You are on page 1of 10

G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960 II.

, 1960 II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court
nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the necessary for any public use or
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant, purpose and in not ordering in the present registration proceedings.
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees. III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the
applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having ceased to
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.
appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano. IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in
estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land of the public domain.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code
application for the registration of a parcel of land. (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
(mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square meters. gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for
by right of accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of
Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the
applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because
either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title under they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the
continuously and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his same:
turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau
of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco,
acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he
had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila
had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession was Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on
distributed by oppositor Valeriano. the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is
property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land
claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land,
covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain.
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public
domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available
public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors: for private ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by
domain. the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government
shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and
as increment thereof.
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands
(CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:
Facts:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in the
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. The director of land opposed the
government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent registration for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the
thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly applicant nor his predecessor-in-interes possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land
the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration appliedwas acquired from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land
that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the Manila
the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such bay. The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be registered are
declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the part of the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court could have declared the
public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.) land not to be part of the public domain.

The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Issue:
Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52).

Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land


. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a
position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes
specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Ruling:

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called upon to
department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited there. A
coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government, specifically from
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership. the executive department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a land in question
is no longer needed for public use, some public use or for the improvement of national wealth.

Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive
prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land
of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government
vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said: G.R. No. 11095 December 16, 1916

The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by THE MUNICIPALITY OF TIGBAUAN, petitioner-appellee,
accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities, although the vs.
occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellant.
wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside
of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public Attorney-General Avancea for appellant.
uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby. Provincial Fiscal Enaje for appellee.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs. ARAULLO, J.:

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez In representation of the municipal corporation of Tigbauan, Province of Iloilo, the president of
David, JJ., concur. said municipality applied for the registration in the property registry of a tract of land situate
within said town, barrio of Supa, and composed of seven parcels described in the application
and the plans presented therewith. The application was based on the claim that the municipality
had acquired the land by continuous possession since time immemorial, and was opposed by
the Director of the Bureau of Lands, through the Attorney-General in representation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, in so far as concerned the registration of the parcels Nos. There is no proof that said parcels were private property at any time prior to the possession
1, 6, and 7, on the ground that the first of these was a public square in the public use of said mentioned by the two above-named witnesses. They are surrounded by the public lands, as
municipality, and that the other two were property of the Government of the United States under shown by the plan presented by the applicant, and the persons whom one of these witnesses
the control and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands. designated as adjacent property owners are mere occupants of the lands situated around the
parcels, as also so stated in the plan itself.
The applicant withdrew in favor of the Insular Government its application for the registration of
the parcel No. 1, as being a public square of the municipality of Tigbauan, but maintained its Said parcels are public or government lands, as shown by the evidence. It was neither
claim with respect to the other two parcels, Nos. 6 and 7. The Director of Lands, in established in the record that this land had been granted by the Government to the municipality
representation of the Government, maintained his also. After trial and the introduction of of Tigbauan to form a part of its municipal assets or estate; nor that there was erected thereon
evidence by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 14, 1915, rendered any building belonging to the municipality and intended for public service, such as might induce
judgment (subsequently supplemented by an order of the 16th of the same month) in which he the presumption that the land had been granted to the municipality; nor that the latter had used
held that the application was entitled to the adjudication and registration of the parcels Nos. 6 these parcels for recognized public purposes. Therefore, under the rule laid down by this
and 7, together with their respective improvements, and disallowed the adverse claim of the Supreme Court in several decisions, among others the case of Municipality of Tacloban vs.
Director of Lands, represented by the Attorney-General, in respect to these same parcels. The Director of Lands (18 Phil. Rep., 201), it is evident that the applicant municipality cannot be held
objector excepted to this judgment and asked for its annulment and a new trial on the grounds to be the owner of said two parcels of land or to be entitled to enter them in its name in the
that the judgment and order were contrary to law and to the rule laid down by this Supreme property registry.
Court in the case of Municipality of Tacloban vs. Director of Lands (18 Phil. Rep., 201), and were
unsupported by the evidence. In the decision above cited the following considerations appears:itc@a1f

This motion for a new trial was overruled, the court holding that, in adjudicating the parcels Nos. The mere fact that a municipality continued to collect revenues or rentals from the
6 and 7 to the applicant municipality, he had taken into account sections 38 and 41 of the Code residents who occupy any parcel of land comprised within its district is not proof that
of Civil Procedure, relative to prescription. The objector excepted to this ruling and appealed the the said municipality is the proprietor of such realty; at the most, it might be
case to us, through the proper bill of exceptions. He alleges that the trial court erred in applying considered to be a usufructuary of the land in question, but without the right to enter it
to said lots or parcels Nos. 6 and 7 the provisions of sections 38 and 41 of the Code of Civil in the property registry.
Procedure, which regulate prescription, and in denying on this account a new trial; and that it
likewise erred in decreeing the adjudication and registration of said parcels in favor of the
applicant disallowing the adverse claim filed in respect thereto.lawphi1.net The benefit granted by section 54 of Act No. 926, for the purpose of fostering
agriculture and increasing the wealth of the country, can not be deemed to be granted,
according to economic principles, to municipal corporations which, on account of their
In the applicant's plan, Exhibit A (record, p. 36), and in the one containing a drawing of said two special conditions, the idiosyncrasy and character of the functions which they
parcels, Nos. 6 and 7, there is a note which reads thus: exercise, and, because of the administrative mission which they have to fulfill in the
name of the Government and in representation of the people who elected them, can
The lands around these parcels are public lands. The names of the persons appearing not engage in agriculture and other industries nor can they attend to the administration
on (the plan of) these parcels are those of the present occupants of the same. of agricultural land and give particular attention to strictly private business, without
serious detriment to the interests of the community.
From the testimony of the municipal president of Tigbauan, Constantino B. Benedicto, and from
that of a resident of this same municipality, Francisco de Paula Tina, the former 42 and the latter In another decision of this Supreme Court, in the case of Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of
56 years of age, it appears that, since the time of the Spanish Government, the municipality was Lands and Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro (24 Phil. Rep., 193), cited in the aforementioned
wont to gather cane for its own use from the canebreaks growing on said two parcels of land; decision, and also in the case of Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director of Lands (17 Phil. Rep.,
that it had subsequently planted thereon caas espinas, which were already yielding product at 216), we said:
the time this testimony was given (March, 1915); and that these witnesses had known of these
facts ever since their early childhood. They further testified that the municipality's possession of It is apparent from these quotations that, as we have said before, in order that the
the parcels of land in question had been continuous, and that no one had opposed the same or municipality may rely upon a presume grant from the State in its favor, the land
claimed any right, title or interest in said land. The first of these witnesses, Benedicto, concerning which the grant is to be presumed must have been used by the
designated the boundaries of the parcel No. 6 as follows: On the north, Francisco Gotera; on the municipality for the purposes specified in said quotations, namely, to meet a public
east, Paulo Totay; on the south, Ignacio Totay; and on the west Benito Totay. The boundaries of necessity, and therefore must be land which would have been originally granted by the
the parcel No. 7 as being: on the north, public lands; on the southeast, Ignacio Totay; on the State for such purposes. In other words, the lands susceptible of this presumption
southwest, Nicolas Guimbal and public lands; and on the northeast, Francisco Garda. cannot be agricultural or communal lands; they must be lands which the municipality
itself can exclusively own, i. e., they must be lands used to meet a public necessity.
The mere facts that during many years the municipality of Tigbauan has been cutting can from vs.
the cane brakes which have been growing on said two parcels land from the time of the Spanish THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Government, and the further fact that it is subsequently planted thereon caa espina trees now FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES,
yielding product, do not prove that the municipality is the owner of these parcels, but only that it SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES, respondents.
has been enjoying their usufruct, which does, not give it the right to have them entered as its
own in the property registry.

As the property in question is agricultural land, aside from the possible presumption that the ROMERO, J.:
government might have granted it to the applicant municipality to enable this latter to meet public
needs, it cannot be understood, in accordance with the holding made by this court in the first of
the decisions aforecited, that this corporation was accorded the benefits allowed by Act No. 926, The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form
section 54, to wit, those of applying to the Court of Land Registration for the confirmation of its part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as follows.
claim of alleged right is said parcels and for the issuance of a certificate of title therefore; and
consequently neither may said municipality, in order to obtain said title, allege the right of On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes
prescription provided for in sections 38 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for section 55 of issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530
Act No. 926 clearly prescribes that all persons claiming title to government lands who do come square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to
not within the classes specified in the section 55 are excluded from the benefits of Chapter VI of the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission. 1
said Act which comprises these two sections. On the other hand, pursuant to Act No. 648 of the
Philippine Commission, the Governor-General is authorized to reserve for public uses the public Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of
lands comprised within certain boundaries, whether they belong to the Insular Government or to America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the
provincial or municipal governments. This provision unquestionably shows that the municipalities name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916; 2 December 28, 3 and January 17, 1917. 4 Diego
or municipal corporations of these Islands cannot appropriate to themselves public or Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly
Government lands without a prior grant from the Government and without reservation in the covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 5 to his heirs, herein
manner and by the procedure specified in said Act No. 648 and in the Act cited, No. 627. It is petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. 6
also evident that municipalities cannot acquire the ownership of public lands through
prescription, as provided in the aforementioned sections 38 and 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, nor do they need to avail themselves of this means for acquiring the same. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation,
Therefore, the trial court erred in taking account of the provisions of the two sections above cited Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May
for the purpose of decreeing the adjudication and registration of said parcels of land in the 30, 1950. 7 The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912,
applicant's behalf. 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. 8

For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment and order appealed from the latter in the On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
part thereof that is complementary of the former and relative to the two parcels of land Nos. 6 embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control,
and 7 described in the application and hold that the adjudication and registration of these management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife,
parcels in behalf of the applicant municipality must be denied, whereby we sustain the adverse now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable
claim filed in connection therewith by the Director of Lands in representation of the Government and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition
of the Philippine Islands. No special finding is made in regard to costs. So ordered. under the provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496).

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.


Moreland J., concurs in the result. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes
thereon 9 and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On
April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and
Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to
guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997 Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for
Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have
down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00. established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which
ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century. The court further stated that
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the
and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because these were issued only when
the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note that although the
were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay. Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners in the
relocation survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the 3,384 square
meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 area, 13 the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:
July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in


WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.

IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the 2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent
plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is transfer certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question
hereby DISMISSED. is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter.

Costs against the plaintiffs. 3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the
premises in favor of the government is against our existing law and
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the jurisprudence.
defendants:
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent
September 14, 1953, as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
153, 10 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-
3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end
transactions based on said titles. of the 19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the
American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements declare them part of any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in
on the lands in question that are found therein and introduced by the interest have been in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50
defendants; years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial
purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and property without due process of law.
Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and 4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park; In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court
of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America which state that
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open
the alleged Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
We are not convinced.
Costs against the defendants.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century.
So Ordered. 12 Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest
were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private
ownership of land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of
various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
(3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory ownership in land registration cases. 18
Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of
January 26, 1889. Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture
of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo.
from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation
No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the
Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the
dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan
1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 19 contains the following note,
of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America presided by "in conflict with provincial reservation." 20 In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law
Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years. 14 The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification
to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court. Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within
the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, 21 were within the
adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in perimeter of the national park, 22 no pronouncement as to damages is in order.
1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were
acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the
reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed reservation zone.
in possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they
would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in
1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include SO ORDERED.
these properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without
government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the
certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of PALOMO v. CA
Appeals, the principle of estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
agents. 15
FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40.
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the lands are still On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio
not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President
domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of
prior to 1913 up to the present. 16 Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park
the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable
purposes, they form part of the forest zone. portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
convert it into private property, 17 unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine
and alienable. Islands.
On October 6, 1972, petitioner likewise asked the Register of Deeds to register the deeds of
ISSUE: sale dated August 28, 1972 and the September 29, 1972 involving Transfer Certificate of Title
Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons. No. 2355 (34515), and to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title in his
name.13 Petitioner did not present the owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of 2355 (34515), which remained in the possession of respondents. Petitioners letter-request was
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law entered in the Primary Books of the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 55952, V.5, on October
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not 19, 1972. The Register of Deeds, however, certified that the original copy of TCT No. 2355
registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private (34515), could not be retrieved or located in the office of the Register of Deeds of Pasay, hence,
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is the requested registration could not be effected.14
no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the
government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for On November 13, 1972, petitioner executed an affidavit of adverse claim15 over TCT No. 2355
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots. (34515) which was entered in the Primary Book under Entry No. 56039, Vol. 5, on November 15,
1972.

On May 18, 1993, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City was able to retrieve the original copy of
TCT No. 2355 (34515).16
G.R. No. 143369 November 27, 2002

On May 20, 1993, petitioner caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No.
LEOPOLDO C. LEONARDO, represented by his daughter EMERENCIANA
2355 (34515),17and asked the respondents to deliver possession of the owners duplicate copy
LEONARDO, petitioner,
of TCT No. 2355 (34515). When the latter ignored his demand, petitioner filed on September 6,
vs.
1993 a complaint for "Delivery of Possession of Property, Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title,
VIRGINIA TORRES MARAVILLA and LEONOR C. NADAL, as Administratrices of the Estate
Rentals and Damages." Petitioner alleged that he filed the case against respondents only in
of MARIANO TORRES, as substituted by FE NADAL VENTURINA, respondents.
1993 because he was living abroad.18

DECISION
In their Answer, respondents countered that since 1938 up to the present, the lot in question has
been registered in the name of the late Mariano Torres y Chavarria, their predecessor-in-interest,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: and that they have been in material possession thereof in the concept of owners. In the
settlement of the estate of Mariano Torres y Chavarria, who died on August 30, 1974,19 his
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision1 dated November 26, 1999 and the widow, Rosario Nadal, and his natural child, Virginia Torres Maravilla, acquired the disputed lot
resolution2dated May 19, 2000 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52932, which by succession.20 After the demise of Rosario Nadal, sometime in January 1990, her share in the
affirmed the order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch III, dismissing petitioners said lot was inherited by her sister, Leonor Nadal, who was appointed as special administratrix
complaint5 for "Delivery of Possession of Property, Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title, Rentals of the estate of Rosario Nadal.21 Subsequently, Leonor Nadal was also appointed administratrix
and Damages," in Civil Case No. 93-10282. of the estate of Mariano Torres y Chavarria.22 Respondents maintain that they have been in open
and peaceful possession of the said property and that it was only in 1993 when they came to
know of the alleged claim of petitioners over the same property.
The instant controversy stemmed from a dispute over a 1,151.80 square meter lot, located in
Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2355 (34515),6 and registered in the
name of Mariano Torres y Chavarria, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents. Petitioner Respondents contended further that the deeds of sale dated August 28, 1972 and September
claims that he is the lawful owner of the disputed lot, having purchased it on September 29, 29, 1972 are falsified documents and that the signature of Mariano Torres y Chavarria on the
1972 from a certain Eusebio Leonardo Roxas,7 who in turn acquired the same lot by purchase August 28, 1972 deed of absolute sale was a forgery. On February 28, 1994, respondents filed a
on August 28, 1972 from Mariano Torres y Chavarria.8 motion to dismiss23 the complaint on the grounds of: (1) non-payment of the correct docket fees;
(2) prescription; and (3) laches. The motion to dismiss was denied on July 25, 1995.
On September 14, 1972, Eusebio Leonardo Roxas sent a letter-request9 to the Register of Deed
of Pasay City asking for the registration of the deed of sale allegedly executed in his favor by Meanwhile, Leonor Nadal died on October 23, 1995, and was substituted by Fe Nadal Venturina
Mariano Torres y Chavarria. The letter was entered in the Registers Primary Book under Entry on January 19, 1996.24
No. 55780, Vol. V. The Office of the Register of Deeds, however, did not register the deed as it
was awaiting the final disposition of a pending case10 between Mariano Torres y Chavarria and a On motion of respondents, the trial court reconsidered its order of July 25, 1995, and issued an
certain Francisco E. Fernandez involving title of the lot.11 Incidentally, the said case was decided order on February 1, 1996, dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription and
in favor of Mariano Torres y Chavarria, which decision became final and executory on laches.
September 21, 1972.12
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the assailed order on of the contract conveying to him the questioned lot, his action was clearly barred by the statute
November 26, 1999. The motion for reconsideration was denied on May 19, 2000. of limitations.

Hence, the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the applicable provision is Article 114127 and not
1144 of the Civil Code because his action is one for recovery of possession of real property
I which prescribes in thirty years.

THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO ENFORCE THE DEEDS (EXHS. 2 AND 4) THROUGH HIS The contention is without merit. Petitioners action is actually an action for specific
COMPLAINT FILED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1993 HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED ON performance, i.e., to enforce the deed of absolute sale allegedly executed in his favor. It is a
SEPTEMBER 29, 1982 PER ARTICLE 114[4]; fundamental principle that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but by delivery. The
delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of
acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract.28 Under Article 1498 of the Civil
II Code, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
THE TITLE ON THE PROPERTY REMAINED IN THE VENDORS (MARIO TORRES) NAME contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Thus, the execution of the contract is
BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE DEEDS (EXHS. 2 AND 4); only a presumptive, not conclusive delivery which can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary,
as when there is failure on the part of the vendee to take material possession of the land subject
III of the sale in the concept of a purchaser-owner.29

IF THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE TCT WAS LOST/MISSING IN THE FILES OF THE In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the lot in question was never delivered to petitioner
REGISTER OF DEEDS, PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE FILED A PETITION FOR notwithstanding the alleged execution of a deed of absolute sale. From 1972 to 1993, petitioner
RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE; neither had, nor demanded, material possession of the disputed lot. It was the respondents who
have been in control and possession thereof in the concept of owners since 1938 up to the
present. It follows that ownership of the lot was never transferred to petitioner. Hence, he can
IV not claim that the instant case is an accion reivindicatoria or an action to recover ownership and
full possession of the property which, in the first place, never came into his possession for lack
PETITIONERS INACTION FOR 21 YEARS TO ENFORCE HIS RIGHTS ON THE DEEDS of the requisite delivery. Thus, in Danguilan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 where the requisite
(EXHS. 2 AND 4) MADE RESPONDENTS BELIVE THAT HE HAD ABANDONED HIS RIGHTS delivery was not effected, the Court held that:
ON THE PROPERTY; and,
Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not
V pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity and Surety Co. v.
Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient delivery
LACHES HAD OPERATED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT PETITIONER WROTE THE where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third persons (Addison v.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY (EXH. 8) AND THE LATTER REPLIED THAT Felix, 38 Phil. 404; Masallo v. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134), it becomes incontestable that even if included
REGISTRATION COULD NOT BE EFFECTED BECAUSE THE TITLE WAS MISSING (EXH. in the contract, the ownership of the property in dispute did not pass... Not having become the
9).25 owner for lack of delivery, [one] cannot presume to recover the property from its present
possessors. [The] action, therefore, is not one of revindicacion, but one against [the] vendor for
specific performance of the sale ...
The issue in the instant case is whether or not petitioners action is barred by prescription and
laches.
Clearly, the case filed by petitioner was an action for specific performance of a written contract of
sale which, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, prescribes in 10 years from the accrual of
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners cause of action is founded on the deed of absolute the right of action. In a contract of sale, there is a reciprocal obligation to pay the purchase price
sale allegedly executed by respondents predecessor-in-interest on August 28, 1972, which
and the corresponding delivery of the thing sold, which obligations give rise to a right of action in
purportedly conveyed the disputed lot to Eusebio Leonardo Roxas, and the deed of sale dated case of breach.31 Here, petitioners right of action for specific performance or rescission arose
September 29, 1972, whereby the latter sold the same lot to petitioner. Being an action based on
when delivery of the thing sold was not effected on September 29, 1972, despite the payment of
written contracts, petitioners complaint falls under Article 114426of the Civil Code, which provides the purchase price. Hence, from 1972 to 1993, when petitioner filed the instant case, 21 years
that an action upon a written contract shall prescribe in ten years from the time the right of action
had elapsed barring the institution of petitioners action which is definitely beyond the 10 year
accrued. Since petitioner brought the instant case only on September 6, 1993, or 21 years from prescriptive period.
the time his supposed right of action accrued on September 29, 1972, i.e., the date of execution
Petitioners claim that the prescriptive period was tolled when he registered his adverse claim adverse claim to be valid, it must be shown that a demand was made on the vendor and that the
with the Register of Deeds is untenable. In Garbin v. Court of Appeals, et al.,32 wherein an action latter refused to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title.39
for annulment of a deed of sale was dismissed on the ground of prescription and laches, the
Court held that the registration of an adverse claim does not toll the running of the prescriptive In instant case, it was not shown that Mariano Torres y Chavarria, the registered owner of the
period, thus: disputed lot, refused to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, nor that petitioner
demanded the surrender thereof. In the affidavit of adverse claim registered by petitioner he
x x x the title of the defendant must be upheld for failure or the neglect of the plaintiffs for an merely stated: "9. That in the meantime the herein (VENDEE) LEOPOLDO C. LEONARDO has
unreasonable and unexplained length of time of more than fifteen (15) years since they no means to get or secure the aforementioned Owner[]s Duplicate Copy of Title No. 2355
registered their adverse claim, or for a period of more than three (3) decades since the (34515) Pasay City Registry Office, from the said Parties, he (Leopoldo C. Leonardo) hereby
execution of the deed of sale in their favor upon which their adverse claim is based, to do that requests the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annotate whatever rights and interest on the
which, by exercising diligence, could or should have been done earlier. For it is this negligence ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 2355 (34515), Pasay Registry Office, in the name of
or omission to assert a right within reasonable time that is construed that plaintiffs had MARIANO C. TORRES as a Notice of Adverse Claim(s) in favor of LEOPOLDO C. LEONARDO
abandoned their right to claim ownership under the deed of sale, or declined to assert it. Thus, to any third party/ies;" For lack of the requisite unjustified refusal of the registered owner to
when a person slept on his rights for 28 years from the time of the transaction, before filing the surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, the affidavit of adverse claim registered by
action, amounts to laches which cannot be excused even by ignorance resulting from petitioner is not valid.
inexcusable negligence (Vda. de Lima v. Tiu, 52 SCRA 516 [1970]).
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's assertion that the prescriptive period should commence
In the same vein, the annotation on May 20, 1993 of the November 13, 1972 affidavit of adverse to run only on May 18, 1993 when the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2355
claim on TCT No. 2355 (34515) afforded no protection to petitioner for the same reason that said (34515) was retrieved by the Register of Deeds. The loss of the original title will not prevent
belated assertion of his alleged right over the property is barred by prescription and laches. petitioners pursuit to enforce his right. Otherwise stated, the recovery of the original title or the
reconstitution thereof is not the only means by which petitioner could protect his right. Under
Moreover, the affidavit of adverse claim registered by petitioner in 1972 was ineffective. The law Article 1155 of the Civil Code - "[t]he prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed in
enforced at the time petitioner filed an adverse claim was Section 110, of Act 496,33 also known court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
as the Land Registration Act, (now Section 7034 of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor." Petitioner therefore may pursue either
Decree35), which stated: judicial or extrajudicial means manifesting his interest in the questioned property in order to
interrupt the prescriptive period.

Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in Certainly, petitioners action filed on September 6, 1993 is barred by the 10 year prescriptive
this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right period from the accrual of his alleged right of action on September 29, 1972. In the same vein,
or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the said action is barred by laches having allowed 21 years to lapse before enforcing his alleged
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or right. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
interest is claimed. to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that
the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it.40 Tempus enim modus
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence tollendi obligationes et actiones, quia tempus currit contra desides et sui juris contemptores
and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be For time is a means of dissipating obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful
entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, and careless of their own rights.41
shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall
enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The November 26,
find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant 1999 decision and the May 19, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
double or treble costs in its discretion. 52932, which sustained the February 1, 1996 order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch III, dismissing petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 93-10282 on the ground of
prescription and laches, is AFFIRMED.
In Junio v. De los Santos, et al.,36 an action for cancellation of an adverse claim, the Court ruled
that the procedure for registration of voluntary instruments, like a deed of sale, is laid down in
Section 5737 of Act 496. But where the vendor refused to deliver to the vendee the owners SO ORDERED.
duplicate certificate of title, which title must be presented in order that the deed of conveyance
may be registered and the corresponding transfer certificate of title may be issued,38 the vendee Vitug, (Acting chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
may file with the Register of Deeds an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496. For an Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), on official leave.
Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not
pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery, and the execution of a public document does not
LEONARDO v. MARAVILLA constitute sufficient delivery where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession
GR No. 143369 November 27, 2002 of third persons, it becomes incontestable that even if included in the contract, the ownership of
the property in dispute did not pass.
FACTS:
Mariano Torres, predecessor-in-interest of respondents, owns a parcel of land covered Clearly, the case filed by petitioner was an action for specific performance of a written contract of
by TCT No. 2355 (34515). The said land was sold by Mariano to Eusebio Roxas but the latter sale which, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, prescribes in 10 years from the accrual of
was not able to register the same due to a legal dispute between Mariano and a certain the right of action. the annotation on May 20, 1993 of the November 13, 1972 affidavit of
Francisco Fernandez. Mariano eventually won that case in 1972. adverse claim on TCT No. 2355 (34515) afforded no protection to petitioner for the same reason
that said belated assertion of his alleged right over the property is barred by prescription and
Petitioner now buys the lot from Eusebio Roxas and asked that it be registered under his name. laches.
He was not able to do so because the Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title (ODCT) was still in
the hands of respondents and that the Register of Deeds made an affidavit that the original copy Moreover, the affidavit of adverse claim registered by petitioner in 1972 was ineffective. The law
of TCT No. 2355 (34515) could not be retrieved or located in their office. Petitioner files an enforced at the time petitioner filed an adverse claim was Section 110 of Act 496, also known as
adverse claim. On May 1993, the Register of Deeds found the original TCT of the land and the Land Registration Act.
annotated thereon the adverse claim filed by petitioner on May 20, 1993.
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner's assertion that the prescriptive period should commence
Petitioner claims that he is the lawful owner of said land having purchased it from Eusebio to run only on May 18, 1993 when the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2355
Roxas and having protected his rights through the annotation of adverse claim when the register (34515) was retrieved by the Register of Deeds. The loss of the original title will not prevent
of Deeds found the Original TCT. Respondents counter that the action has been barred by petitioners pursuit to enforce his right. Otherwise stated, the recovery of the original title or the
prescription and laches, it being filed only 21 years from the time the right of action has reconstitution thereof is not the only means by which petitioner could protect his right. Under
commenced. Petitioner claims that his action is an accion reivindicatoria which prescribes in 30 Article 1155 of the Civil Code - "[t]he prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed in
years. court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor." Petitioner therefore may pursue either
ISSUE: judicial or extrajudicial means manifesting his interest in the questioned property in order to
Whether or not petitioners action is barred by prescription and laches. interrupt the prescriptive period.

HELD: Certainly, petitioners action filed on September 6, 1993 is barred by the 10 year prescriptive
Yes. Petitioners action is actually an action for specific performance. It is a period from the accrual of his alleged right of action on September 29, 1972. In the same vein,
fundamental principle that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but by delivery. The said action is barred by laches having allowed 21 years to lapse before enforcing his alleged
delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of right. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. The execution of the contract is only to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is
a presumptive, not conclusive delivery which can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, as negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that
when there is failure on the part of the vendee to take material possession of the land subject of the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it.
the sale in the concept of a purchaser-owner.

You might also like