Human Studies 25: 3353, 2002.

A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 33

2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

A Stroll with Alfred Schutz1

To the memory of James Edie, 19271998

Unlike Husserl, who developed a number of his ideas on the inten-

tionality of consciousness, and on the ideal objectivity of the objects
of thought by reading James, I came to James from Husserl (and
Schutz and Gurwitsch, two of Husserls commentators whom he him-
self trusted above all others). This interest . . . is somewhat idiosyn-
cratic and eclectic. I think I have read all of James (about), but only
the Principles and Varieties hold my attention, the first for its theory
of knowledge and the second because it is the first and really the only
phenomenology of religious experience to have been written up to now
. . . <James> had a sense of phenomenological method long before
the letter, and I hold it up as a model.

James Edie (1989:210)

Abstract. Taking his point of departure from William James and, by implication, Franz
Brentano, Alfred Schutz made explicit the multifaceted experience of sub-universes (or mul-
tiple realities) as a phenomenon for phenomenological clarification on an entirely different
foundation from James, Brentano and Husserl. The rethinking of Brentano, James and Husserl
makes the phenomenon explicit in such a way that a vast new domain of phenomenological
investigation is opened up.

Preface

Some years ago Jacques Barzun (1983) published a lovely and loving study
of the thought of William James. He called it A Stroll with William James. The
book, Barzun says, is the record of an intellectual debt resulting from keep-
ing an open account with William James. Reading that statement recalled to
me the first time I met Alfred Schutz, the beginning of my stroll.
I had signed up for one of Schutzs courses at the Graduate Faculty, and it
was his custom to interview students who enrolled. Almost the first question
he asked me, perhaps because I was an American student, was whether I had
read William James. The question struck me as especially odd and disappoint-
ing because I had come to Schutz to read, not James, but Husserl. For the
undergraduate philosophical background I had been brought up in, James was
not only declass but also pass. My impression at the time, however, is that
it was not so important that I had read James but rather that James was very
important to Alfred Schutz.
34 FRED KERSTEN

In those days, when your teacher told you to read something with pen in
hand, as Schutz did me, you went home and read it really read it. So I went
home and read William James Principles of Psychology,2 with special at-
tention to be paid to the chapter on Perception.
I mention this because in addition to dating the beginning of my stroll with
Alfred Schutz, it was only when I studied with Alfred Schutz that James made
any real sense to me, that he became more than a promoter of pragmatism
which C. S. Peirce had invented anyway. Only then did I understand why
James was so important to Schutzs thinking.
And it was only after having read James with Schutz that Husserl finally
began to make important sense to me.
Accordingly, this lecture is as much a stroll with William James as with
Alfred Schutz. It is yet another stroll of many over the years. Its purpose is
not just to take the vapors, as my neighbor Jean Schneider says, but also to
record my own intellectual debt in the open account I have been keeping with
Alfred Schutz over the many years which have elapsed since I was briefly his
student. But it is always only a stroll because it is a debt (like my financial
ones) I can never repay. The account, like the vapors, always remains open
and in the open, and I always find that there is no hope of closing it: I can
never seem to do justice either to the man or to the depths of his thought.3
In retrospect that is not at all surprising. After all, Alfred Schutz had a re-
markably original talent for bringing problems of philosophy and sociology
into the domain of genuine phenomenological clarification. My open account
includes the problems of:
1. Understanding the ways in which the structures and forms of everyday
life the wide-awake world of working and social action play a formative
rle in scientific theory about human nature in economics, political theory and
law.
2. Developing the manifold nature of (social) scientific theory, including
the exploration of a meta-theory and the establishment of limits to otherwise
ostensibly universal scientific propositions.
3. Establishing the essential building blocks for the phenomenological
rather than the logical or ideological foundation of scientific knowledge of
the social world.
4. Seeking, in that connection, to critically establish the limits of the phe-
nomenological foundation of the social world and of the phenomenological
clarification of philosophical and sociological problems on the basis of reject-
ing Husserls idea of a single, universal structure of the life-world (such as
Husserl insisted on in Formal and Transcendental Logic and The Crisis of
European Sciences). Thus, for example, the attempt to show that our experi-
ence of someone else is not wholly amenable to phenomenological clarifica-
tion so that certain aspects of the sociality of our lives requires a rather different
kind of clarification.
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 35

5. Formulating the different kind of clarification, which, phenomeno-

logically founded, consists of an ontology of everyday life characterized
by its finite provinces of meaning and corresponding multiple realities, their
temporal forms and inter-relations, and the different logics of propositions
expressing them.
6. Exploring the nature of social action in so far as it serves as a general
model for the intentionalities of human experience i.e., a special case serves
as a paradigm of human experience. Thus scientific theory always departs from
a phenomenologically and ontologically clarified social reality.
This lecture is also only a stroll because what I have to say about Schutz
is highly selective. As Schutz himself observed in the case of Husserl, from
the treasure house of their intellectual tradition philosophers tend to select only
those problems alive for them, such as the six just mentioned. Frequently those
problems bear within themselves preinterpretations which, while not explicit,
even so continue to operate as taken-for-granted assumptions or, as I call them,
loose joints, in their thinking. My stroll is thus a loose-jointed one, like
Barzuns (1983: 3f, 301) with William James. It stumbles over my preinter-
pretations as much as James or Schutzs. For me the stumbling block of those
preinterpretations is called multiple realities.

I. The Existential Void

The springboard for Schutzs theory of multiple realities lies in James Prin-
ciples of Psychology, in the famous, well-thumbed Chapter called The Per-
ception of Reality. When now I read that chapter, for the first time with
Schutzian optics, I suddenly realized that, as the centerpiece of his argument,
James translates the now-famous passage from a book by Franz Brentano: The
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.4 That passage, and others which
James paraphrases,5 form the basis of Brentanos famous three-fold classifi-
cation of psychic phenomena and which James uncritically takes over as the
foundation for his theory of sub-universes of reality.6
I had been acquainted with the writings of Brentano before meeting Schutz.
Brentanos writing seemed like the photos I had seen of him: heavily bearded,
Germanically serious and remote. But after meeting Schutz, through his pres-
ence in James, Brentanos thought came close to home and decisively changed
the way I observed and described my experience.
For I now realized that in his Psychology Brentano makes the down-home
distinction between merely thinking of something and believing and judging
something along with other mental acts such as loving, hating, willing, desir-
ing and choosing. Merely thinking of something is the most fundamental, as
the passage translated by James clearly insists. We cannot believe in something,
judge it to be the case, desire it, unless that something is thought of in the first
36 FRED KERSTEN

place good, empirical common sense, it would seem. Universally, with Bren-
tano James was saying that all acts of consciousness either are merely thinking
of something or if not then based on merely thinking of something.7
That distinction rests on another equally down-home distinction between
an act which makes something objective, and an inner awareness of the act,
of being party to the act. This latter, however, is not to be understood as a
supervenient and distinct act making the original psychic act its primary
object. Instead the inner awareness of each and every act is conveyed as an
intrinsic component by that very act itself8 were it the case that being party
to the act follows upon the act itself bearing on something objective, or is the
superinduced effect of the act, or somehow supervenient to it, then it is con-
ceivable that we would experience the things with which we are busied the-
matically without ever knowing that we do.9
Let us grant, then, that in an act of consciousness we are, as a rule, themati-
cally concerned with the object or affairs the something objective upon
which the act bears. Whether materially relevant or not to our thematic busied-
ness, inner awareness is an a priori condition for consciousness. James will
use this insight to his advantage when formulating his law that the same,
which is thought of before, can be thought of again.10
Ostensibly, the phenomenological datum at issue is this: Built upon on the
mere thought of something is the belief in it as existent in this or that manner
even though the mere thought itself offers no clue as to the manner in which
it is to be believed (or disbelieved).11 In short, the world and things in it are
presented as existent only in acts of belief. Belief is our very sense of real-
ity. As such, it is an acquiescence, James says, an emotion of conviction
akin to consent.12 As we may also say, belief is that further supervenient act
of consciousness in and through which our world is presented as existent, real.
To be sure, as a good pragmatist James limits his discussion of belief to the
active gearing into the real, wide-awake world of work belonging to our emo-
tional and active life.
Now, it is only by virtue of this theory of belief and the adoption of Brentanos
classification of psychic phenomena that James introduces the idea of sub-uni-
verses of reality. If the Brentano-James notion of belief and of the classification
are valid, it follows that, phenomenologically, reality is correlative to super-
venient acts of belief and not to mere thought or objectivating presentation.
Existence, reality, we may also say, is experienced on the basis of an exis-
tential void, an existentially indifferent manifold entertained by my thought
of it. Existentially, there is neither nothing nor not nothing. I found this con-
clusion unsettling and, with James, risked all by asking the first question con-
cerning our gearing believingly into the world:
Under what circumstances do we think things real?(James, 1950, vol.11:
287).
In my zeal to find out I found myself face-to-face with James horse.
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 37

II. James Horse

I dont know if James had a dog. (Pragmatists and existentialists are alike,
apparently, in not having dogs.) But he did have a horse named Maggie.
And his chief example for clarifying the question of the circumstances un-
der which we think things real is that of imagining a winged horse and having
nothing else before the mind.13 In such a case, the mind cannot help but believe
in the winged horse existing precisely as having wings, as really there and no-
where else. The only situation in which it could be believed in as unreal would
be one in which it would be experienced as cancelled or contradicted:
But if, James (1950: 289290) says, with this horse I make an inroad
into the world otherwise known, and say, for example, that is my old mare
Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall, the whole
case is altered.
The alteration consists in the fact that the horse and its place are identified
with a horse and its place otherwise known, and what is known of the latter
objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former. Maggie in
her stall with wings! Never! The wings are unreal, visionary. I have dreamed
a lie about Maggie in her stall.
This and other cases and situations provide James with a basis for distin-
guishing various kinds of contradictory phenomena mental phenomena such
as the winged horse contradicted by something non-mental, Maggie in her stall;
or physical phenomena contradicted by others, where one thing turns out to
be other than it was at first thought to be. On the other hand, one and the same
thing, for instance, the horse Maggie, can at one time be construed as a winged
horse, at another without wings.
A basic law of constitution pertaining to consciousness, of which inner
awareness is an a priori condition, is that we can at any moment think of the
same thing which at any former moment we thought of, but we cannot think
of it incompatibly with our other ways of thinking of it at the same time.14
Expressed phenomenologically what is the significance of James line of
thought here? Phenomena of all kinds are merely thought of. On the basis of
merely thinking of them we can proceed to believe or disbelieve in them as
existent or as non-existent. Because believing and disbelieving are based on
merely thinking of things in no way contradictory, such believing or disbe-
lieving is prima facie justification for believing or disbelieving in them as
existent or non-existent. The visual having is prima facie justification for
believing in the winged horse as existent precisely with respect to those deter-
minations, qualities, relations it is merely thought of as having. As it were,
the existential void makes room for the reality of the world and things in it,
or for the world of dreams and phantasy.
So it would seem that Brentano, and James, have led me strolling down a
primrose path to what? Surely it is not nothing, but it would not appear to
38 FRED KERSTEN

be something either. This conclusion made me wary, suspicious, uncomfort-

able, ill at ease. I became nervous in the face of a world, at bottom, of sheer
spontaneous novelty, yet which somehow remains the same.
At this time in graduate school whenever I suffered such discomfort I would
wander about the used bookstores on 4th Avenue, in one of which, at the time,
by great coincidence I came across and purchased an issue of a journal called
Et Ctera (Vol. V, October 1955). There I read a story called Oneiric Jus-
tice, about the legal status of the justice of dreams and phantasy (by Alfonso
Toral Moreno).
Briefly, the story is about an insomniac who takes a sleeping pill, falls into
a deep sleep, is arrested at work the next morning by the ever-alert dream-
police and charged with murdering in his dreams his neighbor the night be-
fore. In court, the insomniac is convicted of first degree, intentional homicide.
He only escapes the death penalty when his defense counsel proves that he
was briefly awake at the moment trigger was pulled, thus was not responsible
for the crime.
The story made even more disturbing the very intellectual account of ex-
perience by Brentano, and the very pragmatic one by James. Which has prec-
edence? the dream of Maggie with wings, or Maggie in her stall on which
James rode off to work? Is the one more privileged than the other? How and
who decides? Are there situations where we can no longer take for granted
the world of dreams or the waking world of working? In the story I read there
would seem to be more involved than just figuring out if I were awake or asleep
because there is no either-or of Maggie with and without wings. But, then,
this is only literature.
Or so I thought until recently when I learned about the Bintz brothers, both
already serving time in prison, and who have now been accused of commit-
ting a murder twelve years ago, in 1987. They were charged with the murder
because their cellmates overheard them talking in their dreams about com-
mitting it (as well as others) just as in the case of the poor insomniac of my
story (Green Bay Press-Gazette, 1999: A2). Dormant after many decades, my
old discomfort and anxiety, my existential angst, suddenly returned. Risking
everything, I now had to ask again, how does the existential void work any-
way? Once more I was driven back to Brentano and James, eventually back
to Schutz, but now with the oneirically notorious Bintz brothers in mind.

III. The Existential Void at Work

Where, then, do the existential contradictions and interrelations come into

play? At the level of merely thinking of something, or at the level of believ-
ing or disbelieving in something? The stroll with William James heads down
uncharted paths:
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 39

James answer is neither, because between merely thinking of something

and believing in it as existent or non-existent a choice occurs on the basis of
which we believe in one affair or another. Both the winged horse and Maggie
in her stall must have been merely thought of before it is possible to choose
and accept the one and reject the other.
Because we confront phenomena (mental or non-mental) most fundamen-
tally in a mere thinking of them, there is room to choose what to believe and
disbelieve. We are free to choose between two conflicting affairs merely thought
of in their mutually exclusive features. Belief (or disbelief) presupposes
choice which intervenes between merely thinking of things and believing or
disbelieving in them.15
Here we have to pause in our stroll with James to take stock of the contra-
dictions of which James speaks. They are not, for instance, between a horse
with two wings and another with wings and tail feathers. Instead the contra-
diction is between a horse with wings and another without wings. The con-
tradictions are not between things of a kind in one sub-universe as James
will say but between things in different sub-universes.
Therefore to accept reality at its cash value is merely to think of the world
as a manifold of existentially indifferent sub-universes, each with its own
specific kinds of things, co-present and not canceling each other out. They
are always there for us to believe or disbelieve, to entertain or not, by virtue
of the inner awareness characterizing our experience of them in their contra-
dictory diversity. James theory of sub-universes derives directly from Bren-
tanos now-revised classification of psychic phenomena.
In James (1950, II: 294) words on our stroll:

. . . in the strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, everything which
can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object. . . . The mere fact of
appearing as an object at all is not enough to constitute reality. . . . what we
need is practical reality, reality for ourselves; and, to have that, an object
must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting and important.
The worlds whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat
simply negatively, we brand them as unreal . . . In this sense, whatever ex-
cites and stimulates our interest is real. . . .

Of these sub-universes of reality, the most important in James catalogue are

the sub-universe of sense, of material things just as we experience them (strictly
seen colors, heard sounds, etc.), the sub-universe comprising the world as
constructed by the scientist, the sub-universe of ideal things, of abstract truths
held by all, of illusions, superstitions, of myth, the sub-universes of individual
opinions, and the sub-universes of madness. To this list we must add, from
Essays in Radical Empiricism, the world of mental life, and the world of my
life as distinct from the sub-universe of your life.
40 FRED KERSTEN

IV. Filling the Existential Void

That whereby we choose, in a further and supervenient act, to believe in one

sub-universe rather than another is attention. Things are hustled and bandied
about, James says, (1950, II: 293) until they find their proper sub-universes
which will tolerate their presence and where they can stand in relations with
other things which do not cancel them out. When our attention is turned to
one sub-universe, the others tend to drop out of sight; in so-far-as each sub-
universe is attentively heeded, it is real after its own fashion; only the reality
lapses with attention.
Now, sustained voluntary attention, James (1950, II: 297) says, is one of
the dominant modes of gearing into the real world of emotional and active
life. It is our way of filling the maw of the ontic void of our experience. And
the sub-universe amenable to the exercise of voluntary attention also gives
great weight to the things of the senses:

The fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical
point of view, is ourselves. But, as thinkers with emotional reactions, we
give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever we select
and turn to with a will. These are our living realties; and not only these,
but all the other things which are intimately connected with these.

So far so good.
Because the sub-universes are co-presented with one another, neither be-
lieved nor disbelieved in, because the manifold of givenness turns up in our
experience ordered and formed but reality-neutral, there is room for will,
choice, attention, finally belief and disbelief.
Belief is based on choice of something merely thought of to believe in. In
turn, this is based on attending to something as there to be believed in. Yet
because what is thought of offers nothing in itself as a criterion for the selec-
tion of one sub-universe over another, and because neither choice nor atten-
tion are ipso facto belief or disbelief, a willing is required to motivate belief:
the will to believe. Even if I had paid attention to, and chosen, a certain sub-
universe as paramount, believing in it does not follow automatically. Only if
there is a supervenient will to believe do I finally believe. 16
But is this enough to get the insomniac off, let alone the Bintz brothers? A
theory of free will may account for the difference between the sub-universe
of dreams and of waking reality, but not of their interaction.

V. Avoiding the Existential Void

James cited passages from Brentanos Psychology where, as a rule, Brentano

speaks only of the intentional relation that a single act bears on an object
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 41

which, as Brentano says, is not to be understood as real. Single acts are

distinguished from one another by virtue of each having a different inten-
tional relation. A desiring, for example, Brentano says, is nevertheless a
second quite new way of receiving <an object> into consciousness. This way
of speaking has led some commentators on Brentano to observe that alien to
Brentano is the notion that two or more acts, descriptively different from one
another, can have the identically same intentional object. . . .17 The observa-
tion may provide us a clue to how sub-universes can interact for the notion is
not alien to James.
As noted earlier, a basic law of consciousness is that we can at any mo-
ment think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of.
But this law has an important qualification in the Principles later eliminated
from the Essays in Radical Empiricism:
The law holds for each sub-universe but not for all sub-universes taken
together. We can clarify this idea further by noting that Brentano only says, at
least in passages of importance to James, that different acts can have similar
or dissimilar intentional relations apparently without realizing that similar-
ity and dissimilarity can only have meaning if the acts have the same object.18
As a result, James modification of Brentano in this respect is much more
radical than is his introduction of a stratum between merely thinking of some-
thing and belief.
What James does is to broaden Brentanos idea that each act has its object
so that we have say, for James, that each kind of sub-universe has its own kind
of object of belief. Just as for Brentano, the same object does not figure again in
another act, so for James the objects of belief of one sub-universe do not, as
believed-in, figure again among the objects of belief of another sub-universe.
Accordingly, it only makes sense to speak of the same as believed-in
within a given sub-universe. An act of belief in the sub-universe of dreams
cannot have the same object as the act of belief in the sub-universe of practi-
cal reality even though their intentional relations might conceivably be simi-
lar. At the level of mere thinking, many sub-universes and their objects are
merely co-present in our experience. The same can be merely thought of in
any or all sub-universes.
William James, not Henry, would seem to be the first of the magic real-
ists.
But if this is the case, then my stroll has taken me into a phenomenological
cul de sac.
What is there about belief A and belief B such that, although their inten-
tional relations are similar, their objects belong to different sub-universes?
There is nothing in the objects merely thought of which would so distribute
them into different sub-universes despite similarity of intentional relations.
If that is the case, then the insomniac and the Bintz brothers may be off the
hook.
42 FRED KERSTEN

Yet it may be that we are prejudging what is merely thought of when we go

on to say with Brentano that physical phenomena are not real; perhaps it is a
prejudice to appeal to a non-presented, hypothetical and scientifically con-
structed world, not merely thought of at all, to explain all phenomena in their
subsequent distribution into different sub-universes, their reality arising only
correlative to supervenient acts of belief. If the theory is to be faithful to the
affairs it alleges, no difference in kind, nor any other difference, is confronted
when merely thinking of things. What, then, justifies the introduction of kinds
in supervenient acts of belief? Yet, is it not the case that to speak of objects
merely co-present I am hardly entitled to say, co-existent is also to
speak of them implicitly as potentially objects of different kinds?
With James (1958: 23f, 75) let us call the present moment of merely think-
ing, pure experience. In this case, an object co-present with others and merely
thought of is, James says, only virtually or potentially either object or sub-
ject as yet. Only potentially does it belong to the sub-universe of mental or
physical realities, only potentially is there crime in the sub-universe of dreams
or of the working world.

VI. The Primrose Path to Radical Empiricism

In the essay, Does Consciousness Exist, James (1958: 80, 124ff) tries to show
that the law, that the same can be merely thought of as well as believed in with
respect to a given sub-universe, cuts across the boundaries of several sub-
universes. The way James arrives at this conclusion is by rejecting the idea
that there is a hypothetical, unpresented world which explains what is merely
present and which assigns the distribution of what is merely presented into
the various sub-universes.
Brentanos view rests, according to James, (1958: 9ff, 42) on that demon
of modernism, a Cartesian dualism, the rejection of which is tantamount to
rejecting the hypothetical, unpresented world. By universalizing his law of
consciousness James calls into question the sharp, clear-cut distinction Bren-
tano makes between psychical and physical phenomena. Sticking to what is
presented, all that one can say is that, in Jamess words, a given undivided
portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, <plays> the part of
a knowing, of a state of mind, of consciousness; while in a different context
the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known. The
existential void is like an equal opportunity employer. Or, as James says, the
concept expressed by the term, phenomenon, is a double-barreled one.
Yet if we reject Brentanos view, we are left with the paradox of pure experi-
ence: How is it that the one, self-same thing, e.g., the room in which I stand, in
Jamess (1958: 1112) words, should be in two places at once, both in outer space
and in a persons mind? How is it that a crime should be in two places at once?
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 43

But if what is given is truly what is merely thought of, then the first struc-
tural feature of experience is that it is nothing more than a place of two proc-
esses, and that place could be counted twice over, as belonging to either
<process,> and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, although it would
remain all the time a numerically single thing. On such a view, things look
bad indeed for the Bintz brothers. But this is only the beginning of James
puzzlement.
In his Notebooks dating from 1905 to 1908, and after reading a review of
the Principles by Brentanos student, Anton Marty,19 James realized he was
operating with two rather conflicting views in his radical empiricism. There
is a pluralistic dualism (many experiences assigned to different sub-universes
based on the dichotomy between the psychical and physical) and a redupli-
cative monism (the same parcel of experience figuring many times over in
different sub-universes).20 And James cannot decide which doctrine to stand
by. Among many other things, perhaps what is really troubling is the still
persistent haunt of the existential void and the heady novelty it affords.
If something is merely thought of as potentially belonging to this or that
sub-universe, this would imply after all that the object is meant as this-rather-
than-that-kind of object. It is already there standing in certain possible rela-
tions, e.g., of exclusion as in the case of Maggie in her stall and Maggie with
wings.
And if things are already present in our experience as of potential kinds does
this not mean that they are already believed in as possibly existing in this or that
sub-universe? Does this not further mean that the belief-characteristic, to use
Husserls phrase, is not a matter of difference in class of psychical phenomena
but of a quality (Husserl) of the object meant, precisely as presented?
If that is the case, does this not mean that choice, will and attention are rather
based on a belief-presentation of something instead of a merely thinking of
something, instead of a mere presentation of something? Mere presentation
would then be inconceivable except so far as the already imputed belief-
characteristic were deliberately disregarded in a supervenient act. In that case,
the existential void, merely thinking of something, is a neutrality modifica-
tion (Husserl) of a belief-presentation.
It is here that Alfred Schutz joins our stroll. He had, after all, insisted many
times that William James had silently carried out many of his descriptions in
the phenomenologically reduced sphere. But why?

VII. The Consequences of Radical Empiricism for Phenomenology

What are the deeper consequences of radical empiricism such that our whole
picture of human experience is, as it were, turned upside down? In his Psy-
chology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano developed the idea of psy-
44 FRED KERSTEN

chology which sought an understanding of psychic or mental phenomena as

individual realities explained by their correlation with inferred (by hypoth-
esis) physical realities which are not themselves given in experience but which
are the product of the psychologists theoretical interest. It is a psychology
which rests on the assumption of the positing of inferred physical reality which
causes or generates psychic or psychophysical reality. It is an idea of
psychology similar to that of James in the Principles.
However, in the Essays of Radical Empiricism James, at times explicitly,
at times implicitly, changes that idea of psychology by restricting his descrip-
tions to mental living, to psychic processes. Once he does that, as Alfred Schutz
now taught us, his radical empiricism silently becomes the pure phenomenol-
ogy Husserl contrasted with Brentanos psychology.21 Husserl had noted, after
all, that the characterizations of psychic phenomena given by Brentano fre-
quently are by their own sense essential characterizations. And even though
Brentano distinguished these latter characterizations from the factual charac-
terizations which he believed were the subject matter of psychology, still it is
doubtful that Brentano ever considered the essential characterizations as them-
selves objects of a special, let alone neutral science.22
What Alfred Schutz teaches us, and why my stroll really is not with Brentano
or James, is that we may likewise say that by their own sense James charac-
terizations of psychic processes in radical empiricism are also essential char-
acterizations for example, that the description, a given undivided portion
of experience, taken in one context of associates, <plays> the part of a know-
ing . . . while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays
the part of a thing known (Schutz, 1989: 10). To say, in this case, that James
description falls into the phenomenologically reduced sphere, is by no means
a matter of the arbitrary imposition of an alien conceptual scheme on James.
The reason why Schutz can say that James has silently carried out phe-
nomenological reduction is because he not only has restricted his description
of the purely psychic, but has done so without making the assumption of
positing a physical reality which causes or generates the psychic. James
thus accomplishes two other things.
First, he is asserting an essential truth about the possibility and impossibility
of individual realities what James appropriately calls pure experience.
Second, he has silently distinguished psychic processes from the objec-
tivity meant or intended to in them to use a more Husserlian turn of ex-
pression as a substitute for pure experience. Brentanos psychology is, on
this view, tarred by an admixture of objectivity on which his classification
of psychic phenomena rests and which, in turn, is the consequence of an as-
sumption of the positing of physical reality.
If we can say that James transforms Brentanos psychology into radical
empiricism, Schutz brings James radical empiricism out of the closet into the
light of pure or eidetic (transcendental) phenomenology.23
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 45

And the essential phenomenological datum with which we begin in Bren-

tano as much as in James, is that inner awareness intrinsic to psychic processes.
If, now, we make explicit our essential characterizations as essential rather
than factual, and if we distinguish between the process of inner awareness and
the objectivity meant in it, the psychic as it, itself, then we find that things
are already believed in as these or those material things, or as these and those
mental things, or as these and those fictive things, or as these and those mythic
things. And this is the most original and immediate confrontation with reality
presupposed in the mere thought of neutral stuff. The task now is to deter-
mine the essential ways in which something meant and believed in as of a
possible kind is constituted through awareness of it.
But that awareness in which objectivities are constituted, can only
be rendered explicit if we make an eidetic science of inner awareness. That
is to say, we must begin with essential characterizations of our psychic or
mental living as a process, a temporal flux or stream within which we find
qualitatively different currents. It is there that Schutz begins in The Phenom-
enology of the Social World (1967: 43f and ch. 2) (having wrestled it to the
ground in his earlier studies of Bergson).24

VIII. Life Among Multiple Realities

Phenomenologically, then, the subject/object or psychophysical dichotomy is

replaced by a correlation perhaps most succinctly expressed by Aron Gurwitsch
(1966: 138f):

<Mental or psychic living> ought to be considered as a correlation, or

correspondence, or parallelism between the plane of acts . . . and a second
plane which is that of sense (noemata). This correlation is such that corre-
sponding to each act is its noema, but the same noema may correspond to
an indefinite number of acts. It is not then a one-to-one correspondence.

We begin with factual individuals which fall as examples within the ideal
extension of a valid Eidos, which are ideally possible individuals, and, more-
over, which exhibit eidetic necessity. There are eidetic existents which are
singularizations of eidetic universality such as what Schutz calls the pure
(or: ideal) we-relation, or pure thou-relation etc. 25 Here I learned that my
stroll with William James was already one with Alfred Schutz.
This is because the whole problematic of Brentanos classification of psy-
chic phenomena and the question of merely thinking of something silently
but phenomenologically reduced is now better expressed by what Schutz called
multiple realities.
Intellectually my stroll with Alfred Schutz really began with his essay, On
Multiple Realities, first published in 1945, and which he must have had in
46 FRED KERSTEN

mind when I first met him ten years later. There Schutz begins with a sum-
mary of James praise-worthy account of the various orders of reality, of
sub-universes of reality, which is flawed, Schutz says, (1962: 207f) because
James deliberately restricts himself to a psychological aspect of the theory
that is to say, James still operates with the theoretical interest of the psycholo-
gist in Brentanos sense of Psychology operative in the Principles. Schutzs
task is to broaden James focus and establish the relation between the world
of daily life and that of scientific theory rather than a well-founded scien-
tific hypothesis of how the world of daily life is caused or generated by
the real physical world. Schutz heeds the essential rather than the factual
characterizations James provides.
Schutzs (1962: 208229) version of the phenomenology of sub-universes
is anchored in the structure of our being geared for and gearing into the daily,
intersubjective world within the natural attitude: our basic unavoidable
existential stance toward the world. Thus the question, under what circum-
stances do we think something real, is moot.
The daily world so structured is not just one sub-universe among others,
but the paramount sub-universe, the paramount reality. A feature of be-
ing geared for and gearing into the daily world is not a supervenient act of
belief (Brentano/James), nor a neutrality-modification of underlying belief
(Husserl). Instead, it is the suspension of the doubt that the world and its
objects might be otherwise than it appears Schutz refers to this as the
epoch of the natural attitude a striking but not especially felicitous ex-
pression, as Aron Gurwitsch observed, yet one quite consistent with the con-
trast between Brentanos idea of psychology and radical empiricism.
Gurwitsch also noted, in that connection, that one of the reasons for Schutzs
anchoring the theory of multiple realities in this suspension of doubt is that it
has its origin in the fundamental anxiety (Schutz) of the cessation of life:
death.26 I mention this because it points to the first difference of Schutzs from
James account of sub-universes: instead of an existentially neutral stuff, it is
existential Angst and not a choice which underpins and motivates our belief in
the paramount reality of the world, or even one or another multiple reality.
Indeed, it is just seeing this difference which makes the multiple realities
distinct as phenomena within the domain of phenomenological clarification.
For James our basic confrontation with the world is not that of anxiety about
our own existence, but merely thinking of the world. Anxiety is then a super-
venient act. This is hardly the case for Schutz. Our existential anxiety instead
discloses the intrinsic accent of reality presupposed by merely thinking about
the world. Had Schutz not read Husserl and simply taken over the underpin-
nings of James theory, he would have had to explain how there is a shift in
the accent of reality27 from one sub-universe to another since the same, which
can be thought of again, is only merely presented: the same would then have
no intrinsic accent of reality of its own.
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 47

For Schutz, then, as for James, the question remains: How can the same,
which can be thought of again, figure once of twice or more times in differ-
ing sub-universes? The James-Brentano answer is that in each case there is a
different and supervenient act of belief.
But how is it for Schutz (and Husserl) for whom the Jamesian psychology
of belief is rejected but not James essential characterizations of belief?

IX. The Pathway of the Stroll with Alfred Schutz

Schutzs (1962: 230, 231ff) first step is to distinguish, on the one hand, be-
tween finite provinces of meaning the temporal currents of our experi-
encing and, on the other hand, the multiple realities the objectivities
meant in them. Each case of meaning and each finite province, regarded as
an eidetic existent, has its own cognitive style, such as its own determinations
of essential necessity which include attention to life, suspension of doubt,
spontaneity and forms of sociality.
The second step requires developing the various phantasy modifications
of the unity of meanings comprising the paramount reality of daily life. To be
sure, Schutz limits himself to examining the motivation for each such phan-
tasy modification instead of working out the features of each set of phantasy
modifications, instead of working out what we might call the empirically
evidential phantasying-meanings peculiar to each of the multiple realities, or
of working out the non-phantasy evidence of the essential possibilities of in-
dividual affairs having the determinations presented in phantasy.
His (Schutz, 1962: 231) idea, then, is that each cognitive style of phan-
tasy modification results from a

shock which compels us to break through the limits of this finite prov-
ince of meaning and to shift the accent of reality to another one. . . . those
experiences of shock . . . show me that the world of working in standard
time is not the sole finite province of meaning but only one of many others
accessible to my intentional life (emphasis is mine F. K.).

On Schutzs view, our experience is not comprised by neutral stuff but in-
stead our basic existential conviction is, rather than wrested from existentially
indifferent stuff, based upon a manifold of essentially possible accents of
reality essentially intrinsic qualities of the temporal existential currents of
our lives which may be characterized in each case by its specific form of the
suspension of doubt28 and by its own time-perspective (cf. also Schutz, 1967:
52ff.).
Strictly speaking, I think that Schutz should have said, multiple shifts of
the accent of reality, instead of multiple realities. Sub-universes originate
from a shock in daily life, which alters the form of suspension of doubt and
48 FRED KERSTEN

founds one or another shift in the accent of reality. The newly shifted accent
then becomes, until further notice, the existential organizing principle of ex-
perience.
But the shock and suspension of doubt are only necessary conditions for
the shift in the accent from one of the multiple realities to another. Pheno-
menologically, of what does their essential possibility consist? To answer this
question we have to at least answer the following questions:

1. How do we distinguish between the qualitatively distinct finite provinces

of meaning apart from their shift in accent? With respect to their essential
phantasied possibility and impossibility as modes of phantasied empirical
evidence, how do we establish the non-phantasied evidence of the essen-
tial possibility of individual affairs having such phantasied determinations?
2. How are the finite provinces of meaning unified, and how are we to clarify
the relations between multiple realities (or multiple accents of reality)
and the paramount reality of daily life to which they all refer as phantasy
modifications? Phantasy modifications, by themselves, do not legitimate
our belief in anything. Is it the case, then, that the existential belief marked
by a shift in the accent of reality to e.g. the world of dreams, or the world
of myth, is completely unjustified and unjustifiable except by reference
to a non-phantasied accent of reality in its essential possibility of having
certain phantasied determinations? Thus we encounter the case of the
oneiric justice of the man who murdered another in the sub-universe of
his dream which explicitly bears a reference to another sub-universe, namely
the wide-awake world of working.
3. Are the various multiple realities a second reality hiding, or even stand-
ing in for, daily life? (E.g., an ideology, or scientific construct, or dream
replacing common-sense understanding.) What happens to the first real-
ity daily life which cannot be completely abolished even if eclipsed?
Must we reconstruct it as a well-formulated hypothesis in the manner of
Brentano?
4. What about daily life itself? Schutz largely confines himself to the wide-
awake world of working. But how do we circumscribe its boundaries, its
peripheries, its eccentricity as Plessner would say?29 Is it not the case that
the world of working is only one of many possible worlds accessible to my
intentional life?
(a) Once notice is served on its taken-for-grantedness, how does the world
of working allow for shifts of accent and other worlds in the first
place?
(b) The paramount world of reality, after all, is never abolished even if
eclipsed in dreams and phantasy. It thus persists in its paramount sta-
tus as a privileged world to which others refer. How do we account
for that even when it is no longer taken for granted?
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 49

(c) In terms of the dream and oneiric justice, or of the Bintz brothers, is
the reverse possible? Is the momentary shift of accent, of whatever du-
ration, of any moral let alone legal consequence? Precisely what rela-
tionship is presupposed by oneiric justice?30
5. Are there sub-universes within sub-universes (e.g., dreams and the super-
natural)?
6. Is there a cognitive tension among the accents of reality? Is there a play
or competition among multiples realities (or multiple accents) in the
fashion of Leibnizs monadology so that the paramount reality of the world
of working and daily life proves to be the best possible one because it is
actual rather than feigned or phantasied? Schutz, after all, refers to such a
logic of everyday thinking in the spirit of Leibniz.
7. What is the existential grounding of multiple realities? Is there not a meta-
physics at work here, a metaphysics of daily life?

These questions and ones deriving from them are part of my open debt to Alfred
Schutz. My line of credit was opened when he asked me if I had read William
James. My stroll with Alfred Schutz began with the encounter of the existen-
tial void and ends with clinging to the wreckage of anxiety-ridden underpin-
nings and metaphysics of daily life.
My open account with Alfred Schutz is now greater, my intellectual debt
now deeper than ever before. My stroll with Alfred Schutz is still far from over.

Notes

1. The Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture presented at the University of Oregon on 8 Octo-
ber 1999, sponsored by the American Philosophical Association, the Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology, and the Society for Phenomenology and Human Sciences.
I am also indebted to the Butterfly Lady for her encouragement and help.
2. When I had read the book before, I had learned perhaps more about other thinkers than
I did about James from James I had first learned about the tedious grindings in the
Kantian machine-shop, that Wilhelm Wundt was the most unmeaning philosopher who
had ever written, more unmeaning than the unspeakable Meinong. Too I even learned
a little more about Mozart from James, who translates part of a spurious letter of Mozart
the only copy of which was in the possession of Bettina Brentano, and which Schutz
cites in his unfinished Phenomenology of Music (see Collected Papers, IV, p. 248 and
p. 248 note 5).
3. Other accounts of my stroll with Alfred Schutz may be found in Franz Brentano and
William James, Phenomenology, History and Myth, Some Reflections on the Ground
of Comparison of Multiple Realities, Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice,
and Galileo and the Invention of Opera.
4. William James, (1950, Vol. II: p. 286). James translation reads, in part: Every object
comes into consciousness in a twofold way, as simply thought of [vorgestellt] and as
admitted [anerkannt] or denied. The relation is analogous to that which is assumed by
most philosophers (by Kant no less than by Aristotle) to obtain between mere thought
50 FRED KERSTEN

and desire. Nothing is ever desired without being thought of; but the desiring is never-
theless a second quite new way of receiving it into consciousness. No more is anything
judged (i.e., believed or disbelieved) which is not thought of too. But we must insist that,
so soon as the object of a thought becomes the object of an assenting or rejecting judg-
ment, our consciousness steps into an entirely new relation towards it. It is then twice
present in consciousness, as thought of, and as held for real or denied; just as when de-
sire awakens for it, it is both thought and simultaneously desire. The original passage
appears in Brentanos Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, mit ausfhrlicher Ein-
leitung, Anmerkungen und Register von Oskar Kraus, II, p. 38. James of course refers to
the first edition of 1874, p. 266. Krauss edition is cited hereafter.
5. E.g. in Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe, pp. 27ff. which para-
phrases the famous passages on intentional inexistence and the distinction between
psychic and physical phenomena (Brentano, Psychologie, I, p. 124).
6. It is a classification Husserl will reject eight years later when formulating his own theory
of intentionality.
7. See Brentanos formulation, Psychologie, I, p. 136. In this connection, see Husserls pen-
etrating discussion Logische Untersuchungen,2 Volume II, 1, pp. 428ff.
8. What Brentano calls inner awareness (inneres Bewutsein), Volume I, Book II, Chap-
ter 2, 7ff., would seem to be what, in contemporary terms, is called consciousness
e.g., by Searle, Chalmers, etc., and the problem of causal patterns of consciousness
stem from the idea that inner awareness, rather than conveyed by the act itself, is
caused by the act, or that in some (unknown) fashion the psychic act yields or gives
rise to inner awareness. And if the act itself is considered as the operation of the brain,
or neurons and synapses, then inner awareness can be said to be caused by the brain.
9. Although the classification itself does not pass muster with either James, or Schutz or
Husserl, this latter distinction is one on which they agree.
10. For our discussion, more important than certain differences with Brentano is the area of
agreement between Brentano and James: the idea that mere presentation, or thought of
something (Vorstellung) comprises our basic experiential confrontation with the world.
To take a simple example: I see in front of me a dog. The seeing is not, per se, a believ-
ing in the dog as existent. That is rather a supervenient act based on the mere visual having
of the dog. Likewise, the desire to pet the dog is based in turn on believing in the dog not
only as existent but as friendly and, on that account, only in a still further act do I desire
to pet the dog.
11. As in Brentano, so in James, judgment, belief, is employed in a very broad sense
comprising everything from propositional believing to holding that something, no mat-
ter what, has some degree or other of existence. See Principles,II, p. 283; Essays in Radical
Empiricism, pp. 141f. A variety of problems arise here, one of which concerns whether
or not, at the level of mere presentation things are presented as of possible kinds.
12. James, Principles, II, loc. cit.; James would seem to blur the distinction between phe-
nomena of belief and phenomena of love and hate in Brentanos classification.
13. James (1950, Vol. II: 1988). The example is drawn from Spinoza, Ethics,II, p. 49 (Scho-
lium).
14. In James words, (1950: 290): The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psy-
chology of belief, disbelief and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts first, that
we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so,
we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which way to disregard.
15. This is tantamount to a modification of Brentanos classification of psychic phenomena
which classes choice among phenomena such as affections and conations in turn based
on belief or disbelief. As we shall see in what follows, it is not the only modification of
Brentano which James will make.
 A STROLL WITH ALFRED SCHUTZ 51

16. Although James clearly deviates from Brentano by erasing the distinctions between feel-
ing, willing, paying attention, and believing, he nevertheless retains the basic structure
of Brentanos classification of psychic phenomena with its rock-bottom stratum of merely
thinking of something, of Vorstellung. For ambiguities of the term, Vorstellung, see
Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, V, 44f. In later writings, James translates
the term, Vorstellung, by presentation rather than by merely thinking of. Toward the
end of the chapter, The Perception of Reality, James identifies willing with believing.
17. See Ludwig Landgrebe, Husserls Phnomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung,
in Phnomenologie und Metaphysik, p. 60 (my translation). See also Brentano, Psychologie,
II, pp. 103, 145ff., and Oskar Kraus Einleitung, pp. lxixf. In the light of Brentanos
influence on James, Landgrebes statement about Brentano is as relevant to Brentano and
James as it is to Brentano and Husserl the context in which he makes the statement.
18. See Landgrebe, (1949: 60). Cf. Brentano, (1924: 124, 138ff., 153ff).
19. See Anton Marty, Anzeige von William James Werk, The Principles of Psychology,
Zeitschrift fr Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, III (1892), pp. 297333.
(Reprinted in Anton Marty, Gesammelte Schriften,Halle: Niemeyer, 1916, 1 Band, 1
Abteilung, pp. 105156). James copy of Martys review, with his comments, can be found
in the library of Harvard University; see also Aron Gurwitsch, William James Theory
of the Transitive Parts of the Stream of Consciousness, Studies in Phenomenology and
Psychology, pp. 318f.
20. The Notebooks are reprinted in part in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character
of William James, Vol. II, pp. 750ff.
21. Schutz reads James in the light, primarily, of Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phno-
menologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie, 55f. See Alfred Schutz, On Multi-
ple Realities, Collected Papers, Volume I, pp. 230f. As early as 1940, in connection with
his article on William James (published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
I, June, 1941, Schutz insisted in a letter of 11/16/1940 to Aron Gurwitsch that James
unconsciously or rather silently, carries through many of his descriptions within the
<phenomenologically> reduced sphere. But to the extent he does so, he is only one link
in a long chain of philosophers and psychologists, all of whom were already acquainted
with intentionality, even if they did not use the term. See Schutz (1989:28).
22. This was a point repeatedly emphasized by Schutzs colleague at the Graduate Faculty,
Dorion Cairns.
23. This is especially the case with James idea of the fringes of consciousness, just as
Gurwitsch did with the idea of the noematic core in James and Husserl (the object of
thought).
24. See Helmut Wagner with Ilja Srubar, A Bergsonian Bridge to Phenomenological Psy-
chology, 1984, Chapter 1. And Alfred Schutz, Life Forms and Meaning Structure, 1982,
Chapter 1.
25. Just as Gurwitsch read it back into Brentano e.g., in Marginal Consciousness, Chapter 1.
26. See Gurwitschs comment, (1964: 398, note 46). See also Schutzs (1989:156) comment
on Gurwitschs treatment of his view.
27. An eidetically necessary quality of the various diverse currents of the flow of mental living.
28. See, for example (Schutz, 1962: 249), for that specific to scientific theory, which is
Schutzs interest in the first place.
29. For development of this aspect of Schutzs thought, see Fred Kersten, (1998: 14ff).
30. Gurwitsch insists that it is only with respect to the world of working, the paramount re-
ality of daily life, that we can assign moral and legal meaning. Precisely the story of the
insomniac and the Binz brothers suggests that this may not be the case. In the Republic,
571b576b, Plato had already suggested the danger of substituting the morality of
dreams for the thos of the good Polis.
52 FRED KERSTEN

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