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Applied Economics Letters


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Further evidence from ex-dividend days


a b
Rakesh Bali & Jack C. Francis
a
Risk Return Consulting , 10 Ferncliff Road, Scarsdale, NY, 10583, USA
b
Department of Economics and Finance , Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City
University of New York, One Bernard Baruch Way , New York, NY, 10010, USA
Published online: 28 Jun 2011.

To cite this article: Rakesh Bali & Jack C. Francis (2012) Further evidence from ex-dividend days, Applied Economics Letters,
19:6, 537-540, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2011.587763

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Applied Economics Letters, 2012, 19, 537540

Further evidence from ex-dividend


days
Rakesh Balia,* and Jack C. Francisb
a
Risk Return Consulting, 10 Ferncliff Road, Scarsdale, NY 10583, USA
b
Department of Economics and Finance, Zicklin School of Business,
Baruch College, City University of New York, One Bernard Baruch Way,
New York, NY 10010, USA
Downloaded by [The University of British Columbia] at 19:00 29 October 2014

We tested how dividend pricing is impacted by the reduction in capital gains


tax rate to 20% (May 1997) and the move to trading in 6.25 (June 1997).
Price behaviour does not support tax clienteles but is consistent with
transaction costs-based explanation. Raw returns, for all groups, are
within or close to weak no-arbitrage bounds and are unchanged around
these events. We find that taxes may impact investor behaviour but they do
not impact marginal dividend pricing.

Keywords: ex-day; tax clienteles; transaction costs; price discreteness; bid-


ask prices

JEL Classification: G12; G35

I. Introduction June 1997 events. They support the transaction costs


hypothesis.
Elton and Gruber (1970) claim that tax clienteles exist. If tax clienteles exist then subsequent to reduction
Kalay (1982) argues that short-term, tax-neutral tra- in capital gains tax rate a lower premium on capital
ders (arbitrageurs) would arbitrage away any tax losses should be observed, that is, ex-day return would
premium. increase following the act. Further, this effect should be
Bali and Hite (1998) propose the discreteness model most prominent for stocks held by high tax bracket
which can explain the clientele effects. Naranjo et al. investors, that is, low-yield stocks.
(2000) support the Bali and Hite model. Bali (2003a, b) The change in tick size has implications for inves-
augment the model by incorporating bid-ask spreads tors costs of trading and on the strategic behaviour of
and provide supporting empirical evidence. the arbitrageur impacting market liquidity. This sug-
Jakob and Ma (2007) find support for the transac- gests that the distribution of ex-day returns should
tion costs hypothesis for both small and large divi- change subsequent to the events if transaction costs
dends but do find clientele effects for large dividends. change.
Rantapuska (2008) studies the Finnish market and The raw returns for high- and low-yield stocks are
finds that transaction costs, beta, idiosyncratic risk not significantly different subsequent to these events
and dividend yield influence ex-day price behaviour. and do not support the claims in Graham et al. (2003)
Whitworth and Rao (2010) find that for high (low) and Jakob and Ma (2004). The volatility of ex-day
yields the relative price decline on ex-day is associated returns increases in the post-event period consistent
with the corporate (personal) tax rates. They do not with a decline in liquidity and market quality.
model transaction costs but support tax clienteles. Bali This article is organized as follows: Section II details
and Francis (forthcoming) document a decline in trad- the model and Section III presents the analysis.
ing volume for high yields subsequent to the May and Section IV concludes.

*Corresponding author. E-mail: rb@caa.columbia.edu

Applied Economics Letters ISSN 13504851 print/ISSN 14664291 online # 2012 Taylor & Francis 537
http://www.informaworld.com
DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2011.587763
538 R. Bali and J. C. Francis
II. The Model III. Analysis

The proportional price drop (ex-day price drop, P, Bali (2003a) provides the data selection procedure.
divided by cum price, P) is as follows (Bali, 2003a): Table 1 reports the results of regression equations
(23). For the full sample the intercept is significantly
P D  negative (-0.25) and increases in the post-event period
qc  qx :spr b: l: e 1
P P P (0.13). This implies that overall the arbitrageurs are
long the stocks from cum to ex and there is a tendency
where spr is the relative spread, qc (qx) is the probabil- for more sales in the post-event period. The coefficient
^ is significantly larger than 1 (1.14) and falls in the
b
ity that the closing transaction price on the cum (ex)
post-event period b ^ 0:15 consistent with
day is the ask price and  = D D. ev
If investors tend to sell cum and buy ex due to decline in dividend capture post-event. The estimate
^l is positively significant (0.63) and is unchanged in
dividend aversion, then qc , qx, that is, a negative
intercept in Equation 1. The liquidity providers then the post-event period.
inventory the dividend overnight. If dividend capturing Other estimates are consistent with the model.
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investors (e.g. corporations) trade due to regulatory Both high and low yields indicate selling cum and
reasons, they may buy cum and sell ex which leads to buying ex with significant intercepts (-0.33 and
qc . qx and implies a positive intercept in Equation 1. -0.20, respectively). They are higher in the post-
The liquidity providers are then short the stock event period consistent with more sales. The magni-
tude of the intercept is smaller for low yields con-
overnight.
sistent with them having lower relative spreads. For
We estimate the following regression: ^ is significantly larger than 1 (1.20) and
high yields b
P D D ^l is significantly positive (0.57). For low yields b ^ is
a aev :DUMev b: bev : :DUMev not significantly different from 1 (1.05) and l is ^
P P P
  positively significant (0.65). Negatively significant
l: lev : :DUMev e 2 ^ (-0.26 for both groups) indicates reduced value
P P b ev
placed on dividend post-event.
where a is the intercept term from Equation 1; b and l The GARCH terms are significant for the full sam-
are coefficients on the dividend pricing and discreteness ple and for the two yield groups. The coefficient on the
terms, respectively; DUMev = 1 in the post-event per- dummy term in the variance equation is positively
iod and 0 otherwise; and aev, bev and lev measure the significant for all groups. The error variance is signifi-
respective changes caused by the events. The error term cantly higher post-event consistent with a decline in
follows a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional market quality. GARCH (2,2) did not converge.
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH (1,1)) process which is These results complement the conclusions in Bali and
tested for change in the post-event period. Specifically, Francis (forthcoming), who show a post-event decline
in volume for high yields.
ht b0 b1  e2t1 b2  ht1 b3  DUMev 3 The DurbinWatson statistics indicate positive
autocorrelation for all groups. The Chow tests do
where ht is the conditional variance and b indicates not detect a structural break post-event for any
standard GARCH (1,1) terms and the dummy term. group. To test for the effects of outliers we form a
The null hypothesis states that the slope coefficients subsample by omitting bottom and top 1% of obser-
of the terms with the event dummy (aev, bev and lev) vations with extreme (D P) values. The dividend
should equal 0 in Equation 2. Any significance is only pricing estimates are unaffected but for high yields the
necessary but not sufficient condition for rejecting the GARCH term assumes more prominence at the
no-arbitrage conditions. expense of ARCH terms.
We test fairly weak arbitrage conditions and utilize Figure 1(a) and (b) provides the time-series varia-
tion in monthly raw returns along with the discrete-
the observable discreteness in dividends alone and
ness bounds for high and low yields over the period
compute bounds assuming the price drop equals the
1994 to 2000. For the whole period and for both
tick multiple just below the dividend (D) and D plus 1
groups RWs are generally constrained by the weak
tick, that is,
no-arbitrage bounds. Overall, for the full sample,
the mean raw return is 0.22 (bounds -0.21 and 0.15)
DR  RW  DR 4 per cent. For high yields the mean raw return is
0.12 (bounds -0.33 and 0.28) per cent. For low
where RW is the ex-day raw return. yields the mean raw return is 0.24 (bounds -0.18 and
Downloaded by [The University of British Columbia] at 19:00 29 October 2014

Table 1. Regression analysis for the full sample, high- and low-yield groups of NYSE taxable cash dividends around the moves to reduction in capital gains tax rate from 28% to
20% and to trading in 6.25 (dividends . 12.5)
Panel A: Pricing dynamics

a aev b bev l lev R2

Full sample
Estimate -0.25a 0.13a 1.14b -0.15a 0.63a 0.15 0.18
SE 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.21
High-yield group
Estimate -0.33a 0.49a 1.20b -0.26a 0.57a -0.11 0.17
SE 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.26
Low-yield group
Further evidence from ex-dividend days

Estimate -0.20a 0.17a 1.05 -0.26a 0.65a 0.39 0.04


SE 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.37
D D  
Notes: P
P a aev :DUMev b: P bev : P :DUMev l: P lev : P :DUMev e
where P is the price drop, P the cum price, D equals the tick multiple just short of the dividend amount,  = (DD), DUMev is a dummy variable equal to 1 over the period 24
June 1997 to 6 May 2000 and 0 over the period 24 June 1994 to 6 May 1997. NYSE, New York Stock Exchange.
a
Denotes significant difference from 0 at the 5% level.
b
Denotes significant difference from 1 at the 5% level (for b only).
Panel B: Error term parameters

b0 b1 b2 b3

Full sample
Estimate 0.004a 0.005a 0.993a 0.003a
SE 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
High-yield group
Estimate 0.956a 0.031a 0.550a 0.583a
SE 0.286 0.009 0.130 0.178
Low-yield group
Estimate 0.007a 0.007a 0.990a 0.005a
SE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Notes: The error term is modelled as ht b0 b1  e2t1 b2  ht1 b3  DUMev where ht is the conditional variance.
a
Denotes significant difference from 0 at the 5% level.
539
540 R. Bali and J. C. Francis
(a) fall by about one-half in the second period. Gene-
1.5 rally, the raw returns are within trading costs for
both yield groups in the two periods. For neither
1.0 group are returns statistically different across the
two periods (tst = 0.9 and 1.6 for high and low
Returns (%)

0.5 yields, respectively).

0.0

0.5 IV. Conclusions

1.0 We utilize the framework in Bali (2003a) and study the


Jan-94

Feb-95

Mar-96

Apr-97

May-98

Jun-99

Jul-00
events analysed by Bali and Francis (forthcoming).
We find that taxes may affect investor behaviour but
Month
our results do not support the contention that tax
(b)
Downloaded by [The University of British Columbia] at 19:00 29 October 2014

1.5 clienteles exist. We confirm that transaction costs-


based models are capable of explaining the data well
1.0 and find that generally raw returns satisfy weak no-
arbitrage bounds and are statistically equal in the pre-
Returns (%)

0.5 and post-event periods.

0.0

0.5
References
Bali, R. (2003a) Variation in ex day dividend pricing: Myth
1.0 or reality?, Journal of Economics and Finance, 27,
190210.
Jan-94

Feb-95

Mar-96

Apr-97

May-98

Jun-99

Jul-00

Bali, R. (2003b) Seasonality in ex dividend day returns,


Month Applied Economics Letters, 10, 92932.
Bali, R. and Francis, J. C. (forthcoming) Trading volume
Fig. 1. Monthly raw returns and discreteness bounds for the around ex-dividend days, Applied Economics Letters.
(a) high-yield and (b) low-yield groups around the reduction in Bali, R. and Hite, G. L. (1998) Ex dividend day stock price
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trading in 6.25 (1 January 1994 to 31 December 2000) Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 12759.
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stocks, the bounds are twice as wide. prices: a re-examination of the clientele effect, Journal
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Naranjo, A., Nimalendran, M. and Ryngaert, M. (2000)
January 1994 to 30 April 1997 equal 0.10%, -0.41% Time variation of ex-dividend day stock returns and
and 0.35%, respectively. In the period 1 July 1997 corporate dividend capture: a reexamination, Journal
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