualbank will
for safe keeping,but as available to the bank for ordinarilyalso have access to "reserves," e.g.
lending. In so doing, however,they do not re- assets which, though earning interest,are suf-
linquishany propertyrightsin thesefunds. The ficiently liquid to be realizedon shortnotice,and
fundsare repayableby thebankin fullon demand, in the last analysis such resourcesas those of a
the onlynormalrestrictions beingwith respectto federalreservesystem. The individualbank,and
bankinghours. The bank,however,uses part of withit its depositors,is thus ordinarilyrelatively
the balances on depositwith it to make loans at secure.
interest,pursuantto whichit not only makes the We all know,however,thatthis is trueonlyso
moneyavailableto theborrower,but in mostcases long as the systemoperates smoothly. A par-
assumes binding obligationsnot to demand re- ticularbank can meetunusual demandsforwith-
paymentexcepton agreedterms,whichin general drawal of deposits,but if this unusual demand
leave the borrower undisturbedcontrol for a spreads to a whole banking system,the result
stipulatedperiod-or obligates him to specified may be a crisis,which only collectiveaction can
installments of amortization.In otherwords,the solve. Quite clearlythe expectationthat all de-
same dollars come to do "double duty," to be positors should be paid, all at once, in "real"
treatedas possessionsby the depositors,who re- money,e.g. even "cash" to say nothingof mone-
tain theirpropertyrights,and also by the banker tary metal, cannot be fulfilled. Any monetary
who preemptsthe rightsto loan them,as if they systemin which bank creditplays an important
were "his." In any case thereis a corresponding part is in the natureof the case normally"insol-
net additionto the circulatingmedium,measured vent" by that standard.
35Whetherthis be interpreted
as net additionto the
34H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society mediumor as increasein the velocityof circulationof
(New Haven, Yale UniversityPress, 1950) and Mills, the "slow" deposit funds, is indifferent,because its
The Power Elite, op. cit. economiceffectsare the same.
Back of theseconsiderations, it maybe said, lies in circulationis economically"functional"only

an importantrelation between bindingnessand if it leads aftera sequence of operationsover a
"confidence"which is in certainrespectsparallel period of time to a correspondingincrease in
to thatbetweencoercionand consensusin relation productivity-ifit does not the consequence is
to power,indeed one which,throughthe element inflationary.The processis knownas investment,
of bindingness,involvesa directarticulationbe- and the standardof a good investment is the ex-
tweenmoneyand power. How is this parallelto pectedincrementof productivity which,measured
be definedand how does the articulationoperate? in moneyterms,is profitability.The organiza-
First the bankingoperationdependson mutual tional question of allocationof responsibility for
confidence or trustin thatdepositorsentrusttheir decisionsand paymentsshould of course not be
fundsto the bank,knowing,if theystop to think too directlyidentifiedwith the present level of
aboutit,thatthebankwill have a volumeof loans analyticalargument.
outstandingwhich makes it impossibleto repay It mayhelp roundout thispictureiftheconcept
all depositsat once. It is well knownwithwhat of investment is relatedto thatof "circularflow"
hesitation,historically,many classes have been in Schumpeter'ssense.36 The conceptionis that
broughtto trustbanksat all in thissimplesense- the routinefunctioning of economicprocesses is
theclassicalcase oftheFrenchpeasant'sinsistence organized about the relationbetween producing
on puttinghis savingsin cash underthe mattress and consumingunits, we may say firms and
is sufficient illustration. The other side of the households. So long as a series of parametric
coin, however,is the bank's trust that its de- constantssuch as the state of demand and the
positors will not panic to the point of in fact coefficients of cost of productionhold, this is a
demandingthe completefulfillment of theirlegal processin equilibriumthroughwhichmoneymedi-
rights. ates the requisite decisions oriented to fixed
The banker here assumes bindingobligations referencepoints. This is preciselythe case to
in two directions,the honoringof both of which whichthe zero-sumconceptapplies. On the one
dependson this trust. On the one hand he has hand a fixedquantityand "velocityof circulation"
loanedmoneyon contractwhichhe cannotrecover of the monetarymediumis an essentialcondition
on demand,on the otherhe is legally bound to of the stabilityof thisequilibrium, whereason the
repaydepositson demand. But by makingloans otherhand, thereis no place for bankingopera-
on binding contractualterms he is enabled to tions which, through credit expansion, would
create money,which is purchasingpower in the changetheparametric conditions.
literalsense that,as notedabove, the statusof the These decisions are governedby the standard
monetary unit is politically guaranteed-e.g. of solvency,in the sense thatbothproducingand
throughits positionas "legal tender"-and hence consumingunitsare normallyexpectedto recoup
the newly created dollars are "as good as" any theirmonetaryexpenditures, on the one hand for
otherdollars. Hence I suggestthat what makes factors of production, on the otherforconsumers'
themgood in this sense is the inputof power in goods, frommonetaryproceeds,on the producing
the form of the bindingnessof the contractual side, sale of output,on the consuming,sale of fac-
obligation assumed by the banker-I should tors of production,notablylabor. Solvencythen
classifythisas opportunity foreffectiveness.The is a balance betweenmonetarycost and receipts.
bank, as thus
collectivity, enjoys a "power posi- Investmentis also governedby the standardof
tion" by virtueof whichit can give its borrowers solvency,but over a longer time period, long
effective controlof certaintypesof opportunity. enough to carry out the operationsnecessaryto
It is, however,criticallyimportantthat in gen- bringabout an increaseof productivity matching
eral this grant of power is not unconditional. the monetary obligations assumed.
First it is power in its formof directconvertibil- There is here a crucial relation between the
ity with money,and second, withinthat frame- time-extension of the investment process and use
work,the conditionis that,per unitof time,there of power to make loan contracts binding. Only
shouldbe a surplusof moneygenerated,the bor- if the extension of control of resources through
rowercan and must return more money than he loans creates obligations can the recipientsof the
received,the difference being "interest." Money, 36 Joseph Schumpeter, The Theoryof EconomicDe-
however,is a measureof productivity, and hence velopment (Cambridge, Harvard UniversityPress, 1955),
we may say thatincreasingthe quantityof money translated by Redvers Opie.
loans in turnassume furtherobligationsand ex- throughcommitment to performservices,broadly

pectothersto assumethem. balances the output of offerof opportunityfor
The essentialprinciplehere is that,in the sense effectiveperformance.
ofthehierarchyof control,a higher-order medium The suggestionis that it is a conditionof the
is used as a source of leverageto break into the stabilityof this circulationsystemthat the inputs
"circle" of the Schumpeterianflow, giving the and outputsof poweron each side shouldbalance.
recipientsof this power effectivecontrol of a This is anotherway of saying that it is ideally
share of fluidresourcesin order to divertthem formulated as a zero-sumsystem,so far as power
fromthe establishedroutinechannelsto new uses. is concerned,thoughbecauseit includestheinvest-
It is difficultto see how this could work sys- mentprocess,the same is not trueforthe involve-
tematicallyif the elementof bindingnesswere ab- mentof monetaryfundsin the interchanges.The
sent either from loan contracts or from the politicalcircularflowsystemthenis conceivedas
acceptance-status of the monetarymedium. the locus of the "routine"mobilizationof perform-
One furtherelementof the monetarycomplex ance expectationseitherthroughinvokingobliga-
needs to be mentionedhere. In thecase of invest- tions under old contractual-and in some cases,
mentthereis the elementof time,and hence the e.g. citizenship, ascriptive-relations,or througha
uncertaintythat projected operationsaiming at stable rate of assumptionof new contractualobli-
increasein productivity will in factproduceeither gations, which is balanced by the liquidation,
this increase or financialproceeds sufficient to typicallythroughfulfillment, of old ones. The
repay loans plus interestin accordancewith con- balance applies to the system,of course, not to
tract. In the case of the particularborrower- particularunits.
lenderrelationship thiscan be handledon an indi- Correspondingto utilityas the value-pattern
vidual contract-solvency basis witha legallydeter- governingeconomicfunctionI have put forward
minedbasis of sharingprofitsand/orlosses. For effectiveness as that governingpoliticalfunction.
the system,however,it creates the possibilityof If it is importantto distinguishutility,as the
inflation,namely that the net effectof credit- categoryof value to which incrementsare made
extensionmay not be increasein productivity but by the combinatorial process of economicproduc-
decline in the value of the monetaryunit. Fur- tion,fromsolvencyas the standardof satisfactory
thermore,once a systeminvolves an important performancein handlingmoney as the medium
componentof credit, the opposite disturbance, of economicprocess,then we need to distinguish
namely deflationwith a rearrangementof the effectiveness as the politicalvalue category,from
meaningof the whole networkof financialand a correspondingstandard for the satisfactory
credit expectationsand relationships,is also a handlingof power. The best available termfor
possibility. This suggests that there is, in a this standardseems to be the success of collective
ramifiedcredit economy,a set of mechanisms goal-attainment.Where the polityis sufficiently
which,independently of particularcircular flow, differentiated so thatpowerhas becomegenuinely
and credit-extension and repaymenttransactions a generalizedmediumwe can say that collective
regulatesthe total volume of credit,rates of in- unitsare expectedto be successfulin thesensethat
terest,and price-levelrelationsin the economy. the bindingobligationsthey undertakein order
to maintainand createopportunities foreffective-
ZERO-SUM: THE CASE OF POWER ness, is balanced by the input of equally binding
Let us now attemptto work out the parallel, commitmentsto performservice, either within
and articulating,analysis for power systems. the collectivity in some status of employment, or
There is, I suggest,a circularflowoperatingbe- for the collectivityon a contractualbasis.
tween polity and economy in the interchange The unit of productivedecision-making, how-
betweenfactorsin politicaleffectiveness-inthis ever,is, in a sense corresponding to thatapplying
case a share of controlof the productivity of the to the householdfor the economiccase, also ex-
economy-and an outputto the economyin the pectedto be successfulin the sense thatits expen-
formof the kind of controlof resourceswhich a ditureof power throughnot only the output of
thereare variousotherforms. This circularflow services but their commitmentto utilizationby
loan for investmentprovides-though of course particularcollectivities,is balanced by an input
is controlledby the mediumof powerin the sense of opportunitywhich is dependenton collective
thatthe inputof bindingobligations,in particular organization,thatis a unitin a positionto under-
take to provide opportunitieswhich are binding gous to that of the banker. The "deposits" of
on the unit. power made by constituents are revocable,if not
In the lightof this discussionit becomesclear at will,at thenextelection-a conditionanalogous
that the business firmis in its aspect as collec- to regularityof bankinghours. In some cases
tivityin our technicalsense, the case where the electionis tied to barterlikeconditionsof expec-
two standardsof success and solvencycoincide. tation of carryingout certain specificmeasures
The firmuses its powerincomeprimarily to main- favoredby thestrategically crucialvotersand only
tain or increaseits productivity and, as a measure these. But particularlyin a system which is
of this, its moneyincome. A surplus of power pluralisticnot onlywithreferenceto the composi-
will thereforein general be exchanged for en- tion of politicalsupport,but also to issues,such a
hancementof its controlof economicproductivity. leadershipelementacquiresfreedomto make cer-
For a collectivityspecializedin politicalfunction tain types of binding decision, binding in the
the primarycriterionof success would be given natureof the case on elementsof the collectivity
in its powerposition,relativethatis to othercol- other than those whose "interest" is directly
lectivities. Here there is the special problemof served. This freedommay be conceived to be
the meaningof the termpower position. I inter- confinedto thecircularflowlevel,whichwould be
pret it here as relativeto othercollectivitiesin a to say thatthe inputof power throughthe chan-
competitive system,notas a positionin an internal nel of politicalsupportshouldbe exactlybalanced
hierarchyof power. This distinctionis of course by the outputthroughpolicydecisions,to interest
particularly importantfora pluralisticpower sys- groups which have specificallydemanded these
tem where governmentis a functionally special- decisions.
ized subsystemof the collectivity structure, not an There is, however,anothercomponentof the
approximationto the totalityof that structure.37freedomof electedleadershipwhichis crucialhere.
In somewhatcorrespondingfashiona collectivity This is the freedomto use influence-forexample
specializedin integrativefunctionwould measure throughthe "prestige"of officeas distinguished
its successin termsof its "level of influence"-for from its specifiedpowers-to embark on new
example,as a politicalinterest-group in the usual venturesin the "equation"of powerand influence.
sense, its capacityto influencepublic policy de- This is to use influenceto createadditionsto the
cisions. A consequenceof this reasoningis that total supply of power. How can this be con-
such an influencegroup would be disposed to ceived to work?
"give away" power,in the sense of tradingit for One important pointis thattherelationbetween
an incrementof influence.This could take the the media involvedwith respectto positiveand
formof assuringpoliticalsupport,withoutbarter- negativesanctionsis the obverse of the case of
like conditions, to leadership elements which creatingmoneythroughbanking. There it was
seemedto be likelyto be able to exercisethe kind the use of power embodiedin the bindingcharac-
of influencein question. ter of loan contractswhich"made the difference."
Is therethena politicalequivalentof the bank- Here it is the optionalcapacityto exertinfluence
ing phenomenon, a way in whichthe circularflow throughpersuasion. This process seems to op-
of power comes to be brokenthroughso as to erate throughthe functionof leadershipwhich,
bringabout net additionsto the amountof power by way of the involvements it possesseswithvari-
in the system? The trendof the analyticalargu- ous aspects of the constituencystructureof the
ment indicatesthat there must be, and that its collectivity,generates and structuresnew "de-
focus lies in the supportsystem,that is the area mands" in the specific sense of demands for
of interchangebetween power and influence, policydecision.
betweenpolity and integrativesystem. Such demands then may be conceived,in the
First I suggestthat,particularly conspicuousin case of the deciders,to justifyan increasedoutput
the case of democraticelectoralsystems,political of power. This in turn is made possible by the
support should be conceived as a generalized generalityof the mandateof politicalsupport,the
grantof power which,if it leads to electoralsuc- factthat it is not given on a barterbasis in ex-
cess, puts electedleadershipin a positionanalo- change for specificpolicy decisions,but once the
perhapsthe old term
37 If very carefullyinterpreted, "equation"of powerand influencehas been estab-
"sovereignty" could be used to designatethis standard lished throughelection,it is a mandate to do,
somewhatmoredefinitely thansuccess. withinconstitutionallimits,what seems best, in
the governmentalcase "in the public interest." votes in their decisions dictated by their own
Collectiveleadershipmaythenbe conceivedas the interests.38
bankersor "brokers"who can mobilizethe bind- It is perhapslegitimateto call the responsibility
ing commitments of their constituentsin such a assumed in this connectionspecificallyleadership
way thatthe totalityof commitments made by the responsibilityand distinguishit in these terms
collectivityas a whole can be enhanced. This from administrativeresponsibility which focuses
enhancementmust,however,be justifiedthrough on theroutinefunctions.In any case I shouldlike
the mobilizationof influence;it must,thatis, both to conceivethis processof power-enhancement as
be feltto be in accordancewith valid normsand strictlyparallel to economic investment,in the
apply to situationswhich "call for" handlingat furthersense that the pay-offshould be an in-
the level of bindingcollectivecommitments. crementto the level of collectivesuccess in the
The criticalproblemof justificationis, in one sense outlinedabove, i.e. enhanced effectiveness
direction,that of consensus,of its bearingon the of collectiveaction in valued areas which could
value-principleof solidarityas we have outlined not have been expectedwithoutrisk-taking on the
this above. The standardthereforewhichcorre- part of leadershipin a sense parallel to entre-
sponds to the value principleof solidarityis con- preneurialinvestment.
sensusin the sense in whichthatconcepthas been The operationof both governmentaland non-
used above. governmentalcollectivitiesis full of illustrations
The problemthenis thatof a basis forbreaking of the kind of phenomenonI have in mind,
throughthe circularstabilityof a zero-sumpower though because this type of formal analysis is
system. The crucial point is that this can only somewhatunfamiliar,it is difficult to pin them
happen theif collectivityand its members are down exactly. It has, for example, oftenbeen
readyto assume new bindingobligationsover and pointed out that the relation of executive re-
above thosepreviouslyin force. The crucialneed sponsibilityto constituency-interests is very dif-
is to justifythis extensionand to transformthe ferent in domestic and in foreign affairs. I
"sentiment"that somethingought to be done suggest that the element of "political banking" in
into a commitmentto implementthe sentiment thefieldof foreignaffairsis particularly large and
by positive action, includingcoercive sanctions that the sanctionof approval of policy decisions,
if necessary. The crucial agency of this process where is occurs, cannot infalliblybe translated
seems to be leadership,precisely conceived as intovotes,certainlynot in the shortrun. Similar
possessing a componentanalyticallyindependent considerationsare very frequentlyinvolved in
of the routinepower positionof office,which de- what may be called "developmental"ventures,
finesthe leader as the mobilizerof justifications whichcannotbe expectedto be "backed" by cur-
forpolicieswhichwould not be undertakenunder rentlywell-structured interestsin the same sense
the circularflow assumptions. as maintenance of current functions. The case of
It may be suggestedthat the parallel to credit support of research and training is a good one
creationholds with respectto time-extension as since the "communityof scholars" is not a very
well as in otherrespects. The incrementsof ef- strong"pressuregroup" in the sense of capacity
fectiveness whichare necessaryto implementnew directlyto influencelarge blocksof votes.
bindingpolicies which constitutean addition to It would followfromthese considerationsthat
the total burdenon the collectivity cannotsimply there is, in developedpolities,a relatively"free-
be willed into being; they require organizational 38 Perhapsthis is an unusuallyclear case of the rela-
changes through recombinationsof the factors tivityof the formallegal sense of the bindingnessof
of effectiveness, developmentof new agencies, commitments. Thus the populisticcomponentin demo-
craticgovernment oftenties both executiveand legisla-
procurementof personnel,new norms,and even tive branchesratherrigidlyin what they can formally
changes in bases of legitimation. Hence leader- promise. However,thereare manyde factoobligations
ship cannotjustifiablybe held responsiblefor ef- assumedby Government whichare verynearlybinding.
Thus legally Congress could withdrawthe totalityof
fective implementationimmediately,and con- fundsrecentlygrantedto universities for the supportof
versely,the sources of politicalsupportmust be scientific researchand training, theformalappropriations
willingto trusttheirleadershipin the sense of not being made year by year. Universities, however,plan
very much in the expectationof maintenanceof these
demandingimmediate-by the time of the next fundsand thismaintenance is certainlysomething like a
election-"pay-off"of the power-valueof their de factoobligationof Congress.
floating"elementin the power systemwhich is of the commitments in which the widest exten-
analogous to a credit-system.Such an element sion had takenplace was in the international field
should then be subject to fluctuationson a di- -the United States had very rapidlycome into
mensionof inflation-deflation, and be in need of the positionof bearing the largest share of re-
controlsfor the systemas a whole, at a level sponsibility formaintenanceof worldpoliticalor-
above thatof the activitiesof particularunits. der againstan expansionistCommunistmovement.
The analogue of inflationseems to me to touch The "loss of China" was in certain quarters a
the credibilityof the assertionof the bindingness particularly traumaticexperience,and the Korean
of obligationsassumed. Power, as a symbolic war a highlychargedsymbolof the costs of the
medium,is like moneyin that it is itself"worth- new stewardship.
less," but is accepted in the expectationthat it A pluralisticpoliticalsystemlike the American
can later be "cashed in," this time in the activa- always has a large body of latentclaims on the
tionof bindingobligations. If, however,"power- loyaltyof its citizensto theirgovernment, not only
credit" has been extended too far, withoutthe for the "right sentiments"but for "sacrifices,"
necessaryorganizationalbasis for fulfillment of but equallytheseare expectedto be invokedonly
expectationshavingbeen laid, thenattempting to in genuineemergencies.The McCarthydefinition
invoke the obligationswill result in less than a of the situationwas, however,thatvirtuallyany-
full level of performance,inhibitedby various one in a positionofsignificant should
responsibility
sorts of resistance. In a collectivityundergoing not onlyrecognizethe"in case" priority-notnec-
disintegrationthe same formal officemay be essarilyby our basic values the highest-of na-
"worthless" than it otherwisewould have been tional loyalty,but should explicitlyrenounceall
because of attritionof its basis of effectiveness. otherloyaltieswhich mightconceivablycompete
The same considerationshold when it is a case with that to the nation,includingthose to kith
of overextension of new power-expectationsand kin. This was in effecta demandto liquidate
without adequate provision for making them all othercommitments in favorof the national,a
effective. demand which in the nature of the case could
It goes without saying that a power-system not be met withoutdisastrous consequences in
in which this creditlikeelementis prominentis manydifferent directions. It tendedto "deflate"
in a state analogous to the "insolvency"of a the power systemby underminingthe essential
monetarysystem which includes an important basis of trust on which the influenceof many
elementof actual credit,namelyits commitments elementsbearingformaland informalleadership
cannot be fulfilledall at once, even if those to responsibilities,and which in turn sustained
whom theyhave been made have formallyvalid "power-credit,"necessarilyrested. Perhaps the
rightsto such fulfillment.Only a strictzero-sum most strikingcase was the allegation of com-
power system could fulfill this condition of munist infiltration and hence widespread "dis-
"liquidity." Perhaps the conservatismof politi- loyalty"in the army,whichwas exploitedto try
cal ideologiesmakes it even more difficult to ac- to forcethe army leadershipto put the commit-
cept the legitimacyof such a situation-it is all ments of all associated personnel,includinge.g.
too easy to defineit as "dishonest"-than in the research scientists,in completely"liquid" form.
corresponding economiccase. Two featuresof the McCarthymovementparticu-
There is, however, a fine line between solid, re- larly mark it as a deflationaryspiral, firstthe
sponsible and constructivepolitical leadership vicious circle of spreadinginvolvementwith the
which in fact commitsthe collectivity beyondits casting of suspicion on wider and wider circles
capacitiesfor instantaneousfulfillment of all obli- of otherwisepresumptively loyal elementsin the
gations, and reckless overextendedness,just as societyand secondly the surprisingly abruptend
there is a fineline betweenresponsiblebanking of the spiral once the "bubble was pricked"and
and "wild-catting." "confidencerestored,"events associated particu-
Furthermore,under unusual pressures, even larly withthe public reactionto McCarthy'sper-
highlyresponsibleleadershipcan be put in situ- formance in the televisedarmy hearings,and to
ations wherea "deflationary"spiral sets in, in a Senator Flanders' protest on the floor of the
patternanalogous to that of a financialpanic. I Senate.39
interpret,forinstanceMcCarthyismas such a de- 39I have dealt with some aspects of the McCarthy
flationary spiral in the politicalfield. The focus episode in "Social Strains in America,"Structureand
The focus of the McCarthy disturbancemay tions to governmentalfinance which has been
be said to have been in the influencesystem,in seen to be thefocusof thesehighest-level controls.
the relation between integrativeand pattern- In the case of power it is of course the first
maintenancefunctionsin the society. The pri- crucialpointthattherewas to be some relatively
mary deflationaryeffect was on the "credit" paramountapex of controlof the power and au-
elements of pluralisticloyalties. This in turn thoritysystem,which we think of as in some
would make leadershipelements,not only in gov- sense the "sovereign"state.40 This has mainlyto
ernmentbut private groups, much less willing do with the relations between what we have
to take risks in claiming loyalties which might called justificationand legitimacy,in relationto
competewith those to government. Since, how- government as thehighest-order tightlyintegrated
ever, in the hierarchyof control the influence collectivity structure-so far. This is the central
systemis superordinateto the power system,de- focus of Weber's famous analysis of authority,
flationin the formeris necessarilypropagated but his analysis is in need of considerableexten-
to the latter. This takes in the firstinstancethe sion in our sense. It seems,among otherthings,
formof a rush to withdrawpolitical support- thathe posed an undulysharpalternativebetween
whichit will be rememberedis here treatedas a charismaticand "routine" cases, particularlythe
formof power-from leadershipelementswhich rational-legalversionof the latter. In particular
could in any sense be suspectedof "disloyalty." it would be my view that very substantialpossi-
The extremeperhaps was the slogan propagated bilitiesof regulatedextensionof power-commit-
by McCarthyand played withby more responsi- mentsexist withinthe framework of certaintypes
ble Republicanleaders like Thomas E. Dewey, of of "legal" authority,especially where they are
"twentyyears of treason" which impugnedthe aspectsof a politicalsystemwhichis pluralisticin
loyaltyof the DemocraticParty as a whole. The generalterms. These problems,however,cannot
effectwas, by deprivingoppositionleadershipof furtherbe exploredat the end of what is already
influence,to make it unsafe even to consider a very long paper.
grantingthempower.
The breakingthroughof the zero-sumlimita- CONCLUSION
tions of more elementarypower systemsopens
the way to altogethernew levels of collective This paper has been designedas a generalthe-
oreticalattackon the ancientproblemof the na-
effectiveness, but also, in the natureof the case,
involves new levels of risk and uncertainty. I ture of politicalpower and its place, not only in
have alreadydealt brieflywiththisproblemat the politicalsystems,narrowlyconceived,but in the
level of the particularcollectivityand its exten- structureand processes of societies generally.
sion of commitments.The problemof course is The main point of referencefor the attack has
compoundedfora systemof collectivities been the conceptionthat the discussion of the
because
of the risk not only of particularfailures,but of problem in themain traditionsof politicalthought
have not been couchedat a sufficiently rigorously
generalizedinflationary and deflationarydisturb-
ances. There are, as we have noted,mechanisms analytical level, but have tended to treat the na-
of controlwhich operate to regulateinvestment, tion,the state,or the lower-levelcollectivelyor-
and similarlyextension of the commitmentsof ganized "group," as the empiricalobject of ref-
particularcollectivities,both of whichhave to do erence,and to attemptto analyze its functioning
with the attemptto ensure responsibility, withoutfurtherbasic analyticalbreakdown. The
on the
one hand for solvencyover the long run, on the 40In sayingthis I am veryfar frommaintaining that
otherfor success of the larger "strategy"of ex- "absolute"sovereigntyis an essentialconditionof the
minimalintegration politicalsystems. On the con-
tension. It is reasonableto suppose that beyond trary,firstit is farof fromabsoluteinternally, precisely
these,theremustbe mechanismsoperatingat the becauseof thepluralisticcharacterof mostmodernpoliti-
level of the systemas a whole in bothcontexts. cal systemsand becauseof the opennessof theirbound-
In themonetarycase it was the complexof cen- aries in the integrativeeconomicand other directions.
tral banking,credit managementand their rela- Externallythe relationof the territorialunit to norms
and values transcending
it is crucial,and steadilybe-
Process, op. cit., chapter7, pp. 226-249. The inherent comingmore so. See my paper "Polarizationof the
impossibilityof the demandfor "absolutesecurity"in a World and InternationalOrder" in Quincy Wright,
pluralisticsystemis very cogentlyshown by Edward William M. Evan and MortonDeutsch,eds.,Preventing
Shils in The Tormentof Secrecy (New York, The Free World War III (New York, Simonand Schuster,1962),
Press of Glencoe,1956), especiallyin chapterVI. pp. 310-331.
most conspicuousmanifestation of this tendency enteredupon heremakesit possibleto treatpower

has been thetreatment of power. in conceptually specificand precisetermsand thus
The presentpaper takes a radically different gets away fromthe theoreticaldiffusenesscalled
position,cuttingacross the traditionallines. It to attention,in termsof whichit has been neces-
takes its departurefromthe positionof economic saryto includesuch a verywide varietyof proble-
theoryand, by inference, the asymmetry between matical phenomenaas "forms" of power. Sec-
it and the traditionalpoliticaltheory,41 whichhas ondly,I thinkit can advance a valid claimto pre-
treatedone as thetheoryof an analyticallydefined senta resolutionof theold dilemmaas to whether
functionalsystemof society-the economy-and (in theolder terms) power is "essentially"a phe-
the otheras a concretesubstructure, usuallyiden- nomenonof coercionor of consensus. It is both,
tifiedwithgovernment.Graduallythe possibility preciselybecause it is a phenomenonwhichinte-
has opened out both the extensionof the ana- gratesa pluralityof factorsand outputsof politi-
lyticalmodel of economictheoryto the political cal effectiveness and is not to be identifiedwith
fieldand the directarticulationof politicalwith any one of them. Finally,lighthas been thrown
economictheorywithinthe logical frameworkof on the famouszero-sumproblem,and a definite
the theoryof the social systemas a whole, so positiontakenthat,thoughunder certainspecific
thatthe politycould be conceivedas a functional assumptionsthe zero-sumconditionholds, these
subsystemof the societyin all its theoreticalfun- are not constitutive of power systemsin general,
damentalsparallel to the economy. but under different conditionssystematic"exten-
This perspectivenecessarilyconcentrated atten- sion" of power spheres withoutsacrificeof the
tionon theplace of moneyin theconceptionof the power of otherunits is just as importanta case.
economy. More thanthat,it becameincreasingly These claimsare put forwardin fullawareness
clearthatmoneywas essentiallya "symbolic"phe- thaton one level thereis an inherentarbitrariness
nomenonand hence that its analysis required a in them,namelythatI have definedpower and a
frameofreferencecloserto thatof linguisticsthan numberof relatedconceptsin myown way,which
of technology, i.e. it is not the intrinsicproperties is different frommany if not most of the defini-
of gold whichaccountforthe value of moneyun- tions currentin politicaltheory. If theorywere
der a gold standardany more than it is the in- a matteronlyof the arbitrarychoice of definitions
trinsic propertiesof the sounds symbolizedas and assumptionsand reasoning from there, it
"book" whichaccountfor the valuationof physi- mightbe permissibleto leave the questionat that
cally fixeddissertationsin linguisticform. This and say simply,this is only one more personal
is the perspectivefromwhich the conceptionof "point of view." Any claim that it is more than
power as a generalizedsymbolicmedium,oper- thatrestson the conceptionthatthe scientific un-
atingin theprocesses of social interactionhas been derstanding of societies is arrived at through a
set forth. graduallydevelopingorganonof theoreticalanaly-
This paperhas not includeda surveyof the em- sis and empiricalinterpretation and verification.
pirical evidence bearing on its ramifiedfield of My most important contention is that the line of
problems,but my strong conviction is not only analysis presented here is a further development
thatthe line of analysisadoptedis consistentwith of a main line of theoreticalanalysisof the social
thebroad lines of theavailableempiricalevidence, systemas a whole, and of verifiedinterpretation
but that it has already shown that it can illumi- of the empiricalevidencepresentedto that body
natea rangeofempiricalproblemswhichwere not of theory. This body of theorymust ultimately
well understoodin termsof themoreconventional be judged by its outcomesbothin theoreticalgen-
theoreticalpositions-e.g. the reasonsforthe gen- eralityand consistency,over the whole range of
eral egalitarianpressure in the evolutionof the social systemtheory,and by its empiricalvalidity,
politicalfranchise,or the natureof McCarthyism again on levelswhichincludenot onlyconvention-
as a processof politicaldeflationary spiral. ally "political"references, but theirempiricalin-
It does not seem necessaryhere to recapitulate terrelationswith all otheraspects of the modern
the main outline of the argument. I may con- complexsocietylooked at as a whole.
clude with the three main points with which I TECHNICAL NOTE
began. I submit,first,that the analyticalpath
The above analysishas beenpresentedin wholly
41 I myselfonce acceptedthis. Cf. The Social System
(Illinois,The Free Press of Glencoe,1951), chapterV, discursive terms. Many decisionsabout categori-
pp. 161-163. zation and detailed steps of analysis were, how-
FIGURE 1
ever, referredto a formalizedparadigm of the
FORMAT OF THE SOCIETAL INTERCHANGE SYSTEM
principalstructuralcomponentsand process cate-
gories and relationsof a societyconsideredas a A RESOURCE > G
social system. For the benefitof readers with ADAPTIVESUBSYSTEM
(THE ECONOMY)
MOBILIZATION
SYSTEM
GOAL-ATTAINMENT
SUBSYSTEb
(THE ITY)
more technicalinterestsin social systemtheoryit
has seemed advisableto presenta verybriefout-
line of the most directlyrelevantparts of the
generalparadigmhere,witha briefelucidationof
( C
OF I A E , { [ A
its relevanceto the above discussion.42
OM ,
L (THETY POITY
The structuralreferencepoints are essentially -z 2U) -
two, namelyfirstthat at a sufficiently high level

of differentiationof a society,economy,polityand MOTIVATIONAL~~~~
COMTET) SYTM ~~~~ > SCA CONTOL
integrativesystembecome empiricallydistinctin L -LOYALTY---. 3I

terms of the primacyof functionof structural PATTERN-MAINTENANCE - SOLIDARITY INTEGRATIVESUBSYSTEM
~
(LOCUS OF CULTURALAND COMMITMENT *- (LAW (AS NORMS]AND
units e.g. thereis an importantstructuraldiffer- MOTIVATIONALCOMMITMENTS) ~SYSTEM - W SCIAL CONTROL)
ence betweena privatebusinessfirm,an adminis-

trativeagencyof governmentand a courtof law. mentalitiesof gaining control of "lower-order"
Secondlyeverysuch unitis involvedin plural in- resourceswhich are necessaryfor fulfillment of
terchangerelationswith otherunits with respect expectations. Thus the expenditureof moneyfor
to most of its functionalrequirementsfrom its "goods" is not,at the systemor "aggregate"level
situation-i.e., for factorinputs-and the condi- (as analyzedby Keynes), acquisitionof the pos-
tions of makingits contributions to otherunits in session of particularcommodities, but consistsin
the "divisionof labor"-i.e., disposalof "product" thegeneralizedexpectationof availabilityof goods
outputs. This order of differentiation requires on "satisfactory" marketterms. This is the pri-
double interchangesbetween all the structural maryoutputof theeconomyto consumers. Simi-
componentsbelongingto each category-pair, e.g. larly,whenwe speak of controlof productivity as
firmsand households,firmsand politicalagencies it is not managerialcon-
a factorof effectiveness,
(not necessarilygovernmental,it should be re- trol of particularplantswhichis meant,but con-
membered) etc. The double interchangesitua- trol of a share of general productivityof the
tion precludes mediationof processes in terms economy through market mechanisms,without
either of ascriptive expectationsor barter ar- specificationof particulars.
rangements,or a combinationof the two. It The paradigm of interchangebetweengeneral
necessitatesthe developmentof generalizedsym- media of communicationis presentedin figures
bolic media, of which we have treated money, 1 and 2. Figure 1 simplydesignatesthe format
power, and influenceas cases. in which this part of the paradigmis conceived.
At a sufficiently
highlevel of generalizeddevel- The assumptionsof thisformatare three,none of
opment the "governing" interchanges(in the which can be grounded or justifiedwithinthe
sense of cybernetichierarchy)take place between limitsof the presentexposition. These are (1)
the media whichare anchoredin thevariousfunc- thatthe patternsof differentiationof a social sys-
tional subsystems-as power is anchored in the tem can be analyzed in terms of four primary
polity. These media in turn serve as instru- functionalcategories,each of whichis thefocusof
42The paradigmitselfis still incomplete,and even in a primaryfunctionalsubsystemof the society. As
its presentstatehas not beenpublishedas a whole. The notedin thebodyof theessay,economyand polity
firstbeginningstatement dealingwithprocesswas made are conceived to be such subsystems; (2) The
by Parsons and Smelserin Economyand Society,esp. primary interchangeprocesses through which
ChapterII, and has been furtherdevelopedin certain
respectsin Smelser'stwo subsequentindependent
these subsystemsare integratedwith each other
books
(Social Changein theIndustrialRevolution, and Theory operatethroughgeneralizedsymbolicmedia of the
of CollectiveBehazior). In myown case certainaspects, typewhichI have assumed moneyand power to
whichnow need furtherrevision,were publishedin the of in-
be,43and (3) at the level of differentiation
article"PatternVariables Revisited"(AmericanSocio- teresthere, each interchangesystemis a double
logical Review, August,1960). Early and partialver-
sions of applicationto politicalsubject-matter
are found 43 There is a verycrucialproblemarea whichconcerns
in my contributions to Roland Young, ed., Approaches thenatureof theinterchanges betweena societyas a sys-
to theStudyof Politics,and Burdickand Brodbeck,eds., temin our senseand its environment. This set of prob-
AmericanVotingBehavior. lemsunfortunately cannotbe enteredintohere.
interchange, implyingboththe "alienation"of re- to figure1 only by introducingnames of cate-

sources and productsfromtheirsystemof origin gories, directionsof flow and designationsas to
and the transcendingof the barter level of ex- medium(money,power,etc.) foreach of thefour
change. Under these assumptionsall figure 1 places in each of the six interchangesystems,thus
does' is to portraya systemof six double inter- presentingtwenty-four categories,each of thefour
changes operatingbetween each logically given basic media appearingin four"forms."
pair among the four primaryfunctionalsubsys- Among the six interchangesets, power as a
tems of a society. For conveniencetentative mediumis involved,by our analysis,in onlythree,
names are givento each of thesesix double inter- namelythe interchangesof the polity (G) with
change systems. each of the otherthree. These are the systemof
Figure 2, then, places each of the six inter- "resource mobilization,"vis-a'-vis the economy,
change systemson a horizontalaxis, simplybe- the support systemwhich involvesthe input of
cause theyare easier to read that way. It adds political support and the output of decisions
FIGURE 2
THE CATEGORIES OF SOCIETAL INTERCHANGE
In to G Controlof ProductivityM2b
FACTORS
LIn to A for EffectivenessPlb
Opportunity
A routtoG Commitment
of Services to the CollectivityPla G
PRODUCTS '
LOutto A -Allocationof Fluid Resources (financial) M2a
rinto A Labor Capacity C2b tIntoI PolicyDecisions P2a

FACTORS FACTORS n t
age Income Mb In G _Interest-Demnds
L rIn to L A G Ila
rOut toA Commodity Demand Mla rOut toI Leadership Ilb
Responsibility
PRODUCTS PRODUCTS>
LOut to L ,Commitment to Production LOut toG PoliticalSupportP2b
of Goods C2a
Fino L Justifications
forAllocationof Loyalties I2a
In toI Commitment
to ValuedAssociationCia
rOuttoL Commitments
to Common
Value Clb
PRODUCTS
LOutto I Value-basedClaims to LoyaltiesI2b
rIntoI Assertionof Claimsto In toL OperativeResponsibility

P3a
FACTORS Resources M3a - FACTORS
tIn to A StandardsforAllocdtion tn to G Legitimation
of Authority
C3a
A of Resources I3a G
OuttoI GroundsforJustification rOuttoL MoralResponsibility for
PRODUCTS of Claims I3b PRODUCTS CollectiveInterestC3b
(Out toA <Ranking
of Claims M3b 1Out to G Legalityof Powersof
(Budgeting) Office P3b
M= Money P= Power
I = Influence C Commitments
1,2,3 = Order of hierarchicalcontrolas betweenmedia.
a, b : Orderof hierarchicalcontrolwithininterchange systems.
"In" means Inputof a categoryof resourcesto the subsystemindicated
fromthe othermemberof the pair.
"Out" meansOutputof a categoryof 'product"fromthe indicated
source to the relevantdestination.
Every double interchange consistsof one input(factor) interchange
and one output(product)interchange.
VOL. 107, NO. 3, 19631 ON THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL POWER 261
(vis-a-vis the integrativesystem) and the sys- pect of group structureand solidarityin relation
tem of legitimation, as I have called it, vis-a-vis to the systemof norms (legal and informal)-as
the value aspect of the pattern-maintenance sys- distinguishedfromvalues. The basic difference
tem. The last of these three is a special case lies in the fact that power here is interchanged
which does not involvepower as a medium,but not with money but with influence,and that
rather the structureof the code governingau- whereasvis-ad-vismoneyit was the "controlling"
thorityas definingthe institutionalized uses of medium,vis-a-visinfluenceit is controlled. This
power,hence the legitimationof authority. Pri- differenceis symbolizedby the placing of the
maryattentioncan thusbe givento the othertwo. power categories here in the outside positions
The categoriesincludedin the A-G (economy- whereas in the A-G case theywere placed inside
polity,or resourcemobilization)interchangecan (as the monetarycategorieswere in L-A).
be describedas "forms"of power and of money The relevant factor interchangehere is be-
(or wealth) respectively. They will be seen to tweenpolicy decisionsas a "factorof solidarity"
be the categorieswhichhave been used in the ap- and interest-demands as a factorof effectiveness,
propriateparts of the discursiveexpositionof the in the senses in which these conceptswere used
body of the paper. The double interchangehere, above. Essentiallywe may say that interest-de-
as in the classic economy-or labor-consumptionmands"definethe situation"forpoliticaldecision-
case, involvesfirstone factor-interchange, namely making-which of course is by no means to say
controlof productivity as factorof effectiveness thatdemandsin theirinitialformare or shouldbe
exchanged for opportunityfor effectiveness(in simply "granted" without modification. Like
the particularcase of capital,as a factorof pro- otherfactorstheyare typicallytransformed in the
duction). Productivityis a monetaryfactorbe- course of the politicalprocess. Correspondingly
cause it is a pool of resourcescontrolledthrough policy decisionsare a factorin solidarityin that
monetaryfunds-which of course in turncan be theyconstitutecommitments for collectiveaction
exchanged for the particular facilities needed, on which "interestedparties" withinlimits can
notablygoods and services. Opportunity,how- count.
ever, is a formof power in the sense discussed. The interchangeof "product" outputs then
The second part of the double interchangeis consistsof leadershipresponsibility as outputof
one of "product" outputs. This takes place be- the polity (a form of influence,note, not of
tween commitment of services to organization- power), and politicalsupportas an outputof the
typicallythroughemployment-whichI have in- "associational"system-in the governmentalcase
terpretedto be a formof power,and the alloca- e.g. the electorate,whichis a source of the politi-
tionof fluidresourcesto the purveyorsof service cal "income"of power. It will of coursebe noted
as facilitiesessentialto the performanceof their that the units involvedin any particularcase of
obligations-typicallythe control of budgeted thesetwo interchanges typicallyare not the same
funds,though oftengeneralizationdoes not ex- -thus partyleadersmay bid forsupportwhereas
tend as high as this. Thus fluidresourcesin the administrativeofficialsmake certain policy de-
ideal typecase take the formof moneyfunds.44 cisions. This typeof "split" (carriedout to vary-
The second primaryinterchangesystem,which ing degrees) is characteristicof any highlydif-
for convenienceI shall call the supportsystem, ferentiated system.
is that between polity and integrativesystem Figure 3 attemptsto look at the generalized
(G-I), whichlatterinvolvesthe associationalas- media fromthe point of view not only of their
hierarchicalordering,but of the relationbetween
44The processof investment, whichI conceiveto be thecode and messagecomponents, and theposition
one veryimportant special case of the operationof this of the latteras sanctionscontrollingon the one
interchange system,seems to work in such a way that hand factorsessential to the various functional
the powercomponent of a loan is a grantof opportunity,subsystems,on the other hand product outputs
throughwhich an incrementof otherwiseunavailable
controlof productivity is gained. The recipientof this
fromthese subsystems. The rows are arranged
"grant"is then,throughcommitting (individualor col- from top to bottomin termsof the familiarhier-
lective) services,in a positionto utilizetheseresources archyof control-each row designatingone of the
forincreasingfutureeconomicproductivity in someway. four media. The columns,on the other hand,
This is a specialcase becausetheresourcesmightbe used
in some otherway, e.g. for relievingdistressor for sci- designate componentsinto which each medium
entificresearch. needs to be brokendown if some of the basic con-
\COMOEN F THE
FIGURE 3
The A and G columnsof figure3 then desig-
MEDIA AS SANCTIONS
\ME,DIAAND
iNTERCHANGE
IREC IPROCALS
CODED nate contextsof operationof each of the four
MESSAGES
(SANCTIONS) TYPES OF
HIERARCHY VALUE - COORDINATION media as sanctions,but arranged not by inter-

FACTORS PRODUCTS SANCTION
OF CONTROL
change systemas in figure2, but by controlof
PRINCIPLE STANDARD CONTROLLED CONTROLLED AND OF EFFECT
SOURCE DESTINATION
L-
COMMITMENTS INTEGRITY PATTERN-

factor inputs and product outputs respectively.
WAGES A CONSUMERS' A NEGTIVE-
AUCTIVATION
oF
JUSTCIFICAT Thus moneythoughnot itselfa factorof produc-
OF LOYALTIES
ION I CLAIMSTO
LOYALTIES I
CM HITENTS
tion,"controls,"i.e. buys,labor and capitalas the

COMITMENTS
TO
VHLUED L
MITENT
TO COMMN L
INFLUENCE SOLIDARITY CONSENSUS primaryfactors,in the A-L and the A-G inter-
ASSUrCATION V ALUES -
POSITIVE
TENPOSITIVL
change systemsrespectively,whereas for "con-

POLICY IPERSUASION)
POLITICAL
G DECISIONS G SUPPORT
suming"systemsmoneybuysoutputsof the econ-

INTEREST- I LEADERSHIP
G RNESPONSBlTH
DEMA^NDS
IT -
HERGTIVH
omy, namelygoods (in A-L) and services (in

POWER EFFECTIVENESS SUCCESS SITUATIONAL
CONTROL
OF A CTROL o oLUHA COMPLIANCE)
A
A-G)
A
respectively.
PRODUCTIVITY RESOURCES
A G CAPITAL COMMITMENT 6
MONEY UTILITY SOLVENCY

The involvementof power is conceivedto be SITUATIONAL
L or parallel. On the one hand it "commands"the

LABGR EXPECTUTION
GOODS I'HUDUEUEHTY
twoprimarymobilefactorsofeffectiveness, namely
ditions of its operationin mediatinginteraction control of productivity(in G-A) and interest-
are to be understood. demands (in G-I) (as justifiedin termsof appeal
In the body of the paper I have discussed the to norms). On the otherhand the "consumers"
reasons for which it seems necessaryto distin- or beneficiariesof the outputsfromthe process
guish two componentsin the code aspect of each can use power to commandthese outputsin the
medium,namelywhat have been called the rele- formof fluidresources (e.g. throughbudget al-
vant value principleon the one hand, the "coor- locationin G-A) and of leadershipresponsibility
dinativestandard" on the other. The most fa- for valued goals (in G-I).
miliar example concerns the paradigmaticeco- It will be noted that in figure3 negativeand
nomic case. Here the famous conceptof utility positivesanctiontypesalternatein the hierarchy
seems to be the relevantvalue principlewhereas of control. Power, as the mediumdependingon
that of solvency is the coordinativestandard. negativesituationalsanctionsis "sandwiched"be-
Utility is the basic "measure" of value in the tween money (below it) with its positive situ-
economicsense, whereas the imperativeto main- ationalsanctionsand influence(above it) withits
tain solvencyis a categoryof normfor the guid- positiveintentionalsanctions.
ance of unitsin economicaction. For the political Returningto figure2, power is also involved
case I have adopted the conceptof effectiveness in the legitimationsystem (L-G), but this time
in Barnard's sense as the parallel to the econo- as code, as aspect of authority.This may be con-
mist's utility. Success, for the unit in question, ceived as a mechanismfor linkingthe principles
notablythe collectiveease, seems to be the best and standardsin the L and G rows. What is
available termfor the correspondingcoordinative called the assumptionof operativeresponsibility
standard. (Possibly, used with properqualifica- (P3a), whichis treatedas a "factorof integrity"
tions, the term sovereigntymightbe still more is responsibility forsuccess in the implementation
appropriateforthis standard.) of thevalue-principles,not onlyof collectiveeffec-
At the other most importantdirect boundary tiveness,but of integrity of theparamountsocietal
of the polity, solidarity in Durkheim's sense value-pattern. It may be said that the legitima-
seems to be the value-principleof integration tion of authority(C3a) "imposes" the responsi-
which is parallel to utility and effectiveness,bilityto attemptsuch success. Legality of the
whereas the very important(to politicaltheory) powers of officeon the other hand (P3c), as a
conceptof consensusseems adequatelyto formu- categoryof outputto the polity,is an application
late the relevantintegrativecoordinativestandard. of the standard of pattern-consistency. At the
Since theyare not directlyinvolvedin the inter- various relevantlevels action may and should be
change systems of immediateconcern here, I takenconsistentwiththe value-commitments. In
merely call attentionto the designationof the exchange for legal authorizationto take such
value-principleof the pattern-maintenance system action, the responsibleoffice-holder must accept
as integrityand the correspondingcoordinative moral responsibility for his use of power and his
standardas pattern-consistency. decisionsof interpretation (C3b).

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On the Concept of Political Power

Author(s): Talcott Parsons

relationto alter fromwhat it would otherwise cisionsof complianceversusnoncompliance is also

ever,as discussedabove, introducecertaincompli- cally valuable entityif it is to serve as a general-

takingshe entersinto is overwhelmingly optional freedomare protected,e.g. in the fieldsof em-

depends. Effectivenessfor the collectivityas a by thehighechelonsof authorityand power. The

thischoicehas been freedfromascriptivebases of characterof the leadership elementswhich as-

Back of theseconsiderations, it maybe said, lies in circulationis economically"functional"only

loans in turnassume furtherobligationsand ex- throughcommitment to performservices,broadly

most conspicuousmanifestation of this tendency enteredupon heremakesit possibleto treatpower

The structuralreferencepoints are essentially -z 2U) -

two, namelyfirstthat at a sufficiently high level

integrativesystembecome empiricallydistinctin L -LOYALTY---. 3I

ence betweena privatebusinessfirm,an adminis-

interchange, implyingboththe "alienation"of re- to figure1 only by introducingnames of cate-

rinto A Labor Capacity C2b tIntoI PolicyDecisions P2a

rIntoI Assertionof Claimsto In toL OperativeResponsibility

HIERARCHY VALUE - COORDINATION media as sanctions,but arranged not by inter-

COMMITMENTS INTEGRITY PATTERN-

tion,"controls,"i.e. buys,labor and capitalas the

change systemsrespectively,whereas for "con-

suming"systemsmoneybuysoutputsof the econ-

omy, namelygoods (in A-L) and services (in

MONEY UTILITY SOLVENCY

L or parallel. On the one hand it "commands"the

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