Anonymous v.
Radam _____
>Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Alaminos City in
Pangasinan, was charged with immorality w/ch
tainted the image of the judiciary.The unnamed
complainant alleged (in an anonym letter) that
respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and
gave birth outside wedlock.
>Judge Abella conducted a discreet
investigation: found truthfulness of the allegation. He
was told by the respondent that they are unable to
marry because they plan to migrate to Canada.
In a further investigation it was revealed that the
father of her son is unknown, as shown by the
childs Certificate of Live Birth.
> Judge Abella recommends one (1) month or a fine
of Php5,000.00 plus a warning
> Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that, respondent be absolved of
the charge of immorality because her alleged
misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock)
did not affect the character and nature of her
position as a utility worker but be held liable for
conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a
fine ofP5,000 for stating in the birth certificate
of her child Christian Jeon that the father was
"unknown" to her.
1. ISSUE: W/N she can be admin charged for being a
single mom?
NO. >In determining administrative responsibility,
giving birth out of wedlock is not per se immoral
under civil service laws. For such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. SO IF the father is
married, may be admin charged- extramarital
relations to a married man. IN THE CASE not
disputed
>TEST: not personal bias or "cultural" values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been
recognized in the realm of public policy expressed
in the Constitution and the laws.16 At the same time,
the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as
the right to privacy) should be observed to the
extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned
upon by the majority.
2. Issue: whether or not respondent may be held
liable in relation to her entry in her childs birth
certificate regarding her sons father?
Held: No. Case Dismissed. The essence of due
process in an administrative proceeding is the
opportunity to explain ones side, whether written
or verbal. This presupposes that one has been
previously apprised of the accusation against him
or her (copy of the charges). Here, respondent
was deprived of both with regard to her alleged
unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain
statement in the birth certificate of her child. She
was indicted only for alleged immorality for
giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge
of which she was informed. Judge Abellas
investigation focused solely on that matter. She
was neither confronted with it nor given the chance to
explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different
charge of which she was totally unaware will
violate her right to due process.
AMELITA CASTILLO-CASIQUIN, Complainant,
vs.GREGORIA FIGUERREZ CANSINO, Court
Stenographer
Complainant charges respondent, court
stenographer in RTC, with disgraceful and
immoral conduct for marrying and cohabiting
with her (complainants) husband. Respondent
also had 2 children w/ Cs husband. C allged that R has
knowledge about the guys married status since C and
R are former best friends and co-employees
>R, she married the C hubby in good faith in the belief
that his 1st marriage is fake because his real name was
Victor Cansino, not Villamor Casiquin. 2 years after she
learned the truth and so she left Villamor.
>OCA disregarded the claim of good faith and found
her guilty of the charges but since this is her 1 st
offense- suspension of 6 mos and 1 day
SC: found Respo guilty because her conduct is a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
also adopted OCAs recommendation-
_______
Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo
Wellcome Phils., Inc.
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative
on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson
stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by the existing company rules; (1) to disclose to
management any existing future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees with competing drug companies and (2)
should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides
the same with stipulation that management may transfer the
employee to another department in a non-counterchecking
position or preparation for employment outside of the
company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's
products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and
entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, Branch
Coordinator in Albay of Astra, Glaxo's competition. (She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives
of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in
that area.)
Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager
reminded him several times of the conflict of interest
but love prevailed and the marriage took place in Sept. 1998.
In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict
of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition
(that either he or Betsy resign from their respective
positions).
> Tecson requested for time to comply with the
company policy as Betsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package that will be offered after Astra merge
with Zeneca.
>To resolve the conflict, Tecson applied for a transfer in
Glaxos milk division, since Astra did not have a milk
division, -> denied in view of Glaxos least-movement-
possible policy.
>Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to
reconsider its decision. Tecson brought the matter to
Glaxo's Grievance Committee and continued acting as
medical representative
>Griev Committee X resolve, they submitted the matter for
voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer.
> During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson
was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products
which were competing with similar products
>National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy
on relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos
right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
CA sustained; MR denied.
Petitioners Contention: marriage policy violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it creates
invalid distinctions among employees on account only of
marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees
right to marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed
constructively dismissed as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) he was transferred to the Butuan-Surigao-
Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay, (3) he
was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions
for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from
promoting respondents products which were competing with
Astras products.8
GLAXO argues: valid exercise of its management prerogatives
and does not violate the equal protection clause;- aimed at
preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, Tecson signed and aware.
And for (1) conflict, Butuan, his hometown and Betsys roots,
(3)conflict (4) delay in the receipt of his sales paraphernalia
caused by mix-up created by his refusal to transfer
1. ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees
from marrying employees of any competitor company
is valid Or invalid as it violated the Equal Protection
clause.? VALID
>Glaxo has a right to guard its econ int: trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. The
prohibition is reasonable under the circumstances
because relationships of that nature might compromise
the interests of the company.
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy
on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that
every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
>It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or
those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it
has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions
that the equal protection clause erects no shield against
merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or
wrongful.
> The only exception occurs when the state has been
found to have become involved in the wrongful private
conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not
present in this case.
EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees
and those of competitor companies.NOT a POLICY AGAINST
MARRIAGE. Its employees are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a
conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships.
Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several
chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought
about by his relationship with Bettsy.. Indeed the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-
handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
>when signed contract, was informed about the policy,
>2. ISSUE/HOLDING: NO CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL:
when he was asked to the Butuan City-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from
attending the companys seminar on new products
which were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra.
>valid exercise of mgt prerog as the co. found potential
conflict: betsys supervisotry position means active particip in
the market war as well as the proximity of the couples area of
respo (H-camarines, W- Albay)
>Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in
pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by
an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None
of these conditions are present in the instant case.
> By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or
medical representative is expected to travel and such
reassignments are part of the employment contract.
____
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual.
Hes a biological male who feels trapped in a male
body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in
Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful he
(she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he
filed a petition for the change of his first name (from
Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his
birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila
RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others,
so that he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that
it should be granted based on equity; that Silverios
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even
the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this
point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused
to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and
[her] fianc and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG
before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to
sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change
of such entries finds no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE
OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed.
This law provides that it should be the local civil
registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the
change of first names and not the regular courts.
Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name
is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that
the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-
assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law.
Under the law, a change of name may only be
grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to
be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above,
he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition
before the regular courts or a petition for the local civil
registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to
support it. And not with the civil registry because there
is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male
hence it was just but right that the entry written in his
birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a persons sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial
legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of
the Labor Code on employment of women, certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if Silverios
petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege.
___
Petitioners claim / Issue:
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and
sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413
of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and
RA 9048.
Held: Petitioner, your contention is not meritorious.
Ratio decidendi:
1.) Change of Name, primarily Administrative in nature:
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence that no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors, which can be
changed by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general. The jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged
with these officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial. Hence, the venue to
which petitioner filed is improper.
2.) Grounds for change of name: RA 9048 provides the
grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: 1)
petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; 2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or 3) The change will avoid confusion.
From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using
his true and official name.
3.) No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment: By
virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register,
excluding the clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA
9048 provides expressly that no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code (*please see
the codal provisions). The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
4.) Purposes:
A. Correction - To correct simply means "to make or set
aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. No correction is necessary.
B. Entry of Certain Acts under Article 407 - Article 407
of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization,
loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
5.) Status of a Person is permanent. The status of a
person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not. The comprehensive term status
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession. (emphasis supplied)
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to
sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition.
_____
Republic vs Cagandahan
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her
Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she
suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed
that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has
no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition where those afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male
hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for
Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her
gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be
changed to Jeff. She presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The
lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should
be granted.
HELD:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should
not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where
the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent,
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being a male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
__
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of
sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower
court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General
that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to
implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who
have or claim any interest therein is not without merit.
However, it must be stressed that private respondent
furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the
order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings,
orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which
case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial
compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the
determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt
with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this
case.
>In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth
the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which
is the condition or let us say a disorder that
respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary
sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land
consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should
not be subject to outright denial.
>The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates
such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must
render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In
the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points
that respondent is male. In determining respondent to
be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, , having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing
to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of
the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to
the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme
Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
>As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The
trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
______
Griswold v. Connecticut
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with
violating a statute preventing the distribution of advice
to married couples regarding the prevention of
conception. Appellants claimed that the statute
violated the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut
and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who
served as Medical Director for the League at its Center
in New Haven, were arrested and charged with
giving information, instruction, and medical
advice to married persons on means of
preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty
as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants
appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as
applied violated the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Appellants claimed
standing based on their professional relationship with
the married people they advised.Griswold and her
colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law
which criminalized the provision of counseling, and
other medical treatment, to married persons for
purposes of preventing conception.
(it was not a crime to sell birth control devices, but it
was a crime to use any drug or medicinal instrument
for the purpose of preventing contraception)
Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a
privacy right for married couples?
Held. The First Amendment has a uncertainty where
privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion, which although not expressly included in
the Amendment, is necessary to make the
express guarantees meaningful.
>The association of marriage is a privacy right
older than the Bill of Rights, and the States effort
to control marital activities in this case is
unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on
protected Constitutional freedoms.
>Discussion. The right to privacy in marriage is not
specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or the
Constitution. Nonetheless, it is a right so firmly rooted
in tradition that its protection is mandated by various
Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and 14th
Amendments.
>In other words, the Constitution's words are more
than just what is immediately apparent; there are
broader implications, which can be inferred. Here, the
Court held that the right to privacy is suggested by the
following amendments:
First: individual liberties, including religion and
assembly
Fourth: protection of your property and body
against search and seizure of evidence without a
warrant
Fifth: right to refuse to testify against yourself
or produce evidence to be used to convict
Ninth: even if a right is not spelled out in the
Constitution, that doesn't mean that we do not have it
These together create a zone of privacy. Your
body, home, and property are generally free
from government interference. These are a safe
zone where you can expect to have your privacy
protected. You have the right to worship as you please,
to assemble and peacefully protest, to protect your
body and property against search, and to refuse to
incriminate yourself, as well as the guarantee that you
have other
___
Eisenstadt v. Baird
Brief Fact Summary. Appellee was convicted for
exhibiting and distributing contraceptive articles
under a law that forbid single as opposed to
married people from obtaining contraceptives.
Facts. Appellee William Baird was being charged for
exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of
delivering a lecture on contraception to a group of
students at Boston University and, second, for giving
a young woman a package of Emko vaginal foam
at the close of his address.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court set aside the
conviction for exhibiting contraceptives on the grounds
that it violated Appellees First Amendment rights, but
sustained the conviction for giving away the foam.
Under Massachusetts law, it was a felony for
anyone other than a doctor or pharmacist to
distribute contraceptives, and even licensed
professionals were restricted from distributing
contraceptives to anyone but married couples.
<imprisonment for "whoever . . . gives away . . .
any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever
[405 U.S. 438, 441] for the prevention of conception,"
except as authorized in 21A. Under 21A,"[a] registered
physician may administer to or prescribe for any
married person drugs or articles intended for the
prevention of pregnancy or conception. >Baird was
convicted in state court, and his appeals were
unsuccessful. He then filed for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal district court, seeking to challenge his
conviction on constitutional grounds and directed his
suit against Eisenstadt, the sheriff that prosecuted his
case. The district court dismissed his petition, but the
First Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute was a
per se prohibition on contraception at odds with both
fundamental human rights and Supreme Court
precedent.
Does the differing treatment of unmarried and
married persons with regard to contraception
under Massachusetts law violate Equal
Protection or Due Process?
Holding: Yes, respondent has standing to challenge the
law. Yes, the asserted justifications for restricting
contraceptives were insufficient and there was not
valid reason for differentiating between married and
unmarried persons based on the record thus violating
equal protection guarantees. The Court did not reach
the Due Process issue.
HELD: ACQUITTED. Statute is unconstitutional. It
violates the rights of single persons under the
Equal Protection Clause because it provides
dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried
persons who are similarly situated.
Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States
the power to treat different classes of persons in
different ways. The Equal Protection Clause of
that amendment does, however, deny to States
the power to legislate that different treatment
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute. A
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.
In this case, there is no ground of difference
(whether the ground is to deter fornication, to protect
health, or to prohibit contraception) that rationally
explains the different treatment accorded to married
and unmarried persons under the Massachusettes
statute because:
1) If the law's plain purpose is to deter
fornication (to protect purity, to preserve
chastity, etc) the statute does not reasonably
relate to such goal, as married persons to whom
contraceptives are available can use these in
illicit sexual relations with unmarried persons. Also,
it is hard to distinguish when the contraceptive will be
used to prevent conception (prohibited) or to
prevent disease (allowed).
2) The Court says that the statute never really
intended to protect health (health measure), as
it was in a chapter dealing with Crimes Against
Chastity, Morality, Decency and Good Order, thus
it was cast only in terms of morals. Besides, if
health were the rationale, the statute would also be
both discriminatory and overbroad. If there is need to
have a physician prescribe (and a pharmacist
dispense) contraceptives, that need is as great for
unmarried persons as for married persons.
3) If the Massachusetts statute is sustained simply as
a prohibition on contraception, it is still conflicting
to say that contraceptives are immoral, and are to be
forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless
persist in having intercourse. Such a view of morality
clearly conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the
absence of demonstrated harm, it should be beyond
the competency of the state.
TEST:: The law's distinction between single and
married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational
basis test." Withholding that right to single persons
without a rational basis proved the fatal flaw
(In relation to privacy)
Enforcement of the Massachusetts statute will
materially impair the ability of single persons to
obtain contraceptives. The Court concluded that
despite the statute's superficial earmarks as a
health measure, health, on the face of the
statute, it is can reasonably be regarded that its
purpose is the deterrence of premarital sexual
relations.
o"If, under Griswold, the distribution of contraceptives
to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on
distribution to unmarried persons would be equally
impermissible. It is true that, in Griswold, the right of
privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity,
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals, each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision to whether to bear or beget a
child."
The conception of privacy at issue here is one which
allows each person to make decisions about their
lives which the government should not interfere
with. SC upheld the idea that the government is
obligated to respect a sphere of privacy for each
individual, but specifically focused on the
individual as an individual, rather than as a
member of a family unit.
Loving v. Virginia
Brief Fact Summary. The state of Virginia enacted laws making
it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person
or the reverse. The constitutionality of the statutes was called
into question. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Restricting the freedom
to marry solely on the basis of race violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Facts. The state of Virginia enacted laws making it
a felony for a white person to intermarry with a
black person or a black person to intermarry
with a white person.
>two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black
woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were
married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings
returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple
was then charged with violating the state's
antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial
marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and
sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed
to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would
leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the
statutes served the legitimate state purpose of
preserving the racial integrity of its citizens.
The State argued that because its miscegenation
statutes punished both white and black participants in
an interracial marriage equally, they cannot be said to
constitute invidious discrimination based on race and,
therefore, the statutes commanded mere rational basis
review.
Issue. Was rational basis the proper standard of
review by which to evaluate the constitutionality
of the statutes?
Were the Virginia miscegenation statutes
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
Held. No and No.
The mere fact that a statute is one of equal
application does not mean that the statute is
exempt from strict scrutiny review. The statutes
were clearly drawn upon race-based distinctions.
The legality of certain behavior turned on the races of
the people engaging in it. Over the years, the Court
has consistently repudiated distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry as being
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.
TEST: STRICT SCRUTINY
Equal Protection requires, at least, that classifications
based on race be subject to the most rigid scrutiny.
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution (Constitution) prohibits classifications
drawn by any statute that constitutes arbitrary and
invidious discrimination. The fact that Virginia bans
only interracial marriages involving whites is
proof that the miscegenation statutes exist for
no purposes independent of those based on
arbitrary and invidious racial discrimination.
> The Virginia law, the Court found, had no
legitimate purpose "independent of invidious
racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's
argument that the statute was legitimate because it
applied equally to both blacks and whites and found
that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational
purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court also held that the Virginia law violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief
Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."
>The State Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that
the legitimate purposes of the law were "to preserve
the racial integrity of its citizens", to prevent the
"corruption of blood" and a "mongrel breed of citizens."
___
Boddie v. Connecticut
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Due process prohibits a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages. This is due to the basic
position of the marriage relationship in societys hierarchy of values
and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally
dissolving this relationship.
Gladys Boddie was a married resident of
Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed
for a divorce in New Haven County Superior
Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing
because she had not paid the filing fee under
Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
The average cost for divorce was $60, with $45 to
court costs and $15 for service of process by sheriff.
Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay
the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also
denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces
under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement
in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The District Court upheld the
requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court.
Did Connecticut's fee requirement for divorce filings
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the District
Court and held the fee requirement
unconstitutional. In a majority opinion authored by
Justice John M. Harlan, the Court recognized the
importance of "access to the courts" for Boddie,
as state court was the only method of obtaining
a divorce in Connecticut. While the Court
acknowledged Connecticut's interest in
conserving limited resources and preventing
"frivolous litigation," this interest was not a
"sufficient countervailing justification."
Therefore, Connecticut's refusal to allow Boddie to
proceed with her divorce was "a denial of due
process" in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
>The Supreme Court concluded that, given the basic
position of the marriage relationship in this
society's hierarchy of values and the
concomitant state monopolization of the means
for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process did prohibit a state from denying, solely
because of inability to pay, access to its courts
to individuals who sought judicial dissolution of
their marriages.
Thus, the Court held that a state could not,
consistent with the obligations imposed on it by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this
legal relationship without affording all citizens
access to the means it had prescribed for doing so.
> Due process typically involves rights of defendants,
rather than those seeking access to the judicial process
in the first instance. However, appellants are akin to
that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes.
This is because adults may not divorce and separate
themselves from the constraints of legal obligations
that accompany marriage without state assistance.
Precedent established two important due
process principles: 1) it requires, at a minimum, that
absent a countervailing state interest of
overriding significance, persons forced to settle
their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard; 2) a statute or rule may
be held constitutionally invalid as applied when
it operates to deprive an individual of a
protected right although its general validity as a
measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of
state power is beyond question.
DUE PROCESS The States refusal to admit
these appellants to its courts must be regarded
as the equivalent of denying them an
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right
to a dissolution of their marriages. This is a denial
of due process, absent a sufficient countervailing
justification for the States action. The States claims
that the fee and cost requirements are for the
prevention of frivolous litigation and to allocate scarce
resources are insufficient to override the appellants
constitutional rights.
__
Zablocki v. Redhail
Brief Fact Summary. A Wisconsin Statute forced
individuals to receive court permission in order to
marry if they have a minor issue not in their custody
which they are obligated to pay support for. Appellant
was unable to receive court permission under the statute and
brought suit on behalf of all residents similarly situated.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a statute significantly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
constitutional right, it must be supported by
sufficiently important state interests and closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests. Such
interests are subject to strict scrutiny or critical
examination.
Facts. Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor,
fathered a child out of wedlock. Appellee was
unemployed and indigent until 1974, and unable to
make payments.A court ordered him to pay child
support. Two years later, he applied for a
marriage license in Milwaukee County. His
application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E.
Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a
state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more
than $3,700 in child support and his child had been a
public ward since birth, therefore he was unable to
satisfy the requirements for a court order.
>Wisconsin statute that did not permit a
resident to marry without court permission if he
has a minor issue not in his custody which he is
obligated to pay support by court order. The statute
allowed court permission only if the marriage applicant
submits proof of compliance with the support
obligation and additionally demonstrates that the
children covered by the support order are not then or
likely thereafter to become public charges. Redhail filed
a class action in federal district court against Zablocki
and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in
Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States
Issue. Is a Wisconsin statute that provides that
members of a certain class of residents cannot
marry, within the State or elsewhere, without
first obtaining a court order granting permission
to marry constitutional?
Held. The statute is unconstitutional because it
significantly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right and is not supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is not
closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.
>TEST: The court employs a critical examination of
the state interests advanced in support of the statute
because the right to marry is of fundamental
importance. Previous court decisions have confirmed
that the right to marry is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although reasonable restrictions that do not
significantly interfere with the right to marry may be
imposed, the present statute absolutely prevents
some in the protected class from obtaining the
required order, and places sufficient burdens and
significant intrusions on others.
STATE: States interest in counseling the
applicant as to the need of fulfilling his prior
support obligations and protects the welfare of
the out-of-custody children.
Court:The first claim is faulty because even if
counseling is provided there would be no
interest in continuing to withhold permission to
marry after counseling is completed.
>The second is faulty for two reasons. First, if the
individual is unable to meet payments, the
statute simply prevents marriage without
providing any money to the minor children.
Second, the State has numerous other means for
extracting the payments.
>There is also suggestion that the statute prevents
applicants from incurring new support obligations.
However, this is underinclusive because it limits only
the new financial commitments arising out of a
marriage and overinclusive because in many cases
the income from the new spouse may increase advanced in support of the classification apply.Right to
the applicants ability to pay. The statute may marry is placed in the same class as decisions to
only result in more children being born out of procreate, childbirth, child-rearing, and family
relationship. Here, Redhails right to procreate means
wedlock.
nothing unless he has a right to enter the only relationship
>by determining what burden of justification the classification
that WI allows sexual relations legally to take place. This does
created must meet. This is accomplished by looking at the
not mean every state regulation related to marriage is subject
nature of the classification and the individual rights affected.
to rigorous scrutiny. Rbl regs that do not significantly interfere
Past decision held the right to marry as a fundamental right.
with the decision to enter marriage may legitimately imposed.
The classification at issue significantly interferes with the
exercise of that right strict scrutiny of the states interests