1. KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia Jr., 239 SCRA 386 by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994.
y the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_115381_1994.html
FACTS: Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Secretary
Oscar M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman,
Remedios A.S. Fernando that will allow provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB
official rate for a period of one (1) year to be implemented on August 6, 1990.
The Memo read as is the liberalization of regulations in the transport sector
and to move away gradually from regulatory policies and make progress
towards greater reliance to market forces: Chairman Fernando informed Sec.
Orbos that the Memo is not legally feasible and recommended for further
studies because (1) under Public Service Act rates should be approved by
public service operators; there should be publication and notice especially to
affected sectors; and a public hearing be held; (2) it was untimely due to an
earthquake happened on July 16; (3) it will trigger upward adjustment in bus
fares especially in trips bound for Northern Luzon; and (4) DOTC should
consider reforms that will be uplifting after the earthquake. On December 5,
1990 the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. On December 14, 1990
LTFRB released a fare schedule based on a straight computation. On March
30, 1992 DOTC Sec. Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No 92-
587 defining the framework on the regulation of transport services. Then on
October 8, 1992 DOTC Sec. Jose B. Garcia issued a memorandum to LTFRB
for the swift action on the adoption of the rules and procedures to implement
Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down the deregulation and other
liberalization policies for the transport sector. LTFRB issued on February 17,
1993
On March 16, 1994. Kilusang Mayo Uno anchors its claim on two (2) grounds.
First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to
set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus
twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the
existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a
presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport
service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of
the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court and petitions before the LTFRB.
LTFRB dismissed because of lack of merit.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining,
prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate
increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This
meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized
issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs. DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not
have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within
DOTC and LTFRBs authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a
presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience.
ISSUE: Are the petitioners have the right to petition of this case? Whether or not the
fare adjustment is constitutional?
HELD: (1) YES. KMU has a locus standi (or ability of a party to demonstrate to the
court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support
that partys participation in the case) which is inherent in the Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution provides: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
NO. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED
and the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely: DOTC Department
Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are
hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions
therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to
increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a
presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of
public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the
proposed service to the oppositor. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June
20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate
increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars,
memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.
2. Phil. Assn. Of Services Exporters vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/aug1992/gr_101279_1992.html
FACTS: As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, the DOLE Secretary (Torres) issued
Department Order (DO) 16, which temporarily suspended the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. DOLE itself
took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong bound workers. Pursuant DO
16, POEA issued Memorandum Circular 30 which provided for guidelines on the
Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong
and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire The circulars fall within the administrative and policing powers expressly or by
Filipino domestic helpers. necessary implication conferred upon the DOLE and the POEA.
POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular 37 on the processing The power to restrict and regulate conferred upon by Article 36 of the Labor Code
of employment contract of domestic workers for Hong Kong which says that involves a grant of police power.
all Hong Kong recruitment agencies hiring Domestic Helpers from the To RESTRICT: to confine, limit, or stop.
Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior To REGULATE: the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and
accreditation with the POEA. control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public,
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) filed a petition for then of the utility and of its patrons.
prohibition to annul the DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their The Court also took note of the observations of the SolGen that the alleged takeover
implementation, alleging that: is limited in scope and is a remedial measure, which will expire after its purpose has
The DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or been achieved. Furthermore, they are reasonable and valid under the general
in excess of their rule making authority. welfare clause of the Constitution since the recruitment and deployment business is
Said circulars are contrary to the Constitution, and are affected with public interest.
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive. As to the 3rd objection:
The requirements of publication were not complied with. Article 2 of the Civil Code requires publication in the Official Gazette for a period of
15 days.
ISSUE/S: WON the DOLE and POEA circulars are valid in light of the 3 Article 5 of the Labor Code makes such rules and regulations effective 15 days after
aforementioned objections. announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation.
Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 requires the
HELD: The circulars are a valid exercise of police power but are legally invalid agency to file with the UP Law Center, 3 certified copies of the rules adopted by it.
for lack of proper publication and are therefore suspended pending compliance Finally, Section 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides
with the requirements on publication. that the rules and regulations shall become effective 15 days from the date of filing
as provided for in Section 3 (above).
RATIO:
As to the first 2 objections: 3. Santiago vs. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/127325.htm
and regulate recruitment and placement activities, and is thus given the FACTS: Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
authority to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out its (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
objectives. Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC
POEA is likewise vested with regulatory authority, which is broad and far for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
ranging, such that it Is authorized to establish a registration/licensing system to (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for
regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
workers. and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies is not assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the
the growing complexity of the modern society. These agencies, being conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
specialized in the particular field assigned to them can deal with the problems a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC
legislature or the courts. Resolution No. 2300 is void.
The court noted that the circulars do not prohibit PASEI from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino workers from overseas employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
(2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of
to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. . Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes
the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in
HELD: NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the
subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The
referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void. was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for
violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
RATIO: Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that
6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed
filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics ascertainable standard of guilt. Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act
Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain,
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details
petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was 5. Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/mar1987/gr_74457_1987.html
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, Facts: Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or wer confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another.
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Confiscation will be a result of this. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond
4. U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1922/feb1922/gr_l-17122_1922.html confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered
the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for
its presumed validity. The same result was decided in the trial court. In the
Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due
to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before
an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the
improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under
Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality
of a law. Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review. Justice Laurel's
said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming
the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or
excise the affliction. The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority
over the president under Amendment number 6. Provisions of the constitution
should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due process
clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This
was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all
circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with
varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest
they be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against
arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience
or rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples
is a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power
which both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was
invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with
an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant
be said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport
prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process
is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a
court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the
method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or
his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of
powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
6. Dar v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, Oct. 19, 2005
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/162070.htm
Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Masbate devoted exclusively to
cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the agrarian reform program at the time, they
made a voluntary offer to sell their holding to DAR to avail of the incentives in 1987.
In 1988, a new law, CARL, took effect, which included farms used for raising
livestock under its coverage. In light of the Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their land was outside the coverage of
CARL. The DAR ignored their request. In 1993 the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which
provides that only lands used for raising livestock, poultry and swine are outside the
coverage of CARL. And in 1995, the DAR ordered a part of the Suttons landholdings
to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of the assailed AO
HELD: Unconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e.,the power
to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the
authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them.
Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due
to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not
immune from judicial review They may be properly challenged before the courts to
ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative
discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
To be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law
andmust not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of
their regulations.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the
investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified
as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform.
Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to
address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have
been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their
coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with ISSUE & HELD: WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents
family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in
RATIO:
the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the
cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this
fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the
enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL
prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes
after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business
interest in the case of respondents.
7. Sol. Gen. v. MMA, 204 SCRA 837
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/dec1991/gr_102782_1991.html
FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon.
Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled that (1) the confiscation of the license plates
of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could
be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2)
even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by
the Commission.
Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by
police authorities of driver's licenses and removal of license plates for
alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not among those that
may be imposed under PD 1605.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of
1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
o The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on
the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred
upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict between the decision and
the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not
supplant the latter.
o The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation
of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of
legislative power. The question the SC must resolve is the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
o A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan
Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such
sanctions.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that
the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is
conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what
is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress,
the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the
will of their principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605
but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually
prohibits.
There is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory
prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
 Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be REGULAR salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas issued an order for the payment of
imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. A motion for
legislative powers. reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna
affirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned of medical
NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 representatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity date of MO 28 and its
applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general implementing guidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay.
authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of Phil. Fuji Xerox
punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction where it was found there was underpayment of 13th month pay since commissions
therein prescribed, including those here questioned. were not included. In their almost identically-worded petitioner, petitioners, through
common counsel, attribute grave abuse of discretion to respondent labor officials
8. BOIE-Takeda v. De la Serna, 228 SCRA 329 Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/dec1993/gr_92174_1993.html
Facts: P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of ISSUE: Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month
said law, all employers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic pay
salary of not more than P 1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the
employment, and such should be paid on December 24 of every year. The HELD: NO. Contrary to respondents contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal,
Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 contained provisions defining supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of MO No.
13-month pay and basic salary and the employers exempted from giving it 28, it merely modified Section 1 of the decree by removing the P 1,000.00 salary
and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and Regulations ceiling. The concept of 13th Month pay as envisioned, defined and implemented
Implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement to said benefit was no
alia set items of compensation not included in the computation of 13-month longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than P
pay. (overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which are not part of 1,000.00 said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the basic salary of the
basic salary shall not be included in the computation of 13-month pay). Pres. employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the
Corazon Aquino promulgated on August 13, 1985 M.O. No. 28, containing a term basic salary was defined in PD 851 applies equally to basic salary under
single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P M.O. No. 28. The term basic salary is to be understood in its common, generally
1,000.00 a month. More than a year later, Revised Guidelines on the accepted meaning, i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such
Implementation of the 13-month pay law was promulgated by the then Labor additional payments as bonuses and overtime. In remunerative schemes consists of
Secretary Franklin Drilon, among other things, defined particularly what a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is
remunerative items were and were not included in the concept of 13-month patently the basic salary for this is what the employee receives for a standard work
pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed period. Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in consummating sales of
wage plus commission or commissions were included in the computation of other related transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which the SC has made
13th month pay) clear do not from part of the basic salary.
A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of petitioner. Finding that
petitioner had not been including the commissions earned by its medical Moreover, the Supreme Court said that, including commissions in the computation of
representatives in the computation of their 1-month pay, a Notice of Inspection the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines
Result was served on petitioner to effect restitution or correction of the on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of
underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to 1988 of Medical "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules
representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.
of Inspection Results, and expressing the view that the commission paid to its Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
medical representatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13- department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to
moth pay since the law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot
BASIC salary and therefore exclude all remunerations which are not part of the amend an act of Congress.

9. United BFHA v. BF Homes, 310 SCRA 304
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/124873.htm
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative
of all homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is the owner-
developer of the subdivision.
Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10
years under Atty. Orendain for 10 years.
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI.
Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with
the two major homeowners' associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners
Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF Homeowners
Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative
homeowners' association and the setting up of an integrated security program
that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision.
Subsequently, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of
agreement, and was amended.
Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered
with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), 6 and recognized
as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the
subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the
administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open
space respectively.
The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of
respondent BFHI's board of directors was appointed. 9
Based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of
receivers sent a letter to the different homeowners' association in the
subdivision informing them that as a basic requirement for BFHI's
rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security of the
subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of
squatters. On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging
that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with
the previous receiver.
The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking
over the clubhouse, securing all entry and exit points, impeding or preventing
the execution and sale of properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating
any contract or agreement or petitioner with the BFHI.
Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC,
respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC
from proceeding with the case. 14
The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application
for preliminary injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application for
prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20)
effectivity of the temporary restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the
parties to maintain the status quo. 15
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition.
Motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied. Hence this petition.
Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as
provided for in sec1(b) rule II of HIGCs rules of procedure.
Ruling: HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Originally, administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to
PD902-A, this function was delegated to the HIGC. As stated in PD92-A, HIGC was
given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide homeowners disputes
arising out of the following intra-corporate relations: 1. Between and among members
of the association; 2.Between any and/or all of them and the association of which
they are member; and 3.In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate
entity, between the association and the state. When HIGC adopted its revised rules
of procedure in the hearing of homeowners disputes, it added the phrase between
the association and the state/general public or other entity.
The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the
revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the
provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.
The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter
which HIGC cannot legally do . The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the
authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the
scope intended. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot
be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute." 26 If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative
purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a
valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
10. Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/apr1988/gr_77372_1988.html themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all
Facts On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success
Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
licensure examinations in accountancy knowledge that will promote their personal growth
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November
2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a
prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground
that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement
of its resolution
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from
enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the
Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held: It is not Constitutional.

the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is
"to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However,
its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing
the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future
examinations conducted by the respondent PRC
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on
the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent