RECTO, GAYLE ANGELI M.

2011-0008 | AUSL
Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof. Henedino M. Brondial)
attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond
executed to the
I. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES [Rules 57-61] attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made,
in an amount equal
to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs.
A. Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57) But if the attachment
is sought to be discharged with respect to a particular property, the
1. Grounds counter-bond shall be
equal to the value of that property as determined by the court. In either
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement case, the cash deposit
of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the
may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction attaching party may
of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases: recover in the action. A notice of the deposit shall forthwith be served on
the attaching party.
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of
damages, other this section, the
than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi- property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered
contract, to the party making
delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or to the person appearing on his
intent to defraud his creditors; behalf, the deposit
or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released.
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently Should such counter-
misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a bond for any reason be found to be or become insufficient, and the party
corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his furnishing the same
employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching party may apply for a
willful violation of duty; new order of
attachment. (12a)
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently
taken,
detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed,
or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized
person;

(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in

contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the
performance
thereof;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his

property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.

2. Requirements

Section 3. Affidavit and bond required. An order of attachment shall be granted

only when it appears by the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who
personally
knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those
mentioned in section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the
value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as
the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit,
and the bond required by the next succeeding section, must be duly filed with the
court before the order issues.

3. Manner of Attaching

Section 5. Manner of attaching property. The sheriff enforcing the writ shall
without
delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in
the action,
only so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom the writ is
issued,
not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand,
unless the
former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a
counter-bond
executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the
order of
attachment or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs. No levy
on
attachment pursuant to the writ issued under section 2 hereof shall be enforced
unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment the applicant's
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment, on the defendant within
the Philippines.

The requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply

where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite
diligent efforts, or the defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent
therefrom, or the defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in
rem or quasi in rem.

4. Discharge of Attachment

See Section 5 above

Section 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counter-bond. After a writ of

attachment has been enforced, the party whose property has been attached, or
the person
appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or
in part on
the security given. The court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the
discharge of the

Section 13. Discharge of attachment on other grounds. The party whose property
has been ordered attached may file a motion with the court in which he action is pending,
before or after levy or even after the release of the attached property, for an order to set
aside or discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly
issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient. If the attachment is excessive, the
discharge shall be limited to the excess. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the
movant but not otherwise, the attaching party may oppose the motion by counter-affidavits or
other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After due notice and
hearing, the court shall order the setting aside or the corresponding discharge of the
attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the
bond is insufficient, or that the attachment is excessive, and the defect is not cured forthwith.
5. Third Party Claim
Section 14. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If the property
attached is claimed by any person other than the party against whom attachment had been
issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon
the sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon
the attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment,
unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by
the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property
levied upon. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be decided by the court
issuing the writ of attachment. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property
may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of such property to any
such third-party claimant, if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent
such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the
attaching party from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer
duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is
sued for damages as a result of the attachment, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General,
and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose.
6. Claim for Damages
Section 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment. An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive
attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties setting
forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be
awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the
attachment was issued he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of
the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the
judgment of the appellate court becomes
executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by
the trial
court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was
issued from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any
property of the attaching party not exempt from execution should the bond or
deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.
ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA,
respondents. G.R. No. 125027 August 12, 2002
THIRD DIVISION
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
x Mangila, an exporter of sea foods and doing business under the name and style
of Seafoods Products, entered into a contract with PR Guina, the
President and
General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered
proprietorship
engaged in the freight forwarding business, for shipment of the sea
foods to
Guam
x Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay Guina for the 1st shipment
x However, on the next 3 shipments, Mangila failed to pay
x No payment was made despite demands
x Guina filed an action for sum of money before RTC Pasay
x In the Sheriffs Return, however, it was shown that the summons was not served
upon Mangila
o A woman found at petitioners house informed the sheriff that
petitioner transferred her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua,
Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had
left the Philippines for Guam.
x Guina filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment
x RTC granted; issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment
o The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from
their counterparts in RTC, Pampanga. Thus, on October 28,
1988,
Sheriff Alfredo San Miguel of RTC Pampanga served on
petitioners
household help in San Fernando, Pampanga, the Notice of
Levy
with the Order, Affidavit and Bond
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
o The contact stipulates "if
court litigation becomes necessary
x Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge to
Attachment without submitting enforce collection
herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. xxx the agreed
o She pointed out that up to then, she venue for such
had not been served a copy of action is Makati,
the Complaint and the Metro Manila."
summons. Hence, x Guinan filed an Opposition
petitioner claimed the o asserting that although
court had not acquired "Makati" appears as the stipulated
jurisdiction over her venue,
person the same was merely
x Guinans counsel did not appear during the an inadvertence by
setting, hence, the Motion was the printing press
deemed submitted for resolution whose general
x RTC granted Mangilas Motion to Discharge manager executed
Attachment an affidavit14
o BUT did not rule on the issue of admitting such
jurisdiction inadvertence.
x Guinan applied for alias summons Moreover, private
o RTC granted respondent claimed
x Summons was then properly served that petitioner
x Mangila filed an MD on the ground of improper knew that private
venue respondent was
 holding office in Pasay City of the action." The reference
and plainly is to a time before
not in Makati. summons is served on the
x RTC denied .the MD defendant, or even before
x Mangila filed her Answer summons issues.
o With affirmative defense of improper x In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court
venue of Appeals,22 this Court clarified the
x During the setting for pre-trial, only the counsel actual time when jurisdiction should be
for Guinan was present had:
o RTC issued an Order allowing o "It goes without saying that
Guinan to present her evidence ex whatever be the acts done by the
parte Court prior to the
x Mangila filed an MR acquisition of
o RTC denied jurisdiction over the
x Mangila filed an Omnibus Motion opposing the person of
Order defendant - issuance
o Her counsel arrived 5 minutes late of summons, order of
during the 2nd call, as evidenced attachment and writ
by the TSN of
o the presentation of evidence ex-parte attachment - these do
should be suspended not and cannot bind
because there was no declaration of and affect the
petitioner as in default defendant until and
x RTC denied the Omnibus Motion unless jurisdiction
x Mangila appealed to CA over his person is
x CA affirmed RTC eventually obtained
o The Court of Appeals upheld the by the court, either by
validity of the issuance of the writ service on him
of attachment and sustained of summons or other
the filing of the action in the coercive process or
RTC of his voluntary
Pasay. The Court of Appeals submission to the
also affirmed the declaration courts authority.
of default Hence, when the
on petitioner and concluded sheriff or
that the trial court did not other proper officer
commit any commences
reversible error. implementation of the
x Mangila filed an MR writ of
o CA denied MR attachment, it is
x Mangila filed a Rule 45 before the SC essential that he
serve on the
ISSUE # 1: Whether the issuance and service of the writ of defendant not only
attachment were proper. a copy of the
applicants affidavit
HELD # 1: NO. and attachment bond,
x Petitioner ascribes several errors to the issuance and of the
and implementation of the writ order of attachment,
of attachment. Among petitioners as explicitly required
arguments are: first, there was no ground by Section 5 of Rule
for 57,
the issuance of the writ since the intent
to defraud her creditors had not been
established; second, the value of the
properties levied exceeded the value of
private respondents claim. However, the
crux of petitioners arguments rests on
the question of the validity of the writ of
attachment. Because of failure to serve
summons on her before or
simultaneously with the writs
implementation,
petitioner claims that the trial court had
not acquired jurisdiction over her person
and thus the service of the writ is void.
x As a preliminary note, a distinction should be
made between issuance and
implementation of the writ of attachment.
It is necessary to distinguish between the
two to determine when jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant should be
acquired to validly implement the writ.
This
distinction is crucial in resolving whether there is
merit in petitioners argument.
x This Court has long settled the issue of when
jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant should be
acquired in cases where a party
resorts to provisional remedies. A party to
a suit may, at any time after filing the
complaint, avail of the provisional
remedies under the Rules of Court.
Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary
attachment speaks of the grant of the
remedy "at the commencement of the
action or at any time
thereafter."21 This phrase refers to the
date of filing of the complaint which is the
moment that marks "the commencement

but also the summons addressed to
said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint xxx." (Emphasis supplied)
x Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional
remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the
court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues
pursuant to the order granting the writ; and
third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is
not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ
commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to
act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing from the
Court will not bind the
defendant.23
x In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was
issued on September
27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988.
However, the alias summons was served only on
January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the
implementation of the writ of attachment.
x The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of
Attachment on September
27 since a motion for its issuance can be filed "at
the commencement of the
action." However, on the day the writ was
implemented, the trial court should
have, previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ, acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was shown in
the records of the case, the
summons was actually served on petitioner several
months after the writ had
been implemented.
x Private respondent, nevertheless, claims that the prior or
contemporaneous
service of summons contemplated in Section 5 of
Rule 57 provides for
exceptions. Among such exceptions are "where the
summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent efforts or where
the defendant is a resident temporarily absent
therefrom x x x." Private respondent asserts that
when she commenced this action, she tried to serve
summons on petitioner but the latter could not be
located at her customary address in
Kamuning, Quezon City or at her new address in
Guagua, Pampanga.24
Furthermore, respondent claims that petitioner was
not even in Pampanga; rather, she was in Guam
purportedly on a business trip.
x Private respondent never showed that she effected
substituted service on
petitioner after her personal service failed. Likewise,
if it were true that private
respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of
petitioner after a diligent
inquiry, still she had some other recourse under the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
x The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where
personal service could not
be effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides that whenever the
defendants "whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by
leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation x x
x." Thus, if petitioners whereabouts could not be
ascertained after the sheriff had served the
summons at her given address, then respondent
could have immediately asked the court for
service of summons by publication on
petitioner.25
x Moreover, as private respondent also claims that
petitioner was abroad at the
time of the service of summons, this
made petitioner a resident who is
temporarily out of the country. This is
the exact situation contemplated in
Section 16,26 Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, providing for service of
summons by publication.
x In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons
belatedly served on petitioner
cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The
trial court cannot enforce such a coercive
process on petitioner without first obtaining
jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary
writ of attachment must be served after or
simultaneous with the service of summons
on the defendant whether by personal
service, substituted service or by publication
as warranted by the circumstances of the
case.27 The subsequent service of summons
does not confer a retroactive acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person because the law
does not allow for retroactivity of a belated
service.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the venue was properly laid in Pasay City.
HELD # 2: NO. (NOT because of the STIPULATION in the
contract BUT because the business of Guina is a sole
proprietorship, hence, does not have a separate and
distinct personality of its own. Thus, the venue should
have been the residence of Guina)
x Petitioner assails the filing of this case in the RTC of
Pasay and points to a
provision in private respondents invoice which
contains the following:
o "3. If court litigation becomes necessary
to enforce collection, an
additional equivalent (sic) to
25% of the principal amount
will be charged. The agreed
venue for such action is Makati,
Metro
Manila, Philippines."28
x Based on this provision, petitioner contends that the
action should have been
instituted in the RTC of Makati and to do
otherwise would be a ground for the
dismissal of the case.
x We resolve to dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue but not for the
reason stated by petitioner.
x The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action
may agree in writing on the
venue on which an action should be
brought.29 However, a mere stipulation on
the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in
other venues.30 The parties must be able to
show that such stipulation
is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show
the parties intention to
restrict the filing of a suit in a particular
place, courts will allow the filing of a case in
any venue, as long as jurisdictional
requirements are followed. Venue
stipulations in a contract, while considered
valid and enforceable, do not as a rule
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court.31 In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words,
they should be considered merely as an
agreement on additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.32
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
exclusive venue other than the
places mentioned in the rules.
x In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit But, as we have
the venue exclusively to discussed, this exception is not
Makati. There are no qualifying or applicable in this case. Hence,
restrictive words in the invoice that following the
would evince the intention of the general rule, the instant case
parties that Makati is the "only or may be brought in the place of
exclusive" venue where the action residence
could be instituted. We therefore agree of the plaintiff or defendant, at
with private the election of the plaintiff
respondent that Makati is not the only venue (private
where this case could be filed. respondent herein).
x Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the x In the instant case, the residence of
proper venue for this case. private respondent (plaintiff in the lower
x Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court) was not alleged in the
general rule is venue in personal complaint. Rather, what was
actions is "where the defendant or any alleged was the
of the defendants resides or may be postal address of her sole
found, or where the plaintiff or any of proprietorship, Air Swift
the plaintiffs resides, at the election of International. It was only
when private respondent
the plaintiff."33 The exception to this testified in court, after
rule is when the parties agree on an petitioner was declared in
default, that she mentioned
 her residence to be in Better Living
Subdivision,
Paraaque City.
x In the earlier case of Sy v. Tyson Enterprises,
Inc.,34 the reverse happened.
The plaintiff in that case was Tyson
Enterprises, Inc., a corporation owned
and
managed by Dominador Ti. The
complaint, however, did not allege the
office or
place of business of the corporation,
which was in Binondo, Manila. What was
alleged was the residence of Dominador
Ti, who lived in San Juan, Rizal. The
case was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig. The Court there
held
that the evident purpose of alleging the
address of the corporations president
and manager was to justify the filing of
the suit in Rizal, Pasig instead of in
Manila. Thus, the Court ruled that
there was no question that venue
was
improperly laid in that case and
held that the place of business of
Tyson
Enterpises, Inc. is considered as its
residence for purposes of venue.
Furthermore, the Court held that the
residence of its president is not the
residence of the corporation because a
corporation has a personality separate
and distinct from that of its officers and
stockholders.
x In the instant case, it was established in the
lower court that petitioner resides
in San Fernando, Pampanga35 while
private respondent resides in
Paraaque
City.36 However, this case was brought
in Pasay City, where the business of
private respondent is found. This would
have been permissible had
private respondents business been a
corporation, just like the case in Sy v.
Tyson Enterprises, Inc. However, as
admitted by private
respondent in her Complaint37 in the
lower court, her business is a
sole proprietorship, and as such, does
not have a separate juridical
personality that could enable it to file a
suit in court.38 In fact, there
is no law authorizing sole
proprietorships to file a suit in court.39
x A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical
personality separate and
distinct from the personality of the
owner of the enterprise.40 The law
merely recognizes the existence of a
sole proprietorship as a form of
business
organization conducted for profit by a
single individual and requires its
proprietor or owner to secure licenses
and permits, register its business name,
and pay taxes to the national
government.41 The law does not vest a
separate
legal personality on the sole
proprietorship or empower it to file or
defend an
action in court.42
x Thus, not being vested with legal personality to
file this case, the sole
proprietorship is not the plaintiff in this
case but rather Loreta Guina in her
personal capacity. In fact, the complaint
in the lower court acknowledges in its
caption that the plaintiff and defendant
are Loreta Guina and Anita Mangila,
respectively. The title of the petition
before us does not state, and rightly so,
Anita Mangila v. Air Swift International,
but rather Anita Mangila v. Loreta
Guina. Logically then, it is the residence
of private respondent Guina, the
proprietor with the juridical
personality, which should be
considered as one of
the proper venues for this case.
x All these considered, private respondent
should have filed this case
either in San Fernando,
Pampanga (petitioners
residence) or Paraaque (private
respondents residence). Since
private respondent (complainant
below) filed this case in Pasay,
we hold that the case should be
dismissed on the ground of
improper venue.
x Although petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Discharge Attachment in the lower
court, petitioner expressly stated
that she was filing the motion
without
submitting to the jurisdiction of
the court. At that time, petitioner
had not been
served the summons and a copy
of the complaint.43 Thereafter,
petitioner
timely filed a Motion to
Dismiss44 on the ground of
improper venue. Rule 16,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court
provides that a motion to dismiss
may be filed
"[W]ithin the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading
asserting a claim." Petitioner
even raised the issue of improper
venue in his
Answer45 as a special and
affirmative defense. Petitioner
also continued to raise
the issue of improper venue in
her Petition for Review46 before
this Court. We
thus hold that the dismissal of
this case on the ground of
improper venue is
warranted.
x The rules on venue, like other procedural
rules, are designed to insure a just
and orderly administration of
justice or the impartial and
evenhanded
determination of every action
and proceeding. Obviously, this
objective will not be attained if
the plaintiff is given unrestricted
freedom to choose where to file
the complaint or petition
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
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FIRS FACTS:
T x Chuidian, alleged to be a dummy of then President
DIVIS Marcos, allegedly used false
ION pretenses to induce the officers of the
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation (PHILGUARANTEE),
the Board of Investments (BOI) and
the Central Bank, to facilitate the
procurement and issuance of a loan
guarantee
in favor of the Asian Reliability Company,
Incorporated (ARCI), which was
granted a loan of $25M
x Chuidian reneged on the approved business plan and
instead invested the
proceeds of the loan in corporations
operating in the United States, more
particularly Dynetics, Incorporated and
Interlek, Incorporated
x ARCI then defaulted in the payment of the loan
x Govt (through PCGG) filed before the
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0027
against the Marcos spouses, several
government officials who served under the
Marcos administration, and a number of
individuals known to be cronies of the
Marcoses, including Chuidian
o Seeking the reconveyance, reversion,
accounting and restitution of
all forms of wealth allegedly
procured illegally and stashed
away by the defendants
o charged that Chuidian, by himself and/or
in conspiracy with the
Marcos spouses, engaged in
"devices, schemes and
stratagems"
by: (1) forming corporations for
the purpose of hiding and
avoiding
discovery of illegally obtained
assets; (2) pillaging the coffers of
government financial institutions
such as the Philguarantee; and (3)

executing the court settlement

between Philguarantee and
Chuidian
which was grossly
disadvantageous to the
government and the
Filipino people
x While the case was pending, PCGG filed a motion for
issuance of writ of
attachment on the ff grounds:
o (1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied the funds of
ARCI acting in a fiduciary
capacity, justifying issuance of
the writ under Section 1(b),
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
o (2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d)
of the same rule as
Chuidian is guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the
action was brought, or that he
concealed or disposed of the
property that is the subject of the
action;
o (3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of
his property with the
intent of defrauding the plaintiff
as justified under Section 1(c)
of Rule 57; and
o (4) Chuidian is residing out of the country
or one on whom
summons may be served by
publication, which justifies the
writ of attachment prayed for
under Section 1(e) of the same
rule.
x Chiudian filed an Opposition
o (1) The plaintiff's affidavit appended to
the motion was in form and
substance fatally defective;
 o (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since the loan, or in concealing or
there was no disposing of the subject
fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and property, the
Chuidian; Sandiganbayan held that there
o (3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his was a prima facie case of fraud
part, if ever there committed by Chuidian,
was breach of contract, such fraud must justifying the issuance of
be present at the time the contract is the writ of
entered into; attachment. The
o (4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his Sandiganbayan also
property in the adopted the Republic's
absence of any intent to defraud plaintiff; position that since it was
o (5) Chuidian's absence from the country does not compelled to pay, through
necessarily make Philguarantee,
him a non-resident; and the bank loans taken out by
o (6) Service of summons by publication cannot be Chuidian, the proceeds of which
used to justify the were
issuance of the writ since Chuidian had fraudulently diverted, it is
already submitted to the jurisdiction of entitled to the issuance of the
the Court by way of a motion to lift the writ of
freeze order filed through his counsel. attachment to protect its rights as
x Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution ordering the issuance creditor.
of a writ of o Assuming that there is truth to the
attachment against L/C No. SSD-005-85 as government's allegation that
security for the satisfaction of judgment. Chuidian has removed or
o On the first issue, the Sandiganbayan found that disposed of his property with the
although no intent to defraud, the
separate affidavit was attached to the Sandiganbayan held that the writ
motion, the motion itself of attachment is
contained all the requisites of an warranted, applying Section
affidavit, and the verification 1(e) of Rule 57. Besides, the
thereof is deemed a substantial Rules
compliance of Rule 57, Section 3 of the provide for sufficient security
Rules of Court. should the owner of the
o Anent the second contention, the Sandiganbayan property
ruled that there attached suffer damage or
was no fiduciary relationship existing prejudice caused by the
between Chuidian and the attachment.
Republic, but only between Chuidian and o Chuidian's absence from the country was
ARCI. Since the Republic considered by the
is not privy to the fiduciary relationship Sandiganbayan to be "the most
between Chuidian and potent insofar as the relief
ARCI, it cannot invoke Section 1(b) of Rule 57. being sought is concerned."
o On the third issue of fraud on the part of Chuidian
in contracting
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o Second, there was no
evidence at all of initial fraud or
o Sandiganbayan ruled that even if subsequent
Chuidian is one who ordinarily concealment
resides in the Philippines, but except for the
is temporarily living outside, affidavit
he is still subject to the submitted by
provisional remedy of the PCGG
attachment. Chairman citing
x Chuidian after 4 years) filed a motion to lift the mere "belief
attachment and
o First, he had returned to the information"
Philippines; hence, the and "not on
Sandiganbayan's "most knowledge of the
potent ground" for the facts." Moreover, this
issuance of the writ of statement is hearsay
preliminary attachment no since
longer existed. Since his the PCGG Chairman
absence in the past was the was not a witness to
very foundation of the the litigated
Sandiganbayan's writ of incidents,
preliminary attachment, his was never presented
presence in the country as a witness by the
warrants the immediate Republic and thus was
lifting thereof.
 not subject to cross-
examination.
o Third, Chuidian denies that he ever
disposed of his assets to
defraud the Republic, and
there is nothing in the
records that
support the Sandiganbayan's
erroneous conclusion on the
matter.
o Fourth, Chuidian belied the allegation
that he was also a defendant
in "other related criminal
action," for in fact, he had
"never been a defendant in
any prosecution of any sort in
the Philippines."21
Moreover, he could not
have personally appeared
in any other action
because he had been
deprived of his right to a
travel document by the
government.
o Fifth, the preliminary attachment was,
in the first place,
unwarranted because he was
not "guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt
incurring the obligation". In
fact, the L/C was not a
product of fraudulent
transactions, but was the
result of a US Court-
approved settlement.
Although he was accused of
employing
blackmail tactics to procure
the settlement, the California
Supreme
Court ruled otherwise. And in
relation thereto, he cites as a
sixth
ground the fact that all these
allegations of fraud and
wrongdoing
had already been dealt with in
actions before the State and
Federal
Courts of California. While it
cannot technically be
considered as
forum shopping, it is
nevertheless a "form of suit
multiplicity over
the same issues, parties and
subject matter." 22 These
foreign
judgments constitute res
judicata which warrant the
dismissal of
the case itself.
x SB denied Chuidian's motion to lift attachment
x Chuidian filed an MR
o First, Chuidian was out of the country
in 1993, but is now presently
residing in the country.
o Second, the Sandiganbayan could not
have known then that his
absence was due to the non-
renewal of his passport at the
instance
of the PCGG. Neither was it
revealed that the Republic had
already
disposed of Chuidian's assets
ceded to the Republic in
exchange for
the L/C. The foreign judgment
was not an issue then because
at
that time, said judgment
had not yet been issued and
much less
final. Furthermore, the
authority of the PCGG
Commissioner to
subscribe as a
knowledgeable witness
relative to the issuance of
the writ of
preliminary
attachment was
raised for the first
time in
the motion to lift the
attachment. Finally,
the issue of laches
could not have been
raised then because
it was the Republic's
subsequent neglect
or failure to
prosecute despite
the passing of the
years that gave rise
to laches.
x SB denied MR
x Chuidian filed a Rule 65 before the SC
ISSUE # 1: What are Chuidians remedies against the
attachment of the L/C?
HELD # 1: There are two courses of action available
to the petitioner
x The Rules of Court specifically provide for
the remedies of a defendant whose
property or asset has been
or attached. As has been
consistently ruled by this
Court, the determination of
the existence of grounds to
discharge a writ of
attachment rests in the
sound discretion of the lower
courts
x First. To file a counterbond in accordance
with Rule 57, Section 12,
which provides:
o SEC. 12. Discharge of
attachment upon giving
counterbond. - At
anytime after an
order of attachment
has been granted,
the party
whose property has
been attached, or the
person appearing on
his
behalf, may, upon
reasonable notice to
the applicant, apply
to the
judge who granted
the order, or to the
judge of the court in
which
the action is pending,
for an order
discharging the
attachment
wholly or in part on
the security given.
The judge shall, after
hearing, order the
discharge of the
attachment if a cash
deposit is
made, or a
counterbond
executed to the
attaching creditor is
filed,
on behalf of the
adverse party, with
the clerk or judge of
the court
where the application
is made, in an
amount equal to the
value of
the property attached
as determined by the
judge, to secure the
payment of any
judgment that the
attaching creditor
may recover
in the action. Upon
the filing of such counter-
bond, copy thereof
shall forthwith be served on
the attaching creditor or his
lawyer.
Upon the discharge of an
attachment in accordance
with the
provisions of this section the
property attached, or the
proceeds of
any sale thereof, shall be
delivered to the party making
the deposit
or giving the counter-bond, or
the person appearing on his
behalf,
the deposit or counter-bond
aforesaid standing in place of
the
property so released. Should
such counterbond for any
reason be
found to be, or become,
insufficient, and the party
furnishing the same fail to file
an additional counter-bond, the
attaching creditor may apply for
a new order of attachment.
x Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that
it was irregularly
or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13
of the same Rule:
o SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for
improper or irregular
issuance. - The party whose
property has been attached may
also, at any time either before or
after the release of the attached
property, or before any
attachment shall have been
actually levied,
upon reasonable notice to the
attaching creditor, apply to the
judge
who granted the order, or to the
judge of the court in which the
action is pending, for an order to
discharge the attachment on the
ground that the same was
improperly or irregularly issued.
If the motion be made on
affidavits on the part of the
party whose
property has been attached,
but not otherwise, the
attaching
creditor may oppose the
same by counter-affidavits
or other
evidence in addition to that on
which the attachment was made.
After hearing, the judge shall
order the discharge of the
attachment if it appears that it
was improperly or irregularly
issued and the defect is not cured
forthwith.
x It would appear that petitioner chose the latter
because the grounds he raised
assail the propriety of the issuance of
the writ of attachment. By his own
admission, however, he repeatedly
acknowledged that his justifications to
warrant the lifting of the attachment are
facts or events that came to light or took
place after the writ of attachment had
already been implemented.
x More particularly, petitioner emphasized that four (4)
years after the writ was
issued, he had returned to the Philippines.
Yet while he noted that he would have
returned earlier but for the cancellation of
his passport by the PCGG, he was not
barred from returning to the Philippines.
Then he informed the
Sandiganbayan that while the case against
him was pending, but after the
attachment had already been executed, the
government lost two (2) cases for
fraud lodged against him before the U.S.
Courts, thus invoking res judicata.
Next, he also pointed out that the
government is estopped from pursuing the
case against him for failing to prosecute for
the number of years that it had been
pending litigation.
x It is clear that these grounds have nothing to do with
the issuance of the writ of
attachment. Much less do they attack the
issuance of the writ at that time as
improper or irregular. And yet, the rule
contemplates that the defect must be in
the very issuance of the attachment writ. For
instance, the attachment may be
discharged under Section 13 of Rule 57
when it is proven that the allegations of
the complaint were deceptively framed,30 or
when the complaint fails to state a
cause of action.31 Supervening events
which may or may not justify the
 discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this was no evidence of fraud on record other
particular rule. than the affidavit of PCGG Chairman
x In the instant case, there is no showing that the issuance of Gunigundo. This issue of fraud, however,
the writ of touches on the very merits of the main
attachment was attended by impropriety or case which accuses petitioner of committing
irregularity. Apart from seeking a fraudulent acts in his dealings with
reconsideration of the resolution granting the the government. Moreover, this alleged fraud
application for the writ, petitioner was one of the grounds for the
no longer questioned the writ itself. For four (4) long application of the writ, and the
years he kept silent and did not exercise any of the Sandiganbayan granted said application
remedies available to a defendant whose property or after it found a prima facie case of fraud
asset has been attached. It is rather too late in the committed by petitioner.
day for petitioner to question the propriety of the x In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the
issuance of the writ. issuance of the preliminary
x Petitioner also makes capital of the two foreign judgments attachment, it was at the same time the
which he claims government's cause of action in the main
warrant the application of the principle of res judicata. case.
The first judgment, in Civil x We have uniformly held that:
Case Nos. 575867 and 577697 brought by o x x x when the preliminary attachment is
Philguarantee before the Santa Clara issued upon a ground
Country Superior Court, denied Philguarantee's prayer which is at the same time the
to set aside the stipulated applicant's cause of action; e.g.,
judgment wherein Philguarantee and Chuidian agreed "an
on the subject attached action for money or property
L/C. On March 14, 1990, the Court of Appeal of the embezzled or fraudulently
State of California affirmed the Superior Court's misapplied
judgment. The said judgment became the subject of or converted to his own use by a
a public officer, or an officer of a
petition for review by the California Supreme Court. corporation, or an attorney,
There is no showing, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in
however, of any final judgment by the California the
Supreme Court. The records, including petitioner's course of his employment as
pleadings, are bereft of any evidence to show that such, or by any other person in a
there is a final foreign judgment which the Philippine fiduciary capacity, or for a willful
courts must defer to. Hence, res judicata finds no violation of duty," or "an action
application in this instance because it is a requisite against a party who has been
that the former judgment or order must be final. guilty of fraud in contracting the
debt
ISSUE # 2: Whether Chuidian may raise the issue of fraud in his or incurring the obligation upon
motion to lift the attachment and in the ensuing motion for which the action is brought," the
reconsideration. defendant is not allowed to file a
motion to dissolve the attachment
HELD # 2: NO.
x Petitioner may argue, albeit belatedly, that he also raised the under Section 13 of Rule 57 by
issue that there offering to show the falsity of the
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x Thus, this Court has time and again ruled
that the merits of the action in which a
factual averments in the writ of preliminary attachment
plaintiff's application and has been issued are not triable
affidavits on on a motion for dissolution of
which the writ was based - the attachment, otherwise an
and consequently that the applicant for the lifting of the
writ based writ could force a trial of the
thereon had been merits of the case on a mere
improperly or irregularly motion.35
issued - the reason x It is not the Republic's fault that the
being that the hearing on litigation has been protracted. There is as
such a motion for dissolution yet no evidence of fraud on the
of the writ part of petitioner. Petitioner is
would be tantamount to a only one of the twenty-three
trial of the merits of the (23) defendants in the main
action. In other action. As such, the litigation
words, the merits of the would take longer than most
action would be ventilated at cases. Petitioner cannot invoke
a mere this delay in the
hearing of a motion, instead of proceedings as an excuse for not
at the regular trial.34 seeking the proper recourse in
(Underscoring having the writ of attachment
ours) lifted in due time. If ever laches
set in, it was petitioner, not the
 government, who failed to take action
within a reasonable time period.
Challenging the issuance of the Nov
writ of attachment four (4) years em
after its ber
implementation showed 25,
petitioner's apparent indifference 200
towards the 9
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. THI
x In sum, petitioner has failed to convince this Court RD
that the Sandiganbayan DIVI
gravely abused its discretion in a SIO
whimsical, capricious and arbitrary N
manner. There are no compelling PERALTA, J.
reasons to warrant the immediate
lifting of the FACTS:
attachment even as the main case is still x The siblings Sofia Torres (Sofia), Fructosa
pending. On the other hand, allowing Torres (Fructosa), and Mario Torres
the discharge of the attachment at this (Mario) each own adjacent
stage of the proceedings would put in 20,000 square meters track of
jeopardy the right of the attaching party land situated at Barrio Lankaan,
to realize upon the relief sought and Dasmarias, Cavite
expected to be granted in the main or x Agripina (their mother) agreed to sell
principal action. It would have the effect the properties to Nicanor Satsatin
of prejudging the main case. (Nicanor) after consultation with the said
x The attachment is a mere provisional remedy to siblings
ensure the safety and x Nicanor offered to sell the properties to
preservation of the thing Solar Resources, Inc. (Solar), which the
attached until the plaintiff can, by latter agreed (10,000 sqm for for
appropriate P35,000,000.00)
proceedings, obtain a judgment x Torreses alleged that Nicanor was
and have such property applied supposed to remit to them the total
to its amount of P28,000,000.00 or
satisfaction.36 To discharge the P9,333,333.00 each to Sofia,
attachment at this stage of the Fructosa, and the heirs of
proceedings Mario
would render inutile any favorable o Nicanor only remitted the
judgment should the government total amount of P9,000,000.00,
leaving
prevail in
an unremitted balance of
the principal action against petitioner.
P19,000,000.00
Thus, the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the
x Torreses filed with the RTC Dasma
Cavite Br 90 a Complaint7 for sum of
questioned resolutions, which are
money and damages against
interlocutory in nature, committed no
Nicanor, Ermilinda Satsatin,
grave
Nikki Normel Satsatin, and Nikki
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Norlin Satsatin
excess of jurisdiction. As long as the
o filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Sandiganbayan acted within its
the Issuance of a Writ of
jurisdiction, any alleged errors Attachment,8
committed in the exercise of its alleging among other
jurisdiction will amount to nothing more things: that
than errors of judgment which are respondents are
reviewable by timely appeal and not by about to depart the
special civil action of Philippines; that they
certiorari.37
have properties, real
x Moreover, we have held that when the writ of
and personal in
attachment is issued upon a
Metro Manila and in
ground which is at the same time the
the nearby
applicant's cause of action, the only
provinces; that the
other way the writ can be lifted or
amount due
dissolved is by a counterbond, in
them is
accordance with Section 12 of the same
P19,000,000.00
rule.38 This recourse, however, was not
above all other
availed of by petitioner, as noted by the
claims; that there is
Solicitor General in his comment.39
no
x To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a
other sufficient
writ of attachment: (a) by
security for the
filing a counterbond immediately; or (b)
claim sought to be
by moving to quash on the ground of
enforced; and
improper and irregular issuance.40
that they are willing
These grounds for the dissolution of an
to post a bond fixed
attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the
by the court to
Rules of Court and the power of the Court
answer for all costs
to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed
which may be
by the grounds specified therein.41
adjudged to the
Petitioner's motion to lift attachment failed
respondents and all
to demonstrate any infirmity or defect
damages which
in the issuance of the writ of attachment;
respondents may
neither did he file a counterbond.
sustain by reason of
the
attachment prayed
SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO
for, if it shall be finally
TORRES and SOLAR RESOURCES, INC., Petitioners,
adjudged that
vs. NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA
petitioners are not
SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI
entitled thereto
NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.
G.R. No.
166759
 discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
x RTC issued an Order9 directing the petitioners to post a jurisdiction on the part of the trial
bond in the amount court in approving the bond posted by
of P7,000,000.00 before the court issues the writ of petitioners despite the fact that not all the
attachment requisites for its approval were complied with.
x Torreses filed the said bond In accepting a surety bond, it is
x RTC issued the writ necessary that all the requisites for its
o directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or approval are met; otherwise, the bond
personal, of the should be rejected.37
respondents x Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance
x Summons was then served upon the Satsatins from the Supreme Court
x Satsatins filed their answer and a Motion to Discharge Writ showing that the company concerned is
of Attachment qualified to transact business which is
o the bond was issued before the issuance of the valid only for thirty (30) days from the date
writ of attachment; of its issuance.38 However, it is
the writ of attachment was issued before apparent that the Certification39 issued by
the summons was the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received by the respondents; the sheriff at the time the bond was issued would
did not serve copies of the clearly show that the bonds
application for attachment, order of offered by Western Guaranty Corporation
attachment, plaintiffs affidavit, may be accepted only in the RTCs of
and attachment bond, to the the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig.
respondents; the sheriff did not Therefore, the surety bond issued by the
submit a sheriffs return in violation of the bonding company should not have been
Rules; and the grounds accepted by the RTC of Dasmarias,
cited for the issuance of the writ are Branch 90, since the certification secured by
baseless and devoid of merit. the bonding company from the OCA at the
In the alternative, respondents offered to time of the issuance of the bond certified that
post a counter-bond for it may only be accepted in the above-
the lifting of the writ of attachment. mentioned cities. Thus, the trial court acted
x RTC denied the motion; directed Satsatins to file with grave abuse of
counterbond of 7M discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
x Satsatins filed an Urgent Motion to Lift/Set Aside Order jurisdiction when it issued the writ of
o RTC denied; denied also the ensuing Urgent MR attachment founded on the said bond.
x Satsatins filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and x Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of
Prohibition with preliminary
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before attachment, the distinction between the
the CA issuance and the
o Respondents argued that the subject writ was implementation of the writ of attachment is
improper and of utmost importance to
irregular having been issued and the validity of the writ. The distinction is
enforced without the lower court indispensably necessary to
acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of determine when jurisdiction over the person
the respondents. They of the defendant should
maintained that the writ of attachment be acquired in order to validly implement
was implemented without the writ of attachment upon
serving upon them the summons together his person.
with the complaint. They also argued that x This Court has long put to rest the issue of when
the bond issued in favor of the petitioners jurisdiction over the person of
was the defendant should be acquired in cases
defective, because the bonding company where a party resorts to provisional
failed to obtain the proper remedies. A party to a suit may, at any
clearance that it can transact business time after filing the complaint, avail of
with the RTC of Dasmarias, the provisional remedies under the Rules of
Cavite. They added that the various Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on
clearances which were issued preliminary attachment speaks of the grant
in favor of the bonding company were of the remedy "at the
applicable only in the courts commencement of the action or at any time
of the cities of Pasay, Pasig, Manila, and before entry of judgment."40 This
Makati, but not in the phrase refers to the date of the filing of the
RTC, Imus, Cavite. complaint, which is the moment that
x CA ruled in favor of Satsatins; ordered the lifting of the writ marks "the commencement of the action."
of attachment; The reference plainly is to a time
denied ensuing MR of the Torreses before summons is served on the defendant,
x Torreses filed a Rule 45 before the SC or even before summons issues.41
x In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in lifting the subject writ of Appeals,42 this Court clarified the
attachment. actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
o It goes without saying that whatever be
HELD: YES. the acts done by the Court
x A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional prior to the acquisition of
remedy jurisdiction over the person of
issued upon order of the court where an action is defendant x x x issuance of
pending to be levied summons, order of attachment
upon the property or properties of the defendant and writ of
therein, the same to attachment x x x these do not
be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the and cannot bind and affect the
satisfaction of defendant until and unless
whatever judgment that might be secured in the jurisdiction over his person is
said action by the attaching creditor against the eventually
defendant.36 obtained by the court, either by
x In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was service on him of summons or
grave abuse of
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provisional remedy of attachment
involves three stages: first, the
other coercive process or court issues the order granting
his voluntary submission to the application; second, the writ
the courts authority. of attachment
Hence, when the sheriff or issues pursuant to the order
other proper officer granting the writ; and third,
commences implementation of the writ is implemented. For
the writ of attachment, it is the initial two stages, it is not
essential necessary that
that he serve on the defendant jurisdiction over the person of the
not only a copy of the defendant be first obtained.
applicants However, once the
affidavit and attachment bond, implementation of the writ
and of the order of commences, the court
attachment, as must have acquired jurisdiction
explicitly required by Section 5 over the defendant, for without
of Rule 57, but also the such
summons jurisdiction, the court has no
addressed to said defendant power and authority to act in any
as well as a copy of the manner
complaint x x against the defendant. Any order
x. (Emphasis supplied.) issuing from the Court will not
x In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals,43 this Court held bind
that the grant of the the defendant.44
x Thus, it is indispensable not only for the by either of the two
acquisition of jurisdiction over the ways indicated in the
person of the defendant, but also upon law, the attachment
consideration of fairness, to apprise the debtor cannot be
defendant of the complaint against him deemed to
and the issuance of a writ of preliminary have waived
attachment and the grounds therefor that any defect in
prior or contemporaneously to the the issuance
serving of the writ of attachment, service of the
of summons, together with a copy of the attachment
complaint, the application for writ by
attachment, the applicants affidavit and simply
bond, and the order must be served upon availing
him. himself of
x In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the one way of
trial court validly issued the writ discharging the
of attachment on November 15, 2002, attachment writ,
which was implemented on November 19, instead of the other.
2002, it is to be noted that the summons, The filing of a
together with a copy of the complaint, counter-bond is
was served only on November 21, 2002. merely a speedier
x At the time the trial court issued the writ of way of discharging
attachment on November 15, 2002, the
it can validly to do so since the attachment writ instead of
motion for its issuance can be filed the other way.45
"at the x Moreover, again assuming arguendo that
commencement of the action or at the writ of attachment was validly
any time before entry of judgment." issued, although the trial court
However, at the time the writ was later acquired jurisdiction over
implemented, the trial court has not the respondents by service of
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the summons upon them, such
the respondent since no summons was belated service of summons on
yet respondents cannot be deemed
served upon them. The proper officer to have cured the fatal defect
should have previously or in the
simultaneously with the implementation enforcement of the writ. The
of the writ of attachment, served a copy trial court cannot enforce such a
of the coercive process on
summons upon the respondents in respondents without first
order for the trial court to have obtaining jurisdiction over their
acquired person. The
jurisdiction upon them and for the writ preliminary writ of attachment
to have binding effect. Consequently, must be served after or
even if the writ of attachment was validly simultaneous with the
issued, it was improperly or irregularly service of summons on the
enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and defendant whether by personal
affect the respondents. service, substituted
x Moreover, although there is truth in the service or by publication as
petitioners contention that an warranted by the circumstances
attachment may not be dissolved by a of the case. The
showing of its irregular or improper subsequent service of summons
issuance if it is upon a ground which is at does not confer a retroactive
the same time the applicants cause of acquisition of
action in the main case, since an jurisdiction over her person
anomalous situation would result if the because the law does not allow
issues for retroactivity of a belated
of the main case would be ventilated and service.
resolved in a mere hearing of a
motion. However, the same is not ALEJANDRO NG WEE,
applicable in the case bar. It is clear from petitioner, vs. MANUEL
the TANKIANSEE, respondent. G.R.
respondents pleadings that the grounds No. 171124 February
on which they base the lifting of the 13, 2008
writ of attachment are the irregularities in T
its issuance and in the service of the H
writ; not petitioners cause of action. I
x Further, petitioners contention that respondents R
are barred by estoppel, laches, D
and prescription from questioning the
orders of the RTC issuing the writ of D
attachment and that the issue has I
become moot and academic by the V
renewal of I
the attachment bond covering after its S
expiration, is devoid of merit. As correctly I
held by the CA: O
o There are two ways of discharging the N
attachment. First, to file a
counter-bond in accordance
with Section 12 of Rule 57. N
Second[,] A
[t]o quash the attachment on C
the ground that it was H
irregularly or U
improvidently issued, as R
provided for in Section 13 of A
the same ,
rule. Whether the
attachment was discharged J
.
: x Wee learned some news on Wincorp's financial
condition
FACTS: o He then discovered that the company
x Petitioner Alejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of extended a loan equal to his
Westmont Bank (now United total money placement to a
Overseas Bank), made several money corporation [Power Merge]
placements totaling P210,595,991.62 with a
with subscribed capital of only
the bank's affiliate, Westmont Investment P37.5M. This credit facility
Corporation (Wincorp), a domestic originated
entity engaged in the business of an from another loan of about P1.5B
investment house with the authority extended by Wincorp to another
and license to extend credit. corporation [Hottick Holdings].
When the latter defaulted in its
obligation, Wincorp instituted
a case against it and its
surety.
Settlement was, however,
reached in which Hottick's
president,
Luis Juan L. Virata (Virata), assumed the
obligation of the surety
o petitioner's money placements were
transferred without his
knowledge and consent to the
loan account of Power Merge
through an agreement that
virtually freed the latter of any
liability
x Wee filed an action for damages before RTC Manila
o the trial court ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary
attachment against the
properties not exempt from
execution of all the defendants in
the civil case subject, among
others, to
petitioner's filing of a P50M-bond.
x RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the
properties not exempt from execution of
all the defendants in the civil case
subject, among others, to petitioner's
filing of a P50M-bond.
x Tankiansee moved for the discharge of the
attachment
o RTC denied
x co-defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines
Corporation (UEM-MARA)
filed a Rule 65 before the CA
o CA denied
x Tankiansee filed before the trial court another
Motion to Discharge
Attachment,20 re-pleading the grounds he
raised in his first motion but raising
the following additional grounds: (1) that he
was not present in Wincorp's board
meetings approving the questionable
transactions;21 and (2) that he could not
have connived with Wincorp and the other
defendants because he and Pearlbank
Securities, Inc., in which he is a major
stockholder, filed cases against the
company as they were also victimized by its
fraudulent schemes
o RTC denied (since the same has been
passed upon by the CA);
denied ensuing MR
x Tankiansee filed a Rule 65 before the CA
o CA ruled in favor of Tankiansee and
reversed RTC
x Wee filed a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE: Whether there is basis for issuing a writ of attachment in

favor of Wee.

HELD: NO.
x In the case at bench, the basis of petitioner's
application for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of respondent is Section 1(d) of
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which
pertinently reads:
o Section 1. Grounds upon which
attachment may issue.-At the
commencement of the action or
at any time before entry of
judgment, a plaintiff or any
proper party may have the
 property of the adverse party attached
as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered in the
following cases:
(d) In an action against a party who
has been guilty
of a fraud in contracting the
debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the
action is brought, or in the
performance thereof.
x For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant
must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud
because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to
comply with his obligation.30 The applicant must then
be able to demonstrate that the debtor has
intended to defraud the creditor.31 In Liberty
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32 we
explained as follows:
o To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must
be shown that the
debtor in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation intended
to defraud the creditor. The fraud must
relate to the execution of
the agreement and must have been the
reason which induced the
other party into giving consent which he
would not have otherwise
given. To constitute a ground for
attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule
57 of the Rules of Court, fraud
should be committed upon
contracting the obligation sued
upon. A debt is fraudulently
contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay,
as it is in this case.
Fraud is a state of mind and need
not be proved by direct evidence
but may be inferred from the
circumstances attendant in each
case.33
x In the instant case, petitioner's October 12, 2000
Affidavit34 is bereft of any
factual statement that respondent committed
a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the
alleged fraudulent transaction between
Wincorp and Virata and/or Power
Merge, which, by the way, explains why this
Court, in G.R. No. 162928, affirmed the writ
of attachment issued against the latter. As to
the participation of
respondent in the said transaction, the
affidavit merely states that respondent,
an officer and director of Wincorp, connived
with the other defendants in the civil
case to defraud petitioner of his money
placements. No other factual averment
or circumstance details how respondent
committed a fraud or how he connived
with the other defendants to commit a fraud
in the transaction sued upon. In
other words, petitioner has not shown any
specific act or deed to support the
allegation that respondent is guilty of
fraud.
x The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ,35
must contain such particulars
as to how the fraud imputed to respondent
was committed for the court to
decide whether or not to issue the writ.36
Absent any statement of other factual
circumstances to show that respondent, at
the time of contracting the obligation,
had a preconceived plan or intention not to
pay, or without any showing of how
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when the wrongdoing has been
clearly and convincingly
respondent committed the alleged fraud, established.40
the general averment in the affidavit x Let it be stressed that the provisional
that respondent is an officer and director remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh
of Wincorp who allegedly connived with and rigorous for it exposes the
the other defendants to commit a fraud, is debtor to humiliation and
insufficient to support the issuance of annoyance.41 The rules
a writ of preliminary attachment.37 In the governing its issuance are,
application for the writ under the said therefore, strictly construed
ground, compelling is the need to give a against the applicant,42
hint about what constituted the fraud such that if the requisites for its
and how it was perpetrated38 because grant are not shown to be all
established is the rule that fraud is never present, the court
presumed.39 Verily, the mere fact that shall refrain from issuing it, for,
respondent is an officer and director of otherwise, the court which issues
the company does not necessarily give it acts in
rise to the inference that he committed a excess of its jurisdiction.43
fraud or that he connived with the other Likewise, the writ should not
defendants to commit a fraud. While be abused to cause
under certain circumstances, courts may unnecessary prejudice. If it is
treat a corporation as a mere wrongfully issued on the basis
aggroupment of persons, to whom liability of false or
will directly attach, this is only done insufficient allegations, it should at once
be corrected.44
 x Considering, therefore, that, in this case, (c) That a party, court, agency or a
petitioner has not fully satisfied the person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
legal obligation to show the specific acts to
constitutive of the alleged fraud do, or is procuring or suffering to be done
committed by respondent, the trial court some act or acts probably in violation of the
acted in excess of its jurisdiction when rights
it issued the writ of preliminary of the applicant respecting the subject of the
attachment against the properties of action or proceeding, and tending to render
respondent. the
x We are not unmindful of the rule enunciated in judgment ineffectual.
G.B. Inc., etc. v. Sanchez, et
al.,45 that 3. Requirements
o [t]he merits of the main action are not
triable in a motion to
discharge an attachment Section 4. Verified application and bond for
otherwise an applicant for preliminary injunction or temporary
the dissolution could force a restraining order. A preliminary injunction
trial of the merits of the case or temporary restraining order may be
on his motion.46 granted
x However, the principle finds no application here only when:
because petitioner has
not yet fulfilled the requirements set (a) The application in the action or
by the Rules of Court for the proceeding is verified, and shows facts
issuance of the writ against the entitling the applicant to the relief
properties of respondent.47 The evil demanded; and
sought to be prevented by the said
ruling will not arise, because the (b) Unless exempted by the court
propriety or impropriety of the issuance the applicant files with the court where the
of the writ in this case can be action
determined by simply reading the or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to
complaint and the affidavit in the party or person enjoined, in an amount to
support of the application.
be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
x Furthermore, our ruling in G.R. No. 162928, to the
effect that the writ of applicant will pay to such party or person all
attachment is properly issued insofar as it
concerns the properties of Virata and
UEM-MARA, does not affect respondent
herein, for, as correctly ruled by the CA,
respondent is "never a party thereto."48
Also, he is not in the same situation as
Virata and UEM-MARA since, as aforesaid,
while petitioner's affidavit detailed the
alleged fraudulent scheme perpetrated by
Virata and/or Power Merge, only a
general allegation of fraud was made against
respondent.
x We state, in closing, that our ruling herein deals
only with the writ of preliminary
attachment issued against the properties
of respondent-it does not concern the
other parties in the civil case, nor affect
the trial court's resolution on the merits
of the aforesaid civil case.

B. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

1. Definition, Classes

Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes.

A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction.

2. Grounds; TRO

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary

injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief

demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts
either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance

or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
 resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or aayos."
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide x Idolor failed to comply with her undertaking; thus
that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of Gumersindo filed a motion for
the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be execution before the Office of the Barangay
issued. (4a) captain who subsequently issued a
certification to file action.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary x On 21 March 1997, Gumersindo De Guzman filed an
injunction or a temporary extra judicial foreclosure of
restraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory the real estate mortgage pursuant to the
pleading, the case, if filed in a parties agreement set forth in the real
multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the estate mortgage.On 23 May 1997, the
presence of the adverse mortgaged property was sold in a public
party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the
shall be preceded, or highest bidder and consequently, the
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered
together with a copy of the with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and City on 23 June 1997.
bond, upon the adverse party x On 25 June 1998, Idolor filed with the Regional Trial
in the Philippines. Court of Quezon City,
Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of
However, where the summons could not be served personally or Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the
by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the adverse issuance of a temporary restraining order
party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction
therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or against the De Guzman spouses, Deputy
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply. Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano
and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order x In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was
shall thereafter be acted upon issued by the trial court. On
only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall 28 July 1998, the trial court issued a writ of
be conducted within twenty- preliminary injunction enjoining the
four (24) hours after the sheriff's return of service and/or the Sheriff and the Registry of Deeds from
records are received by the causing the issuance of a final deed of
branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted sale and consolidation of ownership of the
immediately. subject property in favor of the De
Guzman spouses.
x The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration
4. Damages filed by the de Guzman
spouses.
Section 8. Judgment to include damages against party and x Spouses de Guzman filed with the Court of Appeals a
sureties. At the trial, petition for certiorari
the amount of damages to be awarded to either party, upon the seeking annulment of the trial court's order.
bond of the adverse party, x On 28 September 1999, the appellate court granted
shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same the petition and annulled the
procedure prescribed in section 20 assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
of Rule 57. x Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration
which was denied in a
resolution dated 4 February 2000.
x Teresita Idolor filed the petition for review on
TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, certiorari with the Supreme Court.
SPS. GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN
and HON. PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional ISSUE: Whether Idolor has proprietary right over the
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a
City, writ of injunction.
respondents.
G.R. No. 141853 HELD: NO.
x Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and
February 7, 2001 interests. Before an injunction can be issued,
THIRD DIVISION it is essential that the following
GONZAGA-REYES, J. requisites be present: 1) there must be
aright in esse or the existence of a right
FACTS: to be protected; 2) the act against which the
x On 21 March 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, Teresita injunction is to be directed is a
Idolor executed in violation of such right. Hence the existence of
favor of Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real a right violated, is a prerequisite to
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on designed to protect contingent or
or before 20 September 1994. future rights. Failure to establish either the
x On 21 September 1996, Iluminada de Guzman, wife of existence of a clear and positive right
Gumersindo de Guzman, which should be judicially protected through
filed a complaint against dolor before the Office of the the writ of injunction or that the
Barangay Captain of 7
Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which
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- in other words, that she shows
no equity. The possibility of
defendant has committed or has irreparable damage without proof
attempted to commit any act which of actual existing right is not
has aground for an injunction.
endangered or tends to endanger x In the instant case, we agree with the
the existence of said right, is a respondent Court that petitioner has no
sufficient more proprietary right to speak
ground for denying the injunction. The of over the foreclosed property
controlling reason for the existence of to entitle her to
the judicial power to issue the writ is the issuance of a writ of
that the court may thereby prevent a injunction. It appears that the
threatened or continuous irremediable mortgaged property was
injury to some of the parties before their sold in a public auction to private
claims can be thoroughly investigated respondent Gumersindo on May
and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be 23, 1997 and
resorted to only when there is a pressing the sheriff's certificate of sale
necessity to avoid injurious was registered with the Registry
consequences which cannot be remedied of Deeds of
under any standard of compensation. Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
It is always a ground for denying Petitioner had one year from the
injunction that the party seeking it has registration of the sheriff's sale to
insufficient title or interest to sustain it, redeem the property but she
and no claim to the ultimate relief sought failed to exercise her right on or
 before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de x Libo-on sought the recounting of ballots in
Guzman are now entitled to a two precincts, preliminary prohibitory
conveyance and possession of the injunction, and damages.
foreclosed property. When petitioner filed x On 29 May 1997, the judge issued a
her temporary restraining order (TRO), after
complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale receiving the Lobo-on's
against private respondents with prayer evidence ex parte, and
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary annulled the proclamation of
injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed complainant as the duly
to show sufficient interest or title in the elected punong barangay of
property sought to be protected as her Punta Mesa, Manapla.
right of redemption had already expired x On 20 May 1997, Gustilo took his oath of
on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days office as punong barangay. That same
before the filing of the complaint. It is day, he also filed a petition for
always a ground for denying injunction certiorari before the Regional
that the party seeking it has Trial Court of Silay City, Negros
insufficient title or interest to sustain it, Occidental, Branch 69.
and no x On 5 June 1997, the RTC lifted the TRO
claim to the ultimate relief sought - in issued by the Judge and declared as null
other words, that she shows no equity.11 and void the order nullifying
The possibility of irreparable damage Gustilo's proclamation as
without proof of actual existing right is duly elected punong
not aground for an injunction barangay.
x Believing that the Judge could not decide
the case impartially, Gustilo moved for
his inhibition.
x On 11 June 1997, the Judge denied
Gustilo's motion for inhibition and after
RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, vs. HON. RICARDO S. hearing Libo-on's motion for
REAL, SR., Presiding Judge, 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial permanent injunction, issued
Court of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental, a second TRO "to maintain
respondent. the status quo between the
AM MTJ-00-1250, 28 February 2001, contending parties."
S x In a verified complaint dated 15 June
e 1997, Gustilo charged Judge Real with
c gross misconduct, gross
o incompetence, gross ignorance of
n the law, and violation of the Anti-
d Graft and Corrupt Practices.

D ISSUE # 1: Whether a TRO (the first) can be issued

i without notice and hearing.
v
i HELD # 1: NO.
x Under Supreme Court Administrative
s
Circular No. 20-95], whenever an
i
application for a TRO is filed,
o
the court may act on the
n
application only after all parties
have been notified and heard in
a summary hearing. In other
Q
words, a summary hearing may
u
not be dispensed with.
i
s
ISSUE # 2: Whether a TRO (the second)
u
can be issued in favor of the losing
m
candidate on
b
the ground that "extreme urgency" and
i
"grave injustice and irreparable injury will
n
arise."
g
HELD # 2: NO.
[
x Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it
J is essential that the following requisites
] be present: (1) there must be
aright in esse or the existence of
FACTS: a right to be
x Rimeo Gustilo was a candidate for punong protected; and (2) the act against
barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, which injunction to be directed is
Manapla, Negros Occidental in the 12 May 1997 a violation of
elections.
such right. The onus probandi is
x His lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the
on movant to show that there
incumbent punong barangay
exists a right to
and the representative of the
be protected, which is directly
Association of Barangay Captains
threatened by the act sought to
(ABC) to the
be enjoined.
Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Negros
Occidental.
x Both Gustilo and Libo-on garnered 819 votes
during the elections, resulting in a
tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board of
Canvassers was in Gustilo's favor and he
was proclaimed duly elected punong
barangay.
x On 20 May 1997, Libo-on filed an election protest
case before the MCTC of
Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental.
 ratiocinated that the incident was not
Further, there must be a showing that the invasion work-related since it occurred only after
of the right is material and the district meeting of territory managers.
substantial and that there is an urgent and x Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which
paramount necessity for the writ to the NLRC denied in an
prevent a serious damage. In this case, complainant Order dated 4 February 2004. Later, the
had been duly proclaimed Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution.
as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He Notices of garnishment were then served
had taken his oath of office. upon the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.
Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-
all the rights of said office. Myers and the Bank of the Philippine Islands
We do not see how the complainant's exercise of for the balance of the judgment award.
such rights would cause an x Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution
irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing contending that it timely filed
candidate so as to justify the a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
issuance of a temporary restraining order "to x The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers
maintain the status quo." petition and issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, Petitioner, vs. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB execution and notices of garnishment.
(PHIL.), INC./MEAD x Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court
JOHNSON PHIL., RICHARD SMYTH as General Manager and issued a writ of preliminary
FERDIE SARFATI, as Medical injunction dated 17 September 2004. Bristol-
Sales Director, Respondents. Myers then moved to discharge and release
G.R. No. 168637 the TRO cash bond.
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), INC./MEAD JOHNSON x It argued that since it has posted an injunction cash
PHIL.,Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MICHAEL J. bond, the TRO cash bond
LAGROSAS, Respondents. should be legally discharged and released.
G.R. No. On 28 January 2005, the appellate court
170684, 12 rendered a Decision, granting the petition.
September Lagrosas filed a motion for reconsideration
2008, Second which the appellate court denied.
Division x In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the
Quisumbing [J] TRO cash bond and
injunction cash bond.
FACTS: x On 12 August 2005, the appellate court denied the
motion as premature since
x Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb
(Phil.), Inc./Mead the decision is not yet final and executory
Johnson Phil. from 6 January 1997 until 23 March due to Lagrosas appeal to this Court.
2000 as Territory Manager in its Medical Sales Force Bristol-Myers filed a motion for
Division. reconsideration.
x On 4 February 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory x On 28 October 2005, the appellate court resolved to
Manager and Lagrosas reconsider and set aside its
former girlfriend, attended a district meeting of August 2005 resolution.
territory managers at McDonalds Alabang Town
Center. ISSUE # 1: Whether the conditions of writ of preliminary
injunction were satisfied.
x After the meeting, she dined out with her friends and rode
with Cesar R.
Menquito, Jr. Lim told Menquito not to stop his car HELD #1. YES.
but Lagrosas followed them and slammed x [I]t is settled that the purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent
Menquitos car thrice.
x Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Lagrosas approached threatened or continuous irremediable injury
them and hit to some of the parties before their claims can
Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
When Lim tried to intervene, Lagrosas sole aim is to preserve the status quo until
accidentally hit her head. the merits of the case can be heard fully.
x Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas x A preliminary injunction may be granted only when,
to explain in among other things, the
writing why he should not be dismissed for applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with
assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. the court where the action or
x After administrative proceedings, on 23 March 2000, Bristol- proceeding is pending, a bond executed to
Myers dismissed the party or person enjoined, in an amount to
Lagrosas effective immediately. Lagrosas then be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, among applicant will pay such party or person all
others. damages which he may sustain by reason of
x On 28 February 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, the injunction or temporary restraining order
declaring the if the court should finally decide that the
dismissal illegal. applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
x On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
set aside the preliminary injunction shall be issued.
Decision of Labor Arbiter in its Decision dated 24 x The injunction bond is intended as a security for
September 2002. Lagrosas moved for damages in case it is finally
reconsideration. decided that the injunction ought not to have been
x On 7 May 2003, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its granted. Its principal purpose
earlier ruling, which
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ISSUE # 2: Whether the injunction bond is
a security for the judgment award by the
is to protect the enjoined party labor
against loss or damage by reason arbiter.
of the injunction, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly. HELD # 2: NO.
x In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ x [T]he appellate court ruled that Lagrosas
of preliminary injunction to had no right to the monetary awards
enjoin the implementation of the writ of granted by the labor arbiter
execution and notices of garnishment and the NLRC, and that the
"pending final resolution of this case or implementation of the
unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the writ of execution and notices of
Court." garnishment was properly
x By its Decision, the appellate court disposed of enjoined. This in
the case by granting Bristol- effect amounted to a finding that
Myers petition and reinstating the Lagrosas did not sustain any
Decision dated 24 September 2002 of damage by
the NLRC which dismissed the complaint reason of the injunction. To
for dismissal. It also ordered the reiterate, the injunction bond is
discharge of the TRO cash bond and intended to protect
injunction cash bond. Thus, both Lagrosas against loss or damage
conditions of the writ of preliminary by reason of the injunction only.
injunction were satisfied. Contrary to
Lagrosas claim, it is not a
 security for the judgment award by the x Then petitioners reneged on their
labor arbiter. agreement without any justifiable reason.
x On 3 January 2003, the students filed a
NELSON JENOSA and his son NIO CARLO complaint for injunction and damages
JENOSA, SOCORRO CANTO and her son with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
PATRICK CANTO, CYNTHIA APALISOK and her Iloilo City.
daughter CYNDY APALISOK, EDUARDO x On 5 February 2003, the trial court issued
VARGAS and his son CLINT EDUARD VARGAS, a writ of preliminary injunction and
and NELIA DURO and her son NONELL directed the University to admit the
GREGORY DURO, Petitioners, vs. REV. FR. JOSE students during the pendency of the
RENE C. DELARIARTE, O.S.A., in his case.
capacity as the incumbent Principal of the High x The University filed a motion for
School Department of the University of San reconsideration and asked for the dissolution of
Agustin, and the UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, the writ.
herein represented by its incumbent o The trial court denied their
motion.
President REV. FR. MANUEL G. VERGARA, O.S.A., Respondents.
G x They complied but with reservations.
x On 25 March 2003, respondents filed a
R
motion to dismiss.
o On 19 May 2003, the trial
1
court denied the university's
7
motion.
2 x They filed a motion for reconsideration.
1 x On 28 May 2003, the students filed
3 another complaint for mandatory injunction
8 praying for the release of the students
, report cards and other credentials.
o The trial court consolidated
8 the two cases.
x On 17 June 2003, the trial court issued a
S writ of preliminary injunction and
e directed the University
p to release the students
t report cards and other
e credentials.
m x The University filed a motion for
b reconsideration.
e o On 14 July 2003, the trial
r court issued an Order denying both
motions for reconsideration.
2 x On 1 September 2003, the University filed
0 a special civil action for certiorari with
1 the Court of Appeals.
0 x The Court of Appeals reversed the order
, of the trial court, holding that the case
was premature or for failure to exhaust
S administrative remedies.
e x The students filed motion for
c reconsideration, but was denied.
o x They filed the
n
d petition for review with
the Supreme Court.
D
i ISSUE: Whether the
v
students can avail of
i
s injunction.
i
o HELD: NO.
n x Discipline in education is specifically
Carpio [J] mandated by the 1987 Constitution which
provides that all educational
FACTS: institutions shall "teach the rights
x On 22 November 2002, some students of the and duties of
University were caught engaging in citizenship, strengthen ethical
hazing outside the school premises. and spiritual values, develop
The hazing incident was entered into moral character and personal
the blotter of the Iloilo City Police. discipline."24 Schools and school
x Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were administrators have the authority
conducted among the school to maintain school discipline25
authorities, the apprehended students and the right to impose
and their parents. During the 28 appropriate and reasonable
November 2002 meeting, the parties disciplinary measures.26 On the
agreed that, instead of the possibility of other hand, students have the
being charged and found guilty of hazing, duty and the
the students who participated in the responsibility to promote and
hazing incident as initiators would just maintain the peace and
transfer to another school, while those tranquility of the school by
who participated as neophytes would be observing the rules of
suspended for one month. The parents of discipline.27
the apprehended students affixed their
signatures to the minutes of the
meeting to signify their conformity.
x In view of the agreement, the University did not
anymore convene the
Committee on Student Discipline (COSD)
to investigate the hazing incident and
instead issue the transfer credentials of
petitioner students.
 mortgaged properties and share the
x In this case, we rule that the Principal had the authority to proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until
order the immediate such time that the whole obligation would
transfer of petitioner students because of the 28 be fully paid.
November 2002 agreement.28 x SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of
Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the the certificates of title of the
minutes of the 28 November mortgaged properties without the burden of
2002 meeting and signified their conformity to updating interests on all loans. In a
transfer their children to another letter dated 20 March 2000 addressed to
school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia Duro CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of
even wrote a letter to inform its loans, a reduction of interests and
the University that they would transfer their children penalties and the implementation of a
to another school and dacion en pago of the New Cubao Central property.
requested for the pertinent papers needed for the x In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated 17 April
transfer.29 In turn, the 2000 stating that the loans had
University did not anymore convene the COSD. been completely restructured effective 1
The University agreed that it March 1999 in the amount of
would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings P218,540,646.00. On the aspect of
and instead issue the transfer interests and charges, CBC suggested the
credentials of petitioner students. Then petitioners updating of the obligation to avoid paying
reneged on their agreement interests and charges.
without any justifiable reason. Since petitioners x Subsequently, in a letter dated 18 September 2000,
present complaint is one for CBC demanded SBI to settle
injunction, and injunction is the strong arm of equity, its outstanding account within ten days from
petitioners must come to receipt thereof. On 5 October 2000, claiming
court with clean hands. As held in University of the that the interests, penalties and charges
Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, imposed by CBC were
Jr.,: iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin
o Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he CBC from initiating foreclosure
who must apply for proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint
it must come with equity or with clean "To Compel Execution of Contract
hands. This is so because and for Performance and Damages, With
among the maxims of equity are (1) he Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
who seeks equity must do Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining
equity, and (2) he who comes into equity Order" in the Regional Trial Court
must come with clean (RTC) of Pasig City.
hands. The latter is a frequently stated x After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an
maxim which is also Order dated 14 December
expressed in the principle that he who 2000 granting the application of SBI
has done inequity shall not have equity. and MFII for the issuance of a writ of
It signifies that a litigant may be denied preliminary injunction.
relief by a court of equity on the ground x CBC sought reconsideration but the trial court denied
that his conduct has been it in an Order dated 10
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or December 2001. Aggrieved, CBC filed a
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the Petition for Certiorari in the Court of
controversy in issue. Appeals.
x Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without x The Court of Appeals granted the petition of CBC, set
any justifiable aside the Orders and
reason, come to court with unclean hands. This Court dissolved the injunctive writ issued by the RTC of
may deny a litigant relief if Pasig City.
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and x SBI and MFII filed a motion for reconsideration but it
dishonest as to the controversy in was denied by the Court of
issue Appeals in a Resolution dated 18 September 2007.
x Hence, the petition.
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioners, vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent. ISSUE # 1: Whether the requisite of clear right for
GR the issuance of the writ was complied
179 with.
665,
3 HELD # 1: NO.
April x A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
201 stage of an action
3 prior to judgment of final order, requiring
First a party, court, agency, or
Divi person to refrain from a particular act or
sion acts. It is a preservative
Leonardo-De Castro [J] remedy to ensure the protection of a
partys substantive rights or
FACTS: interests pending the final judgment in the
x During the period from 4 September 1992 to 27 March 1996, principal action. A plea for
China Banking an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of
Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid a claimed emergency or
Builders, Inc. (SBI), which extraordinary situation which should be
amounted to P139,999,234.34, exclusive of avoided for otherwise, the
interests and other charges. outcome of a litigation would be useless as far
x To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) as the party applying for the writ is
executed in CBCs concerned.
favor several surety agreements and contracts of x At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we
real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the have consistently ruled
Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao that there is no power the exercise of which is more
Central in Cainta, Rizal. delicate and which calls for
x Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which 9
SBI would sell the
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taking cognizance of a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction is
greater circumspection than the issuance to determine
of an injunction. It should only be whether the requisites necessary
extended in cases of great injury where for the grant of an injunction are
courts of law cannot afford an adequate present in the
or commensurate remedy in damages; "in case before it.25 In this
cases of extreme urgency; where the connection, a writ of preliminary
right is very clear; where considerations injunction is issued to
of relative inconvenience bear strongly preserve the status quo ante,
in complainants favor; where there is a upon the applicants showing of
willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs two important
right against his protest and requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right
remonstrance, the injury being a to be protected exists prima facie, and
continuing one, (2) the acts sought to be
and where the effect of the mandatory enjoined are violative of that
injunction is rather to reestablish and right. It must be proven
maintain a preexisting continuing relation that the violation sought to be
between the parties, recently and prevented would cause an
arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, irreparable injury.26
than to establish a new relation." x Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right
x A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary to have their mortgaged properties
event which must be granted shielded from foreclosure by
only in the face of actual and existing CBC on the ground that the
substantial rights. The duty of the court interest rate and penalty
 charges imposed by CBC on the loans where the complainant-movants
availed of by SBI are iniquitous and right is doubtful or disputed, the
unconscionable. In particular, SBI and issuance of an
MFII assert: injunctive writ is not proper.
o There is therefore an urgent necessity
for the issuance of a writ of ISSUE #2: Whether SBI's default of payment
preliminary injunction or at negates its resort to motion for the issuance
least a status quo [order], of an injunctive writ.
otherwise,
respondent bank will HELD # 2: YES.
definitely foreclose x Even assuming that SBI and MFII are
petitioners properties correct in claiming their supposed right, it
without awaiting the trial of nonetheless disintegrates in the
the main case on the merits, face of the ten promissory notes
with said usurious and in the total
confiscatory rates of interest amount of P218,540,648.00,
as basis and exclusive of interest and
o There is therefore no legal justification penalties, issued by SBI in
for the Honorable Court of favor of CBC on March 1, 1999
Appeals to lift/dissolve the which until now remain unpaid
injunction issued by the trial despite the
court, maturity of the said notes on
otherwise, respondent bank - March 1, 2004 and CBCs
on the basis of this illegal repeated demands for
imposition payment.37 Foreclosure is but a
of interest - can already necessary consequence of
foreclose the properties of nonpayment of
petitioners and mortgage indebtedness.38 As
render the whole case (sans this Court held in Equitable PCI
trial on the merits) moot and Bank, Inc. v. OJ-
academic Mark Trading, Inc.39:
x On this matter, the Order dated December 14, o Where the parties stipulated
2000 of the trial court enumerates in their credit agreements,
as the first argument raised by SBI and mortgage
MFII in support of their application for contracts and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary promissory notes that
injunction: the mortgagee is
o 1. Their rights basically are for the authorized to
protection of their properties put foreclose the
up as collateral for the loans extended mortgaged properties
by defendant bank to them in case of default by
x As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do the
not have a right to mortgagors, the
prevent the creditor-mortgagee mortgagee has a
CBC from foreclosing on the clear right to
mortgaged properties simply on foreclosure in case of
the basis of alleged "usurious, default, making the
exorbitant and confiscatory rate of issuance of a Writ of
interest." First, assuming that the Preliminary
interest rate agreed upon by the parties Injunction improper.
is usurious, the nullity of the x x x.
stipulation of usurious interest does not x In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to
affect the lenders right to pay the mortgage
recover the principal loan, nor affect the indebtedness disqualifies them
other terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious from availing of the equitable
loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose relief
the mortgage that is the injunctive writ. A
subsists, and this right can be exercised debtors various and constant
by the creditor upon failure by the debtor requests for
to pay the debt due. deferment of payment and
x Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 restructuring of loan, without
of the trial court, which actually
granted the application for the issuance paying the amount due, are clear
of a writ of preliminary injunction, indications that said debtor was
recognizes that the parties still have to unable to settle his obligation.
be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness SBIs default or failure to settle
of the increase in interests and its
penalties" during the trial on the merits. obligation is a breach of
Thus, contractual obligation which
the basis of the right claimed by SBI and tainted its hands
MFII remains to be controversial or
disputable as there is still a need to
determine whether or not, upon
consideration of the various
circumstances surrounding the
agreement of the
parties, the interest rates and penalty
charges are unconscionable. Therefore,
such claimed right cannot be considered
clear, actual and subsisting. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the
issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes

grave abuse of discretion.

x [The] finding of the trial court that the validity of
the increase in the amount of
the loan obligation is in issue simply
amounted to a finding that the rights of
SBI and MFII vis--vis that of CBC are
disputed and debatable. In such a case
 sought to be prevented by the application for
and disqualified it from availing of the equitable preliminary
remedy of preliminary injunction. injunction is the loss of the mortgaged
properties to auction sale.45 The alleged
ISSUE # 3: Whether MFII's interest is prejudiced by SBI's conduct and entitlement of SBI and MFII to the
breach. "protection of their properties put up as
collateral for the loans" they procured
HELD # 3: YES. from CBC is not the kind of irreparable
x As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injury contemplated by law. Foreclosure of
injunction, so is mortgaged property is not an
MFII. The accessory follows the principal. The irreparable damage that will merit for the
accessory obligation of MFII as debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary
accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBIs provisional remedy of preliminary
principal obligation to CBC injunction. As this Court stated in
and arises only in the event of SBIs default. Thus, Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy
MFIIs interest in the issuance of the writ of Technology Corporation46:
preliminary injunction is necessarily prejudiced by o All is not lost for defaulting mortgagors
SBIs wrongful conduct and breach of contract. whose properties were
x Thus, MFIIs interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary foreclosed by creditors-
injunction is mortgagees. The respondents
necessarily prejudiced by SBIs wrongful conduct and breach will not be deprived outrightly of
of contract. their property, given the right of
x Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII redemption granted to them
invoke, works against under the law. Moreover, in
them. Under that provision, the equitable reduction extrajudicial
of the penalty stipulated by foreclosures, mortgagors have
the parties in their contract will be based on a the right to receive any surplus in
finding by the court that such the selling price. Thus, if the
penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the mortgagee is retaining more of
trial court has not yet made a ruling as to whether the proceeds of the sale than he
the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is is entitled to, this fact alone will
unconscionable. Such finding will be made by the not affect the validity of the sale
trial court only after it has but will give the mortgagor a
heard both parties and weighed their respective cause of action to recover such
evidence in light of all relevant surplus. (Citation omitted.)
circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to claim any
right or benefit under that provision at this point is ISSUE # 5: Whether the reinstatement of writ of
premature. preliminary injunction circumvents the Court's En Banc
x As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in
an injunctive writ Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
has been shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their Mortgages.
favor, the first requirement for
the grant of a preliminary injunction has not been HELD # 5 YES.
satisfied. In the absence of x Issued on February 20, 2007, or some two months
any requisite, and where facts are shown to be before the Court of Appeals
wanting in bringing the matter promulgated its decision in this case, the
within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary resolution embodies the additional
writ of injunction must be guidelines intended to aid courts in
struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse foreclosure proceedings, specifically limiting
of discretion.43 Thus, the the instances, and citing the conditions,
Court of Appeals did not err when it granted the when a writ against foreclosure of a
petition for certiorari of CBC and mortgage may be issued, to wit:
ordered the dissolution of the writ of preliminary o (1) No temporary restraining order or writ
injunction issued by the trial of preliminary injunction
court. against the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate
ISSUE # 4: Whether there was showing of irreparable injury to merit mortgage shall be issued on the
issuance of the writ. allegation that the loan secured
by the mortgage has been paid
HELD # 4: NO. or is not delinquent unless the
x Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An application is verified and
injury is supported by evidence of
considered irreparable if it is of such constant and payment.
frequent recurrence o (2) No temporary restraining order or writ
that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor of preliminary injunction
in a court of law, against the extrajudicial
or where there is no standard by which their amount foreclosure of real estate
can be measured mortgage shall be issued on
with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible the allegation that the interest
of mathematical on the loan is
computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary unconscionable, unless the
injunction may debtor pays the mortgagee at
only be resorted to when there is a pressing least
necessity to avoid twelve percent per annum
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied interest on the principal
under any standard of compensation. obligation as
x In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in stated in the application for
case of foreclosure foreclosure sale, which shall
of the mortgaged properties will be purely monetary be
and compensable by an updated monthly while the case is
appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC. pending.
Moreover, where there is a
valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot 10
be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage
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outstanding debt, and
the time limitation for
o (3) Where a writ of preliminary its effectivity, shall
injunction has been issued against apply as well to a status quo
a foreclosure of mortgage, order.
the disposition of the case x The guidelines speak of strict exceptions
shall be and conditions. To reverse the decision
speedily resolved. To this of the Court of Appeals and
end, the court concerned reinstate the writ of preliminary
shall submit to injunction issued by the trial
the Supreme Court, through court will be to allow SBI and MFII
the Office of the Court to circumvent the guidelines and
Administrator, conditions provided by the En
quarterly reports on the Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
progress of the cases 99-10-05-0 dated February
involving ten million 20, 2007 and prevent CBC
pesos and above. from foreclosing on the
o (4) All requirements and restrictions mortgaged
prescribed for the issuance of properties based simply on the
a temporary restraining allegation that the interest on the
order/writ of preliminary loan is unconscionable. This Court
injunction, such will not permit such a situation.
as the posting of a bond, What cannot be done directly
which shall be equal to the cannot be done indirectly.
amount of the
 principal action. When the
complainants right or title is
doubtful or disputed, he
does not have a clear legal right
and, therefore, the issuance of
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. injunctive relief
PLAZA, Petitioners, vs. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, is not proper."23
ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON
GOLOSENO, Respondents. GR 172909, 5 March ISSUE # 2: Whether the question of issuance of the
2014, Second Division, writ has become moot and academic.
Brion [J]
HELD # 2: YES.
FACTS: x Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main
x On 28 August 1997, the CA ruled that among the case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the
Plaza siblings (Aureliano, question of issuance of the writ
Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and Barbara), of preliminary injunction has
Barbara was the owner of the subject become moot and
agricultural land. academic. In Arevalo v. Planters
x The decision became final and executory and Development Bank,24 the Court
Barbara's successors, Guillermo ruled that a
Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and case becomes moot and
Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have continued academic when there is no more
occupying the property. issue between the
x On 14 September 1999, Vidals son and daughter- parties or object that can be
in-law, the spouses Plaza, filed served in deciding the merits of
a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, the case. Upon the dismissal of
Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the the main action, the question of
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary the non-issuance of a writ of
Injunction and/or Temporary preliminary injunction
Restraining Order against Lustiva, et automatically died with it. A writ
al. and the City Government of of preliminary injunction is a
Butuan. provisional remedy; it is
x They prayed that Lustiva, et al. be enjoined from auxiliary, an adjunct of, and
unlawfully and illegally subject to the
threatening to take possession of the subject determination of the main
property. action. It is deemed lifted upon
x In its 14 December 1999 order, the Regional Trial the dismissal of the main case,
Court (RTC) of Butuan City, any appeal therefrom
Branch 5, reconsidered its earlier order, notwithstanding.
denied the prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that C. Receivership (Rule 59)
the possession and occupation of the
land be returned to Lustiva, et al.
x Through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 65, the petitioners
challenged the RTCs order before the CA.
x While the petition for review on certiorari was
pending before the CA, the
spouses Plaza filed an action for specific
performance against the City
Government of Butuan, claiming that the
latter should issue them a certificate of
sale.
x In its 24 October 2005 decision, the CA affirmed
the RTCs ruling, found the
petitioners guilty of forum shopping,
dismissed the case, and referred the case
to the Court and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation and
institution of the appropriate administrative
action.
x On 6 April 2006, the CA rejected the spouses
Plaza's motion for reconsideration.
x Hence, the
petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE # 1: Whether
spouses Plaza are
entitled to the writ.

HELD # 1: NO.
x As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no
ownership to confer to the
petitioners despite the latters
reimbursement of Tuazons purchase
expenses. Because they were never
owners of the property, the petitioners
failed to
establish entitlement to the writ of
preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to
an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that
right must be shown. A writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the
 Section 8. Termination of receivership; compensation of
receiver. Whenever the court, motu proprio or on
1. When writ may issue motion of either party, shall determine that the
necessity for a
receiver no longer exists, it shall, after due notice to all
Section 1. Appointment of receiver. Upon a verified interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of
application, one or more
the receiver, direct the delivery of the funds and other
receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may
property in his
be appointed by the court where the action is pending or by the
possession to the person adjudged to be entitled to
Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof,
receive them and order the discharge of
in the following cases:
the receiver from further duty as such. The court shall
allow the receiver such reasonable
(a) When it appears from the verified application, and
compensation as the circumstances of the case
such other proof as the court may require, that the party
warrant, to be taxed as costs against the
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the
defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires.
property or fund which is the subject of the action or proceeding,
and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S.
administer and preserve it; LARROBIS, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
VETERANS BANK, respondent.
(b) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for G
the foreclosure of a mortgage R
that the property is in danger of being wasted or dissipated or
materially injured, and that its 1
value is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, or 3
that the parties have so 5
stipulated in the contract of mortgage; 7
0
(c) After judgment, to preserve the property during the 6
pendency of an appeal, or to ,
dispose of it according to the judgment, or to aid execution when
the execution has been 1
returned unsatisfied or the judgment obligor refuses to apply his
property in satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to carry the O
judgment into effect; c
t
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the o
appointment of a receiver is the b
most convenient and feasible means of preserving, e
administering, or disposing of the property r
in litigation.
2
During the pendency of an appeal, the appellate court may 0
allow an application for the appointment of a receiver to be 0
filed in and decided by the court of origin and the receiver 4
appointed to be subject to the control of said court. (1a)
S
2. Requirements e
c
o
Section 2. Bond on appointment of receiver. Before issuing the n
order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to d
file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is
presented, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect
D
that the
i
applicant will pay such party all damages he may sustain by
v
reason of the appointment of such receiver in case the applicant
i
shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause;
s
and the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the
i
appointment, require an additional bond as further security for
o
such damages.
n
Austria-Martinez [J]
3. Power of Receiver
FACTS:
Section 6. General powers of receiver. Subject to the x On 3 March 1980, spouses Larrobis contracted a
control of the court in which monetary loan with Philippine
the action or proceeding is pending a receiver shall have the Veterans Bank in the amount of
power to bring and defend, in P135,000.00, evidenced by a promissory
such capacity, actions in his own name; to take and keep note, due and demandable on 27 February
possession of the property in 1981, and secured by a Real Estate
controversy; to receive rents; to collect debts due to himself Mortgage executed on their lot together with the
as receiver or to the fund, improvements thereon.
property, estate, person, or corporation of which he is the x On 23 March 1985, the bank went bankrupt and was
receiver; to compound for and placed under
compromise the same; to make transfers; to pay outstanding receivership/liquidation by the Central
debts; to divide the money and other property that shall remain Bank from 25 April 1985 until August
among the persons legally entitled to receive the same; and 1992.
generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court x On 23 August 1985, the bank, through Francisco Go,
may authorize. However, funds in the hands of a receiver may be sent the spouses a demand
invested only by order of the court upon the written consent of all letter for "accounts receivable in the total
the parties to the action. (7a) amount of P6,345.00 as of 15 August 1984,"
which pertains to the insurance premiums
No action may be filed by or against a receiver without leave advanced by the bank over the mortgaged
of the court which appointed property of the spouses.
him.
11
4. Termination and Compensation
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ISSUE: Whether the bank, through a
receiver, can foreclose properties during
x On 23 August 1995, more than fourteen years the period of receivership.
from the time the loan became
due and demandable, the bank filed a HELD # 1: YES.
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of x Respondents claims that because of a
mortgage of the spouses' property. fortuitous event, it was not able to
x On 18 October 1995, the property was sold in a exercise its right to foreclose
public auction with Philippine the mortgage on petitioners
Veterans Bank as the lone bidder. property; and that since it was
x On 26 April 1996, the spouses filed a complaint banned from pursuing its
with the RTC, Cebu City, to business and was placed
declare the extra-judicial foreclosure under
and the subsequent sale thereof to receivership from April 25,
the bank null and void. 1985 until August 1992, it
x On 17 April 1998, the RTC rendered its decision could not foreclose the
dismissing the complaint. mortgage on petitioners
x The spouses filed a motion for reconsideration property within such period
which the RTC denied on 25 since foreclosure is
August 1998. embraced in the phrase "doing business,"
x Hence, the petition for review, raising pure are without merit.
questions of law. x While it is true that foreclosure falls within
the broad definition of
"doing business," it should not be
considered included, however, in
 the acts prohibited whenever banks are and pay the obligation
"prohibited from doing business" during of the bank under
receivership and liquidation proceedings. receivership, and take
x This we made clear in Banco Filipino Savings & steps to prevent
Mortgage Bank vs. dissipation of such
Monetary Board, Central Bank of the assets. Accordingly,
Philippines where we explained the receiver of the
that bank is obliged to
o Section 29 of the Republic Act No. collect pre-existing
265, as amended debts due to the
known as the Central Bank bank, and in
Act, provides that when a connection
bank is forbidden to do therewith, to
business in the Philippines foreclose mortgages
and placed under securing such
receivership, the person debts.29 (Emphasis
designated as receiver shall supplied.)
immediately take charge of x It is true that we also held in said case
the banks assets and that the period during which the bank
liabilities, as expeditiously as was placed under receivership
possible, collect and gather was deemed fuerza mayor which
all the assets and administer validly
the same for the benefit of its interrupted the prescriptive
creditors, and represent the period.30 This is being invoked by
bank personally or through the respondent
counsel as he may retain in all and was used as basis by the trial
actions or proceedings for or court in its decision. Contrary to
against the institution, the position
exercising all the powers of the respondent and court a quo
necessary however, such ruling does not
for these purposes including, find application
but not limited to, bringing in the case at bar.
and foreclosing mortgages in the x A close scrutiny of the Provident case,
name of the bank. shows that the Court arrived at said
x This is consistent with the purpose of receivership conclusion, which is an
proceedings, i.e., to receive exception to the general rule,
collectibles and preserve the assets of due to the peculiar
the bank in substitution of its former circumstances of Provident
management, and prevent the Savings Bank at the time. In
dissipation of its assets to the said case, we stated
detriment of the creditors of the bank. that:
x When a bank is declared insolvent and placed o Having arrived at the
under receivership, the Central conclusion that a foreclosure is part
Bank, through the Monetary Board, of a
determines whether to proceed with the banks business
activity which could
liquidation or reorganization of the not have been
financially distressed bank. A receiver, pursued by the
who receiver then because
concurrently represents the bank, then of the circumstances
takes control and possession of its assets discussed in the
for the benefit of the banks creditors. A Central
liquidator meanwhile assumes the role Bank case, we are
of the receiver upon the determination by thus convinced that
the Monetary Board that the bank can the prescriptive
no longer resume business. His task is to period was
dispose of all the assets of the bank legally interrupted by
and effect partial payments of the banks fuerza mayor in 1972
obligations in accordance with legal on account of the
priority. In both receivership and prohibition imposed
liquidation proceedings, the bank retains by the Monetary
its Board against
juridical personality notwithstanding the petitioner from
closure of its business and may even be transacting business,
sued as its corporate existence is until the directive of
assumed by the receiver or liquidator. The the Board was
nullified in 1981.31
receiver or liquidator meanwhile acts not (Emphasis supplied.)
only for the benefit of the bank, but for
its creditors as well.27
x In Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals,28
we further stated that:
o When a bank is prohibited from
continuing to do business by the
Central Bank and a receiver is
appointed for such bank, that
bank
would not be able to do new
business, i.e., to grant new
loans or to
accept new deposits. However,
the receiver of the bank is in
fact
obliged to collect debts owing
to the bank, which debts form
part
of the assets of the bank. The
receiver must assemble the
assets
 x Further examination of the Central Bank case reveals that the
circumstances of
Provident Savings Bank at the time were peculiar
because after the Monetary
Board issued MB Resolution No. 1766 on September
15, 1972, prohibiting it from
doing business in the Philippines, the banks majority
stockholders immediately
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which
prompted the trial court to
issue its judgment dated February 20, 1974, declaring
null and void the
resolution and ordering the Central Bank to desist
from liquidating Provident. The
decision was appealed to and affirmed by this Court in
1981. Thus, the
Superintendent of Banks, which was instructed to take
charge of the assets of
the bank in the name of the Monetary Board, had no
power to act as a receiver
of the bank and carry out the obligations specified in
Sec. 29 of the Central Bank
Act.32
x In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank
was placed under
receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank by virtue of Resolution No. 364 on April 25,
1985, pursuant to Section 29 of the Central Bank
Act on insolvency of banks.33
x Unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition
imposed upon
herein respondent to deter its receiver and
liquidator from performing their obligations
under the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in the
Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.
x There is also no truth to respondents claim that it could not
continue doing
business from the period of April 1985 to August
1992, the time it was under
receivership. As correctly pointed out by petitioner,
respondent was even able to
send petitioners a demand letter, through Francisco
Go, on August 23, 1985 for
"accounts receivable in the total amount of P6,345.00
as of August 15, 1984" for
the insurance premiums advanced by respondent
bank over the mortgaged
property of petitioners. How it could send a demand
letter on unpaid insurance
premiums and not foreclose the mortgage during the
time it was "prohibited
from doing business" was not adequately explained
by respondent.
x Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or
failure to act of its
receiver.34 As we held in Philippine Veterans
Bank vs. NLRC,35 a labor case which also
involved respondent bank,
o all the acts of the receiver and liquidator
pertain to petitioner,
both having assumed petitioners
corporate existence. Petitioner cannot
disclaim liability by arguing that the
non-payment of
MOLINAs just wages was committed by
the liquidators during the liquidation
period.36
x However, the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to
it for any culpable
or negligent failure to collect the assets of such bank and to
safeguard its assets.
ANA MARIA A. KORUGA, Petitioner, vs. TEODORO O.
ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S. PAGUIO,
FRANCISCO A. RIVERA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168332 June 19, 2009
TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, CESAR S.
PAGUIO, and FRANCISCO A. RIVERA, Petitioners, vs. HON.
SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 138, Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, and ANA MARIA A. KORUGA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 169053 June 19, 2009
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FACTS:
x Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank.
x On August 20, 2003, she filed a complaint before the
Makati RTC, alleging
Violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the
Corporation Code ("Code") which prohibit
self-dealing and conflicts of interest of
directors and officers, Right of a
stockholder to inspect the records of a
corporation (including financial
statements) under Sections 74 and 75 of the
Code, Receivership and Creation of a
Management Committee pursuant to: (a)
Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rules");(b) Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799; (c)
Rule 1, Section 1(a)(1) of the Interim Rules;
(d) Rule 1, Section 1(a)(2) of the Interim
Rules; (e) Rule 7 of the Interim Rules; (f) Rule
9 of the Interim Rules; and (g) The General
Banking Law of 2000 and the New Central
Bank Act.
x On 12 September 2003, Arcenas, et al. filed their
Answer raising, among others,
the trial courts lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case.
o They also filed a Manifestation and
Motion seeking the dismissal of
the case.
x In an Order dated 18 October 2004, the trial court
denied the Manifestation and
Motion. Arcenas, et al. moved for
reconsideration but, on 18 January 2005,
the RTC denied the motion.
x This prompted Arcenas, et al. to file before the CA a
Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and a temporary
retraining order (TRO).
x On 9 February 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO
enjoining Judge Marella from
conducting further proceedings in the case.
x On 22 February 2005, the RTC issued a Notice of Pre-
trial9 setting the case for
pre-trial on June 2 and 9, 2005. Arcenas, et
al. filed a Manifestation and Motion
before the CA, reiterating their application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.
x Thus, on 18 April 2005, the CA issued the assailed
Resolution, granting the
preliminary injunction.
x Hence, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and
decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under
receivership.
HELD: NO.
x It is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-
Corporate Controversies, or Rule
59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on
Receivership, that would apply to this case.
Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New
Central Bank Act should be followed.
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management
thereof,
o Section 29. Appointment of reorganize the
Conservator. - Whenever, on the basis management,
of a report submitted by the collect all
appropriate supervising or monies and
examining debts due said
department, the Monetary institution, and
Board finds that a bank or a exercise all
quasi-bank powers
is in a state of continuing necessary to restore
inability or unwillingness to its viability. The
maintain a conservator shall
condition of liquidity deemed report and be
adequate to protect the responsible to the
interest of Monetary Board and
depositors and creditors, the shall have the power
Monetary Board may appoint to overrule or revoke
a the actions of the
conservator with such previous
powers as the Monetary management and
Board shall deem necessary board of directors of
to take charge of the the bank or quasi-
assets, liabilities, and the bank.
 The Monetary Board shall Deposit
terminate the Insuranc
conservatorship e
when it is satisfied Corporat
that the institution ion as
can continue to receiver
operate on its own of the
and the banking
conservatorship is institutio
no longer n.
necessary. The o The actions of the Monetary
conservatorship Board taken under this section or
shall likewise be under Section 29 of
terminated should this Act shall be final
and executory, and
the Monetary may
Board, on the not be restrained or
basis of the report set aside by the
of the court except on
conservator or of petition for
its own findings, certiorari on the
determine that ground that the
the action taken was in
continuance in excess of
business of the jurisdiction or with
institution would such grave abuse of
involve probable discretion as to
loss to its amount to
depositors or lack or excess of
creditors, in jurisdiction. The
which case the petition for certiorari
provisions of may only be
Section 30 shall filed by the
apply. stockholders of record
o Section 30. Proceedings in representing the
Receivership and Liquidation. - majority of the
Whenever, upon report of the capital stock within
head of the supervising or ten (10) days from
examining receipt by the board
department, the Monetary of
Board finds that a bank or directors of the
quasi-bank: institution of the
(a) is unable to pay its order directing
liabilities as they become due receivership,
in the ordinary liquidation or
course of conservatorship.
business: o The designation of a
Provided, That this conservator under Section 29 of
shall not include this Act or
inability to pay the appointment of a
caused by receiver under this
extraordinary section shall be
demands vested exclusively
induced by with the Monetary
financial panic in Board. Furthermore,
the banking the designation of a
community; conservator is not a
(b) has insufficient precondition to the
realizable assets, as determined designation of a
by receiver
the Bangko Sentral, to x On the strength of these provisions, it is
meet its liabilities; or the Monetary Board that
(c) cannot continue in exercises exclusive jurisdiction
business without involving over proceedings for
probable losses to its receivership of
depositors or creditors; or
banks.
(d) has willfully violated a
x Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision
cease and desist order
that says the "appointment
under Section 37
of a receiver under this
that has become
section shall be vested
final, involving
exclusively with the
acts
Monetary Board." The term
or transactions
"exclusively" connotes that
which amount to
only the
fraud or a
Monetary Board can resolve the
dissipation
issue of whether a bank is to be
of the assets of
placed under receivership and,
the institution; in
upon an affirmative finding, it also
which cases, the
has
Monetary Board
authority to appoint a receiver.
may summarily
This is further affirmed by the
and without need
for prior hearing fact that the law allows the
forbid the Monetary Board to take action
institution from "summarily and
doing without need for prior hearing."
business in the And, as a clincher, the law
Philippines and explicitly
designate the provides that "actions of the
Philippine Monetary Board taken under this
 section
or under Section 29 of this Act shall be
final and executory, and may
not be restrained or set aside by the
court except on a petition for
certiorari on the ground that the action
taken was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction." [T]here is no
doubt that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that
seeks to place Banco Filipino
under receivership.
EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES,
Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY.
FIDELA Y. VARGAS, Respondents.
G.R. No.
174356
January
20, 2010
SECOND
DIVISION
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
x Fidela Y. Vargas owned a five-hectare mixed
coconut land and rice fields in
Sorsogon. Evelina G. Chavez had been staying in
a remote portion of the land
with her family, planting coconut
seedlings on the land and supervising
the harvest of coconut and palay.
x Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of
all products from the land
between themselves.
x Since Fidela was busy with her law practice, Evelina
undertook to hold in trust
for Fidela her half of the profits. But Fidela
claimed that Evelina had failed to remit
her share of the profits and, despite
demand to turn over the
administration of the property to Fidela, had refused
to do so.
x Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against
Evelina and her daughter, Aida C.
Deles, who was assisting her mother, for
recovery of possession, rent, and
damages with prayer for the immediate
appointment of a receiver before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan,
Sorsogon.
x In their answer, Evelina and Aida claimed that the
RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case since it actually
involved an agrarian dispute.
x After hearing, the RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
Dissatisfied, Fidela appealed to the CA.
x She also filed with that court a motion for the
appointment of a receiver.
x On April 12, 2006 the CA granted the motion and
ordained receivership of the
land, noting that there appeared to be a
need to preserve the property and its fruits
in light of Fidelas allegation that Evelina and
Aida failed to account for her share of such
fruits.

ISSUE # 1: Whether receivership is the proper remedy

for the landowner's deprivation of her share of the
land's produce.

HELD # 1: NO.
x [A] petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule
59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that the property or fund
subject of the action is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured,
necessitating its protection or
preservation. Its object is the prevention of
imminent danger to the property. If
the action does not require such protection
or preservation, the remedy is not
receivership. Here Fidelas main gripe is that
Evelina and Aida deprived her of her
share of the lands produce. She does not
claim that the land or its productive
capacity would disappear or be wasted if not
entrusted to a receiver. Nor does
Fidela claim that the land has been materially
injured, necessitating its protection
and preservation. Because receivership is a
harsh remedy that can be granted
only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove
a clear right to its issuance. But she has not.
Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed
against Evelina and Aida
has that remedy been granted her.

ISSUE # 2: Whether the Court of Appeals should

have been more retrospect in ordaining receivership,
considering that RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case.

HELD # 2: YES.
x Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidelas action for lack of
jurisdiction over the case,
holding that the issues it raised properly
belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA
is but an offshoot of that RTC case. Given that
the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction
over the case, it would seem more prudent
for the CA to first provisionally determine that
the RTC had jurisdiction before granting
receivership which is but an incident of the
main action.
D. Replevin (Rule 60)

1. When writ may issue

Section 1. Application. A party praying for the recovery of

possession of personal property may, at the commencement of
the action or at any time before answer, apply for an order for
the delivery of such property to him, in the manner hereinafter
provided.

2. Requirements

Section 2. Affidavit and bond. The applicant must show by his

own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows
the facts:

(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property

claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;

(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the

adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief ;

(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for
a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise
placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from
such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

3. Third Party Claim

Section 7. Proceedings where property claimed by third

person. If the property
taken is claimed by any person other than the party against
whom the writ of replevin had
been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of
his title thereto, or right to
the possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and serves
such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of
the property and a copy thereof upon the applicant, the
sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under replevin or
deliver it to the applicant
unless the applicant or his agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall
file a bond approved by the
court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less
than the value of the property
under replevin as provided in section 2 hereof. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the
court shall determine the same. No claim for damages for the
taking or keeping, of the
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property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the
taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-
party claimant if such bond shall be filed. Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any
third person from vindicating his claim to the
property, or prevent the applicant from claiming
damages against a third-party claimant who filed a
frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the same or a
separate action.
National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated
for the purpose. (7a)
4. Judgment and Damages
Section 9. Judgment. After trial of the
issues the court shall determine who has
the right of possession to and the value of
the property and shall render judgment in
the
alternative for the delivery thereof to the
party entitled to the same, or for its value
in case
delivery cannot be made, and also for such
damages as either party may prove, with
costs.

When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines, or any officer
duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall
not be required, and in case the sheriff is
sued for damages as a result of the replevin, he shall
be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held
liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the
court shall be paid by the
Section 10. Judgment to include recovery
against sureties. The amount, if any, to
be awarded to any party upon any bond filed
in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule,
shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the o ordering private respondent's
same procedure as prescribed in section surety, Stronghold Insurance Co.,
20 of Rule 57. Inc. to jointly and
severally [with
private respondent]
return to
petitioner the 1983
Ford Laser 1.5
Sedan or its,
equivalent in kind
JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA, petitioners, vs. or in cash and to pay
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FCP CREDIT the damages
CORPORATION, respondents. specified in the main
G.R. decision to the extent
No. of the value of the
1110 replevin bond in the
80 amount of
P210,000.00.
x Stronghold filed a Rule 65 before the
April CA
5, o CA dismissed
2000 o SC affirmed CA but deleted
FIRS the order for the issuance of a writ
T of execution pending appeal.
DIVI x FCP appealed to CA
SION o CA affirmed RTC ruling
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
ISSUE # 1: Whether CA Eighth Division has
FACTS: jurisdiction to hear the appeal
x Orosa bought Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan from Fiesta
Motor Sales Corporation on HELD # 1: YES.
installment basis x In its first assignment of error, petitioner
x A PN and a chattel mortgage was executed alleges that the Eighth Division of the
covering the subject vehicle Court of Appeals had no
x Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note jurisdiction to review the present
and chattel mortgage to private case since the First
respondent FCP Credit Corporation Division of the Court of Appeals
x Orosa Failed to pay the installments which fell already passed upon the law and
due on July 28, 1984 as well as the facts of the
three (3) consecutive installment
which fell due on August 28,
September 28, and October 28, 1984
x FCP Credit demanded payment
x Orosa failed to pay
x FCP filed a complaint with the RTC Manila for
replevin and damages
x Orosa filed a counterclaim
x RTC dismissed the complaint; granted the
counterclaim
o The trial court ruled that private
respondent FCP had no reason to
file the present action since
petitioner already paid the
installments for the months of
July to November 1984, which
are the sole bases of the
complaint. The lower court
declared that private
respondent was not entitled
to the writ of replevin, and
was liable to petitioner for
actual damages under the
replevin bond it filed. 3
o Ruling on petitioner's counterclaim,
the trial court stated that there
was no legal or factual
basis for the writ of
replevin and that its
enforcement by the sheriff
was "highly irregular, and
unlawful,
done, as it was, under
shades of extortion, threats
and force." 4
The trial court ordered
private respondent to pay
the sum of
P400,000.00 as moral
damages; P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and
P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees. Private respondent
was also ordered to return
to petitioner the 1983 Ford
Laser 1.5 Sedan, or its
equivalent, in kind or value
in cash, as of date of
judgment and to pay the
costs of the suit
x RTC issued a supplemental order

same. Petitioner alleges that the present appeal
involves the same causes of action, same parties,
same facts and same relief involved in the
decision
rendered by the First Division and affirmed by this Court in
G.R. No. 84979. 11
x Petitioner's argument is untenable. Jurisdiction is simply the
power or authority
to hear a case. The appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to review
decisions and orders of lower courts is conferred by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
More importantly, petitioner cannot now assail the
Court of Appeals' jurisdiction
after having actively participated in the appeal and
after praying for affirmative
relief.
ISSUE # 2: Whether res judicata may be invoked.
HELD # 2: NO.
x he petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was for
certiorari with injunction,
brought by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc.
alleging that there was grave
abuse of discretion when the trial court adjudged it
liable for damages without
due process, in violation of Rule 60, Section 10 in
relation to Rule 57, Section 20,
of the Rules of Court. The surety also questioned the
propriety of the writ of
execution issued by the trial court pending appeal. 13
x On the other hand, CA-G.R. CV No. 25929 was filed by
petitioner Orosa under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court raising alleged
errors of law on the part of the trial court. The subject
of the appeal was the main decision, while the
subject of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was the
Supplemental Decision.
x We agree with the Court of Appeals that: 14
o The decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 14938 and
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 84979 did
not pass on the merits of this case. It
merely ruled on the issues of whether the
surety,
Stronghold Insurance, Co., Inc., can be
held jointly and solidarily liable with
plaintiff-appellant and whether execution
pending appeal is proper under the facts
and circumstances of this case.
Consequently, this Court is not
estopped from reviewing the
conclusions reached by the court a
quo.
ISSUE # 3: Whether the CA correctly took cognizance of
issues raised for the first time on
appeal.
HELD # 3: YES.
x Private respondent belatedly pointed out that: 16
o 1.1. It is pertinent to note that Defendant-
Appellee has waived
prior notice and demand in order to be
rendered in default, as in
fact the Promissory Note expressly
stipulates that the monthly
installments shall be paid on the date
they fall due, without need of prior notice
or demand.
o 1.2. Said Promissory Note likewise expressly
stipulates that a late
payment charge of 2% per month shall
be added on each unpaid installment
from maturity thereof until fully paid.
o 1.3. Of equal significance is the Acceleration
Clause in the
Promissory Note which states that
if default be made in the
payment of any of the installments
or late payment charges
thereon when the same became
due and payable, the total
principle sum then remaining unpaid,
together with the agreed late
payment charges thereon, shall at once
become due and payable.
x Private respondent argued that based on the
provisions of the Promissory Note
itself, petitioner incurred in default since,
even though there was actual
payment of the installments which fell due on
July 28, 1984, as well as the three
installments on August 28 to October 28,
1984, the payments were all late and
irregular. 17 Private respondent also argued
that petitioner assigned the subject car to his
daughter without the written consent of the
obligee, and hence, violated the terms of the
chattel mortgage. 18 Meritorious as these
arguments are, they come too late in the day.
Basic is the rule that matters not raised in
the complaint cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.
x Contrary to petitioner's accusation, the Court of
Appeals restricted the
determination of the case to matters
alleged in the complaint and raised during
trial. 19 Citing jurisprudence, 20 the Court
of Appeals held that "it would be
offensive to the basic rule of fair play,
justice and due process" if it considered
issues raised for the first time on appeal.
21
x The Court of Appeals' statement that "under the
terms and conditions of the
chattel mortgage, defendant-appellee Jose S.
Orosa was already in default," was made only
to justify the deletion of the trial court's
award of moral, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, in consonance with its finding
that private
respondent was motivated by a sincere
belief that it had sufficient basis and
acted in good faith when it filed the
claim.
ISSUE # 4: Whether the Orosas were entitled to their
counterclaim.
HELD # 4: NO.
x We now come to the matter of moral damages.
Petitioner insists that he
suffered untold embarrassment when
the complaint was filed against him.
According to petitioner, the car subject
of this case was being used by his
daughter, married to Jose Concepcion
III, a scion of a prominent family.
Petitioner laments that he assigned the car
to his daughter so that she could
"approximate without equaling the status
of her in-laws." This being the case,
petitioner experienced anguish and
unquantifiable humiliation when he had to
face his daughter's wealthy in-laws to
explain the "why and the whats of the
subject case." Petitioner further insists that
an award of moral damages is
especially justified since he is no ordinary
man, but a businessman of high social
standing, a graduate of De La Salle
University and belongs to a well known
family of bankers. 23
x We must deny the claim. The law clearly states that
one may only recover moral
damages if they are the proximate result of the,
other party's wrongful act or
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brought the complaint, it did so
only to exercise a legal right,
omission. 24 Two elements are required. believing that it
First, the act or omission must be the had a meritorious cause of
proximate result of the physical action clearly borne out by a
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious mere perusal of the
anxiety, besmirched reputation, promissory note and chattel
wounded feelings, moral shock, mortgage. To constitute
social humiliation and similar malicious prosecution,
injury. Second, the act must be there must be proof that the
wrongful. prosecution was prompted by a
x Petitioner maintains that embarrassment resulted sinister design to
when he had to explain the vex and humiliate a person, and
suit to his daughter's in-laws. However, that it was initiated
that could have been avoided had he deliberately, knowing that
not assigned the car to his daughter the charges were false and
and had he been faithful and prompt in groundless. 25 Such was not
paying the installments required. the case when the
Petitioner brought the situation upon instant complaint was filed. The
himself rule has always been that moral
and cannot now complain that private damages
respondent is liable for the mental cannot be recovered from a
anguish and humiliation he suffered. person who has filed a complaint
x Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court against another in good faith. 26
that when private respondent The law always presumes good
 faith such that any person who seeks to x SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG
be awarded damages due to acts of personnel who would be recommended by
another has the burden of proving that SMART
the latter acted in bad faith or with ill x One of those recommended was Astorga,
motive who was offered a supervisory position
x Anent the award of exemplary damages, in the Customer Care Department
jurisprudence provides that where a x Astorga refused because the position
party is not entitled to actual or carried lower salary rank and rate
moral damages, an award of x SMART then issued a memorandum
exemplary damages is likewise advising Astorga of the termination of her
baseless. 28 employment on ground of redundancy
x In the matter of attorney's fees, petitioner avers x Astorga filed an action for illegal
that to prosecute and defend dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other
this case in the lower court and in the benefits with prayer for moral
appellate court, he incurred expenses and exemplary damages against
amounting to P50,000.00, 29 and as SMART and Ann Margaret V.
such, attorney's fees should be Santiago (Santiago)
granted. x SMART filed an Answer
We deny the claim. No premium should o argued that Astorga was
be placed on the right to litigate and not dismissed by reason of redundancy,
every winning party is entitled to an which
automatic grant of attorney's fees. 30 The is an authorized
cause for termination
party must show that he falls under one of employment, and
of the instances enumerated in Article the
2208 of the Civil Code. 31 This, petitioner dismissal was
failed to do. Furthermore, where the effected in
award of moral and exemplary damages accordance with the
is eliminated, so must the award for requirements of the
attorney's fees be deleted. Labor Code. The
redundancy of
ISSUE # 5: Whether the subject vehicle should be returned to Astorgas position
the Orosas. was the result of the
abolition of CSMG and
HELD # 5: NO. the creation of a
x We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the specialized and more
trial court erred when it technically equipped
ordered private respondent to return the SNMI, which is a valid
subject car or its equivalent considering and legitimate
that petitioner had not yet fully paid the exercise of
purchase price. Verily, to sustain the management
trial court's decision would amount to prerogative.
unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals x SMART sent a letter to Astorga
demanding that she pay the current market
was correct when it instead ordered value
private respondent to return, not the car of the Honda Civic Sedan which
was given to her under the
itself, but only the amount equivalent to companys car plan program, or
the fourteen installments actually paid to surrender the same to the
with interest. company for proper disposition
x Astorga failed to comply with the demand
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. x SMART filed an action for replevin with
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent. G.R. No. 148132 RTC Makati Br 57
January 28, 2008
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,
vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent. G.R.
No. 151079 January 28, 2008
REGINA M. ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. SMART
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ANN MARGARET V.
SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No.
151372

January
28, 2008

NACHUR
A, J.:

FACTS:
x Astorga was a District Manager of SMART who
enjoyed benefits including a car
plan
x SMART then launched an organizational
realignment to achieve more efficient
operations
x Thus, SMART entered into a joint venture
agreement with NTT of Japan, and
formed SMART-NTT Multimedia,
Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was
formed to do the sales and marketing
work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD,
Astorgas
division
 x The Court shall first deal with the propriety of
o Astora filed an MD on grounds of (i) lack of dismissing the replevin case filed
jurisdiction; (ii) with the RTC of Makati City allegedly for
failure to state a cause of action; (iii) lack of jurisdiction, which is the issue
litis pendentia; and (iv) forum- raised in G.R. No. 148132.
shopping x Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person
That RTC had no jurisdiction because entitled to
the benefit repossession of goods or chattels may
arose of an employment contract recover those goods or chattels
x LA (pending resolution of the MD in the replevin case) from one who has wrongfully distrained or
ruled in favor of taken, or who wrongfully
Astorga detains such goods or chattels. It is
o Declared that the dismissal was illegal designed to permit one having
o the abolition of CSMG done neither in good faith right to possession to recover property in
nor for causes specie from one who has
beyond the control of SMART, but a wrongfully taken or detained the
ploy to terminate Astorgas property.30 The term may refer
employment either to the action itself, for the
x RTC denied Astorgas MD the replevin case; denied ensuing recovery of personalty, or to the
MR provisional remedy traditionally
o As correctly pointed out, this case is to enforce a associated with it, by which
right of possession of the property may be
possession over a company car assigned obtained by the plaintiff and retained
to the defendant under a during the pendency of the action.31
car plan privilege arrangement. The car is x That the action commenced by SMART against
registered in the name of Astorga in the RTC of Makati City
the plaintiff. Recovery thereof via replevin was one for replevin hardly admits of doubt.
suit is allowed by Rule x In reversing the RTC ruling and consequently
60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil dismissing the case for lack of
Procedure, which is undoubtedly jurisdiction, the CA made the following disquisition,
within the jurisdiction of the Regional viz.:
Trial Court. o [I]t is plain to see that the vehicle was
o In the Complaint, plaintiff claims to be the owner issued to [Astorga] by
of the company [Smart] as part of the
car and despite demand, defendant employment package. We
refused to return said car. This is clearly doubt that
sufficient statement of plaintiffs cause of [SMART] would extend [to
action. Astorga] the same car plan
x Astorga filed a Rule 65 before the CA against the order of privilege
the RTC denying were it not for her
her MD employment as district sales
o CA granted the petition manager of the
the CA held that the case is company. Furthermore, there
intertwined with Astorgas is no civil contract for a loan
complaint for illegal between [Astorga] and
dismissal; thus, it is the [Smart]. Consequently, We
labor tribunal that has find that the
rightful jurisdiction over car plan privilege is a benefit
the arising out of employer-
complaint employee
x Smart elevated the CA decision to the SC relationship. Thus, the claim
x Smart appealed the LA decision to the NLRC for such falls squarely within
o NLRC reversed LA; partially granted Astorgas the
MR insofar as the original and exclusive
payment of backwages is concerned jurisdiction of the labor
the NLRC declared the abolition of arbiters and the
CSMG and the NLRC.32
creation of SNMI to do the x We do not agree. Contrary to the CAs ratiocination,
sales and marketing the RTC rightfully
services for SMART a valid assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted
organizational action. It well within its discretion in denying
overruled the Labor Arbiters Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs
ruling that SNMI is an in- demand for payment of the market value of
house agency, holding that it the car or, in the alternative, the surrender
lacked legal basis. It of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute.
also declared that contracting, It involves the relationship of debtor and
subcontracting and creditor rather than employee-employer
streamlining of operations for relations.33 As such, the dispute falls within
the purpose of the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
increasing efficiency are x In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,34 this Court, in upholding
allowed under the law. The the jurisdiction of the RTC
NLRC further found erroneous over the replevin suit, explained:
the Labor Arbiters o Replevin is a possessory action, the gist
disquisition that redundancy of which is the right of
to be valid must be possession in the plaintiff. The
impelled by economic reasons, primary relief sought therein is
and upheld the the
redundancy measures return of the property in specie
undertaken by SMART. wrongfully detained by another
x Astorga and Smart filed their separate Rule 45 before the 15
SC
o Consolidated

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the replevin

case for the recovery of the car which Astorga acquired as
part of her employment case.

HELD: YES.
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Replevin
Case. The
person. It is an ordinary respective
statutory proceeding to issues
adjudicate rights to the raised in
title or possession of each forum
personal property. The can be
question of whether or not resolved
a party has the right of independe
possession over the ntly on the
property involved and if other. In
so, whether or not the fact in 18
adverse party has November
wrongfully taken and 1986, the
detained said property as NLRC in the
to require its case before
return to plaintiff, is it had
outside the pale of issued an
competence of a labor Injunctive
tribunal and beyond the Writ
field of specialization of enjoining
Labor Arbiters. the
o The labor dispute involved is not petitioners
intertwined with the issue in the from
blocking
 the free ingress and egress actually
to the Vessel and ordering owned by
the petitioners to Silver
disembark and x Hao then filed a counterbond
vacate. That aspect of the x Judge Emmanuel C. Carpio then
controversy is properly ordered Andres to immediately cease and
settled under desist from further
the Labor Code. So also implementing the
with petitioners right to order of seizure, and
picket. But the to return the seized
determination of the motor vehicles
question of who has the including its
better right to take accessories to their
possession of the Vessel lawful owners.
and whether petitioners x The vehicles were however reported
can deprive the to have gone missing
Charterer, as the legal x Andres filed his report
possessor of the Vessel, of o He narrated that on
that right to October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo
possess in addressed to Despe, one of
the competence of Civil the
Courts. policemen
o In thus ruling, this Court is not guarding
sanctioning split jurisdiction but the subject
defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid motor
down by pertinent laws. vehicles,
x The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it reported to
overturned the RTC ruling him that a
and ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for certain
lack of jurisdiction. "Nonoy"
entered the
KENNETH HAO, complainant, vs. ABE C. ANDRES, compound
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao and caused
City, respondent. the
A.M. duplication of the
No. P- vehicles keys
07- x Subsequently, Hao reported that
2384 three of the carnapped vehicles were
recovered
by the police.12 He
June then accused Andres
18, of conspiring and
2008 conniving with Atty.
SECON Oswaldo
D Macadangdang
DIVISIO (Silvers counsel) and
N the policemen in the
QUISUMBING, J.: carnapping
of the motor vehicles.
FACTS: Hao also accused
x Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin Andres of concealing
docketed as Civil Case the depository
No. 31, 127-20052 entitled "Zenaida receipts from them and
Silver, doing trade and business under pointed out that the
the name and style ZHS Commercial v. depository receipts
Loreto Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, show that Silver and
Kenneth Hao and John Does," pending Atty. Macadangdang
before the RTC of Davao City, Branch were the ones who
16 chose the policemen
x Judge Fuentes issued an Order of Seizure4 against who will guard the
22 motor vehicles allegedly motor vehicles.
owned by the complainant. x Andres denied the allegations
o On the strength of the said order, Andres x the case was recommended to EJ
was able to seize two of Fuentes
the subject motor vehicles x EJ Fuentes found Andres guilty of
on October 17, 2005; four on serious negligence in the custody of the
October 18, 2005, and nine motor vehicles. He
another three on October 19, recommended that Andres be
2005, or a total of nine suspended from office
motor vehicles x OCA Andres be held liable only for
x Hao filed a complaint against Andres before the simple neglect of duty and be suspended
OCA for one (1) month and one (1) day.
o Hao alleged that Andres gave undue
advantage to Zenaida Silver in ISSUE: Whether Sheriff Andres complied with his
the implementation of the duties under the writ of replevin.
order and that Andres
seized the nine HELD: NO.
motor vehicles in an x Being an officer of the court, Andres
oppressive manner. Hao must be aware that there are well-defined
also averred that steps provided in the
Andres was accompanied by Rules of Court
unidentified armed personnel regarding the proper
on board a military vehicle implementation of a
which was excessive since writ of replevin and/or
there were no an order of seizure. The
resistance from them. Hao Rules, likewise, is
also discovered that the explicit on the
compound duty of the sheriff in its
where the seized motor implementation. To
vehicles were placed is recapitulate what
should be common
knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent building or enclosure to be broken
provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of open and take the property into his
Court possession. After the sheriff has
are quoted hereunder: taken possession of the
o SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.-Upon receiving property as herein provided, he
such order, the sheriff must keep it in a secure place and
must serve a copy thereof shall be responsible for its delivery
on the adverse party, to the party entitled thereto
together with a upon receiving his fees and
copy of the application, necessary expenses for taking
affidavit and bond, and must and keeping the same.
forthwith take (Emphasis supplied.)
the property, if it be in the o SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.-If
possession of the adverse within five (5) days
party, or his after the taking of the property
agent, and retain it in his by the sheriff, the adverse party
custody. If the property or does not object to the sufficiency
any part of the bond, or of the surety or
thereof be concealed in a sureties thereon; or if the
building or enclosure, the adverse party so objects and the
sheriff must court
demand its delivery, and if it affirms its approval of the
be not delivered, he must applicants bond or approves a
cause the new
bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property
but his bond is objected to and
found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the
property shall be delivered to
the applicant. If for any reason the
property is not delivered to the
applicant, the sheriff must return it
to the adverse party. (Emphasis
supplied.)
x First, the rules provide that property seized under a
writ of replevin is
not to be delivered immediately to the
plaintiff.22 In accordance with the said rules,
Andres should have waited no less than five
days in
order to give the complainant an opportunity
to object to the
sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or
sureties thereon, or require
the return of the seized motor vehicles by
filing a counter-bond. This,
he failed to do.
o Records show that Andres took possession
of two of the subject
motor vehicles on October 17,
2005, four on October 18, 2005,
and
another three on October 19, 2005.
Simultaneously, as evidenced
by the depository receipts, on
October 18, 2005, Silver received
from Andres six of the seized motor
vehicles, and three more motor
vehicles on October 19, 2005.
Consequently, there is no question
that Silver was already in
possession of the nine seized
vehicles
immediately after seizure, or no
more than three days after the
taking of the vehicles. Thus,
Andres committed a clear
violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of
the Rules of Court with regard to
the proper disposal of the
property.
x It matters not that Silver was in possession of the
seized vehicles merely for
safekeeping as stated in the depository
receipts. The rule is clear that the
property seized should not be immediately
delivered to the plaintiff, and the
sheriff must retain custody of the seized
property for at least five days.23 Hence,
the act of Andres in delivering the seized
vehicles immediately after seizure to
Silver for whatever purpose, without observing
the five-day requirement finds no
legal justification.
x In Pardo v. Velasco,24 this Court held that
o Respondent as an officer of the Court is
charged with certain
 ministerial duties which must be performed committed a clear neglect of duty.
faithfully to the letter. x Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 Despe
Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a reported the unauthorized
specific reason duplication of the vehicles keys, Andres
or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) failed to take extra precautionary
days is to give measures to ensure the safety of the
a chance to the defendant to object to the vehicles. It is obvious that the vehicles
sufficiency of the bond were put at risk by the unauthorized
or the surety or sureties thereon or require the duplication of the keys of the vehicles.
return of the Neither did he immediately report the incident
property by filing a counterbond.25 (Emphasis supplied.) to the police or to the court. The loss of the
x In Sebastian v. Valino,26 this Court reiterated that motor vehicles could have been prevented if
o Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under Andres immediately
a writ asked the court for an order to transfer the
of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the vehicles to another secured place as
plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for soon as he discovered the unauthorized
five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if duplication. Under these circumstances,
the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return even an ordinary prudent man would have
and files a counterbond.27 (Emphasis supplied.) exercised extra diligence. His warning
x Likewise, Andres claim that he had no knowledge that the compound is to the policemen to closely watch the vehicles
owned was insufficient. Andres cannot
by Silver fails to convince us. Regardless of who actually owns toss back to Silver or to the policemen the
the responsibility for the loss of the motor vehicles
compound, the fact remains that Andres delivered the vehicles since he remains chiefly responsible for their
to Silver safekeeping as legal
prematurely. It violates the rule requiring him to safekeep the custodian thereof. Indeed, Andres failure to
vehicles take the necessary precaution and proper
in his custody.28 The alleged lack of facility to store the seized monitoring of the vehicles to ensure its safety
vehicles is constitutes plain
unacceptable considering that he should have deposited the negligence.
same in a bonded x Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, Andres
warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should have sought prior failed to return the motor
authorization vehicles to their lawful owners. Instead of
from the court issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles to returning the motor vehicles
Silver. immediately as directed, he opted to write
x Second, it must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery Silver and demand that she put up an
in replevin is executed by taking possession of the property indemnity bond to secure the third-party
specified therein, such property is in custodia legis. As legal claims. Consequently, due to his delay,
custodian, it is
Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence,
16
when he passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to
Silver, he
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court, they cannot
afford to err without
the eventual loss of the motor vehicles affecting adversely
rendered the order to return the seized the
vehicles ineffectual to the prejudice of proper dispensation of
the complaining owners. justice. Sheriffs play
o It must be stressed that as court an important role in
custodian, it was Andres the
responsibility to ensure that administration of
the motor vehicles were safely justice and as agents
kept of the law, high
and that the same were standards
readily available upon order of of performance are
the court or expected of them.29
demand of the parties Hence, his failure to
concerned. Specifically, return the motor
sheriffs, being vehicles at the time
ranking officers of the court when its return was
and agents of the law, must still
discharge feasible constitutes
their duties with great care another instance of
and diligence. In serving and neglect of duty.
implementing court writs, as x Fifth, as found by the OCA, we agree that
well as processes and orders Andres also disregarded the provisions
of the
 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court with regard to Thus, the lower court
payment of expenses. ordered Karen
x Under Section 9,31 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, Go to file a motion
the procedure for the for the inclusion of
execution of writs and other processes Glenn Go as co-
are: First, the sheriff must make an plaintiff.
estimate of the expenses to be incurred x Petitioners MR was denied
by him; Second, he must obtain court x Petitioner elevated to CA
approval for such estimated expenses; o According to Navarro, a
Third, the approved estimated expenses complaint which failed to state a
shall be deposited by the interested cause of
party with the Clerk of Court and ex action could not be
officio sheriff; Fourth, the Clerk of Court converted into one
shall disburse the amount to the with a cause of
executing sheriff; and Fifth, the action by mere
executing sheriff shall liquidate his amendment or
expenses within the same period for supplemental
rendering a return on the writ. pleading.
x In this case, no estimate of sheriffs expenses was x CA affirmed RTC
submitted to the court by x Petitioner Navarro elevated the case to
Andres. Without approval of the court, he SC by way of Rule 45
also allowed Silver to pay directly to the o Even assuming the
policemen the expenses for the complaints stated a cause of action
safeguarding of the motor vehicles against him,
including their meals.32 Obviously, this Navarro maintains
practice departed from the accepted that the complaints
procedure provided in the Rules of Court. were premature
because no
prior demand was
made on him to
comply with the
provisions of
the lease agreements
before the complaints
for replevin were
filed.
ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. o Lastly, Navarro posits that
ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, since the two writs of replevin were
Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing issued based on
business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, flawed
Respondents. complaints, the
G.R. No. vehicles were
153788 illegally seized
from his
possession and
November should be
27, 2009 returned to him
SECOND immediately
DIVISION
BRION, J.: ISSUE: Whether prior demand is a condition
precedent to the issuance of a writ of replevin.
FACTS:
x Petitioner allegedly entered into a lease HELD: NO.
agreement with option to purchase with x In arguing that prior demand is required
PR Karen Go, who was married to one before an action for a writ of replevin is
Glenn Go and doing business under the filed, Navarro apparently likens a replevin
name of Kargo Enterprises which buys action to an unlawful detainer.
and sells motor vehicles, and paid post
dated checks which were later on
dishonored.
x As a result, PR filed 2 complaints before RTC for
replevin and/or sum of money
with damages
x RTC issued writs of replevin on the 2 cases
x As a result, sheriff seized to vehicles and delivered
them to PR
x Petitioner sought consolidation of the case
which was granted
x Petitioner filed an MD on the ground that
complaint did not state cause of
action and of lack of legal personality
x RTC granted MD on the ground complaint did
not state cause of action
x PR filed MR
x RTC reversed
o Acting on the presumption that Glenn
Gos leasing business is a
conjugal property, the RTC
held that Karen Go had
sufficient
interest in his leasing
business to file the action
against Navarro.
However, the RTC held that
Karen Go should have
included her
husband, Glenn Go, in the
complaint based on Section
4, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court (Rules).12
 Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of
x For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is Citimotors, Inc.
to file an affidavit x The contract provides, among others, that: for
and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which receiving the amount of Php834,
states: 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php 17,391.00
o Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. every 15th day of each succeeding month
o The applicant must show by his own affidavit or until fully paid; the loan is secured by a 2001
that of some other Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an
person who personally knows the facts: interest of 6% per month shall be imposed
(a) That the applicant is the owner of for failure to pay each installment on or
the property before the stated due date.
claimed, particularly x On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its
describing it, or is entitled to rights, title and interests in the
the possession thereof; Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage to
(b) That the property is wrongfully ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO),
detained by the which, on 31 May 2002, likewise assigned
adverse party, alleging the the same to BPI Family
cause of detention thereof Savings Bank, Inc. For failure to pay four
according to the best of his successive installments, the bank,
knowledge, information, through counsel, sent to the spouses a
and belief; demand letter dated 29 August 2002,
(c) That the property has not been declaring the entire obligation as due and
distrained or taken demandable and requiring to pay
for a tax assessment or a Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged
fine pursuant to law, or vehicle immediately upon receiving
seized under a writ of the letter. As the demand was left unheeded,
execution or preliminary the bank filed on 4 October 2002
attachment, or otherwise an action for Replevin and Damages before
placed under custodia legis, the Manila Regional Trial Court
or if so seized, that it is (RTC).
exempt from such seizure or x A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the
custody; and subject vehicle was not seized.
(d) The actual market value of the Trial on the merits ensued.
property. x On August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for
o The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the bank and ordered the
the adverse party spouses to jointly and severally pay the
in double the value of the property as amount of Php576,664.04 plus interest until
stated in the affidavit fully paid, and the costs of suit.
aforementioned, for the return of the x The spouses appealed the decision to the Court of
property to the adverse party Appeals (CA), but the CA
if such return be adjudged, and for the affirmed the lower courts decision and,
payment to the adverse subsequently, denied the motion for
party of such sum as he may recover from reconsideration
the applicant in the x Hence, this petition.
action.
x We see nothing in these provisions which requires the ISSUE: Whether demand is a condition precedent to an action for
applicant to a writ of replevin.
make a prior demand on the possessor of the
property before he can file an action for a writ of HELD: NO.
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a x A provision on waiver of notice or demand has been
condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. recognized as legal and
x More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim valid in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
that a Appeals,13 wherein We held:
prior demand is necessary, as he has already o The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides
admitted in his Answers that he had received the that one incurs in delay or is
letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he in default from the time the
either pay his unpaid obligations or return the obligor demands the fulfillment of
leased motor vehicles. Navarros position that a the obligation from the obligee.
demand is necessary and has not been made is However, the law expressly
therefore totally unmeritorious. provides that demand is not
necessary under certain
circumstances, and one of these
circumstances is when the parties
expressly waive
demand. Hence, since the co-
signors expressly waived
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER, Petitioners, vs. BPI demand in
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., Respondent. the promissory notes, demand
G.R. No. 182963 was unnecessary for them to be
in
default.14
June 3, 2013 x Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v.
THIRD DIVISION Escobido15 that prior demand is not
PERALTA, J.: a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin, since there is nothing in
FACTS: 17
x On 15 February 2001, spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner
executed a
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Henedino M. Brondial)
at the
address that may
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court hereafter be given in
that requires the applicant to make a writing by the
demand on the possessor of the MORTGAGOR
property before an action for a writ of to the MORTGAGEE or
replevin his/its assignee. The
could be filed. mere act of sending
x Also, petitioners representation that they have any correspondence
not received a demand letter is by mail or by
completely inconsequential as the personal delivery to
mere act of sending it would suffice. the said
Again, We look into the Promissory address shall be
Note with Chattel Mortgage, which valid and effective
provides: notice to the
o All correspondence relative to this mortgagor for all
mortgage, including demand legal purposes and
letters, summonses, the fact that any
subpoenas, or notifications of communication is
any judicial or not actually received
extrajudicial action shall be by the MORTGAGOR
sent to the MORTGAGOR at or that it has been
the address returned
indicated on this promissory unclaimed to the
note with chattel mortgage or MORTGAGEE or that
 no person was found at the
address given, or that the
address is fictitious or cannot
be located
shall not excuse or relieve the
MORTGAGOR from the effects
of
such notice.16 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
x The Court cannot yield to petitioners denial in
receiving respondents demand
letter. To note, their postal address
evidently remained unchanged from the
time
they executed the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage up to time the case
was filed against them. Thus, the
presumption that "a letter duly directed
and mailed was received in the regular
course of the mail"17 stands in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary.
x Petitioners cannot find succour from Ting v. Court
of Appeals18 simply because it
pertained to violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. As a
higher quantum of proof - that is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt - is required in
view of the criminal nature of the case, We
found insufficient the mere
presentation of a copy of the demand
letter allegedly sent through registered
mail and its corresponding registry
receipt as proof of receiving the notice
of
dishonor.
x Perusing over the records, what is clear is that
petitioners did not take advantage
of all the opportunities to present their
evidence in the proceedings before the
courts below. They miserably failed to
produce the original cash deposit slips
proving payment of the monthly
amortizations in question. Not even a
photocopy
of the alleged proof of payment was
appended to their Answer or shown during
the trial. Neither have they demonstrated
any written requests to respondent to
furnish them with official receipts or a
statement of account. Worse, petitioners
were not able to make a formal offer of
evidence considering that they have not
marked any documentary evidence during
the presentation of Deo Agners
testimony.19
x Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one
who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it; the burden rests
on the defendant to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove
non-payment.20 When the creditor is
in
possession of the document of credit,
proof of non-payment is not needed for it
is presumed.21 Respondent's possession
of the Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage strongly buttresses its claim
that the obligation has not been
extinguished. As held in Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. Spouses Royeca:2
o x x x The creditor's possession of the
evidence of debt is proof that
the debt has not been
discharged by payment. A
promissory note
in the hands of the creditor
is a proof of indebtedness
rather than
proof of payment. In an
action for replevin by a
mortgagee, it is
prima facie evidence that
the promissory note has not
been paid.
Likewise, an uncanceled
mortgage in the possession
of the
mortgagee gives rise
to the presumption
that the mortgage
debt is unpaid.23
x Indeed, when the existence of a debt is
fully established by the evidence
contained in the record, the
burden of proving that it has
been extinguished by payment
devolves upon the debtor who
offers such defense to the claim
of the creditor.24 The debtor
has the burden of showing with
legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged
by payment
x The remedies provided for in Art. 1484
are alternative, not cumulative. The
exercise of one bars the exercise
of the others. This limitation
applies to
contracts purporting to be leases
of personal property with option
to buy by
virtue of Art. 1485. The condition
that the lessor has deprived the
lessee of
possession or enjoyment of the
thing for the purpose of applying
Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case
by the filing by petitioner of the
complaint for replevin to recover
possession of movable property.
By virtue of the writ of seizure
issued by the trial court, the
deputy sheriff seized the vehicle
on August 6, 1986 and
thereby deprived private
respondents of its use. The car
was not returned to private
respondent until April 16, 1989,
after two (2) years and eight (8)
months, upon issuance by the
Court of Appeals of a writ of
execution.
x Petitioner prayed that private
respondents be made to pay the sum of
P39,054.86, the amount that they
were supposed to pay as of May
1986, plus
interest at the legal rate. At the
same time, it prayed for the
issuance of a writ of
replevin or the delivery to it of the
motor vehicle "complete with
accessories and
equipment." In the event the car
could not be delivered to
petitioner, it was
prayed that private respondent
Rolando Lantan be made to pay
petitioner the
amount of P60,000.00, the
"estimated actual value" of the
car, "plus accrued
monthly rentals thereof with
interests at the rate of fourteen
percent (14%) per
annum until fully paid." This
prayer of course cannot be
granted, even assuming
that private respondents have
defaulted in the payment of their
obligation. This
led the trial court to say that
petitioner wanted to eat its cake
and have it too
x Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject
matter of this case was never
recovered and delivered to
respondent despite the issuance
of a writ of replevin. As there was
no seizure that transpired, it
cannot be said that petitioners
were deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the mortgaged
vehicle or that respondent
pursued, commenced or
concluded its actual foreclosure.
The trial court,
 therefore, rightfully granted the alternative
prayer for sum of money, which is
equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly,
there is no double recovery or unjust
enrichment30 to speak of.
x All the foregoing notwithstanding, We are of the
opinion that the interest of 6%
per month should be equitably reduced to one
percent (1%) per month or twelve percent
(12%) per annum, to be reckoned from May
16, 2002 until full payment and with the
remaining outstanding balance of their car
loan as of May 15, 2002 as the base amount.

F. Support Pendente Lite (Rule 61)

1. Application

Section 1. Application. At the commencement of the

proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified
application for support pendente lite
may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the
claim and the financial conditions of both
parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
other authentic documents in support
thereof.

2. Procedure: Comment, Hearing Order

Section 2. Comment. A copy of the application and

all supporting documents shall be
served upon the adverse party, who shall have five (5)
days to comment thereon unless a
different period is fixed by the court upon his motion.
The comment shall be verified and shall
be accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other
authentic documents in support thereof.
(2a, 3a)

Section 3. Hearing. After the comment is filed, or

after the expiration of the period for
its filing, the application shall be set for hearing not more
than three (3) days thereafter. The
facts in issue shall be proved in the same manner as is
provided for evidence on motions. (4a)

Section 4. Order. The court shall determine

provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such
orders as justice and equity may require, having the
regard to the probable
outcome of the case and such other circumstances as
may aid in the proper resolution of the
question involved. If the application is granted, the court
shall fix the amount of money to be
provisionally paid or such other forms of support as
should be provided, taking into account
the necessities of the applicant and the resources or
means of the adverse party, and the
terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If
the application is denied, the principal case shall be tried
and decided as early as possible. (5a)

3. Enforcement

Section 5. Enforcement of order. If the adverse party

fails to comply with an order granting support pendente
lite, the court shall, motu proprio or upon motion; issue
an order of execution against him, without prejudice to
his liability for contempt. (6a)

When the person ordered to give support pendente lite

refuses or fails to do so, any third
person who furnished that support to the applicant
may, after due notice and hearing in the
same case obtain a writ of execution to enforce his right
of reimbursement against the person ordered to provide
such support. (h)

4. Restitution

Section 7. Restitution. When the judgment or final

order of the court finds that the
person who has been providing support pendente lite is not
liable therefor, it shall order the
recipient thereof to return to the former the amounts already
paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment,
without prejudice to the right of the recipient to obtain
reimbursement in a separate action from the person legally
obliged to give the support. Should
the recipient fail to reimburse said amounts, the person who
provided the same may likewise
seek reimbursement thereof in a separate action from the person
legally obliged to give such
support.

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MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME
T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC,
Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS (1)
represented by her The civil
mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents. status of persons;
G.R. No.
127578

February
15, 1999
THIRD
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her
capacity as the legal
guardian of the minor, Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, brought an action for
maintenance and support against
Manuel de Asis, alleging that the
defendant Manuel de Asis (the
petitioner here) is the father of
subject minor Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, and the former refused and/or
failed to provide for the maintenance
of the latter, despite repeated
demands.
x Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a
manifestation the pertinent portion
of which, reads; defendant (herein
petitioner) has made a judicial
admission/declaration that defendant
denies that the said minor child (Glen
Camil) is his child he (petitioner) has no
obligation to the plaintiff Glen Camil . . .
That with the aforesaid judicial
admission/declarations by the
defendant, it
seems futile and a useless exercise to
claim support from said defendant.That
under the foregoing circumstances it
would be more practical that plaintiff
withdraws the complains against the
defendant subject to the condition that
the
defendant should not pursue his
counterclaim in the above-entitled
case, . . .
x By virtue of the said manifestation, RTC dismissed with
prejudice
x On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for
maintenance and support was
brought against Manuel A. de Asis,
this time in the name of Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, represented by her
legal guardian/mother, Vircel D.
Andres
x On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the
Complaint on the ground of
res judicata
x RTC ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action
for support for the reason
that renunciation or waiver of future support is
prohibited by law
x CA affirmed RTC

ISSUE: Whether an action for support may be barred by res

judicata.

HELD: NO.
x The right to receive support can neither be renounced
nor transmitted to a third
person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point,
reads:
o Art. 301. The right to receive support
cannot be renounced,
nor can it be
transmitted to a third
person. Neither can it
be
compensated with
what the recipient
owes the obligor
...................................
o Furthermore, future support cannot be the
subject of a
compromise.
x Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that:
o No compromise upon the following
questions shall be valid:
 x Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal the dismissal with prejudice
separation; of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res
(3) Any ground for legal separation judicata on the subsequent case for
(4) Future support; support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula 7
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; comes to the fore. In Advincula,
(6) Future legitime. the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case
x The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, for acknowledgment and support
transmission against her putative father, Manuel Advincula.
and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus: On motion of both parties and for
o The right to support being founded upon the need of the the reason that the "plaintiff has lost interest
recipient to maintain his existence, he is not and is no longer interested in
entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this continuing the case against the defendant
would mean and has no further evidence to
sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. introduce in support of the complaint", the
The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, case was dismissed. Thereafter, a
support which is the means to attain the former, similar case was instituted by Manuela, which
cannot be renounced. the defendant moved to dismiss,
o To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of theorizing that the dismissal of the first case
the family precluded the filing of the second
right of a person to support is virtually to allow case.
either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a x In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
public burden. This is contrary to public policy. 4 o The new Civil Code provides that the
x In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in allowance for support
the first is provisional because the amount
case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it may be increased or
seemed futile to claim decreased depending upon the
support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. means of the giver and the
Since the right to needs of the recipient (Art. 297);
claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation and that the right to
between the minor receive support cannot be
child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe renounced nor can it be
that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support transmitted to a third person
from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future neither can it be
complaint for support. compensated with what the
x The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, recipient owes the obligator
which (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to
acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint support can not be
for support, waived or transferred to third
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that parties and future support
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his cannot be the subject of
putative parent, the petitioner. compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV
petitioner and Civil Code by Padilla, p.
respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is
maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of indisputable that the
the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which present action for support can be
cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any brought, notwithstanding
compromise of the right to support. the fact the previous case filed
x Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in against the same defendant
a was dismissed. And it also
motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his appearing that the dismissal of
obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as Civil Case No. 3553, was not an
an assent to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right adjudication upon the
to claim for support. 5 merits, as heretofore shown, the
x It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must right of herein plaintiff-
first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, appellant to reiterate her suit for
support and
paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship acknowledgment is available, as
that her needs arise. Once the
must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare needs of plaintiff arise, she has the
its right to bring an action
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement for support, for it is only then that
of the her cause for action is
parties. accrues......
o It appears that the former dismissal was
x The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from predicated upon
which the compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as
right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no it does the civil status
effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative of a persons and future support, cannot be
declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. 6 the subject of
x Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil
upon the Code). Hence, the first
respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does 19
not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
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dismissal cannot have force 9
and effect and can not bar 9
the filing of another action,
asking for the same relief
against the same E
defendant. (emphasis supplied). N
x Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of
Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower B
court's pronouncement that such A
dismissal was with prejudice, the second N
action for support may still prosper. C

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FACTS:

MANUEL MANAHAN, alias Maning, defendant- x RTC found Manahan guilty of rape and
appellant. was sentenced to death
G.R. o He was also ordered to
No. indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as
1281 moral
57. damages, pay
Sept the costs, and
emb acknowledge
er and support
29,
 the offspring of his Executive Order No. 209 (The
indiscretion Family Code of the Philippines).7
x Manahan appealed x CA affirmed the trial court

ISSUE: Whether Manahan should be ordered to support the

child. ISSUE: Whether there is basis to hold
petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable
HELD: YES. with him to support respondents.
x On the matter of acknowledgment and support of
the child, a correction of the HELD: YES.
view of the court a quo is in order. Article x By statutory9 and jurisprudential
345 of The Revised Penal Code mandate,10 the liability of ascendants to
provides that persons guilty of rape shall provide legal support to their
also be sentenced to "acknowledge the descendants is beyond cavil.
offspring, unless the law should prevent Petitioners themselves
him from doing so," and "in every case admit as much - they limit their
to support the offspring." In the case petition to the narrow question of
before us, compulsory acknowledgment of when their
liability is triggered, not if they
the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper are liable. Relying on
there being a legal impediment in doing provisions11 found in Title
so IX of the Civil Code, as amended,
as it appears that the accused is a married on Parental Authority, petitioners
man. As pronounced by this Court in theorize that
People v. Guerrero,[16] "the rule is that if their liability is activated only
the rapist is a married man, he cannot upon default of parental
be compelled to recognize the offspring of authority, conceivably
the crime, should there be any, as his either by its termination12 or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." suspension13 during the
Consequently, that portion of the childrens minority. Because at
judgment under review is accordingly the time respondents sued for
deleted. In any case, we sustain that part support, Cheryl and Edward
ordering the accused to support the child exercised parental authority over
as it is in accordance with law. their children,14 petitioners
submit that the obligation to
support the latters offspring
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, Petitioners, ends with them.
vs. MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of x Neither the text of the law nor the
her minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents. constriction of the scope of
G.R. No. familial obligation to give
163209 support. In the first place,
the governing text are the
relevant provisions in Title VIII of
October the Civil Code, as
30, 2009 amended, on Support, not the
THIRD provisions in Title IX on Parental
DIVISION Authority. While
both areas share a common
FACTS: ground in that parental authority
x In 1979, respondent married Edward Lim , son of encompasses the
petitioners. Cheryl bore obligation to provide legal
Edward three children, respondents support,15 they differ in other
Lester Edward, Candice Grace and concerns including the
Mariano III. Edwards family business, duration of the obligation and its
which provided him with a monthly concurrence among relatives of
salary of differing
P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl degrees.16 Thus, although
had no steady source of income. the obligation to provide
x On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the support arising from
Forbes Park residence, bringing the parental authority ends
children with her (then all minors), upon the emancipation of
after a violent confrontation with the child,17 the same
Edward whom she caught with the in- obligation arising from spousal and
house midwife of Chua Giak general familial ties ideally lasts during
x Cheryl sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and the
Mariano for support.
x The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly
support of P6,000 pendente
lite; then rendered judgment ordering
Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide

P40,000 monthly support to respondents,

with Edward shouldering P6,000 and

clarified that petitioners and Chua

Giak were held jointly liable with
Edward because of the latters
inability to give sufficient support
x Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
assailing, among others, their
liability to support respondents.
Petitioners argued that while Edwards
income is insufficient, the law itself
sanctions its effects by providing that
legal support
should be "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" under Article 194
of the Civil Code, as amended by
 the person who has a right
obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority to receive support. The latter
under Title IX (and the alternative cannot be availed of
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, in
passing to ascendants only upon case there is a moral or legal obstacle
its termination or suspension, the obligation to thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
provide legal support passes on x is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons
to ascendants not only upon default of the parents entitled to receive support
but also for the latters are petitioners grandchildren and
inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the
in another case raising the option in Article 204 will secure to the
ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give grandchildren a well-provided future;
support in light of the fathers however, it will also force Cheryl to return
sufficient means: to the house which, for her, is the
o Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren scene of her husbands infidelity. While not
cannot demand rising to the level of a legal obstacle,
support directly from their as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward
grandparents if they have parents for concubinage did not prosper for
(ascendants of nearest degree) who insufficient evidence, her steadfast
are capable of supporting them. This is insistence on its occurrence amounts to a
so because we have to follow the order moral impediment bringing the case within
of support under Art. 199. We agree the ambit of the exception clause of Article
with this view. 204, precluding its application.
o There is no showing that private respondent is
without means to
support his son; neither is there any CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, vs.
evidence to prove that petitioner, as the DIVINA BULING, Respondent. G.R.
paternal grandmother, was willing to No. 165166 August 15,
voluntarily provide for her grandson's 2012
legal support. x x x18 (Emphasis SECOND DIVISION
supplied; internal citations omitted)
x Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge FACTS:
her obligation to x Respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for
provide sufficient legal support to her children, then compulsory recognition and
all school-bound. It is also support pendente lite, claiming that the
undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able petitioner is the father of her child
to give to respondents, Gliffze.
P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents x In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed
basic needs. This inability of paternity of Gliffze.
Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their x RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
children shifts a portion of evidence proving Gliffzes
their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest filiation.
degree, both in the paternal x CA reversed RTCs decision.
(petitioners) and maternal19 lines, following the
ordering in Article 199. To hold ISSUE: Whether Divinas testimony that she had been
otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is sexually involved only with one man, herein petitioner
to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating Charles, at the time of her conception, is sufficient in
extreme material deprivation of children because of establishing a prima facie case against the latter.
parental inability to give adequate support
even if ascendants one degree removed are HELD: YES.
more than able to fill the void.1avvphi1 x We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings
x However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends are usually filed not just to
only to their adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
descendants as this word is commonly understood to legal right associated with paternity, such as
refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As citizenship, support (as in this case) or
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden
Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong of proof] is on the person who alleges that
to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive the putative father is the biological father of
support from the Lim family extends only to her the child."31
husband x One can prove filiation, either legitimate or
Edward, arising from their marital bond.20 illegitimate, through the
Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of record of birth appearing in the civil register
monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be or a final judgment, an
determined from the records. Thus, we are admission of filiation in a public document or
constrained to remand the case to the trial court for a private handwritten
this limited purpose instrument and signed by the parent
x As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the concerned, or the open and
option in Article 204 continuous possession of the status of a
of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that legitimate or illegitimate child,
they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by or any other means allowed by the Rules of
maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati Court and special laws.32
residence. The option is unavailable to We have held that such other proof of
petitioners. one's filiation may be a
x The application of Article 204 which provides that "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
o The person obliged to give support shall have the family bible in which his
option to fulfill name has been entered, common reputation
the obligation either by paying the respecting [his] pedigree,
allowance fixed, or by receiving 20
and maintaining in the family dwelling
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admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court."33
x In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are
four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action
that parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father
and the child.35 We explained
that a prima facie case exists if a woman
declares supported by corroborative
proof that she had sexual relations with
the putative father; at this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father.36 We explained further that the
two affirmative defenses available to the
putative father are: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to
either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at
the time of conception.37
x In this case, the respondent established
a prima facie case that the petitioner is
the putative father of Gliffze
through testimony that she had
been sexually involved only with
one man, the petitioner, at the
time of her conception.38
Rodulfo corroborated her
testimony that the petitioner and
the respondent had intimate
relationship.39
x On the other hand, the petitioner did not
deny that he had sexual encounters
with the respondent, only that
it occurred on a much later
date than the respondent
asserted, such that it was
physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3)
months pregnant already in
September 1994 when he was
informed of the pregnancy.40
 However, the petitioner failed to See Section 1 above
substantiate his allegations of infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity. His 3. Procedure
allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support.
Section 2. Order. Upon the filing of the
The petitioners denial cannot overcome
complaint, the court shall issue an order
the respondents clear and categorical
requiring the conflicting claimants to
assertions.
interplead with one another. If the interests
x We find that the contradictions are for the most
of justice so
part more apparent than real,
require, the court may direct in such order
having resulted from the failure of the
that the subject matter be paid or delivered
respondent to comprehend the question
to the
posed, but this misunderstanding was
court. (2a, R63)
later corrected and satisfactorily
explained. Indeed, when confronted for
Section 3. Summons. Summons shall be
her contradictory statements, the
served upon the conflicting claimants,
respondent explained that that portion of
together with a copy of the complaint and
the transcript of stenographic notes was
order. (3, R63)
incorrect and she had brought it to the
attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her
Section 4. Motion to dismiss. Within the
former counsel) but the latter took no
time for filing an answer, each claimant may
action on the matter.42
x Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the
credibility of a witness, his testimony file a motion to dismiss on the ground of
impropriety of the interpleader action or on
must be considered in its entirety instead
other
of in truncated parts. The technique in
appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16.
deciphering a testimony is not to consider
only its isolated parts and to anchor a The period to file the answer shall be tolled
conclusion based on these parts. "In and if
ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on
direct, cross and redirect examinations
must be calibrated and considered."43
Evidently, the totality of the respondent's
testimony positively and convincingly
shows that no real inconsistency exists.
The respondent has consistently
asserted that she started intimate
sexual relations with the petitioner
sometime in September 1993.44
x Since filiation is beyond question, support
follows as a matter of obligation; a
parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate.45
Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.46 Thus,
the amount of support is variable and, for
this reason, no final judgment on the
amount of support is made as the amount
shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of
the recipient.47 It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to
the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged
to support.48
x In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00
monthly child support, without
prejudice to the filing of the proper
motion in the RTC for the determination of
any support in arrears, considering the
needs of the child, Gliffze, during the
pendency of this case.

_____________________________________

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A. Interpleader [RULE 62]

1. What is an action in Interpleader?

Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever

conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a
person who claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants, he
may bring an action against the conflicting claimants
to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves.

2. Requisites
 x Won and Tan filed separate MDs
the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the o upon the grounds of res judicata, failure
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days of the complaint to state a
in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n) cause of action, and bar by prescription.
x RTC granted MDs; dismissed the complaint
Section 5. Answer and other pleadings. Each claimant shall x Wack-Wack appealed
file his answer setting forth his claim within fifteen (15) days o The trial court erred in dismissing the
from service of the summons upon him, serving a copy thereof complaint, instead of
upon each of the other conflicting claimants who may file their compelling the appellees to
reply thereto as interplead because there
provided by these Rules. If any claimant fails to plead within the actually are
time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare him in conflicting claims between the
default and thereafter render judgment barring him from any latter with respect to the
claim in respect to the subject matter. ownership
of membership fee certificate
The parties in an interpleader action may file 201, and, as there is not Identity
counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party of
complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as parties, of subject-matter, and of
provided by these Rules. (4a, R63) cause of action, between civil
case 26044 of the CFI of Manila
Section 6. Determination. After the pleadings of the conflicting and the present action, the
claimants have been filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in complaint should not have been
accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine dismissed upon the ground of
their respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. (5a, res
R63) judicata.

Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation ISSUE: Whether the action for interpleader was timely filed.
expenses as liens. The docket and other lawful fees paid by
the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the HELD: NO.
costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or change x Although res judicata or bar by a prior judgment was
upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall the principal ground availed
order otherwise. (6a, R63) of by the appellees in moving for the
dismissal of the complaint and upon which
the trial court actually dismissed the
complaint, the determinative issue, as can
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties,
vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, relates to the propriety and
defendants-appellees. timeliness of the remedy of interpleader.
EN BANC, G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 x The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the
Code of Civil
FACTS: Procedure, 2 is a remedy whereby a person
x Lee E. Won claims ownership of Wack Wacks membership fee who has personal property
certificate 201, by in his possession, or an obligation to render
virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of wholly or partially, without
the CFI of Manila, entitled claiming any right to either, comes to court
"Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & and asks that the persons
Country Club, Inc." and also who claim the said personal property or who
by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. consider themselves
1478 issued on October 17, entitled to demand compliance with the
1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of obligation, be required to
the said CFI of Manila, for litigate among themselves in order to
and in behalf of the president and the secretary of the determine finally who is entitled
Corporation and of the to tone or the one thing. The remedy is
People's Bank & Trust Company as transfer afforded to protect a person not
agent of the said Corporation, pursuant to the against double liability but against double
order of September 23, 1963 in the said case vexation in respect of one
x On the other hand, Bienvenido A. Tan claims to be lawful liability. 3 The procedure under the Rules of
owner of its aforesaid Court 4 is the same as that
membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of under the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 except
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued that under the former the
to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment remedy of interpleader is available regardless
made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the of the nature of the
original owner and holder of subject-matter of the controversy, whereas
membership fee certificate 201 under the latter an
x Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. filed an action for interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-
interpleader praying
matter of the controversy
for: is personal property or relates to the
o (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to
performance of an obligation.
interplead and
x There is no question that the subject matter of the
litigate their conflicting claims; and
present controversy, i.e., the
o (b) judgment. be rendered, after hearing, membership fee certificate 201, is proper for
declaring who of the two
an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is
is the lawful owner of membership fee
the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in
certificate 201, and ordering the
the light of the facts and circumstances
surrender and cancellation of membership
obtaining.
fee certificate 201-
21
serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.
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aware of the conflicting
claims
x A stakeholder 6 should use reasonable diligence to of the appellees with
hale the contending claimants respect to the membership
to court. 7 He need not await actual fee certificate 201
institution of independent suits against long before it filed the
him present interpleader suit. It
before filing a bill of interpleader. 8 He had been
should file an action of interpleader recognizing Tan as the
within lawful owner thereof. It was
a reasonable time after a dispute has sued by Lee who
arisen without waiting to be sued by also claimed the same
either membership fee certificate.
of the contending claimants. 9 Yet it did not
Otherwise, he may be barred by laches interplead Tan. It
10 or preferred to proceed with the
undue delay. 11 But where he acts litigation (civil case
with reasonable diligence in view of 26044) and to defend
the environmental circumstances, itself therein. As a matter of
the remedy is not barred. 12 fact, final judgment
x Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, was rendered against it
in view of all the and said judgment has
circumstances, such that it may properly already been executed.
invoke the remedy of It is not therefore too
interpleader? We do not think so. It was late for it to invoke the
remedy of interpleader. adverse
x It has been held that a stakeholder's claimants in
action of interpleader is too late when filed the suit in
after judgment has been rendered which the
against him in favor of one of the judgment
contending was
claimants, 13 especially where he had rendered.
notice of the conflicting claims prior to United
the Procedures
rendition of the judgment and neglected Pipe Line
the opportunity to implead the adverse Co. v.
claimants in the suit where judgment Britton,
was entered. This must be so, because Tex. Civ.
once judgment is obtained against him App. 264
by one claimant he becomes liable to S.W. 176;
the latter. 14 In once case, 15 it was Nash v.
declared: McCullum,
o The record here discloses that long before Tex. Civ. 74
the rendition of the S.W. 2d
judgment in favor of relators 1046; 30
against the Hanover Fire Am. Jur. p.
Insurance 223, Sec.
Company the latter had 11; 25 Tex.
notice of the adverse claim Jur. p. 56,
of South to the Sec. 5; 108
proceeds of the policy. No A.L.R., note
reason is shown why the 5, p. 275.
Insurance 16
Company did not implead x Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a
South in the former suit suit filed by one of the adverse claimants
and have the and
conflicting claims there allows said suit to
determined. The proceed to final
Insurance Company judgment against
elected not to do so and him, he cannot later
that suit proceeded to a on
final judgment in favor of have that part of the
relators. The Company litigation repeated in
thereby became an interpleader suit.
independently In the case at
liable to relators. It was hand, the Corporation
then too late for such allowed civil case
company to invoke the 26044 to proceed to
remedy of interpleader final judgment. And
x The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason it offered no
why it did not file an satisfactory explanation
application for interpleader in civil case for its failure to implead
26044 to compel the appellees herein Tan in the same
to litigate between themselves their litigation. In this factual
conflicting claims of ownership. It was situation, it is clear that
only after adverse final judgment was this interpleader suit
rendered against it that the remedy of cannot
interpleader was invoked by it. By then prosper because it was filed much too
it was too late, because to he entitled late.
to this remedy the applicant must be x If a stakeholder defends a suit by one
able to show that lie has not been claimant and allows it to proceed so far as
made a judgment against
independently liable to any of the him without filing a bill
claimants. And since the Corporation is of interpleader, it then
already liable to Lee under a final becomes too
judgment, the present interpleader suit late for him to do so.
is clearly Union Bank v. Kerr, 2
improper and unavailing. Md. Ch. 460; Home
o It is the general rule that before a person Life Ins. Co. v.
will be deemed Gaulk, 86 Md. 385,
to be in a position to ask for 390, 38 A. 901; Gonia
an order of intrepleader, he v. O'Brien, 223 Mass.
must be prepared to show, 177, 111 N.E.
among other prerequisites, 787. It is one o the
that main offices of a bill of
he has not become interpleader to restrain
independently liable to any a separate
of the proceeding at law by
claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, claimant so as to avoid
Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, the resulting partial
Section 8. judgment; and
o It is also the general rule that a bill of if the stakeholder
interpleader comes acquiesces in one
too late when it is filed claimant's trying out
after judgment has been his claim and
rendered in favor of one of establishing it at law,
the claimants of the fund, he cannot then have
this being that part of the
especially true when the litigation repeated in an
holder of the funds had interpleader suit. 4
notice of the conflicting Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. No.
claims prior to the rendition 162; Mitfor's Eq.
of the judgment and had an Pleading (Tyler's Ed.)
opportunity to implead the 147 and 236; Langdell's
Summary of Eq.
 Pleading, No. 162' De Zouche v.
Garrizon, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A/450. 17
x It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes
too late when
application therefore is delayed until
after judgment has been rendered in
favor of one of the claimants of the fund,
and that this is especially true where the
holder of the fund had notice of the
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of
such judgment and an opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the
suit in which such judgment was
rendered. (See notes and cases cited 36 Am. Dec.
703, Am. St. Rep. 598, also
5 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. Sec. 41.)
x The evidence in the opinion of the majority shows
beyond dispute that the
appellant permitted the Parker county
suit to proceed to judgment in favor of
Britton with full notice of the adverse
claims of the defendants in the present
suit
other than the assignees of the judgment
(the bank and Mrs. Pabb) and no excuse is
shown why he did not implead them in the
suit. 18
x To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court
after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights in civil case 26044
to the membership fee certificate 201, is to
increase instead of to diminish the number of
suits, which is one of the purposes of an action
of interpleader, with the possibility that the
latter would lose the benefits of the favorable
judgment. This cannot be done because having
elected to take its chances of success in said
civil case 26044, with full
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation
must submit to the consequences of
defeat.
x The act providing for the proceeding has nothing to say
touching the right of
one, after contesting a claim of one of the
claimants to final judgment
unsuccessfully, to involve the successful
litigant in litigation anew by bringing an
interpleader action. The question seems to be
one of first impression here, but, in other
jurisdictions, from which the substance of the
act was apparently taken, the rule prevails that
the action cannot be resorted to after an
unsuccessful trial against one of the claimants.
x It is well settled, both by reasons and authority, that
one who asks the
interposition of a court of equity to compel
others, claiming property in his
hands, to interplead, must do so before putting
them to the test of trials at law.
Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. 291
(41 Am. Dec. 626); Gornish v.
Tanner, 1 You. & Jer. 333; Haseltine v. Brickery,
16 Grat. (Va.) 116. The remedy
by interpleader is afforded to protect the party
from the annoyance and hazard
of two or more actions touching the same
property or demand; but one who,
with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to
avail himself of the relief, or elects to
take the chances for success in the actions at
law, ought to submit to the
consequences of defeat. To permit an
unsuccessful defendant to compel the
successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase
instead of to diminish the
number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of
others the burden which he asks
may be taken from his own '
x It is urged, however, that the American Surety
Company of New York was not in
position to file an interpleader until it had tested the
claim of relatrix to final
judgment, and that, failing to meet with success, it
promptly filed the
interpleader. The reason why, it urges, it was not in
such position until then is
that had it succeeded before this court in sustaining its
construction of the bond
and the law governing the bond, it would not have
been called upon to file an
interpleader, since there would have been sufficient
funds in its hands to have
satisfied all lawful claimants. It may be observed,
however, that the surety
company was acquainted with all of the facts, and
hence that it simply took its
chances of meeting with success by its own
construction of the bond and the
law. Having failed to sustain it, it cannot now force
relatrix into litigation anew
with others, involving most likely a repetition of what
has been decided, or force
her to accept a pro rata part of a fund, which is far from
benefits of the
judgment. 19
x Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be
impleaded by his defeated
adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to
prove his claim anew against
other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the
judgment.
x The jurisprudence of this state and the common law states is well-
settled that a
claimant who has been put to test of a trial by a surety, and has
establish his
claim, may not be impleaded later by the surety in an interpleader suit,
and
compelled to prove his claim again with other adverse claimants.
American
Surety Company of New York v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727;
American
Surety Company of New York v. Brim (In Re Lyong Lumber Company),
176 La.
867, 147 So. 18; Dugas v. N.Y. Casualty Co., 181 La. 322, 159 So. 572;
15
Ruling Case Law, 228; 33 Corpus Juris, 477; 4 Pomeroy's Jurisprudence,
1023;
Royal Neighbors of America v. Lowary (D.C.) 46 F2d 565; Brackett v.
Graves, 30
App. Div. 162, 51 N.Y.S. 895; De Zouche v. Garrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A.
450,
451; Manufacturer's Finance Co. v. W.I. Jones Co. 141 Ga., 519, 81 S.E.
1033;
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lawder, 22 R.I. 416, 84 A. 383.
x There can be no doubt that relator's claim has been finally and
definitely
established, because that matter was passed upon by three courts in
definitive
judgments. The only remaining item is the value of the use of the land
during
the time that relator occupied it. The case was remanded solely and
only for the
purpose of determining the amount of that credit. In all other aspects
the
judgment is final. 20

x It is generally held by the cases it is the office of interpleader to protect

a party,
not against double liability, but against double vexation on account of
one
liability. Gonia v. O'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. And so it is said
that it is
too late for the remedy of interpleader if the party seeking this relef has
contested the claim of one of the parties and suffered judgment to be
taken.
x In United P.P.I. Co. v. Britton (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S.W. 576. 578, it was
said: 'It
is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when
application
therefor is delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of
one of the
claimants of the fund, and this is especially true where the holder of the
fund
had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such
judgment and
an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which
such
judgment was rendered. See notes and cases cited 35 Am. Dec. 703; 91
An. St.
Rep. 598; also 5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence No. 41.'
x The principle thus stated has been recognized in many cases in other
jurisdictions, among which may be cited American Surety Co. v. O'Brien,
223
Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787; Phillips v. Taylor, 148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18;
Moore v.
Hill, 59 Ga. 760, 761; Yearborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. (11
Miss.) 291,
41 Am. Dec. 626. See, also, 33 C.J. p. 447, No. 30; Nash v. McCullum,
(Tex. Civ.
App.) 74 S.W. 2d 1042, 1047.
x It would seem that this rule should logically follow since, after the
recovery of
judgment, the interpleading of the judgment creditor is in effect a
collateral
attack upon the judgment. 21

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x In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the MISSION under the
Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be
Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case paid to whomever may
be found later to be entitled thereto, with costs.
26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in o IAC
dismissed petition BUT reversed itself
effect be a collateral attack upon the inexcusably late, for which
final judgment in the said civil reason it is barred by laches or
case; the appellee Lee had already unreasonable delay.
established his rights to membership fee
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS
certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST
and, therefore, this interpleader suit SPECIAL CASES DIVISION
would compel him to establish his rights INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
anew, and thereby increase instead of NORTH
diminish litigations, which is one of the PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE
purposes of an interpleader suit, with the SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS,
possiblity that the benefits of the final respondents.
judgment in the said civil case might SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 73794 September 19,
eventually be taken away from him; and 1988
because the Corporation allowed itself
to be sued to final judgment in the said FACTS:
case, its action of interpleader was filed
x Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks the aforesaid
Corporation and private respondent contract; and
North Philippine Union Mission o (c) The trial or
Corporation of the Seventh Day hearing is hereby ordered as
Adventists (MISSION for short) scheduled to
executed a Land Development proceed on
Agreement whereby the former November 29, 1984
undertook to introduce and construct and on December 6,
at its own expense and 1984 at 8:30 in the
responsibility necessary improvements on morning per order of
the property owned by private respondent this Court dated
into a memorial park to be subdivided October 4, 1984 in
into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a order to determine
stipulated area and price per lot and the the alleged claims of
latter is entitled to 40% of the net gross ownership by the
collection from the project to be remitted intervenors and all
monthly by petitioner to private claims and
respondent through a designated allegations of each
depositary trustee bank party to the instant"
x Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership case will be
over the parcel of land in question considered and
x Eternal filed a complaint for interpleader (Rollo, decided carefully by
pp. 169-179) against private this court on just and
respondent MISSION and Maysilo Estate, meritorious grounds.
docketed as Special Court Case No. C- (Rollo, p. 39)
9556 of the then CFI of Rizal, Branch XII, x Mission filed an MD on the Interpleader
Caloocan, alleging among others, that and the claims of the Maysilo Estate
in view of the conflicting claims of and the Intervenors and to
ownership of the defendants (herein order the Eternal Gardens to
private comply with its Land
respondent and Maysilo Estate) over the Management with MISSION.
properties subject matter of the x RTC granted the MD; dismissed the
contracts, over which plaintiff corporation interpleader
(herein petitioner) has no claim of x RTC REVERSED itself
ownership except as a purchaser thereof, x Inspite of the new order of the RTC
and to protect the interests of plaintiff reversing itself, Mission filed a motion for
corporation which has no interest in the execution
subject matter of the dispute and is o RTC denied
willing to pay whoever is entitled or x Mission elevated to CA via Rule 65
declared to be the owners of said o CA dismissed petition
properties, x Mission elevated to SC
the defendants should be required to o SC denied
interplead and litigate their several claims x Heirs of the late spouses Vicente Singson
Encarnacion and Lucila Conde filed
between themselves Civil Case No. C-11836 for
x Maysilo filed an MD quieting of title with Branch
o for lack of cause of action but also CXXII, Regional Trial
presented an answer dated Court, Caloocan City, where
November 12, 1981 petitioner and private
x RTC denied MD respondent were named as
x Mission then filed a motion for the placing on defendants.
judicial deposit the amounts due x Mission filed a petition for certiorari
and unpaid from petitioner with the then Intermediate Appellate
o RTC denied Court docketed as AC-G.R. No.
x RTC set aside the order 04869 praying that the
o (a) The order directing the aforementioned Orders of
NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION February 13, 1984 and October
MISSION CORPORATION OF 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial
SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS Court be set aside and that an
to order be issued to deposit in
deposit the amounts it court or in a depositor trustee
received under the bank of any and all payments,
implementation of the plus interest thereon, due the
LAND DEVELOPMENT private respondent
AGREEMENT which is not
questioned by the
plaintiff, Eternal Gardens, is
hereby ordered set aside for
the
reason that the titles to
ownership, the North
Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of
Seventh Day Adventists on
the lots subject
matter of the aforesaid
agreement is not established
invalid, and
the alleged titles of
intervenors are not proven
yet by competent
evidence;
o (b) The motion to require
Eternal Gardens to deposit the
balance under the Land
Development Agreement is
likewise hereby ordered
denied considering the fact
the aforesaid plaintiff had not
denied its obligations under
 WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders
its decision of
February 27, 1986, and sets
aside the questioned
portions of the respondent
Court's orders of February
13 and October 26, 1984. The
private respondent is hereby
ordered to deposit whatever
amounts are due from it
under the Land Development
Agreement of October 6,
1976 with a reputable bank to
be
designated by the
respondent court to be the
depository trustee of the
said amounts to be paid to
whoever shall be found
entitled thereto. No costs
x Eternal filed an MR
x IAC resolved as follows
o In the meantime, to avoid possible wastage of
funds, the Court
RESOLVED to require the private
respondent 6 to DEPOSIT its
accruing installments within ten (10)
days from notice with a
reputable commercial bank in a
savings deposit account, in the
name of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, with the details to be
reported or manifested to this Court
within ten (10) days from the time the
deposit/deposits are made, such
deposits not to be withdrawn without
authority from this Court.
ISSUE: Whether Mission correctly resorted to an interpleader.
HELD: YES.
x There is no question that courts have inherent power to
amend their judgments,
to make them conformable to the law applicable
provided that said judgments
have not yet attained finality (Villanueva v. Court of
First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro, Pinamalayan Branch II, 119 SCRA 288
[1982]). In fact, motions for
reconsideration are allowed to convince the courts
that their rulings are
erroneous and improper Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138
SCRA 543-544 [1985]; Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. v.
CFI of Lanao del Sur (32 SCRA 317 [1970]) and in so
doing, said courts are given sufficient opportunity to
correct their errors.
x In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show
that petitioner
admitted among others in its complaint in
Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain
amounts to private respondent; that it claims no
interest in such
amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared
entitled to said amounts. Such admissions in the
complaint were reaffirmed in open court before the
Court of Appeals as stated in the latter court's
resolution dated September 5, 1985 in A.C. G.R. No.
04869 which states:
o The private respondent (MEMORIAL) then
reaffirms before the
Court its original position that it is a
disinterested party with respect to the
property now the subject of the
interpleader case ...
o In the light of the willingness, expressly made
before the court,
affirming the complaint filed below, that
the private respondent (MEMORIAL) will
pay whatever is due on the Land
Development Agreement to the
rightful owner/owners, there is
no reason why the amount due
on subject agreement has not
been placed in the custody of
the Court. (Rollo, p. 227).
x Under the circumstances, there appears to be no
plausible reason for
petitioner's objections to the deposit of the
amounts in litigation after
having asked for the assistance of the lower
court by filing a complaint
for interpleader where the deposit of
aforesaid amounts is not only
required by the nature of the action but is a
contractual obligation of
the petitioner under the Land
Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).
x As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, the essence of an
interpleader, aside from the disavowal of
interest in the property in
litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the
deposit of the property or
funds in controversy with the court. it is a
rule founded on justice and
equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to
benefit from the
property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the
expense of whoever will ultimately be
decided as entitled thereto."
(Rollo, p. 24).
x The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari with
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Said
appellate court found that more than
twenty million pesos are involved; so that on
interest alone for savings or time
deposit would be considerable, now accruing
in favor of the Eternal Gardens.
Finding that such is violative of the very
essence of the complaint for
interpleader as it clearly runs against the
interest of justice in this case, the Court
of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that
the lower court committed a grave
abuse of discretion which requires correction
by the requirement that a deposit
of said amounts should be made to a bank
approved by the Court. (Rollo, p.-25)
x Petitioner would now compound the issue by its
obvious turn-about, presently
claiming in its memorandum that there
is a novation of contract so that the
amounts due under the Land
Development Agreement were allegedly
extinguished, and the requirement to make a
deposit of said amounts in a
depositary bank should be held in abeyance
until after the conflicting claims of
ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII
RTC-Caloocan City, has finally been
resolved.
x All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in
question has been
established, riot only in the lower courts and
in the Court of Appeals but also in the
Supreme Court where such deposit was
required in "the resolution of July 8, 1987 to
avoid wastage of funds.
SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA,
Petitioners, vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.,
Respondent.
Third Division, G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008
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accompanied by
consignation in order
that the effects of
payment may be
FACTS: before MeTC Mla Branch 12
x Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and x MeTC dismissed the complaint
petitioners executed two Contracts o It considered petitioners non-
of Lease3 whereby the former, as lessor, payment of rentals as unjustified.
agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, The court held
24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the that mere
San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. willingness to
Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, pay the rent did
Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay not
monthly rentals amount to
x The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not payment of the
materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, obligation;
32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease petitioners
contracts should have
x Pasricha religiously paid the monthly rentals deposited their
until May 1992 payment in the name
x Demands followed of respondent
x Don Luis (through representative Ms. Bautista) company. On the
filed a complaint for ejectment matter of possession
 of the subject premises, the the premises and they had the
court did not give credence to right to
petitioners claim that private the use and enjoyment of the
respondent failed to turn over same. They, likewise, had the
possession of the premises. right to resist any
The court, however, act of intrusion into their
dismissed the complaint peaceful possession of the
because of Ms. Bautistas property, even as against
alleged lack of authority to the lessor itself. Yet, they did not
sue on behalf of the lift a finger to protect their right
corporation. if, indeed,
x RTC reversed there was a violation of the
o The court adopted the MeTCs finding contract by the lessor.
on petitioners unjustified x What was, instead, clearly established by
refusal to pay the rent, which the evidence was petitioners
is a valid ground for non-payment of rentals because
ejectment. It, ostensibly they did not know to
however, faulted the MeTC in whom
dismissing the case on the payment should be made.
ground of However, this did not justify their
lack of capacity to sue. failure to
Instead, it upheld Ms. pay, because if such were the
Bautistas authority to case, they were not without any
represent respondent remedy.
notwithstanding the absence They should have availed of the
of a board provisions of the Civil Code of the
resolution to that effect, Philippines on the consignation
since her authority was of payment and of the Rules of
implied from her power as a Court on interpleader.
general manager/treasurer x Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:
of the company. o Article 1256. If the creditor to
whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without
ISSUE: Whether Pasricha should have availed of the just cause to accept
remedy of interpleader considering their defense it, the debtor shall be
that they did not know to whom payments are due. released from
responsibility by the
HELD: YES. consignation of the
x Petitioners justifications are belied by the thing or sum
evidence on record. As correctly held due.
by the CA, petitioners communications to o Consignation alone shall
respondent prior to the filing of the produce the same effect in the
complaint never mentioned their alleged following
inability to use the rooms.52 What they cases:
pointed out in their letters is that they did (4) When two or
not know to whom payment should be more persons claim the
made, whether to Ms. Bautista or to same right
Pacheco.53 In their July 26 and October x Consignation shall be made by depositing
30, the things due at the disposal of a
1993 letters, petitioners only questioned judicial authority, before
the method of computing their electric whom the tender of
billings without, however, raising a payment shall be proved in
complaint about their failure to use the a
rooms.54 Although petitioners stated in proper case, and the
their December 30, 1993 letter that announcement of the
respondent failed to fulfill its part of the consignation in other
contract,55 nowhere did they specifically cases.57
refer to their inability to use the leased x In the instant case, consignation alone
rooms. Besides, at that time, they were would have produced the effect of
already in default on their rentals for more payment of the rentals. The
than a year. rationale for consignation is to
x If it were true that they were allowed to use only avoid the
one of the nine (9) rooms performance of an obligation
subject of the contract of lease, and becoming more onerous to the
considering that the rooms were debtor by reason of
intended causes not imputable to him.58
for a business purpose, we cannot Petitioners claim that they made a
understand why they did not specifically written tender
assert their right. If we believe of payment and actually prepared
petitioners contention that they had vouchers for their monthly
been rentals. But that
prevented from using the rooms for more was insufficient to constitute a
than a year before the complaint for valid tender of payment. Even
ejectment was filed, they should have assuming that it
demanded specific performance from the was valid tender, still, it would not
constitute payment for want of
lessor and commenced an action in consignation
court. With the execution of the contract, of the amount. Well-settled is the
rule that tender of payment must
petitioners were already in a position to be
exercise their right to the use and
enjoyment of the property according to
the terms of the lease contract.56 As
borne out by the records, the fact is that
respondent turned over to petitioners
the keys to the leased premises and
petitioners, in fact, renovated the rooms.

Thus, they were placed in possession of

 produced.59
x Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
o Section 1. When interpleader proper. - Whenever
conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may
be made against a
person who claims no interest whatever
in the subject matter, or
an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants
to compel them to interplead and litigate
their several claims
among themselves.
x Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee
does not know to whom payment of rentals should
be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).60 The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but
to protect him against double vexation in respect of
one liability.61
x Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies,
petitioners opted to refrain
from making payments.
x Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of
Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as
a justification for non-payment of rentals. Although
the two contracts embraced
the lease of nine (9) rooms, the terms of the
contracts - with their particular
reference to specific rooms and the monthly rental for
each - easily raise the inference that the parties
intended the lease of each room separate from that of
the others.lavvphil There is nothing in the contract
which would lead to the
conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to
be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9)
rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room by the
lessee gave rise to the corresponding obligation to
pay the monthly rental for the same. Notably,
respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the
rooms actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners.
x It may also be mentioned that the contract specifically
provides that the lease of
Rooms 36, 37 and 38 was to take effect only when
the tenants thereof would
vacate the premises. Absent a clear showing that
the previous tenants had
vacated the premises, respondent had no obligation
to deliver possession of the subject rooms to
petitioners. Thus, petitioners cannot use the non-
delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as an excuse for
their failure to pay the rentals due on the other rooms
they occupied.1avvphil
x In light of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every
right to exercise his
right to eject the erring lessees. The parties
contracts of lease contain identical provisions, to
wit:
o In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment
of rental on the
fifth (5th) day of each month, the amount
owing shall as penalty bear interest at
the rate of FOUR percent (4%) per
month, to be paid, without prejudice to
the right of the LESSOR to terminate his
contract, enter the premises, and/or eject
the LESSEE as
hereinafter set forth;62
x Moreover, Article 1673 of the Civil Code gives the lessor the
right to judicially
eject the lessees in case of non-payment of
the monthly rentals. A contract of lease is a
consensual, bilateral, onerous and
commutative contract by which the owner
temporarily grants the use of his property to
another, who undertakes to pay the rent
therefor.64 For failure to pay the rent,
petitioners have no right to remain in the
leased premises.
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 154470-71 September 24, 2012
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.
Second Division, G.R. Nos. 154589-90
FACTS:
x These are two consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, on
pure questions of law, filed by the petitioners
Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
x Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was
the registered owner of seven
Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face
value of P 70 million, issued on January
2, 1994 and would mature on January 2,
1995.2 As evidenced by a "Detached
Assignment" dated April 8, 1994,3 the RCBC
sold these CB bills to the BOC
x BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB
x PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70
million, with maturity
date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a
Trading Order8 and a Confirmation of
Sale
x However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the
PDB delivered the seven CB
bills to the BOC, as evidenced by a PDB
Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a
"note: ** substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" -
referring to the Treasury Bills.10
x Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the
Detached Assignments. It is
basically the nature of this April 15
transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot
agree on.
x On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it "sold
back"11 to the PDB three of the
seven CB bills. In turn, the PDB transferred
these three CB bills to Bancapital
Development Corporation (Bancap). On April
25, 1994, the BOC bought the three
CB bills from Bancap - so, ultimately, the BOC
reacquired these three CB bills
x On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four
(4) CB bills to Capital One
Equities Corporation13 which transferred
them to All-Asia Capital and Trust
Corporation (All Asia). On September 30,
1994, All Asia further transferred the four
CB bills back to the RCBC.
x On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All
Asia one of these 4 CB bills.
o When the BSP refused to release the
amount of this CB bill on
maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia
this lone CB bill
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Bank of the Philippines,
which in turn sold it to
x As the registered owner of the remaining three CB the BOC
bills, the RCBC sold them to x On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the
IVI Capital and Insular Savings Bank. transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB
Again, when the BSP refused to release informed20 the Officer-in-Charge
the of the BSPs Government
amount of this CB bill on maturity, the Securities
RCBC paid back its transferees, reacquired Department,21 Lagrimas Nuqui,
of the PDBs claim over these CB
these three CB bills and sold them to the bills, based on
BOC - ultimately, the BOC acquired the Detached Assignments in its
these three CB bills. possession. The PDB requested
x All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven the BSP22 to
CB bills record its claim in the BSPs
x On April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner, books, explaining that its non-
o (i) sold two CB bills with a total face possession of the CB
value of P 20 million to the bills is "on account of imperfect
PDB and negotiations thereof and/or
o (ii) delivered to the PDB the subsequent setoff or
corresponding Detached Assignment transfer.
x PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills18 (April o Nuqui denied the request
19 transaction). In turn, x PDB filed29 with the RTC two separate
Bancap sold the CB bills to Al- petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition
Amanah Islamic Investment
 and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order
o The PDB essentially claims that in
both the April 15 transaction
(involving the first set of
CB bills) and the April 19
transaction
(involving the second set
of CB bills), there was no
intent on its
part to transfer title of the CB
bills, as shown by its non-
issuance of a detached
assignment in favor of the
BOC and Bancap,
respectively. The PDB
particularly alleges that it
merely
"warehoused"31 the first
set of CB bills with the BOC,
as security
collateral.
x RTC issued a TRO
o temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the
BSP from paying the face value
of the CB bills on maturity
x PDB filed an Amended Petition, additionally
impleading the BOC and All Asia.
o Cases were then consolidated
x RTC granted the PDBs application for a writ of
preliminary prohibitory
injunction
x BOC filed their Answer
o praying for the dismissal of the
petition. It argued that the PDB has
no cause of action against it
since the PDB is no longer the
owner
of the CB bills. Contrary to the
PDBs "warehousing
theory,"38 the
BOC asserted that the (i) April
15 transaction and the (ii)
April 19
transaction - covering both
sets of CB bills - were valid
contracts of
sale, followed by a transfer of
title (i) to the BOC (in the April
15
transaction) upon the PDBs
delivery of the 1st set of CB
bills in
substitution of the Treasury
Bills the PDB originally
intended to sell, and (ii) to
Bancap (in the April 19
transaction) upon the PDBs
delivery of the 2nd set of
CB bills to Bancap,
likewise by way of
substitution.
x BOC and the PDB entered into two separate
Escrow Agreements.45
o The first agreement covered the first
set of CB bills, while the
second agreement covered
the second set of CB bills.
The parties
agreed to jointly collect from
the BSP the maturity
proceeds of
these CB bills and to deposit
said amount in escrow,
"pending final
determination by Court
judgment, or amicable
settlement as to
who shall be eventually entitled
thereto."46
x The BOC and the PDB filed a Joint Motion,47
submitting these Escrow
Agreements for court approval.
o RTC gave its approval to the
parties Joint Motion
x In view of the BOCs acquisition of all the CB bills,
All Asia50 moved to be
dropped as a respondent
(with the PDBs
conformity51), which the
RTC granted.52 The RCBC
subsequently followed
suit.
o RTC required the parties to
manifest their intention regarding
the case and to
inform the court
of any amicable
settlement;
"otherwise, th[e]
case shall be
dismissed for
lack of interest."
x BOC moved (i) that the case be set for
pre-trial and (ii) for further
proceeding to resolve the
remaining issues between
the BOC and the PDB,
particularly on "who has a
better right over the subject
CB bills."
o PDB joined the BOC in its
motion
x RTC granted the BSPs motion to
interplead and, accordingly, required the
BOC to amend its Answer and for the
conflicting claimants to comment thereon
x BOC filed its Amended Consolidated
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,
reiterating its earlier arguments asserting
ownership over the subject CB bills.
x RTC admitted60 the BOCs Amended
Consolidated Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims.
x PDB mfiled an Omnibus Motion,61
questioning the RTCs jurisdiction over the
BOCs "additional
counterclaims." The PDB argues
that its petitions pray for the
BSP (not the RTC) to determine
who among the conflicting
claimants to the CB
bills stands in the position of the
bona fide holder for value. The
RTC cannot
entertain the BOCs
counterclaim, regardless of its
nature, because it is the BSP
which has jurisdiction to
determine who is entitled to
receive the proceeds of the
CB bills.
x RTC dismissed the PDBs petition, the
BOCs counterclaim and the BSPs
counter-complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader, holding that under
CB Circular No. 28, it has no
jurisdiction (i) over the BOCs
"counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve
the issue of ownership of the CB
bills.64
x With the denial of their separate motions
for Reconsideration,65 the BOC and
the BSP separately filed the present
petitions for review on certiorari

ISSUE # 1: Whether the RTC should have taken cognizance of PDBs
petition.
HELD # 1: YES.
x Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the
RTC acted correctly
in initially assuming jurisdiction over the PDBs
petition for mandamus,
prohibition and injunction.128 While the RTC agreed
(albeit erroneously) with the PDBs view (that the BSP
has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not only the
BOCs/the BSPs counterclaims but the PDBs petition
itself as well, on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction.
o This is plain error.
x Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are
bound by the rule
on non-waiver of jurisdiction.129 believes that
jurisdiction over the BOCs
counterclaims and the BSPs counterclaim/crossclaim
for interpleader calls for the application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the allowance of the
PDBs petition even becomes imperative because
courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua
sponte.130
x Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the
adoption of either of these
two would lead the trial court into serious legal error:
first, if it granted the PDBs
petition, its decision would have to be set aside on
appeal because the BSP has
no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second
when it dismissed the PDBs
petitions and the BOCs counterclaims on the ground
that it lacks jurisdiction, the
trial court seriously erred because precisely, the
resolution of the conflicting
claims over the CB bills falls within its general jurisdiction.
x Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have
properly dismissed the
PDBs petition but on the ground that mandamus
does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct
alternative is no longer plausible since the BSP, as a
respondent below, already properly brought before
the RTC the remaining conflicting claims over the
subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim
for interpleader. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of
Court provides when an interpleader is proper:
o SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. -
Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against a person who
claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the
claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to
compel them to interplead and litigate
their several claims
among themselves.
x The remedy of an action of interpleader131 is designed to
protect a
person against double vexation in respect of a single
liability.7 It
requires, as an indispensable requisite, that
conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against the stakeholder (the
possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest
which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants.132
x Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing
claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without
exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having
to pay more than once on a single liability.133
x When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, in
reality a new action arises,134 where the
claims of the interpleaders themselves are
brought to the fore, the stakeholder as
plaintiff is
relegated merely to the role of initiating the
suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader,
when proper, merely provides an avenue for
the
conflicting claims on the same subject
matter to be threshed out in an action.
Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:
o SEC. 2. Order. - Upon the filing of the
complaint, the court shall
issue an order requiring the
conflicting claimants to
interplead with
one another. If the interests of
justice so require, the court may
direct in such order that the
subject matter be paid or
delivered to
the court.
x This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the
BSPs motion to interplead.
The PDB itself "agreed that the various
claimants should now interplead." Thus, the
PDB and the BOC subsequently entered into
two separate escrow
agreements, covering the CB bills, and submitted
them to the RTC for approval.
x In granting the BSPs motion, the RTC acted on the
correct premise that it has
jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting
claims over the CB bills - consistent
with the rules and the parties conduct - and
accordingly required the BOC to
amend its answer and for the PDB to
comment thereon. Suddenly, however, the
PDB made an about-face and questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by
the PDBs argument, the RTC dismissed even
the PDBs petition - which means
that it did not actually compel the BSP to
resolve the BOCs and the PDBs claims.
x Without the motion to interplead and the order
granting it, the RTC could only
dismiss the PDBs petition since it is the RTC
which has jurisdiction to resolve the
parties conflicting claims - not the BSP. Given
that the motion to interplead has
been actually filed, the RTC could not have
really granted the relief originally
sought in the PDBs petition since the RTCs
order granting the BSPs motion to
interplead - to which the PDB in fact
acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the
dismissal of the PDBs petition. This is not
altered by the fact that the PDB
additionally prayed in its petition for
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit
"against the public respondents" because
the grant of the order to interplead
effectively sustained the propriety of the
BSPs resort to this procedural device.
x Interpleader
o 1. as a special civil action
x What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did
not initiate the interpleader
suit through an original complaint but
through its Answer. This circumstance
becomes understandable if it is considered
that insofar as the BSP is concerned,
the PDB does not possess any right to have
its claim recorded in the BSPs
books; consequently, the PDB cannot
properly be considered even as a potential
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"counter-complaint/cross-claim
for interpleader" runs counter to
claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills general
upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader procedures.
was only an alternative position, made x Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141
only in the BSPs Answer.135 allow a party to seek an affirmative relief
x The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil from the court through the
action, is primarily procedural device of a
governed by the specific provisions in Rule motion. While captioned
62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily "Answer with counter
by the provisions applicable to ordinary complaint/cross-claim for
civil actions.136 interpleader," the RTC
Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly understood this as in the nature
authorize the filing of a complaint-in- of a motion,142 seeking relief
interpleader as part of, although separate which essentially
and independent from, the answer. consists in an order for the
Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to conflicting claimants to litigate
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of with each other so
Court137 does not include a complaint-in- that "payment is made to the
interpleader as a claim,138 a form of rightful or legitimate owner"143
defense,139 or as an objection that a of the subject CB
defendant may be allowed to put up in bills.
his
answer or in a motion to dismiss. This x The rules define a "civil action" as "one by
does not mean, however, that the BSPs which a party sues another for the
 enforcement or protection of a right, or required. It reasons out that
the prevention or redress of a wrong." since the RCBC and All Asia (the
Interpleader may be considered as a intervening holders of the CB
stakeholders remedy to prevent a bills) have already been dropped
wrong, that is, from making payment to from the case, then the BOCs
one not entitled to it, thereby rendering counterclaim must only be
itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those permissive in nature and the
legally entitled to payment. BOC should have paid the
x Interpleader is a civil action made special by the correct docket fees.
existence of particular rules to x We see no reason to belabor this claim.
govern the uniqueness of its application Even if we gloss over the PDBs own
and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 conformity to the dropping of
of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary these entities as parties, the BOC
civil actions, a partys claim is asserted correctly argues
"in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, that a remedy is provided under
third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or the Rules. Section 12, Rule 6 of
complaint-in-intervention." In an the Rules of
interpleader suit, however, a claim is not Court reads:
required to be contained in any of these o SEC. 12. Bringing new parties.
pleadings but in the answer-(of the - When the presence of parties
conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. other than those to
This claim is different from the counter- the original action is
claim (or cross-claim, third party- required for the
complaint) which is separately allowed granting of complete
under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62. relief in the
determination of a
ISSUE # 2: Whether BOCs failure to pay the counterclaim or
appropriate docket fees prevents the RTC from cross-
acquiring jurisdiction over the BOCs claim, the court shall
"counterclaims." order them to be
brought in as
HELD: # 2: NO. defendants, if
o 2. the payment of docket fees jurisdiction over them
covering BOCs counterclaim can be obtained.
x The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC x Even then, the strict characterization of
has jurisdiction over the issue the BOCs counterclaim is no longer
of ownership of the CB bills, the BOCs material in disposing of the
failure to pay the appropriate docket fees PDBs argument based on non-
prevents the RTC from acquiring payment of docket
jurisdiction over the BOCs fees.
"counterclaims." x When an action is filed in court, the
o We disagree with the PDB. complaint must be accompanied by the
x To reiterate and recall, the order granting the payment of the requisite docket
"PDBs motion to interplead," and filing fees by the party
already resulted in the dismissal of the seeking affirmative
PDBs petition. The same order relief from the court. It is the
required the BOC to amend its answer filing of the complaint or
and for the conflicting claimants appropriate initiatory
to comment, presumably to conform to pleading, accompanied by the
the nature of an answer-in payment of the prescribed docket
interpleader. Perhaps, by reason of the fee, that vests a trial court with
BOCs denomination of its claim as a jurisdiction over the claim or the
"compulsory counterclaim" and the PDBs nature of the action.147
failure to fully However, the non-payment of
appreciate the RTCs order granting the the docket fee at the time of
"BSPs motion for interpleader" (with the filing does not
PDBs conformity), the PDB mistakenly automatically cause the
treated the BOCs dismissal of the case, so long
claim as a "permissive counterclaim" as the fee is paid within
which necessitates the payment of
docket fees.
x As the preceding discussions would show,
however, the BOCs "claim" - i.e., its
assertion of ownership over the CB bills -
is in reality just that, a "claim" against
the stakeholder and not as a
"counterclaim,"144 whether
compulsory145 or
permissive. It is only the BOCs
alternative prayer (for the PDB to deliver
to the
BOC, as the buyer in the April 15
transaction and the ultimate successor-
in-
interest of the buyer in the April 19
transaction, either the original subjects of
the sales or the value thereof plus
whatever income that may have been
earned
pendente lite) and its prayer for
damages that are obviously
compulsory counterclaims against
the PDB and, therefore, does not
require payment of docket fees.146
x The PDB takes a contrary position through its
insistence that a compulsory
counterclaim should be one where the
presence of third parties, of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is not
 fees are necessary to defray
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, court expenses in the handling
especially when the claimant of cases. Consequently, in
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules order to avoid tremendous
prescribing such payment.148 losses to the judiciary, and to
x In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline the government as well, the
on the payment of payment of docket fees cannot
docket fee by the claimants in an interpleader suit, be made dependent on the
compounded by the unusual manner in which the outcome of the case, except
interpleader suit was initiated and the circumstances when the claimant is a pauper-
surrounding it, we surely cannot deduce from the litigant
BOCs mere failure to specify in its prayer the total
amount of the CB bills it lays claim to (or the value of
the B. Declaratory Relief [RULE 63]
subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April 19
transactions, in its alternative prayer) an intention to 1. Nature; Kinds
defraud the government that would warrant the
dismissal of its claim.149
x At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOCs Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person
"counterclaims," for interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
purposes of payment of filing fees, both the BOC and instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
the PDB, properly executive order or
as defendants-in-interpleader, must be assessed the regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
payment of the regulation may, before breach or violation thereof
correct docket fee arising from their respective bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
claims. The seminal to determine any question of construction or validity
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
Asuncion150 provides us guidance in the payment thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
of docket fees, to wit:
o 1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet
is not title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
accompanied by payment of the docket consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
fee, the court may Code, may be brought under this Rule.
allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in 2. Parties
no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary Section 2. Parties. All persons who have or claim
period any interest which would be affected by the declaration
o 2. The same rule applies to permissive shall be made parties; and no declaration shall, except
counterclaims, as otherwise
third-party claims and similar pleadings, provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not
which shall not be considered filed until parties to the action.
and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow
3. Conversion into ordinary action
payment of said fee within a reasonable
time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action. If
period. before the final termination of the
[underscoring ours] case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a
x This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of statute, executive order or regulation,
which reads: ordinance, or any other governmental regulation should
o SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and take place, the action may thereupon be converted into
litigation expenses an ordinary action, and the parties shall be allowed to
as liens. - The docket and other lawful file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper.
fees paid by the party who filed a
complaint under this Rule, as well as the EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA,
costs and litigation expenses, shall petitioners, vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES,
constitute a lien or charge upon the INC., respondent.
subject matter of the action, unless the THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008
court shall order otherwise.
x only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the 26
one who
initiated the interpleader suit, and who, under the
Rules, actually
"claims no interest whatever in the subject matter."
By constituting a
lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in
effect only aims to
actually compensate the complainant-in-interpleader,
who happens to
be the stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught
in a legal
crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants,
for the faultless
trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-
interpleader are
actually the ones who make a claim - only that it was
extraordinarily
done through the procedural device of interpleader -
then to them
devolves the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed
under Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.151
x The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee
cannot be
overemphasized:
o The matter of payment of docket fees is not a
mere triviality. These
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suit. There is no
showing that
respondent committed
an act constituting a
breach
FACTS: four (4) years from
x Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, May 1, 1997
represented by its president Ramon unless sooner terminated as
H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of provided in the contract
Lease4 with Ponciano L. Almeda x During the effectivity of the contract,
(Ponciano), Ponciano died.
as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia x Almedas then wrote to Bathala that the
and father of petitioner Romel Almeda former shall assess and collect Value
o Under the said contract, Ponciano Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals.
agreed to lease a portion of the o Bathala contended that VAT
Almeda Compound, located may not be imposed as the rentals
at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, fixed in the
Makati contract of lease
City, consisting of 7,348.25 were supposed to
square meters, for a monthly include the VAT
rental of therein,
P1,107,348.69, for a term of considering that
their contract was
 executed on May 1, 1997
when the VAT law had long
been in effect
x Bathala then received another letter from
Almedas informing the former that
its monthly rental should be increased by
73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the
contract and Article 1250 of the Civil
Code. Respondent opposed petitioners'
demand and insisted that there was no
extraordinary inflation to warrant the
application of Article 1250 in light of the
pronouncement of this Court in various
cases
x Bathala refused to pay the VAT and adjusted
rentals as demanded by
petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
amount set forth in their contract.
x Bathala instituted an action for declaratory
relief (DR) for purposes of
determining the correct interpretation
of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease
contract to prevent damage and
prejudice before the RTC Makati
x Almedas in turn filed an action for ejectment,
rescission and damages against
respondent for failure of the latter to
vacate the premises after the
demand made by the former.
o Before Bathala can file its Answer,
Almedas filed a Notice of
Dismissal
o Almedas then subsequently refiled the
same in MeTC Makati
x Almedas filed an MD in the DR case for being
an improper remedy considering
that respondent was already in breach of
the obligation and that the case would
not end the litigation and settle the rights
of the parties.
x RTC denied MD; ruled in favor of Bathala
o denied petitioners their right to pass
on to respondent the burden
of paying the VAT since it was
not a new tax that would call
for the
application of the sixth clause
of the contract. The court,
likewise,
denied their right to collect
the demanded increase in
rental, there
being no extraordinary
inflation or devaluation as
provided for in
the seventh clause of the
contract. Because of the
payment made
by respondent of the rental
adjustment demanded by
petitioners,
the court ordered the
restitution by the latter to the
former of the
amounts paid,
notwithstanding the well-
established rule that in an
action for declaratory relief,
other than a declaration of
rights and
obligations, affirmative reliefs
are not sought by or awarded
to the
parties.
x Almedas appealed to CA
x CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision
x Almedas filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o The appellate court agreed with the
conclusions of law and the
application of the decisional
rules on the matter made by
the RTC. However, it found
that the trial court exceeded
its jurisdiction in granting
affirmative relief to the
respondent, particularly the
restitution of its excess payment.
ISSUE: Whether Bathala correctly resorted
to a petition for declaratory relief
considering the allegation of the Almedas
that the former has already breached the
contract of lease.
HELD: YES.
x Declaratory relief is defined as an action
by any person interested in a
deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity
arising
from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute, and for
a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that
may be raised in such a petition is
the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute. Corollary is the
general rule that such an action
must be justified, as no other adequate
relief or remedy is available under
the circumstances. 15
x Decisional law enumerates the
requisites of an action for declaratory
relief, as follows: 1) the subject
matter of the controversy must
be a
deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute,
executive
order or regulation, or
ordinance; 2) the terms of said
documents and
the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial
construction; 3)
there must have been no breach
of the documents in question; 4)
there
must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one
between persons whose interests
are adverse; 5) the issue must be
ripe for judicial determination;
and 6) adequate relief is not
available through other means
or other forms of action or
proceeding.16
x It is beyond cavil that the foregoing
requisites are present in the instant case,
except that petitioners
insist that respondent was
already in breach of the
contract when the petition
was filed.
o We do not agree.
x After petitioners demanded payment of
adjusted rentals and in the months that
followed, respondent complied
with the terms and conditions set
forth in their
contract of lease by paying the
rentals stipulated therein.
Respondent religiously
fulfilled its obligations to
petitioners even during the
pendency of the present
 of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is remedy, according to the
not barred from instituting before the trial court the OSG, is to file a petition for
petition for declaratory relief. annulment or for legal
x Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper separation.5
because a separate action Furthermore, the OSG
for rescission, ejectment and damages had been argues there is no law that
commenced before another court; thus, the governs respondents
construction of the subject contractual provisions situation. The OSG posits
should be ventilated in the same forum. that this is a matter of
o We are not convinced. legislation and not of judicial
x It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum determination
Corporation17 we held x Cipriano For his part, respondent admits that
that the petition for declaratory relief should be Article 26 is not directly
dismissed in view of the applicable to his case but insists that when
pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
However, we cannot apply decree which capacitated her to remarry, he
the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, is likewise capacitated by operation of law
the unlawful detainer case pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
had already been resolved by the trial court before Constitution.
the dismissal of the
declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that ISSUE: What is the nature of Ciprianos petition before the RTC?
case who insisted that the
action for declaratory relief be preferred over the HELD: DECLARATORY RELIEF.
action for unlawful detainer. x At the outset, we note that the petition for authority
Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had to remarry filed before the
not yet resolved the trial court actually constituted a petition for
rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
the declaratory relief petition. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was o Section 1. Who may file petitionAny
on appeal, itself initiated person interested under a
the suspension of the proceedings pending the deed, will, contract or other
resolution of the action for written instrument, or whose
declaratory relief. rights are
x We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, affected by a statute, executive
Jr. v. Mirasol18 order or regulation, ordinance, or
where the declaratory relief action was dismissed other governmental regulation
because the issue therein could may, before breach or violation
be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, thereof, bring an action in the
again, in that case, there was appropriate Regional Trial Court
already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of to determine any question of
the declaratory relief construction or validity arising,
petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the and for a declaration of his rights
Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case. or duties, thereunder.
x Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is x The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
disposed to entertain the (1) there must be
instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
it, notwithstanding the pendency of the must be between persons whose interests are
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
resolution of the present petition would write finis to has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for that the issue is ripe for
all the question of the proper interpretation of the judicial determination.8
two contractual stipulations subject of this x This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
controversy. Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. U.S.A. The interests of the parties
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 are also adverse, as petitioner representing
the State asserts its duty to protect
FACTS: 27
x Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
o Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
x Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer.
x A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an
American citizen.
x Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley
x Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
x Republic did not file its Opposition
x RTC granted Ciprianos petition
x Republic filed an MR
o RTC denied
x Republic filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
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the institution of marriage while September 17, 2009

respondent, a private citizen, insists on
a FACTS:
declaration of his capacity to remarry. x During the lifetime of Anastacio
Danao, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
(Consuelo), who was
interest in the controversy. The issue
married to Joaquin
raised is also ripe for judicial
Boncad, to build on and
determination inasmuch as when
occupy the
respondent remarries, litigation ensues
southern portion of the
and puts into question the validity of his
subject property.
second marriage.
Anastacio and Consuelo
agreed that the
latter would vacate the
CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA,
said land at any time
EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO
that Anastacio and his
and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented
heirs might
herein by their Attorney-
need it.
in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, vs.
x Danao died.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA,
x Malana are the Owners of a parcel of
SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES
land (TCT T-1279373 situated in
FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN,
Tuguegarao City,
Respondents. THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No.
Cagayan). They
181303
 inherited the subject property from (Emphasis
Danao, who died intestate. ours.)
x Malana Demand against Consuelos family x As the afore-quoted provision states,
members (Tappa, etc.) to vacate a petition for declaratory relief under the
the same, as they need the land. Tappa refused. first paragraph of
x Malana referred land dispute to the Lupong Section 1, Rule 63
Tagapamayapa of Barangay may be brought
Annafunan West for conciliation. Tappa asserted they before the
owned land. appropriate
x Malana Filed Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting RTC.
of Title, and Damages x Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
with RTC (Branch 3, Tuguegarao City) Court further provides in its second
x RTC Dismissed Complaint paragraph
o on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (BP that:
129, as amended by RA o An action for the
7691), where RTC with reformation of an instrument,
jurisdiction over real to quiet
actions, where the title to real
assessed value of the property or
property involved remove
exceeds P20,000.00. It clouds
found that the subject therefrom,
property had a value of or to
less than consolidate
P20,000.00. ownership
x Malana Filed a Motion for Reconsideration under
o arguing that their principal cause of action Article
was for quieting of title; 1607 of the
the accion reivindicacion Civil Code,
was included merely to may be
enable them to seek brought
complete relief. under this
x RTC Denied Motion for Reconsideration. Rule.
x Malana Filed another pleading, simply designated (Emphasis
as Motion, for RTC to set ours.)
aside dismissal. x The second paragraph of Section 1,
o RTC Denied Motion. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically
x Malana Filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of refers to (1) an action
the Rules of Court, with for the reformation of
the Supreme Court. an instrument,
recognized under
ISSUE: Whether an action to quiet title to real Articles 1359 to 1369
property or remove clouds therefrom Sis the of the Civil Code; (2)
correct remedy considering that the Malana has an action to quiet title,
already demanded but the Tappa et. al. refused authorized by
to vacate the property. Articles 476 to 481 of
the Civil Code; and (3)
HELD: NO. an action to
x An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a consolidate ownership
person interested required by Article
under a deed, a will, a contract or other 1607 of the Civil Code
written instrument, and whose rights are in a sale with a right to
affected by a statute, an executive repurchase.
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The These three remedies
relief sought under this remedy includes are considered similar
the to declaratory relief
interpretation and determination of because they also result
the validity of the written in the adjudication of
instrument and the judicial declaration the legal rights of the
of the parties rights or duties litigants, often without
thereunder.21 the need of execution to
x Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 carry the judgment into
of the Rules of Court. The effect.22
RTC correctly made a distinction x To determine which court has
between the first and the second jurisdiction over the actions identified in
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the the
Rules of Court. second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
x The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules 63 of the Rules of Court, said
of Court, describes the provision
general circumstances in which a
person may file a petition for
declaratory relief,
to wit:
o Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written
instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a
statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance,
or any other
governmental
regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any
question of construction or
validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
 action for declaratory relief, the courts can no
must be read together with those of the Judiciary longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. other words, a court has no more jurisdiction
x It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court over an action for declaratory relief if its
does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be subject has already been infringed or
filed transgressed before the institution of the
before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" - that an action.26
action for x In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting
quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions of title was filed after
for petitioners already demanded and respondents
declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for refused to vacate the subject property. In fact,
declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the
Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute latters express claim of ownership over the
denotes subject property before the Lupong
that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to
possibility, petitioners title.
an opportunity or an option.23 x Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they
x In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act had already been deprived
of 1980, of the possession of their property, the proper
as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the remedy for them is the filing of an
MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria,
actions which involve title to or not a case for declaratory relief. An
possession of real property where the assessed value accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of
does not exceed P20,000.00, thus: possession, filed one year after the
o Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, occurrence of the cause of action or from the
Municipal Trial unlawful withholding of possession
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal that has for its object ones
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
shall exercise: x Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil for an accion
actions reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action
which involve title to, possession of, would depend on the value of the property
real property, or involved. Given that the subject property
any interest therein where the assessed herein is valued only at
value of the P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has
property or interest therein does not jurisdiction over an action to recover the
exceed Twenty same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil grave abuse of discretion in
actions in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners
Metro Manila, where such assessed Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
value does not jurisdiction.
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos x As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu
(P50,000.00) exclusive proprio, the following
of interest, damages of whatever kind, pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28
attorneys proves instructive:
fees, litigation expenses and costs: x o It is axiomatic that the nature of an action
x x (Emphasis and the jurisdiction of a
ours.) tribunal are determined by the
x As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as material allegations of the
stated in Tax complaint and the law at the time
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, the action was commenced.
petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the
the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction subject matter or nature of an
of the MTC, not the RTC. action is
x Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there conferred only by law and not by
has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the consent or waiver upon a
rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action court which, otherwise, would have
for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement no jurisdiction over the subject
of the rights and matter or nature of an action. Lack
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for of jurisdiction of the court over
their an action or the subject matter of
guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, an action cannot be cured by the
and not silence, acquiescence, or even by
to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may express consent of the parties. If
be the court has no jurisdiction over
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, the nature of an action, it may
deed, or dismiss the same ex mero motu or
contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis
a supplied.
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached x Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint,
the acted in complete accord
state where another relief is immediately available; and with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said
supplies the to have done so with grave abuse
need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
before they jurisdiction. An act of a court or
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a tribunal may only be considered to have been
commission of wrongs.25 committed in grave abuse of
x Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the 28
filing of an
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discretion when the same was performed FACTS:

in a capricious or whimsical exercise of x Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
judgment, which is equivalent to lack of Departed on 29 May 2012.
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion x Former Solicitor General Francisco I.
must be so patent and gross as to Chavez Nominated in the Judicial and
amount to an evasion of a positive duty Bar Council as CJ Coronas potential
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty successor
enjoined by law or to act at all in o Failed to manifest his
contemplation of law, as where the acceptance of his recommendation
power is exercised in an arbitrary to the
and position of Chief Justice.
despotic manner by reason of x Chavez Filed petition (certiorari, 65)
passion or personal hostility.29 No with the Supreme Court.
such o In his initiatory pleading,
circumstances exist herein as to justify the petitioner asked the Court to
issuance of a writ of certiorari. determine 1]
whether the first
paragraph of Section
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND 8, Article VIII of the
BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. 1987
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Constitution allows
Respondents. more than one (1)
EN BANC, G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 member of Congress
 to sit in
the JBC; and 2] if the practice
of having two (2)
representatives
from each House of Congress
with one (1) vote each is
sanctioned by the
Constitution.
x JBC Filed comment.
x Congress Sen. Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Rep. Niel C. Tupas Jr. filed
comments through Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
x SC granted petition
o WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The current numerical
composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself
so that only one (1) member
of
Congress will sit as a
representative in its
proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
x Respondents filed an MR
ISSUE # 1: Whether the petition is one for certiorari under
Rule 65.
HELD # 1: NO.
x Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations
therein and the character of the relief
sought, the Court views the petition as
essentially an action for declaratory
relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules
of
Civil Procedure. The Constitution as
the subject matter, and the validity
and
construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII
as the issue raised, the petition should
properly be considered as that which
would result in the adjudication of rights
sans the execution process because the
only relief to be granted is the very
declaration of the rights under the
document sought to be construed. It
being
so, the original jurisdiction over the
petition lies with the appropriate
Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the
fact that only questions of law are raised
in the petition, an action for declaratory
relief is not among those within the
original jurisdiction of this Court as
provided in Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 181359 August 5,
2013
FACTS:
x Garcia Executed an unnotarized Deed
of Sale in favor of Juanito Muertegui
(Juanito) over a 7,500-square
meter parcel of unregistered land
(the lot) located in Dalutan
Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran,
Leyte del Norte covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985
in Garcias name.
x Muertegui Juanitos father (Domingo
Sr.) and brother (Domingo Jr.) took
actual possession of the lot and
planted thereon coconut and ipil-
ipil trees. They also paid the real
property taxes on the lot for the
years 1980 up to 1998.
x Garcia Sold the lot to the Muertegui
family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C.
Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a
notarized deed of absolute sale.
x Sabitsana Sale was registered with the
RD. TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a
new one, TD No. 5327, was
issued in Atty. Sabitsanas name.
Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid
the real estate taxes, Atty.
Sabitsana also paid real property
taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999.
In 1996, he introduced concrete
improvements on the property,
which shortly thereafter were
destroyed by a typhoon.
x Muertegui Domingo Sr. passed away.
His heirs applied for registration and
coverage of the lot under the Public Land
Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141.
x Sabitsana Opposed the application in a
letter.

ISSUE # 2: Whether the Supreme Court correctly

took cognizance of the petition considering that it is
for declaratory relief.

HELD # 2: YES.
x At any rate, due to its serious implications, not
only to government processes
involved but also to the sanctity of the
Constitution, the Court deems it more
prudent to take cognizance of it. After
all, the petition is also for prohibition
under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin
Congress from sending two (2)
representatives with one (1) full vote
each to the JBC.

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA.

ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F.
MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact
DOMINGO A.
MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.
 VANESSA TORNO, and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO L.
x Muertegui Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., BATHAN, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
filed a Civil Case Quezon City, Branch 92, Respondents.
for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, EN BANC, G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013
against Atty. Sabitsana and his wife, Rosario.
(Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Naval, Biliran)
x Sabitsana Filed Answer with Counterclaim, asserting that FACTS:
the sale to Juanito is x Roque Filed a Petition for declaratory relief before
null and void and that the Complaint is barred by prescription the RTC (Regional Trial
and laches. Court of Quezon City, Branch 92), assailing
x RTC Decided in favor of the Muerteguis, declaring that their the constitutionality of the following
deed of sale is sections of RA 9372 ("An Act to Secure the
valid and preferred. State and Protect our People from
x Sabitsana Filed a Motion for Reconsideration Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
o RTC Denied the Motion for Reconsideration Security Act of 2007):
x Sabitsana Appealed to CA o (a) Section 3, for being void for
o CA Denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC vagueness;
decision in toto. o (b) Section 7, for violating the right to
x Sabitsana Filed a Motion for Reconsideration privacy of communication
o CA Denied the Motion for Reconsideration and due process and the
x Sabitsana Filed Rule 45 before the SC privileged nature of priest-
penitent relationships;
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for o (c )Section 18, for violating due process,
quieting of title. the prohibition against ex
post facto laws or bills of
Held: YES. attainder, the Universal
x On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that Declaration of Human Rights, and
an action for the International Covenant on
quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, Civil and Political Rights, as well
regardless of the assessed value as for contradicting Article 125 of
of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the the Revised Penal Code, as
Rules of Court,29 an action amended;
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds o (d) Section 26, for violating the right to
therefrom may be brought in the travel;15 and
appropriate RTC. o (e) Section 27, for violating the
x It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prohibition against unreasonable
prompted by searches and seizures.
petitioners August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to x Republic Moved to suspend the proceedings,
respondents application for averring that certain petitions
registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372s
from being cast upon his constitutionality have been lodged before
application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case the Court.
No. B-1097 to obtain a o RTC Granted motion.
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is x SC promulgated its Decision in the Southern
one for declaratory relief, Hemisphere cases and thereby
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC dismissed the SC petitions.
pursuant to Rule 63 of the x Republic Filed motion to dismiss, contending that
Rules. Roque, et al. failed to satisfy
the requisites for declaratory relief.
Likewise, they averred that the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE constitutionality of RA 9372 had
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE already been upheld by the Court in
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN the Southern Hemisphere cases.
AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF x Roque Filed Comment/Opposition.
NATIONALDEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND x RTC Denied motion to dismiss
LOCAL GOVERNMENT THE o finding that the Court did not pass upon
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE the constitutionality of RA
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT THE TREASURER OF 9372 and that Roques petition
THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES for declaratory relief was
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEFOF THE PHILIPPINE properly
NATIONAL filed.
POLICE, Petitioners, vs. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO x Republic Moved for reconsideration
CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S x RTC Denied the motion.
ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE SORIANO, STEPHANIE x Republic Filed the Petition for
ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES
ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ, CZARINA MAYALTEZ, SHERYL certiorari (65) with the Supreme Court. ISSUE:
BALOT, RENIZZA BATACAN,
Whether the petition for declaratory relief was
EDAN MARRI CAETE, LEANA CARAMOAN, ALDWIN CAMANCE,
RENE DELORINO, PAULYN sufficient.
MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA
ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY ANN HELD: NO.
LEE,LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO,
NORMAN ROLAND OCANA 29
III, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU
REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT, CRISTINE MAE TABING,
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x An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.28 It is well-settled that the
abuse of discretion to be qualified as
"grave" must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty or
to act at all in contemplation of law.29 In
this relation, case law states that not
every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.30
The degree of gravity, as above-
described, must be met.
x Applying these principles, the Court observes that
while no grave
abuse of discretion could be ascribed on
the part of the RTC when it
found that the Court did not pass upon
the constitutionality of RA 9372
in the Southern Hemisphere
cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that
private respondents petition had
met all
the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief. Consequently,
its
denial of the subject motion to
dismiss was altogether improper.
x To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in
Southern Hemisphere, did not
make any definitive ruling on
the constitutionality of RA 9372.
The
certiorari petitions in those
consolidated cases were
dismissed based
solely on procedural grounds,
namely: (a) the remedy of
certiorari was improper;31 (b)
petitioners therein lack locus
standi;32 and (c)
petitioners therein failed to
present an actual case or
 controversy.33 Therefore, there was no threat to any of them. As held in Southern
grave abuse of discretion. Hemisphere:
x The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached x Without any justiciable controversy, the
with regard to the RTCs petitions have become pleas for
ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents declaratory relief, over which
petition for declaratory relief. the Court has no original
x Case law states that the following are the jurisdiction. Then again,
requisites for an action for declaratory declaratory actions
relief: characterized by "double
o first , the subject matter of the contingency," where both the
controversy must be a activity the petitioners intend to
deed, will, contract or other undertake and the anticipated
written instrument, statute, reaction to it of a public official
executive order or are merely theorized, lie beyond
regulation, or ordinance; judicial review for lack of
o second , the terms of said documents ripeness.1wphi1
and the validity x The possibility of abuse in the
thereof are doubtful and require implementation of RA 9372does not avail to
judicial construction; take
o third , there must have been no the present petitions out of the
breach of the documents in realm of the surreal and merely
question; imagined. Such
o fourth , there must be an actual possibility is not peculiar to RA
justiciable controversy or 9372 since the exercise of any
the "ripening seeds" of power granted by
one between persons law may be abused. Allegations
whose interests are of abuse must be anchored on
adverse; real events
o fifth , the issue must be ripe for before courts may step in to settle
judicial determination; and actual controversies involving
o sixth , adequate relief is not available rights which are
through other means legally demandable and
or other forms of action or enforceable.41 (Emphasis
proceeding.34 supplied; citations omitted)
x Based on a judicious review of the records, the x Thus, in the same light that the Court
Court observes that while the dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern
first,35 second,36 and third37 Hemisphere cases on the
requirements appear to exist in this basis of, among others, lack
case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth of actual justiciable
requirements, however, remain controversy (or the ripening
wanting. seeds of one), the RTC
x As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt should have dismissed
that an actual justiciable private respondents
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists petition for declaratory relief
in this case. all the same.
x Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an x It is well to note that private respondents
existing case or controversy also lack the required locus standi to
that is appropriate or ripe for judicial mount their constitutional
determination, not one that is challenge against the
conjectural or merely anticipatory.38 implementation of the above-
Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it stated provisions of RA 9372
is meant, not that sufficient accrued since they have not shown any
facts may be dispensed with, but that a direct and personal
dispute may be tried at its inception
interest in the case.42 While it
before it has accumulated the asperity,
has been previously held that
distemper,
transcendental
animosity, passion, and violence of a
public importance dispenses
full blown battle that looms ahead. The
with the requirement that the
concept describes a state of facts
petitioner has
indicating imminent and inevitable
experienced or is in actual
litigation provided that the issue is not
danger of suffering direct and
settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
personal injury,43 it
declaration.39
must be stressed that cases
x A perusal of private respondents petition for
involving the constitutionality
declaratory relief would show that
of penal legislation
they have failed to demonstrate how they
are left to sustain or are in immediate
danger to sustain some direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the
assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the
Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests
as
citizens, and taxpayers and infractions
which the government could prospectively

commit if the enforcement of the said law

would remain untrammeled. As their
petition would disclose, private
respondents fear of prosecution was
solely based
on remarks of certain government officials
which were addressed to the general
public.40 They, however, failed to show
how these remarks tended towards any
prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA
9372 against them. In other words, there
was no particular, real or imminent
 PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA
belong to an altogether different genus of (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF
constitutional litigation.44 Towards CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH
this end, compelling State and societal interests in ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD),
the proscription of harmful AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO
conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus LUMBERA, RENATO CONSTANTINO,
standi,45 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO
to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA
every worthy cause is an interest shared by the LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS
general public.46 SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA
x As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS,
neither can it be EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA
inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA
adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity
the above-discussed allegations in private as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
respondents SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
petition, remain highly-speculative and merely DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES,
theorized.1wphi1 It is well- DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
effect on the individual challenging it.47 This private SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
x Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
irrelevant to proceed with SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
since no impending threat or injury to the private NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
respondents exists in the first place. COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE
x All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE,
requisites for an action for THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF
declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of the THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE
sixth requisite, private ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
respondents petition for declaratory relief should (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL
have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON,
abused its discretion. THE PNP, including its intelligence
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178581
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf
of the South-South KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein
ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and representing the following
JR., Petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE organizations: HUSTISYA, represented
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE by Evangeline Hernandez and also on her own behalf;
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary
AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA),
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE represented by Donato Continente and also
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE on his own behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented
POLICE, Respondents. by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF
EN BANC, G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010 CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE,
represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,
vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
Elmer Labog, NATIONAL SECRETARTY EDUARDO
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU- ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
KMU), represented by its GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF
National President Joselito V. Ustarez and Secretary General FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT
Executive Director Daisy Arago, OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
Petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT
Executive Secretary, NORBERTO OF FINANCE SECRETARY
GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of National MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
his capacity as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
capacity as Secretary of the NATIONAL BUREAU OF
Interior and Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE
his capacity as AFP Chief of OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE
Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his capacity 30
as PNP Chief of Staff,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 178554

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL

ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR
REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION
(GABRIELA), KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY),
SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN,
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-
SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST),
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF GABRIELA-ST,
THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI- KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL (KASAMA-TK),
CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES
including its intelligence and investigative MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST,
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
ESPERON, Respondents. AND
G.R. No. 178890 ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN
represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF
FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST,
ANA CONSUELO A.S. KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA
MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEA REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT
III and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, Petitioners, vs. LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT
MEMBERS OF THE ANTI- UGNAYAN NG MGA
TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), Respondents. MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG
G.R. No. 179157 KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER,
LOSOS RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS that the challenged
& EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIO LAJARA, provisions of RA 9372 forbid
TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, constitutionally protected
JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. conduct or activity that
LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, they seek to do. No
ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN, Petitioners, demonstrable threat has
vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as been established, much
President and Commander-in-Chief, less a real and existing one.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, x Petitioners obscure allegations of
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being
GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS tagged as "communist
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, fronts" in no way
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING approximate a credible
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, threat of prosecution. From
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T these allegations, the Court
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, is being lured to render an
DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO advisory opinion, which is
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER not its function.43
NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE x Without any justiciable controversy, the
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE petitions have become pleas
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE for declaratory relief, over which
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE the Court has no original
OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF jurisdiction.
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE Then again, declaratory actions
PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING characterized by "double
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE contingency,"
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF where both the activity the
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE petitioners intend to undertake
GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its and the
intelligence and investigative elements, AFP anticipated reaction to it of a
CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents. public official are merely
G.R. No. 179461 theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.44
FACTS: x The possibility of abuse in the
x RA 9372 ("An Act to Secure the State and Protect implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to
our People from Terrorism," take
otherwise known as the Human the present petitions out of the realm of
Security Act of 2007) was signed into the surreal and merely imagined. Such
law on March 6, 2007.
o RA 9372 subsequently became
effective.
x Petitioners Filed petitions for certiorari and
prohibition

ISSUE: Whether declaratory actions characterized

by double contingency are within the ambit of
judicial review.

HELD: NO.
x The Court is not unaware that a reasonable
certainty of the occurrence of a
perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for
mounting a constitutional challenge.
This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be
sufficient facts to enable the
Court to intelligently adjudicate
the issues.38
x Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,39
allowed the pre-enforcement review of a
criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced
a "credible threat of prosecution" and
"should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the
sole
means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs
therein filed an action before a federal
court to assail the constitutionality of the
material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the
provision of material support to
organizations
declared by the Secretary of State as
foreign terrorist organizations. They
claimed that they intended to provide
support for the humanitarian and
political
activities of two such organizations.
x Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an
adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows
that the challenged prohibition forbids
the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would
then be a justiciable controversy.42
x Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein
petitioners have failed to show

possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by
law may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events
before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
C. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of the
COMELEC and COA [Rule 64]
The distinctive nature and procedure of the special civil action
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(ANAD), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013
FACTS:
x COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling
Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD)
Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation for 2013 Party-List Elections.
x ANAD Filed the Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for
the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus with the
Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether the issues on (1) grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC as to its promulgation of the assailed
Resolution in that it was made without the benefit of a
summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process
clause and (2) COMELECs error in
finding that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it
failed to submit its Statement
of Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007 Elections may be
raised in a Rule 64 petition.
HELD: ONLY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
x The only question that may be raised in a petition for
certiorari under
Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is whether or
not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper,
there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion.5
x "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific
meaning. It
is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.6
x ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it
promulgated the assailed Resolution without giving
ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary
hearing, thus violating its right to due process. It is
to be noted, however, that ANAD was already
afforded a summary hearing on23 August 2013,
during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANADs
president,
authenticated documents and answered questions
from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to
ANADs qualifications.7
x ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have
called for another
summary hearing after this Court remanded the
case to the COMELEC for re-
evaluation in accordance with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum, Inc.
v. Comelec . This is a superfluity.
x ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its
qualifications during the
summary hearing of 23 August 2012, during which
ANAD submitted documents
and other pieces of evidence to establish said
qualifications. In re-evaluating
ANADs qualifications in accordance with the
parameters laid down in Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the
COMELEC need not have called
another
summary hearing. The Comelec could,
as in fact it did,8 readily resort to
documents and other pieces of evidence
previously submitted by petitioners in re-
appraising ANADs qualifications. After all,
it can be presumed that the
qualifications, or lack thereof, which were
established during the summary
hearing of 23 August2012 continued until
election day and even there after.
x As to ANADs averment that the COMELEC erred in
finding that it violated
election laws and regulations, we hold that
the COMELEC, being a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all
over the country, its factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered
on matters falling within its competence shall
not be interfered with by this Court in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.9
x As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown
reasons, submitted only three
nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8
of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives through
the Party-List System, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor).10 Such factual finding of the
COMELEC was
based on the Certificate of Nomination
presented and marked by petitioner
during the 22 and 23 August
2012summary hearings.11
x Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is
essential as the said provision is a
safeguard against arbitrariness.1wphi1
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-
list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or
even to switch the order of the nominees,
after submission of the list to the
COMELEC.
x In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec,12 the Court discussed the
importance of Sec.8 of R.A.
No. 7941 in this wise:
o The prohibition is not arbitrary or
capricious; neither is it
without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC
can rightly presume from the
submission of the list that the
list reflects the true will of the
party-list organization. The
COMELEC will not concern itself
with whether or not the
list contains the real intended
nominees of the party-list
organization, but will only
determine whether the
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nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law

and whether or not the right of the people,
nominees possess all the enabling the voters to
qualifications and none of the make intelligent
disqualifications. Thereafter, and informed choices.
the names of the nominees In contrast, allowing
will be published in the party-list
newspapers organization to
of general circulation. change its nominees
Although the people vote for through withdrawal of
the their nominations, or
party-list organization itself in to alter the order of
a party-list system of the nominations
election, not for the individual after the submission
nominees, they still have the of the list of nominees
right to know who the circumvents
nominees of any particular the voters demand
party-list for transparency. The
organization are. The lawmakers
publication of the list of the exclusion of such
party-list arbitrary withdrawal
nominees in newspapers of has eliminated the
general circulation serves that possibility of such
 circumvention. pending
x Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANADs failure obligati
to submit a proper Statement on, the
of Contributions and Expenditures statem
for the 2007 Elections, in ent
violation of COMELEC Resolution shall
No. 9476, viz: reflect
o Rule 8, Sec. 3. Form and contents of such
statements. - The statement fact;
required in next preceding And such other
section shall be in writing, information that the
subscribed and sworn to by Commission may
the candidate or by the require.
treasurer of the party. It x The prescribed form for the Statement of
shall set forth in detail the Election Contributions and Expenses is
following: attached to these Rules as
The amount of Annex "F." The Schedules of
contribution, the date of receipt, Contributions and
and Expenditures (Annexes "G"
the full name, and "H", respectively)
profession, should be supported and
business, accompanied by certified
taxpayer true copies of official
identification receipts, invoices and other
number (TIN) similar documents.
and exact home x An incomplete statement, or a statement
and business that does not contain all the required
address of the information and attachments, or
person or entity does not conform to the
from whom the prescribed form, shall be
contribution was considered as not filed and shall
received; (See subject the candidate or party
Schedule of treasurer to the penalties
Contributions prescribed by law.
Received, Annex x As found by the COMELEC, ANAD failed to
"G") comply with the above-mentioned
The amount of every requirements as the exhibits
expenditure, the date thereof, submitted by ANAD consisted
the full name and mainly of a list of
exact address of total contributions from other
the person or persons, a list of official
entity to whom receipts and amounts
payment was without corresponding receipts,
made, and the and a list of expenditures
purpose based on order slips
of the and donations without
expenditure; (See distinction as to whether the
Schedule of amounts listed were
Expenditures, advanced subject to
Annex "H") reimbursement or
A Summary Report of donated.13 This factual
Lawful Expenditure categorized finding was neither
according to the contested nor rebutted by
list specified ANAD.
above shall be x We herein take the opportunity to
submitted by the reiterate the well-established principle that the
candidate or rule that factual findings of
party treasurer administrative bodies will not
within thirty (30) be disturbed by the
days after the courts of justice except when
day of the there is absolutely no evidence
election. The or no substantial
prescribed form evidence in support of such
for this Summary findings should be applied with
Report is hereby greater force when it
attached to concerns the COMELEC, as the
these Rules as framers of the Constitution
Annex "H-1." intended to place the
Any unpaid obligation, its COMELEC - created and explicitly
nature and amount, the full made independent by the
name and exact Constitution itself -
home and on a level higher than statutory
business address administrative organs. The
of the COMELEC has broad
person or entity powers to ascertain the true
to whom said results of the election by means
obligation is available to it. For
owing; the attainment of that end, it is
and (See not strictly bound by the rules of
Schedule of evidence.14
Unpaid x As empowered by law, the COMELEC may
Obligations, motu proprio cancel, after
Annex "I") due notice and hearing, the
If the candidate or registration of any party-list
treasurer of the party has organization if
received it violates or fails to comply with
no contribution, laws, rules or regulations relating
made no to
expenditure, or elections.15 Thus, we find no
has no
 grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC when it issued the assailed
Resolution dated 11 May
2013.
x In any event, the official tally results of the
COMELEC show that ANAD garnered
200,972 votes.16 As such, even if
petitioner is declared qualified and the
votes cast for it are canvassed, statistics
show that it will still fail to qualify for a
seat in the House of Representatives.
D. Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus [RULE 65]
1. Certiorari
a. grounds
b. requirements
c. procedure; parties and effects
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule
46.
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO
L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of Deeds, Pasig
City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO,
and GEMA O. CHENG, Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION , G.R. No. 192685 July 31, 2013
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN,
Respondent. G.R. No. 199115
FACTS:
x SB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance
Company (MICO) entered
into a Joint Project Development
Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of
a
condominium building to be known as
"The Malayan Tower, " wherein MICO
shall provide the real property located at
the heart of the Ortigas Business
District, Pasig City, while ASB would
construct, and shoulder the cost of
construction and development of the condominium
building.
x ASB & MICO entered into another contract, with MICO
selling to ASB the land it
was contributing under the JPDA. Under the
Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will
vest on ASB only upon full payment of the
purchase price.
x As part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a
Petition for Rehabilitation with
Prayer for Suspension of Actions and
Proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
x SEC approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by
the ASB Group of
Companies.
x ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO
under the JPDA and the
Contract to Sell due to obvious financial difficulties.
x ASB & MICO executed their Third contract, allowing
MICO to assume the entire
responsibility for the development and
completion of The Malayan Tower. At the
time of the execution of the MOA, ASB had
already paid MICO P427,231,952.32 out of
the P640,847,928.48 purchase price of the
realty.
x RD Pasig City (Espensin) issued Condominium
Certificates of Title (CCTs) for
 38 units and the allotted parking spaces in the name Ombudsman.
of ASB, and another set for the same units, with MICO x Yuchengco, Cheng, Espenesin, and Serrano Filed
as registered owner thereof. their counter-affidavits.
x ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed x Ombudsman Dismissed Ampil's complaint
amendment in the o holding that the resolution of whether
CCTs which he had originally issued in ASBs name. respondents falsified the
x RD replied that, believing it was a simple error and on CCTs must be prefaced by a
representation of the determination of who, between
person we came to know and considered the MICO and ASB, is the rightful
representative of both parties (Atty. owner of the subject units. The
Serrano), he erased the name ASB Realty Corporation Ombudsman held that it had no
on those specified titles authority to interpret the
and placed instead the name MICO. provisions of the MOA and, thus,
x Ampil Wrote Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief refrained from resolving the
Financial Officer of preliminary question of
MICO, respectively, introducing himself as an ownership. Ombudsman did not
unsecured creditor of ASB have
Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming probable cause to indict
part of the ASB Group of respondents for falsification of
Companies. He demanded that Yuchengco and the CCTs
Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and because the last element of the
facilitate the registration of the subject units back to crime, i.e., that the change
ASBs made
name. the document speak something
x MICO paid no heed to ASBs and Ampils demands. false, had not been established.
x Ampil Charged Yuchengco, Cheng, Espenesin, and Serrano x Ampil Filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
with Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the 32
Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the
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Court, as to dismissal of the
Criminal complaint; and filed a
o Ombudsman Denied Ampils motion petition for review on certiorari
and affirmed the dismissal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
of his complaint. Court, as to the
o On the administrative litigation front ruling of the Ombudsman on the
and as previously narrated, administrative liability of Espenesin.
the Ombudsman found Espenesin x Petitions were consolidated.
liable for Simple Misconduct.
x Ampil Filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman
x Ombudsman Reconsidered its earlier resolution committed grave abuse of discretion in
and recalled the one-month the dismissal of complaint filed before it.
suspension meted on Espenesin.
x Ampil Filed a petition for review under Rule 43 HELD: YES.
of the Rules of Court before x G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed
the appellate court. with merit. Accordingly, we find grave
o CA Affirmed the Ombudsmans abuse of discretion in the
resolution absolving Espenesin of Ombudsmans incomplete
not just Grave disposition of Ampils
Misconduct and complaint.
Dishonesty, but also of x That the Ombudsman is a constitutional
Simple Misconduct. officer duty bound to
x Ampil Filed a Petition for certiorari under Rule "investigate on its own, or on
65 of the Rules of complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such tackle and resolve the issue of
act or omission appears to be illegal, whether respondents violated
unjust, improper, or inefficient"17 the particular
brooks no objection. The Ombudsmans provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
conduct of preliminary x Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed
investigation is both power and duty. Thus, Ampils complaint-affidavit as one "for:
the Ombudsman and his Falsification of Public
Deputies, are constitutionalized as Documents and Violation of
protectors of the people, who "shall Sections 3(a) and (e) of
act promptly on complaints filed in any Republic Act No. 3019, as
form or manner against public amended."24 The
officials or employees of the government x Ombudsman even prefaced
x x, and shall, x x x notify the
the complainants of the action taken and Resolution, thus: "this has
the result thereof."18 reference to the complaint filed
x The raison d'tre for its creation and by Oscar Ampil on 17 September
endowment of broad investigative 2007 against respondents, for
authority is to insulate the Office of the Falsification of Public Documents
Ombudsman from the long and Violation of Sections 3,
tentacles of officialdom that are able to paragraphs (a) and (e) of
penetrate judges and fiscals Republic Act No. 3019,
offices, and others involved in the otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
prosecution of erring public officials, and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended
through the execution of official pressure
and influence, quash,
delay, or dismiss investigations into A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
malfeasances and misfeasances vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by
committed by public officers.19 her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR,
x Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," Respondent.
based on the attendant SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200804 January 22,
facts and circumstances, to determine the 2014
existence of probable cause or the lack
thereof.20 On this score, we have
consistently hewed to the policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsmans
exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers.21
The Ombudsmans finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution
of a criminal case can only be
assailed through certiorari proceedings
before this Court on the ground
that such determination is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion which
contemplates an abuse so grave and so
patent equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.22
x However, on several occasions, we have
interfered with the Ombudsmans
discretion in determining probable cause:
o (a) To afford protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
o (b) When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
o (c) When there is a prejudicial
question which is sub judice;
o (d) When the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of
authority;
o (e) Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
o (f) When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent;
o (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense;
o (h) Where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution;
o (i) Where the charges are manifestly
false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance.23 (Emphasis
supplied).
x The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No.
192685.
x While we agree with the Ombudsmans
disquisition that there is no probable
cause to indict respondents for
Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code, we are puzzled why the
Ombudsman
completely glossed over Ampils charge
that respondents committed prohibited
acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the
Resolution or in the Order denying
reconsideration thereof did the
Ombudsman
 ordinary course of law." In Jaca
FACTS: v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court
x AL Ang Network is allegedly the duly authorized to supply
water to and collect ruled:
payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl x x x Although Section 1, Rule
Subdivision 65 of the Rules of
x AL Ang filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule Court provides that
of Procedure for the special civil action
Small Claims Cases before the MTCC (Bacolod City, of certiorari may only
Branch 4), seeking to collect be invoked when
from Mondejar the amount of P23,111.71 which "there is no appeal,
represented her unpaid water nor any plain, speedy
bills. and adequate remedy
x Mondejar Alleged payment, but that AL Ang Network made in the course of law,"
unreasonable and this rule is not
excessive adjusments in the rate, and questioned basis of the without exception.
claim. The
x AL Ang Network, in the interim, Disconnected Mondejar's availability of the
water line. ordinary course of
x MTCC Held that AL Ang Network was issued a Certificate of appeal does not
Public constitute sufficient
Convenience (CPC) by the National Water Resources ground to prevent a
Board (NWRB) only on party from
August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge Mondejar the making use of the
agreed flat rate of P75.00 extraordinary
per month prior thereto or the sum of P1,050.00 for remedy of certiorari
the period June 1, 2002 to where appeal is not
August 7, 2003. Thus, given that Mondejar had made an adequate remedy
total payments equivalent or equally
to P1,685.99 for the same period, she should be beneficial, speedy
considered to have fully paid AL and sufficient. It is
Ang Network. the inadequacy
x AL Ang Network Filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 - not the mere
of the Rules of absence - of all
Court before the RTC (Bacolod City, Branch 45) other legal remedies
o ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MTCC in and the danger of
finding that it (AL Ang Network) failed to failure of justice
establish with certainty Mondejar's without the writ
obligation, and in not ordering the latter that usually
to pay the full amount sought to be determines the
collected. propriety of
x RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari. certiorari.
x AL Ang Network Moved for reconsideration. x This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of
o RTC Denied motion for reconsideration. Appeals:
x AL Ang Network Filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, as o Truly, an essential requisite for the
a direct recourse, availability of the
with the Supreme Court. extraordinary remedies under the
Rules is an absence of an
ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a appeal nor any "plain, speedy and
proper remedy to assail the propriety of the MTCC decision adequate remedy" in the
in a small claims case ordinary course of law, one which
has been so defined as a
HELD: YES. "remedy which (would) equally
x Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases (be) beneficial, speedy and
states that: sufficient not merely a remedy
o SEC. 23. Decision. After the hearing, the court which at some time in the
shall render its future will bring about a revival of
decision on the same day, based on the the judgment x x x
facts established by the evidence (Form complained of in the certiorari
13-SCC). The decision shall immediately proceeding, but a remedy
be entered by the Clerk of Court in the which will promptly relieve the
court docket for civil cases and a copy petitioner from the
thereof forthwith served on the parties. injurious effects of that
o The decision shall be final and unappealable. judgment and the acts of
x Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision the
under the inferior court or tribunal"
above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not concerned. x x x (Emphasis
allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move supplied)
for its execution.25 x In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the
Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small RTCs apprehension that
claims cases, similar respondents recourse before it (was only
to other proceedings where appeal is not an available filed to circumvent the non-appealable
remedy,26 does nature of [small claims cases], because it
not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition asks [the court] to supplant the
for certiorari decision of the lower [c]ourt with another
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule decision directing the private
has been enunciated respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger
in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance sum than what has been awarded."28
Corporation,27 wherein it was Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an
held that appeal, is an original action29 designed
o In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not
ruled that "the of judgment. Owing to its nature, it
extraordinary writ of certiorari is always is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to
available where there is no appeal or any establish that jurisdictional errors
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn,
in the could either grant or dismiss the
petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the 33
MTCC gravely abused its
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discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or
arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to the controversy.30
x In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that
petitioner correctly availed of
the remedy of certiorari to assail the
propriety of the MTCC Decision in
the subject small claims case,
contrary to the RTCs ruling.
x Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the
said petition before the proper
forum (i.e., the RTC).1wphi1 To be
sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari.31 Such concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not give a
party
unbridled freedom to choose the
venue of his action lest he ran afoul of
the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a
becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
dictates that petitions for the
issuance of writs of certiorari
against first level
courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals, before
resort may be had before the
Court.32 This
procedure is also in consonance
with Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.33
x Hence, considering that small claims
cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts,34 certiorari
petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before
their corresponding Regional Trial
Courts. This
petitioner complied with when it
 instituted its petition for certiorari before x Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of
the the Laguna Lake Development
RTC which, as previously mentioned, has Authority v. SM Prime
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC Holdings, Inc.28 on the
erred in dismissing the said petition on the doctrine of exhaustion of
ground that it was an improper remedy, administrative remedies
and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must is instructive, to wit:
be reinstated and remanded thereto for its o Under the doctrine of
proper disposition. exhaustion of administrative
remedies, before
a party is allowed to
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, vs. seek the
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING intervention of the
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its court, he or she
incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, should have availed
Respondent. himself or herself of
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013 all the means of
administrative
processes afforded
FACTS: him or her. Hence, if
x Maglalang a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles resort to a
City Branch, Angeles City, which remedy within the
was operated by PAGCOR, erroneously administrative
spread the bills, handed by one Cecilia machinery can still
Nakasato, in four clusters instead of five. be made by
For his mistake, Cecilia accused him of giving the
trying to shortchange her and that administrative
petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of officer concerned
her every opportunity to
money. He tried to explain, but Cecilia decide on a matter
allegedly continued to berate and curse that comes within
him. To ease the tension, Maglalang was his or her
asked to take a break, after which he jurisdiction, then
returned to his booth. However, Cecilia such remedy should
allegedly showed up and continued to be exhausted first
berate Maglalang. As a result, the two of before the court's
them were invited to the casinos judicial
Internal Security Office in order to air power can be sought.
their respective sides. Thereafter, The premature
Maglalang was required to file an invocation of the
Incident Report which he submitted on intervention of the
the same day of the incident. court is fatal to ones
x Maglalang received a Memorandum issued by the cause of action. The
casinos Branch Manager doctrine of
informing him that he was being exhaustion of
charged with Discourtesy towards a administrative
casino customer, in which he remedies is based on
submitted a letter-explanation. practical and
x Maglalang received another Memorandum stating legal reasons. The
that the Board of Directors of availment of
PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy administrative remedy
towards a casino customer and imposed entails lesser
on him a 30-day suspension for this first expenses and
offense. provides for a
x Maglalang Filed a Motion for Reconsideration. speedier disposition of
x Maglalang Filed a Motion for Production, controversies.
praying that he be furnished with Furthermore, the
copies of documents relative to the courts of justice, for
case including the recommendation of reasons of comity and
the investigating committee and the
Decision/Resolution of the Board convenience, will shy
supposedly containing the latters away from a dispute
factual findings. until the system of
x Maglalang Received letter-reply of one Atty. administrative redress
Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. denying the has been completed
motion. and complied with, so
x PAGCOR Issued two memoranda, the latter one
denying Maglalang's
reconsideration.
x Maglalang Filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, before the CA.
o CA Outrightly dismissed the petition
for certiorari for being
premature as Maglalang
failed to exhaust
administrative remedies
before seeking recourse from
the CA.
x Maglalang Filed a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE # 1: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies applies in cases where an
employee under the civil service is penalized with a
suspension for not more than 30 days and is a
condition precedent prior to the filing of a Rule 65
before the CA.

HELD # 1: NO.

as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and dispose of the case.
x However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute
as it admits of the following exceptions:
o (1) when there is a violation of due process;
o (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question;
o (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction;
o (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency
concerned;
o (5) when there is irreparable injury;
o (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval
of the latter;
o (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would
be unreasonable;
o (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim;
o (9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case
proceedings;
o (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate
remedy, and
o (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable
delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law;
(13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue
of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.29
x The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12
since the law per
se provides no administrative review for
administrative cases whereby an employee like
petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and penalized with a suspension for not
more than 30 days.
x Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the
Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, provides for the unavailability of
any appeal:
o Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
o (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative
disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from Office. A
complaint may be filed directly
with the Commission by a private citizen
against a government
official or employee in which case it may
hear and decide the case or it may
deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to
be taken.
o (b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall
be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty days
salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office
head is
appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially
appealed
to the department and finally to
the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the
penalty is
removal, in which case the same
shall be executory only after
confirmation by the department
head. (Emphasis supplied.)
x Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted
Section 4730 of E.O. No. 292
essentially providing that cases of this sort
are not appealable to the CSC. Correlatively,
we are not unaware of the Concurring Opinion
of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v.
Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit:
o In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is
not categorically sanctioned
by the Civil Service Law. For what
the law declares as "final" are
decisions of heads of agencies
involving suspension for not more
than thirty (30) days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty (30)
days salary. But there is a clear
policy reason for declaring these
decisions final. These decisions
involve minor offenses. They are
numerous for they are the usual
offenses committed by
government officials and
employees. To allow their multiple
level appeal will doubtless
overburden the quasijudicial
machinery of our administrative
system and defeat the
expectation of fast and
efficient action from these
administrative agencies.
Nepotism, however, is not a
petty offense. Its deleterious
effect on
government cannot be over-
emphasized. And it is a stubborn
evil.
The objective should be to
eliminate nepotic acts, hence,
erroneous
decisions allowing nepotism
cannot be given immunity from
review,
especially judicial review. It is
thus non sequitur to contend that
since some decisions exonerating
public officials from minor
offenses can not be appealed,
ergo, even a decision acquitting
a
government official from a major
offense like nepotism cannot also
be appealed.
ISSUE # 2: Whether decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared final and
unappealable by law are still subject to judicial
review.
HELD # 2: YES.
x Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies
which are declared final and
unappealable by law are still subject to
judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v.
Francisco,32 we held:
34
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final and
unappealable are
o Since the decision of the Ombudsman subject to
suspending judicial review if they
respondents for one (1) fail the test of
month is final and arbitrariness, or upon
unappealable, it follows that
the CA had no appellate proof of gross abuse
jurisdiction to review, rectify of discretion, fraud or
or reverse the same. The error of law.
Ombudsman was not When such
estopped from asserting in administrative or
this Court that the CA had no quasi-judicial bodies
appellate jurisdiction to grossly
review and reverse the misappreciate
decision of the Ombudsman evidence of such
via petition for review under nature as to compel
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. a
This is not to say that contrary conclusion,
decisions of the Ombudsman the Court will not
cannot be questioned. hesitate to reverse
Decisions of the factual findings.
administrative or quasi- Thus, the decision of
administrative agencies the Ombudsman
which are declared by law may be reviewed,
 modified or reversed via
petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, on a
finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the
complaint, or of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of
jurisdiction.It bears stressing
that the judicial recourse
petitioner availed of in this
case before the CA is a
special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave
abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of PAGCOR, not an
appeal. Suffice it to state that
an appeal and a special civil
action such as certiorari
under
Rule 65 are entirely distinct
and separate from each other.
One cannot file petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules where appeal is
available, even if the ground
availed
of is grave abuse of
discretion. A special civil
action for
certiorari under Rule 65 lies
only when there is no
appeal, or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the
ordinary
course of law. Certiorari
cannot be allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal
a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, as
the same should not be a
substitute for the lost remedy
of appeal. The remedies of
appeal and
certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not
alternative or
successive.33
x In sum, there being no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law in
view of petitioner's allegation
that P AGCOR has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the CA's outright dismissal of the petition
for certiorari on the basis of
non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is bereft of any legal
standing and should therefore be set aside.
x Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is valid only
when the question involved is an error of
jurisdiction, or when there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the court or tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Hence, courts exercising certiorari
jurisdiction should refrain from
reviewing factual assessments of the
respondent court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are
constrained to wade into factual
matters when the evidence on record
does not support those factual findings;
or when too much is concluded, inferred
or deduced from the bare or incomplete
facts appearing on record.34 Considering
the
circumstances and since this Court is not
a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to
the CA for its judicious resolution
is in order.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C.
CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE CAESAR A.
CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N.
MINDARO-
GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND
CUSTODIO MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR.,
Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 208290
December 11, 2013
FACTS:
x Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio
Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. (Vestidas Jr.) as
owner/proprietress and broker of
Plinth Enterprise respectively,
were charged for
violation of Section 36023 in
relation to Sections 2503 and
2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3)
(4) and (5) of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines,
as amended, for importing 858
cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-
Virus Software Kaspersky Internet
Security Premium 2012, with the
CTA.
o Pleaded "Not Guilty"
x Prosecution During trial, and
subsequent to the presentation of witnesses,
filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.
x Garcia and Vestidas Filed their Omnibus
Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence
o CTA granted
x Garcia and Vestidas Filed the Demurrer
to Evidence.
o CTA granted Demurer;
Dismissed the case
x Prosecution Filed its motion for
reconsideration
o CTA Denied motion.
x Prosecution Filed petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court, more than 60
days from receipt of the decision
ISSUE #1: Whether the belated filing should be
allowed by the Court.
HELD # 1: NO.
x Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is explicit in
stating that certiorari should be instituted
within a period of 60 days
 certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution Court,it must be shown that
sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is there was grave abuse of discretion
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that amounting to lack or excess of
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a jurisdiction or a denial of due process. In
speedy this case, a perusal of the
disposition of their case.13 While there are challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not
recognized exceptions14 to such strict observance, disclose any indication of
there should be an effort on the part of the grave abuse of discretion on its partor
party invoking liberality to advance a denial of due process.The
reasonable or meritorious explanation for records are replete with indicators that the
his/her failure to comply with the rules.15 petitioner actively
x In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the participated during the trial and, in fact,
belated filing of the presented its offer of evidence and opposed
petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the the demurrer.
Rules.Notably, the records x Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or
show that the petition was filedonly on August 12, whimsical exercise of
2013, or almost a month late judgment as is equivalent to lack of
from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
excuse this grave procedural patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
lapse will not only be unfairto the other party, but it of a positive duty or a virtual
will also sanction a seeming refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of or to act at all in contemplation of
procedure. Suffice it to say, law, as where the power is exercised in an
the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry arbitrary and despotic manner by
even a tinge of merit that reason of passion and hostility.16 Here, the
would deserve leniency. subject resolutions of the CTA have
x The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioners been issued in accordance with the rules on
failure to monitor evidence and existing jurisprudence.
incoming court processes that neededto be
addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission
of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS
office tasked toeffectively curb smuggling activities and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of
which rob the government of millions of revenue the Board, petitioners, vs. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in
every year. her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional
x The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules Trial Court of Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL,
leads the Court to respondents.
suspectthat the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. EN BANC, G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
was doomed by designfrom the start. The failure to
present the certified true copies of documentary
evidence; the failure to competently and properly FACTS:
identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify x UP Administration conceptualized and implemented
the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this the socialized scheme of
petition on time challenging a judgment of tuition fee payments through the Socialized
acquittal, are tell-tale signs ofa Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP),
reluctantand subduedattitude in pursuing the popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan"
case. This stance taken by the program.
lawyers in government service rouses the Courts x Congress granted official recognition through
vigilance against inefficiency in allocation of a portion of the
the administration of justice. Verily, the National Budget for the implementation of the
lawyersrepresenting the offices under program.
the executive branchshould be reminded that x All students were entitled to apply for STFAP benefits.
theystill remain as officers of the x UP Adopted measures to safeguard the integrity of
courtfrom whom a high sense of competence and the program, such as the
fervor is expected. The inclusion as one of the punishable acts
Courtwill not close its eyes to this sense of apathy under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and
in RATS lawyers, lest the governments goal of Regulations on Student Conduct and
revenue enhancement continues to suffer the Discipline of the University the deliberate
blows of smuggling and similar activities. falsification or suppression/withholding of
x Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for any material information required in the
reconsideration with application form.
the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects of x UP Administration Made a random sample, such
an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional as Ramon P. Nadal, a
proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been student enrolled in the College of Law.
eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it o Nadal's aunt's interview included in home
would have, in the first place, presented its evidence visit report. Discrepancies
with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules. found. Matter was
presented to the Diliman
ISSUE # 2: Whether a judgment of acquittal in the present Committee on
criminal case may correctly be assailed in a petition for Scholarships and
certiorari under Rule 65. Financial Assistance.
x UP Informed Nadal of misdeclarations and his
HELD # 2: NO. reclassification to bracket 9
x In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules from bracket 4; required Nadal to pay back school
and permit fees; and warned him that
this recourse, the end result would remain the same. 35
While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may
be assailed in a petition for
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finding him guilty of "wilfully and
deliberately withholding
failure to settle account would mean the information about the
suspension of his registration privileges income of his mother, who is
and the withholding of clearance and living abroad, in support of the
transcript of records; and that his case studies of his
might be referred to the Student Disciplinary brothers Antonio and Federico,
Tribunal for further investigation. which is tantamount to acts of
x Nadal Issued a certification stating, among dishonesty in
other things, that his mother relation to his studies in
migrated to the United States in 1981 but violation of paragraph [a],
because her residency status had not Section 2 of the Rules. As
yet been legalized, she had not been able such, the SDT imposed upon
to find a "stable, regular, well-paying Nadal the penalty of expulsion
employment." He also stated that his from the University and required
mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, him to reimburse all STFAP
was benefits he had received but if
shouldering the expenses of the college he does not voluntarily make
education of his two younger brothers. reimbursement, it shall be
x UP Charged Nadal before the Student "effected by the University thru
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). outside legal action." The SDT
x UP SDT exculpated Nadal of charge of decision was thereafter
deliberately withholding in his STFAP automatically elevated to the
application form information that he was Executive Committee of U.P.
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but Diliman for review pursuant to
 Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student tread upon legally forbidden
Conduct and Discipline. grounds. For, by virtue of the
x UP Executive Committee Affirmed the decision writ, the University's
of the SDT exercise of academic freedom
x Nadal Appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). was peremptorily curtailed.
x UP BOR Affirmed decision of the SDT, but Moreover, the door
modified penalty "from Expulsion to was flung wide open for Nadal to
One Year- Suspension, effective do exactly what the decision of
immediately, plus reimbursement of all the BOR
benefits received from the STFAP, with prohibited him from doing
legal interest." The BOR also decided and that is, to violate the
against suspension order by
giving Nadal, a certification of good moral enrolling for the first
character. semester of 1993-1994. It
x NADAL Filed a motion for reconsideration of the must have been with
BOR decision, allegedly consternation that the University
against the advice of his counsel, to which UP officials helplessly watching him
opposed. complete his
x UP BOR Modified the decision, imposing on academic requirements for
Nadal the penalties of suspension taking the Bar. 40 In the event
for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, that he be allowed to
non-issuance of any certificate of good continue with his studies he
moral character during the suspension would, in effect render moot and
and/or as long as Nadal has not academic the
reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had disciplinary sanction of
received with 12% interest per annum suspension legally imposed
from 30 March 1993 and non-issuance upon him by the BOR's final
of his transcript of records until he has decision of March 29, 1993.
settled his financial obligations with the What is to prevent other
university. aspirants for STFAP
x Nadal Filed with the Regional Trial Court of scholarships from
Quezon City a petition for misleading the University
mandamus with preliminary injunction authorities by
and prayer for a temporary restraining misrepresenting
order against President Abueva, the certain facts or as in instant
BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. case, withholding vital
Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. information and stating
Caoili. downright falsehoods, in their
x RTC Issued TRO. application forms with
x RTC Issued writ of preliminary injunction. impunity? Not only would
x UP Dispensing with the filing of a motion for this undermine the authority of
reconsideration, filed the petition the U.P. to discipline its
for certiorari and prohibition with students who violated
prayer for the issuance of an the rules and regulations of the
injunction or temporary restraining institution but, more
order. importantly, subvert the
very concept and lofty intent to
ISSUE: Whether lower court gravely abused its give financial assistance to poor
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary but deserving
injunction. students through the STFAP
which, incidentally, has not
HELD: YES. ceased refining and
x On the second issue presented for adjudication, modifying it operations.
the Court finds that the lower
court gravely abused its discretion in ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V.
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S.
of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said Viado, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS,
writ was based on the lower court's CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and
finding that the implementation of the the NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
disciplinary sanction of suspension on TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and
Nadal "would work injustice to the in
petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his
course, and consequently, in getting a
decent and good paying job." Sadly,
such a ruling considers only the situation
of Nadal without taking into
account the circumstances clearly of his
own making, which led him
into such a predicament. More
importantly, it has completely
disregarded the overriding issue of
academic freedom which provides
more than ample justification for the
imposition of a disciplinary
sanction upon an erring student of an
institution of higher learning.
x From the foregoing arguments, it is clear
that the lower court should
have restrained itself from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition filed by
Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in
doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and
certain right on the part of the petitioner
being required. 38 It is of no avail against
an official or government agency whose
duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment. 39
x Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, the lower court dared to
 of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab
behalf of the other members of the "Consuelo Heights initio as against the law and public
Homeowners Association," petitioners- policy.
intervenors. x These acts may thus be properly struck down by the
EN BANC, G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988 writ of certiorari,
because done by an officer in the
performance of what in essence is a
FACTS: judicial function, if it be shown that the acts
x Spouses Tuason (Roman C. Tuason and Remedios Tuason) were done without or in
were retired public excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
school teachers. of discretion. Since Mr.
x Spouses Tuason With funds pooled from their retirement Marcos was never vested with judicial power,
benefits and such power, as everyone
savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. of a knows, being vested in the Supreme Court
piece of land in the latter's subdivision in Barrio and such inferior courts as
Makatipo, Caloocan City. may be established by law 12 the judicial
x RD Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was acts done by him were in
cancelled and a new the circumstances indisputably perpetrated
one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. without jurisdiction. The
x Spouses Tuason Took possession of their property. acts were completely alien to his office as
x President Marcos Issued PD 293, declaring lots in Carmel's chief executive, and utterly
subdivision open beyond the permissible scope of the
for disposition and sale to the members of the legislative power that he had
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., assumed as head of the martial law regime.
the present bona fide occupants thereof." x Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e.
x RD Caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title of determined the
MEMORANDUM. relevant facts and applied the law thereto
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this without a trial at which all
certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void interested parties were accorded the
ab initio and considered cancelled as against the opportunity to adduce evidence
Government and the property described herein is to furnish the basis for a determination of
declared open for disposition and sale to the members the facts material to the
of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. controversy. He made the finding ostensibly
x Spouses Tuason Filed with the Supreme Court a petition for on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of
certiorari. Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is
no indication whatever the nature and
ISSUE # 1: Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper reliability of these records and that they are
remedy to question the acts committed by President in no sense
Marcos, through the issuance of PD 293. conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner
Tuasons (and the petitioners in
HELD (1): YES. intervention) were never confronted with
x The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that those records and afforded a chance to
the dispute their trustworthiness and present
extraodinary writ of certiorari 9 may properly issue to countervailing evidence. This is yet
nullify only another fatal defect. The adjudication was
judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of patently and grossly violative of the
prohibition which may right to due process to which the petitioners
be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. are entitled in virtue of the
Section 1, Rule 65 Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not
of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in only arrogated unto himself a
relation to "any power never granted to him by the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, Constitution or the laws but had in addition
while Section 2 exercised it unconstitutionally.
of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in x In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the
relation to petition for
"proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or certiorari as one for prohibition if the
person ... averments of the former
exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the sufficiently made out a case for the latter. 13
petition will be Considered in this wise, it
shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against will also appear that an executive officer had
an unlawful acted without jurisdiction
exercise of judicial power. exercised judicial power not granted to him
x The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously by the Constitution or
judicial function. He the laws and had furthermore performed
made a determination of facts, and applied the law to the act in violation of the
those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby
parties were in the premises. These acts essentially affected. The Court will
constitute a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of grant such relief as may be proper and
jurisdiction which is the power and authority to efficacious in the premises even
hear or try and decide or determine a if not specifically sought or set out in the
cause. 11 He adjudged it to be an established prayer of the appropriate
fact that neither the original 36
purchasers nor their subsequent transferees
have made full payment of all
installments of the purchase money and interest on
the lots claimed by Carmel
Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of
the members of ... (the)
Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the
law to that situation, he
made the adjudication that "title to said land has
remained with the Government,
and the land now occupied by the members of said
association has never ceased
to form part of the property of the Republic of the
Philippines," and that 'any and
all acts affecting said land and purporting to
segregate it from the said property
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Henedino M. Brondial)
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in
pleading, the permissible relief being the proper court, alleging the facts with
determined after all not by the prayer certainty and praying that judgment be
but by the basic averments of the rendered
parties' pleadings. commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter
2. Prohibition specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
a. grounds
b. requirements The petition shall likewise be accompanied
c. procedure; parties and effects by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
forum shopping as provided in the third
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
any other plain, speedy, and adequate
EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK,
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
PETITIONER, vs. THE MONETARY BOARD
OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND x OSI Filed with the Department of Justice
THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE (DOJ) a complaint for Estafa
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. Through Falsification of
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013 Commercial Documents
against certain officials and
FACTS: employees of ECBI.
x Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI), is a uly x MB Issued Resolution No. 1164 (2009),
registered rural banking denying the appeal of ECBI from
institution with principal office in Centro Resolution No. 1255 which placed it under
Sur, Sto. Nio, Cagayan. The corporate PCA framework.
life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005. x ISD II Conducted the general
x Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his principals examination of the books and records of ECBI
Acquired the controlling interest in with the cut-off date of September 30,
RBFI sometime in January 2006, and 2009
tt the initiative of Vivas and the new x ISD II Reminded ECBI of the non-
submission of its financial audit reports for
management team, an internal the years 2007 and 2008 with a
audit was conducted on RBFI, and warning that failure to submit
certain those reports and the written
measures calculated to revitalize explanation for such omission
the bank were allegedly introduced. shall result in the imposition of a
x BSP Issued the Certificate of Authority monetary penalty.
extending the corporate life of RBFI for x ISD II Informed ECBI of MB Resolution
another fifty (50) years; and approved the No. 1548 which denied its request for
change of its corporate name to reconsideration of Resolution No. 726.
EuroCredit Community Bank,
Incorporated, as well as the increase in
the number of the members of its BOD,
from 5 to 11.
x Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of
the BSP Conducted a general
examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of
December 31, 2007.
x Examiners from the Department of Loans and
Credit of the BSP Cancelled the
rediscounting line of the bank.
x Vivas Appealed the cancellation to BSP.
x Monetary Board Issued Resolution No. 1255
(2008), placing ECBI under
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA)
framework because of the serious
findings and supervisory concerns noted
during the general examination.
x Vivas Moved for a reconsideration of Resolution
No. 1255 on the grounds of
non-observance of due process and arbitrariness.
x BSP Directed ECBI to explain why it transferred
the majority shares of RBFI
without securing the prior approval of the
MB in apparent violation of Subsection
X126.2 of the Manual of Regulation for
Banks (MORB).
x ISD II Required ECBI to explain why it did not
obtain the prior approval of the
BSP anent the establishment and operation of the
banks sub-offices.
x MB Issued Resolution No. 726 (2009), imposing
monetary penalty/fine on
ECBI, in view of ECBIs refusal to comply
with the required examination, and
referred the matter to the Office of the
Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing
of appropriate legal action.
x BSP Wrote a letter, advising ECBI to comply
with MB Resolution No. 771,
which essentially required the bank to follow its
directives.
x ISD II Reiterated its demand upon the ECBI BOD
to allow the BSP examiners
to conduct a general examination.
x ESBI Asked for another deferment of the
examination due to the pendency of
certain unresolved issues subject of its
appeal before the MB, and because Vivas
was then out of the country.
x ISD II Denied ECBIs request and ordered the
general examination to proceed
as previously scheduled.
x MB Issued Resolution No. 823 (2009) approving
the issuance of a cease and
desist order against ECBI, which
enjoined it from pursuing certain acts
and
transactions that were considered
unsafe or unsound banking practices,
and
from doing such other acts or
transactions constituting fraud or might
result in the dissipation of its assets.

x MB Issued Resolution No. 27623 placing ECBI under
receivership in
accordance with the recommendation of the ISD II.
x Vivas Filed petition for prohibition
before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether Vivas
correctly resorted to a petition for prohibition.
HELD: NO.
x To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB
issued Resolution No.
276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its
power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30
thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under
conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may
not be restrained or set aside except on a petition
for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653 read:
o Section 30. -
The actions of the Monetary Board
taken under this
section or under Section 29 of
this Act shall be final
and executory, and may not
be restrained or set aside
by the court except on petition
for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken
was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion as
to amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. The
petition for certiorari may
only be filed by the
stockholders of record
representing the majority of
the capital stock within ten
(10) days from receipt by
the board of directors of the
institution of the order
directing receivership,
liquidation or
conservatorship.
x Prohibition is already unavailing
x Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already
an
ineffective remedy under the circumstances
obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that
process by which a superior court prevents inferior
courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not
been vested by law,
and confines them to the exercise of those powers
legally conferred.
Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals
or persons from
exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its
cognizance or
exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has
cognizance.26 In our jurisdiction, the rule on
prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit:
o Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the
proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying
that the judgment be rendered
commanding the
respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as the
law and justice require.
x Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a
judgment be
rendered which would direct the defendant to
desist from continuing
with the commission of an act perceived to
be illegal.27 As a rule, the
proper function of a writ of prohibition is to
prevent the doing of an act
which is about to be done. It is not intended
to provide a remedy for
acts already accomplished.28
x Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for
prohibition apparently seeks
to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and
placing it under receivership.
Resolution No. 276, however, had already
been issued by the MB and the closure of
ECBI and its placement under receivership by
the PDIC were already
accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of
prohibition is no longer
appropriate. Settled is the rule that
prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that
is already a fait accompli
x Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition
should have been filed
with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
o Section 4. When and where petition filed.
The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the
judgment,
order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or
new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the
denial of said
motion.
x The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if
it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided
by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court
of Appeals. [Emphases
supplied]
x That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already
settled and reiterated in the
case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters
Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas.
x Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is
also dismissible because it
simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC
have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. The
concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does
not
grant the party seeking any of the
extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to
file a petition in any court of his choice. The
petitioner has not advanced any
special or important reason which would allow
a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules
of Court, a party may directly appeal to this
Court only on pure
37
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imposition on the precious time
and attention of the Court.
questions of law.31 In the case at x In any event, no grave abuse of discretion
bench, there are certainly factual can be attributed to the MB for the
issues as Vivas is questioning the issuance of the assailed Resolution No.
findings of the investigating team. 276.
x Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy x Vivas insists that the circumstances of the
demands that where the case warrant the application of Section
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also 11 of R.A. No. 7353, which provides:
within the competence of the CA or the o Sec. 11. The power to
RTC, the special action for the obtainment supervise the operation of any rural
of such writ must be presented to bank by
either court. As a rule, the Court will not the Monetary Board
entertain direct resort to it unless the as herein indicated
redress desired cannot be obtained in shall consist in
the appropriate lower courts; or where placing
exceptional and compelling limits to the
circumstances, such as cases of national maximum credit
interest and allowed to any
with serious implications, justify the individual borrower;
availment of the extraordinary remedy of in
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or prescribing the
mandamus calling for the exercise of its interest rate, in
primary jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy determining the loan
must be observed to prevent an period and
 loan procedures, in indicating
the manner in which technical
assistance shall be extended
to rural banks, in imposing a
uniform
accounting system and
manner of keeping the
accounts and
records of rural banks; in
instituting periodic surveys of
loan and
lending procedures, audits,
test-check of cash and other
transactions of the rural
banks; in conducting training
courses for
personnel of rural banks; and,
in general, in supervising the
business operations of the
rural banks.
o The Central Bank shall have the power
to enforce the laws, orders,
instructions, rules and
regulations promulgated by
the Monetary
Board, applicable to rural
banks; to require rural
banks, their
directors, officers and agents
to conduct and manage the
affairs of the rural banks in a
lawful and orderly manner;
and, upon proof that the rural
bank or its Board of Directors,
or officers are
conducting and
managing the affairs of
the bank in a manner
contrary to laws, orders,
instructions, rules and
regulations
promulgated by the
Monetary Board or in a
manner substantially
prejudicial to the interest of
the Government, depositors
or
creditors, to take over the
management of such bank
when
specifically authorized to
do so by the Monetary
Board after due
hearing process until a new
board of directors and
officers are
elected and qualified
without prejudice to the
prosecution of the
persons responsible for
such violations under the
provisions of
Sections 32, 33 and 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, as
amended.
Nagcarlan, Laguna
(Sangguniang Bayan) .
x Corales Renewed the appointment of
Dr. Angeles, but Sangguniang Bayan
disapprove appointment on
the grround of nepotism, as
well as the latters
purported unfitness and
unsatisfactory performance.
x Dr. Angeles Continued to discharge the
functions and duties of a Municipal
Administrator for which he received an
annual salary of P210,012.00.
x Provincial State Auditor of Laguna
Issued an Audit Observation Memorandum,
which recommends an
appropriate Notice of
Disallowance be issued for the
payment of salary expenses
(against Dr. Angeles) incurred
without legal basis. Corales was
required to comment or reply.
x Corales and Angeles Filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus against
Andal and the then members
of the Sangguniang Bayan
before the RTC (San Pablo City,
Laguna, Branch 32)
x OSG Filed a Motion to Dismiss
petitioners Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus grounded on lack of
cause of action, prematurity and
non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
x RTC Denied Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that Andal was merely a nominal
party.
x OSG Moved for reconsideration.
o RTC Denied motion for
reconsideration
x Republic of the Philippines (represented
by COA, represented by Andal) Filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals.
x CA Granted Petition for Certiorari
o thereby annulling and setting
aside the RTC Orders and,
accordingly,
dismissing the
Petition for
Prohibition with
the trial
court.
x Corales and Angeles Moved for
reconsideration.
o CA Denied motion for
reconsideration
x Corales and Angeles Filed Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R.
ANGELES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN,
LAGUNA, PETITIONERS, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AS REPRESENTED BY
PROVINCIAL STATE AUDITOR OF LAGUNA MAXIMO L.
ANDAL, RESPONDENT.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 186613 August 27, 2013

FACTS:
x Corales Elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan,
Laguna for three (3)
consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004
elections.
x Corales Appointed Dr. Angeles to the position of
Municipal Administrator,
whose appointment was unanimously
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of
 basis thereof, he finds that the transaction
ISSUE # 1: Whether the authority of a public official to should be suspended or disallowed,
request comment/reply from petitioners is within the he will then issue the corresponding Notice of
ambit of a writ of prohibition. Suspension (NS), Notice of
Disallowance (ND) or Notice of Charge (NC),
HELD # 1: NO. as the case may be, furnishing a
x petitioner Corales was simply required to submit his copy thereof to the Cluster Director.
comment/reply on the Otherwise, the Director may dispatch a
observations stated in the AOM. As so keenly team to conduct further investigation work to
observed by the Court of Appeals, justify the contemplated action. If
any mention in the AOM that petitioner Corales shall after in-depth investigation, the DLAO for
reimburse the salaries paid each sector in Metro Manila and the
to petitioner Dr. Angeles in light of the repeated RLACD for the regions find that the issuance
disapproval or rejection by the of the NS, ND, and NC is warranted,
Sangguniang Bayan of his appointment as Municipal he shall issue the same and transmit such NS,
Administrator was merely an ND or NC, as the case may be, to
initial opinion, not conclusive, as there was no the agency head and other persons found
showing that Andal had taken any liable therefor.
affirmative action thereafter to compel petitioner x From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the
Corales to make the necessary issuance of an AOM is, indeed,
reimbursement. Otherwise stated, it has not been an initial step in the conduct of an
shown that Andal carried out investigative audit considering that after its
or enforced what was stated in the AOM. On the issuance there are still several steps to be
contrary, petitioner Corales was conducted before a final conclusion
given an opportunity to refute the findings and can be made or before the proper action can
observations in the AOM by be had against the Auditee. There
requesting him to comment/reply thereto, but he is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales
never did. More so, even claim that his comment thereon
though the AOM already contained a would be a mere formality. Further, even
recommendation for the issuance of a though the AOM issued to petitioner
Notice of Disallowance of the payment of salary Corales already contained a
expenses, the records are bereft recommendation for the issuance of a
of any evidence to show that a Notice of Disallowance Notice of
has, in fact, been issued. Disallowance, still, it cannot be argued that
Concomitantly, the AOM did not contain any his comment/reply to the AOM would be a
recommendation to the effect that futile act since no Notice of Disallowance was
petitioner Corales would be held personally liable for yet issued. Again, the records are bereft of
the amount that would be any evidence showing that Andal has already
disallowed. It is, therefore, incongruous to conclude taken any affirmative action against
that the said AOM is petitioner Corales after the issuance of the
tantamount to a directive requiring petitioner AOM.
Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to and x Viewed in this light, this Court can hardly see any
received by petitioner Dr. Angeles during the actual case or controversy to
latters stint as warrant the exercise of its power of judicial
Municipal Administrator after his appointment review. Settled is the rule that for
thereto was held invalid for want of conformity from the courts to exercise the power of judicial
the Sangguniang Bayan. review, the following must be extant:
x In relation thereto, as aptly observed by the OSG, to which (1) there must be an actual case calling for
the Court of Appeals the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question
conformed, the issuance of the AOM is just an must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the
initiatory step in the investigative audit being person challenging must have the "standing."
conducted by Andal as Provincial State Auditor to An actual case or controversy involves a
determine the conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
propriety of the disbursements made by the opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
Municipal Government of Laguna. resolution as
That the issuance of an AOM can be regarded as distinguished from a mere hypothetical or
just an initiatory step in the abstract difference or dispute. There must be
investigative audit is evident from COA a contrariety of legal rights that can be
Memorandum No. 2002-053 dated 26 interpreted and enforced on the basis of
August 2002.24 A perusal of COA Memorandum No. existing law and jurisprudence. Closely
2002-053, particularly related thereto is that the
Roman Numeral III, Letter A, paragraphs 1 to 5 and question must be ripe for adjudication. A
9, reveals that any finding or observation by the question is considered ripe for
Auditor stated in the AOM is not yet conclusive, as adjudication when the act being challenged
the comment/justification25 of the head of office or has had a direct adverse effect on
his duly authorized the individual challenging it. The third
representative is still necessary before the Auditor requisite is legal standing or locus standi,
can make any conclusion. The Auditor may give due which has been defined as a personal or
course or find the comment/justification to be without substantial interest in the case such
merit but in either case, the Auditor shall clearly state that the party has sustained or will sustain
the reason for the direct injury as a result of the
conclusion reached and recommendation made. governmental act that is being challenged,
Subsequent thereto, the Auditor alleging more than a generalized
shall transmit the AOM, together with the comment or grievance. The gist of the question of
justification of the Auditee standing is whether a party alleges "such
and the formers recommendation to the Director, personal stake in the outcome of the
Legal and Adjudication Office controversy as to assure that concrete
(DLAO), for the sector concerned in Metro Manila adverseness which sharpens the
and/or the Regional Legal and presentation of issues upon which the court
Adjudication Cluster Director (RLACD) in the case of depends for illumination of difficult
regions. The transmittal constitutional questions." Unless a person is
shall be coursed through the Cluster Director injuriously affected in any of his
concerned and the Regional Cluster constitutional rights by the operation of
Director, as the case may be, for their own comment statute
and recommendation. The or ordinance, he has no standing.26
DLAO for the sector concerned in the Central Office
and the RLACD shall make 38
the necessary evaluation of the records transmitted
with the AOM. When, on the
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Henedino M. Brondial)
compelled to reimburse petitioner
Dr.
x The requisites of actual case and ripeness are Angeles salaries, should the audit
absent in the present case. To investigation confirm the
repeat, the AOM issued by Andal irregularity of such
merely requested petitioner disbursements. Further, as
Corales to correctly pointed out by
comment/reply thereto.1awp++i1 respondent Republic
Truly, the AOM already contained in its Memorandum, what
a petitioners actually assail is
recommendation to issue a Notice of Andals authority
Disallowance; however, no Notice of to request them to file the desired
Disallowance was yet issued. More so, comment/reply to the AOM, which
there was no evidence to show that Andal is
had already enforced against petitioner beyond the scope of the action for
Corales the contents of the AOM. prohibition, as such request is
Similarly, there was no clear showing that neither an actionable wrong nor
petitioners, particularly petitioner constitutive of an act perceived to
Corales, would sustain actual or imminent be
injury by reason of the issuance of the illegal. Andal, being the Provincial
AOM. The action taken by the petitioners State Auditor, is clothed with the
to assail the AOM was, indeed, authority to audit petitioners
premature and based entirely on surmises, disbursements, conduct an
conjectures and speculations that investigation
petitioner Corales would eventually be thereon and render a final finding
 and recommendation thereafter. submitted to the court without
Hence, it is beyond question that in first giving such administrative
relation to his audit investigation agency the opportunity to
function, Andal can validly and legally dispose of the same after due
require petitioners to submit deliberation. Also, in The Special
comment/reply to the AOM, which the Audit Team, Commission on
latter cannot pre-empt by Audit v. Court of Appeals and
prematurely seeking judicial intervention, Government Service Insurance
like filing an action for System,32 this Court has
prohibition. extensively pronounced
x Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy that:
to seek a judgment o If resort to a remedy within
ordering the defendant to desist from the administrative machinery can
continuing with the commission still
of an act perceived to be illegal, may be made by
only be resorted to when there is giving the
"no appeal or any other plain, speedy, administrative
and adequate remedy in the officer concerned
ordinary course of law. every
opportunity to
ISSUE # 2: Whether the peititioners exhausted decide on a
all remedies before resorting to judicial matter that
intervention, through the filing of the petition comes within his
for prohibition. or her
jurisdiction, then such
HELD # 2: NO. remedy should be
x In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer exhausted first before
necessary to exhaust the
administrative remedies considering courts judicial power
that there is no appeal or any other can be sought. The
plain, speedy and appropriate remedial premature invocation
measure to assail the imposition under of
the AOM aside from an action for the intervention of
prohibition. the court is fatal to
o This Court finds the said contention ones cause of action.
plain self-deception. The
x As previously stated, petitioners action for doctrine of
prohibition was premature. exhaustion of
The audit investigative process was still administrative
in its initial phase. There was remedies is based on
yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. practical and legal
And, even granting that the AOM reasons. The
issued to petitioner Corales is already availment of
equivalent to an order, decision administrative
or resolution of the Auditor or that such remedy
AOM is already tantamount to entails lesser
a directive for petitioner Corales to expenses and
reimburse the salaries paid to provides for a
petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action speedier disposition
for prohibition is premature since of
there are still many administrative controversies.
remedies available to Furthermore, the
petitioners to contest the said AOM. courts of justice, for
Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 reasons of
Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, comity and
provides: "[a]n aggrieved party convenience, will shy
may appeal from an order or decision or away from a dispute
ruling rendered by the Auditor until the
embodied in a report, memorandum, system of
letter, notice of disallowances and administrative
charges, Certificate of Settlement and redress has been
Balances, to the Director who completed and
has jurisdiction over the agency under complied
audit." From the final order or with, so as to give the
decision of the Director, an aggrieved administrative
party may appeal to the agency concerned
Commission proper.28 It is the decision or every
resolution of the opportunity to correct
Commission proper which can be appealed its error and dispose
to this Court.29 of the case. x x x.
x Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies x Moreover, courts have accorded respect
available to them at the for the specialized ability of other
administrative level but they failed to agencies of government to
exhaust the same and instead, deal with the issues within
immediately sought judicial their respective
intervention. Otherwise stated, the specializations prior to any
auditing process has just begun but the court intervention. The Court
petitioners already thwarted the same has reasoned thus:
by immediately filing a Petition for
Prohibition. In Fua, Jr. v. COA,30 citing
Sison v. Tablang,31 this Court declared
that the general rule is that before a
party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail himself of all
the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues
which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and

o We have consistently declared that the doctrine
of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the
rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their
responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. The
rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It
entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to
shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress has been
completed.
x The 1987 Constitution created the constitutional commissions
as independent
constitutional bodies, tasked with specific roles in the
system of governance that require expertise in
certain fields. For COA, this role involves:
o The power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of
its subdivisions, agencies,
instrumentalities, including government-
owned and controlled corporations with
original charter. x x x.
x As one of the three (3) independent constitutional
commissions, COA has been
empowered to define the scope of its audit and
examination and to establish the techniques and
methods required therefor; and to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses
of government funds and properties.
x Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the
courts must exercise
caution when intervening with disputes involving
these independent bodies, for
the general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he
should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized
to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a
court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same
after due
deliberation.33 (Emphasis supplied).
x In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their
favor, petitioners
aver that by filing a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in
essence, admitted all the material averments and
narration of facts stated in the Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus. As such,
there is no longer any question of fact to speak of
and what remains is a pure
question of law. The judgment, therefore, of the trial
court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no longer
subject to any appeal or review by the Court of
Appeals.
Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
where only pure questions of law may be raised and
dealt with. This is in line with the pronouncement in
China Road and Bridge
Corporation v. Court of Appeals34 (China Road Case).
The Court of Appeals
should have dismissed respondent Republics Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court for being an improper and
inappropriate mode of review.
o Petitioners above argument is misplaced.
x China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench.
Therein, the Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint was granted. As the
order granting the motion to
dismiss was a final, as distinguished from
an interlocutory order, the proper
remedy was an appeal in due course.35 Thus,
this Court in China Road Case held
that:
o x x x Applying the test to the instant
case, it is clear that private
respondent raises pure questions
of law which are not proper in an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41,
but should be raised by way of a
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.1wphi1
x We agree with private respondent that in a motion to
dismiss due to failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court can
consider all the pleadings filed,
including annexes, motions and the evidence
on record. However in so doing,
the trial court does not rule on the truth or
falsity of such documents. It merely
includes such documents in the hypothetical
admission. Any review of a finding
of lack of cause of action based on these
documents would not involve a
calibration of the probative value of such
pieces of evidence but would only limit
itself to the inquiry of whether the law was
properly applied given the facts and
these supporting documents. Therefore, what
would inevitably arise from such a
review are pure questions of law, and not
questions of fact.36 (Emphasis
supplied).
x In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss
was denied. It is well-
entrenched that an order denying a motion
to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case as it leaves something to be done by
the court before the case is finally decided
on the merits.37
Therefore, contrary to the claim of
petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss
is not appealable, not even via Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The only remedy for the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special
civil action for certiorari
showing that such denial was made with grave abuse
of discretion.38
x Taking into consideration all the foregoing, this Court
finds no reversible error on
the part of the Court of Appeals in
reversing the Orders of the court a quo and
consequently dismissing petitioners
Petition for Prohibition filed thereat
ROLANDO TAN, ELENA TAN and LAMBERTO TAN,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. HERMES B. MONTERO, in his capacity as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 164966 June 8, 2007
FACTS:
x James L. King (King) lent money to spouses Roderick
Lim Go and Grace Tan-Go
(spouses Go), who proposed to him a
business transaction wherein the spouses
Go would borrow cash from King in exchange
for which Roderick Go would issue
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x Go, et. al. Pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.
postdated checks corresponding to the x Go, et. al. Filed a Petition for Prohibition
amount borrowed plus interest. Checks and Injunction with Preliminary
were honored by the bank. Injunction and Prayer for
x King lent P40M to the spouses Go and Rolando Tan Temporary Restraining Order
(father of Grace Tan-Go), before the Court of Appeals,
Elena Tan (mother of Grace Tan-Go), seeking to restrain the trial
allegedly for the renovation of their movie court from proceeding with
houses in Butuan City. Go issued several the subject criminal cases
checks to King in the amount of P61.28 against them and prayed
Million, inclusive of the interest for three that the same be dismissed.
months. Initial checks were honored by o CA Dismissed the case for
the bank, but subsequent checks were lack of merit.
dishonored for having been drawn against x Go, et. al. Moved for reconsideration.
insufficient funds. o CA Denied motion for
x King Filed a complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 reconsideration.
and Estafa, after demands x Go, et. al. Filed petition for
were unheeded.
x Prosecutor (Montero) Found probable cause, review on certiorari with the Supreme
and caused the filing of an
Court. ISSUE: Whether resort to the
information.
x Go, et al. Posted bail, before any warrant of extraordinary relief of prohibition was
arrest could be issued.
proper.
HELD: NO. that petitioners other co-accused,
x Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an Roderick Lim Go and Grace Tan-
extraordinary remedy Go, were able
to prevent the unlawful and oppressive to timely appeal the Joint
exercise of legal authority and to provide Resolution dated November 8,
for a fair and orderly administration of 2002 to the Secretary of
justice.9 It is Justice while petitioners failed to
available only when there is no appeal the same before their
appeal or any plain, speedy and arraignment.
adequate remedy in the ordinary x In fine, the arguments raised in their
course of law, and when the petition for prohibition ineluctably shows
proceedings are done without or in that petitioners are principally
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse questioning the factual and
of discretion. The petitioner must allege legal bases of the
in his petition and finding of probable cause
establish facts to show that any other against them. This is but a
existing remedy is not speedy or veiled attempt to litigate
adequate.10 A remedy is plain, speedy issues which should have been
and adequate if it will promptly timely appealed to the Secretary
relieve the petitioner from the injurious of Justice via a
effects of that judgment and petition for review. However,
the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.11 petitioners, through their own
Further, the writ will not lie fault, failed to avail
to correct errors of judgment but only themselves of this remedy.
errors of jurisdiction. As long as Countless times we have ruled
the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any that the extraordinary
alleged errors committed in remedy of certiorari or prohibition
the exercise of its discretion will amount is not a substitute for a lost
to nothing more than mere appeal.18 This
errors of judgment which are case is no different.
correctible by a timely appeal.12 In x There is another equally important reason
determining whether a tribunal acted why the instant petition
in grave abuse of discretion, should be denied outright.
mere abuse of discretion is not enough. After the Court of Appeals
There must be grave abuse of issued the
discretion as where the tribunal exercised assailed Decision dated
its power in an arbitrary or November 24, 2003 which
despotic manner, by reason of passion or dismissed
personal hostility, and it must petitioners petition for
be so patent or gross as would amount to prohibition, several
an evasion, or virtual refusal supervening events took
to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in place.
contemplation of law.13 x As earlier noted, petitioners failed to
x In the case at bar, petitioners contend that there appeal from the Joint Resolution dated
was no appeal or other plain, November 8, 2002 issued by
speedy or adequate remedy available in public respondent Montero
the ordinary course of law because they which found, among
were prevented by the trial court from others, probable cause against
appealing public respondent Monteros them for estafa. Only co-
Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002 accused Grace Tan-Go
which found, among others, probable and Roderick Go separately and timely
cause for estafa against them. They claim appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Then
that the trial court "forced arraigned"
them on November 19, 2002. This was
allegedly done in order to prevent them
from appealing the Joint Resolution dated
November 8, 2002 to the Secretary of
Justice as a consequence of paragraph 2,
section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 7014
("2000 National Prosecution Service Rule
on Appeal") which provides in part that
"[i]f an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if
the accused has already been
arraigned x x x."
o We are not persuaded.
x Petitioners admit15 that they received a copy of
the Joint Resolution dated
November 8, 2002 as early as November
13, 2002. However, from the time they
received the copy of the aforesaid
Resolution to the time they were
arraigned on
November 19, 2002, petitioners did not
take steps to move for reconsideration,
or appeal the aforesaid Resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. More importantly,
the Court of Appeals observed that there
is no evidence on record to support
petitioners claim that they were "forced
arraigned." In fact, the arraignment of
petitioners proceeded without objections
on the part of petitioners or their
counsel.16 Absent proof of force or
intimidation, the trial judge enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of his functions.17 We also
note
 Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong
subsequently issued a Resolution19 dated December
23, 2003 granting Grace Tan-Gos petition for review.
The
aforesaid Resolution was, likewise, favorable to petitioners
cause.
x When King moved for reconsideration of the above
Resolution, petitioners
participated in the proceedings before the Secretary
of Justice by opposing the
same together with Grace Tan-Go.21 In a Resolution22
dated February 11, 2004,
then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N.
Guitierrez granted Kings motion
for reconsideration and reinstated public respondent
Monteros Joint Resolution
dated November 8, 2002. Grace Tan-Go then filed a
motion for reconsideration
which was joined by petitioners through their motion
for leave to join the motion
for reconsideration.23 However, Acting Secretary
Guiterrez denied the same in a
Resolution dated August 18, 2004. Thereafter, Grace
Tan-Go filed a motion to
resolve the second ground raised in her motion for
reconsideration. In a Resolution24 dated December
17, 2004, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez
reversed and set aside the February 11, 2004 and
August 18, 2004 Resolutions of Acting Secretary
Gutierrez, and reinstated former Secretary
Datumanongs Resolution dated December 23,
2003. Consequently, a motion to withdraw
informations25 was filed by the prosecution before
the trial court.
x By participating in the proceedings before the Secretary of
Justice, petitioners
have actively litigated the issues regarding the
factual and legal bases of the finding of probable
cause against them as well as the authority of
public
respondent Montero to file the subject criminal
informations. This is clearly borne by the tenor of the
Resolution dated December 17, 2004 issued by the
Secretary of Justice. Yet, these issues are exactly the
same issues being raised by
petitioners before this Court through the instant
petition which is separate and
distinct from the proceedings before the Secretary
of Justice whose aforesaid
Resolution is not the one before us for review. To
reiterate, what is before us for review is the Decision
of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition
for prohibition filed by petitioners to restrain the trial
court from proceeding with the criminal cases against
them.
x In effect, by taking these two distinct courses of actions,
petitioners have
pursued the same or related causes, prayed for
the same or substantially the
same reliefs, and, in the process, have created the
possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora
upon the same issues which is
precisely the evil that the rule on forum-shopping
seeks to prevent.26 Doubtless,
they have engaged in a form of forum-shopping. Their
attempt to trifle with the
courts and abuse their processes must not be
countenanced. As a consequence
of petitioners violation of the rule against forum-
shopping and in order to
preserve the laudable objectives of the rule
against forum-shopping, the dismissal of the
petition for prohibition should be upheld.
3. Mandamus
a. grounds
b. requisites
c. procedure; parties and effects
d. damages
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46.
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS,
BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO,
and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RTC JUDGE
TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice,
Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
FACTS:
x Hipos, et al. were charged, through two Informations,
for the crime of rape and
one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness before Branch 86 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as
a Family Court, presided by Judge
Bay.
x Complainants Filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
asking Judge Bay to order the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the
proper Informations had been filed against
Hipos.
x Judge Bay Granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.
x Hipos, et al. Filed their Joint Memorandum to
Dismiss the Case[s] before the
City Prosecutor.
x Prosecutor (Cruz, Arellano) Issued a Resolution on
the reinvestigation
affirming the Informations filed against Hipos, et al.
x Prosecutor (de Vera) Treated the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as
an appeal, reversed the Resolution
holding that there was lack of probable
cause.
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specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office,
x Prosecutor (de Vera) Filed a Motion to Withdraw trust, or station;
Informations before Judge or when the
Bay. respondent excludes another
o Judge Bay Denied the Motion to from the use and enjoyment
Withdraw Informations. of a right or office to
x Hipos, et al. Filed the Petition for Mandamus, which the latter is entitled,
without moving for a and there is no other
reconsideration. plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the
ISSUE: Whether the Judge may be compelled to ordinary course of law.3
dismiss the case, by way of mandamus and, on the x As an extraordinary
ground that the resolution of the prosecutor finding writ, the remedy of
no probable cause. mandamus lies only to
compel
HELD: NO. an officer to
x Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a perform a
tribunal, ministerial duty,
corporation, board, officer or person, not a
immediately or at some other discretionary one;
specified time, to do the act required to
be done, when the respondent mandamus will
unlawfully neglects the performance of not issue to
an act which the law
 control the exercise of discretion of the
by a executive.
public officer where the law imposes But in such
upon him the duty to exercise his a case the
judgment in reference to any manner in proper
which he is required to act, remedy to
because it is his judgment that is to call for
be exercised and not that of the such
court.4 exception
x In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that is a
we compel the trial court petition
to do is to grant the Office of the City for
Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of mandamu
Informations against petitioners. In s, not
effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge certiorari
Bays exercise of judicial discretion. or
x There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters prohibitio
involving n.8
judgment and discretion are beyond the (Emphase
reach of a writ of mandamus, s
for such writ may be issued to compel supplied.)
action in those matters, when x Petitioners have taken the above
refused.5 However, mandamus is never passage way out of its context. In the case
available to direct the exercise of
of judgment or discretion in a particular Sanchez, Calauan
way or the retraction or Mayor Antonio Sanchez
reversal of an action already taken in brought a Petition for
the exercise of either.6 In other words, Certiorari before
while a judge refusing to act on a this Court, challenging
Motion to Withdraw the order of the
Informations can be compelled by respondent Judge
mandamus to act on the same, he therein denying his
cannot be compelled to act in a certain motion to quash the
way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. Information filed
In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not against him and six
refuse to act on the other persons for
Motion to Withdraw Informations; he alleged rape and
had already acted on it by homicide. One of the
denying the same. Accordingly, arguments of Mayor
mandamus is not available anymore. If Sanchez was that
petitioners believed that Judge Bay there was
committed grave abuse of discrimination against
discretion in the issuance of such Order him because of the
denying the Motion to non-inclusion of two
Withdraw Informations, the proper other persons in the
remedy of petitioners should have Information. We held
been to file a Petition for Certiorari that even this Court
against the assailed Order of Judge cannot order the
Bay. prosecution of a
x Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which person against
has been argued by the whom the
Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling prosecutor does not
of this Court, which allegedly states find sufficient
that evidence to support
the proper remedy in such cases is a at least a prima
Petition for Mandamus and not facie case.
Certiorari. However, if there
Petitioners cite the following excerpt was an
from our ruling in Sanchez v. unmistakable showing
Demetriou7: of grave abuse of
o The appreciation of the evidence involves discretion on the part of
the use of discretion on the prosecutors in that
the part of the prosecutor, case, Mayor Sanchez
and we do not find in the should have filed a
case at bar a Petition for Mandamus
clear showing by the to compel the filing of
petitioner of a grave abuse charges against said
of such discretion. two other persons.
o The decision of the prosecutor may be x In the case at bar, the Petition for
reversed or modified by the Mandamus is directed not against the
Secretary of Justice or in prosecution, but
special cases by the against the trial court,
President of the Philippines. seeking to compel the
But even this Court cannot trial court to grant the
order the prosecution of a Motion to Withdraw
person against whom the Informations by the
prosecutor does not find City Prosecutors
sufficient Office. The
evidence to support at least prosecution has
a prima facie case. The already filed a case
courts try and absolve or against petitioners.
convict the accused but as Recently, in Santos
a rule have no part in the v.
initial decision to prosecute Orda, Jr.,9 we
him. reiterated the
o The possible exception is where there is doctrine we
an unmistakable showing established in the
of grave abuse of discretion leading case of
that will justify a judicial Crespo v. Mogul,10
intrusion into the precincts
that once a criminal complaint or an
information is filed in competence, and discretion of
court, any disposition or dismissal of the trial court. The trial
the case or acquittal or conviction of court is the best and sole judge
the on what to do with the
accused rests within the jurisdiction, case before it. A motion to
competence, and discretion of the dismiss the case filed by the
trial public prosecutor should be
court. Thus, we held: addressed to the court who
o In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that has the option to grant or deny the
once a criminal same. Contrary to the contention
complaint or information is of the petitioner, the rule applies to
filed in court, any disposition a motion to withdraw the
of the case or dismissal or Information or to dismiss the case
acquittal or conviction of the even
accused rests within the exclusive before or after arraignment of the
jurisdiction, accused. The only
qualification is that the action of
the court must not impair
the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the
People or the private complainant
to due process of law.
When the trial court grants a
motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or
to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the
Information in compliance
with the directive of the Secretary
of Justice, or to deny the
said motion, it does so not out of
subservience to or
defiance of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but in
sound exercise of its judicial
prerogative.
x Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a
Motion for Reinvestigation,
he should have "deferred to the Resolution of
Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the
case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion
of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:
o In the instant case, the respondent Judge
granted the motion for
reinvestigation and directed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Bulacan to conduct the
reinvestigation. The former was,
therefore, deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the
prosecution arm of the
Government to consider the so-
called new relevant and material
evidence and determine whether
the information it had filed should
stand.13
x Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez,
petitioners took specific statements
from our Decision, carefully cutting off the
portions which would expose the real
import of our pronouncements. The Petition for
Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was
directed against a judge who, after granting
the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the
accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the
accused; and, shortly
thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the
case on the basis of a Resolution of
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of the case. The
dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done
despite the disapproval of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Resolution by
the Provincial Prosecutor
(annotated in the same Resolution), and
despite the fact that the reinvestigation
the latter ordered was still ongoing, since the
Resolution of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained
finality. We held that the judge should
have waited for the conclusion of the Petition
for Reinvestigation he ordered,
before acting on whether or not the case
should be dismissed for lack of
probable cause, and before proceeding with
the arraignment. Thus, the
continuation of the above paragraph of our
Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:
o Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait
for a
final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a
criminal
case which takes cognizance of an
accused's motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating
prosecutor or for reinvestigation and
defers the
arraignment until resolution of the said
motion must
act on the resolution reversing the
investigating
prosecutor's finding or on a motion to
dismiss based
thereon only upon proof that such
resolution is
already final in that no appeal was
taken thereon to
the Department of Justice.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Rutor
recommending the dismissal of
the case never
became final, for it was not
approved by the
Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary,
the latter
disapproved it. As a consequence, the
final resolution
with respect to the reinvestigation is
that of the
Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section
4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, no complaint or
information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating
fiscal without
the prior written authority or approval of
the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor. Also,
under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as
amended by
P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No.
911.14
x As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by
petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is
not meant to establish a doctrine that the
judge should just follow the determination by
the prosecutor of whether or not there is
probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr.
states:
o The rule is settled that once a criminal
complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound
discretion
of the court. While the prosecutor
retains the discretion and control
of the prosecution of the case, he
cannot impose his opinion on the
court. The court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the
case. Accordingly, a motion to
dismiss the case filed by the
prosecutor before or after the
arraignment, or after a
reinvestigation, or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records upon
reinvestigation, should be
addressed to the discretion of the
court. The action of the court must
not,
however, impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of
the People to due process of law.
x In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of
petitioners counsel, he tries to
convince us that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to
Withdraw Informations
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court found probable cause
against the petitioners, but
from the prosecution only when there is likewise provided an adequate
grave abuse of discretion on the part of discussion of the reasons for such
the prosecutors moving for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is
withdrawal; and that, where there is no that where there is a conflict
grave abuse of discretion on the part of between the dispositive portion or
the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion the fallo and the body of the
to Withdraw Informations is void. decision, the fallo controls.
x The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the However, where the inevitable
alleged actuations of the conclusion from the body of the
complainants after the alleged rapes and decision is so clear as to show
acts of lasciviousness. The alleged that there was a mistake in the
actuations are evidentiary in nature and dispositive portion, the body of
should be evaluated after full blown trial the decision will prevail.23
on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a x In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for
suspicion of prejudgment against the Mandamus to compel the
accused.22 trial judge to grant their Motion to
o This statement of petitioners counsel Withdraw Informations is
is utterly misleading. There is improper. While mandamus is
no such statement in our Decision in available to compel action on
Ledesma matters involving
x As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not judgment and discretion when
only plainly stated that the refused, it is never available to
 direct the exercise of judgment or right to the claim that
discretion in a particular way or the is sought and that, on
retraction or reversal of an action already the other hand,
taken in the exercise of respondent has an
either.24 The trial court, when confronted imperative
with a Motion to Withdraw duty to
an Information on the ground of lack of perform that
probable cause, is not bound which is
by the resolution of the prosecuting arm demanded of
of the government, but is him.
required to make an independent Mandamus will
assessment of the merits of such not issue to
motion, a requirement satisfied by the enforce a
respondent judge in the case at right, or to
bar compel
compliance with
a duty, which is
EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C questionable or
SALVADOR A. METEORO, Petitioners, vs. over which a
ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as substantial doubt
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE exists. The
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondent. principal function
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 161735 September 25, 2007 of the writ of
mandamus is to
FACTS: command and to
x Sanchez (a constable in the Philippine expedite, not to
Constabulary [PC]) was discharged from inquire and to
the service for allegedly losing his service firearm. adjudicate. Thus, it
x Meteoro (also a constable) was likewise is neither the office
discharged from the service for being nor the aim of the
absent without leave. writ to secure a
x Sanchez and Meteoro Appealed, and both were legal right but to
cleared of all charges. implement that
x Sanchez and Meteoro Applied for which is already
reinstatement. established.
x PNP No absorption order yet issued, nor Unless the
application acted upon. right to relief
x Sanchez and Meteoro Instituted 1998, a sought is
petition for mandamus in the unclouded,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. mandamus
x PNP Issued Resolution No. 99-061, recalling the will not
earlier Resolution No. 98-105. issue.22
x RTC Rendered its Decision declaring as void ab x Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the
initio NAPOLCOM Resolution PNP Chiefs issuance of the orders for
No. 99-061 and ruling in favor of the petitioners; the absorption of herein
issued writ of mandamus petitioners in the police force is
x PNP Appealed. not compellable by a
x CA Reversed the ruling of the trial court writ of mandamus precisely
o ruled that a writ of mandamus could because the same does not
not be issued because involve a performance of
petitioners had not a ministerial duty. Let it be noted
established with distinct that petitioners were discharged
clarity their right to be from the PC
absorbed into the PNP.
x Sanchez and Meteoro Moved for
reconsideration.
o CA Denied MR
x Sanchez and Meteoro Filed petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have a cause of

action to compel the PNP Chief to absorb them
into the PNP.

HELD: NO.
x We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions
that the remedy of
mandamus is employed only to compel
the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty, but not to require
anyone to fulfill a discretionary
one. The issuance of the writ is simply a
command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform a duty
already imposed.20 In Manila
International Airport Authority v. Rivera
Village Lessee Homeowners Association,
Inc.,21 we emphasized, through the
erudite and eloquent ponencia of Justice
Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be
issued only when the applicants legal
right to the performance of a
particular act sought to be
compelled is clear and complete, one
which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law, thus:
o In order that a writ of mandamus may
aptly issue, it is essential
that, on the one hand,
petitioner has a clear legal

service, subsequently cleared of the charges against
them, applied for
reinstatement but their applications were not acted
upon until the integration of
the PC into the PNP in 1990 when R.A. No. 697523
was enacted. Thus, we no
longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners
to the service because the
Philippine Constabulary no longer exists, but of their
employment in the PNP
which is, as we held in Gloria v. De Guzman,24
technically an issuance of a new
appointment. The power to appoint is essentially
discretionary to be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.25
Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an
application for a writ of
mandamus.26
x Furthermore, the petitioners do not have a clear legal right
over the issuance of
the absorption orders.1wphi1 They cannot claim the
right to be issued an
appointment based on the NAPOLCOM issuances,
specifically Resolution Nos. 98-
037 and 98-105. Suffice it to state that R.A. No. 6975
clearly provides that the
power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of
"Police Officer I" to "Senior
Police Officer IV" to which petitioners may be
appointed27 is vested in the PNP
regional director or in the Chief of the PNP as the case
may be, and not in the
NAPOLCOM, thus:
o Section 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and
Members.The
appointment of the officers and
members of the PNP shall be
effected in the following manner:
(a) Police Officer I to Senior Police
Officer IV.
Appointed by the
regional director for regional
personnel or by the Chief of
the PNP for the national
headquarters personnel and
attested by the Civil
Service Commission.
x Even if, for the sake of argument, petitioners can derive a
right from
NAPOLCOM Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-
105, still their right
collapses and their mandamus petition
becomes moot with the
issuance by NAPOLCOM of Resolution No. 99-
061 recalling the
approval of their absorption. The trial court
should then have
immediately dismissed the mandamus
petition when the OSG
submitted a copy of Resolution No. 99-061 because
well-settled is the rule that courts will not resolve a
moot question.29
x Also improper is the trial courts declaration that NAPOLCOM
Resolution No. 99-
061 is void ab initio. In the petition filed below, only
the Chief of the PNP is
impleaded as the party-defendant.30 NAPOLCOM was
never impleaded. As it was
the latter, a separate entity, which had issued
Resolution No. 99-061,
NAPOLCOM was an indispensable party over which the
trial court should have
acquired jurisdiction. Since it was not impleaded,
NAPOLCOM remains a stranger
to the case, and strangers are not bound by the
judgment rendered by the
court.31 The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present..
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor
of the City of Manila, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
FACTS:
x Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila Enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance
No. 8027 reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to
cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date
of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-
called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
x Mayor Atienza Approved the ordinance, which
became effective after its
publication.
x City of Manila and Department of Energy Entered
into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the
scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable
option."
x Sangguniang Panlungsod Ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97. In the same
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002.
x Sangguniang Panlungsod Adopted Resolution No.
13 extending the validity of
PNP Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.
x Social Justice Society Filed the original action for
mandamus before the SC
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the immediate removal of the terminals of
the oil companies.
ISSUE: Whether the Mayor may be compelled via
mandamus to enforce the Ordinance,
notwithstanding the MOU made and resolutions
subsequently issued after the promulgation of the
Ordinance.
HELD: YES.
x Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an
extraordinary writ that is
employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty that is already
imposed on the respondent and there is no
other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petitioner should have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the performance of the act and it
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many members who are
residents of Manila. The other
must be the clear and imperative duty of petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are
respondent to do the act required to be allegedly residents of Manila.
done.17 x We need not belabor this point. We have
x Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to ruled in previous cases that when a
compel compliance mandamus proceeding concerns a
with a duty, which is questionable or over public right and its object is to
which a substantial doubt exists. The compel a public duty, the people
principal function of the writ of who are interested in the
mandamus is to command and to execution of the laws are
expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; regarded as the real parties in
thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of interest and they need not show
the writ to secure a legal right but to any specific interest.19
implement that which is already Besides, as residents of Manila,
established. Unless the right to the relief petitioners have a direct interest
sought is unclouded, mandamus will not in the enforcement of the citys
issue.18 ordinances. Respondent never
x To support the assertion that petitioners have a questioned the right of petitioners
clear legal right to the to institute this proceeding.
enforcement of the ordinance, x On the other hand, the Local Government
petitioner SJS states that it is a Code imposes upon respondent the
political party registered with the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all
Commission on Elections and has its laws and ordinances relative to
offices in Manila. It claims to have the
 governance of the city.">20 One of these thru offices outside of
is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief the official or
executive of the city, he has the duty to governmental
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it organs.
has not been repealed by the Sanggunian o Hence, despite ending their
or annulled by the courts.21 He has no diplomatic ties, the people of
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do Taiwan
so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we and of the Philippines
stated the reason for this: maintained an
o These officers cannot refuse to unofficial relationship
perform their duty on the ground of facilitated by the
an alleged invalidity of the offices of the Taipei
statute imposing the duty. Economic and
The reason Cultural Office, for the
for this is obvious. It might former, and the
seriously hinder the MECO, for the latter.
transaction of x MECOs purposes are:
public business if these o 1. To establish and develop
officers were to be permitted the commercial and industrial
in all cases to interests
question the constitutionality of Filipino nationals
of statutes and ordinances here and abroad,
imposing and assist on all
duties upon them and which measures designed
have not judicially been to promote and
declared maintain the trade
unconstitutional. Officers of relations of the
the government from the country with the citizens of
highest to other foreign countries;
the lowest are creatures of o 2. To receive and accept
the law and are bound to grants and subsidies that are
obey it.23 reasonably
x The question now is whether the MOU entered necessary in carrying
into by respondent with the oil out the corporate
companies and the subsequent resolutions purposes provided
passed by the Sanggunian have made the they are not subject
respondents duty to enforce Ordinance to conditions
No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or defeatist for or
uncertain. This is also connected to the incompatible with
second issue raised by petitioners, that said
is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. purpose;
97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the o 3. To acquire by purchase,
Sanggunian can amend or repeal lease or by any gratuitous title real
Ordinance No. 8027. and
x We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the personal properties
terms of the MOU were as may be
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the necessary for the
resolutions which ratified it and made it use and need of the
binding on the City of Manila expressly corporation, and to
gave it full force and effect only until April dispose of the same
30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is in like manner when
nothing that legally hinders respondent they are no longer
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24 needed or useful;
x Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the and
Philippines, along with the rest o 4. To do and perform any and
of the world, witnessed the horror of the all acts which are deemed
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin reasonably necessary to carry
Towers of the World Trade Center in New out the purposes.
York City. The objective of the x Funa (a concerned citizen) sent a letter to
ordinance is to protect the residents of the COA requesting for a "copy of the
Manila from the catastrophic devastation latest financial and audit report" of the
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist MECO invoking, for that purpose, his
attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No
reason exists why such a protective
measure should be delayed.

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. MANILA

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 193462 February 4, 2014

FACTS:
x The case stemmed from PHs adherence to the
One China policy of the Peoples
Republic of China (PROC)
o The Philippines commitment to the
One China policy of the PROC,
however, did not preclude the
country from keeping
unofficial
relations with Taiwan on a
"people-to-people" basis.10
Maintaining ties with Taiwan
that is permissible by the
terms of the Joint
Communiqu, however,
necessarily required the
Philippines, and Taiwan, to
course any such relations
 when the former had already obliged itself to
"constitutional right to information on matters of do the same.
public concern." He made the request on the belief x Be that as it may, this Court refrains from dismissing
that the MECO, being under the "operational outright the petition. We
supervision" of the Department of Trade and Industry believe that the mandamus petition
(DTI), is a government owned and was able to craft substantial issues
controlled corporation (GOCC) and thus subject to presupposing the commission of a
the audit jurisdiction of the grave violation of the Constitution and
COA. involving paramount public interest, which need to be
x COA (Naranjo) Issued a memorandum referring the resolved nonetheless:
petitioners request to o First. The petition makes a serious
COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M. Espina for allegation that the COA had
"further disposition." In this been remiss in its constitutional
memorandum, however, Assistant Commissioner or legal duty to audit and
Naranjo revealed that the examine the accounts of an
MECO was "not among the agencies audited by any otherwise auditable entity in the
of the three Clusters of the Corporate Government MECO.
Sector." o Second. There is paramount public
x Funa Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an interest in the resolution of the
admission that the COA issue concerning the failure of the
had never audited and examined the accounts of the COA to audit the accounts of the
MECO, he filed the petition for mandamus before the MECO. The propriety or
SCto compel: impropriety of such a refusal is
o (1) the Commission on Audit (COA) to audit and determinative of whether the
examine the funds COA was able to faithfully fulfill
of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office its constitutional role as the
(MECO), and guardian of the public treasury,
o (2) the MECO to submit to such audit and in which any citizen has an
examination. interest.
o Third. There is also paramount public
ISSUE # 1: Whether the mandamus case should be dismissed, interest in the resolution of
considering that the COA has already obligated itself to audit the issue regarding the legal
MECO. status of the MECO; a novelty
insofar as our jurisprudence is
HELD # 1: NO. concerned. We find that the
x The first preliminary issue relates to the alleged mootness of status of the MECOwhether it
the instant may be considered as a
mandamus petition, occasioned by the COAs government agency or nothas
issuance of Office Order No. 2011- a direct bearing on the countrys
698. The COA claims that by issuing Office Order No. commitment to the One China
2011-698, it had already policy of the PROC.67
conceded its jurisdiction over the accounts of the x An allegation as serious as a violation of a
MECO and so fulfilled the constitutional or legal duty, coupled
objective of the instant petition.58 The COA thus with the pressing public interest in the
urges that the instant petition be dismissed for resolution of all related issues, prompts
being moot and academic.59 this Court to pursue a definitive ruling
o We decline to dismiss the mandamus petition on thereon, if not for the proper guidance of
the ground of the government or agency concerned, then
mootness. for the formulation of controlling
x A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the principles for the education of the bench,
occurrence of a bar and the public in general.68 For this
supervening event, it ceases to present any purpose, the Court invokes its symbolic
justiciable controversy.60 Since they lack an actual function.69
controversy otherwise cognizable by courts, moot x If the foregoing reasons are not enough to convince,
cases are, as a rule, dismissible.61 We still add another:
x The rule that requires dismissal of moot cases, however, is o Assuming that the allegations of neglect
not absolute. It is on the part of the COA
subject to exceptions. In David v. were true, Office Order No. 2011-
Macapagal-Arroyo,62 this Court 698 does not offer the strongest
comprehensively captured these exceptions certainty that they would not be
scattered throughout our jurisprudence: replicated in the future. In the
o The "moot and academic" principle is not a first place, Office Order No. 2011-
magical formula that 698 did not state any legal
can automatically dissuade the courts in justification as to why, after
resolving a case. Courts decades of not auditing the
will decide cases, otherwise moot and accounts
academic, if: first, there is a of the MECO, the COA suddenly
grave violation of the Constitution;63 decided to do so. Neither does it
second, the exceptional state any determination regarding
character of the situation and the the true status of the MECO. The
paramount public interest is justifications provided by the
involved;64 third, when COA, in fact, only appears in the
constitutional issue raised requires memorandum70 it submitted
formulation of controlling principles to to this Court for purposes of
guide the bench, the bar, and the this
public;65 and fourth, the case is capable case.
of repetition yet evading review.66 x Thus, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order No.
x In this case, We find that the issuance by the COA of Office 2011-698 appears to be
Order No. 2011-698 entirely dependent upon the judgment of the
indeed qualifies as a supervening event that incumbent chairperson of the COA;
effectively renders moot and academic the main susceptible of being undone, with or without
prayer of the instant mandamus petition. A writ of reason, by her or even her
mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts 43
of the MECO would certainly be a mere superfluity,
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successor. Hence, the case now
before this Court is dangerously
capable of being repeated yet
evading review.
o Verily, this Court should not dismiss
the mandamus petition on the
ground of mootness.
ISSUE # 2: Whether Funa correctly filed the present petition
HELD # 2: YES.
x The second preliminary issue is concerned with
the standing of the petitioner to
file the instant mandamus petition. The
COA claims that petitioner has none, for
the latter was not able to concretely
establish that he had been aggrieved or
prejudiced by its failure to audit the accounts of
the MECO.71
x Related to the issue of lack of standing is the
MECOs contention that
petitioner has no cause of action
to file the instant mandamus
petition. The MECO faults
petitioner for not making any
demand for it to submit to an
audit by the COA or for the COA
to perform such an audit, prior to
filing the instant petition.72
x We sustain petitioners standing, as a
concerned citizen, to file the instant
petition.
x The rules regarding legal standing in
bringing public suits, or locus standi, are
already well-defined in our
case law. Again, We cite David,
which summarizes
jurisprudence on this point:73
x By way of summary, the following rules
may be culled from the cases decided by
this Court.1a\^/phi1 Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may
be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following
requirements are met:
 o (1) the cases involve constitutional approved by and to be deposited in the court
issues; by the person at whose request and upon
o (2) for taxpayers, there must be a whose relation the same is brought. (4a)
claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure Section 4. When hearing had on application for
is unconstitutional; permission to commence action.
o (3) for voters, there must be a Upon application for permission to
showing of obvious interest in the commence such action in accordance with
validity of the election law in question; the next
o (4) for concerned citizens, there must preceding section, the court shall direct that
be a showing that the issues notice be given to the respondent so that he
raised are of may be heard in opposition thereto; and if
transcendental permission is granted, the court shall issue
importance which must an
be settled early; and
o (5) for legislators, there must be a
claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
x We rule that the instant petition raises issues of
transcendental
importance, involved as they are with
the performance of a constitutional
duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA.
Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a
concerned citizen, has the requisite
legal standing to file the instant
mandamus petition.
x To be sure, petitioner does not need to make any
prior demand on the
MECO or the COA in order to maintain
the instant petition. The duty of the COA
sought to be compelled by mandamus,
emanates from the
Constitution and law, which explicitly
require, or "demand," that it
perform the said duty. To the mind of
this Court, petitioner already
established his cause of action against
the COA when he alleged that
the COA had neglected its duty in
violation of the Constitution and the
law.

_______________________________________________

QUO WARRANTO [Rule 66]

1. Parties

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.

An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified
petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or

unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers

an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or

(c) An association which acts as a

corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to
act. (1a)

Section 2. When Solicitor General or public

prosecutor must commence action. The Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he
has good reason to believe that any case specified
in the preceding section can be established by
proof, must commence such action. (3a)

Section 3. When Solicitor General or public

prosecutor may commence action with permission of
court. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor
may, with the
permission of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, bring such an action at the request and
upon the relation of another person; but in such case
the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity
for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount
 Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City
order to that effect, copies of which shall be served on all x Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of
interested parties, and the petition shall then be filed the CIIS.
within the period ordered by the court. (5a) x Mendoza then received a letter from Deputy
Customs Commissioner Cesar Z.
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. Dario, informing him of his termination from
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position the Bureau of Customs, in view of
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an respondent Allas' appointment as Director
action therefor in his own name. (6) III by President Fidel V. Ramos
x Mendoza wrote to BOC demanding for
Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against usurpation. reinstatement, among others
When the action is o No reply
against a person for usurping a public office, position or x Mendoza filed a quo warranto case before RTC
franchise, the petition shall set forth x RTC ruled in favor of Mendoza
the name of the person who claim to be entitled thereto, if any, o The court found that petitioner was
with an averment of illegally terminated from office
his right to the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in without due process of law and in
possession thereof. All persons violation of his security of
who claim to be entitled to the public office, position or franchise tenure, and that as he was
may be made deemed not to have vacated his
parties, and their respective rights to such public office, position office,
or franchise determined, in the same action. (7a) the appointment of respondent
Allas to the same office was void
ab
2. Period initio. The court ordered the
ouster of respondent Allas from
Section 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be the
reduced; action given position of Director III, and at the
precedence. The court may reduce the period provided by same time directed the
these Rules for filing pleadings reinstatement of petitioner to the
and for all other proceedings in the action in order to secure the same position with payment of
most expeditious full back salaries and other
determination of the matters involved therein consistent with the benefits appurtenant thereto.
rights of the parties. Such x Allas appealed to CA
action may be given precedence over any other civil matter x During pendency of appeal, Allas was promoted by
pending in the court. President Ramos to the
(9a) position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for
Assessment and Operations
3. Limitations x Mendoza filed an MD on the ground of mootness
x CA granted MD
x Mendoza filed a Motion for Execution before the
Section 11. Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule shall
RTC
be construed to authorize
x RTC denied the motion
an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster
o on the ground that the contested position
from office unless the same be
vacated by respondent
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or
Allas was now being occupied by
the right of the petitioner to
respondent Godofredo Olores who
hold such office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for
was not a party to the quo
damages in accordance with
warranto petition
the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be
x Mendoza filed a special civil action for certiorari
commenced within one (1) and mandamus before the CA
year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's x CA dismissed the petition
right to the office in question.
(16a)
44
4. Judgment for Cost

Section 12. Judgment for costs. In an action brought in

accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the court may render
judgment for costs against either the petitioner, the relator, or
the respondent, or the person or persons claiming to be a
corporation, or may apportion the costs, as justice requires. (17a)

PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO

OLORES, respondents. G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
x Mendoza joined Bureau of Customs and held the ff
positions:
o Port Security Chief from March 1972 to August
1972
o Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August
1972 to September
1975,
o Acting Commissioner of Customs from September
1975 to April
1977 and
o Customs Operations Chief I from October 1987 to
February 1988
x His position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the
Civil Service as
"Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No.
6758 and National
Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's
position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function
and duties of said office.
x Mendoza was then temporarily designated as Acting
District Collector,
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enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has
ISSUE: Whether the RTC decision reinstating Mendoza forfeited his
may bind Olores, the new holder of the position, such right to enjoy the privilege. 10
that the latter may be ousted therefrom, considering The action may be
that he was not made a party to the original case. commenced for the
Government by the Solicitor
HELD: NO. General or the fiscal 11 against
x The instant petition arose from a special civil individuals
action for quo warranto under Rule who usurp a public office, against
66 of the Revised Rules of Court. Quo a public officer whose acts
warranto is a demand made by the state constitute a ground for the
upon some individual or corporation to forfeiture of his office, and
show by what right they exercise some against an association which acts
franchise or privilege appertaining to the as a
state which, according to the corporation without being legally
Constitution and laws of the land, they incorporated. 12 The action may
cannot legally exercise except by virtue of also be
a grant or authority from the state. 9 In instituted by an individual in his
other words, a petition for quo own name who claims to be
warranto is a proceeding to determine entitled to
the right of a person to the use or the public office or position
exercise of a franchise or office and to usurped or unlawfully held or
oust the holder from its exercised by
another. 13
x Where the action is filed by a private person, he Mendoza,
must prove that he is Jr. to the
entitled to the controverted position, position
otherwise respondent has a right of
to the undisturbed possession of the Director
office. 14 If the court finds for the III,
respondent, the judgment should simply Customs
state that the respondent is entitled to Intelligen
the office. 15 If, however, the court finds ce and
for the petitioner and declares the Investigat
respondent guilty of usurping, intruding ion
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising Service of
the office, judgment may be rendered as the
follows: Bureau of
o Sec. 10. Judgment where Customs
usurpation found. When the with full
defendant is found guilty of back
usurping, intruding into, or wages
unlawfully holding or and other
exercising an office, position, monetary
right, privilege, or benefits
franchise, judgment shall be appurtena
rendered that such defendant nt thereto
be from the
ousted and altogether time they
excluded therefrom, and that were
the plaintiff or relator, as the withheld
case may be, recover his until
costs. Such further reinstated
judgment may be rendered . 19
determining the respective x The trial court found that respondent
rights in and to the office, Allas usurped the position of "Director III,
position, right, privilege, or Chief of the Customs Intelligence
franchise of all the parties to and Investigation Service."
the action as justice requires. Consequently, the court ordered
x If it is found that the respondent or defendant is that respondent Allas be ousted
usurping or intruding into the from the contested position and
office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court that petitioner be reinstated in
may order: his stead. Although petitioner did
o (1) The ouster and exclusion not specifically pray for his back
of the defendant from salaries, the court ordered that
office; he be paid his "full back wages
o (2) The recovery of costs by and other monetary benefits"
plaintiff or relator; appurtenant to the contested
o (3) The determination of the position "from the time they
respective rights in and to were withheld until reinstated."
the office, position, right, x The decision of the trial court had long
privilege or franchise of all become final and executory, and
the parties to the action as petitioner prays for its execution.
justice requires. 16 He alleges that he should have
x The character of the judgment to be rendered in been reinstated
quo warranto rests to despite respondent Olores'
some extent in the discretion of the appointment because the subject
court and on the relief sought. 17 In the position was never
case at bar, petitioner prayed for the vacant to begin with. Petitioner's
following relief: removal was illegal and he was
o WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed deemed never
that respondent be ousted
to have vacated his office when
and altogether excluded respondent Allas was appointed
from the position of Director
to the same.
III, Customs Intelligence and
Respondent Allas'
Investigation Service of the
appointment was null and
Bureau of Customs, and
void and this nullity
petitioner be seated to the
allegedly extends to
position as the one legally
respondent Olores, his
appointed and entitled
successor-in-interest. 20
thereto.
x Ordinarily, a judgment against a public
o Other reliefs, just or equitable in the officer in regard to a public
premises, are likewise prayed
right binds his successor in
for. 18
office. This rule, however, is not
x In granting the petition, the trial court ordered
applicable in quo warranto cases.
that:
21 A judgment in quo warranto
o WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of
does not bind the respondent's
the foregoing, judgment is
successor in office, even though
hereby rendered granting this petition
such successor may trace his
for quo warranto by:
title to the same source. This
1. Ousting and
follows from the nature of the
excluding respondent Ray
writ of quo warranto itself. It is
Allas from the
never directed to an officer as
position of
such, but always against the
Director III,
person to determine whether
Customs
he is
Intelligence and
Investigation
Service of the
Bureau of
Customs; and
2. Reinstating
petitioner Pedro C.
 the St. John Hospital Inc. which
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any originally under PD 902-A
act in, or approved on March 11, 1976 is
exercise any function of the office to which he lays within the original and exclusive
claim. 22 In the
case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by jurisdiction of the Securities and
petitioner solely Exchange Commission to try
against respondent Allas. What was threshed out and
before the trial court decide
was the qualification and right of petitioner to the o A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect
contested position 15 December 2000
as against respondent Ray Allas, not against designated certain branches of
Godofredo Olores. The the Regional Trial Court to try
Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of and
the trial court's decide Securities and Exchange
decision. Commission Cases arising
x Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the within
compulsory retirement age their respective territorial
of sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. jurisdiction with respect to the
Reinstatement not being possible, National
petitioner now prays for the payment of his back Capital Region and within the
salaries and other benefits from respective provinces in the First
the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the to
trial court's decision. 23 Twelve Judicial Region.
x Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for Accordingly, in the Province of
petitioner's back salaries Camarines
and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23
position by the President presided by the Hon. Pablo M.
of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional Paqueo, Jr. was designated as
power as Chief Executive. "special court" (Section 1, A.M.
Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to No. 00-11-03-SC).
pay the said back salaries o Administrative Circular No. 8-01 "all
and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was SEC cases originally
not a party to the petition assigned or transmitted to the
for quo warranto. regular Regional Trial Court shall
be transferred to branches of the
Regional Trial Court specially
MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON designated to hear such cases in
PETER P. CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-
PERFECTO NIXON C. TABORA, Petitioners, vs. JOSE PIERRE A. 03-SC.
PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P. MALLARI, o Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a]
Respondents. Motion to Dismiss is
G.R. No. 168696 among the prohibited
pleadings. On the otherhand,
the Supreme
February 28, 2006 Court under Administrative
FIRST DIVISION Order 8-01 has directed the
transfer
FACTS: from the regular courts to the
x Panday and Mallari (respondents) have allegedly been branches of the Regional Trial
members of the board of Courts specially designated to try
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated and decide intra-corporate
x Calleja et al (also among the incorporators and stockholders dispute.
of said corporation) x Calleja et al did not file an MR
allegedly forcibly and with the aid of armed men
usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to o Filed
Respondents. DIRECTLY a Rule 45 before the SC
x Panday et al filed a quo warranto case(with Damages and
Prayer for ISSUE # 1: Whether a Rule 45 is
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages
the correct remedy.
and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order)
before the RTC San Jose, Camarines Sur Br 58 HELD # 1: NO.
x RTC CamSur Br 58 issued an order transferring the case to x The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the
RTC Naga wrong remedy to assail the
o since the verified petition showed petitioners Order of July 13, 2005. It is hornbook
therein (herein principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
respondents) to be residents of Naga City, Civil Procedure governs appeals from
then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the judgments or final orders.4 The Order
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of
for quo warranto should be brought in the herein petitioners prayer in their
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction Answer for the dismissal of respondents
over the territorial area where the case against them. As a consequence
respondents or any of the respondents of the trial courts refusal to dismiss the
resides case, it then directed the transfer of the
x EJ of RTC Naga effused to receive the case case to another branch of the Regional Trial
o stating that improper venue is not a ground for Court that had been designated as
transferring a quo a special court to hear cases formerly
warranto case to another administrative cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order
jurisdiction.
was merely interlocutory as it does not
x RTC Br 58 proceeded with the case
dispose of the case completely, but
x RTC Br 58 REMANDED the case to RTC Br 23 Naga City
(because the latter 45
has been designated as special court to try
and decide intra-corporate controversies
under R.A. 8799)
o cause of action involves controversies arising out
of intra-corporate
relations, between and among
stockholders, members or associates of
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course
of law
leaves something more to be done on by an
its merits. Such being the case, the appeal
assailed Order cannot ordinarily be from the
reviewed through a petition under Rule judgme
45. As we held in Tolentino v. nt after
Natanauan, 5 to wit: trial.
o In the case of Bangko Silangan The
Development Bank vs. Court of ordinary
Appeals, the Court reiterated the procedu
well-settled rule that: re to be
. . . an order denying a followed
motion to dismiss is merely in that
interlocutory and event is
therefore not to file
appealable, nor an
can it answer,
be the subject of go to
a petition for trial,
review on and if
certiorari. the
Such order may decisi
only be reviewed on is
in the ordinary adver
 se, reiterate exercise
the issue on jurisdiction over
appeal from these cases. xxx
the final x Therefore, actions of quo warranto
judgment.6 against persons who usurp an office
x It appears, however, that the longer this case in a corporation, which were
remains unresolved, the greater formerly cognizable by the
chance there is for more violence Securities and
between the parties to erupt. In Exchange Commission under PD
Philippine 902-A, have been transferred to
Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the the
Court proceeded to give due course to courts of general jurisdiction.
a But, this does not change the
case despite the wrong remedy fact that
resorted to by the petitioner therein, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
stating Procedure does not apply to quo
thus: warranto cases against
o While a petition for review on persons who usurp an
certiorari under Rule 45 would office in a private
ordinarily be inappropriate corporation. Presently,
to assail an interlocutory Section 1(a) of Rule 66
order, in the reads thus:
interest, however, of o Section 1. Action by
arresting the perpetuation Government against individuals. -
of an apparent An action
error committed below that for the usurpation
could only serve to of a public office,
unnecessarily position or
burden the parties, the franchise may be
Court has resolved to ignore commenced by a
the technical flaw and, also, verified petition
to treat the petition, there brought in the
being no other plain, speedy name of the
and adequate remedy, as a Republic of the Philippines
special civil action for against
certiorari. Not much, after all, (a) A person who
can be gained if the Court usurps, intrudes into, or
were to refrain from now unlawfully
making a pronouncement on h
an issue so basic as that ol
submitted by the parties.8 d
s
ISSUE # 2: Whether Panday et al. correctly or
resorted to a quo warranto under the Rules of e
Court, considering that the subject positions are x
those of a private corporation. er
ci
HELD # 2: NO. s
x It should be noted that allegations in a complaint e
for quo warranto that certain s
persons usurped the offices, powers a
and functions of duly elected members p
of the board, trustees and/or officers u
make out a case for an intra-corporate bl
controversy.9 Prior to the enactment ic
of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting o
Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in ffi
Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that c
Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of e,
Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of p
quo warranto against persons who usurp o
a public office, position or franchise; si
public officers who forfeit their office; and ti
associations which act as corporations o
without being legally incorporated," while n
"[a]ctions of quo warranto against or
corporations, or against persons who fr
usurp an office in a corporation, fall under a
the jurisdiction of the Securities and n
Exchange Commission and are governed c
by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as hi
amended)."11 s
x However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section e;
5.2 thereof provides as follows: x As explained in the Unilongo12 case,
o 5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules
over all cases enumerated under no longer contains the phrase "or
Section 5 of Presidential an office in a corporation created
Decree No. 902-A is hereby by authority of law" which was
transferred to found in the old Rules. Clearly,
the Courts of general the present Rule 66 only
jurisdiction or the appropriate applies to actions of quo
Regional Trial warranto against persons who
Court: Provided, That the usurp a public
Supreme Court in the office, position or franchise;
exercise of its public officers who forfeit their
authority may designate office; and
the Regional Trial Court associations which act as
branches that shall corporations without being
legally
incorporated despite the passage
 of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A.
No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules)
which applies to the petition for quo
warranto filed by respondents before the
trial court since what is being
questioned is the authority of herein
petitioners to assume the office and act
as
the board of directors and officers of St.
John Hospital, Incorporated.
x The Interim Rules provide thus:
o Section 1. (a) Cases covered. - These
Rules shall govern the
procedure to be observed in civil
cases involving the following:
(2) Controversies arising
out of intra-corporate,
partnership, or
association
relations,
between and
among
stockholders,
members, or
associates,
and
between, any
or all of them
and the
corporation,
partnership, or
association of
which they are
stockholders, members, or
associates, respectively;
ISSUE # 3: Which court/tribunal may validly take cognizance of
the present case?
HELD # 3: RTC that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
corporation.
x The next question then is, which branch of the
Regional Trial Court has
(3) Controversies in the
election or appointment of
directors,
trustees,
officers, or
managers of
corporations
,
partnerships
, or
associations;
o SEC. 5. Venue. - All actions covered by
these Rules shall be
commenced and tried in the
Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the principal
office of the corporation,
partnership, or association
concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours)
x Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the
Supreme Court promulgated A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC (effective December 15,
2000) designating certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts to try and decide cases
formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
x Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-
03-SC, effective July 1,
2003, which provides that:
o 1. The Regional Courts previously
designated as SEC Courts
through the: (a) Resolutions of
this Court dated 21 November
2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November
2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued
in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b)
Resolution dated 27 August
2001 in
A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c)
Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in
A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are
hereby DESIGNATED and shall
be
CALLED as Special Commercial
Courts to try and decide cases
involving violations of
Intellectual Property Rights
which fall within
their jurisdiction and those cases
formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange
Commission;
o 4. The Special Commercial Courts shall
have jurisdiction over cases
arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with
respect to the National Capital
Judicial Region and within the
respective
provinces with respect to the
First to Twelfth Judicial Regions.
Thus, cases shall be filed in the
Office of the Clerk of Court in
the
official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court;
(Emphasis ours)
jurisdiction over the present action for quo
warrato? Section 5 of the Interim
Rules provides that the petition should be
commenced and tried in the
Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over
the principal office of the
corporation. It is undisputed that the principal
office of the corporation is
situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus,
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M.
 No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court
designated as Special
Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall
have jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto filed by herein Respondents.
x Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft
of jurisdiction over
respondents petition for quo warranto. Based on the
allegations in the petition,
the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate
dispute. The trial court
should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799
and the aforementioned
administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58
was never designated as a
Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested
with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by
the SEC.
x Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite
authority or power to
order the transfer of the case to another branch of
the Regional Trial Court. The
only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter
was to dismiss the petition
for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and
Development Corp. v. Emily
Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association,13
the Court held that the trial
court, having no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint, should
dismiss the same so the issues therein could be
expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal
which was clothed with jurisdiction.
x Note, further, that respondents petition for quo warranto was
filed as late as
2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC took effect as early as
July 1, 2003 and it was
clearly provided therein that such petitions shall be
filed in the Office of the Clerk
of Court in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court. Since
the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court for Camarines Sur
is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents
should have filed their
petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having
been in effect for four
years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect
for almost two years by
the time respondents filed their petition, there is no
cogent reason why
respondents were not aware of the appropriate court
where their petition should
be filed.
x The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No.
08-2001
authorized said trial court to order the transfer of
respondents petition to the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious
because as of the time of filing of
the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly
stated that cases formerly
cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office
of the Clerk of Court in the
official station of the designated Special Commercial
Court, had been in effect for
almost two years. Thus, the filing of the petition with
the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Camarines Sur, which had no jurisdiction
over those kinds of actions,
was clearly erroneous.

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE

AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32

June 22, 2010

EN BANC

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C.
GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents. G.R. No.
180443

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
members, in order to confirm
the withdrawal of the
FACTS: nomination of Lokin, Tugna and
x Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) Galang and the substitution of
manifested its intent to participate in Borje
the May 2007 elections o averred that Lokin and Tugna
x It then submitted the names of its 5 nominees: were not among the nominees
o (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) presented and
herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, proclaimed by CIBAC
Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz- in its proclamation
Gonzales; (4) Sherwin rally held in
Tugna; and (5) Emil L. May 2007; and that
Galang Galang had signified
x CIBAC then filed a motion to amend the names of his desire to focus on
its nominees, among others his
o withdrew the nominations of Lokin, family life
Tugna and Galang and x CIBAC filed before the COMELEC En
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one Banc a motion seeking the proclamation
of the nominees of Lokin as its second nominee
o The amended list of nominees of o The right of CIBAC to a
CIBAC thus included: (1) second seat as well as the right of
Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Lokin to
Borje. be thus proclaimed
x CIBAC then submitted signed petitions of more were purportedly
than 81% of the CIBAC based on Party-List
 Canvass warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil
Report No. 26, which showed action for certiorari in this Court.
CIBAC to have garnered a
grand total ISSUE: Whether COMELEC is correct in
of 744,674 votes. Using all its position that a quo warranto may be
relevant formulas, the motion a correct remedy for Lokin, and not a
asserted petition for certiorari.
that CIBAC was clearly entitled
to a second seat and Lokin to HELD: NO.
a x An election protest proposes to oust the
proclamation. winning candidate from office. It is
x Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales opposed the strictly a contest between the
motion defeated and the winning
x COMELEC failed to act on the matter candidates, based on
x COMELEC En Banc then declared that CIBAC the grounds of electoral frauds
was entitled to an additional seat and irregularities, to determine
o Then resolved E.M. No. 07-054: who between
WHEREFORE, considering them has actually obtained the
the above discussion, the majority of the legal votes cast
Commission and is entitled to hold the office.
hereby approves It can only be filed by a candidate
the withdrawal of who has duly filed a certificate of
the candidacy and has been voted for
nomination of Atty. in the preceding elections.
Luis K. Lokin, x A special civil action for quo warranto
Sherwin N. Tugna refers to questions of disloyalty
and Emil Galang to the State, or of ineligibility of
as second, third the winning candidate. The
and fourth objective
nominees of the action is to unseat the
respectively and ineligible person from the office,
the substitution but not
thereby with Atty. to install the petitioner in his
Cinchona C. place. Any voter may initiate the
Cruz-Gonzales action,
as second which is, strictly speaking, not a
nominee and contest where the parties strive
Atty. Armi Jane for
R. Borje as third supremacy because the
nominee for the petitioner will not be seated
party list CIBAC. even if the
The new order of respondent may be unseated.
CIBAC's nominees x The controversy involving Lokin is neither
therefore shall an election protest nor an action for
be: quo warranto, for it concerns a
x 1. Emmanuel very peculiar situation in which
Joel J. Villanueva Lokin is seeking
x 2. Cinchona C. to be seated as the second
Cruz-Gonzales nominee of CIBAC. Although an
x 3. Armi Jane R. election protest may
Borje properly be available to one
x THUS, COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz- party-list organization seeking to
Gonzales as the official second unseat another
nominee of CIBAC and the latter took oath and party-list organization to
assumed office determine which between the
x The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation defeated and the winning
of the winning party-list party-list organizations actually
organization has been done and its obtained the majority of the legal
nominee has assumed office, any votes, Lokins
question case is not one in which a
relating to the election, returns and nominee of a particular party-list
qualifications of the candidates to the organization thereby
House wants to unseat another nominee
of Representatives falls under the of the same party-list
jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to organization. Neither
Section does an action for quo warranto
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. lie, considering that the case does
Thus, Lokin should raise the question he not
poses herein either in an election protest involve the ineligibility and
or in a special civil action for quo disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the
warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action Republic
for certiorari in this Court. of the Philippines, or some other
o We do not agree. cause of disqualification for her.
x Lokin filed a Rule 65
x The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation
of the winning party-list
organization has been done and its
nominee has assumed office, any
question
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the
House
of Representatives falls under the
jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to
Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, Lokin should raise the question he
poses herein either in an election protest
or in a special civil action for quo
 imprisonment of four (4)
x Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for years and one (1) day of
certiorari against the prisin
COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, correccional as minimum, to
2007 resolution of the eight (8) years and one (1)
COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A day of prisin mayor as
of the 1987 Constitution, maximum
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by x COMELEC EN Banc ordered Vice-Mayor Efren Racel
Cruz-Gonzales. The Aratea to cease and desist
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule from discharging the functions of the
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Office of the Mayor, and to cause a
Procedure, which provides for the review of the peaceful turn-over of the said office to
judgments, final orders or Antipolo upon her proclamation
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. As Rule 64 states, the ISSUE: Whether
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be HELD:
filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of x Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to
30 days. Undoubtedly, the or the cancellation of the
Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications
Lokins petitions for certiorari but on a finding that the candidate made a
and for mandamus against the COMELEC. material representation that is false, which
may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office
EFREN RACEL ARATEA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSiON ON he/she is running for. It is noted that the
ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents. candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she
G.R. No. 195229 is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be
read in relation to the
October 9, 2012 constitutional and statutory provisions on
EN BANC qualifications or eligibility for public
office. If the candidate subsequently states a
FACTS: material representation in the CoC
x Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo that is false, the COMELEC, following the law,
(Antipolo) were is empowered to deny due course
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
2010 elections Court has already likened a proceeding
x Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under under Section 78 to a quo warranto
Section 78 of the proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC
Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida since they both deal with the eligibility or
and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas qualification of a candidate, with the
certificate of candidacy distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
o on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and 78" petition is filed before
had served, as proclamation, while a petition for quo
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for warranto is filed after proclamation of the
four (4) consecutive terms winning candidate
immediately prior to the term for the x It is obvious from a reading of the laws and
May 2010 elections jurisprudence that there is an
o asserted that Lonzanida made a false material overlap in the grounds for eligibility and
representation in his ineligibility vis--vis qualifications and
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida disqualifications. For example, a candidate
certified under oath that he was eligible may represent that he is a resident of
for the office he sought election a particular Philippine locality37 when he is
x COMELEC 2nd division cancelled Lonzanidas CoC actually a permanent resident of
o Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of another country.38 In cases of such overlap,
mayor for more the petitioner should not be
than three consecutive terms, went constrained in his choice of remedy when the
against the three-term limit Omnibus Election Code explicitly
rule; therefore, he could not be allowed makes available multiple remedies.39
to run anew in the 2010 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to
elections. deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
x Lonzanida filed an MR before COMELEC En Banc candidacy before the election, while
x Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for
highest number of votes quo warranto after the election.
and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor Despite the overlap of the grounds, one
x Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional should not confuse a petition for
Trial Court (RTC) disqualification using grounds enumerated in
Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City Section 68 with a petition to deny
o Upon his inquiry, he was allowed by DOJ due course or to cancel a certificate of
Secretary Jesse M. candidacy under Section 78.
Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of x
office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales without 47
prejudice
however to the outcome of the
cases pending before the
[COMELEC]."
x COMELEC EN Banc issued a Reso disqualifying Lonzanida
from running for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections
o first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served
as Mayor for
more than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and
o second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final
judgment of ten
(10) counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code.
Lonzanida was sentenced for
each count of falsification to
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Henedino M. Brondial)
under Section 68.
Hence, the 25-day
x The distinction between a petition under Section 68 prescriptive period
and a petition under Section provided in Section 78
78 was discussed in Loong v. should be strictly
Commission on Elections40 with respect applied. We recognized
to the the possible gap in the
applicable prescriptive period. law:
Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed o It is true that the
a petition discovery of false
under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner representation as to material
Benjamin Loong for the office of facts
Regional Vice-Governor of the required
Autonomous Government of Muslim to be
Mindanao for stated in
false representation as to his age. The a
petition was filed 16 days after the certificat
election, and clearly beyond the e of
prescribed 25 day period from the last candidac
day of y, under
filing certificates of candidacy. This Section
Court ruled that Ututalums petition was 74 of the
one Code,
based on false representation under may be
Section 78, and not for disqualification made
 only after the lapse of the raise the said
grounds."44 A petition
25-day period prescribed for disqualification can
by Section 78 of the only be premised on
Code, through no a ground specified in
fault of the person who Section 12 or 68 of the
discovers such Omnibus Election Code
misrepresentations and who or Section
would want the 40 of the Local
disqualification of the Government Code.
candidate committing the Thus, a petition
misrepresentations. It questioning a
would seem, therefore, candidates
that there could indeed possession of the
be a gap between the required one-year
time of the discovery of residency
the requirement, as
misrepresentation, (when distinguished
the discovery is made after from permanent
the 25-day residency or
period under Sec. 78 of the immigrant status in a
Code has lapsed) and the foreign country,
time when should be
the proclamation of the filed under Section
results of the election is 78, and a petition
made. During this under Section 68 is
so-called "gap" the would- the wrong remedy.
be petitioner (who would x In Munder v. Commission on
seek the Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a
disqualification of the certificate of
candidate) is left with candidacy for Mayor
nothing to do except to of Bubong, Lanao del
wait for the proclamation of Sur on 26 November
the results, so that he could 2009. Respondent
avail of a Atty. Tago Sarip filed
remedy against the a petition for
misrepresenting candidate, Munders
that is, by filing a disqualification
petition for quo warranto on 13 April 2010.
against him. Respondent Sarip claimed that
Commission Munder
sees this "gap" in what it misrepresented that
calls a procedural gap which, he was a
according to it, is registered voter of
unnecessary and should be Bubong, Lanao del Sur,
remedied. and that he was eligible
x At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the to register as a voter in
purpose and intent of the 2003 even though he
legislative branch of the government to was not yet 18 years of
fix a definite time within which petitions age at the time of the
voters registration.
of protests related to eligibility of Moreover, Munders
candidates for elective offices must be certificate of candidacy
filed, as was not
seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the accomplished in
Code. Respondent Commission may full as he failed to
have indicate his
seen the need to remedy this so- precinct and did
called procedural gap", but it is not not affix his
for it to prescribe what the law does thumb-mark. The
not provide, its function not being COMELEC Second
legislative. The question of whether Division dismissed
the time to file these petitions or Sarips petition
protests is too short or ineffective is and
one for the Legislature to decide and declared that his
remedy.41 grounds are not
x In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a grounds for
candidates possession of disqualification under
the required one-year residency Section 68
requirement was raised in a petition for but for denial or
disqualification under Section 68 cancellation of
instead of a petition to deny due course Munders certificate
or to of candidacy under
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section
Section 78. Despite the question of the 78. Sarips petition was
one-year residency being a proper filed out of time as he
ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, had only 25 days after
the the filing of
petitioner before the COMELEC in Munders certificate of
Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and candidacy, or until 21
5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. December 2009, within
780043 and filed the petition under which to file
Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a his petition.
COMELEC rule or resolution cannot x The COMELEC En Banc, however,
supplant or vary legislative enactments disqualified Munder. In reversing the
that distinguish the grounds for COMELEC
disqualification from those of Second Division, the
ineligibility, and the appropriate COMELEC En Banc did
proceedings to not rule on the
 propriety of Sarips
remedy but focused on the question of
whether Munder was a registered voter
of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court
reinstated the COMELEC Second
Divisions
resolution. This Court ruled that the
ground raised in the petition, lack of
registration as voter in the locality
where he was running as a candidate, is
inappropriate for a petition for
disqualification. We further declared
that with our ruling in Fermin, we had
already rejected the claim that lack of
substantive
qualifications of a candidate is a ground
for a petition for disqualification under
Section 68. The only substantive
qualification the absence of which is a
ground for a petition under Section 68 is
the candidates permanent residency or
immigrant status in a foreign country.
x The dissenting opinions place the violation of the
three-term limit rule as a
disqualification under Section 68 as the
violation allegedly is "a status,
circumstance or condition which bars
him from running for public office
despite
the possession of all the qualifications
under Section 39 of the [Local
Government Code]." In so holding the
dissenting opinions write in the law
what
is not found in the law. Section 68 is
explicit as to the proper grounds for
disqualification under said Section. The
grounds for filing a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 are
specifically enumerated in said Section.
However, contrary to the specific
enumeration in Section 68 and contrary
to
prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting
opinions add to the enumerated
grounds
the violation of the three-term limit rule and
falsification under the Revised Penal Code,
which are obviously not found in the
enumeration in Section 68.
x The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanidas possession
of a disqualifying
condition (violation of the three-term limit rule)
with the grounds for
disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is
explicit as to the proper grounds
for disqualification: the commission of specific
prohibited acts under the Omnibus
Election Code and possession of a permanent
residency or immigrant status in a
foreign country. Any other false representation
regarding a material fact should
be filed under Section 78, specifically under the
candidates certification of his
eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-
term limit as a condition for
eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to
judicial legislation, ignoring the verba
legis doctrine and well-established
jurisprudence on this very issue.
x In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to
certify under oath his
eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office
he seeks election. Even though the certificate
of candidacy does not specifically ask the
candidate for the number of terms elected and
served in an elective position, such fact is
material in
determining a candidates eligibility, and thus
qualification for the office. Election to and
service of the same local elective position for
three consecutive terms
renders a candidate ineligible from running for
the same position in the
succeeding elections. Lonzanida
misrepresented his eligibility because he knew
full well that he had been elected, and had
served, as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales for more than three consecutive
terms yet he still certified that he was
eligible to run for mayor for the next
succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanidas
representation that he was eligible for the office
that he sought election
constitutes false material representation as to
his qualification or eligibility for the
office.
x The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local
elective office and the
disqualifications that may apply to candidates
necessarily create distinctions on
the remedies available, on the effects of lack of
eligibility and on the application
of disqualification. The remedies available are
essentially: the cancellation of a
CoC, disqualification from candidacy or from
holding office, and quo
warranto, which are distinct remedies with
varying applicability and effects. For ease of
presentation and understanding, their
availability, grounds and effects are topically
discussed below.
o As to the grounds:
x In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC,
the ground is essentially
lack of eligibility under the pertinent
constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office;20
the governing provisions are
Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.21
x In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the
grounds are traits, conditions,
characteristics or acts of disqualification,22
individually applicable to a candidate,
as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of B.P.
Blg. 881; Section 40 of LGC 1991;
and, as discussed below, Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution. As previously
discussed, the grounds for disqualification are
different from, and have nothing
to do with, a candidates CoC although they
may result in disqualification from
candidacy whose immediate effect upon
finality before the elections is the same
 as a cancellation. If they are cited in a petition filed before the
elections, they
remain as disqualification grounds and carry effects that are
distinctly peculiar to disqualification.
x In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from
his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic
of the
Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the
OEC and
governed by the Rules of Court as to procedures. While quo
warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds,
they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A
cancellation case is brought before the elections, while a quo
warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a CoC
cancellation case was not filed before elections.
x The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section
78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the
certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections,
whereas a petition
for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the
basis of two grounds
- (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, and must be
initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election
results. Under
section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be
elected to office,
and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for
elective office.23
x Note that the question of what would constitute acts of disqualification -
under
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991 - is
best resolved by
directly referring to the provisions involved. On the other hand,
what constitutes
a violation of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution has
been clarified in
our case law.24 The approach is not as straight forward in a
petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC and also to a quo warranto petition,
which similarly
covers the ineligibility of a candidate/elected official.
In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,25 we ruled that -
o [I]n order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy
under Section 78, it is essential that the false
representation
mentioned therein pertain to a material matter
for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the
substantive rights of a
candidate the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed
the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does
not specify what
would be considered as a "material representation,"
the Court has
interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying Section 78 of
the Code.
o Therefore, it may be concluded that the material
misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to
qualifications for
elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of
having made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy
are grave to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or
to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It
could not have
been the intention of the law to deprive a person of
such a basic
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x The period to file a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC depends on
and substantive political the provision of law invoked. If
right to be voted for a public the petition is filed under Section
office upon 78 of the OEC, the petition must
just any innocuous mistake. be filed within twenty-five (25)
[emphases ours, citation days from the filing of the
omitted] CoC.26 However, if the petition is
x Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply brought under Section 69 of the
with the eligibility same law, the
requirements, a material petition must be filed within five
misrepresentation must be present in a (5) days from the last day of filing
cancellation of CoC situation. The law the CoC.27
apparently does not allow material x On the other hand, the period to file a
divergence from the listed requirements disqualification case is at any time before
to qualify for candidacy and enforces its the proclamation of a winning
edict by requiring positive representation candidate, as provided in
of compliance under oath. Significantly, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696.28
where The three-term limit
disqualification is involved, the mere disqualification, because of its
existence of a ground appears sufficient unique
and a material representation assumes no characteristics, does not strictly
relevance. follow this time limitation and is
o As to the period for filing: discussed at length below. At the
very least, it should follow the
 temporal limitations of a quo warranto elections should the winning
petition which must be filed within ten candidate be disqualified by final
(10) days from proclamation.29 The judgment before
constitutional nature of the violation, the elections, as clearly provided
however, argues against the in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.34
application of this time requirement; the The same
rationale for the rule and the role of the effect obtains when the
Constitution in the countrys legal order electorate is fully aware, in
dictate that a petition should be allowed fact and in law and within the
while a consecutive fourth-termer is in realm of notoriety, of the
office. disqualification, yet they still
o As to the effects of a successful suit: voted for the
x A candidate whose CoC was denied due course or disqualified candidate. In this
cancelled is not considered a situation, the electorate that cast
candidate at all. Note that the law fixes the plurality of votes in favor of
the period within which a CoC may be the notoriously disqualified
filed.30 After this period, generally no candidate is simply deemed to
other person may join the election have waived their right to
contest. vote.35
A notable exception to this general rule is x In a CoC cancellation proceeding, the law
the rule on substitution. The is silent on the legal effect of a
application of the exception, however, judgment cancelling the CoC and
presupposes a valid CoC. Unavoidably, a does not also provide any
"candidate" whose CoC has been temporal distinction. Given,
cancelled or denied due course cannot be however, the formal initiatory role
substituted for lack of a CoC, to all intents a CoC plays and the standing it
and purposes.31 Similarly, a gives to a political aspirant, the
successful quo warranto suit results in the cancellation of the CoC based on
ouster of an already elected official a finding of its invalidity
from office; substitution, for obvious effectively results in a vote for an
reasons, can no longer apply. inexistent "candidate" or for one
x On the other hand, a candidate who was simply who is
disqualified is merely prohibited deemed not to be in the ballot.
from continuing as a candidate or from Although legally a misnomer, the
assuming or continuing to assume the "second placer"
functions of the office; substitution can should be proclaimed the winner
thus take place under the terms of as the candidate with the highest
Section 77 of the OEC.32 However, a number of
three-term candidate with a valid and votes for the contested position.
This same consequence should
subsisting CoC cannot be substituted result if the
if the basis of the substitution is his cancellation case becomes final
disqualification on account of his after elections, as the
three-term limitation. Disqualification cancellation signifies non-
that is based on a breach of the three- candidacy from the very start,
term limit rule cannot be invoked as i.e., from before the elections.
this
disqualification can only take place after EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO,
election where the three-term official Petitioner, vs. EMERSON S. CARLOS,
emerged as winner. As in a quo Respondent.
warranto, any substitution is too late at G.R. No. 194994 April 16,
this point. 2013
o As to the effects of a successful suit EN BANC
on the right of the
second placer in the elections: FACTS:
x In any of these three remedies, the doctrine of x President GMA appointed De Castro as
rejection of the second placer assistant general manager for operations
applies for the simple reason that - (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila
o To simplistically assume that the Development Authority (MMDA)
second placer would have o concurred in by the members
received the other votes of the Metro Manila Council in
would be to substitute our MMDA
judgment for the mind of Resolution No. 09-10, Series
the voter. The second placer of 2009
is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of
voters. He could not be
considered the first
among qualified candidates
because in a field which
excludes the
disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have
substantially
changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate
the results under such
circumstances.33
x With the disqualification of the winning candidate
and the application of the
doctrine of rejection of the second placer,
the rules on succession under the law
accordingly apply.
x As an exceptional situation, however, the
candidate with the second highest
number of votes (second placer) may be
validly proclaimed as the winner in the
 x "A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
x Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued determine the right of a
Office Order No. person to use or exercise a franchise or an
106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in- office and to oust the holder
charge (OIC) of the Office of the from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is
AGMO not well-founded, or if his
x De Castro then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative right to enjoy the privilege has been
Affairs Office, Office of forfeited."21 Where the action is
the General Manager filed by a private person, in his own name, he
x Carlos was then designated by Atty Tolentino as OIC of the must prove that he is
Office of the entitled to the controverted position,
AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24 otherwise, respondent has a right to the
x De Castro was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was undisturbed possession of the office.22
no longer paid his x The controversy arose from the issuance of OP
salary beginning November 2010 Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and
o was later offered the position of Director IV of 2, which applies to all non-CESOs occupying
MMDA Public Health CES positions in all agencies of the
and Safety Services and/or MMDA executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-
consultant. He turned down the offer, CESO, avers that he is not covered by
claiming that it was a demotion in rank. these OP memoranda considering that the
x Pres Noynoy then appointed Carlos as AGMO AGMO of the MMDA is a non-CES
x De Castro filed Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo position.
warranto under Rule x Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee
66 seeking to oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos of then President Arroyo
(respondent) from the position ISSUE # 1: Whether De Castro whose term ended on 30 June 2010,
correctly filed the quo warranto case directly to the SC petitioners term of office was also deemed
terminated upon the assumption of President
HELD # 1: NO. Aquino.
x As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct x Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was
recourse to this Court allegedly replaced by another
is warranted by the urgent demands of public non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto
interest, particularly the veritable need for stability proceeding, the person suing must
in the civil service and the protection of the rights of show that he has a clear right to the office
civil allegedly held unlawfully by
servants. Moreover, considering that no other than another. Absent a showing of that right, the
the President of the Philippines is the appointing lack of qualification or
authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.41
appellate court justice, with a prospect of promotion x All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an
in the judiciary would be willing to go against a outright dismissal for
presidential appointment. disregarding the hierarchy of courts and
x Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution petitioners lack of cause of action against
explicitly respondent for failure to sufficiently show
provides that the Supreme Court has original that he has undisturbed rights to the position
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, of AGMO of the MMDA.
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive EXPROPRIATION [Rule 67]
but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals
and regional trial court and does not give petitioner 1. The right of eminent domain
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.16
The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent
x Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last
domain shall be exercised by the filing
resort and must so
of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
the right and purpose of expropriation,
assigned to it by the
describe the real or personal property sought to be
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition."17 A
expropriated, and join as defendants all
disregard of the doctrine of
persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright
part thereof or interest therein,
dismissal of a petition.18
x A direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction is allowed only 49
when there are
special and important reasons that are clearly
and specifically set forth in a petition.19 The
rationale behind this policy arises from the
necessity of
preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and
attention of the Court, which is better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2)
further overcrowding of the Courts docket.20
x In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with
this Court only when
he filed his Reply and after respondent had already
raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the
outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner
likewise cites stability in the civil service and
protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale
for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
x Petitioners excuses are not special and important
circumstances that would
allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere
speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial
discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be
valid
justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

ISSUE # 2: Whether quo warranto is the correct remedy.

HELD # 2: NO.
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
LEONORA AND ADELAIDA,
ALL SURNAMED SERRANO,
showing, so far as practicable, the separate respondents.
interest of each defendant. If the title to any G.R. No. 142304 June 20, 2001
property sought to be expropriated appears to be SECOND DIVISION
in the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, or if the title is FACTS:
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff x City Council of Manila enacted the
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are Ordinance 7833, authorizing the
the real owners, averment to that effect shall be expropriation
made in the complaint. of certain properties
in Manila 's First
District in Tondo,
2. Who may expropriate
covered by TCT Nos.
70869, 105201,
3. Two stages in expropriation 105202, and 138273
of the Register of
a. Determination of public use Deeds of Manila,
b. Just compensation which are to be sold
and distributed to
qualified occupants
pursuant to the Land
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. OSCAR, Use Development
FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, Program of the City of
Manila.
 x One of the properties sought to be expropriated,
denominated as Lot 1-C, HELD: NO.
consists of 343.10 square meters. It is x Petitioner contends that the
covered by TCT No. 138272 which was respondents' remedy against the order of
the trial
derived from TCT No. 70869 issued in court granting a writ
the name of Feliza De Guia. After her of possession was not
death, the estate of Feliza De Guia to file a petition for
was settled among her heirs by virtue certiorari under Rule
of a 65 but a petition for
compromise agreement, which was review under Rule 45
duly approved by the Regional Trial which should have
Court, been filed in the
Branch 53, Manila in its decision. Supreme Court.17
Subsequently, Alberto De Guia, one of o This contention has no
the heirs merit.
of Feliza De Guia, died, as a result of x A petition for review under Rule 45 is
which his estate, consisting of his share a mode of appeal. Accordingly, it could not
in have been resorted
the properties left by his mother, was to by the
partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C was respondents
assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the inasmuch as the
heirs of Alberto De Guia. Subsequently, order of the trial
Edgardo De Guia was issued TCT No. court granting a
215593, covering Lot 1-C. The said writ of possession
property was transferred to Lee Kuan was merely
Hui, in whose name TCT No. 217018 interlocutory from
was issued. The property was which no
subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia appeal could be taken.
to whom TCT No. 226048 was issued. Rule 45, 1 of the
x City of Manila filed an amended complaint for 1997 Rules for Civil
expropriation, with the Regional Procedure applies only
Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against to final judgments or
the supposed owners of the lots orders of the Court of
covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Appeals, the
Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202 and 138273, Sandiganbayan, and
which the Regional Trial
included the Serranos. On November Court. On the other
12, 1997, respondents filed a hand, a petition for
consolidated answer, praying that certiorari is the
judgment be rendered declaring Lot l-C suitable remedy in
exempt from view of Rule 65, 1
expropriation and ordering the which provides:
cancellation of the notice annotated on o When any tribunal, board
the back of TCT No. 226048, regarding or officer exercising judicial or
the pendency of the Civil Case for quasi-
eminent judicial
domain. functions
x Upon motion of the City of Manila, the trial court has acted
issued an order, directing the without or
City to deposit the amount of in excess
Pl,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed of its or his
value of the properties. After the City
had made the deposit, the trial court jurisdiction
issued another order, directing the , or with
issuance of a writ of possession in favor grave
of the City. abuse of
x The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the discretion
Court of Appeals. amounting
x The Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that to lack or
Lot l-C is not exempt from excess of
expropriation because it undeniably jurisdiction
exceeds 300 square meters which , and there
is no is no
longer considered a small property appeal,
within the framework of R.A. No. nor any
7279. plain,
However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in speedy,
Filstream International Inc. and
v. Court of Appeals, the other modes of acquisition of adequate
lands enumerated in 9- remedy in
10 of the law must first be tried by the
the city government before it can ordinary
resort to course of
expropriation. As petitioner failed to law, a
show that it had done so, the Court of person
Appeals gave judgment for aggrieved
respondents and enjoined thereby
petitioner from expropriating may file a
Lot 1-C. verified
x In its resolution, the Court of Appeals likewise denied petition in
two motions for the proper
reconsideration filed by the City. court,
x Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. alleging
the facts
ISSUE: Whether the authorization of the issuance of with
a writ of possession and petitioner's entry into the certainly
property pursuant to Rule 67, 2 by the trial court is and
tantamount to condemnation of the subject lot in praying
the expropriator's favor.
that judgment
be rendered annulling or tribunal, board or officer, and
modifying the proceedings granting such incidental reliefs
of such as laws and justice may require.
x Respondents' petition before the Court of Appeals
alleged that the trial court had
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order, dated
December 15, 1998, resolving that Lot 1-C is
not exempt from expropriation and ordering
the issuance of the writ of possession in favor
of petitioner
x Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for deciding
issues not raised in the trial
court, specifically the question of whether or
not there was compliance with 9
and 10 of RA. No. 7279. It argues that the sole
defense set up by respondents in
their petition before the Court of Appeals was
that their property was exempted
from expropriation because it comes within the
purview of a "small property" as
defined by R.A. No. 7279 . Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals should not have
applied the doctrine laid down by this Court in
the Filstream19 case as such issue was not
raised by respondents in their petition before
the Court of Appeals.
x This contention likewise has no merit. In their petition
before the Court of
Appeals, respondents raised the following issues:
o 1. Whether or not the subject Lot 1-C with
an area of 343.10
square meters covered by T.C.T.
No. 226048 in the name of
petitioners' mother, the late
Demetria [De Guia] Serrano, may
be lawfully expropriated "for the
public purpose of providing
landless occupants thereof
homelots of their own under the
"land-for-the landless program of
respondent City of Manila."
o 2. Whether or not the expropriation of the
said Lot l-C by
respondent City of Manila violates
the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, since petitioners,
with the exemption of petitioner
Oscar G. Serranno, who are
likewise landless are actual
occupants
hereof.
o 3. Whether or not Lot 1-C is or may be
exempted from
expropriation pursuant to R.A.
7279, otherwise known as the
Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992.20
x It is clear that respondents raised in issue the propriety
of the expropriation of
their property in connection with RA. No. 7279.
Although what was discussed at length in their
petition before the Court of Appeals was
whether or not the said property could be
considered a small property within the
purview of the
exemption under the said law, the other
provisions of the said law concerning
expropriation proceedings need also be
looked into to address the first issue
raised by the respondents and to determine
whether or not expropriation of Lot 1-C was
proper under the circumstances. The Court of
Appeals properly
considered relevant provisions of R A. No.7279
to determine the issues raised by respondents.
Whether or not it correctly applied the doctrine
laid down in
Filstream in resolving the issues raised by
respondents, however, is a different matter
altogether, and this brings us to the next
point.
x Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C
has been ordered condemned in its favor when
the fact is that the order of the
trial court, dated December 15, 1998, merely
 authorized the issuance of a writ of
possession and petitioner's entry into the property pursuant to
Rule 67, 2. At
that stage, it was premature to determine whether the
requirements of RA. No.
7279, 9 - 10 have been complied with since no evidentiary
hearing had yet
been conducted by the trial court.21
x This contention is well taken. Rule 67, 2 provides:
o Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter
and after
due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to
take or enter upon possession of the real
property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government
depository an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the
orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money,
unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of
a government bank of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the authorized
government depositary.
x If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally
ascertained and
the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court.
x After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other
proper officer
to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and
promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service
of copies to the
parties.
x Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by
the
government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance and upon deposit made by the government of
the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial.22 In this case, these requirements were satisfied
and, therefore, it became the
ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession.
x The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply
with the
requirements laid down in 9 - 10 of RA. No. 7279 and
reiterated in Filstream
ruling. This is error. The ruling in the Filstream was
necessitated because an
order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial
court in that case.
Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In
this case, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a
writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the
requirements provided in RA. No. 7279. It is, therefore,
premature at this stage
of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted
expropriation without first
trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in 10 of the law.
x RA. No 7279 in pertinent parts provide:
o SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land Lands for
socialized
housing shall be acquired in the following order:

Those owned by the Government or any of its

subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including
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Henedino M. Brondial)
Bagong Lipunan
Improvement and Sites
government and Services
owned and or BLISS sites
controlled which have not
corporations and yet been
their acquired, and;
subsidiaries; Privately-owned
lands.
Alienable lands of the
public domain; o Where on-site development is
found more practicable and
Unregistered or
abandoned and idle lands; advantageously to
Those within the declares the beneficiaries, the
Areas or Priority priorities mentioned
Development, in this section shall
Zone not apply. The local
Improvement government units
shall give
Program sites,
and Slum budgetary priority on-site
development of government
Improvement and
lands.
Resettlement
o SEC. 10. Modes of Lands
Programs sites
Acquisition. -- The modes of
which have not acquiring
yet been
acquired;
 lands for purposes of Property. The Register of
this Act shall include, Deeds thus cancelled TCT
amount others, No. 4067 and issued
community mortgage, independent titles for the
land swapping, land approved lots.
assembly or x Pobre started advertising and selling the
consolidation, land lots.
banking, donation to the x Subsequently, the Commission on
Government, joint- Volcanology certified that thermal mineral
venture agreement, water and steam were present
negotiated purchase, and beneath the Property. The
expropriation: Commission on Volcanology
Provided, however; That found the thermal mineral
expropriation shall be water and steam suitable for
resorted to only domestic use and potentially
when other modes of for commercial or industrial
acquisition have been use.
exhausted: Provided, x Pobre leased to National Power
further; That were Corporation (NPC), for one year, 11 lots from
expropriation is resorted to, the
parcels of land approved subdivision plan. *
owned by small property Subsequently, NPC filed its first
owners shall be exempted for expropriation case against Pobre
purposes of this Act: Provided to acquire an 8,311.60 square-
finally, That abandoned meter portion of the Property.
property, as herein x The trial court ordered the expropriation
defined, shall be reverted and of the lots upon NPC's payment of P25
escheated to the State in a per square meter or a total amount of
proceeding analogous to the P207,790.
procedure laid down in Rule x NPC began drilling operations and
91 of the Rules of Court. construction of steam wells.
o For the purpose of socialized housing, x While this first expropriation case was
government-owned and pending, NPC dumped waste materials
foreclosed properties shall beyond the site agreed upon by
be acquired by the local NPC with Pobre. The dumping of
government waste materials altered the
units, or by the National topography of some portions of
Housing Authority the Property. NPC did not act on
primarily through Pobre's complaints and NPC
negotiated purchase: continued with its dumping.
Provided, That qualified x Subsequently, NPC filed its second
beneficiaries who are actual expropriation case against Pobre to acquire
occupants of the lands shall an additional 5,554 square
be given the right of first meters of the Property, as it
refusal. needed the lot for the
x Whether petitioner has complied with these construction and maintenance
provisions requires the presentation of Naglagbong Well Site F-20,
of evidence, although in its amended pursuant to
complaint petitioner did allege that it Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act
had No. 5092.
complied with the requirements.23 The x NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36
determination of this question must with the Philippine National Bank. The
await that hearing on the complaint for deposit represented 10% of
expropriation, particularly the hearing for the total market value of the
the condemnation of the properties lots covered by the second
sought to be expropriated. Expropriation expropriation.
proceedings consist of two stages: first, x NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot
condemnation of the property after it is upon the trial court's issuance of a writ
determined that its acquisition will be for of possession to NPC.
a public purpose or public use and, x Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second
second, the determination of just complaint for expropriation, and
compensation to be paid for the taking prayed for just compensation of
of the private property to be made by all the lots affected by NPC's
actions and for the payment of
the court with the assistance of not
damages.
more than three commissioners.
x The trial court ordered the case submitted
for decision since NPC failed to appear
to present its evidence. The
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
trial court denied NPC's
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE,
motion to reconsider the
respondents.
submission of the case for
G.R. No.
decision.
106804
x NPC filed a petition for certiorari with the
then Intermediate Appellate Court.
August
12,
2004
SECOND
DIVISIO
N

FACTS:
x Pobre began developing the 68,969 square-meter
land located in Barangay Bano,
Municipality of Tiwi, Albay ("Property") as
a resort-subdivision, which he named as
"Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision."
x The then Court of First Instance of Albay approved
the subdivision plan of the

x The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed NPC's petition
but directed the lower
court to rule on NPC's objections to Pobre's documentary
exhibits.
x The trial court admitted all of Pobre's exhibits and upheld its
Order, and
considered the case submitted for decision.
x The trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre.
x NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision.
x The trial court issued its Order denying NPC's motion for
reconsideration.
x NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals.
x The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court but
deleted the award
of attorney's fees.
x The Court of Appeals denied NPC's motion for reconsideration
x Hence, the petition for review.
ISSUE # 1: Whether Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules applies squarely in
expropriation cases.
HELD # 1: NO.
x Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the
exception to the
general rule that the dismissal of the complaint is
addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. For as long as all of the
elements of Section 1, Rule 17
were present the dismissal of the complaint rested
exclusively on the plaintiff's
will. The defending party and even the courts were
powerless to prevent the
dismissal. The courts could only accept and record the
dismissal. A plain reading
of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes
it obvious that this rule
was not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same
Rules While Section 1,
Rule 17 spoke of the "service of answer or summary
judgment," the Rules then
did not require the filing of an answer or summary
judgment in eminent domain
cases. In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67
required the defendant to file a
single motion to dismiss where he should present all
of his objections and
defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose
specified in the complaint.
In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of
Rule 67, the motion to dismiss
took the place of the answer. In expropriation cases,
there is no such thing as
the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint
precisely because the
landowner may have already suffered damages at the
start of the taking. The
plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the
complaint has always been
subject to court approval and to certain conditions.
The exceptional right that
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court
conferred on the plaintiff must be
understood to have applied only to other civil actions.
The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the dismissal of the expropriation case by the
expropriator (NPC) includes the dismissal of the claim for
damages by the landowner.
HELD # 2: NO.
x There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that
provided for the
dismissal of the defendant's claim for
damages, upon the dismissal of the
expropriation case. Case law holds that in the
event of dismissal of the
expropriation case, the claim for damages may be
made either in a separate or in the same action, for
all damages occasioned by the institution of the
expropriation case. The dismissal of the complaint
can be made under certain conditions, such as the
reservation of the defendant's right to recover
damages either in the same or in another action.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and
Highways), petitioner, vs. ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent.
G.R. No.
160656
June 15,
2007
SECOND
DIVISION
FACTS:
x Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels
of land in Bading, Butuan
City (TCT RT-10225 and RT-10646)
x These properties are subject to a 60-meter wide
perpetual easement for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and
other similar works of the government or
public enterprise, at no cost to the
government, except only the value of the
improvements existing thereon that may be
affected.
x Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with
Andaya to enforce the 60-
meter easement of right-of-way. The
easement was for concrete levees and
floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower
Agusan Development Project. The parties,
however, failed to reach an agreement.
x The Republic instituted an action before the Regional
Trial Court of Butuan City
to enforce the easement of right-of-way or
eminent domain. The trial court
issued a writ of possession. It also constituted
a Board of Commissioners (Board)
to determine the just compensation.
Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of
Expropriation upon payment of just
compensation. Later, the Board reported that
there was a discrepancy in the description of
the property sought to be
expropriated.
x The Republic thus amended its complaint, reducing
the 60-meter easement to 10
meters, or an equivalent of 701 square
meters.The Board reported that the
project would affect a total of 10,380
square meters of Andayas properties,
4,443 square meters of which will be for the
60-meter easement. The Board also reported
that the easement would diminish the value
of the remaining 5,937
square meters. As a result, it
recommended the payment of
consequential damages amounting to
P2,820,430 for the remaining area.
x Andaya objected to the report because although the
Republic reduced the
easement to 10 meters or an equivalent of
701 square meters, the Board still granted
it 4,443 square meters. He contended that
the consequential damages should be
based on the remaining area of 9,679
square meters. Thus, the just compensation
should be P11,373,405. The Republic did
not file any comment, opposition, nor
objection.
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interest on the consequential
damages from the date of the
x After considering the Boards report, the trial court writ of possession or the actual
decreed that the plaintiff is taking, and by deleting the
legally entitled to its inherent right of attorneys fees.
expropriation to lots, it being shown that x Hence, the petition for review.
it
is for public use and purpose --- free of ISSUE # 1: Whether the Republic is
charge by reason of the statutory lien of required to resort to expropriation
easement of right-of-way imposed on proceedings in enforcing existing
defendants titles; That however, the easements over a landowner's lot.
plaintiff is obligated to pay
defendant the sum of 2,820,430.00 HELD # 1: NO.
as fair and reasonable severance x It is undisputed that there is a legal
damages; To pay members of the easement of right-of-way in favor of the
Board of Republic. [The landowner's]
Commissioners; To pay defendants transfer certificates of title
counsel P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees; contained the reservation that the
and That the Registry of Deeds of lands covered thereby are subject
Butuan City is also directed to effect the to the provisions of the Land
issuance of TCT for the 2 lots in the Registration Act and the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Public Land Act. Section 112
x Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. of the Public Land Act
x The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts provides that lands granted
decision by imposing a 6%
 by patent shall be subject to a right-
of-way not
exceeding 60 meters in width for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
and other similar works of the
government or any public enterprise,
free of
charge, except only for the value of the
improvements existing thereon that may
be affected. In view of this, the Court of
Appeals declared that all the Republic
needs to do is to enforce such right
without having to initiate expropriation
proceedings and without having to pay
any just compensation. Hence, the
Republic may appropriate the 701 square
meters necessary for the construction of
the floodwalls without paying for it.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the Republic is required to pay full
value for just compensation to a
landowner due to the deprivation of beneficial use of
the subject lots owned by the landowner.
HELD # 2: NO.
x [J]ust compensation should be paid only for 5,937
square meters of the total
area of 10,380 square meters.
Admittedly, the Republic needs only a 10-
meter
easement or an equivalent of 701 square
meters. Yet, it is also settled that it is
legally entitled to a 60-meter wide
easement or an equivalent of 4,443
square
meters. Clearly, although the Republic
will use only 701 square meters, it should
not be liable for the 3,742 square meters,
which constitute the difference
between this area of 701 square meters
and the 4,443 square meters to which it is
fully entitled to use as easement, free of
charge except for damages to
affected existing improvements, if any,
under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
In effect, without such damages alleged
and proved, the Republic is liable for
just compensation of only the remaining
areas consisting of 5,937 square
meters, with interest thereon at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from the date of
the writ of possession or the actual taking
until full payment is made. For the
purpose of determining the final just
compensation, the case is remanded to
the
trial court.
more basic and immediate issues
arising from the said award, this
Court is still continuously
besieged by Petitions arising from
the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III) Project to the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO). The sheer
magnitude of the project, the
substantial cost of its building,
the expected high profits from its
operations, and its remarkable
impact on the Philippine
economy, consequently raised
significant interest in the project
from various quarters.
x Once more, two new Petitions concerning
the NAIA IPT III Project are before
this Court.
ISSUE # 1: Whether it was appropriate for
the Republic to pursue expropriation
proceedings over the airport project which
was built on the government's land.
HELD # 1: YES.
x The Court.. , in Gingoyon, directly
addressed the issue on the appropriateness of
the Republic's resort to
expropriation proceedings: The
Government has chosen to resort
to expropriation, a remedy
available under the law, which
has the
added benefit of an integrated
process for the determination of
just
compensation and the payment
thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate
that the case
at bar is a highly unusual case,
whereby the Government seeks
to expropriate a

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION,

Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATION, SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, Respondents.
G.R. No.
169914

March
24, 2008

EN BANC

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Eighth Division) and SALACNIB BATERINA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 174166

FACTS:
x Despite the promulgation by this Court of
Decisions and Resolutions in two
cases, Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. and Republic v.
Gingoyon, which already resolved the
 owner before a writ of possession may issue.
building complex constructed on land which the The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974
State already owns. There is an guarantees compliance with this bare
inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on minimum requirement, as it assures the
property already owned by private property owner the payment of, at
the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the very least, the proffered value of
the property on which the property to be seized. Such payment of
NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin the proffered value to the owner,
to an action for ejectment. However, the reason followed by the issuance of the writ of
for the resort by the Government to expropriation possession in favor of the Government, is
proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No.
Resolution, in requiring the 8974, one which facially complies
payment of just compensation prior to the takeover with the prescription laid down in the 2004
by the Government of NAIA Resolution.
3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession
or ownership of the NAIA 3 ISSUE # 3: Whether the BIR zonal valuation, under
through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the Rule 67, apply for determination of
owner of the ground on which preliminary compensation to acquire possession of
the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the the structures built in government land.
2004 Resolution, the right of
the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was HELD # 3: NO.
preconditioned by lawful x [A]s to the determination of the amount due PIATCO,
order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO this Court ruled in
as builder of the Gingoyon that Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the
structures. Xxx The right of eminent domain Government is required to
extends to personal and real "immediately pay" the owner of the property
property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered the amount equivalent to the sum
as they are to the soil, are of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the
considered as real property. The public purpose value of the property based on the
for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR];
should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 and (2) the value of the
(on improvements and/or structures as
Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that determined under Section 7. As stated above,
the property sought to be the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this
expropriated may be titled in the name of the case, thus the amount subject to
Republic of the Philippines, immediate payment should be limited to "the
although occupied by private individuals, and in such value of the improvements and/or
case an averment to that structures as determined under Section 7,"
effect should be made in the complaint. The instant with Section 7 referring to the
expropriation complaint did "implementing rules and regulations for the
aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of equitable valuation of the
land owned by the Bases improvements and/or structures on the land."
Conversion Development Authority, another agency Under the present implementing
of [the Republic of the rules in place, the valuation of the
Philippines]." Admittedly, eminent domain is not the improvements/structures are to be based
sole judicial recourse by which the Government may using "the replacement cost method."
have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying However, the replacement cost is only one
the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent of the factors to be considered in determining
domain though may be the most effective, as well as the just compensation. In addition
the speediest means by which such goals may be to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in
accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate Agan also mandated that the
possession after satisfaction of payment of just compensation should be in
the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in accordance with equity as well. Thus,
procedure through which just in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just
compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there compensation, the duty of the trial
should be no question as to the court is to ensure that such amount conforms
propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this not only to the law, such as Rep.
case. Still, in applying the laws Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as
and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are well. Admittedly, there is no way, at
impelled to apply or least for the present, to immediately ascertain
construe these rules in accordance with the Court's the value of the improvements
prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the and structures since such valuation is a
end effect that the Government may validly take matter for factual determination. Yet
over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited
concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only means by which the Government can
as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights and immediately take possession of the property
prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not without having to await precise
enforced, in the resolution of this petition. determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of
Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in
this Court will be severely diminished. case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency
ISSUE # 2: Whether expropriation proceedings should be held in and importance, and there is no existing
accordance with Republic Act No. 8974. valuation of the area concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay
HELD # 2: YES. the owner of the property its
proferred value, taking into consideration the
x It was further settled in Gingoyon that the expropriation
proceedings shall be standards prescribed in Section 5
held in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, thus: 52
Unlike in the case of Rule
67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not
contravene the 2004 Resolution,
which requires the payment of just compensation
before any takeover of the
NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004
Resolution does not particularize the extent such
payment must be effected before the takeover, but
it
unquestionably requires at least some degree of
payment to the private property
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
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[of the law]." The "proffered value" may
strike as a highly subjective standard
based solely on the intuition of the
government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does
provide relevant standards by which
"proffered value" should be based, as
well
as the certainty of judicial determination
of the propriety of the proffered value. In
filing the complaint for expropriation, the
Government alleged to have
deposited the amount of P3 Billion
earmarked for expropriation, representing
the assessed value of the property. The
making of the deposit, including the
determination of the amount of the
deposit, was undertaken under the
erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not
Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law.
Still, as regards the amount, the Court
sees no impediment to recognize this sum
of P3 Billion as the proffered value under
Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974.
After all, in the initial
determination of the proffered
value, the Government is not
strictly required to adhere to any
predetermined standards,
although its proffered value may
later be subjected to judicial
review using the standards
enumerated under Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 8974.
SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS.
ROSARIO AND ERWIN COLLANTES, SPS.
RICARDO AND FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND
ROGER LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA,
RESTITUTO MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD AND
MIRIAM MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND
WENCESLAO A.
RAPACON, SPS. ROMEO AND EMILYN
HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN AND
ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON, SPS.
ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS. JOSEFINA AND
JOEL YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE
CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA AND MARIO
ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS,
FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO, Petitioners, vs. FIL-
HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents.
G.R. No.
189239
November
24, 2010
THIRD
DIVISION
FACTS:
x Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation
and Magdiwang Realty
Corporation, co-owners of two lots
situated in Sucat, Paraaque City (TCTs
21712 and 21713), filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Abad, et al.
before the Paraaque Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC). They alleged that Abad, et
al., through tolerance, had occupied the
subject lots since 1980 but ignored their
repeated demands to vacate them.
x Abad, et al. countered that there is no possession
by tolerance for they have
been in adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the lots for
more than 30 years; and that the
companies predecessor-in-interest,
Pilipinas
Development Corporation, had no title
to the lots. In any event, they contend
that the question of ownership must
first be settled before the issue of
possession may be resolved.
x During the pendency of the case, the City of
Paraaque filed expropriation
proceedings covering the lots before the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque with the
intention of establishing a socialized
housing project therein for distribution to
the occupants. A writ of possession was
consequently issued and a Certificate of
Turn-over given to the City.
x Branch 77 of the MeTC rendered judgment in the
unlawful detainer case against
Abad, et al.
x On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by
Decision of September 4, 2008,2
reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed the
companies complaint.
x The companies filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals.
x The Court of Appeals, , noting that Abad et al. did
not present evidence to rebut
respondents allegation of possession by
tolerance, and considering Abad, et al.s
admission that they commenced
occupation of the property without the
permission of the previous owner
Pilipinas Development Corporation as
indicium of tolerance by the companies
predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor of
the companies.
x Abad, et al.s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
x Hence, the petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the occupiers of the lot, owned by the
landowners and subject to expropriation, can maintain
themselves therein, considering that a writ of
possession has been granted to the City in pursuance
of a socialized housing project.
HELD: NO.
x Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538 [provides
that] Section 1. When the
Government seeks to acquire, through
purchase or expropriation proceedings,
lands belonging to any estate or
chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for
ejectment against the tenants occupying
said lands shall be automatically
suspended, for such time as may be
required by the expropriation proceedings
or the necessary negotiations for
the purchase of the lands, in
which latter case,
the period of suspension shall not
exceed one year. To avail himself
of the
benefits of the suspension, the
tenants shall pay to the
landowner the current
rents as they become due or
deposit the same with the court
where the action
for ejectment has been
instituted. Petitioners did not
comply with any of the
acts mentioned in the law to avail
of the benefits of the suspension.
They
nevertheless posit that since the
lots are the subject of
expropriation
proceedings, respondents can no
longer assert a better right of
possession; and
that the City Ordinance
authorizing the initiation of
expropriation proceedings
designated them as beneficiaries
of the lots, hence, they are
entitled to continue
staying there. Petitioners position
does not lie. The exercise of
expropriation by
a local government unit is
covered by Section 19 of the
Local Government Code
(LGC)[.] Lintag v. National Power
Corporation clearly outlines the
stages of
expropriation, viz: Expropriation
of lands consists of two stages:
The first is
concerned with the determination
of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the
power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the
context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal
of the action,
"of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the
property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the
 x The Board of Commissioners submitted its second
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation Report, which fixed the just
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the compensation of the subject properties (at P1,000.00
complaint x x x. The second phase of the eminent per sq m).
domain action is concerned with the determination x The RTC rendered a Decision, which adopted the
by the court of "the just report and recommendation of
compensation for the property sought to be taken." the Board of Commissioners.
This is done by the court x NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of
with the assistance of not more than three (3) Appeals.
commissioners x x x . It is only x The Court of Appeals rendered the Decision which
affirmed the RTC decision
upon the completion of these two stages that
with modification only in so far as the
expropriation is said to have been
value of just compensation for the
completed. The process is not complete until
property involved is concerned (at
payment of just compensation.
P900.00 per sq.m).
Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in
x Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
this case does not write finis to the expropriation
proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership,
ISSUE: Whether the Commissioners' report, which is not
it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners
substantiated by documents, should be disregarded by
the final just
the Courts.
compensation. [T]he mere issuance of a writ of
possession in the expropriation proceedings did not
HELD: YES.
transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City.
x The Court has consistently ruled that just
Such issuance was only the first stage in
compensation cannot be arrived at
expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial
arbitrarily; several factors must be
deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior
considered such as, but not limited to,
to the Citys
acquisition cost, current market value
possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the
of like properties, tax value of the
LGC.
condemned property, its size, shape, and
location. But before these factors can
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. YCLA
be considered and given weight, the same
SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
must be supported by documentary
G.R. No. 193936
evidence. The amount of just compensation
could only be attained by using
December 11, 2013 reliable and actual data as bases for fixing
FIRST DIVISION the value of the condemned property. A
commissioners report of land prices which is
FACTS: not based on any documentary evidence is
x YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered manifestly hearsay and should be
owner of three disregarded by the court. A
parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental commissioners report of land prices is
Mindoro (TCTs T-5209, T- considered as evidence in the
21280 and T-78583) determination of the amount of just
x In order to complete its 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid compensation due the land owner in
Project in Puerto expropriation cases. The recommended
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct amount of just compensation contained
transmission lines that would in the commissioners report of land prices, in
traverse several private properties, including the turn, is based on various factors
said parcels of land owned by such as the fair market value of the property,
YCLA. the value of like properties. Thus,
x NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against it becomes imperative that the
YCLA and several commissioners report of land prices be
other individuals. The NPC sought the expropriation of supported
a portion of the parcels of by pertinent documents, which impelled the
land owned by the said defendants for the acquisition commissioners to arrive at the
of an easement of right-of- recommended amount for the condemned
way over areas that would be affected by the properties, to aid the court in its
construction of transmission lines. determination of the amount of just
The portion of YCLAs properties that would be compensation. Otherwise, the
affected by the construction of commissioners report becomes hearsay and
NPCs transmission lines has an aggregate area of 5,846 should thus not be considered by
square meters. the court. The trial court, in expropriation
x The parties moved, inter alia, for the constitution of a Board cases, may accept or reject, whether
of Commissioners to in whole or in part, the report submitted by
be appointed by the RTC to determine the the Board of Commissioners, which
reasonable amount of just compensation to is merely advisory and recommendatory in
be paid by the NPC. character. It may also recommit the
x The RTC issued an order terminating the pre-trial conference report or set aside the same and appoint new
and directing the commissioners.
constitution of a Board of Commissioners, which
would submit a report and recommendation as to
the reasonable amount of just compensation for 53
the properties sought to be expropriated.
x The RTC, acting on NPCs urgent ex- parte motion, issued a
writ of possession
placing NPC in possession of the properties sought to be
expropriated.
x The Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed
the amount of
just compensation of the subject properties (at at P900.00 per
sq m).
x YCLA filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the Board of
Commissioners to
conduct an ocular inspection over the subject
properties and, thereafter, amend/revise the
Board of Commissioners Report.
x The RTC rendered a Partial Decision as regards the amount of
just compensation
that would be paid by the NPC to the other defendants.
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FORECLOSURE OF REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE [Rule 68]

1. Complaint

Section 1. Complaint in
action for foreclosure.
In an action for the
foreclosure of a
mortgage or other
encumbrance upon real
estate, the complaint
shall set forth the date
and
due execution of the
mortgage; its
assignments, if any; the
names and residences of
the
mortgagor and the
mortgagee; a description
of the mortgaged
property; a statement of
the
date of the note or other
documentary evidence
of the obligation secured
by the mortgage,
the amount claimed to
be unpaid thereon; and
the names and
residences of all persons
having
or claiming an interest in
the property subordinate
in right to that of the
holder of the
mortgage, all of whom
shall be made
defendants in the action.
(1a)

2. Judgment

Section 2. Judgment on
foreclosure for payment
or sale. If upon the
trial in such
action the court shall
find the facts set forth in
the complaint to be true,
it shall ascertain the
amount due to the
plaintiff upon the
mortgage debt or
obligation, including
interest and other
charges as approved by
the court, and costs, and
shall render judgment for
the sum so found
due and order that the
same be paid to the
court or to the judgment
obligee within a period of

not less than ninety (90)

days nor more than one
hundred twenty (120)
days from the entry of
judgment, and that in
default of such payment
the property shall be
sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment.
(2a)

3. Sale of Foreclosed property

Section 3. Sale of mortgaged

property; effect. When the
defendant, after being
directed to do so as provided in the
next preceding section, fails to pay
the amount of the
judgment within the
period specified therein,
the court, upon motion,
shall order the property

to be sold in the
manner and under the
provisions of Rule 39
and other regulations
governing
sales of real estate
under execution. Such
sale shall not affect the
rights of persons
holding
prior encumbrances
upon the property or a
part thereof, and when
confirmed by an order
of
the court, also upon
motion, it shall operate
to divest the rights in
the property of all the
parties to the action
and to vest their rights
in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of

redemption as may be
allowed by law.

Upon the finality of the order of

confirmation or upon the expiration
of the period of
redemption when allowed by law,
the purchaser at the auction sale or
last redemptioner, if
any, shall be entitled to
the possession of the
property unless a third
party is actually
holding
the same adversely to
the judgment obligor.
The said purchaser or
last redemptioner may
secure a writ of
possession, upon
motion, from the court
which ordered the
foreclosure. (3a)

Equity of redemption

4. Deficiency Judgment

Section 6. Deficiency
judgment. If upon the
sale of any real
property as provided in
the next preceding
section there be a
balance due to the
plaintiff after applying
the proceeds
of the sale, the court,
upon motion, shall
render judgment
against the defendant
for any such
balance for which, by
the record of the case,
he may be personally
liable to the plaintiff,
upon
which execution may
issue immediately if the
balance is all due at the
time of the rendition of
the judgment;
otherwise; the plaintiff
shall be entitled to
execution at such time
as the
balance remaining
becomes due under
the terms of the
original contract, which
time shall be stated in
the judgment. (6a)

JOSE T. RAMIREZ, Petitioner, vs.

THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198800 December
11, 2013
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS:
x Ramirez mortgaged 2
parcels of land in Marikina in
favor of MBC to secure his
P265,000 loan.
x The real estate
mortgage provides that all
correspondence relative to
the
mortgage
including
notifications
of
extrajudicial
actions shall
be sent to
petitioner
Ramirez at
his given
address
o N) All
correspondence
relative to this
MORTGAGE,
including
demand
letters,
summons,
subpoenas
or
notification
s of any
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x Ramirez failed to pay

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
mortgage is not
a ground to set
x MBC then filed a request for extrajudicial aside the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage9 foreclosure sale
before Atty. Hipolito Saez
x MBC was the only bidder during the auction sale ISSUE: Whether Ramirez was entitled to personal
thus a certificate of sale was notice of the foreclosure proceedings.
issued in its favor
x Ramirez sued MBC for annulment of sale and HELD: YES.
prayed that the certificate of x We have consistently held that unless the
sale be annulled on the ground, parties stipulate, personal
among others, that paragraph N of notice to the mortgagor in
the real extrajudicial foreclosure
estate mortgage was violated for he proceedings is not necessary
was not notified of the foreclosure because Section 31 of Act No.
and 31352 only requires the
auction sale. posting of the notice of sale in
x RTC ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure three public places and the
proceedings were null and void publication of that notice in a
and the certificate of sale is invalid newspaper of general
x CA reversed RTC circulation
o ruled that absence of personal notice x In this case, the parties stipulated in
of foreclosure to Ramirez as paragraph N of the real estate mortgage
required by paragraph N that all correspondence relative
of the real estate to the mortgage including
 notifications of extrajudicial actions provisions similar to paragraph N of the
shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez at real estate mortgage in this case.
his given address. Respondent had no
choice but to comply with this
contractual provision it has entered into SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA
with Ramirez. The contract is the law J. MARQUEZ, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
between them. Hence, we cannot agree CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG,
with the bank that paragraph N of the Respondents.
real estate mortgage does not impose G.
an additional obligation upon it to R.
provide personal notice of the N
extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the o.
mortgagor Ramirez. 1
x As we explained in Metropolitan Bank v. Wong,22 8
the banks violation of 4
paragraph N of the real estate 0
mortgage is sufficient to 4
invalidate the extrajudicial 5
foreclosure sale:
o [A] contract is the law between the
parties and absent any Ja
showing that its provisions n
are wholly or in part u
contrary to law, ar
morals, good customs, y
public order, or public 2
policy, it shall be 2,
enforced to the letter by the courts. 2
Section 3, Act No. 3135 reads: 0
"Sec. 3. Notice shall be 1
given by posting notices of 4
the sale for not S
less than twenty E
days in at least C
three public places O
of the municipality N
or city where the D
property is DI
situated, and if VI
such property is SI
worth more than O
four hundred N
pesos, such
notice shall also
FACTS:
be published
x Benjamin Gutierrez (Gutierrez) executed a
once a week for
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor
at least three
of Anita J. Marquez (Anita)
consecutive
to secure his loan from the
weeks in a
latter amounting to
newspaper of
P500,000.00 over a parcel
general
of land in Tagaytay
circulation in the
x Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his
municipality and
loan obligation
city."
x Anita sought to foreclose the mortage
x The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of
x Anita became the highest bidder
sale in three public places, and
x Upon Gutierrezs failure to redeem the
(2) the publication of the same in a
same property within the prescribed
newspaper of general circulation.
period therefor, title was
Personal notice to the mortgagor is not
consolidated under TCT No. T-
necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to
41939 in the name of Anita J.
the mortgage contract are not
Marquez, married to Nicasio C.
precluded from exacting additional
Marquez
requirements. In this case, petitioner and
o ANNOTATION OF ADVERSE
respondent in entering into a contract of
CLAIM (copied from the old TCT): in
real estate mortgage, agreed inter alia:
the names of
o "all correspondence relative to this
respondents-
mortgage, including demand
spouses Carlito
letters, summonses,
and Carmen
subpoenas, or notifications
Alindog (Sps.
of any judicial or extra- Alindog)
judicial action shall be sent x Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for
to the MORTGAGOR." annulment of real estate mortgage and
x Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation certificate of sale with prayer
is to apprise for damages against Sps.
respondent of any action which Marquez and a certain Agripina
petitioner might take on the subject Gonzales
property, thus according him the o alleged that they
opportunity to safeguard his rights. purchased13 the subject property
When petitioner failed to send the from Gutierrez
notice of foreclosure sale to way back in September 1989,
respondent, he committed a contractual but were unable to secure a
breach sufficient to render the foreclosure
sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.
x We reiterated the Wong ruling in Global Holiday
Ownership Corporation v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company23 and recently, in Carlos
Lim, et al. v. Development Bank of the
Philippines.24 Notably, all these cases
involved
 weighing the conflicting claims of
certificate of title in their names because the parties and subsequently
Gonzales - to whom they have entrusted issuing the writ of preliminary
said task - had deceived them in that injunction in Sps.
they were assured that the said Alindogs favor.
certificate was already being processed x Sps Alindog filed a Rule 45 before the SC
when such was not the case.14
o Eventually, they found out that the property had ISSUE: Whether a writ of preliminary injunction may still
already been enjoin Sps. Alindog from possession of the land,
mortgaged to Sps. Marquez, and that considering the consolidation of title in their names.
when they tried to contact Gonzales for
an explanation, she could no longer be HELD: NO.
found. x It is an established rule that the purchaser in an
o Separately, Sps. Alindog averred that when the extra-judicial foreclosure sale is
mortgage was entitled to the possession of the property and
executed in favor of Sps. Marquez, Gutierrez was can demand that he be placed in possession
already dead. of the same either during (with bond) or after
x Sps. Marquez filed their answer the expiration (without bond) of the
o disputed Sps. Alindogs ownership over the redemption period therefor. To this end, the
subject property, Court, in China
arguing that the purported sale in the Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada41 (China
latters favor was never Banking Corp.), citing several cases on
registered and therefore, not binding the matter, explained that a writ of
upon them. Further, they possession duly applied for by said purchaser
insisted that their certificate of title, TCT should issue as a matter of course, and thus,
No. T-41939, was already indefeasible, merely constitutes a ministerial
and cannot be attacked collaterally. duty on the part of the court, viz.:42
x Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of o The procedure for extrajudicial
possession foreclosure of real estate mortgage
o RTC granted is governed by Act No. 3135, as
x Sps. Alindog sought the issuance of a temporary amended. The purchaser at the
restraining order (TRO) public auction sale of an
and/or writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for extrajudicially foreclosed real
damages,21 in a separate case docketed as SCA No. property may seek possession
TG-05-252122 (injunction case) which was raffled to thereof in accordance with
the same court. Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
o RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction amended, which provides:
enjoining Sps. SEC. 7. In any sale made
Marquez from taking possession of the under the provisions of this
subject property until after the Act, the purchaser
controversy has been fully resolved on may petition the Court
the merits of First
x Sps Marquez filed an MR Instance of the
o essentially pointing out that, as the confirmed province or place
and registered where the property
owners of the subject property, they are or any part thereof is
entitled to its possession situated, to give him
as a matter of right. They argued that possession
pursuant to Sections 728 thereof during the
and 829 of Act No. 3135,30 as amended redemption period,
by Act No. 4118,31 the furnishing bond
RTC was legally bound to place them in in an amount
possession of the subject equivalent to the use
property pending resolution of the of the property for
annulment case. Further, it is a period of twelve
their position that the purpose for the months, to indemnify
issuance of the injunctive the debtor in
writ - i.e., to restrain the implementation case it be shown that
of the writ of possession the sale was made
- had already been rendered moot without
and academic by its actual violating the
enforcement in the interim. mortgage or without
x Sps. Alindog filed a Motion for Approval of Cash Bond and complying with the
to Regain requirements of this
Possession Act. Such petition
x RTC denied motion of Sps. Alindog; granted motion of Sps shall be made
Marquez under oath and filed
x Sps Alindog filed a Rule 65 before CA in form or an ex parte
x CA dismissed petition motion in
o no grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part the registration or
when it issued the cadastral proceedings
injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. if the
Marquez from taking possession property is registered,
of the subject property. It observed that or in special
Sps. Alindog had indeed proceedings in the
"adduced prima facie proof of their right case of property
to possess the subject registered under the
property"36 while the annulment case Mortgage Law
was pending, adding that or under section one
the latters "right to remain in hundred and ninety-
possession"37 proceeds from the fact of four of the
the subject propertys earlier sale to them. Administrative Code,
Thus, while Sps. or of any other real
Marquez concededly had a right to property
possess the subject property on account encumbered with a
of the consolidation of the title in their mortgage duly
names, the CA registered in the
nonetheless found no fault on the part of office of any register
the RTC for "proceeding with caution"38 in
of deeds in accordance with 55
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
issue
addressed
existing law, and to the
in each case the sheriff of
clerk of court the
shall, upon the province
filing of such in which
petition, collect the
the fees property
specified in is
paragraph eleven situated,
of section one who shall
hundred and execute
fourteen of Act said order
Numbered Four immediat
hundred and ely.
ninety six as x The Court expounded on the application
amended by Act of the foregoing provision in De Gracia
Numbered Twenty- v. San Jose, thus:
eight hundred and o As may be seen, the law
sixty-six, and the expressly authorizes the purchaser
court shall, upon to
approval of the petition for a writ of
bond, order that a possession during
writ of possession the redemption
 period by filing an ex parte is not redeemed
motion under oath for that during the period of
purpose in the one year after the
corresponding registration or registration of the
cadastral proceeding in the sale. As such, he is
case of entitled to the
property with Torrens title; possession of the said
and upon the filing of such property and can
motion and demand it at any
the approval of the time following the
corresponding bond, the law consolidation of
also in express ownership in his name
terms directs the court to
issue the order for a writ of and the issuance to
possession. him of a new transfer
Under the legal provisions certificate of
above copied, the order for a title. The buyer can in
writ of fact demand
possession issues as a possession of the land
matter of course upon the
filing of the even during the
proper motion and the redemption period
approval of the except that he has to
corresponding bond. No post a bond in
discretion is left to the accordance with
court. And any question Section 7 of Act No.
regarding the 3135,
regularity and validity of the as amended. No such
sale (and the consequent bond is required after
cancellation of the writ) is left the redemption
to be determined in a period if the property
subsequent proceeding as is not redeemed.
outlined in section 8. Such Possession of the
question is not to be raised land then becomes an
as a absolute right of the
justification for opposing purchaser as
the issuance of the writ of confirmed owner.
possession, since, under Upon proper
the Act, the proceeding for application and proof
this is ex parte. of
o Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as title, the issuance of
amended, refers to a the writ of possession
situation wherein the becomes a
purchaser seeks possession ministerial duty of the
of the foreclosed property court. (Emphases and
during the 12-month period underscoring
for redemption. Upon the supplied; citations
purchasers filing of the ex and emphases in the
parte petition and posting of original omitted)
the appropriate bond, the x In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. CA,43
RTC shall, as a matter of the Court expounded on the
course, order the issuance ministerial nature of the foregoing
of the writ of possession in issuance as follows:44
the purchasers favor. o The issuance of a writ of
o In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance possession to a purchaser in a
Corporation v. Nera, the public auction is a
Court reasoned that if under ministerial
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as act.1wphi1 After the
amended, the RTC has the consolidation of title in
power during the period of the buyers name for
redemption failure of the
to issue a writ of possession mortgagor to redeem
on the ex parte application of the property, the writ
the of possession
purchaser, there is no reason becomes a matter of
why it should not also have right. Its issuance to a
the same purchaser in an
power after the expiration of extrajudicial
the redemption period, foreclosure sale is
especially merely a ministerial
where a new title has already function. The trial
been issued in the name of the court has no
discretion on this
purchaser. Hence, the matter.
procedure under Section 7 of Hence, any talk of
Act No. 3135, discretion in
as amended, may be availed connection with such
of by a purchaser seeking issuance is misplaced.
possession x A clear line demarcates a discretionary
of the foreclosed property he act from a ministerial one. Thus:
bought at the public auction o The distinction between a
sale after ministerial and discretionary act is
the redemption period has well
expired without redemption delineated. A purely
having been ministerial act or
o It is thus settled that the buyer in a duty is one which an
foreclosure sale officer or tribunal
becomes the absolute owner performs in a given
of the property purchased if it state of facts, in a
prescribed
 manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority,
without
regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the
propriety
or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a Court illumined that "the phrase a
public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or
when the
duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary
and not
ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the
discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or
judgment.
x Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance
of a ministerial act are
mutually exclusive. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
x The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, however,
admits of an exception. Section 33,45
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
pertinently provides that the possession
of
the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure unless a third party is actually
holding the property by adverse title or
right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta.
Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno,46
citing the case of China Banking Corp., the
third party who is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment
obligor contemplates a situation in which a
third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-
owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-
owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary
possess the property in their own
right, and they are not merely the successor
or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner
of the property. Notably, the
property should not only be possessed by a
third party, but also held by the third
party adversely to the judgment obligor."47 In
other words, as mentioned in
Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors
Corporation,48 the third person must
therefore claim a right superior to that of the
original mortgagor.
x In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of Sps.
Marquez, who had already consolidated their
title over the extra-judicially foreclosed
property, is merely ministerial in nature. The
general rule as herein stated - and not the
exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules -
should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their
claim over the subject property on their
purported purchase of the same from its
previous owner, i.e., Sps.
Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original
mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be
seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are only
the latters (Sps. Gutierrez)
successors-in-interest who do not have a
right superior to them.
x That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the
injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez
from taking possession of the
subject property. To be sure, grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court
or tribunal patently violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.49
Here, while the RTC had initially issued a writ
of possession in favor of Sps.
Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence
when it effectively rescinded the said
writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog's
prayer for injunctive relief. The
RTC's finding anent the initial evidence
adduced by Sps. Alindog constitutes
improper basis to justify the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction in their
favor since, in the first place, it had no
authority to exercise any discretion in this
respect. Jurisprudence is clear on the matter:
without the exception under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules availing, the
issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser of an extra-judicially
foreclosed property - such as Sps
Marquez in this case - should come as a
matter of course, and, in such regard,
constitutes only a ministerial duty on the part
of the court. Besides, it was
improper for the RTC to have issued a writ of
preliminary injunction since the act
sought to be enjoined, i.e., the
implementation of the writ of possession, had
already been accomplished in the interim and
thus, rendered the matter moot.
Case law instructs that injunction would not
lie where the acts sought to be
enjoined had already become fait accompli
(meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act).50 Hence, since the
consummation of the act sought to be
 restrained had rendered Sps. Alindog's injunction x Ardientes executed in favor of the bank a PN and a
petition moot, the issuance of Real Estate Mortgage over 1
the said injunctive writ was altogether improper. parcel of land at Mabutag, Cawa,
x All told, by acting averse to well-settled jurisprudential rules Buenavista, Quezon and 3 others at
and resultantly Cadlit, Guinayangan, Quezon
depriving Sps. Marquez of their right of possession x Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes
over the subject property, the purchased a mini bus costing
Court therefore concludes that the RTC gravely P81,875.00.
abused its discretion in this case. x The minu bus, however, met an accident
In effect, the CA's contrary ruling thereto is hereby o rendered the Ardientes unable to meet
reversed and set aside, which their obligation to the bank
consequentially leads to the nullification of the writ of x The Ardientes were later on granted by the bank an
preliminary injunction additional loan of P46,000
issued by the RTC in favor of Sps. Alindog, and the for which they executed an October 29,
reinstatement of the writ of 1981 Promissory Note,3 the Real Estate
possession issued by the same court in favor of Sps. Mortgage was amended.
Marquez. It must, however, x Ardientes failed to pay
be noted that these pronouncements are without x The bank thus extra-judicially foreclosed the
prejudice to any separate mortgage and the parcels of land
action which Sps. Alindog may file in order to covered thereby were sold at public auction
recover ownership of the subject to the bank which was the highest
property. bidder.
x The bank later notified the Ardientes by letter of
RUSTICO A. ARDIENTE and ASUNCION PALOMARDIENTE, February 24, 19844 that they
petitioners, vs. PROVINCIAL had one (1) year from November 11,
SHERIFF, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON and PENINSULA 1983 or up to November 11, 1984 to
DEVELOPMENT BANK, redeem the foreclosed mortgage.
respondents. x Ardientes (2 days before the expiration of its period
G.R. No. 148448 to redeem) filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon at
Gumaca a complaint, denominated as
August 17, 2004 Petition,5 against the bank, the provincial
THIRD DIVISION Sheriff of Quezon, and the Register of deeds
of Quezon, for Annulment of Auction Sale
FACTS: with Preliminary Injunction and Damages,
x spouses Rustico Ardiente and Asuncion Paloma, together with anchored to two grounds:
their son Angel P.
Ardiente and the latters wife Gliceria Ardiente, 56
obtained a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from
the Peninsula Development Bank (the bank)
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o petitioners were duly
notified of the extra-judicial
o (a) that it was the defendant, not herein foreclosure and
petitioners, who had public
violated the Real auction
Estate Mortgage and sale.
Amended Real Estate There
Mortgage, and was
o (b) that the requisite of notifying the sufficie
mortgagors of the intended nt
extra-judicial foreclosure notice
sale was not duly and
complied with the publica
FORECLOSURE SALE tion
should be annulled served
Ardiente spouses capitalized to all
on the alleged lack of concer
notice to n[ed] of
them of the said
"judicial public
foreclosure auction
auction sale of
sale. the
x Bank filed its answer properties offered as
collaterals.
x Ardientes amended complaint manner
o alleged that, among other things, the and that
purchase price of the the
mortgaged parcels of land defendant-
was so "grossly and greatly appellant
inadequate," Bank
hence, the foreclosure sale complied
should be annulled; by with the
reason of the requiremen
unlawful foreclosure of the ts under
real estate mortgage, they the law will
suffered damages; and to suffice. And
protect their interests, they while it
filed a formal request with may be
the Register of Deeds to true
cause a notice of lis that the
pendens. Supreme
x RTC Gumaca Br 61 declared the extra-judicial Court said,
foreclosure and the sale of the in the case
mortgaged properties null and void of
o Despite these allegations on record, no Tambunting
documentary exhibits of v. Court of
such publication of notice Appeals
of public auction sale in a and relied
newspaper of upon by
general circulations the trial
supported by publishers court, that
affidavit were ever the
submitted by respondent presumptio
Bank. Considering that n of
petitioners are compliance
clearly attacking the with official
validity of the public duty is
auction sale for which rebutted by
respondent Bank was the the failure
sole bidder, said to present
documentary exhibits proof of
should have been posting and
presented in court and not publication
merely alleged to be of the
attached to the record in notice of
the Office of the Provincial sale, such
Sheriff of may be
Quezon at Calauag, Quezon. applied
o Therefore, in the absence of convincing only when
proof that the statutory these
provisions governing omissions
publication of notice of are alleged
mortgage foreclosure sales and raised
have been strictly complied by the
with, this Court has no party in the
other complaint.
recourse except to declare x Ardientes filed a Rule 45 before SC
as null and void the sale in
favor of ISSUE: Whether the absence of allegations on the
judgment creditor, made lack of (1) sheriff certification of posting,
by respondent Sheriff on (2) newspaper where the
November 12, notice was published, and
1983, awarding the (3) the publishers
properties in question to affidavit are
respondent Bank, and for indispensable
which, the titles in the name requirements is
of petitioner-spouses were tantamount to a waiver of
already cancelled and such defenses.
registered in its name
x CA reversed RTC HELD: YES.
o In this case, even perfunctory reading of x The spouses Ardientes (hereinafter
the Petition and the referred to as petitioners) argue that
Amended Petition, readily paragraph 15 of their
reveals the absence of any Complaint and
averment paragraph 16 of the
relating to the required Amended Complaint
posting and publication of show that they were
the notice of "attacking the
foreclosure sale. validity of the extra-
Understandably then, the judicial sale"; that
defendant-appellant the
Bank saw no need to impleading of the sheriff
present the Sheriffs demonstrates that they
Certification of Posting are "questioning the
and the newspaper where validity and legality of
the notice was published his performance of
as well as the officially duty"; that the
publishers affidavit. bank was sufficiently
Clearly, the presumption informed of their
that the Provincial "cause of action, theory
Sheriff of Quezon has of their case and relief
discharged his official duty being sought"
in a regular as shown by the banks
 allegations in paragraphs 15 and 16 of
its Answer; and x It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in
that in fact in the banks Special and extra-judicial
Affirmative Defenses, particularly foreclosure proceedings is not necessary,
paragraph hence, not a ground to set aside the
25 thereof which reads: foreclosure sale.22
o 25) That answering respondent as well as x With respect to petitioners argument that the bank, in
the Office of Provincial paragraph 25 of its
Sheriff fully compl[ied] Answer, in fact put in issue its compliance with
[with] the requirements of the requirements of Act 3135, "more
law under Act 3135 as specifically with regards to the notices of the
amended, more specifically public auction sale as well as the extra-judicial
with regards to notices of application in accordance with law," to thus call
the public auction sale as for the presentation of evidence, they citing
well as the extra-judicial again Benavides,23 the same fails.
foreclosure o Benavides bears on the rendition of
application in accordance with the law.20, judgment on the pleadings. It
x an issue was tendered, the nature of which affirmative holds that where the
defense-answer called for defendants answer tenders
the presentation of evidence, they an issue, as
citing Benavides v. Alabastro,21 but the where it does not only deny
bank did not present "proof of proper the material allegations of the
compliance with Act 3135, "AN ACT TO complaint but also sets up certain
REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY special and affirmative defenses,
UNDER SPECIAL POWERS INSERTED IN the nature of such answer calls for
OR ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE presentation of evidence,
MORTAGES,: as to posting and hence, it is error to render a
publication of notices of public auction judgment on the pleadings
sale. thereon without such evidence.
o The Court is not persuaded.
x With respect to petitioners paragraphs 15 and 16 x No doubt, it is a well-settled rule that statutory
allegations in their Complaint, provisions governing
clearly, they were questioning the publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure
validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that
of the mortgage on the basis of lack of even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate
notice to them as mortgagors. the notice and the sale at least voidable.24
x Despite petitioners non-allegation of lack of
publication of notice of foreclosure
in their Complaint, the bank pleaded in its
Answer (1) "that petitioners were duly
notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure and
public auction sale" and "[t]here was
sufficient notice and publication served to all
concern[ed] of said public auction
sale," and (2) that it and the Office of the
provincial Sheriff "fully compl[ied] with
the requirements of law under Act 3135, more
specifically with regard to notices
of the public auction as well as the extra-
judicial foreclosure in accordance with
law."
x Yet petitioners never refuted in their Reply and Answer
to Counterclaim such
defense of the bank nor presented evidence
before the trial court to disprove the
same.
x In fact, in its Comment on petitioners Formal Offer of
Evidence before the trial
court, the bank, passing on Exhibit "D" - its
letter to petitioners advising them that they
had one year from November 11, 1993 to
exercise their right of
redemption, stated that said exhibit was
admitted "with the qualification as to the
purpose to the effect that said extra-judicial
foreclosure was filed in
accordance with law and that all
requirements of said law were complied with
and that plaintiffs were duly notified of said
proceedings."25
x Despite the banks repeated claim that the statutory
requirements governing
extra-judicial foreclosure had been
complied with, the banks plea of lack of
publication of notice of foreclosure was not
raised by petitioners either in the
Amended Complaint or in the Reply and
Answer to Counterclaim. It was not also
raised during the trial as the entire transcripts
of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings before the trial court show. Nor
even in their memorandum filed
before the trial court, petitioners having
merely assailed the lack of "personal"
notification to them of any "intended"
extrajudicial foreclosure and the "grossly and
greatly inadequate" purchase price of the
lands.
x As the appellate court thus held, the issue of lack of publication of
notice cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.
x In the Tambunting case cited by petitioners to support their thesis that
failure
to strictly comply with statutory requirements governing
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales renders the
sale at least voidable, the therein
mortgagors, in their complaint for annulment of mortgage and
damages, sought
to enjoin the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage. During the
pendency of the
case, the extra-judicial foreclosure pushed thru just the same.
The mortgaged
property was sold at public auction to the mortgagees, and the
property was
eventually sold to the Tambunting Realty. The mortgagors
thereupon filed a
Supplemental Complaint impleading the realty firm, the
provincial sheriff as the
officer responsible for holding the foreclosure, and the Register
of Deeds for the
subsequent transfer of the property "despite alleged non-
compliance with the
requirements of Act 3135, Sec. 3 (as amended by Act 4118) on
posting and
publication of the notice of foreclosure sale." In other
words, the lack of publication was raised in issue by the
mortgagors in their
Supplemental Complaint.
x In the case of Go v. Court of Appeals,26 as in the present case, despite
the fact
that the mortgagees pleaded as a defense in their Answer the
"receipt of the notice of the sale which was published in a
newspaper of general circulation, the issue of lack of
publication of the notice of foreclosure was never raised in
issue by the mortgagors.
x In disposing of the issue of lack of publication of the notice of
foreclosure of
mortgage which was raised for the first time on appeal, this Court in Go
held:
o Indeed, as correctly held by the respondent Court, the issue
of lack
of publication of the notice of foreclosure of the
mortgage was
raised only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent
that he directly
attacked in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8920 the
validity of the
foreclosure because of such lack of notice. His own
Statement of
the Facts and of the Case in the instant petition
makes no
reference to such lack o notice as one, or even just
as a basis for
any, of his causes of action in the complaint. He
sought the
cancellation of the contract of mortgage because he
allegedly never
received the amounts indicated in the promissory
notes. Of course,
nullity of the mortgage due to absence of
consideration is leagues
apart form the nullity of the foreclosure of a
mortgage because of
non-publication of the notice of foreclosure.
x Additionally, petitioner presented no evidence before the trial court to
prove the
absence of publication of the notice despite the fact that
private respondents, in
their Answer, squarely pleaded as a defense the foreclosure
sale and petitioners
receipt of the "notice of the sale which was published in a
newspaper of general
circulation." That the lack of publication of the notice of
foreclosure was never
raised in issue by petitioner and that it is not within the issues
framed by the
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
x the lot was sold at a public auction after
Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed
parties in the trial court are then too the real estate mortgage and the
obvious. (Emphasis and latter emerged as the highest
underscoring bidder during the auction sale
supplied) x LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 150, a complaint for
LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT annulment of extra judicial
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS foreclosure, mortgage contract,
DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent. promissory note and
G.R. No. damages
187973 o also prayed for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order
(TRO)
January or writ of
20, 2014 preliminary
FIRST injunction to enjoin
DIVISION the consolidation of
title over the lot by
FACTS: Planters Bank.
x LZK Holdings obtained a P40,000,000.00 loan x Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion
from Planters Bank and secured for the issuance of a writ of possession
the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot with the RTC-San Fernando.
located in La Union x RTC Makati (3 days before the expiration
x LZk failed to pay of LZKs redemption period) issued a
 TRO effective for 20 days enjoining of judgment bars the relitigation
Planters Bank from consolidating its title of such particular issue.
over the property. x Moreover, the authority relied upon by
x RTC-Makati then ordered the issuance of a writ LZK Holdings defeats rather than support
of preliminary injunction for its position. The ruling in PNB21
the same purpose3 but the writ was echoes the very same rationale
issued only on June 20, 2000 upon of the judgment in G.R. No.
LZK Holdings' posting of a P40,000.00 167998 that is - the purchaser in
bond. foreclosure sale may take
x Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its possession of the property even
ownership over the property before the expiration of the
x RTC Pampanga suspended the proceedings for redemption period
its ex-parte motion for the by filing an ex parte motion for
issuance of a writ of possession in such purpose and upon posting
view of the TRO and writ of of the necessary
preliminary injunction issued by the bond.22
RTC-Makati x The pronouncement in PNB that right of
o Planters filed an MR possession is based on the ownership of
o RTC Pampanga denied MR the subject property by
o CA reversed the applicant pertains to
o SC affirmed CA applications for writ of
x LZK moved that the consolidated title of possession after the
Planters be declared as null and void expiration of the
o RTC Makati granted motion redemption period, a
o CA affirmed situation not
x Planters (armed with the SC decision affirming the contemplated within the
CA) went to RTC facts of the present case.
Pampanga and filed a motion to set ex- x We cannot also uphold the contentions of
parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of LZK Holdings that the RTC, in issuing
possession the writ of possession, transgressed Act
x RTC Pampanga issued another Order10 No. 3135.23
declaring the scheduled hearing moot
and academic and granting Planter
Bank's ex-parte motion for the issuance
of a writ of possession which was filed as
early as December 27, 1999.
o CA affirmed and dismissed LZK
Holdings' petition for certiorari
docketed; likewise denied LZK
Holdings' motion for reconsideration
x LZK moved for a 30 day extension to file Rule
45
o SC granted BUT ordered that the
30-day extended period shall
be counted from the expiration of the
original reglementary period.
As such, LZK Holdings had
until July 23, 2009 to file
its petition and
not August 24,
2009 or the date
when the petition
was actually filed.

ISSUE: Whether LZK is still entitled to notice on the

scheduled hearing for the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of Planters.

HELD: NO.
x Under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, the right of Planter's Bank to
a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R.
No. 167998 is binding and conclusive on
the parties.
x The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment postulates
that "when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with
them."19
x All the elements of the doctrine are present in this
case. The final judgment in
G.R. No. 167998 was rendered by the
Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the

review of decisions and rulings of the CA.

It was a judgment on the merits of
Planters Banks's right to apply for and be
issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the
parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same
parties involved in the present case.20
x Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question
Planter Bank's right to a writ of
possession over the subject property
because the doctrine of conclusiveness
 x Goldenway verified with RD and confirmed that it
x No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of ownership has already been
possession. This consolidated
is clear from the following disquisitions in x Goldenway filed a complaint7 for specific
Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils.24 which performance and damages against
reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, the respondent, asserting that it is the one-
to wit: year period of redemption under Act No.
o The proceeding in a petition for a writ of 3135 which should apply and not the shorter
possession is ex redemption period provided in Republic Act
parte and summary in nature.1wphi1 (R.A.) No. 8791
It is a judicial proceeding brought for o argued that applying Section 47 of R.A.
the benefit of one party only and 8791 to the real estate
without notice by the court to any mortgage executed in 1985
person adverse of interest. It is a would result in the impairment
proceeding wherein relief is granted of obligation of contracts and
without giving the person against violation of the equal protection
whom the relief is sought an clause under the Constitution.
opportunity to be heard. o Additionally, petitioner faulted the
o By its very nature, an ex parte petition for respondent for allegedly failing
issuance of a writ of to furnish it and the Office of the
possession is a non-litigious proceeding. Clerk of Court, RTC of Valenzuela
It is a judicial proceeding for the City with a Statement of Account
enforcement of one's right of possession as directed in the Certificate of
as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is Sale, due to which petitioner was
not an ordinary suit filed in court, by not apprised of the assessment
which one party sues another for the and fees incurred by respondent,
enforcement of a wrong or thus depriving petitioner of the
protection of a right, or the prevention opportunity to exercise its right
or redress of a wrong.25 (Citations of redemption prior to the
omitted) registration of the certificate of sale
x Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of x Equitable filed answer with counterclaim
possession, the R TC o petitioner cannot claim that it was
did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled unaware of the redemption price
hearing and in granting which is clearly provided in
Planters Bank's motion without affording notice to Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791,
LZK Holdings or allowing it to and that
participate. petitioner had all the opportune
x Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to time to redeem the foreclosed
emphasize that our task in properties from the time it
an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is received the letter of demand
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, and the
to reviewing errors of law that might have been notice of sale before the
committed by the CA.26 The registration of the certificate of
allegations of incorrect computation of the surety sale. As to
bond involve factual matters the check payment tendered by
within the competence of the trial court to address petitioner, respondent said that
as this Court is not a trier of even assuming arguendo such
facts. The RTC found the amount of P2,000,000.00 to redemption was timely made, it
be sufficiently equivalent was not for the amount as
to the use of the property for a period of twelve (12) required by law.
months. We are bound by x RTC dismissed the complainant AND counterclaim
such factual finding especially considering the o the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 47 of
affirmation accorded it by the CA. R.A. No. 8791 was never
x In fine, the decision of the CA is in accordance with the law raised by the petitioner during the
and jurisprudence on pre-trial and the trial. Aside from
the matter. It correctly sustained the Order of the fact that petitioners attempt
the RTC in issuing a writ of possession in favor to redeem was already late, there
of Planters Bank. was no valid redemption made
because Atty. Judy Ann Abat-Vera
GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Petitioner, who talked to Atty. Joseph E.
vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondent. Mabilog of the Legal Division of
G.R. No. 195540 respondent bank, was not
properly authorized by
petitioners Board
March 13, 2013 of Directors to transact for and in
FIRST DIVISION its behalf; it was only a certain
Chan Guan Pue, the alleged
FACTS: President of petitioner
x Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a corporation,
Real Estate who gave instruction to Atty.
Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank Abat-Vera to redeem the
(respondent) over its real properties foreclosed properties.
situated in Valenzuela to secure its Two Million x CA affirmed RTC
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan
x Goldenway failed to pay
58
x Equitable foreclosed and the mortgaged properties were sold
for P3,500,000.00
to it
x Certificate of Sale was then issued, registered and inscribed
on the TCTs
x Goldenways counsel (March 8, 2001) offered to redeem
the foreclosed
properties by tendering a check in the amount of
P3,500,000.00
o Met with Equitables counsel to reiterate its offer
BUT was told that
redemption can no longer be had
because the certificate of sale had
already been registered
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Henedino M. Brondial)

HELD: Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 (which

o petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 amended Act No. 3135).
of R.A. No. 8791 should x In the present petition, it is
be declared contended that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791
unconstitutional. is
Furthermore, the appellate inapplicable
court considering that the
concluded that a reading of contracting parties
Section 47 plainly reveals expressly and
the intention categorically
to shorten the period of agreed that the
redemption for juridical foreclosure of the real
persons and that estate mortgage shall
the foreclosure of the be in accordance
mortgaged properties in this with Act No. 3135.
case when R.A. Citing Co v. Philippine
No. 8791 was already in National Bank11
effect clearly falls within the petitioner contended
purview of that the right of
the said provision. redemption is part
x Goldenway filed a Rule 45 before the SC and parcel of the
Deed of Real Estate
ISSUE: Which, between Act No. 3135 and R.A. 8791, is the law
applicable in this case?
 Mortgage itself and attaches thereto term of one
upon its execution, a vested right year from
flowing and
out of and made dependent upon the after the
law governing the contract of date of the
mortgage sale; and
and not on the mortgagees act of such
extrajudicially foreclosing the redemption
mortgaged shall be
properties. This Court thus held in governed
said case that "Under the terms of the by the
mortgage contract, the terms and provisions
conditions under which redemption of sections
may be exercised are deemed part four
and parcel thereof whether the same hundred
be merely conventional or imposed and
by law." sixty-four to
x Petitioner then argues that applying Section 47 of R.A. four
No. 8791 to the present hundred
case would be a substantial and sixty-
impairment of its vested right of six,
redemption under inclusive, of
the real estate mortgage contract. the
Such impairment would be violative of Code of
the Civil
constitutional proscription against Procedure,1
impairment of obligations of contract, a 5 in so far
patent as these are
derogation of petitioners vested right not
and clearly changes the intention of the inconsistent
contracting parties. Moreover, citing this with the
Courts ruling in Rural Bank of Davao provisions
City, Inc. v. Court of Appeals12 where it of this Act.
was held that "Section 119 prevails over x The one-year period of redemption is
counted from the date of the registration
statutes which provide for a shorter of the certificate of
period of redemption in extrajudicial sale. In this case,
foreclosure sales", and in Sulit v. Court the parties provided
of Appeals,13 petitioner stresses that in their real estate
it has always been the policy of this mortgage contract
Court to aid rather than defeat the that upon
mortgagors right to redeem his property. petitioners default
x Petitioner further argues that since R.A. No. 8791 does and the latters
not provide for its entire loan
retroactive application, courts obligation becoming
therefore cannot retroactively apply its due, respondent may
provisions immediately foreclose
to contracts executed and the mortgage
consummated before its effectivity. judicially in
Also, since R.A. accordance with the
8791 is a general law pertaining to the Rules of Court, or
banking industry while Act No. 3135 is extrajudicially in
a accordance with Act
special law specifically governing real No. 3135, as
estate mortgage and foreclosure, amended.
under x However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791
the rules of statutory construction that otherwise known as "The
in case of conflict a special law prevails General Banking
Law of 2000" which
over a general law regardless of the took effect on June
dates of enactment of both laws, Act 13, 2000, amended
No. Act No. 3135. Said
3135 clearly should prevail on the provision reads:
redemption period to be applied in this o SECTION 47. Foreclosure
case. of Real Estate Mortgage. In
x The constitutional issue having been squarely raised the
in the pleadings filed in the event of
trial and appellate courts, we shall proceed to resolve foreclosur
the same. e,
x The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of whether
mortgage is Act No. judicially
3135,14 as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 or
thereof provides: extrajudic
o SEC. 6. In all cases in which an ially, of
extrajudicial sale is made any
under the special power mortgage
hereinbefore referred to, the on real
debtor, his successors-in- estate
interest or any judicial which is
creditor or security
judgment creditor of said for any
debtor, or any person having loan or
a other
lien on the property credit
subsequent to the mortgage accommo
or deed of dation
trust under which the granted,
property is sold, may the
redeem the
same at any time within the
mortgagor or debtor whose
real property has been sold
for
the full or partial payment
of his obligation shall have
the
right within one year after
the sale of the real estate,
to
redeem the property by
paying the amount due
under the
mortgage deed, with interest
thereon at the rate specified
in the mortgage, and all the
costs and expenses incurred
by
the bank or institution from
the sale and custody of said
property less the income
derived therefrom.
However, the purchaser at
the auction sale concerned
whether in a
judicial or extrajudicial
foreclosure shall have the
right to enter upon and
take possession of such
property
immediately after the date
of the confirmation of the
auction sale and administer
the same in accordance
with
law. Any petition in court to
enjoin or restrain the
conduct
of foreclosure proceedings
instituted pursuant to this
provision shall be given
due course only upon the
filing by
the petitioner of a bond in
an amount fixed by the
court
conditioned that he will pay all
the damages which the bank
may suffer by the enjoining or
the restraint of the foreclosure
proceeding.
o Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons
whose
property is being sold pursuant to
an extrajudicial
foreclosure, shall have the right to
redeem the property in
accordance with this provision until,
but not after, the
registration of the certificate of
foreclosure sale with the
applicable Register of Deeds which
in no case shall be more
than three (3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is
earlier. Owners of property that has
been sold in a
foreclosure sale prior to the
effectivity of this Act shall
retain their redemption rights until
their expiration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
x Under the new law, an exception is thus made in the
case of juridical persons
which are allowed to exercise the right of
redemption only "until, but not after, the
registration of the certificate of foreclosure
sale" and in no case more than three (3)
months after foreclosure, whichever comes
first.16
x May the foregoing amendment be validly applied in
this case when the real
estate mortgage contract was executed in
1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when
R.A. No. 8791 was already in effect?
o We answer in the affirmative.
x When confronted with a constitutional question, it is
elementary that every court
must approach it with grave care and
considerable caution bearing in mind that
every statute is presumed valid and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved
in favor of its constitutionality.17 For a law to
be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt.18 Indeed, those who petition this Court
to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition
must fail.19
x Petitioners contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791
violates the constitutional
proscription against impairment of the obligation of
contract has no basis.
x The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution20 is to safeguard
the integrity of contracts against
unwarranted interference by the State. As a
rule, contracts should not be tampered with
by subsequent laws that would
change or modify the rights and obligations
of the parties.21 Impairment is
anything that diminishes the efficacy of the
contract. There is an impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a
contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon
or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of
the rights of the parties.22
x Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right
to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the
exercise of such right by reducing the one-
year period originally provided in Act No.
3135. The new redemption period
commences from the date of foreclosure sale,
and expires upon
registration of the certificate of sale or three
months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier.
There is likewise no retroactive application of
the new redemption
 period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those which case a shorter term is deemed
properties necessary to reduce the period of
foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain uncertainty in the ownership of property and
their redemption rights under Act No. 3135. enable mortgagee-banks
x Petitioners claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It
as it must be underscored that
discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the
persons is equally bereft of merit. aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial
x The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act
and of 1949 by
individual or class privilege.1wphi1 It is not intended to fashioning a legal framework for maintaining
prohibit legislation a safe and sound banking system.28 In this
which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the context, the amendment introduced by
territory in which it Section 47 embodied one of such safe and
is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely sound practices aimed at ensuring the
that all persons solvency and liquidity of our banks.1wphi1
be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges It cannot therefore be disputed that the said
conferred and provision amending the redemption period in
liabilities imposed.23 Equal protection permits of reasonable Act 3135 was based on a reasonable
classification.24 We classification and germane to the purpose of
have ruled that one class may be treated differently from the law.
another where the x This legitimate public interest pursued by the
groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions.25 If legislature further enfeebles
classification is petitioners impairment of contract theory.
germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of x The right of redemption being statutory, it must be
the class, and exercised in the
applies equally to present and future conditions, the manner prescribed by the statute,29 and
classification does not within the prescribed time
violate the equal protection guarantee.26 limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as
x We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten with other individual rights to
the period contract and to property, it has to give way to
of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were police power exercised for public
foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. welfare.30 The concept of police power is well-
3135.27 established in this jurisdiction. It
x The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons has been defined as the "state authority to
was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed - whether enact legislation that may interfere
these with personal liberty or property in order to
are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year promote the general welfare." Its
redemption 59
period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial
purposes, in
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scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate
the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient
and
flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the
greatest
benefits.31
x The freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State
and not only may regulations
which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations
must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general well-being
of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or
as experience may demonstrate the
necessity.32 Settled is the rule that
the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the
loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. The
right granted by this provision
must submit to
the demands and necessities of
the States power of regulation.33
Such authority
to regulate businesses extends to
the banking industry which, as
this Court has
time and again emphasized, is
undeniably imbued with public
interest.34
x Having ruled that the assailed Section 47
of R.A. No. 8791 is constitutional, we
find no reversible error
committed by the CA in holding
that petitioner can no longer
exercise the right of
redemption over its foreclosed
properties after the certificate
of sale in favor of respondent
had been registered.

____________________________________________
PARTITON [Rule 69]
1. Complaint
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real
estate. A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so
as provided in this Rule, setting forth in
his complaint the nature and extent of his title and
an adequate description of the real estate
of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the
property.
2. Order
Section 2. Order for partition and partition by
agreement thereunder. If after the
trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right
thereto, it shall order the partition of the real
estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the
parties may, if they are able to agree,
make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties, and such partition, together with the order of
the court confirming the same, shall be recorded in
the registry of deeds of the place in which the
property is situated. (2a)
report to the court of all their proceedings
as to the partition, or the assignment of real
estate to one of the parties, or the sale of
the
same. Upon the filing of such report, the
clerk of court shall serve copies thereof on
all the
interested parties with notice that they are
allowed ten (10) days within which to file
objections to the findings of the
report, if they so desire. No
proceeding had before or conducted
by the commissioners and rendered
judgment thereon. (6a)
Section 7. Action of the court upon
commissioners report. Upon the expiration
of the period of ten (10) days referred to in
the preceding section or even before the
expiration of such period but after the
interested parties have filed their objections
to the report or their statement of agreement
therewith the court may, upon hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in
accordance therewith, or, for cause shown
recommit the same to the

A final order decreeing partition and accounting

may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.

3. Stages of Partition

4. Rule of Commissioners

Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when

parties fail to agree. If the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not
more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to
each party in interest such part and proportion of the
property as the court shall direct. (3a)

Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners.

Before making such partition; the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that
they will faithfully perform their duties as
commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with
the other proceedings in the case. In
making the partition, the commissioners shall view
and examine the real estate, after due
notice to the parties to attend at such view and
examination, and shall hear the parties as to
their preference in the portion of the property to be
set apart to them and the comparative
value thereof, and shall set apart the same to the
parties in lots or parcels as will be most
advantageous and equitable, having due regard to
the improvements, situation and quality of
the different parts thereof. (4a)

Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by

commissioners. When it is made to appear to the
commissioners that the real state, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided
without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the
court may order it assigned to one of the
parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to
the other parties such amount as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
interested parties asks that the property be
sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the
court shall order the commissioners to sell
the real estate at public sale under such conditions
and within such time as the court may
determine. (5a)

Section 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings

not binding until confirmed.
The commissioners shall make a full and accurate
 but the petitioner still refused to surrender
commissioners for further report of facts; or set aside the report possession of the same to them.
and appoint new o Respondents claimed that they had
commissioners; or accept the report in part and reject it in part; exhausted all remedies for the
and may make such order amicable settlement of the case, but to
and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair and just no avail.
partition of the real estate, or of x RTC ordered Saturnino and Leonarda to execute a
its value, if assigned or sold as above provided, between the Deed of Sale in favor of the
several owners thereof. (7) Celestino, the one-third share of the
property in question, presently possessed
by him, and described in the deed of
5. Judgment partition
o The RTC held that the right of petitioner
Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in to purchase from the
registry of deeds. If actual partition of property is made, the respondents his share in the
judgment shall state definitely, by metes and disputed property was recognized
bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the by
real estate assigned to each the provisions of the Extrajudicial
party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each Settlement of Estate, which the
party to the action in severalty parties had executed before the
the portion of the real estate assigned to him. If the whole respondents bought the subject
property is assigned to one of the lot
parties upon his paying to the others the sum or sums ordered from the Bank.
by the court, the judgment x Saturnino and Leonarda appealed to CA
shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of x CA reversed RTC
the real estate to the party o ordering petitioner to immediately
making the payment, and the effect of the judgment shall be to surrender possession of the
vest in the party making the subject property to the respondents
payment the whole of the real estate free from any interest on the o when petitioner and respondents did not
part of the other parties to redeem the subject
the action. If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the property within the redemption
court, the judgment shall state period and allowed the
the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite consolidation of ownership and
description of the parcels of real estate the issuance of a new title in
sold to each purchaser, and the effect of the judgment shall be to the name of the Bank, their co-
vest the real estate in the ownership was extinguished.
purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free
from the claims of any of the ISSUE: Whether there was co-ownership between and
parties to the action. A certified copy of the judgment shall in among Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda over the
either case be recorded in the property in that Celestino may only be ordered by the
registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, court to deliver 2/3 of the subject lot to his two siblings.
and the expenses of such
recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action. HELD: NO.
x Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong
premise that, at
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner, vs. SATURNINO BALUS and the time of the execution of the
LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents. Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject
G.R. No. 168970 property formed part of the estate of their
deceased father to which they may lay
claim as his heirs.
January 15, 2010 x At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no
THIRD DIVISION dispute with respect to the
fact that the subject property was exclusively
FACTS: owned by petitioner and
x Rufo Balus (father of the parties herein) mortgaged a respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it
parcel of land, which he was mortgaged in 1979. This was
owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the stipulated by the parties during the hearing
Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del conducted by the trial court on
Norte October 28, 1996.12 Evidence shows that a
x Rufo failed to pay Definite Deed of Sale13 was issued
x mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after
sold to the Bank as the period of redemption expired.
the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose There is neither any dispute that a new title
x Rufo failed to redeem was issued in the Bank's name
x Upon death of their parents, Celestino, Saturnino and
Leornarda executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate5 adjudicating to 60
each of them a specific one-
third portion of the subject property
o The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact
that their father mortgaged the subject
property to the Bank and that they
intended to redeem the same at the
soonest possible time.
x Saturnino and Leonarda (3 years after execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement)
bought the subject
property from the Bank

o TCT was
issued in their favor
x Celestino maintained possession over the subject property
x Saturnino and Leonarda filed a Complaint8 for Recovery of
Possession and
Damages against petitioner, contending that they
had already informed
petitioner of the fact that they were the new
owners of the disputed property,
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before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank
acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot x Petitioner and respondents, therefore,
during the lifetime of Rufo. were wrong in assuming that
x The rights to a person's succession are they became co-owners of the
transmitted from the moment of his subject lot. Thus, any issue
death.14 In addition, the inheritance of arising from the supposed right of
a person consists of the property and petitioner as co-owner of the
transmissible rights and obligations contested parcel of land is
existing at the time of his death, as well negated by the fact that, in the
as eyes of the law, the disputed lot
those which have accrued thereto since did not pass into the hands of
the opening of the succession.15 In the petitioner and respondents as
present case, since Rufo lost ownership of compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given
the subject property during point in time.
his lifetime, it only follows that at the time x The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court
of his death, the disputed finds a necessity for a complete
parcel of land no longer formed part of his determination of the issues
estate to which his heirs raised in the instant case to
may lay claim. Stated differently, look into petitioner's
petitioner and respondents never argument that the
inherited the subject lot from their Extrajudicial Settlement is an
father. independent contract which
gives him the right to enforce
 his right to claim a portion of the property was already transferred
disputed lot bought by to the
respondents.1avvphi1 Bank does not give them the
x It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code right or the authority to
of the Philippines, contracts unilaterally declare
are perfected by mere consent; and from themselves as co-owners of the
that moment, the parties are bound not disputed property; otherwise,
only to the fulfillment of what has been the disposition of
expressly stipulated but also to all the the case would be made to
consequences which, according to their depend on the belief and
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, conviction of the party-
usage and law. litigants and not on the evidence
x Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that adduced and the law and
the contracting parties may jurisprudence
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms applicable thereto.
and conditions as they may deem x Furthermore, petitioner's contention that
convenient, provided these are not he and his siblings intended to continue
contrary to law, morals, good customs, their supposed co-ownership of
public order or public policy. the subject property contradicts
x In the present case, however, there is nothing in the provisions of
the subject Extrajudicial the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement to indicate any express Settlement where they clearly
stipulation for petitioner and manifested their intention
respondents to continue with their of having the subject property
supposed co-ownership of the contested divided or partitioned by
lot. assigning to each of the
x On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions petitioner and respondents a
of the Extrajudicial Settlement specific 1/3 portion of the same.
would not, in any way, support Partition calls for
petitioner's contention that it was his the segregation and conveyance
and his sibling's intention to buy the of a determinate portion of the
subject property from the Bank and property owned
continue what they believed to be co- in common. It seeks a severance
ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in of the individual interests of each
the co-owner,
interpretation of contracts that the vesting in each of them a sole
intention of the parties shall be estate in a specific property and
accorded giving each one a
primordial consideration.16 It is the right to enjoy his estate without
duty of the courts to place a practical supervision or interference from
and the other.20 In
realistic construction upon it, giving due other words, the purpose of
consideration to the context in which it is partition is to put an end to co-
negotiated and the purpose which it is ownership,21 an
intended to serve.17 Such intention is objective which negates petitioner's
determined from the express terms of claims in the present case.
their agreement, as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent
acts.18 Absurd and illogical EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife
interpretations should also be CEFERINA DE PALMA- FELICIANO, ANGELINA
avoided.19 DE LEON, representing the heirs of ESTEBAN
x For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial FELICIANO, TRINIDAD VALIENTE, AND BASILIA
Settlement is an agreement between TRINIDAD, represented by her son
him and his siblings to continue what DOMINADOR T. FELICIANO, Petitioners, vs.
they thought was their ownership of the PEDRO
subject property, even after the same CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO, ROSAURO
had been bought by the Bank, is FELICIANO, ELSA FELICIANO AND
stretching the interpretation of the said PONCIANO FELICIANO, Respondents.
Extrajudicial Settlement too far. G.R
x In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no .
co-ownership to talk No.
about and no property to partition, as 16
the disputed lot never formed part of 17
the estate of their deceased father. 46
x Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and
respondents' intention of
continuing with their supposed co- Sep
ownership is negated by no less than his te
assertions in the present petition that on mb
several occasions he had the chance to er
purchase the subject property back, but 1,
he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that 20
after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it 10
offered to re-sell the same to him but he THI
ignored such offer. How then can RD
petitioner now claim that it was also his DIV
intention to purchase the subject property ISI
from the Bank, when he admitted that he ON
refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the
subject property to him?
x In addition, it appears from the recitals in the
Extrajudicial Settlement that, at
the time of the execution thereof, the
parties were not yet aware that the
subject property was already exclusively
owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the
lack of knowledge on the part of
petitioner and respondents that the
mortgage
was already foreclosed and title to the
FACTS:
x Antonio Feliciano passed away, leaving behind his only
property, a parcel of land
located at Bunga4 Mayor, Bustos, Bulacan
x Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all surnamed Feliciano,
declared themselves to
be the only surviving heirs of Antonio Feliciano, with the
exception of Salina
o executed an extrajudicial settlement of Antonio
Felicianos estate6
and appropriated among themselves the
said parcel of land, to the exclusion of the
heirs of Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo
Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio Feliciano
x Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina executed a deed of
absolute sale or Kasulatan
sa Ganap Na Bilihan over the property in favor of the
late Jacinto Feliciano
(Pedros portion), Felisa Feliciano (Salinas portion) and
Pedro Canoza (Leona and Marias portions)
o Jacinto (during lifetime) applied for a free
patent over the
portion of land he bought, declaring
that the same was a public
land, first occupied and cultivated by
Pedro Feliciano; GRANTED
o Pedro also applied for a free patent over the
portion of land
which he bought, claiming that the
same was public land, first
occupied and cultivated by Leona and
Maria Feliciano; GRANTED
x Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-de Leon, surviving
heirs of the late
Esteban Feliciano, and Trinidad Feliciano-Valiente and
Basilia Feliciano-Trinidad
(surviving heirs of DOROTEO) filed complaint
against Salina Feliciano, Felisa
Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the heirs of the late
Jacinto Feliciano, namely Delia,
Rosauro, Elsa, Nardo and Ponciano, all surnamed
Feliciano, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Documents and Title, Recovery of Real
Property and Damages
o They alleged that the settlement of the estate
and sale were done
without their participation and consent
as heirs of Esteban and
Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that
the ancestral home of the
Felicianos is erected on the subject
property and that they have
occupied the same since birth. Canoza
and Jacinto falsely declared
that the property was not occupied, so
their titles to the property
should be declared null and void on the
ground that they have
made false statements in their
respective applications for free
patent.
x Doroteos heirs filed an amended complaint
o to include the allegation that they sought to
recover the shares of
their fathers, Esteban and Doroteo, which
they could have acquired as heirs of
Antonio Feliciano
x Pedro and spouse Delia filed their answer
o alleged that they were buyers in good faith and
for value.
o They likewise contended that assuming that there
was preterition
of legal heirs, they never took part in it.
o As affirmative defenses, they alleged that the
complaint failed to
state a cause of action; the lower court
had no jurisdiction as the subject of the
case were free patents and therefore
prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies
was required; the case was
prematurely filed; no effort was exerted
towards a settlement;
plaintiffs right has prescribed; Eugenio
Feliciano was a mere squatter who
should be ordered to vacate; the deed of
sale was validly, genuinely and duly
executed; Eugenio and Angelina were
guilty of misleading the court because
there were other heirs who were
indispensable parties but who
were not included; and
Presidential Decree No. 1508 or
the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law was not
resorted to by plaintiffs.
x Rosauro Feliciano, Elsa Feliciano and Ponciano
Feliciano likewise filed an
Answer15
o containing the same allegations and
defenses as respondents Pedro
Canoza and Delia Feliciano.
x The other defendants, Salina Feliciano, Felisa
Feliciano and Nardo Feliciano were
declared in default.
x RTC in favor of Doroteos heirs
o The trial court explained that by
operation of law, the plaintiffs
(herein petitioners) have as much
right as Leona, Maria, Pedro and
Salina Feliciano to inherit the
property in question, and they
cannot
be deprived of their right unless
by disinheritance for causes set
forth in the law. When Leona
Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, Maria
Feliciano and Salina Feliciano
appropriated the disputed lot
solely to
themselves through the
extrajudicial settlement of estate,
they
committed a fraudulent act. To
the extent that Doroteo and
Esteban were deprived of their
rightful share, the said out-of-
court
settlement was annullable, said
the trial court. The trial court also
declared that Pedro Canoza was
not a buyer in good faith of Leona
and Marias shares. Records show
that Pedro Canozas live-in
partner, Delia Feliciano, was a
relative of the petitioners and the
other defendants; thus, he could
be reasonably charged with the
knowledge of petitioners status
vis--vis the subject property. The
acquisition by Canoza and Jacinto
Feliciano of free patent titles
over portions of the contested lot
also did not legitimize their
ownership thereof, as they
acquired no greater rights over
the
property than their predecessors-
in-interest, having merely stepped
into their shoes
x CA reversed RTC; denied ensuing MR
o The CA ruled that prescription had set in,
citing the case of Pedrosa
v. Court of Appeals,20 which
held that the applicable
prescriptive
period to annul a deed of
extrajudicial settlement is four
(4) years
from the discovery of the fraud.
It reasoned that when
petitioners
filed the instant complaint for
the annulment of the
extrajudicial
settlement of Antonio Felicianos
estate, more than four (4) years
had elapsed from the issuance
of the free patents. As regards
the
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HELD: YES.
x While respondents have not assigned the
portion claimed by the late defense of prescription in their appeal
Jacinto Feliciano, sixteen (16) before the CA, they raised such
years had elapsed from the defense in their December 1,
time the free patent was 1993 Answer as
issued to him before one (1) of their affirmative
petitioners filed the defenses.22 In their brief before
complaint, while in the the CA, respondents
case of Canoza, specifically prayed for the reliefs
fourteen (14) years had mentioned in their respective
elapsed from the answers before
issuance of the free the trial court. Thus, by reference,
patent in Canozas favor. they are deemed to have adopted
Hence, according to the CA, the defense of prescription, and
the action for the annulment could not properly be said to have
of the documents had waived the defense of
prescribed. prescription.
x Moreover, Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997
ISSUE: Whether the COA of Doroteos heirs has Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
prescribed, considering that the action was filed provides that when it appears
only 16 years and 14 years after Jacinto and from the pleadings or the
Feliciano were issued free patents evidence on record that the
respectively. action is already barred by the
statute of limitations, the court
 shall dismiss the claim. Thus, in Gicano v. is fraudulent and vicious.25
Gegato,23 we held: Hence, an action to set it aside
o We have ruled that trial courts have on the
authority and discretion to ground of fraud could be
dismiss an action on the instituted. Such action for the
ground of prescription when annulment of the said partition,
the parties however, must be brought within
pleadings or other facts on four (4) years from the discovery
record show it to be indeed of the fraud.1avvphi1
time-barred x In Gerona v. De Guzman,26 respondents
x x x; and it may do so on the therein executed a deed of extrajudicial
basis of a motion to dismiss, settlement declaring
or an themselves to be the sole
answer which sets up such heirs of the late Marcelo de
ground as an affirmative Guzman. They secured new
defense; or transfer certificates of title in
even if the ground is alleged their own names,
after judgment on the thereby excluding the
merits, as in a petitioners therein from the
motion for reconsideration; estate of the deceased. The
or even if the defense has petitioners brought an action
not been for the annulment of the said
asserted at all, as where no deed upon the
statement thereof is found in ground that the same is tainted with
the fraud. The Court held,
pleadings, or where a o Inasmuch as petitioners seek
defendant has been to annul the aforementioned deed
declared in default. of
What is essential only, to "extra-judicial
repeat, is that the facts settlement" upon
demonstrating the ground of fraud
the lapse of the prescriptive in the
period, be otherwise execution thereof,
sufficiently and the action therefor
satisfactorily apparent on the may be filed within
record: either in the four (4)
averments of the plaintiffs years from the
complaint, or otherwise discovery of the
established by the evidence. fraud (Mauricio v.
(Underscoring supplied.) Villanueva, L-
x But did the CA nonetheless commit error when it 11072, September
held that the applicable 24, 1959). Such
prescriptive period is four (4) years? discovery is deemed
o Petitioners argue that the CA to have
erroneously treated the action they taken place, in the
filed at the trial court as one case at bar, on June
(1) for annulment of the 25, 1948, when said
extrajudicial settlement and
applied the four (4)-year instrument was filed
prescriptive period in with the Register of
dismissing the same. They Deeds and new
contend that the action they certificates of title
filed was one (1) for were issued in the
Declaration of Nullity of name of
Documents and Titles, respondents
Recovery of Real Property and exclusively, for the
Damages, and as such, their registration of the
action was deed of extra-
imprescriptible pursuant to Article judicial
141024 of the Civil Code. settlement
o Respondents, for their part, maintain constitute
that the CA did not err in constructive notice
holding that the deed of to the whole
extrajudicial partition world.27
executed without including (Emphasis and
some of the heirs, who had no underscoring
knowledge of the partition supplied.)
and did not consent thereto, x Evidently, the applicable prescriptive
is merely fraudulent and not period to institute the action to
void. They stress that the annul the deed of extrajudicial
action to rescind the partition settlement was four (4) years
based on fraud prescribes in counted from the discovery of
four (4) years counted from fraud as held in the case of
the date of registration, which Gerona v. De
is constructive notice to the Guzman.28 However, the
whole world. records show that petitioners
x We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records complaint was filed only on
show, the heirs of October 18, 1993, or almost
Doroteo and Esteban did not participate sixteen (16) years after
in the extrajudicial partition executed by Jacinto
Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Feliciano was issued Free Patent
Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the No. (IV-4) 012293 on November
said deed was fraudulently obtained as it 28, 1977, and almost fourteen
deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and (14) years from the time Pedro
Esteban of their shares in the estate. A Canoza was issued OCT No. P-
deed of extrajudicial partition executed 364 on November 28, 1979. As
without including petitioners are
some of the heirs, who had no deemed to have obtained constructive
knowledge of and consent to the same, notice of the fraud upon the
 registration of the Free Patent, they
clearly failed to institute the
present civil action within the allowable
period. The same result
obtains even if their complaint is treated
as one (1) essentially for
reconveyance as more than ten (10)
years have passed since
petitioners cause of action accrued. The
CA committed no error in dismissing
their complaint.

CARMELA BROBIO MANGAHAS, Petitioner, vs.

EUFROCINA A. BROBIO, Respondent. G.R. No. 183852
October 20, 2010
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
x Pacifico S. Brobio (Pacifico) died intestate, leaving
three parcels of land.
o He was survived by:
his wife, respondent
Eufrocina A. Brobio, and
four legitimate and
three illegitimate children
x petitioner
Carmela Brobio
Mangahas is
one of the
illegitimate
children.
x Eufrocina (and 4 LC) executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
the Late Pacifico Brobio with Waiver
o in consideration of their love and
affection for respondent and the
sum of P150,000.00, waived and
ceded their respective shares
over the three parcels of land in
favor of respondent
x Carmela claimed that Eufrocina promised to give
her an additional amount for
her share in her fathers estate.
o Thus, after the signing of the Deed,
petitioner demanded from
respondent the promised
additional amount, but
respondent refused to pay,
claiming that she had no
more money
x Eufrocina (after being required to submit an original
copy of the Deed by the
BIR) asked her to
countersign a copy of the
Deed x Carmela refused
o demanding that respondent first give her
the additional amount
that she promised. Considering
the value of the three parcels
of land (which she claimed to
be worth P20M), petitioner
asked for P1M, but respondent
begged her to lower the
amount.
o Petitioner agreed to lower it to
P600,000.00. Because respondent
did not have the money at
that time and petitioner
refused to countersign the
Deed without any assurance
that the amount would be
paid, respondent executed a
promissory note.
o Petitioner agreed to sign the Deed when
respondent signed the
promissory note
x Eufrocina failed to pay upon demand
x Carmela filed a Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages
x Eufrocina filed answer
o Claimed that she was only forced to sign
the PN
x RTC in favor of Carmela
o The RTC found that the alleged "pressure
and confused disposition"
experienced by respondent and
the circumstances that led to the
execution of the promissory note
 do not constitute undue influence as
would vitiate respondents consent
thereto.
o The court maintained that the promissory note
was an additional
consideration for the waiver of
petitioners share in the three properties
in favor of respondent. Its conclusion
was bolstered by the fact that the
promissory note was executed after
negotiation and haggling between the
parties.
x CA reversed RTC
o The CA found that there was a complete absence
of consideration
in the execution of the promissory note,
which made it inexistent and without
any legal force and effect. The court
noted that
"financial assistance" was not the
real reason why respondent
executed the promissory note, but
only to secure petitioners
signature. The CA held that the waiver
of petitioners share in the three
properties, as expressed in the deed of
extrajudicial
settlement, may not be considered as the
consideration of the
promissory note, considering that
petitioner signed the Deed way back in
2002 and she had already received the
consideration of P150,000.00 for signing
the same. The CA went on to hold that if
petitioner disagreed with the amount she
received, then she should have filed an
action for partition.
o CA found that intimidation attended the signing
of the promissory
note. Respondent needed the Deed
countersigned by petitioner in
order to comply with a BIR requirement;
and, with petitioners
refusal to sign the said document,
respondent was forced to sign the
promissory note to assure petitioner that
the money promised to her would be
paid.
x Carmela filed Rule 45

ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in ruling that Carmelas remedy

should have been an action for partition

HELD: NO.
x Contracts are voidable where consent thereto is given
through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. In
determining whether consent is
vitiated by any of these circumstances, courts
are given a wide latitude in
weighing the facts or circumstances in a given case
and in deciding in favor of
what they believe actually occurred, considering
the age, physical infirmity,
intelligence, relationship, and conduct of the parties at the
time of the execution

62
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
choice.16 For undue influence to
be present, the influence exerted
of the contract and subsequent thereto, must have so overpowered or
irrespective of whether the contract is in a subjugated the mind of a
public or private writing.14 contracting party as to destroy his
x Nowhere is it alleged that mistake, violence, free agency, making him express
fraud, or intimidation attended the the will of another rather than his
execution of the promissory note. Still, own.17
respondent insists that she was "forced" x Respondent may have desperately
into signing the promissory note because needed petitioners signature on the Deed,
petitioner would not sign the document but there is no showing that she
required by the BIR. In one case, the Court was deprived of free agency
- in characterizing a similar when she signed
argument by respondents therein - held the promissory note. Being
that such allegation is tantamount to forced into a situation does not
saying that the other party exerted amount to vitiated
undue influence upon them. However, consent where it is not shown
the Court said that the fact that that the party is deprived of free
respondents were "forced" to sign the will and choice.
documents does not amount to vitiated Respondent still had a choice:
consent.15 she could have refused to
x There is undue influence when a person takes execute the promissory
improper advantage of his power note and resorted to judicial
over the will of another, depriving the means to obtain petitioners
latter of a reasonable freedom of signature. Instead,
 respondent chose to execute the
promissory note to obtain petitioners 1. Parties
signature, thereby agreeing to pay the
amount demanded by petitioner.
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings,
x The fact that respondent may have felt
and when. Subject to the provisions of
compelled, under the circumstances, to
execute the promissory note will not the next succeeding section, a person
negate the voluntariness of the act. As deprived of the possession of any land or
rightly observed by the trial court, the building by
execution of the promissory note in the force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
amount of P600,000.00 was, in fact, the stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
product of a negotiation between the person
parties. against whom the possession of any land or
x Contrary to the CAs findings, the situation did not building is unlawfully withheld after the
amount to intimidation that expiration
vitiated consent.1awphil There is or termination of the right to hold possession,
intimidation when one of the contracting by virtue of any contract, express or implied,
parties is compelled to give his consent by or
a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an the legal representatives or assigns of any
imminent and grave evil upon his person such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
or property, or upon the person or may,
property of his spouse, descendants, or at any time within one (1) year after such
ascendants.19 Certainly, the payment of unlawful deprivation or withholding of
penalties for delayed payment of taxes possession,
would not qualify as a "reasonable and bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
well-grounded fear of an imminent and Court against the person or persons
grave evil." unlawfully
x We join the RTC in holding that courts will not set withholding or depriving of possession, or
aside contracts merely any person or persons claiming under them,
because solicitation, importunity, for the restitution of such possession,
argument, persuasion, or appeal to together with damages and costs. (1a)
affection was used to obtain the
consent of the other party. Influence 2. Procedure: Summary
obtained by
persuasion or argument or by appeal to Section 3. Summary procedure. Except
affection is not prohibited either in law in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy
or morals and is not obnoxious even in laws or when the law otherwise expressly
courts of equity.20 provides, all actions for forcible entry and
x On the issue that the promissory note is void for unlawful detainer, irrespective of the
not being supported by a amount of damages or unpaid rentals
consideration, we likewise disagree with the CA. sought to be recovered, shall be governed
x A contract is presumed to be supported by cause by the summary procedure hereunder
or consideration.21 The provided. (n)
presumption that a contract has sufficient
consideration cannot be overthrown by
a mere assertion that it has no
consideration. To overcome the
presumption, the
alleged lack of consideration must be
shown by preponderance of evidence.22
The burden to prove lack of
consideration rests upon whoever
alleges it, which, in the present case, is
respondent.
x Respondent failed to prove that the promissory
note was not supported by any
consideration. From her testimony and
her assertions in the pleadings, it is clear
that the promissory note was issued for a
cause or consideration, which, at the very
least, was petitioners signature on the
document.1avvphi1
x It may very well be argued that if such was the
consideration, it was inadequate.
Nonetheless, even if the consideration is
inadequate, the contract would not be
invalidated, unless there has been fraud,
mistake, or undue influence.23 As
previously stated, none of these grounds had
been proven present in this case.
x The foregoing discussion renders the final issue
insignificant. Be that as it may,
we would like to state that the remedy
suggested by the CA is not the
proper one under the circumstances. An
action for partition implies
that the property is still owned in
common.24 Considering that the
heirs had already executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement and waived their
shares in favor of respondent, the
properties are no longer under a state of
co-ownership; there is nothing more to be
partitioned, as ownership had already
been merged in one person.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER [Rule

70]

Section 4. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be
filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim
pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings
shall be verified. (3a, RSP)
Section 5. Action on complaint. The court may, from an
examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence
as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of
the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent
therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue
summons. (n)
Section 6. Answers. Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims
and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer
shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from
service of the answer in which they are pleaded. (5 RSP)
Section 7. Effect of failure to answer. Should the
defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu
proprio or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.
The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of
damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or
otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of
section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.
(6, RSP)
Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not
later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of
Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
together with their position papers setting forth the law
and the facts relied upon by them. (9,
RSP)
Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment. Within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
the same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify
certain material facts, during the said
period, issue an order specifying the matters to be
clarified, and require the parties to submit
affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the
last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the
same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just
to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (n)
Section 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring
referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed
without
prejudice, and may be revived only after that
requirement shall have been complied with. (18a,
RSP)
Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The
following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be
allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
or failure to comply with section 12;
63

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary

conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The
defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the
next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7,
RSP)

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise

be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next preceding
section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more
defendants sued under a common cause of action defense shall
appear at the
preliminary conference.

No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted

except for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to
such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound
discretion may impose on the movant. (n)

Section 9. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5)

days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the
court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein,
including but not limited to:

1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable

settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;

2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the

stipulations and admission made
by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of
further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days
from issuance of the order;

4. A clear specification of material facts which remain

converted; and

5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of

the case. (8, RSP)

Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers.

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the
next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual
issues defined in the order,
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11. Third-party complaints;

2. Motion for a bill of particulars; 12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)

3. Motion for new trial, or for Section 14. Affidavits. The affidavits
reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of required to be submitted under this Rule shall
trial; state only facts of direct personal knowledge
of the affiants which are admissible in
4. Petition for relief from judgment; evidence, and shall show their competence
to testify to the matters stated therein.
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper; A violation of this requirement may subject
the party or the counsel who submits the
6. Memoranda; same to disciplinary action, and shall be
cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or or portion thereof from the record. (20, RSP)
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court; Section 15. Preliminary injunction. The
court may grant preliminary injunction, in
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default; accordance with the provisions of Rule 58
hereof, to prevent the defendant from
9. Dilatory motions for postponement; committing further acts of dispossession
against the plaintiff.
10. Reply;
A possessor deprived of his possession through executory, without prejudice to a
forcible from the filing of the complaint, present a further appeal that may be taken
motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful therefrom. (10a)
detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within
thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (3a)

3. Judgment

Section 17. Judgment. If after trial court finds that

the allegations of the complaint are
true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the restitution of the premises, the
sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If a
counterclaim is established, the court shall render
judgment for the sum found in arrears from either
party and award costs as justice requires.
(6a)

4. Immediate Execution

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how

to stay same. If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall
issue immediately upon motion unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas
bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any,
as determined by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial
Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation
of the premises for the preceding month
or period at the rate determined by the judgment of
the lower court on or before the tenth
day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the
Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk
of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be

deposited with said court or authorized
government depositary bank, and shall be held
there until the final disposition of the appeal,
unless the court, by agreement of the interested
parties, or in the absence of reasonable
grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should
the defendant fail to make the payments above
prescribed from time to time during the pendency of
the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the
plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order
the execution of the judgment appealed from with
respect to the restoration of possession, but such
execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its
course until the final disposition thereof on the
merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial

Court, any money paid to the court by the
defendant for purposes of the stay of execution
shall be disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
In any case wherein it appears that the
defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession
of land or building pending the appeal
by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court, damages for such
deprivation of possession and restoration of
possession and restoration of possession may be
allowed the defendant in the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
(8a)

Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of

Appeals or Supreme Court.
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court
against the defendant shall be immediately
Preliminary injunction and uncovered possible
anomalies, i.e., forged signatures
Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. and
Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the alterations, in the execution of a
perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may series of deeds of partition
issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the relative to Lot No. 1907-A
plaintiff in x Felix and Marilou filed before the RTC of Cebu City
possession if the court is satisfied that the defendant's appeal a complaint13 for
is frivolous or dilatory or that the appeal of the plaintiff is nullification of the partition and for the
prima facie meritorious. (9a) issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs
respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A.
x Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the
5. Appeals respondents a complaint for
unlawful detainer
CARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. MR. AND MRS. FELIX o She alleged that she bought the subject
E. EMBOY, JR. AND MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, lot from Remedios,
Respondents. Moreno, Veronica and
G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014 Dionesia,15 the registered
owners thereof and the persons
FACTS: who allowed the respondents to
x Subject lot is located in Cebu and owned by Carmencita occupy the same by mere
x Said lot was used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was tolerance. As their successor-in-
partitioned in the interest, she claimed her
following manner among the heirs of Spouses entitlement to possession of the
Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres subject lot and the right to
(Asuncion) demand from the respondents to vacate
the same
x MTCC in favor of CARMENCITA; ordered Felix and
Lot No. TCT No.
Heirs Marilou to vacate
o RTC affirmed
1907-A-1 T-54359 Spouses Rogelio
x Felix and Marilou appealed to CA
and Praxedes Padilla x CA reversed
o A close perusal of [Carmencitas]
complaint a quo reveals that the
Heirs of action was neither one of
Vicente Padilla forcible entry nor unlawful
(Vicente),
namely: (1)
detainer but essentially involved
Azucena an issue of ownership which
Padilla, must be resolved in an accion
married to reivindicatoria. It did not
Felly Carrera; characterize [the
(2) Remedios
Padilla
respondents] alleged entry into
1907-A-2 T-54360 (Remedios), the land: whether the same was
married to Oscar Dimay; legal or illegal. It did not state
(3) Veronica how [the respondents] entered
Padilla the land and constructed a
(Veronica);10
and (4) Moreno
house thereon. It was also silent
Padilla on
(Moreno), whether [the respondents]
married to possession became legal
Teresita Curso before
(Teresita)
[Carmencita] demanded
from them to vacate the
1907-A-3 T-54361 Cresencio Padilla land. The
complaint merely averred that
1907-A-4 T-54362 Fructousa their relatives previously owned
Baricuatro the lot [the respondents] were
occupying and that after
1907-A-5 T-54363 Claudia Padilla- [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she,
Emboy (Claudia) as its new owner, demanded [for
the
respondents] to vacate the
land. Moreover, it is
undisputed that
x Felix and Marilou own the house which stood on the subject [the respondents] and their
lot ancestors have been occupying
o They claim that their mother, Claudia, had the
occupied the subject lot
during her lifetime and it was earmarked 64
to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A.
They had thereafter stayed in the
subject lot for decades after inheriting
the same from Claudia, who had in turn
succeeded her own parents, Carlos and
Asuncion
x Heirs of Vicente asked their cousins Felix and Marilou to
VACATE the subject
lot
o They refused
x They then received a demand letter from the lawyer of
Carmencita on February
23, 2004
o They were informed that Carmencita had already
purchased on
February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the
formers relatives.
o However, the respondents did not heed the
demand.
o Instead, they examined the records pertaining to
the subject lot
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
through
force,
land for several decades intimida
already. There was no tion,
averment as to how or threat,
when [Carmencitas] strategy
predecessors tolerated or
[the stealth
respondents] possession of to make
the land. Consequently, out a
there was no case of
contract to speak of, forcible
whether express or implied, entry.
between [the In any
respondents], on one hand, event,
and [Carmencita] or her [Carmen
predecessors, cita]
on the other, as would cannot
qualify [the respondents] legally
possession of the assert
land as a case of unlawful that
detainer. Neither was it [the
alleged that respond
[the respondents] took ents]
possession of the land possessi
 on of the land was by dispossession has
mere lasted for more than
tolerance. This is because one year. It is an
[Carmencitas] ordinary civil
predecessors-in-interest did proceeding to
not yet own the property determine the better
when [Claudia] took right of possession of
possession realty independently of
thereof. Take note that title. In other words, if
[Carmencitas] at the time of the filing
predecessors-in-interest of the complaint more
merely stepped into the than one year had
shoes of their parents who elapsed since
were also co- defendant had turned
heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, plaintiff out of
to categorize a cause of possession or
action as one defendants possession
constitutive of unlawful had
detainer, plaintiffs become illegal, the
supposed acts of action will be, not one
tolerance must have been of the forcible entry or
present from the start of illegal detainer, but an
the possession accion publiciana.
which he later seek[s] to x On the other hand, accion
recover. This is clearly reivindicatoria is an action to recover
wanting in the ownership also brought
case at bar. in the proper regional
trial court in an
ISSUE: Whether Carmencitas complaint was correctly nominated ordinary civil
as unlawful detainer. proceeding.39
(Citations omitted)
HELD: NO. x In a complaint for unlawful detainer,
x Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the following key jurisdictional facts must
the requisites for be alleged and sufficiently
unlawful detainer are present in the case at bar. established:
x Without a doubt, the registered owner of real o (1) initially, possession of
property is entitled to its property by the defendant was
possession. However, the owner cannot by
simply wrest possession thereof from contract with or by
whoever is in actual occupation of the tolerance of the plaintiff;
property. To recover possession, he o (2) eventually, such
must possession became illegal upon
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, notice by
once he chooses what action to file, he plainti
is required to satisfy the conditions ff to
necessary for such action to prosper.37 defend
x In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent ant of
the three kinds of actions the
available to recover possession of real property, viz: termin
o (a) accion interdictal; ation
o (b) accion publiciana; and of the
o (c) accion reivindicatoria. latter
x Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of s right
action, namely, of
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful posses
detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible sion;
entry, one is deprived of physical o (3) thereafter, the
possession of real property by means of defendant remained in
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or possession of the
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, property and deprived
one illegally withholds possession after the plaintiff of the
the enjoyment thereof; and
expiration or termination of his o (4) within one year from
right to hold possession under any the last demand on defendant
contract, express or implied. The to vacate
two are distinguished from each the property, the plaintiff
other in that in forcible entry, the instituted the complaint
possession of the defendant is illegal for ejectment.40
from the beginning, and that the issue is x In the case at bar, the first requisite
which party has prior de facto mentioned above is markedly
possession while in unlawful detainer, absent.
possession of the defendant is originally Carmencita
legal but became illegal due to the failed to clearly
expiration or termination of the right to allege and prove
possess. how and when
x The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are the
summary in nature, lies in the respondents
proper municipal trial court or entered the
metropolitan trial court. Both actions subject lot and
must be brought within one year from constructed a
the date of actual entry on the land, house upon it.41
in case of forcible entry, and from the Carmencita was
date of last demand, in case of likewise
unlawful detainer. The issue in said conspicuously
cases is the right to physical silent about the
possession. details on who
x Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the specifically permitted
right of the respondents to
possession which should be brought in occupy the lot, and how
the proper regional trial court when and when such
tolerance came about.42 Instead,
Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal
conclusion, sans factual substantiation,
that (a) the respondents initial
occupation of the subject lot was lawful
by virtue of tolerance by the registered
owners, and (b) the respondents
became deforciants unlawfully
withholding the
subject lots possession after
Carmencita, as purchaser and new
registered
owner, had demanded for the former to
vacate the property.43 It is worth
noting that the absence of the first
requisite assumes even more
importance in
the light of the respondents claim that
for decades, they have been occupying
the subject lot as owners thereof.
x Again, this Court stresses that to give the court
jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the
land, it is necessary that the
complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings
are summary in nature. In short,
the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face
of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected
or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.44
x As an exception to the general rule, the respondents
petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A
can abate Carmencitas suit for unlawful
detainer.
x In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:
o As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil
action involving
ownership of the same property
does not justify the
suspension of ejectment
proceedings. The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were
that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve
physical or de facto
possession, and, on not a few
occasions, that the case in
the Regional Trial Court was
merely a ploy to delay
disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues
presented in the former could
quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action
and there resolved.
x Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await
the outcome of the pending
civil action. One such exception is Vda. de
Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court
declared:
o x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one
of illegal
detainer, as distinguished from
one of forcible entry, and the
right of the plaintiff to recover
the premises is seriously
placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more
equitable and just and less
productive of confusion and
disturbance
of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and
expenses. For the Court in which
the issue of legal possession,
whether involving ownership or
not, is brought to restrain, should a
petition for preliminary injunction
be filed with it, the
effects of any order or decision
in the unlawful detainer case in
order to await the final
judgment in the more
substantive case
involving legal possession or
ownership. It is only where there
has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor
of
the prior possession regardless
of the fact that the other party
might ultimately be found to
have superior claim to the
premises
involved, thereby to discourage
any attempt to recover possession
 thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting
to the courts.
o Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would
have
resulted in the demolition of the house subject of
the ejectment
suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of
equity require
the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We
note that, like
Vda. de Legaspi, the respondents suit is one of
unlawful detainer
and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the
ejectment of
petitioners would mean a demolition of their house,
a matter that is likely to create the confusion,
disturbance, inconveniences and
expenses mentioned in the said exceptional case.
o Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would
cause the
respondent to go through the whole gamut of
enforcing it by
physically removing the petitioners from the
premises they claim to
have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is
claiming
ownership only of the land, not of the house.)
Needlessly, the
litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much
time and effort
by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at
best
temporary, but the result of enforcement is
permanent, unjust and
probably irreparable.
o We should stress that respondents claim to physical
possession is
based not on an expired or a violated contract of
lease, but
allegedly on mere tolerance. Without in any way
prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title,
we deem it judicious under the present exceptional
circumstances to suspend the ejectment
case.45 (Citations omitted)
x The Court then quoted with favor the following portion
of the Decision dated July
8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio
G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-
SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
o ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T.
Marayag anchors his action
for unlawful detainer on the
theory that petitioners
possession of the property in
question was by mere tolerance.
However, in
answer to his demand letter dated
April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners
categorically denied having any
agreement with him, verbal or
written, asserting that they are
owners of the premises we are
occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street,
San Vicente, Silang, Cavite. In
other words, it is not merely
physical possession but ownership
as well that is involved in this
case.[]
o TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the
premises in question,
petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, quieting of title
and damages against private
respondents, docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City. The issue of ownership is
squarely raised in this action.
Undoubtedly, the resolution of
this issue will be determinative
of
who is entitled to the possession
of the premises in question.[]
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
tolerance of the
owners. The
o THREE. The immediate execution of the respondents, on the
judgment in the unlawful other hand, raise the
detainer case will defense
include the removal of of ownership of the
the petitioners house subject lot and point to
[from] the lot in the pendency of Civil
question.[] Case No.
o To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, CEB-30548, a petition
nay inequitable, to allow for nullification of the
demolition of petitioners partition of Lot No.
house prior to the 1907-A, in
determination of the which Carmencita and
question of ownership [of] the Heirs of Vicente
the lot on which it were impleaded as
stands.46 (Citation parties. Further,
omitted) should Carmencitas
x We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely complaint be granted,
applicable to the instant the respondents
petition for reasons discussed hereunder. house, which has
x Carmencitas complaint for unlawful detainer is been standing in the
anchored upon the proposition subject lot for decades,
that the respondents have been in would be subject to
possession of the subject lot by mere demolition.
 The foregoing circumstances, thus, detainer case wherein
justify the exclusion of the instant the MTCC ruled
petition against Rafols,
from the purview of the general rule. complainants client.
x All told, we find no reversible error committed by the In
CA in dismissing ejectment cases, the
Carmencitas complaint for unlawful rulings of the courts
detainer. As discussed above, the are immediately
jurisdictional requirement of possession executory and can
by mere tolerance of the owners had not only be stayed via
compliance with
been amply alleged and proven. Section 19, Rule 70 of
Moreover, circumstances exist which the Rules of Court, to
justify the wit:
abatement of the ejectment o Section 19. Immediate
proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate execution of judgment; how to
her stay same.
ownership claims in an action more If
suited for the purpose. The respondents, judgment
on is
other hand, need not be exposed to the rendered
risk of having their house demolished against
pending the resolution of their petition the
for nullification of the partition of Lot No. defendan
t,
1907-A, where ownership over the execution
subject lot is likewise presented as an shall
issue. issue
immediat
ely upon
ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA, Complainant, vs. motion,
ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, Respondent. A.M. No. P-12- unless an
3069 January 20, 2014 appeal
THIRD DIVISION has been
perfecte
FACTS: d and
x Atty Alconera was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the the
defendant in Civil Case No. defenda
5967-2, an unlawful detainer case nt to
entitled Cua Beng a.k.a. Manuel Sy stay
and Ka Kieng v. Morita Rafols, et al., executio
filed before MTCC South Cotabato n files a
o MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co- sufficient
defendants
o Rafols, through complainant Alconera supersed
appealed the case to the eas
RTC bond,
x Cua Beng (Pending appeal before the RTC) filed approve
motion for execution d by the
o MTCC granted Municipa
x Rafols (through Alconera) filed an MR l Trial
o MTCC denied (the denial of the MR has Court
not reached Alconera yet and
at the time the writ was implemented) executed
x Rafols daughter, Evelyn, called Alconera and told the in favor
latter about the writ of of the
execution being implemented by Sheriff Pallanan plaintiff
x RTC ruled that there was no pending Motion to to pay
Approve Supersedeas Bond the
filed with it. Instead, what was filed not rents,
with the RTC but with the MTCC was a damages
"NOTICE OF APPEAL - and - MOTION TO , and
APPROVE PROPERTY SUPERSEDEAS costs
BOND," which was not granted. accruing
x Alconera conforonted Pallana down to
o And altercation ensued the time
x Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 against the of the
respondent sheriff for grave judgment
misconduct, Discourtesy in the appealed
Performance of Official Duties, and from,
Making Untruthful Statements and
x Pallanan filed comment unless,
o he averred that the duty of a court sheriff during
in enforcing a writ of the
execution is ministerial, and pendenc
without a TRO enjoining it, y of the
a sheriff is duty bound to appeal,
implement it. he
x EJ of RTC recommended that respondent Sheriff be deposits
ADMONISHED with
the
ISSUE: Whether Pallanan was correct in his appellate
position that, without a TRO, enforcement of a court the
writ of execution in an ejectment case is his amount of
ministerial duty. rent due
from time
HELD: YES to time
x It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its under the
roots to an unlawful contract, if
any, as determined by the
judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the
absence of a contract, he
shall deposit
with the Regional Trial Court
the reasonable value of the
use and
occupation of the premises
for the preceding month or
period at
the rate determined by the
judgment of the lower court
on or
before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period.
The supersedeas bond shall
be transmitted by the
Municipal Trial Court, with
the other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial
Court to which the action is
appealed.
x Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment
on a forcible entry
and detainer action is made immediately
executory to avoid further
injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant
in such a case may have such
judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an
appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas
bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the
rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the
property during the
pendency of the appeal.9 The failure of the
defendant to comply with any of
these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty
of the court in this respect being ministerial
and imperative. Hence, if the
defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal
but failed to file a
supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a
supersedeas bond will
not stay the execution of the judgment if the
appeal is not perfected.
Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should
be filed within the
period for the perfection of the appeal.10
x In the case at bar, complainant lost his clients case
and appealed to
the RTC. His client has also been periodically
depositing rental with the court for the use of
the property pending appeal. However, as ruled
by the RTC, the bond filed did not meet the
legal requirements because first and
foremost, the bond posted was a property
bond, not cash nor surety.
Furthermore, Rafols did not own the property
he posted as bond and besides, it
was also not issued in favour of the plaintiff in
the ejectment case. Because of
the non-compliance with the requirements
under the above-quoted rule, the
execution of the judgment was not
effectively stayed. The only exceptions to
non-compliance are the existence of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable
negligence which prevented the defendant from
posting the supersedeas bond or making the
monthly deposit, or the occurrence of
supervening events which
brought about a material change in the
situation of the parties and which would make
the execution inequitable.11 But whether or not
these obtain in the case at bar is an issue best
left to the court that issued the writ of
execution.
x Given the above circumstances, there was no legal
impediment preventing
respondent sheriff from performing his
responsibility of enforcing the writ of
execution. Since Rafols failed to comply with
the requirements under the Rules, Cua Beng
who prevailed in the unlawful detainer case is
entitled as a matter of right to the immediate
execution of the courts judgment both as to
the restoration of possession and the
payment of the accrued rentals or
compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises.12
x Well-settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of
a writ is purely
ministerial; he is to execute the order of the
court strictly to the letter.
He has no discretion whether to execute the
judgment or not. When
the writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in
the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with
reasonable celerity and
promptness to implement it in accordance with
its mandate. It is only
by doing so could he ensure that the order is
executed without undue
delay.13 This holds especially true herein
where the nature of the case
requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO,
 an order of quashal, or sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily removal
compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, of the defendant in the
respondent ejectment case and his personal belongings.
sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. Even in cases wherein
x Immediacy of the execution, however, does not mean instant decisions are immediately executory, the
execution. The sheriff must comply with the Rules of Court in required three-day notice
executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid cannot be dispensed with. A sheriff who
down in the Rules of Court is a enforces the writ without the required notice
misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. In this case, Sec. or before the expiry of the three-day period is
10(c), Rule 39 of running afoul with the Rules.15
the Rules prescribes the procedure in the implementation of the x In the present controversy, the Order denying the
writ. It provides: motion for reconsideration
x Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. was allegedly served, according to the
o (c) Delivery or restitution of real property. The officer respondent, on the same day the writ was
shall executed on March 17, 2011. Complainant,
demand of the person against whom the judgment however, avers that his office was
for the delivery only able to receive the denial the day after
or restitution of real property is rendered and all the execution or on March 18, 2011. At first
persons claiming blush, one might hastily conclude that the
rights under him to peaceably vacate the property three-day notice rule was
within three (3) apparently not observed. This Court,
working days, and restore possession thereof to the however, is not prepared to make such a
judgment finding. We are mindful of the possibility that
obligee, otherwise, the officer shall oust all such a demand to vacate has already
persons therefrom been given when complainant and Rafols
with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate were first served the Order granting
peace officers, and the issuance of a writ of execution, before
employing such means as may be reasonably the motion for reconsideration was
necessary to retake filed. More importantly, complainant failed to
possession, and place the judgment obligee in allege con-compliance with Sec.
possession of such 10(c) of Rule 39.
property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits x Thus far, no deviation from the Rules has been
awarded by the properly ascribed to respondent.
judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as As an officer of the court, he is accorded the
a judgment for presumption of regularity in the
money. performance of his duties. The burden was on
x Based on this provision, enforcement in ejectment cases requires the complainant to adduce evidence
sheriff to give notice of such writ and to demand from that would prove the respondents culpability,
defendant to if any. Without evidence of any
vacate the property within three days. Only after such period 66
can the
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
x The subject property pertains to the
vacant lot where the old ancestral house of
departure from well established Genaro stood until its
rules, any unlawful behaviour, or any demolition in June 2004, at
gross the instance of Teodoro
negligence on his part, the Teodoro.
presumption remains applicable and x Genaro had five children:
respondent o Santiago;
cannot be held administratively liable o Maria, from whom
for the offense of grave misconduct. respondents descended and trace
their claim of
TEODORO S. TEODORO (Deceased), Substituted by ownership and right of
his heirs/sons NELSON TEODORO and possession;
ROLANDO TEODORO, Petitioners, vs. DANILO o Petra,
ESPINO, ROSARIO SANTIAGO, JULIANA o Mariano, Teodoro Teodoros
father;
CASTILLO, PAULINA LITAO, RAQUEL RODRIGUEZ,
Respondents
RUFINA DELA CRUZ, and LEONILA CRUZ,
respective parents are
Respondents.
first cousins of
G.R. No. 189248 February 5, 2014
Teodoro Teodoro.
o Ana. Genaro and his children
FACTS:
are all deceased
x Subject land is located in Bulacan and registered
x Petra died
in the name of Genaro, long
deceased ascendant of all the parties
 o her purported will, a holographic will, x The RTCs comment that it "disagrees
was probated in Special with the said ruling" only meant that "the
Proceedings No. 1615-M lower court cannot dispose
before RTC, Branch 8, with finality the issue of
Malolos, Bulacan, ownership" since such
which Decision on the wills ownership issue is "inutile in
extrinsic validity has become an ejectment suit except to
final and throw light on the
executory question of possession."18 And so
o Petra, asserting ownership, devised the RTC ruled that Teodoro
the subject property to Teodoro should
Teodoro Teodoro be restored in the lawful
x Teodoro Teodoro effected the demolition of the possession of the disputed area of
ancestral house, intending to Lot No. 2476 in light
use the subject property for other purposes of the finding of the MTC that the
x Respondents (who resided at portions of Lot No. subject lot still forms part of the
2476 that surround the subject estate of the
property on which the ancestral house late Genaro Teodoro. It is from
previously stood) erected a fence on this same fact that the MTC
the surrounding portion, barricaded its reached the contrary
frontage, and put up a sign thereat, conclusion that Teodoro Teodoros
effectively dispossessing Teodoro Teodoro complaint should be dismissed
of the property bequeathed to him by because he
Petra has "failed to prove his ownership."19
x Teodoro Teodoro made demand to vacate x In the sense that Teodoro Teodoro has not
o BUT this was unheeded proven exclusive ownership, the MTC
x Teodoro Teodoro filed complaint for forcible was right.1wphi1 But exclusive
entry against respondents ownership of Lot No. 2476 or a
x Respondents filed answer portion
o asserted their own ownership and thereof is not in this case
possession of the subject required of Teodoro Teodoro for
property him to be
x MTC dismissed the complaint entitled to possession. Co-
o ruling on the issue of ownership and ownership, the finding of both
ultimately resolving the issue the MTC at
of who between Teodoro first instance and by the RTC on
Teodoro and respondents appeal, is sufficient. The
had a better right to pertinent
possess the subject provisions of the Civil Code state:
property
x RTC adopted MTCs factual findings BUT
REVERSED its ruling
x CA reversed RTC
o In all, the appellate court found that
Teodoro Teodoro (substituted
by his heirs Nelson and
Rolando Teodoro at that
juncture) "failed to discharge
the burden of proof that he
had prior actual physical
possession of the subject
[property] before it was
barricaded by [respondents]
to warrant the institution of
the forcible entry suit." The
appellate court disposed of
the case

ISSUE: Whether exclusive ownership should

be proven before a prayer that herein
respondents be made to vacate may be
sustained.

HELD: NO.
x We grant the petition. We reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and
restore the decision of the RTC on the appeal
reversing the MTC.
x We affirm the finding of fact by the RTC which is
decisive of the issue that has
remained unresolved inspite of a
summary procedure and two appellate
reviews of the forcible entry case filed by
Teodoro Teodoro. The RTC said:
o Analyzing the facts of the case, the
lower [court] concluded that
the subject parcel is a part of
the estate of the late Genaro
Teodoro and in the absence of
an approved partition among
the heirs,
remains a community
property over which the legal
heirs of Genaro Teodoro have
the right to inherit. All
therefore are entitled to
exercise the right of
dominion including the right
of possession.17 (Emphasis
supplied).
 and the expiration of the
o Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the time to appeal of the other
ownership of an parties") once he had given due
undivided thing or right belongs to different course
persons. to the defendants notice of
o Art. 1078. When there are two or more heirs, the appeal. He claimed that he had
whole estate of issued
the decedent is, before its partition, the orders in good faith and with
owned in common by such heirs, no malice after a fair and
subject to the payment of debts of the impartial evaluation of the facts,
deceased. applicable rules, and
x Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot jurisprudence; and that if he
No. 2476 had thereby committed lapses
including the portion now litigated is, owing to in the issuance of the orders, his
the fact that it has doing so should be considered
remained registered in the name of Genaro who as error of judgment on his part.
is the common o He lastly insisted that he did not know
ancestor of both parties herein, co-owned personally the parties in Civil
property. All, or both Case No. 176394-CV, and had
Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to absolutely no reason to give
exercise the right of possession as co-owners. undue
x Neither party can exclude the other from possession. favor or advantage to the
Although the property defendant; that the complainants
remains unpartitioned, the respondents in fact did not
possess specific areas. Teodoro submit evidence to show that the
Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is orders had been issued for a
that which was possessed consideration, material or
by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of otherwise, or that his
such area, not only by issuance of the orders had
virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also been motivated by ill-will or
because of his own right of possession that bad faith.
comes from his co-ownership of the property. As x Complainants filed reply
the RTC concluded, petitioners, as heirs o contended that respondent Judge
substituting Teodoro exhibited his ignorance of the
x Teodoro in this suit, should be restored in the lawful law and procedure in relying on
possession of the disputed Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
area. Court which referred to appeals
from the Regional Trial Court;
LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, Complainants, vs. that
JUDGE ROMEO Rule 40, which contained
A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch provisions on appeal from the
25, Manila, Respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-05- Municipal
1580 October 6, Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
2010 Courts, and which provided in its
[Formerly OCA Section 4 that the perfection of
IPI No. 04- the appeal and the effect of such
1608-MTJ]
THIRD perfection should be governed by
DIVISION the provisions of Section 9 of
Rule 41, concerned appeals by
FACTS: notice of appeal in general; and
x Complainants were the President and the Executive Director that instead, the applicable rule
of the plaintiff in should be Section 19, Rule 70 of
Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment the
suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Rules of Court.
Inc. v. Conrado Cano pending before MTC Manila Br 25 o The complainants pointed out that
with Judge Rabaca as PJ respondent Judge apparently
x Judge Rabaca in favor of YMCA; ordered Cano to vacate, did not know that appeal in
among others forcible entry and detainer
x YMCA filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that cases was not perfected by the
a writ of execution mere filing of a notice of appeal
be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid (as in
Judgment." ordinary actions) but by filing of
o The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules a notice of appeal and a
of Court as basis sufficient supersedeas bond
for its motion approved by the trial judge
x Judge Rabaca denied the motion on the ground that a executed to the
notice of appeal has plaintiff to pay the rents,
been seasonably filed damages and costs accruing
x Judge Rabaca allegedly advised the counsel for the plaintiff to down to the time of the
file an MR judgment appealed from. They
o BUT he denied the MR subsequently asserted that
x The BCC was then ordered to transmit the records to the RTC respondent Judges invocation of
x Complainants filed an administrative complaint against good faith and error of judgment
Judge Rabaca did not absolve him of liability,
o refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules because he had grossly neglected
of Court had
given undue advantage to the defendant his duties mandated by law by
to the plaintiffs damage and prejudice. failing and refusing to act on their
x Judge Rabaca filed comment
o He explained that he had honestly thought that motion for immediate execution
his court had lost and motion for reconsideration
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to and
the provision of Section 9, by giving due course to the
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which appeal despite no supersedeas
provides that "in appeals by bond
notice of appeal, the court loses having been filed and approved by the
jurisdiction over the case upon the trial court.
perfection of the appeals filed in due time
67
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
x Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
x OCA Presbi Velasco recommended that the o "SEC. 19. If judgment is
administrative complaint against rendered against the
respondent Judge be re-docketed as a defendant, execution
regular administrative matter; and shall issue
that immediatel
respondent Judge be fined in the y upon
amount of P5,000.00 with warning motion,
that a unless an
repetition of the same or similar act appeal has
would be dealt with more severely, been
based on an evaluation of the charges perfected
and the
ISSUE: Whether Judge Rabaca was correct in refusing defendant
to execute his decision in favor of YMCA on the to stay
ground that the defendants in the said case were execution
able to seasonably file an appeal. files a
supersedea
HELD: NO. s
x EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that bond,
respondent erred when he approved
did not act on complainants motion for immediate by the
execution. Municipal
Trial Court
 and executed in favor x In appeals by notice of appeal, the
of the plaintiff to pay the court loses jurisdiction over the
rents, damages, and costs case upon the
accruing down perfection of the
to the time of the judgment appeals filed in
appealed from, and unless, due time and the
during the expiration of the
pendency of the appeal, he time to appeal of
deposits with the appellate the other
court the parties.
amount of rent due from x He likewise allegedly relied on the
time to time under the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter
contract, if any, as OCA IPI No. 03-1513-
determined by the judgment MTJ: Susana Joaquin
of the Municipal Trial Court. Vda. De Agregado vs.
XXXX Judge Thelma Bunyi-
XXXX XXXX." Medina, MeTJ wherein
x It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an the Court said that-
appeal by itself o Respondent Judge is
is not sufficient to stay the execution of correct in saying that she had
the judgment in an ejectment lost jurisdiction
case. The losing party should likewise to
file a supersedeas bond executed entertain
in favor of the plaintiff to answer for the motion
rents, damages and costs, and, if for
the judgment of the court requires it, he execution
should likewise deposit the after the
amount of the rent before the appellate perfection
court from the time during the of the
pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, appeal and
execution becomes ministerial and after she
imperative. (Philippine Holding issued an
Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA order to
401 as transmit
cited in Hualam Construction and the records
Development Corporation vs. Court of of the case
Appeals, to the
214 SCRA 612, 626). appellate
x In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his court for
Notice of Appeal dated 9 July review.
2004 on 13 July 2004; he however x The facts of the case against Judge
failed to file any supersedeas bond. Bunyi-Medina are however different from
Prior to the filing of such notice of those prevailing in
appeal, more specifically on 12 July the instant case. In
2004, complainants have already filed their Motion for the Medina case,
Execution dated the fifteen (15) day
8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the period within which
Motion for Execution, respondent to perfect the
Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal had already
appeal in an Order dated 14 July lapsed before the
2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of complainant therein
Court to elevate the records of moved for the
the case to the Regional Trial Court execution of the
(RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court execution judgment.
however failed to forward the records to Clearly
the RTC. This fact is clear from therefore, appeal had
Judge Rabacas Order dated 28 July already been
2004 wherein he directed the Branch perfected. In the
Clerk instant case, although
of Court to forward the records of the the
case to the Manila Regional Trial Court defendant had filed his
immediately. appeal, the period to
x From the foregoing, it is clear that when the appeal had not yet
complainant moved for lapsed since the
the immediate execution of Judge plaintiff still had his
Rabacas decision, the latter still had own period to appeal
jurisdiction over the case. He therefore from the judgment and
clearly erred when he refused to act on such period
the Motion for Execution. The relevant had not yet lapsed. The
question that we provision relied upon by
should resolve however is whether judge Rabaca, more
such error is an error of judgment specifically, Section 9,
or an error amounting to Rule 41 of the Rules of
incompetence that calls for Court, clearly states
administrative that, "In appeals by
discipline. notice of appeal, the
x Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the court loses jurisdiction
complainants Motion for over the case upon
execution because he honestly thought perfection of the
that when he gave due course to the appeals filed on due
defendants appeal which was time and the
seasonably filed, and ordered the expiration of the time
elevation of the records to the appellate to appeal of the other
court, his court already lost jurisdiction
over the case.. In making his ruling, parties." Moreover
respondent asserts he relied on the and more
provisions of Section 9, Rule 41 of the importantly, the
Rules of Court. This provision reads as herein complainants
follows: filed their
 Motion for Execution even before the
defendant had filed his Notice of
Appeal.
Such motion was therefore still well
within the jurisdiction of the lower
court.
x It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of
judgment in
favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right
and mandatory. This has been
the consistent ruling of the Court in a
number of cases involving the same
issue
posed before the respondent judge.
Respondent Judge is expected to know
this
and his justification of erroneous
application of the law, although
mitigating,
could not exculpate him from liability.
x We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court
Administrator.
x Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the
plaintiffs motion for
immediate execution considering that the
defendant did not file the
sufficient supersedeas bond despite having
appealed. Granting the
plaintiffs motion for immediate execution
became his ministerial duty upon the
defendants failure to file the sufficient
supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the
Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:
o Section 19. Immediate execution of
judgment; how to stay same.
If judgment is rendered against
the defendant, execution shall
issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by
the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff
to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time
of the judgment appealed from,
and unless, during the pendency
of the appeal, he deposits with
the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under
the contract, if any, as determined
by the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. In the
absence of a contract, he shall
deposit
with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at
the rate determined by the
judgment of the lower court on or
before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the Municipal Trial
Court, with the other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to
which the action is appealed.
x Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost
jurisdiction over the case by virtue
of the defendants appeal, was unacceptable in
light of the clear and explicit text
of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the
perfection of the appeal by the
defendant did not forbid the favorable action
on the plaintiffs motion
for immediate execution. The execution of the
decision could not be stayed
by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the
filing of the sufficient supersedeas
bond and the deposit with the appellate court
of the amount of rent due from
time to time, coupled with the perfection of the
appeal, could stay the execution.
Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his
omission to act
according to the provision by claiming good
faith or honest belief, or by
asserting lack of malice or bad faith.1avvphil A
rule as clear and explicit as
Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied,
but should be implemented
without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith,
or honest belief, or lack of
malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-
compliance only when there is an as-
yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or
applicability of a rule or legal provision. It
was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his
court, being vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar
to Civil Case No.
176394-CV, had been assigned many such
cases, he was not a trial
judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to
act on the issue of
immediate execution, a fact that further
exposed the abject inanity of
his excuses.
x We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore, that respondent respondents acts not ingrained
Judges with malice or bad faith. It is a
omission to apply Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored matter of public policy that in the
the urging to absence of fraud, dishonesty or
follow the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the corrupt motive, the acts of a
plaintiffs motion for judge in his judicial capacity are
immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his not
authority to grant the subject to disciplinary action even
motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, though such acts are erroneous.
he could have In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan,
easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June
of Court, which 2003, the penalty of fine in the
he well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was amount of five thousand pesos was
seeking for his judicial
action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the deemed sufficient where it was
parties, or that he held that respondents lack of
did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere malice or bad faith frees him from
failure to perform administrative liability but not for
a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him gross ignorance of the law.
administratively x We concur with the rationalization of the Court
accountable. Administrator. Verily, even if
x This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level respondent Judges omission would have
courts to easily amounted to gross ignorance of the law
adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of and procedure, a serious offense under
the Rules of Court Section 8,8 Rule 140, of the
to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the
actions for forcible complainants did not establish that
entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed malice or bad faith impelled his omission to
but has not filed a act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or a
sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the corrupt motive attended his omission to act
special civil action demands a downgrading of the
under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an liability. In the absence of any showing that he
immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from had been held guilty of any other
being further deprived of their rightful possession, should administrative offense,9 and without our
always be borne in mind. attention being called to other
x The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition circumstances that might demonstrate
of the respondent Judges dark motives for his
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely is also inaction, we should find and consider the
correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the recommended penalty of P5,000.00
recommendation of the penalty thuswise:
o Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or
68
Procedure is classified as serious offense for which
the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to
dismissal. However, we find
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O
N
with warning that a repetition of the D
same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely to be D
commensurate to the offense I
V
I
S
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its I
President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. O
BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, N
Petitioners, vs. ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR.,
Respondent FACTS:
G.R. x CGR Corporation, Herman M.
No. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto
170 (petitioners)
916 claimed to have
occupied 37.3033
hectares of public
April land in Barangay
27, Bulanon, Sagay City,
200 Negros Occidental
7
SEC
 x Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly which the
and unlawfully entered the plaintiff
leased properties and once inside could
barricaded the entrance to the have
fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence sustained
along the road going to petitioners as a mere
fishponds, and possessor
harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings , or
owned by the CGR those
x CGR promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court caused by
(MTC) in Sagay City the loss of
separate complaints for Forcible Entry the use and
With Temporary Restraining Order occupation
And/Or Preliminary Injunction And of the
Damages against Treyes property,
x CGR then filed with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for and not the
damages against Treyes damages
o Treyes filed an MD on three grounds - which he
litis pendentia, res may have
judicata and forum shopping. suffered but
o RTC granted MD; dismissed action which have
x CGR filed a Rule 45 before the SC no direct
relation to
ISSUE: Whether a complainant in a forcible his loss of
entry case can file an independent action for material
damages arising after the act of dispossession possession.
had occurred. x x x15
(Emphasis, underscoring
HELD: YES. and italics supplied;
x Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: citations omitted)
o SEC. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court x Other damages must thus be claimed
finds that the in an ordinary action.16
allegations of the x In asserting the negative of the issue,
complaint are true, it respondent cites the 1999 case of
shall render judgment in Progressive
favor of the plaintiff for Development
the restitution of the Corporation, Inc. v.
premises, the sum Court of Appeals.17 In
justly due as arrears of rent this case,
or as reasonable Progressive
compensation for the Development
use and occupation of the Corporation, Inc.
premises, attorneys fees (Progressive), as
and costs. If it lessor, repossessed
finds that said allegations the leased premises
are not true, it shall render from the lessee
judgment for allegedly pursuant to
the defendant to recover his their contract of lease
costs. If a counterclaim is whereby it was
established, authorized to do so if
the court shall render the lessee failed to pay
judgment for the sum found monthly rentals.
in arrears from The lessee filed a case
either party and award costs for forcible entry with
as justice requires. damages against
(Emphasis Progressive
supplied) before the Metropolitan
x The recoverable damages in forcible entry and Trial Court (MeTC) of
detainer cases thus Quezon City. During
refer to "rents" or "the reasonable the pendency of the
compensation for the use and case, the lessee filed
occupation of the premises" or "fair an action for damages
rental value of the property" and before the RTC,
attorneys fees and costs.13 drawing
x The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas14 reiterates the Progressive to file a
long-established rule that the motion to dismiss
only form of damages that may be based on litis
recovered in an action for forcible entry pendentia. The RTC
is the fair rental value or the reasonable denied the motion.
compensation for the use and x On appeal by Progressive, the Court
occupation of the property: of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying
o Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC the motion to dismiss.
that there is no basis for x Progressive brought the case to this
the MTC to award actual, Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
moral, and exemplary of Court, this Court
damages in view of the reversed the lower
settled rule that in ejectment courts ruling, it holding
cases, the only damage that that "all cases for
can be recovered is the fair forcible entry or
rental value or the unlawful detainer shall
reasonable be filed before the
compensation for the Municipal Trial Court
use and occupation of which shall include not
the property. only the plea for
Considering that the restoration of
only issue raised in possession but also all
ejectment is that of claims for damages
rightful possession, and costs therefrom."
damages which could be In other words, this
recovered are those
 Court held that "no claim for damages
arising out of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer may be filed separately and
independently of the claim for
restoration of possession."18
(Underscoring supplied)
x In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a
comparative study of the therein
two complaints, thus:
o A comparative study of the two (2)
complaints filed by private
respondent against
petitioner before the two
(2) trial courts shows that
not only are the elements
of res adjudicata present, at
least insofar as the claim
for actual and
compensatory damages is
concerned, but also that the claim
for damages-moral and
exemplary in addition to actual and
compensatory-constitutes
splitting a single cause of action.
Since this runs counter to the rule
against multiplicity of suits, the
dismissal of the second action
becomes imperative.
x The complaint for forcible entry contains the following
pertinent allegations -
o 2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered
into a contract of lease
with defendant PDC over a
property designated as Ground
Floor,
Seafood Market (hereinafter
"Subject Premises") situated at
the
corner of EDSA corner MacArthur
Street, Araneta Center, Cubao,
Quezon City, for a period of ten
(10) years from 02 January 1989
to 30 April 1998.
o 2.02 Immediately after having acquired
actual physical possession
of the Subject Premises, plaintiff
established and now operates
thereon the now famous Seafood
Market Restaurant. Since then,
plaintiff had been in actual,
continuous, and peaceful
physical
possession of the Subject Premises until 31
October 1992.
o 3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the
Subject Premises, is entitled
to the peaceful occupation and
enjoyment of the Subject Premises
to the exclusion of all others,
including defendants herein.
o 3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms
tactics to forcibly wrest
possession of the Subject
Premises from plaintiff and
maintain
possession thereof through the
use of force, threat, strategy and
intimidation by the use of
superior number of men and
arms
amounts to the taking of the law into their
own hands.
o 3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully
evicting out plaintiff from
the Subject Premises it is leasing
from defendant PDC and depriving
it of possession thereof through the
use of force, threat, strategy and
intimidation should be condemned
and declared illegal for being
contrary to public order and policy.
o 3.05 Consequently, defendants should be
enjoined from continuing
with their illegal acts and be
ordered to vacate the Subject
Premises and restore possession
thereof, together with its contents
to plaintiff.
o 4.07 Considering that defendants act of
forcibly grabbing
possession of the Subject Premises
from plaintiff is illegal and null
and void, defendant should be
adjudged liable to plaintiff for all
the
aforedescribed damages which
plaintiff incurred as a result thereof.
x The amended complaint for damages filed by private
respondent alleges basically
the same factual circumstances and issues as
bases for the relief prayed for, to
wit:
o 4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and
defendant PDC entered into a
Contract of Lease for a period of
ten years or from January 2, 1989
up to April 30, 1998 over a
 property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood million fixtures and
Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) equipment of plaintiff and at prices
situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur way below the market value
Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as
copy of the lease contract is Annex "B" the letter from
attached hereto as Annex "A." defendants dated August 6, 1993
o 5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical addressed to plaintiff, informing
possession of Subject Premises, and established the latter that the former intends to
thereon the now famous "Seafood Market sell at an auction on August
Restaurant." 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of
o 7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant the plaintiff presently in
PDC, defendants possession.
without the benefit of any writ of possession or o 12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the
any lawful court order and with the aid of premises constitutes a
approximately forty (40) armed security guards violation of its obligation under
and policemen under the supervision of defendant Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code
Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises requiring the lessor to maintain
through force, intimidation, threats and stealth the lessee in peaceful and
and relying on brute force and in a adequate enjoyment of the lease
thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will, for the entire duration of the
unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed
of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein the present suit for the recovery of
plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural damages under Art. 1659 of the
possession of the subject premises. The illegal high- New Civil Code x x x x19
handed manner of gestapo like take-over by (Emphasis in the original;
defendants of subject premises is more particularly underscoring supplied)
described as follows: x x x x x Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in
o 8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold Progressive, observed:
the o Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible
Subject Premises, including all the multi-million entry case has one
improvements, cause of action, namely, the
fixtures and equipment therein owned by alleged unlawful entry by
plaintiff, all to the petitioner into the leased
damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of premises out of which three (3)
defendants reliefs
constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and (denominated by private respondent as its
taking of property causes of action) arose:
against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner
defendants are herein) of the
threatening to sell at public auction and without the 69
consent, of
plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-
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Henedino M. Brondial)
possession of the leased
premises to the lessee, (b)
the claim for
actual damages due to the
losses suffered by private
respondent
such as the deterioration of
perishable foodstuffs stored
inside the
premises and the deprivation
of the use of the premises
causing
loss of expected profits; and,
(c) the claim for attorneys
fees and
costs of suit.
x On the other hand, the complaint for damages
prays for a monetary
award consisting of (a) moral damages of
P500,000.00 and exemplary
damages of another P500,000.00; (b)
actual damages of P20,000.00
and compensatory damages of
P1,000,000.00 representing
unrealized
profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for
attorneys fees and costs, all
based on
the alleged forcible takeover of
the leased premises by petitioner.
Since actual and compensatory
damages were already prayed for
in the forcible entry case before
the MeTC, it is obvious that this
cannot be
relitigated in the
damage suit before the
RTC by reason of res
adjudicata.
x The other claims for moral and exemplary
damages cannot also succeed
considering that these sprung
from the main incident being
heard before the
MeTC. x x x20 (Italics in the
original; Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 x It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the required to do so, may be summarily
earlier-quoted allegations in the adjudged in contempt by such court and
complaint for damages of herein punished by a fine not exceeding two
petitioners, their claim for damages thousand pesos or imprisonment not
have no exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a
direct relation to their loss of Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent
possession of the premises. It had to or higher rank, or by a fine not
do with exceeding two hundred pesos or
respondents alleged harvesting and imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or
carting away several tons of milkfish both, if it be a lower court.
and
other marine products in their fishponds, Indirect
ransacking and destroying of a chapel
built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and
stealing religious icons and even Section 3. Indirect contempt to be
decapitating the heads of some of punished after charge and hearing. After
them, after the act of dispossession a
had charge in writing has been filed, and an
occurred. opportunity given to the respondent to
x Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - comment
that the identity between the
pending actions, with respect to the
parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, is such that any judgment rendered
on one action will, regardless of which is
successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration - is not
present, hence, it may not be
invoked to dismiss petitioners
complaint for damages.21
x Res judicata may not apply because the court in a
forcible entry case has no
jurisdiction over claims for damages
other than the use and occupation of
the premises and attorneys fees.22
x Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of
the complaint for damages,
the elements of litis pendentia not
being present, or where a final
judgment in the forcible entry case will
not amount to res judicata in the
former.23
x Petitioners filing of an independent action for
damages other than those
sustained as a result of their
dispossession or those caused by the
loss of their use and occupation of their
properties could not thus be considered
as splitting of a cause of action.

CONTEMPT [Rule 71]

1. Kinds

Direct

Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A

person guilty of misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully
 Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to respondent is adjudged guilty of
be heard by himself or indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be Court or a court of equivalent or higher
punished for indirect contempt; rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos or imprisonment not
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty
performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; of contempt committed against a
lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, five thousand pesos or imprisonment
process, order, or judgment of a not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt
court, including the act of a person who, after being consists in the violation of a writ of
dispossessed or ejected from any real injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent order, he may also be ordered to make complete
jurisdiction, enters or attempts restitution to the party injured by such violation of the
or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for property involved or such amount as may be alleged
the purpose of executing acts and proved.
of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions,
adjudged to be entitled thereto; shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment
imposing a fine unless the court otherwise
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the provides. (6a)
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule; Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When
the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court
of justice; concerned until he performs it. (7a)

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail
and acting as such without fails to answer. When a
authority; respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day
fixed for the hearing, the court may
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; issue another order of arrest or may order the bond
for his appearance to be forfeited and
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be proceeded
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or against, the measure of damages shall be the extent of
process of a court held by him. the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by
reason of the misconduct for which the contempt charge
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent was prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and
the court from issuing process such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party
to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in injured. If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be
custody pending such proceedings. liable and disposed of as in criminal cases. (8a)

2. Procedure 3. Judgment and Review

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for

indirect contempt may be initiated motu propio by the court
70
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why
he should not be
punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be

commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein,
and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that
fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint
hearing and decision.
(n)

Section 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for

indirect contempt has been
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent
or higher rank, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court.
Where such contempt has
been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court
is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower
court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in
the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule. (4a; Bar
Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998)

Section 6. Hearing; release on bail. If the hearing is not

ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released
from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed by the court,
for his appearance at the hearing of the charge. On the day set
therefor, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and
consider such comment, testimony or defense as the respondent
may make or offer. (5a)
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Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond Sep

for stay. The judgment or final order of a court in a te
case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the mb
proper court as in er
criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final 7,
199
order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by
9
the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed
FIR
by the court from which the appeal is taken,
ST
conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him
DIV
he will abide by and perform the judgment or final
ISI
order. (10a)
ON
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
FACTS:
CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE
x SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of
COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER
certain stockholders of Interport Resources
MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN,
Corporation, directed respondent
petitioners, vs. MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T.
Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list
RICALDE and CESAR P.
of stockholders and to set a
MANALAYSAY, respondents.
definite time and place for the
G.R. No.
validation of proxies and
129521
nominations for directors of the
firm
 x SEC issued a TRO enjoining the Interport
Resources Corporation from holding
the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the
stockholders.
x Iterport nonetheless proceeded with the meeting
o Presided by Manalaysay
x SEC declared the meeting null and void
o directed respondents to appear before
the SEC on July 15, 1996, at
3:00 p.m., to show cause
why no disciplinary action
should be
taken against them or why
they should not be cited in
contempt.
x Manalyasay questioned the validity of the TRO
as well as the CONTEMPT
proceedings
x SEC declared Atty. Cesar Manalaysay, Manuel
D. Recto and Atty. Pelagio T.
Ricalde guilty of contempt
x Respondents appealed
x CA reversed SEC
ISSUE: Whether the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is material as to the
determination whether appeal lies as a remedy.
HELD: NO.
x We agree with respondents that the charge of
contempt partakes of the nature
of a criminal offense. 9 The
exoneration of the contemner from
the charge amounts to an acquittal
from which an appeal would not lie.
x A distinction is made between a civil and criminal
contempt. Civil contempt is the
failure to do something ordered by a
court to be done for the benefit of a
party.
A criminal contempt is any conduct
directed against the authority or dignity
of
the court. 10
x Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by
respondents was civil in
nature, as the temporary restraining
order the SEC issued was for the benefit
of a party to a case. The contention is
untenable.
x "Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to
be remedial and civil
in their nature; that is, they are
proceedings for the enforcement of
some duty, and essentially a remedy
for coercing a person to do the
thing required." 11 "In general, civil
contempt proceedings should be
instituted by an aggrieved party, or his
successor, or someone who has a
pecuniary interest in the right to be
protected." 12 If the contempt is initiated
by the court or tribunal exercising the
power to punish a given contempt, it is
criminal in nature, and the proceedings
are to be
conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to
criminal cases. The State is the real
prosecutor. 13
x "The real character of the proceedings in
contempt cases is to be determined by
the relief sought or by the dominant
purpose. The proceedings are to be
regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil
when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial." 14
x "But whether the first or the second,
contempt is still a criminal
proceeding in which acquittal, for
instance, is a bar to a second
prosecution. The distinction is for the
purpose only of determining the
character of punishment to be
administered." 15
x In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature,
but criminal, imposed to
vindicate the dignity and power of
the Commission; hence, as in
criminal proceedings, an
appeal would not lie from
the order of dismissal of, or
an exoneration from, a
charge of contempt." 16
x At any rate, the SEC order directing
respondents to show cause why they should
not be cited in contempt was
highly improper. The Court of
Appeals issued on
July 8, 1996, a temporary
restraining order against the
order of the SEC of June
28, 1996 directing the Interport
Resources Corporation to desist
from holding the
stockholders' meeting on July 9,
1996. Contrary to the view of
petitioners, the
effect of the temporary
restraining order of the Court of
Appeals directing the SEC to
desist from enforcing its own
TRO was to allow such meeting
to proceed as scheduled. More,
the Court of Appeals in its final
decision nullified the SEC's order.
17 Hence, there was no willful
disobedience to a lawful order of
the SEC. Respondents were not
guilty of contempt.
x While the SEC is vested with the power to
punish for contempt, 18 the salutary
rule is that the power to punish
for contempt must be exercised
on the
preservative, not vindictive
principle, 19 and on the
corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. 20
The courts and other tribunals
vested with the power of
contempt must exercise the
power to punish for contempt for
purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended
as a safeguard not for the judges
as persons but for the functions
that they exercise. 21
x In this case, the SEC issued the citation
for contempt sua sponte. There was no
charge filed by a private party
aggrieved by the acts of
respondents. Strictly
speaking, there was no
disobedience to the SEC's
temporary restraining order.
 which the complainant reportedly
The Court of Appeals enjoined that order. uttered, Walang Judge, Judge
Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga,
the scheduled stock-holders' meeting was not abogado ang hinuli ko.
contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to x OCA recommended:
an order of the SEC. 22 The disobedience which the o Dismissal of charge against Sheriff
law punishes as constructive contempt implies Alvarez
willfulness. For, at bottom, contempt is a willful o Referral of charge against Judge to the
disregard or disobedience. 23 CA
x The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for although the complainant
contempt. The never appeared to prove
chairman and commissioners of the SEC must the charges against
exercise the power of contempt judiciously and the respondent
sparingly with utmost self-restraint. 24 judge, the facts
x Finally, the penalty imposed exceeded those authorized in the averred in the
powers of the SEC complaint appear to
25 in relation to the 1964 Revised Rules of Court as be substantially
amended. 26 If the correct and true.
contempt was committed against a superior court or Thus, the respondent
judge, the accused may be judge abused
fined not exceeding thirty thousand pesos his authority to
(P30,000.00) or imprisoned not more charge and punish
than six (6) months, or both. The SEC suspended any person for
respondent Manalaysay from indirect contempt
the practice of law in the SEC, a power vested under Rule 71 of the
exclusively in the Supreme Court Rules of Civil
Procedure
SALVADOR SISON, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR.,
Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff IV, Regional ISSUE: Whether Judge Caoibes was correct in citing
Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch 253, Sison in indirect contempt, considering that the latter
respondents. never became a party to a case pending before Judge
A.M. No. RTJ- Caoibes sala.
03-1771. May
27, 2004 HELD: NO.
EN BANC x Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of
court and in dealing with him
FACTS: accordingly is an inherent power lodged
x Judge issued an Order requiring the complainant to appear in courts of justice, to be used as a
before him to means to protect and preserve the
explain a traffic incident involving his son and the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the
Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila Development proceedings therein, and the administration
Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer of justice from callous misbehavior,
x Sison failed to appear offensive personalities, and contumacious
x Judge issued another Order for Sisons arrest and refusal to comply with court
commitment orders.[15] Indeed, the power of contempt is
x Sheriff served the same power assumed by a court
x Sison appeared and executed an affidavit[6] admitting to or judge to coerce cooperation and punish
the court that he disobedience, disrespect or
made a mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding interference with the courts orderly process
x Judge lifted the 2nd order by exacting summary
x Sison filed a complaint against Judge punishment. The contempt power was
o complainant was greatly surprised when given to the courts in trust for
respondent TEODORO the public, by tradition and necessity, in as
ALVAREZ came and arrested him much as respect for the
without any warrant of arrest, courts, which are ordained to administer the
only on orders of the respondent laws which are necessary to the good order
Judge, and he was ordered to of society, is as necessary as respect for the
board a motor vehicle and was brought to laws
the respondent Judge in themselves.[16] And, as in all other powers
Las Pias City who ordered him detained in of the court, the contempt power, however
the Las Pias City Jail. plenary it may seem, must be exercised
o respondent Teodoro Alvarez informed him that judiciously and sparingly.[17] A judge should
there will be a never allow himself to be moved by pride,
hearing of his indirect contempt prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
charge before the sala of the performance of his
respondent Judge in Las Pias City. duties.[18]
x Judge filed comment x At first blush, it would seem that the respondent
o vehemently denied the accusations against him, judge was justified in holding
contending that he the complainant for contempt, due to the
was merely preserving the dignity and latters refusal to comply with the
honor due to the courts of law. The judges Order of September 15, 1999.
respondent narrated that on September However, it is not lost upon this Court that
8, 1999, he the complainant was not a party to any of the
ordered his son, Jose R. Caoibes III, to go cases pending before the
to the Pasig City RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the
Regional Trial Court to secure certain contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic
records. While on his way there, he was violation incident involving the respondent
flagged down by the complainant for an judges son. Furthermore, the record
alleged shows that when the complainant filed his
traffic violation. Caoibes III explained to reply to the charge as
the complainant that he was on an errand 71
for his father, the respondent judge, to
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required by the respondent judge, the
same was refused by some staff member
in the latters sala.[19]
x In Cortes v. Bangalan,[20] we held that a judge
may not hold a party in
contempt of court for expressing
concern on the judges impartiality
through a motion for voluntary
inhibition, even if the latter may have
felt insulted therein. The Court also
declared, thus:
o [W]hile the power to punish in
contempt is inherent in all courts so
as to preserve order in
judicial proceedings and to
uphold due
administration of justice,
judges, however, should
exercise their
contempt powers judiciously
and sparingly, with utmost
restraint,
and with the end in view of
utilizing their
contempt powers
for
correction and preservation
not for retaliation and
vindication.[21]
x We agree with the Investigating Justice
when he opined that the respondent
judge should have refrained
from ordering the arrest and
detention of the
complainant, since the
incident involved his own son,
and the matter
was very personal to him. The
fact that the respondent judge
insisted that the complainant
personally file his comment in
court gives rise to doubts as to
the motive behind it; as the
Investigating Justice puts it, the
requirement of personal filing
was deliberately inserted so
that the respondent could
 confront and harass the complainant.
[22]
x We also agree with the following ruminations of
Justice Bersamin:
o [T]he respondent judge obviously
resented the refusal of Sison to
let off Caoibes III from the
traffic violation apprehension.
The
refusal of Sison was
apparently aggravated by the
sons reporting to
the father that Sison had
supposedly made the remarks
of Walang
judge, judge Caoibes sa akin;
Kahapon nga, abogado ang
hinuli ko.
o The respondent Judge was not
justified to so consider the act and
remarks of Sison as
thereby displaying
arrogance towards and
deliberate disregard of
the usual respect,
courtesy and
accommodation due to a
court of law and its
representative. First
of all, the refusal of Sison
and the supposed remarks
should not
cause resentment on the
part of the respondent Judge
(whom
Sison most likely did not yet
know at the time) because
he knew,
as a public official himself,
that Sison was only doing
his duty of
enforcing evenly the
particular traffic regulation
against swerving
into a one-way street from
the wrong direction,
regardless of the
office or position of the
violators father. Secondly,
the respondent
Judge should have had the
circumspection expected of
him as a that the person
judge to realize that the
remarks of Sison were invited
by Caoibes
IIIs attempt to bluff his way
out of the apprehension
because he
was the son of an RTC judge.
Hence, the respondent Judge
would
have no grounds to cite Sison
for contempt of court. And,
thirdly,
the respondent Judge and his
son should have challenged
the
issuance of the traffic
violation receipt pursuant to
the pertinent
rules if they did not agree
with the basis of the
apprehension and
also administratively
charged Sison for any
unwarranted act
committed. Since neither was
done by them, but, on the
contrary, both ultimately
accepted the validity of the
apprehension, as borne out
by the retrieval of the drivers
license after September 29,
1999 by paying the fines
corresponding to the traffic
violation, then it follows that
the respondent Judge had the
consciousness that his son
was at fault, instead
of Sison.
o [T]he respondent Judge
claimed at the hearing that his son
was at
that time working with
(sic) me as my
personal driver; and
that his
errand was to secure
some papers from the
Regional Trial Court in
Pasig City involved in
a personal case which
the respondent Judge
had filed against a
bank for specific
performance and
damages, and
since I just suffered a
mild stroke at that
time, specifically on
June
10, 1999, and the
incident took place
(sic) September, I
could not
at that time personally
go to Pasig to secure
the documents I
needed for the next hearing
of the case so I had to send
my son.
o The foregoing renders clear
that the respondent Judge had
no legitimate basis
by which to consider
Sisons
apprehension of his
son as indirect
contempt. As
indicated
earlier, the act
complained against
must be any of those
specified
in Sec. 3, Rule 71,
1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure;
otherwise, there
is no contempt of
court, which requires
obstructed
should be performing
a duty connected
with judicial
functions. As
such, the respondent
Judge acted
oppressively and
vindictively.
x Parenthetically, it is odd that the
respondent Judge would even propose herein
that Caoibes III, already 25
years at the time of the
apprehension, was serving his
father as the latters personal
driver, albeit not officially
employed in the
Judiciary. Most likely, therefore,
Caoibes III might not be doing
anything for his father at the
time of his apprehension but
was in the place for his own
purposes.[23]
x The act of a judge in citing a person in
contempt of court in a manner
which smacks of retaliation, as in
the case at bar, is appalling and
violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which
mandates that a judge should so
behave at all times to promote
public confidence in the integrity
and
impartiality of the judiciary.
[24] The very delicate function
of administering
justice demands that a judge
 should conduct himself at all times in
a manner
which would reasonably merit the respect
and confidence of the people, for he is the
visible representation of the law.[25] The
irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges erodes public confidence in the
judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof.
[26]
x We do not agree, however, that the respondent
judge should be merely
reprimanded for his actuations. The
Court has not been blind to the
improper use by judges of the
erstwhile inherent power of contempt
which, in fine,
amounts to grave abuse of authority. The
penalty imposed by the Court in such
cases ranges from a fine of P2,500;[27]
one months salary;[28] suspension from
the service without pay for a period of three
months;[29] and even the ultimate penalty
of dismissal from the service.[30]
x Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the
respondent judge was previously
sanctioned by the Court for violating
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
where he was meted a fine of P20,000.[31]
He was found guilty of serious
impropriety unbecoming a judge, for
delivering fistic blows on a complainant
judge. To our mind, the instant case falls
under similar conduct, which the Court
avowed would be dealt with more severely if
repeated, and of which the
respondent was duly warned. The respondent
was, likewise, found guilty of
gross ignorance of procedural law and
unreasonable delay in the issuance of an
order of execution, where he was meted a
fine of P30,000;[32] and delay in
resolving a motion to dismiss in a civil case
pending before his sala where he
was, likewise, fined P40,000

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL,* Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, petitioner,
vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO and SPOUSES BENITO
SEE and MARLY SEE, respondents.
G.R. No.
150949

June 21,
2007
FIRST
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought
from Evanswinda Morales
a piece of land in Cavite
x TCT was issued in the name of Sharcons
x Sharcons worker then tried to fence the land
x HOWEVER, the caretaker thereof prevented them,
claiming that spouses Joseph
and Enriqueta Mapua were the true owners of the
land
x Sharcons filed with RTC Dasma complaint for
quieting of title
o Impleaded as defendants were spouses
Mapua, Evanswinda
Morales, and the Register of Deeds of
Trece Martires City
x Sps Mapua filed Answer
o Alleged that all documents used by
Sharcons were spurious and
falsified
x Judge Espanol (PJ of RTC Dasma Br 90) issued an
Order stating that Benito
See and Marly See, president and treasurer,
respectively, of Sharcons, and its
counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso,
respondents, have used a spurious
certificate
of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons)
filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of
title.
o Consequently, petitioner declared
respondents guilty of direct
contempt of court and ordered
their confinement for ten (10)
days in the municipal jail of
Dasmarias, Cavite.
o Petitioner stated that in determining the
merits of Sharcons'
complaint for quieting of title,
she "stumbled" upon Civil Case
No.
623-92 for cancellation of title
and damages filed with the RTC,

Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,

presided by then Judge Lucenito
N.
Tagle.2
o Petitioner then took judicial notice of the
judges Decision declaring
 that Sharcons' TCT and other and administration of the law into disrespect
supporting documents are falsified and or to interfere with or prejudice parties
that respondents are responsible litigants or their witnesses during litigation."4
therefor. Simply put, it is despising of the authority,
x Judge then issued a warrant against respondents justice, or dignity of the court.5
x Respondents were then arrested and confined in the x The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time
municipal jail in England when all courts
x Respondents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the realm were but divisions of the
before the CA Curia Regia, the supreme court of the
x CA nullified and set aside monarch, and to scandalize a court was
o The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol an affront to the sovereign.6 This
erred in taking concept was adopted by the Americans
cognizance of the Decision rendered by and brought to our shores with
then Judge Tagle in Civil modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now
Case No. 623-92 since it was not offered recognized that courts have
in evidence in Civil Case the inherent power to punish for contempt
No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. on the ground that respect
Moreover, as the direct contempt for the courts guarantees the very stability
of court is criminal in nature, petitioner of the judicial institution.7
should have conducted a Such stability is essential to the preservation
hearing. Thus, she could have determined of order in judicial
whether respondents are guilty as proceedings, to the enforcement of
charged. judgments, orders, and mandates
of the courts, and, consequently, to the very
ISSUE: Whether herein respondents were correctly cited in direct administration of justice.8
contempt so as to warrant their incarceration. x Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, provides:
HELD: NO. o SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished
x The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as summarily. - A person guilty of
"some act or misbehavior in the presence of or
conduct which tends to interfere with the business so near a court as to obstruct
of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order or interrupt the proceedings
of the court, or some act of before the same, including
disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some disrespect
way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly toward the court, offensive
proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general personalities toward others, or
efficiency of the same." It has also been described as refusal
"a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the 72
court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
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"in the presence of or so near
the court or judge as to
to be sworn or to answer as a obstruct the
witness, or to subscribe an administration of justice." It is
affidavit or deposition when a contumacious act done
lawfully required to do so, facie curiae
may and may be punished summarily
be summarily adjudged in without hearing.10 In other
contempt by such court and words, one may be summarily
punished by adjudged in direct contempt at
a fine not exceeding two the very moment or at the very
thousand pesos or instance of the commission of
imprisonment not the act of contumely.
exceeding ten (10) days, or x Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules
both, if it be a Regional Trial states:
Court or a o SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to
court of equivalent or higher be punished after charge and
rank, or by a fine not hearing.
exceeding two - After a charge in
hundred pesos or writing has been filed
imprisonment, not exceeding and an opportunity
one (1) day, or given
both, if it be a lower court. to the respondent to
x In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized comment thereon
direct contempt as one done within such period as
 may him in custody
be fixed by the court and to pending such
be heard by himself or by proceedings.
counsel, a x Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn,
person guilty of any of the is one perpetrated outside of
following acts may be the sitting of the court and may
punished for include misbehavior of an
indirect contempt: officer of a court in the
(a) Misbehavior of an performance of his official
officer of court in the duties or in his official
performance transactions, disobedience of
of his official or resistance to a lawful writ,
duties or in process,
his official order, judgment, or command
transactions; of a court, or injunction
(b) Disobedience of or granted by a
resistance to a lawful writ, court or a judge, any abuse or
process, order, or any unlawful interference with
judgment of a the
court, including process or proceedings of a court
the act of a not constituting direct contempt,
person who, after or any improper conduct tending
being directly or indirectly to impede,
dispossessed or obstruct or degrade the
ejected from any administration of justice.11
real property by x We agree with petitioner that the use of
the judgment or falsified and forged documents is a
process of any contumacious act. However, it
court of constitutes indirect contempt
competent not direct
jurisdiction, contempt. Pursuant to the
enters above provision, such act is an
or attempts or improper conduct
induces another which degrades the
to enter into or administration of justice. In
upon Santos v. Court of First Instance
such real of Cebu, Branch VI,12 we ruled
property, for the that the imputed use of a falsified
purpose of document,
executing acts more so where the falsity of
of ownership or the document is not apparent
possession, or in on its face, merely
any manner constitutes indirect contempt,
disturbs and as such is subject to such
the possession defenses as the
given to the accused may raise in the proper
person adjudged proceedings. Thus, following Section 3,
to be Rule 71,
entitled thereto; a contemner may be punished
(c) Any abuse of or any only after a charge in writing has
unlawful interference with the been filed, and an opportunity
processes or has been given to the accused to
proceedings of a be heard by himself and
court not counsel.13 Moreover, settled is
constituting the rule that a contempt
direct contempt proceeding is not a civil action,
under Section 1 but a separate proceeding of a
of this Rule; criminal nature in
(d) Any improper conduct which the court exercises limited
tending, directly or jurisdiction.14 Thus, the modes
indirectly, of procedure
to impede, and the rules of evidence in
obstruct, or contempt proceedings are
degrade assimilated as far as
the practicable to those adapted to
administrati criminal prosecutions.15
on of Perforce, petitioner judge erred
justice; in declaring summarily that
(e) Assuming to be an respondents are guilty of
attorney or an officer of a direct contempt and
court and acting as such ordering their incarceration.
without authority; She should have conducted
(f) Failure to obey a a hearing with notice to
subpoena duly served; respondents.
(g) The rescue, or x Petitioner, in convicting respondents for
attempted rescue, of a person direct contempt of court, took judicial
or notice of the Decision in Civil
property in the Case No. 623-92, assigned to
custody of an another RTC branch,
officer by virtue presided by then Judge Tagle.
of an order or Section 1, Rule 129 of the
process of a Revised Rules of Court
court held by provides:
him. o SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when
o But nothing in this section shall be so mandatory. - A court shall take
construed as to prevent the judicial notice,
court from issuing process without the
to bring the respondent introduction of
into court, or from holding evidence, of the
existence and
territorial extent of states,
their political history,
forms of government, and
symbols of nationality, the
law of
nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world
and their
seals, the political
constitution and history of the
Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial
departments of
the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time,
and the
geographical divisions.
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner, vs. ATTY.
JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG
LA'O, Respondents.
G.R.
205956
February 12,
2014
DIVISION
FACTS:
x In Gener v. De Leon,16 we held that courts are not
authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of records of other
cases even when such cases have been tried
or pending in the same court. Hence, we
reiterate that petitioner took
judicial notice of the Decision rendered by
another RTC branch and on the basis
thereof, concluded that respondents used
falsified documents (such as land title
and tax declaration) when Sharcons filed its
complaint for quieting. Verily, the
Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that
respondents are not guilty of direct
contempt of court.
x Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of
respondents has become moot. We
recall that respondents were released after
posting the required bail as ordered
by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas
corpus will not lie on behalf of a person
who is not actually restrained of his liberty.
And a person discharged on bail is
not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus
No.
THIRD
x This case stemmed from a criminal case entitled
"People of the Philippines v.
P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 265
x Marantan and his co-accused were charged with
homicide
o The case arose from the deaths of Anton
Cu-Unjieng (son of
respondent LaO), Francis Xavier
Manzano, and Brian Anthony
Dulay who were allegedly shot
and killed by police officers in
front of the AIC Gold Tower at
Ortigas Center, which incident
was captured by a television
crew from UNTV 37
x In the meantime, another shooting incident
transpired which also involved
Marantan
x This allegedly resulted in much negative publicity on
the part of Marantan
x Marantan filed a petition before SC to cite Lao
(the private complainant in the
homicide charge) and Atty. Diokno (Laos counsel
therein) in contempt
o submits that the respondents violated
the sub judice rule, making
them liable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for
their contemptuous statements
and
improper conduct tending
directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. He
argues that their
pronouncements and malicious
comments delved not only on
the supposed inaction of the
Court in resolving the petitions
filed, but also on the merits of
the criminal cases before the
RTC and
prematurely concluded that he
and his co-accused are guilty
of
murder. It is Marantas position
 that the press conference was
organized by the respondents for the
sole purpose of influencing
the decision of the Court in the petition
filed before it and the
outcome of the criminal cases before
the RTC by drawing an
ostensible parallelism between the
Ortigas incident and the Atimonan
incident.
x Lao and Diokno filed their comment
o argue that there was no violation of the sub
judice rule as their
statements were legitimate expressions
of their desires, hopes and opinions
which were taken out of context and did
not actually
impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice in a
concrete way; that no criminal intent was
shown as the utterances
were not on their face actionable being a
fair comment of a matter
of public interest and concern; and that
this petition is intended to
stifle legitimate speech.

ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the sub judice rule

on the part of Lao and Atty. Diokno so as to merit their
being cited in contempt.

HELD: NO.
x The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to
the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may
render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec.
3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,4 which reads:
o Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and
hearing. - x x x a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(d) Any improper conduct tending,
directly or
indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade
the administration of
justice[.]
x The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are
criminal in
nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court
or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or
disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and no one can be punished for a
criminal contempt unless the evidence
makes it clear that he intended to commit it.6
x For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it
must really appear"
that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass
the administration of
justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the
all-important duty of the
court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case.8 The specific
rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the
decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that
the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.91wphi1
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Henedino M. Brondial)
justice. Freedom of speech
should not be impaired through
x The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in the exercise of the power of
order to allow them to conduct contempt of court unless there
their business unhampered by is no doubt that the utterances
publications and comments which tend in
to impair question make a serious and
the impartiality of their decisions or imminent threat to the
otherwise obstruct the administration of administration of justice. It must
justice. As important as the constitute an imminent, not
maintenance of freedom of speech, merely a likely, threat.11
is the maintenance of the x The contemptuous statements made by
independence of the Judiciary. The the respondents allegedly relate to the
"clear and present danger" rule may merits of the case,
serve as an aid in determining the particularly the guilt of
proper constitutional boundary petitioner, and the conduct of
between these two rights.10 the Court as to its failure to
x The "clear and present danger" rule means that decide G.R. No. 199462.
the evil consequence of x As to the merits, the comments seem to
the comment must be "extremely serious be what the respondents claim to be an
and the degree of imminence extremely expression of their opinion that
high" before an utterance can be their loved ones were murdered
punished. There must exist a clear and by Marantan.
present danger that the utterance will This is merely a reiteration of
harm the administration of their position in G.R. No.
 199462, which precisely o the only document produced
calls the Court to upgrade the charges by the Acting Corporate Secretary,
from homicide to murder. The Court Atty. Antonio V. Meriz,
detects no malice on the face of the and one of the staff,
said statements. The mere restatement Malou Santos, was
of their argument in their petition the Stock and
cannot actually, or does not even tend Transfer Book of the
to, Corporation. They
influence the Court. alleged that they
x As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the could not find from
respondents' comments reveals the corporate records
that they were simply stating that it had not yet the copies of the
resolved their petition. proxies submitted by
There was no complaint, express or the stockholders,
implied, that an inordinate amount of including the tape
time had passed since the petition was recordings taken
filed without any action from the Court. during the
There appears no attack or insult on the stockholders
dignity of the Court either. meetings, and that
x "A public utterance or publication is not to be they needed more
denied the constitutional protection time to locate and
of freedom of speech and press merely find the list of
because it concerns a judicial proceeding stockholders as of
still pending in the cou1is, upon the March 2002, which
theory that in such a case, it must was in the bodega of
necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly the Corporation.
and fair administration of justice."12 By x Sanchez filed a Manifestation with
no stretch of the imagination could the Omnibus Motion praying that an order be
respondents' comments pose a serious issued in accordance with
and imminent threat to the Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to
administration of justice. No criminal (d) of Rule 29 of the
intent to Rules of Court (Rules), in
impede, obstruct, or degrade the relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of
administration of justice can be inferred the Interim Rules of
from the comments of the respondents. Procedure Governing Intra-
x Freedom of public comment should, in borderline Corporate Controversies under
instances, weigh heavily Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim
against a possible tendency to Rules).
influence pending cases.13 The x RTC gave the parties one last chance to
power to comply with the order dated
punish for contempt, being drastic September 10, 2002
and extraordinary in its nature, o This Court orders the
should not be resorted to unless defendants to strictly comply with
necessary in the interest of justice.14 In this order.
the present case, such necessity is Failure of the
wanting. defendants to comply
with all the
requirements of the
CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and order dated
PABLO B. ROMAN, JR., Petitioners, vs. MANUEL O. September 10, 2002
SANCHEZ, Respondent. will result in this court
G.R. No. citing all
182738 the defendants in
contempt of court.
This Court shall
February order
24, 2014 defendants
THIRD solidarily to pay a
DIVISION fine of P10,000.00
for every day of
FACTS:
x Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of
petitioner Capitol Hills Golf &
Country Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a
petition for the nullification of the annual
meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002
and the special meeting of stockholders of
April 23, 2002
x Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents
o RTC granted
x Capitol filed an MR
o RTC denied
x Capitol filed a Rule 65 before the CA
o CA dismissed
x Capitol filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o SC dismissed
x The supposed inspection was not held
x Sanchez set the inspection on August 1, 2003
o BUT Atty. Matias V. Defensor, then
Corporate Secretary of the
Corporation, was alleged to
be out of town and petitioner
Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman)
purported to have shown no
willingness to comply with
the directive
x Finally, the inspection was conducted on January
11, 2007

delay to comply with the order of
September 10, 2002 until the
defendants shall have fully and
completely complied with the said
order.
x Capitol filed a Rule 65 before the CA
x CA dismissed the petition
o ruled that there is no indication that the RTC
committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
According to the appellate court, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution
was issued pursuant to Section 3,30 Rule
3 of the Interim Rules,
with the suppletory application of Section
1,31 Rule 27 of the
Rules. It noted that, except for the
sanctions contained therein, the
assailed Resolution merely reiterated the
September 10, 2002
Order of Judge Bruselas, which petitioners
did not dispute in
accordance with Section 2,32 Rule 3 of
the Interim Rules or via
petition for certiorari. The CA further held
that petitioners were not
denied due process as they were able to
move for a
reconsideration of the September 10,
2002 Order, but not opted to
file the same with respect to the
September 3, 2007 Resolution.
x Capitol filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o contend that the "threatened imminent action" by
the RTC to
penalize them sua sponte or without
regard to the guideline laid
down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v.
Judge Sardido37 is not
proper and calls for the exercise of Our
power of supervision over
the lower courts. Likewise, citing
Panaligan v. Judge Ibay,38
among others, they claim that the
threatened citation for contempt is not in
line with the policy that there should be
wilfullness or that the contumacious act
be done deliberately in disregard of the
authority of the court.
ISSUE: Whether RTC was justified in issuing an order
constituting a threat to cite Capitol in contempt.
HELD: YES.
x A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
order of a court39 or
commits any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice40
may be punished for indirect
contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules states that, in
addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-
suited or as in default, the
sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail
of, or refusal to comply with,
the modes of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3,
Rule 29 of the Rules, if a
party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order to
produce any document or other things for inspection,
copying, or photographing
or to permit it to be done, the court may make such
orders as are just. The
enumeration of options given to the court under
Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules
is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among
others." Thus, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,41 We said:
o To ensure that availment of the modes of
discovery is otherwise
untrammeled and efficacious, the law
imposes serious sanctions on
the party who refuses to make discovery,
such as dismissing the
action or proceeding or part
thereof, or rendering judgment by
default against the disobedient
party; contempt of court, or
arrest of the party or agent of
the party; payment of the
amount of
reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining a court order to
compel discovery; taking the
matters inquired into as
established in
accordance with the claim of the
party seeking discovery; refusal
to
allow the disobedient party
support or oppose designated
claims or
defenses; striking out pleadings
or parts thereof; staying further
proceedings.42
x If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the
respondent who committed it against
a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank may be punished
with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand
pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) months, or both.43 In this case, the
threatened sanction of possibly
ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine
of P10,000.00 for every day of delay in
complying with the September 10, 2002
Order is well within the allowable range of
penalty.
x As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is
concerned, the case of Baculi
v. Judge Belen44 is instructive:
o x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are
two ways of initiating
indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or
(2) by a verified petition.
x In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen.
Jose M. Calimlim and Atty.
Domingo A. Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim) clarified
the procedure prescribed for indirect
contempt proceedings. We held in that case:
o In contempt proceedings, the prescribed
procedure must be
followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court provide
the procedure to be followed in
case of indirect contempt. First,
there must be an order requiring
the respondent to show cause
why he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the
respondent
must be given the opportunity
to comment on the charge
against
him. Third, there must be a
hearing and the court must
investigate
the charge and consider
respondents answer. Finally, only
if found
guilty will respondent be
punished accordingly. (Citations
omitted.)
x As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings, that is,
through a verified petition, the rule is already settled
in Regalado v. Go:
o In cases where the court did not initiate
the contempt charge, the
Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with
the requirements of initiatory
pleadings as outlined in the
heretofore quoted provision of
second paragraph, Section 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
must be filed.
x The Rules itself is explicit on this point:
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the court in its
discretion orders the
o In all other cases, charges for indirect consolidation of the
contempt shall be contempt
commenced by a verified charge and the
petition with supporting principal action for
particulars and joint hearing and
certified true copies of decision.
documents or papers (Emphasis added.)
involved therein, and x Thus, where there is a verified petition to
upon full compliance with cite someone in contempt of court,
the requirements for filing courts have the duty to ensure
initiatory that all the requirements for filing
pleadings for civil actions in initiatory
the court concerned. If the pleadings have been complied
contempt with. It behooves them too to
charges arose out of or are docket the petition,
related to a principal action and to hear and decide it
pending in separately from the main case,
the court, the petition for unless the presiding
contempt shall allege that judge orders the consolidation of
fact but said the contempt proceedings and
petition shall be docketed, the main action.
heard and decided x But in indirect contempt proceedings
separately, unless initiated motu proprio by the
 court, the above rules, as clarified in consequence of possible non-
Regalado, do not necessarily apply. observance
First, since the court itself motu of the long-overdue order to
proprio initiates the produce and make available for
proceedings, there can be no verified inspection and
petition to speak of. Instead, the court photocopying of the requested
has the duty to inform the respondent in records/documents. In case of
writing, in accordance with his or her another failure or refusal to
right to due process. This formal charge comply with the directive, the
is done by the court in the form of an court or respondent could
Order requiring the respondent to explain formally
why he or she should not be cited in initiate the indirect
contempt of court. contempt proceedings
x In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring pursuant to the
the petitioners to explain their mandatory
failure to bring the accused before the requirements of the
RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We Rules and existing
held in that case that such Order was jurisprudence.
not yet sufficient to initiate the x Even if We are to treat the September 3,
contempt 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final
proceedings because it did not yet order of a court in a case of
amount to a show-cause order directing indirect contempt," this would
the still not work to
petitioners to explain why they should petitioners advantage. Section
not be cited in contempt. The formal 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
charge has to be specific enough to lays down the
inform the person, against whom proper remedy from a judgment
contempt proceedings are being in indirect contempt
conducted, that he or she must explain proceedings. It states:
to the court; o Sec. 11. Review of judgment
otherwise, he or she will be cited in or final order; bond for stay.--The
contempt. The Order must express this judgment or final
in clear and unambiguous language. order of a court in
x Second, when the court issues motu proprio a a case of indirect
show-cause order, the duty of the contempt
court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and may be appealed
decide the case separately from the main to the proper court
case does not arise, much less to exercise as in criminal
the discretion to order the cases. But
consolidation of the cases. There is no execution of the
petition from any party to be docketed, judgment or final
heard and decided separately from the order shall not be
main case precisely because it is the suspended
show-cause order that initiated the until a bond is filed
proceedings. by the person
x What remains in any case, whether the adjudged in
proceedings are initiated by a verified contempt, in an
petition or by the court motu proprio, is amount fixed by
the duty of the court to ensure that the the court from
proceedings are conducted respecting the which the appeal is
right to due process of the party being taken,
cited in contempt. In both modes of conditioned that if
initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the appeal be
decided against him
the court deems that the answer to the he will abide by and
contempt charge is satisfactory, the perform the
proceedings end. The court must conduct judgment or final
a hearing, and the court must consider order.
the respondents answer. Only if found x The recourse provided for in the above-
guilty will the respondent be punished mentioned provision is clear enough: the
accordingly. person adjudged in indirect
x In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be contempt must file an appeal
given the right to defend under Rule 41 (Appeal from the
himself or herself and have a day in court Regional Trial Courts) and post a
- a basic requirement of due process. bond for its suspension pendente
This is especially so in indirect contempt lite.46 Obviously, these were not
proceedings, as the court cannot decide done in this case. Instead,
them summarily pursuant to the Rules of petitioners filed a
Court. As We have stated in Calimlim, petition for certiorari under Rule
in indirect contempt proceedings, the 65 of the Rules and did not post
respondent must be given the opportunity the required
bond, effectively making the
to comment on the charge against him or September 3, 2007 Resolution
her, and there must be a hearing, and final and executory.
the court must investigate the charge and
consider the respondents answer.45 ________________________________________

x In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt

have not been
initiated.1wphi1 To the Courts mind, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution could be
treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a
"judgment or final order of a court in a
case of indirect contempt" as
contemplated under the Rules. The
penalty mentioned therein only serves
as a
reminder to caution petitioners of the
 Section 4. Presumption of death. For purposes of
III. SPECIAL settlement of his estate, a person shall be presumed
dead if absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in
PROCEEDING the Civil Code. But if such person proves to be alive, he
shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after
payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by
S [Rule 72] motion in the same proceeding.

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of 2. Kinds of Settlement

special proceedings are provided for in the following cases:

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons; a. Extrajudicial

(b) Escheat; 1. By Agreement

2. By Self-Adjudication
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
b. Judicial
(d) Trustees;

(e) Adoption; 1. Summary [Rule 74]

(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption; Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement

between heirs. If the decedent
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons; left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their
(h) Habeas corpus;
75
(i) Change of name;

(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural

children;

(l) Constitution of family home;

(m) Declaration of absence and death;

(n) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry.

Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence

of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

A. Settlement of Estate

1. Venue vs. Jurisdiction [Rule 73]

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the

decedents is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.

Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage.

When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died,
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.

Section 3. Process. In the exercise of probate jurisdiction,

Courts of First Instance may
issue warrants and process necessary to compel the attendance
of witnesses or to carry into
effect theirs orders and judgments, and all other powers granted
them by law. If a person
does not perform an order or judgment rendered by a court in
the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant
for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until
he performs such order or judgment, or is released.
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judicial or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may without
securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of
the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of
an affidavit filled in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or
by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or
the sole heir who adjudicates the entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file,
simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or
stipulation in the action for partition, or of
the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an
amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by
the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed
under section 4 of this rule. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if
no creditor
files a petition for letters of administration
within two (2) years after the death of the
decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a
newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in
the nest succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no
notice
thereof.
Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of
small value. Whenever the gross value of
the estate of a deceased person, whether he
died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten
thousand pesos, and that fact is made to
appear to the Court of First Instance having
jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an
interested person and upon hearing, which shall
be held not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months from the date of the last
publication of a notice which shall be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
and after such other notice to interest
persons as the court may direct, the court may
proceed summarily, without the appointment
of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to
grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if
any there be, to determine who are the persons
legally entitled to participate in the estate,
and to apportion and divide it among them after the
payment of such debts of the estate as
the court shall then find to be due; and such persons,
in their own right, if they are of lawful
age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or
trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and
enter into the possession of the portions of the estate
so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make
such order as may be just respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the
office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award,
if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the
proper register's office.
Section 1. Allowance necessary.
Conclusive as to execution. No will shall
pass
either real or personal estate unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to
the right of appeal, such allowance of the
will shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver.
The person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of
the death of the testator, deliver the will to
the court having jurisdiction, or to the
executor named in the will.
Section 3. Executor to present will and
accept or refuse trust. A person named as
executor in a will shall, within twenty (20)
days after he knows of the death of the
testate, or within twenty (20) days after he
knows that he is named executor if he
obtained such
knowledge after the death of the testator, present
such will to the court having jurisdiction,

Section 3. Bond to be filed by distributees. The

court, before allowing a partition in accordance with
the provisions of the preceding section, my require
the distributees, if
property other than real is to be distributed, to file a
bond in an amount to be fixed by court,
conditioned for the payment of any just claim which
may be filed under the next succeeding
section.

Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If

it shall appear at any time within two (2) years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in
accordance with the
provisions of either of the first two sections of this
rule, that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate, such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in
the manner hereinafter provided for the
purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if
within the same time of two (2) years, it
shall appear that there are debts outstanding against
the estate which have not been paid, or
that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation payable in
money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate
may, by order for that purpose, after
hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what
manner each distributee shall contribute in the
payment thereof, and may issue
execution, if circumstances require, against the
bond provided in the preceding section or
against the real estate belonging to the deceased,
or both. Such bond and such real estate
shall remain charged with a liability to creditors,
heirs, or other persons for the full period of
two (2) years after such distribution,
notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that
may
have been made.

Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated

person. If on the date of the expiration of the
period of two (2) years prescribed in the preceding
section the person
authorized to file a claim is a minor or mentally
incapacitated, or is in prison or outside the
Philippines, he may present his claim within one
(1) year after such disability is removed.

2. By Petition [Rule 75-90]

a. Intestate
b. Testate

RULE 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary
 Section 5. Proof at hearing. What sufficient in absence
unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, of contest. At the hearing
and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding
his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it. sections must be shown before the
introduction of testimony in support of the will. All such
Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for testimony shall be taken under oath
neglect. A person who neglects any of the duties required and reduced to writing. It no person appears to contest
in the two last preceding sections without excused the allowance of the will, the court
satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two may grant allowance thereof on the testimony of one of
thousand pesos. the subscribing witnesses only, if such witness testify that
the will was executed as is required by law.
Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed. A person
having custody of a will after the death of the testator who In the case of a holographic will, it shall be necessary
neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will
committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will. and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator.
In the absence of any such competent witness, and if the
court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
RULE 76 resorted to.
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will. Certificate
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any thereupon. No will shall be
executor, devisee, or proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the and validity of the same be established,
estate, may, at any time after and the will is proved to have been in existence at the
the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction time of the death of the testator, or is
to have the will allowed, shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. destroyed in the lifetime of the testator
without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court for the clearly and distinctly proved by at least two (2) credible
allowance of his will. witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions
thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the
Section 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the allowance of judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate
a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and
recorded.
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
Section 7. Proof when witnesses do not reside in
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, province. If it appears at the
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; time fixed for the hearing that none of the subscribing
witnesses resides in the province, but
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the that the deposition of one or more of them can be taken
estate; elsewhere, the court may, on motion,
direct it to be taken, and may authorize a photographic
(d) The name of the person for whom letters are prayed; copy of the will to be made and to be
presented to the witness on his examination, who may be
(e) If the will has not been delivered to the court, the asked the same questions with
name of the person having 76
custody of it.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the allowance

of the will, or the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administration with the will annexed.

Section 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be

published.
When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a
will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a
time and place for proving the will when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of
such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition

for probate has been filed by the testator himself.

Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified

by mail or
personally. The court shall also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places
of residence, and deposited
in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty
(20) days before the
hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the
notice must in like manner be
mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the
petitioner; also, to any person
named as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of residence
be known. Personal service of
copies of the notice at lest (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing.

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will,

notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.
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respect to it, and to the handwriting of the testator and others, as would be pertinent and
competent if the original will were present.
RULE 78
Section 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or (b) If the testator was insane, or
do not reside in the otherwise mentally incapable to make a will,
Philippines. If the appears at the time fixed for the at the time of its execution;
hearing that the subscribing witnesses are dead or
insane, or that none of them resides in the (c) If it was executed under duress, or the
Philippines, the court may admit the testimony of influence of fear, or threats;
other witnesses to prove the sanity of the testator,
and the due execution of the will; and as evidence of (d) If it was procured by undue and
the execution of the will, it may admit proof of the improper pressure and influence, on the part
handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing of the beneficiary, or of some other person
witnesses, or of any of them. for his benefit;

Section 9. Grounds for disallowing will. The (e) If the signature of the testator
will shall be disallowed in any of the following was procured by fraud or trick, and he did
cases: not
intend that the instrument should be his
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law; will at the time of fixing his signature
thereto.
Section 10. Contestant to file grounds of contest.
Anyone appearing to contest the will must state in
writing his grounds for opposing its allowance, and
serve a copy thereof on the petitioner and other
parties interested in the estate.
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for
where will contested.
If the will is contested, all the subscribing
witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills
executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if
present in the Philippines and not insane,
must be produced and examined, and the death,
absence, or insanity of any of them must be
satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such
witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside
the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify
against the due execution of the will, or do not
remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of
doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of
other witnesses and from all the evidence presented
that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
allowance, signed by the judge, and attested
by the seal of the court, to which shall be
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and
recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have
the same effect as if originally proves and
allowed in such court.
Section 4. Estate, how administered.
When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and
such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate
of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of
just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so
far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.

If a holdgraphic will is contested, the same shall be

allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the
handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses,
and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to.

Section 12. Proof where testator petitions for

allowance of holographic will.
Where the testator himself petitions for the probate
of his holographic will and no contest is
filed, the fact that the affirms that the holographic
will and the signature are in his own
handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence of the
genuineness and due execution thereof. If the
holographic will is contested, the burden of
disproving the genuineness and due execution
thereof shall be on the contestant. The testator to rebut the
evidence for the contestant.

Section 13. Certificate of allowance attached to prove

will. To be recorded in the
Office of Register of Deeds. If the court is satisfied,
upon proof taken and filed, that the
will was duly executed, and that the testator at the
time of its execution was of sound and
disposing mind, and not acting under duress,
menace, and undue influence, or fraud, a certificate
of its allowance, signed by the judge, and attested by
the seal of the court shall be attached to the will and
the will and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk.
Attested copies of the will devising real estate and of
certificate of allowance thereof, shall be recorded in
the register of deeds of the province in which the
lands lie.

RULE 77
Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines
and Administration of Estate Thereunder

Section 1. Will proved outside Philippines may be

allowed here. Wills proved and allowed in a foreign
country, according to the laws of such country, may
be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of
First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2. Notice of hearing for allowance. When

a copy of such will and of the order or decree of the
allowance thereof, both duly authenticated, are filed
with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by
the executor or other person interested, in the court
having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and
place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance.

Section 3. When will allowed, and effect thereof.

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be
allowed in the Philippines, the shall so allow it, and
a certificate of its
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or
administrators. No person in competent to serve as (b) The names, ages, and residences of the
executor or administrator who: heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of
the decedent;
(a) Is a minor;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and the estate;

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the (d) The name of the person for whom
duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or
want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of letters of administration are prayed.
an offense involving moral turpitude.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the
Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate.
The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer issuance of letters of administration.
the estate of the first testator.
Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.
Section 3. Married women may serve. A married woman When a petition for letters
may serve as executrix or administratrix, and the marriage of a of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
single woman shall not affect her authority so to serve under a such court shall fix a time and place
previous appointment. for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to
be given to the known heirs and
Section 4. Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons
When a will has been believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner
proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
thereon to the person named as
executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration.
bond as required by these Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition,
rules. contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency
of the
Section 5. Where some coexecutors disqualified others may act. person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the
When all of the executors named in a will can not act because ground of the contestant's own right to the
of incompetency, refusal to accept the trust, or failure to give administration, and may pray that letters issue to
bond, on the part of one or more of them, letters testamentary himself, or to any competent person or person named in
may issue to such of them as are competent, accept and give the opposition.
bond, and they may perform the duties and discharge the trust
77
required by the will.

Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.

If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,

or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests
to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may

be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to

serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.

RULE 79
Opposing Issuance Of Letters Testamentary. Petition And
Contest For Letters Of Administration

Section 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary.

Simultaneous petition
for administration. Any person interested in a will may state
in writing the grounds why
letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named
therein as executors, or any of
them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon
the sufficiency of such
grounds. A petition may, at the time, be filed for letters of
administration with the will
annexed.

Section 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A

petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
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the issuance of letters

Section 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue.
At the hearing of the petition, it
must first be shown that notice has been given as
hereinabove required, and thereafter the
court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support
of their respective allegations, and if
satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that there
is no competent and willing executor, it shall order
the issuance of letters of administration to the
party best entitled thereto.
Section 6. When letters of administration granted
to any applicant. Letters of administration may
be granted to any qualified applicant, though it
appears that there are other competent persons
having better right to the administration, if such
persons fail to appear when notified and claim the
issuance of letters to themselves.
testamentary or of administration
under the will shall be as
RULE 80
Special Administrator
Section 1. Appointment of special
administrator. When there is delay in
granting
letters testamentary or of administration by
any cause including an appeal from the
allowance
or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take
possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.
Section 2. Powers and duties of special
adminsitrator. Such special administrator
shall take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executors or
administrator afterwards appointed, and
for that purpose may commence and maintain suits
as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders
sold. A special administrator shall not be
liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by
the court.
Section 3. When powers of special administrator
cease. Transfer of effects. Pending suits. When
letters testamentary or of administration are
granted on the estate of the deceased, the powers
of the special administrator shall cease, and he shall
forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator
the goods, chattels, money, and estate of the
deceased in his hands. The executor or
administrator may prosecute to final judgment suits
commenced by such special administrator.
RULE 81
Bond of Executors and Administrators
person appointed executor or administrator,
or to such other person as may be
authorized to receive them.
RULE 82
Revocation of Administration, Death,
Resignation, and Removal of Executors or
Administrators
Section 1. Administration revoked if will
discovered. Proceedings thereupon. If
after letters of administration have been
granted on the estate of a decedent as if he
had died
intestate, his will is proved and allowed by
the court, the letters of administration shall
be
revoked and all powers thereunder cease,
and the administrator shall forthwith
surrender the
letters to the court, and render his account
with such time as the court directs.
Proceeding for

Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters.

Amount. Conditions. Before an
executor or administrator enters upon the execution
of his trust, and letters testamentary or
administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such
sum as the court directs, conditioned as
follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within

three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession of any other person
for him;

(b) To administer according to these rules,

and, if an executor, according to the will
of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to
his possession or to the possession of any other
person for him, and from the proceeds to pay
and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the
same, or such dividends thereon as shall
be decreed by the court;

(c) To render a true and just account of his

administration to the court within one
(1) years, and at any other time when required by the court;

(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be

performed.

Section 2. Bond of executor where directed in will. When

further bond required.
If the testator in his will directs that the
executors serve without bond, or with only his
individual bond, he may be allowed by the court
to give bond in such sum and with such
surety as the court approves conditioned only to
pay the debts of the testator; but the court may
require of the executor a further bond in case of a
change in his circumstance, or for other sufficient
case, with the conditions named in the last
preceding section.

Section 3. Bonds of joint executors and

administrators. When two or more persons are
appointed executors or administrators the court may
take a separate bond from each, or a joint bond from
all.

Section 4. Bond of special administrator. A

special administrator before entering
upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in
such sum as the court directs, conditioned
that he will make and return a true inventory of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
of the deceased which come to his possession or
knowledge, and that he will truly account for
such as are received by him when required by the
court, and will deliver the same to the
hereinbefore provided.
Section 2. Court may be remove or accept resignation of
executor or
administrator. Proceeding upon death, resignation, or removal.
If an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly
provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
insuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to
resign. When an executor or
administrator dies, resign, or is removed the remaining executor
or administrator may
administer the the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to
someone to act with him. If
there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration
may be to any suitable person.
Section 3. Acts before revocation, resignation, or removal to be
valid. The lawful acts of an executor or administrator before
the revocation of his letters testamentary or of
administration, or before his resignation or removal, shall have
the like validity as if there had been no such revocation,
resignation, or removal.
Section 4. Powers of new executor or administrator. Renewal
of license to sell
real estate. The person to whom letters testamentary or of
administration are granted
after the revocation of former letters, or the death,
resignation, or removal of a former
executor or administrator, shall have the like powers to
collect and settle the estate not
administered that the former executor or administrator had,
and may prosecute or defend
actions commenced by or against the former executor or
administrator, and have execution on judgments recovered in the
name of such former executor or administrator. An authority
granted by the court to the former executor or administrator for
the sale or mortgage of real estate may be renewed in favor of
such person without further notice or hearing.
RULE 83
Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. Within
three (3) months after his appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may
order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or
their assistance.
written application of such executor or administrator, the
court having jurisdiction of the estate
may order any such surviving partner or partners to freely
permit the exercise of the rights,
and to exhibit the books, papers, and property, as in this
section provided, and may punish
any partner failing to do so for contempt.
Section 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings
in repair. An executor or administrator shall maintain
in tenanble repair the houses and other structures and
fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in
such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to
do by the court.
Section 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole
estate to pay debts, and to
administer estate not willed. An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration.
RULE 85
Accountability and Compensation of Executors and
Administrators
Section 1. Executor or administrator chargeable with
all estate and income. Except as otherwise
expressly provided in the following sections, every
executor or
administrator is chargeable in his account with the
whole of the estate of the deceased which has come
into his possession, at the value of the appraisement
contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit,
and income of such estate; and with the proceeds of so
much of the estate as is sold by him, at the price at
which it was sold.
Section 2. Not to profit by increase or lose by decrease
in value. No executor or administrator shall profit by
the increase, or suffer loss by the decrease or
destruction, without his fault, of any part of the estate.
He must account for the excess when he sells any part of
the estate for more than the appraisement, and if any is
sold for the less than the
appraisement, he is not responsible for the loss, if the sale has
justly made. If he settles any
78

Section 2. Certain article not to be inventoried. The

wearing apparel of the
surviving husband or wife and minor children., the marriage
bed and bedding, and such
provisions and other articles as will necessarily be consumed in
the substinence of the family of the deceased, under the
direction of the court, shall not be considered as assets, nor
administered as such, and shall not be included in the inventory.

Section 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and

minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

RULE 84
General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators

Section 1. Executor or administrator to have access to

partnership books and
property. How right enforced. The executor or administrator of
the estate of a deceased
partner shall at all times have access to, and may examine and
take copies of, books and
papers relating to the partnership business, and make examine
and make invoices of the
property belonging to such partnership; and the surviving partner
or partners, on request,
shall exhibit to him all such books, papers, and property in their
hands or control. On the
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claim against the estate for less than its nominal value, he is entitled to charge in his account
only the amount he actually paid on the settlement.
Section 3. When not accountable for debts due
estate. No executor or
administrator shall be accountable for debts due
the deceased which remain uncollected without
his fault.
Section 4. Accountable for income from realty
used by him. If the executor or administrator
uses or occupies any part of the real estate
himself, he shall account for it as may be agreed
upon between him and the parties interested, or
adjusted by the court with their assent; and if the
parties do not agree upon the sum to be allowed,
the same may be ascertained by the court, whose
determination in this respect shall be final.
Section 5. Accountable if he neglects or delays to
raise or pay money. When an
executor or administrator neglects or unreasonably
delays to raise money, by collecting the
debts or selling the real or personal estate of
the deceased, or neglects to pay over the
money he has in his hands, and the value of
the estate is thereby lessened or unnecessary
cost or
interest accrues, or the persons interested
suffer loss, the same shall be deemed waste
and the damage sustained may be charged
and allowed against him in his account, and
he shall be liable therefor on his bond.
Section 6. When allowed money paid as
cost. The amount paid by an executor or
administrator for costs awarded against
him shall be allowed in his administration
account,
unless it appears that the action or
proceeding in which the costs are taxed was
prosecuted or resisted without just cause,
and not in good faith.
Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed
executor or administrator. Not to
charge for services as attorney. Compensation
provided by will controls unless
renounced. An executor or administrator shall
be allowed the necessary expenses the
care, management, and settlement of the estate, and
for his services, four pesos per day for
the time actually and necessarily employed, or a
commission upon the value of so much of the
estate as comes into his possession and is finally
disposed of by him in the payment of debts,
expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by
delivery to heirs or devisees, of two per
centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value,
one per centum of so much of such
value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not
exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-half per
centum of so much of such value as exceed one
hundred thousand pesos. But in any special
case, where the estate is large, and the settlement
has been attended with great difficulty,
and has required a high degree of capacity on the part
of the executor or administrator, a
greater sum may be allowed. If objection to the fees
allowed be taken, the allowance may be
re-examined on appeal.
Section 1. Notice to creditors to be issued
by court. Immediately after granting
letters testamentary or of administration,
the court shall issue a notice requiring all
persons
having money claims against the decedent
to file them in the office of the clerk of said
court.
Section 2. Time within which claims shall
be filed. In the notice provided in the
preceding section, the court shall estate
the time for the filing of claims against the
estate,
which shall not be more than twelve (12)
not less than six (6) months after the date
of the
first publication of the notice. However, at
any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has
failed to file his claim within the previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and
on such terms as are equitable, allow such
claim to be filed within a time not exceeding
one (1) month.

If there are two or more executors or administrators,

the compensation shall be apportioned
among them by the court according to the services
actually rendered by them respectively.

When the executors or administrator is an attorney,

he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.

When the deceased by will makes some other

provision for the compensation of his executor, that
provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services
unless by a written instrument filed in the court he
renounces all claim to the compensation provided by
the will.

Section 8. When executor or administrator to

render account. Every executor or
administrator shall render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from the time
of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration, unless the court otherwise directs
because of extensions of time for presenting claims
against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for
disposing of the estate; and he shall render such
further accounts as the court may
require until the estate is wholly settled.

Section 9. Examinations on oath with respect to

account The court may examine the executor or
administrator upon oath with respect to every
matter relating to any account rendered by him, and
shall so examine him as to the correctness of his
account before the same is allowed, except when no
objection is made to the allowance of the account
and its correctness is satisfactorily established by
competent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributees,
and creditors of the estate shall have the same
privilege as the executor or administrator of being
examined on oath on any matter relating to an
administration account.

Section 10. Account to be settled on notice.

Before the account of an executor or
administrator is allowed, notice shall be given to
persons interested of the time and place of
examining and allowing the same; and such notice
may be given personally to such persons
interested or by advertisement in a newspaper or
newspapers, or both, as the court directs.

Section 11. Surety on bond may be party to

accounting. Upon the settlement of the account of
an executor or administrator, a person liable as
surety in respect to such account may, upon
application, be admitted as party to such accounting.

RULE 86
Claims Against Estate
Section 3. Publication of notice to creditors. Every executor or executor or administrator to pay to the special
administrator shall, immediately after the notice to creditors is administrator necessary funds to defend such
issued, cause the same to be published three (3) weeks claim.
successively in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, and to be posted for the same period in four public Section 9. How to file a claim. Contents thereof. Notice
places in the province and in two public places in the to executor or
municipality where the decedent last resided. administrator. A claim may be filed by delivering the
same with the necessary vouchers to
Section 4. Filing of copy of printed notice. Within ten (10) the clerk of court and by serving a copy thereof on the
days after the notice has been published and posted in executor or administrator. If the claim
accordance with the preceding section, the executor or be founded on a bond, bill, note, or any other instrument,
administrator shall file or cause to be filed in the court a the original need not be filed, but a
printed copy of the notice accompanied with an affidavit copy thereof with all indorsements shall be attached to
setting forth the dates of the first and last publication thereof the claim and filed therewith. On
and the name of the newspaper in which the same is printed. demand, however, of the executor or administrator, or by
order of the court or judge, the
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If original shall be exhibited, unless it be list or destroyed,
not filed, barred; in which case the claimant must
exceptions. All claims for money against the decent, accompany his claim with affidavit or affidavits containing
arising from contract, express or a copy or particular description of
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all the instrument and stating its loss or destruction. When
claims for funeral expenses and the claim is due, it must be supported
expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for by affidavit stating the amount justly due, that no
money against the decent, payments have been made thereon which
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are not credited, and that there are no offsets to the
are barred forever, except same, to the knowledge of the affiant. If
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the claim is not due, or is contingent, when filed, it must
the executor or administrator also be supported by affidavits
may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or stating the particulars thereof. When the affidavit is made
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action by a person other than the
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor claimant, he must set forth therein the reason why it is
may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, not made by the claimant. The claim
instead of presenting them once filed shall be attached to the record of the case in
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual which the letters testamentary or of
claims may be set off against each administration were issued, although the court, in its
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of discretion, and as a matter of
the defendant, the amount convenience, may order all the claims to be collected in a
so determined shall be considered the true balance against the separate folder.
estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the Section 10. Answer of executor or administrator.
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, Offsets Within fifteen (15) days
may be approved at their present value. after service of a copy of the claim on the executor or
administrator, he shall file his answer
Section 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. Where the admitting or denying the claim specifically, and setting
obligation of the decedent is forth the admission or denial. If he has
solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the no knowledge sufficient to enable him to admit or deny
decedent as if he were the specifically, he shall state such want of
only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to knowledge. The executor or administrator in his answer
recover contribution from the shall allege in offset any claim which
debtor. In a joint obligation of the decedent, the claim the decedent before death had against the claimant, and
shall be confined to the portion belonging to him. his failure to do so shall bar the
claim forever. A copy of the answer shall be served by
Section 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor the executor or administrator on the claimant. The
holding a claim against the court in its discretion may extend the time for filing
deceased secured by mortgage or other colateral security, such answer.
may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share Section 11. Disposition of admitted claim. Any claim
in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may admitted entirely by the executor or administrator shall
foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by immediately be submitted by the clerk to the court who
action in court, making the executor or administrator a party may approve the same without hearing; but the court, in
defendant, and if there is a its discretion, before approving the claim, may order that
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged known heirs, legatees, or devisees be notified and heard.
premises, or the property pledged, If upon hearing, an heir,
in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the legatees, or devisee opposes the claim, the court may,
security, he may claim his deficiency in its discretion, allow him fifteen (15) days to file an
judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section or he answer to the claim in the manner prescribed in the
may rely upon his mortgage preceding section.
or other security alone, and foreclosure the same at any time 79
within the period of the statute
of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a
creditor, and shall receive no
share in the distribution of the other assets of estate; but nothing
herein contained shall
prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the
property mortgaged or pledged, by
paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the
direction of the court, if the court
shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.

Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate.

If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate
he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in
writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator, who shall, in the
adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be
subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other
claims. The court may order the
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shall not be bound to commence

Section 12. Trial of contested claim. Upon the
filing of an answer to a claim, or upon the expiration
of the time for such filing, the clerk of court shall set
the claim for trial with notice to both parties. The
court may refer the claim to a commissioner.
Section 13. Judgment appealable. The judgment of
the court approving or
disapproving a claim, shall be filed with the record of
the administration proceedings with notice to both
parties, and is appealable as in ordinary cases. A
judgment against the executor or administrator shall
be that he pay, in due course of administration, the
amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create
any lien upon the property of the estate, or give to the
judgment creditor any priority of payment.
the action unless on application of
the creditors of the
amount offered in satisfaction of his claim, if
he fails to obtain a more favorable judgment,
he cannot recover costs, but must pay to the
executor or administrator costs from the time
of the offer. Where an action
commenced against the deceased for money
has been discontinued and the claim
embraced therein presented as in this rule
provided, the prevailing party shall be
allowed the costs of his action up to the time
of its discontinuance.
RULE 87
Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators

Section 14. Costs. When the executor or Section 1. Actions which may and which
administrator, in his answer, admits and offers to pay may not be brought against executor or
part of a claim, and the claimant refuses to accept the
administrator. No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor
or administrator; but to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real
or personal, may be commenced against him.
Section 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions which survive.
For the recovery or protection of the property or
rights of the deceased, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend, in the right of
deceased, actions for causes which survive.
Section 3. Heir may not sue until shall assigned
When an executor or administrator is appointed and
assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or
possession of lands or for damages done to such
lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or
devisee until there is an order of the court assigning
such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time
allowed for paying debts has expired.
Section 4. Executor or administrator may
compound with debtor. Within the
approval of the court, an executor or
administrator may compound with the debtor of
the
deceased for a debt due, and may give a discharge
of such debt on receiving a just dividend of the
estate of the debtor.
an action in favor of the executor or
administrator of the estate for double the
value of the
property sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be
recovered for the benefit of such estate.
Section 9. Property fraudulently conveyed
by deceased may be recovered. When
executor or administrator must bring action.
When there is a deficiency of assets in
the hands of an executor or administrator
for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration, and the deceased in his
lifetime had conveyed real or personal
property, or a right or interest therein, or an
debt or credit, with intent to defraud his
creditors or to avoid any right, debt, or duty;
or had so conveyed such property, right,
interest, debt or credit that by law the
conveyance would be void as against his
creditors, and the subject of the
attempted conveyance would be liable to
attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the
executor or administrator may commence and
prosecute to final judgment an action for the
recovery of such property, right, interest,
debt, or credit for the benefit of the creditors;
but he

Section 5. Mortgage due estate may be

foreclosed. A mortgage belonging to the estate
of a deceased person, as mortgagee or assignee of
the right or a mortgage, may be foreclosed by the
executor or administrator.

Section 6. Proceedings when property

concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently
conveyed. If an executor or administrator,
heir, legatee, creditor or other individual
interested in the estate of the deceased,
complains to the court having jurisdiction of the
estate that a person is suspected of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of
the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased, or
that such person has in his possession or
has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond,
contract, or other writing which contains
evidence of or tends or discloses the right, title,
interest, or claim of the deceased, the court
may cite such suspected person to appear before it
any may examine him on oath on the
matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited
refuses to appear, or to answer on such
examination or such interrogatories as are put to him,
the court may punish him for contempt, and may
commit him to prison until he submits to the order of
the court. The interrogatories put any such person,
and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall
be filed in the
clerk's office.

Section 7. Person entrusted with estate compelled to

render account. The court,
on complaint of an executor or administrator, may
cite a person entrusted by an executor or
administrator with any part of the estate of the
deceased to appear before it, and may require
such person to render a full account, on oath, of the
money, goods, chattels, bonds, account,
or other papers belonging to such estate as came to
his possession in trust for such executor
or administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; and
if the person so cited refuses to appear
to render such account, the court may punish him for
contempt as having disobeyed a lawful
order of the court.

Section 8. Embezzlement before letters issued If a

person, before the granting of
letters testamentary or of administration on the estate
of the deceased, embezzles or alienates
any of the money, goods, chattels, or effects of such
deceased, such person shall be liable to
deceased, not unless the creditors making the application disputed by the executor or administrator and, if
pay such part of the costs and disputed, it may be proved and allowed or
expenses, or give security therefor to the executor or disallowed by the court as the facts may warrant. If the
administrator, as the court deems contingent claim is allowed, the
equitable. creditor shall receive payment to the same extent as the
other creditors if the estate retained
Section 10. When creditor may bring action. Lien for costs. by the executor or administrator is sufficient. But if the
When there is such a deficiency of assets, and the deceased in claim is not so presented, after having
his lifetime had made or attempted such a become absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed,
conveyance, as is stated in the last preceding section, and the the assets retained in the hands of
executor or administrator has not commenced the action the executor or administrator, not exhausted in the
therein provided for, any creditor of the estate may, with the payment of claims, shall be disturbed by
permission of the court, commence and prosecute to final the order of the court to the persons entitled to the
judgment, in the name of the same; but the assets so distributed may
executor or administrator, a like action for the recovery of the still be applied to the payment of the claim when
subject of the conveyance or attempted conveyance for the established, and the creditor may maintain
benefit of the creditors. But the action shall not be commenced an action against the distributees to recover the debt,
until the creditor has filed in a court a bond executed to the and such distributees and their estates
executor or administrator, in an amount approved by the judge, shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate
conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against they have respectively received from the
the costs and expenses incurred by reason of such action. Such property of the deceased.
creditor shall have a lien upon any judgment recovered by him in
the action for such costs and other expenses incurred Section 6. Court to fix contributive shares where
therein as the court deems equitable. Where the conveyance or devisees, legalitees, or heirs have been possession.
attempted conveyance had been made by the deceased in his Where devisees, legalitees, or heirs have entered into
lifetime in favor of the executor or administrator, the action which possession of portions of the estate before the debts and
a credit may bring shall be in the name of all the creditors, and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become
permission of the court and filing of bond as above prescribed, liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and
are not necessary. expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate
may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of their several liabilities, and order how much
and in what manner each person shall contribute, and
may issue execution as circumstances require.
RULE 88
Payment of the Debts of the Estate Section 7. Order of payment if estate insolvent If the
assets which can be
Section 1. Debts paid in full if estate sufficient. If, after appropriated for the payment of debts are not sufficient
hearing all the money for that purpose, the executor or administrator shall pay
claims against the estate, and after ascertaining the amount the debts against the estate, observing the provisions of
of such claims, it appears that Articles 1059 and 2239 to 2251 of the Civil Code.
there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor or
administrator pay the same within the time limited for that Section 8. Dividends to be paid in proportion to
purpose. claims. If there are no assets
sufficient to pay the credits of any once class of
Section 2. Part of estate from which debt paid when provision creditors after paying the credits entitled to
made by will. If preference over it, each creditor within such class shall
the testator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate be paid a dividend in proportion to his
to be appropriated for the claim. No creditor of any one class shall receive any
payment of his debts, the expenses of administration, or the payment until those of the preceding class
family expenses, they shall be are paid.
paid according to the provisions of the will; but if the provision
made by the will or the estate
appropriated, is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of the 80
estate of the testator, real or
personal, as is not disposed of by will, if any shall be
appropriated for that purpose.

Section 3. Personalty first chargeable for debts, then realty.

The personal estate of the deceased not disposed of by will shall
be first chargeable with the payment of debts and expenses; and
if said personal estate is not sufficient for tat purpose, or its sale
would
redound to the detriment of the participants for the estate, the
whole of the real estate not
dispose of by will, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be
sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator,
after obtaining the authority of the court therefor. Any deficiency
shall be met by contributions in accordance with the
provisions of section 6 of this rule.

Section 4. Estate to be retained to meet contingent claims. If

the court is satisfied
that a contingent claim duly filed is valid, it may order the
executor or administrator to retain
in his hands sufficient estate to pay such contingent claim when
the same becomes absolute,
or if the estate is insolvent, sufficient to pay a portion equal to
the dividend of the other
creditors.

Section 5. How contingent claim becoming absolute in two years

allowed and
paid. Action against distributees later. If such contingent claim
becomes absolute and
is presented to the court, or to the executor or administrator,
within two (2) years from the
time limited for other creditors to present their claims, it may be
allowed by the court if not
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Section 9. Estate of insolvent non-resident, how
disposed of. In case administration is taken in the
Philippine of the estate of a person who was at the
time of his death an inhabitant of another country,
and who died insolvent, hi estate found in the
Philippines shall, as far as practicable, be so disposed
of that his creditors here and elsewhere may receive
each an equal share, in proportion to their respective
credits.
Section 10. When and how claim proved outside the
Philippines against insolvent
resident's estate paid. If it appears to the court
having jurisdiction that claims have been
duly proven in another country against the estate of
an insolvent who was at the time of his
death an inhabitant of the Philippines, and that the
executor or administrator in the Philippines
had knowledge of the presentation of such claims in
such country and an opportunity to
contest their allowance, the court shall receive a
certified list of such claims, when perfected in
such country, and add the same to the list of
claims proved against the deceased person in
the Philippines so that a just distribution of
the whole estate may be made equally
among all
its creditors according to their respective
claims; but the benefit of this and the
preceding
sections shall not be extended to the
creditors in another country if the property
of such
deceased person there found is not
equally apportioned to the creditors
residing in the Philippines and the
other creditor, according to their
respective claims.
Section 11. Order for payment of debts.
Before the expiration of the time limited for
the payment of the debts, the court shall
order the payment thereof, and the
distribution of
the assets received by the executor or
administrator for that purpose among the
creditors, as
the circumstances of the estate require and in
accordance with the provisions of this rule.
Section 12. Orders relating to payment of debts where
appeal is taken. If an
appeal has been taken from a decision of the court
concerning a claim, the court may suspend
the order for the payment of the debts or may order
the distributions among the creditors
whose claims are definitely allowed, leaving in the
hands of the executor or administrator
sufficient assets to pay the claim disputed and
appealed. When a disputed claim is finally
settled the court having jurisdiction of the estate shall
order the same to be paid out of the
assets retained to the same extent and in the same
proportion with the claims of other
creditors.
Section 13. When subsequent distribution of assets
ordered. If the whole of the debts are not paid on
the first distribution, and if the whole assets are not
distributed, or other assets afterwards come to the
hands of the executor or administrator, the court may
from time to time make further orders for the
distributions of assets.
Section 14. Creditors to be paid in accordance with
terms of order. When an order is made for the
distribution of assets among the creditors, the
executor or administration shall, as soon as the time
of payment arrives, pay the creditors the amounts of
their claims, or the dividend thereon, in accordance
with the terms of such order.
personal estate of the deceased is not
sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of
administration, and legacies, or where the
sale of such personal estate may injure the
business or other
interests of those interested in the estate, and
where a testator has not otherwise made
sufficient provision for the payment of such
debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on
the
application of the executor or administrator
and on written notice of the heirs, devisees,
and
legatees residing in the Philippines, may
authorize the executor or administrator to
sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber so much as
may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of
personal estate, for the purpose of paying
such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it
clearly
appears that such sale, mortgage, or
encumbrance would be beneficial to the
persons
interested; and if a part cannot be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without
injury
to those interested in the remainder, the
authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or
other
encumbrance of the whole of such real estate,
or so much thereof as is necessary or
beneficial
under the circumstances.

Section 15. Time for paying debts and legacies Section 3. Persons interested may prevent
fixed, or extended after notice, such sale, etc., by giving bond. No such
within what periods. On granting letters authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
testamentary or administration the court shall encumber real or personal estate shall be
allow to the executor or administrator a time for
disposing of the estate and paying the debts
and legacies of the deceased, which shall not, in the
first instance, exceed one (1) year; but
the court may, on application of the executor or
administrator and after hearing on such notice
of the time and place therefor given to all persons
interested as it shall direct, extend the time
as the circumstances of the estate require not
exceeding six (6) months for a single extension
not so that the whole period allowed to the original
executor or administrator shall exceed two
(2) years.

Section 16. Successor of dead executor or

administrator may have time extended on notice
within certain period. When an executor or
administrator dies, and a new administrator of the
same estate is appointed, the court may extend the
time allowed for the payment of the debts or
legacies beyond the time allowed to the original
executor or
administrator, not exceeding six (6) months at a
time and not exceeding six (6) months beyond
the time which the court might have allowed to
such original executor or
administrator; and notice shall be given of the time
and place for hearing such application, as required in
the last preceding section.

RULE 89
Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of
Decedent

Section 1. Order of sale of personalty. Upon the

application of the executor or
administrator, and on written notice to the heirs and
other persons interested, the court may
order the whole or a part of the personal estate to be
sold, if it appears necessary for the
purpose of paying debts, expenses of administration,
or legacies, or for the preservation of the
property.

Section 2. When court may authorize sale,

mortgage, or other encumbrance of
realty to pay debts and legacies through
personalty not exhausted. When the

granted if any person interested in the estate gives a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned to pay the debts,
expenses of administration, and legacies within such time as the
court directs; and such bond shall be for the security of the
creditors, as well as of the
executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit of
either.
Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as
beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. When
it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or
personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees,
legatees, and other
interested persons, the court may, upon application of the
executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be
sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or
a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts,
legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority shall
not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case
of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons
entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or
administrator shall give an additional bond, in such
sum as the court directs, conditioned that such
executor or administrator will account for the
proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding
subdivisions of this section have been
complied with, the court, by order stating such
compliance, may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber, in proper cases, such part of the
estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale the
court may authorize it to be public or private, as would
be most beneficial to all parties concerned. The
executor or administrator shall be furnished with a
certified copy of such order;
(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the
mode of giving notice of the time and
place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions
concerning notice of execution sale;

Section 5. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or (f) There shall be recorded in the registry of
other encumbrance of deeds of the province in which the real
estate to pay debts and legacies in other countries. When estate thus sold, mortgage, or otherwise encumbered is
the sale of personal situated, a certified copy of the order
estate, or the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of real of the court, together with the deed of the executor or
estate is not necessary to pay the administrator for such real estate,
debts, expenses of administration, or legacies in the Philippines, which shall be as valid as if the deed had been executed by the
but it appears from records deceased in his lifetime.
and proceedings of a probate court in another country that the
estate of the deceased in such Section 8. When court may authorize conveyance of
other country is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of realty which deceased
administration, and legacies there, contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. Where the
the court here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell deceased was in his lifetime
the personal estate or to under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or
sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for the an interest therein, the court having
payment of debts or legacies in jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
the other country, in same manner as for the payment of debts purpose, authorize the executor or
or legacies in the Philippines. administrator to convey such property according to such
contract, or with such modifications
Section 6. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the
encumbrance of realty acquired on execution or foreclosure. court; and if the contract is to convey
The court may authorize an executor or administrator to sell real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate acquired by him court shall execute the deed. The
on deed executed by such executor, administrator, or clerk
execution or foreclosure sale, under the same cicumstances of court shall be as affectual to
and under the same regulations convey the property as if executed by the deceased in his
as prescribed in this rule for the sale, mortgage, or other lifetime; but no such conveyance
encumbrance of other real estate. shall be authorized until notice of the application for that
purpose has been given personally or
Section 7. Regulation for granting authority to sell, by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice
mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court has been given, by publication or
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may otherwise, as the court deems proper; nor if the assets in
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal the hands of the executor or
estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real administrator will thereby be reduced so as to prevent a
estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it creditor from receiving his full debt or
appears necessary or beneficial under the following diminish his dividend.
regulations.
Section 9. When court may authorize conveyance of
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written lands which deceased held in
petition setting forth the debts trust. Where the deceased in his lifetime held real
due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the property in trust for another person, the
legacies, the value of the personal court may after notice given as required in the last
estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or preceding section, authorize the executor
otherwise encumbered, and such or administrator to deed such property to the person, or
other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other his executor or administrator, for
encumbrance is necessary or beneficial. whose use and benefit it was so held; and the court
may order the execution of such trust, whether
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for created by deed or by law.
hearing such petition, and
cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reasons for
the same, and the time and RULE 90
place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the 81
persons interested, and may cause
such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as
it shall deem proper;
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Section 1. When order for distribution of reside
made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if
any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as the
distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations above
mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in
a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.
Section 2. Questions as to advancement to
be determined. Questions as to
advancement made, or alleged to have been
made, by the deceased to any heir may be
heard
and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the
final order
of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.
Section 3. By whom expenses of partition
paid. If at the time of distribution the
executor or administrator has retained
sufficient effects in his hands which may
lawfully be x Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud
applied for the expenses of partition of the Nicolas were the parents of petitioner
properties distributed, such expenses of partition Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N.
may be paid by such executor or administrator when Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas
it appears equitable to the court and not (deceased husband of petitioner
inconsistent with the intention of the testator; Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor
otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio
proportion to their respective shares or interest in the Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto
premises, and the apportionment shall Nicolas.
be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any x Teresita N. de Leon was appointed
person interested in the partition does not pay administratrix of the estate of Rafael C.
his proportion or share, the court may issue an Nicolas in a case entitled In
execution in the name of the executor or the Matter of the Intestate
administrator against the party not paying the sum assessed. Estate of Rafael C.
Nicolas
Section 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. x Ramon (as oppositor) filed a Motion for
Certified copies of final orders and judgments of the Collation
court relating to the real estate or the partition o claiming that deceased Rafael
thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of Nicolas, during his lifetime, had
the province where the property is situated. given certain real
properties to his
3. Partition [Rule 69] children by
gratuitous title and
that administratrix-
3. The Administrator or Executor petitioner Teresita
failed to include the
a. Special vs. Regular [Rule 80] same in the
b. Bonds [Rule 81] inventory of the
c. Powers and Duties [Rule 84] estate of the
decedent
d. Accountability [ Rule 85]
x RTC directed Ramon to substantiate his
claims
4. Claims against the Estate [Rule 86] x Ramon filed an Amended Motion for
Collation specifying the properties to be
5. Actions by and against Executor and Administrator collated and attaching to said motion, the
[Rule 87] documents in support thereof
x RTC issued an Order
o the Administratrix is hereby
6. Distribution and Partition [Rule 90] ordered to include the said
properties
which were received
TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and from the decedent
the HEIRS OF ANTONIO NICOLAS, petitioners, for collation in the
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P. instant probate
INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS, respondents. proceedings.
G x Teresita filed an MR
. o alleging that the properties
R subject of the Order were already
. titled
N in their names years
O ago[8] and that
. titles may not be
1 collaterally attacked
2 in a motion for
8 collation
7 x RTC denied the MR
8 o ruling that it is within the
1 jurisdiction of the court to
. determine
A whether titled
u properties should be
g collated,[9] citing
u Section 2,
s Rule 90 of the Rules
of Court which
t
provides that the
6
final order of
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FACTS:
 hearing; petitioner deliberately omitted
the court concerning questions as to certain material facts in the petition to
advancements made shall be binding on mislead the Court because petitioners were
the person raising the question and on actually given at least three (3) times
the heir. the opportunity to ventilate and oppose the
x Teresita filed an MR to the said Order issue of collation; as stated by the
x RTC issued another Order appellate court in the Resolution promulgated
o x x x Foremost to be resolved is the issue of on February 10, 1997, both parties
collation of the affirmed that the RTC had proceeded to
properties of the deceased Rafael conduct hearings on January 21 and 28,
Nicolas which were disposed by 1997 as originally scheduled; presentation of
the latter long before his death. The evidence had been terminated and
oppositor-applicant Ramon the twin issues of the appointment of a new
Nicolas should prove to the satisfaction administratrix and the collation of
of the Court whether the two (2) properties covered by TCT No. T-V-
properties disposed of by the late Rafael 1210 and T-V-1211 were already
Nicolas before the latters submitted for resolution to the court below;
death was gratuitous or for valuable [20] subject properties are collatable
consideration. The Court under Articles 1601 and 1071 of the Civil
believes that he or she who asserts Code and Section 2 of Rule 90 of the
should prove whether the Rules of Court and the ruling in Guinguing v.
disposition of the properties was Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil. 144;
gratuitously made or for valuable petitioner failed to present evidence that
consideration. there was valuable consideration for
o The Court has already set for hearing on July 21, these properties and failed to rebut the
1995, at 8:30 evidence that petitioners do not have the
a.m., the reception and/or presentation financial capability to pay for these properties
of evidence in the issue of as evidenced by the testimony of credible
collated properties disposed before the witnesses who are relatives of spouses
death of Rafael Nicolas decedents.
x RTC then removed Teresita as administratix x We find the petition partly meritorious.
o on ground of conflict of interest considering her x Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that
claim that she paid the Order of November 11,
valuable consideration for the subject 1994 had become final for failure of
properties acquired by her petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time,
from their deceased father and we hold that said Order is interlocutory in
therefore the same should not be nature. Our pronouncement in Garcia
included in the collation;[13] and, v. Garcia supports this ruling:
ordered the hearing on the o The court which acquires jurisdiction over
collation of properties covered by TCT the properties of
No. T-V-1211 and T-V-1210 a deceased person through the
only. filing of the corresponding
x Teresita filed an MR proceedings, has supervision
o RTC denied and control over the said
x Teresita (together with Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse properties, and under the said
of Antonio Nicolas) power, it is its inherent duty to
and the Heirs of Antonio Nicolas) filed see that the inventory submitted
a Rule 65 before the CA x CA dismissed by the administrator appointed
the Rule 65 petition by it contains all the properties,
rights and
credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his
inventory. In compliance with this
duty the court has also inherent
ISSUE: Whether the subject order is indeed one of collation which is a power to determine what
final order. properties, rights and credits of
the deceased should be included
HELD: NO. in or
x Petitioners claim that: private respondent never presented excluded from the inventory.
any document to Should an heir or person
prove that the properties transferred by their interested in the properties of a
deceased parents to petitioners are deceased person duly call
by gratuitous title; private respondent never notified the courts attention to the fact
petitioner of any hearing on that certain properties,
said documents to give them opportunity to show rights or credits have been left
cause why their properties out in the inventory, it is
should not be collated; the assailed Order dated likewise the courts duty to hear
November 11, 1994 is arbitrary, the observations, with
capricious, whimsical, confiscatory, depriving them of power to determine if such
due process; the said order observations should be
is interlocutory in nature and therefore non- attended to or not and if the
appealable; the properties acquired properties referred to therein
by petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her deceased belong prima facie to the
brother Antonio Nicolas, intestate, but no such
married to petitioner Zenaida C. Nicolas and their determination is final and
children, were sold to them as evidenced by public ultimate in nature as to the
documents; and, the properties were already titled in ownership of the said properties.
their respective names or sold to third persons. [21] (Emphasis supplied)
x Private respondent contends that: due process has been
afforded the petitioners 82
when the RTC resolved the issue of collation of the
subject properties after
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
then
the opposing parties
x A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate and the administrator
proceeding,[22] can only pass have to resort to an
upon questions of title provisionally. ordinary action
[23] The rationale therefor and the for a final
proper determination of the
recourse of the aggrieved party are conflicting claims of
expounded in Jimenez v. Court of title because the
Appeals: probate
o The patent reason is the probate courts court cannot do so.[24]
limited jurisdiction x Further, In Sanchez v. Court of
and the principle that Appeals, we held:
questions of title or o [A] probate court or one
ownership, which result in in charge of proceedings
inclusion or exclusion from whether testate
the inventory of the or intestate
property, can only be cannot
settled in a separate action. adjudicate
x All that the said court could do as regards said or
properties is determine whether determine
they should or should not be included in title to
the inventory or list of properties to be properties
administered by the administrator. If claimed to
there is a dispute as to the ownership, be a part of
 the estate and which are instituted by the
claimed to belong parties.
to outside parties. All that x In the Rodriguez case, the Court
the said court could do as distinguished between an order of collation
regards said and an order of
properties is to determine exclusion from or
whether they should or inclusion in the
should not be estates inventory,
included in the inventory or thus:
list of properties to be o We hold
administered by further that the
the administrator. If there is dictum of the Court
no dispute, well and good, of Appeals and the
but if there probate
is, then the parties, the court that
administrator, and the the two
opposing parties disputed
have to resort to an ordinary lots are not
action for a final subject to
determination of the collation
conflicting claims of title was a
because the probate court supereroga
cannot do tion and
so.[25] was not
x Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the necessary
Court of Appeals to the
committed an error in considering the assailed Order disposition
dated November 11, 1994 of the case
as final or binding upon the heirs or which
third persons who dispute the merely
inclusion of certain properties in the involved
intestate estate of the deceased the issue of
Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing inclusion in,
rulings of the Court, any aggrieved or
party, or a third person for that matter, exclusion
may bring an ordinary action for a final from, the
determination of the conflicting claims. inventory
x Private respondents reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of of the
the Rules of Court, to wit: testators
o SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to estate. The
be determined. Questions issue of
as to advancement made, collation
or alleged to have been was not yet
made, by the justiciable
deceased to any heir may at that
be heard and determined by early stage
the court of the
having jurisdiction of the testate
estate proceedings; and the proceeding.
final order of It is not
the court thereon shall be necessary
binding on the person to mention
raising the in the order
question and on the heir. of exclusion
x in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final the
order and therefore controversi
appealable and that due to al matter of
petitioners failure to appeal in due collation.
time, they are now bound by said o Whether collation may
Order, is not feasible. exist with respect to the two
x What seems to be a conflict between the above- lots and
quoted Rule and the whether
aforediscussed jurisprudence that the Mrs.
Order in question is an Rustias
interlocutory and not a final order is Torrens
more apparent than real. This is because titles
the questioned Order was erroneously thereto
referred to as an order of collation both are
by the RTC and the appellate court. For indefeasi
all intents and purposes, said Order is a ble are
mere order including the subject matters
properties in the inventory of the estate that may
of the decedent. be raised
x The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of later or
Appeals[26] that the may not
order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a be raised
final order; that it is at all.
interlocutory in the sense that it did not How
settle once and for all the title those
to the subject lots; that the prevailing issues
rule is that for the purpose of should be
determining whether a certain property resolved, if
should or should not be and when
included in the inventory, the probate they are
court may pass upon the title raised,
thereto but such determination is not need not
conclusive and is subject to the be touched
final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be
 upon in the adjudication of
this appeal.
x The intestate and testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estates of the
deceased Valero spouses were
consolidated, as ordered by the lower
court on
November 21, 1974, so that the conjugal
estate of the deceased spouses may be
properly liquidated, as contemplated in
section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
and Act No. 3176.
x We have examined the expedientes of the two cases.
We found that the
proceedings have not yet reached the
stage when the question of collation or
advancement to an heir may be raised
and decided. The numerous debts of
the
decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder (remanente liquido) of their
conjugal estate has not yet been
determined. On the other hand, up to
this time, no separate action has been
brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs.
Rustias
Torrens titles to the disputed lots
or to show that the sale was in
reality a the court as to who are the lawful
donation.
x In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the
question of collation and to
decide whether Mrs. Rustias titles to the
disputed lots are questionable. The
proceedings below have not reached the
stage of partition and distribution when
the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
have to be determined.[27]
x In the light of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should
be interpreted in the
context of Section 1 of the same Rule, to wit:
o Section 1. When order for distribution of
residue made. When the
debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to
the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign
the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions,
or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such person may
demand and recover their
respective
shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession.
If there is a controversy before
heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
o No distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the
distributes, or any of them, give
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations
within such time as the court
directs.
x Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the
lower courts have
perceived to be as an Order of Collation is
nothing more than an order of
inclusion in the inventory of the estate
which, as we have already
discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion
for collation was filed with
the probate court at the early stage of the
intestate estate proceedings. We have
examined the records of the case and we found
no indication that the debts of
the decedents spouses have been paid and the
net remainder of the conjugal
estate have already been determined, and
the estates of the deceased spouses at the
time filing of the motion for collation were
ready for partition and
distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still
premature.
x And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said
assailed Order is a collation
order and a final order, still, the same would
have no force and effect upon the parties. It is
a hornbook doctrine that a final order is
appealable. As such, the Order should have
expressed therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the laws on which it is based as
mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, which
provides:
o SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by
any court without
expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
o No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefore.
x An examination of the subject Order as quoted earlier,[28] readily
reveals that
the presiding Judge failed to comply with the said
constitutional mandate. The
assailed Order did not state the reasons for ordering the
collation of
the properties enumerated therein. The Order simply directed
the
inclusion of certain real properties in the estate of the
deceased. It did
not declare that the properties enumerated therein were given
to the
children of the deceased gratuitously, despite the title in the
childrens
names or deeds of sale in their favor. Moreover, in his
Comment, private
respondent makes mention of the testimonies of his witnesses
but these were
not even mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994.
Petitioner would have
been deprived of due process as they would be divested of the
opportunity of
being able to point out in a motion for reconsideration or on
appeal, any errors
of facts and/or law considering that there were no facts or laws
cited in support
of the assailed Order of collation. As a final Order, it is, on its
face patently null
and void. It could have never become final. A void judgment is
not entitled to
the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or
declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to
be given to
it.[29] For it to be considered as a valid final order, the RTC
must then first rule
and state in its order whether the properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-36734, T-
36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and the 4,009
square meter lot
were acquired by petitioners from the deceased parents of the
parties by
onerous or gratuitous title; and must specifically state in its
order the reasons
why it ordered the subject properties collated. It is only then
that the order of
collation may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Until and
unless the constitutional mandate is complied with, any appeal
from said Order would have been premature.
x Either way therefore, whether the Order in question is a final or
interlocutory
order, it is a reversible error on the part of the appellate court
to rule that the
so-called order of collation dated November 11, 1994 had
already attained
finality.
x As to the prayer of petitioners that the RTC be ordered to give due
course to
their notice of appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996
and December
23, 1996 removing petitioner Teresita N. de Leon as
administratrix of the estate
of private parties deceased parents,[30] to approve their
record on appeal[31]
and to elevate the records of Special Proceeding No. C-1679 to
the Court of
Appeals It is not disputed by the parties that said Orders are
appealable. In fact, the Court of Appeals had correctly directed
the RTC to give due course to
petitioners appeal and this is not assailed by the private respondent.
x But, the approval or disapproval of the record on appeal is not a proper
subject
matter of the present petition for review on certiorari as it is not
even a subject-
matter in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958. Whether or not the record on
appeal should be
approved is a matter that is subject to the sound discretion of
the RTC, provided
that Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court are observed
by appellant.
x Finally, the elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679
to the
Court of Appeals for the purpose of petitioners appeal from the
order removing
the administratrix is unnecessary where a record on appeal is
allowed under the
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T
H
Rules of Court. The court a quo loses I
jurisdiction over the subject of the R
appeal upon the approval of the record D
on appeal and the expiration of the time
to D
appeal of the other parties; but retains I
jurisdiction over the remaining subject V
matter not covered by the appeal I
S
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. I
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. O
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, N
2007
FACTS:
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD x Settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San
SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Luis (former gov of Laguna)
Respondent. x During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
G.R. No. 3 marriages:
134029 o (1) Virginia Sulit on Mar 17,
1942 but Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo;
February o (2) May 1, 1968 Merry Lee
6, 2007 Corwin, but Merry Lee was able to
 secure a divoce decree; and "place of residence"
o (3) June 20, 1974 Felicidad San Luis of the decedent, for
x Respondent filed a petition for letters of purposes of fixing the
administration before the RTC Makati
o alleged that she is the widow of venue of the
Felicisimo; that the decedents settlement of his
surviving heirs are respondent estate, refers to the
as legal spouse, his 6 children personal, actual
by his 1st marriage, and son by or physical
his 2nd marriage habitation, or actual
x Petitioner Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo residence or place of
by his 1st marriage filed abode of a
MD on the grounds of failure to state COA and person as
improper venue distinguished from
o Rodolfo claimed that the petition for legal residence or
letters of administration should domicile. It noted
have been filed in the that although
Province of Laguna Felicisimo discharged
because this was his functions as
Felicisimos place of governor in
residence prior to his Laguna, he actually
death. resided in Alabang,
o He further claimed that respondent Muntinlupa. Thus, the
has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was petition for letters of
only a mistress of Felicisimo
administration was
since the
properly filed in
latter, at the time of his
Makati
death, was still legally
City.
married to Merry
o the marriage between
Lee. Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
x RTC denied MD
dissolved by virtue
x Rodolfo et al filed an MR
of the decree of
o They asserted that paragraph 2, absolute divorce;
Article 26 of the Family Code
Therefore, under
cannot be given
Art 130 of the
retroactive effect to
Family Code, the
validate respondents
petitioner as the
bigamous marriage with
surviving spouse
Felicisimo because this
can institute the
would impair
judicial proceeding
vested rights in derogation of Article
for the settlement
256 16 of the Family Code.
of the estate of the
x RTC denied MR
deceased
o It ruled that respondent, as widow of
the decedent, possessed the
ISSUE # 1: Whether respondent Felicidad,
legal standing to file the petition and
assuming that she was never legally
that venue was properly laid.
married to
x Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 deceased, has the legal capacity to file
because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was the subject petition for letters of
substituted by Judge Salvador administration.
S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
x Mila (daughter of deceased) filed a motion for HELD # 1: YES.
inhibition x Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
x Judge Tensuan granted the motion capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
x Case was re-raffled nevertheless, we find that the
x RTC dismissed the petition for letters of latter has the legal personality to
administration file the subject petition for letters
o It held that, at the time of his death, of administration, as she may be
Felicisimo was the duly considered the co-owner of
elected governor and a Felicisimo as regards the
resident of the Province of properties that were acquired
Laguna. Hence, the petition through their joint efforts during
should have been filed in Sta. their cohabitation.
Cruz, Laguna and not in x Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
Makati City. It also ruled that states that letters of administration
respondent was without legal may be granted to the
capacity to file the petition for surviving spouse of the
letters of administration decedent. However, Section 2,
because her marriage with Rule 79 thereof also provides
Felicisimo was bigamous, in part:
thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimos marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled
that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied
because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimos
legitimate children.
x CA reversed RTC
o ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court, the term
 and not upon the weakness of the
o SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of opponents defense. x x x 81
administration. - A x In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents
petition for letters of administration legal capacity to file the
must be filed by an interested subject petition for letters of administration
person and must show, as far as known may arise from her status as the surviving
to the petitioner: x x x. wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
x An "interested person" has been defined as one who would Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of
be benefited by the the Family Code.
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest ISSUE # 2: Whether the petition for letters of
must be material and direct, and not merely administration was filed in the properly filed in
indirect or contingent. 75 Makati.
x In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a HELD # 2: YES.
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of x Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
their cohabitation, the the petition for letters of
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If administration of the estate of Felicisimo
she proves the validity of the should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails the province "in which he resides at the time
to prove that her marriage of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v.
with him was validly performed under the laws of the Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the
U.S.A., then she may be doctrinal rule for
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the determining the residence - as
Civil Code. This provision contradistinguished from domicile - of
governs the property relations between parties who the
live together as husband and decedent for purposes of fixing the
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage venue of the settlement of his estate:
is void from the o [T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by termini "actual
either or both of them residence" as distinguished from
through their work or industry or their wages and "legal residence or
salaries shall be governed by domicile." This term "resides,"
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not like the terms "residing"
necessary that the and "residence," is elastic and
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts should be interpreted in the
and industry. Any property light of the object or purpose of
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to the statute or rule in
have been obtained which it is employed. In the
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions application of venue statutes
belonging to the co-owners shall and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77 the Revised Rules of
x Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the Court is of such nature -
divorce and the residence rather than domicile is
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article the significant factor. Even where
148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in the statute uses the
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating word "domicile" still it is
the property relations of couples living together as construed as meaning residence
husband and wife but are and not domicile in the technical
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of sense. Some cases make
Appeals, 79 we held that even if a distinction between the terms
the cohabitation or the acquisition of property "residence" and
occurred before the Family Code "domicile" but as generally used
took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court in statutes fixing venue,
described the property regime the terms are synonymous, and
under this provision as follows: convey the same meaning
o The regime of limited co-ownership of property as the term "inhabitant." In other
governing the words, "resides" should
union of parties who are not legally be viewed or understood in its
capacitated to marry each popular sense, meaning,
other, but who nonetheless live the personal, actual or physical
together as husband and wife, habitation of a person,
applies to properties acquired during said actual residence or place of
cohabitation in proportion to their abode. It signifies physical
respective contributions. Co-ownership presence in a place and actual
will only be up to the extent of the proven stay thereat. In this popular
actual contribution of money, property or sense, the term means merely
industry. Absent proof of the extent residence, that is, personal
thereof, their contributions and residence, not legal residence or
corresponding shares shall be presumed domicile. Residence
to be equal. simply requires bodily presence
x In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, as an inhabitant in a given
which involved the place, while domicile requires
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by bodily presence in that place
the parties to a bigamous marriage and an and also an intention to make it
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled ones domicile. No
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition particular length of time of
of the property is essential. x x x residence is required though;
x As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the however, the residence must be
party who, as more than temporary. 41
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the (Emphasis supplied)
case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must 84
be had on the strength of the partys own evidence
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
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personal, actual or
physical habitation, or
x It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," actual residence or
for purposes of fixing the place of abode,
venue of the settlement of the estate of which may not
Felicisimo, is synonymous with necessarily be his legal
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval and residence or domicile
Romualdez are inapplicable to the provided he resides
instant therein with continuity
case because they involve election and consistency. 43
cases. Needless to say, there is a Hence, it is possible
distinction that a person
between "residence" for purposes of may have his
election laws and "residence" for residence in one place
purposes and domicile in
of fixing the venue of actions. In another.
election cases, "residence" and x In the instant case, while petitioners
"domicile" are established that Felicisimo was domiciled
treated as synonymous terms, that is, in
the fixed permanent residence to which Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved
when absent, one has the intention of that he also
returning. 42 However, for purposes of maintained a
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, residence in
the "residence" of a person is his Alabang,
 Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time improvements
of his death. Respondent o Joseph, a grandson of
submitted in evidence the Deed of Joaquin, had been leasing and
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, improving the
1983 showing that the deceased said
purchased the aforesaid property. realtie
She also s and
presented billing statements 45 from had
the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese been
appro
General Hospital for the period August priatin
to December 1992 indicating the g for
address himsel
of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala f P26K
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also per
presented proof of membership of the month
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village since
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, April
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 1994
to 1990 sent by the deceaseds o Eduardo further alleged
children to him at his Alabang address, that there was an imperative
and the need to
deceaseds calling cards 49 stating appoint
that his home/city address is at "100 him as
San special
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, administrat
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial or to take
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. possession
Cruz, Laguna." and charge
x From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a of the
resident of Alabang, estate
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the assets and
venue of the settlement of his estate. their civil
Consequently, the subject petition for fruits,
letters of administration was validly filed pending
the
in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has appointme
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, nt of a
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was regular
filed on December 17, 1993. At that administrat
time, or.
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and x Sebastian filed Comment
the branches of the Regional Trial Court o generally admitting the
of the National Capital Judicial Region allegations in the petition, and
which had territorial jurisdiction over conceding to
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati the appointment of
City as per Supreme Court Eduardo as special
Administrative administrator.
Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject x Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed
petition was validly filed before the their answer/opposition
Regional o They alleged that the two
Trial Court of Makati City. subject lots belong to the
conjugal
partnershi
p of
Joaquin
with
Lucia, and
that, upon
Lucias
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs. death in
April
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
1924,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
they
ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.
became
G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011
the pro
indiviso
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
owners of
G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP,
the
WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO,
subject
Respondents.
properties
G.R. No. 177192
. They
SECOND DIVISION
said that
their
FACTS: residence
x Eduardo filed a verified petition for the judicial was built
settlement of the estate of his
with the
deceased father Joaquin
exclusive
o alleged that Joaquin died intestate on Nov
money of
21, 1964;
their late
o During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
father
marriages,
Jose, and
first with Lucia Garcia
the
x Lucia died on April
expenses
24, 1924 (3 children)
of the
second with Caridad Garcia
extensions
x Joaquin married
Caridad on Feb 9, 1926 to the
(3 children) house
o At the time of his death, Joaquin left 2 were
parcels of land with shouldere
 d by Gloria and Teresa,
while the restaurant x (3) he does not
(Manongs Restaurant) was possess the desire to
built with the earn.
exclusive money of Joseph and his They
business partner. claim
o They opposed the appointment of Eduardo ed
as administrator on the that
following grounds: the
(1) he is not physically and best
mentally fit to do so; intere
(2) his interest in the lots is sts of
minimal; and the
estate
dictat
e that
Josep
h be
appoi
nted
as
specia
l or
regula
r
admin
istrato
r.
x RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as
regular administrator of
Joaquins estate
x Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention
o alleging that Mercedes is survived not only
by her daughter Cecile,
but also by him as her husband.
He also averred that there is a
need to appoint a special
administrator to the estate, but
claimed that Eduardo is not the
person best qualified for the task.
x RTC issued an Order of Partition
o In the light of the filing by the heirs of their
respective proposed
projects of partition and the
payment of inheritance taxes due
the
estate as early as 1965, and there
being no claim in Court against
the estate of the deceased, the
estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is
now consequently - ripe - for
distribution among the heirs
minus
the surviving spouse Caridad
Garcia who died on Aug 25, 1999.
o Considering that the bulk of the estate
property were acquired
during the existence of the
second marriage, the greater
part of
the estate is perforce accounted
by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder
(with a total value of
P14,177,500
x Eduardo rendered accounting
o The accounting report included the income
earned and received for
the period and the expenses
incurred in the
administration, sustenance
and allowance of the widow.
x RTC issued an order
o WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate
of the late JOAQUIN
AGTARAP with a total value of
P14,177,500.00, together with
whatever interest from bank
deposits and all other incomes
or
increments thereof accruing
after the Accounting Report of
December 31, 1996, after
deducting therefrom the
compensation of the administrator
and other expenses allowed by
the Court, are hereby ordered
distributed as follows ---
x CA affirmed RTC
o The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, Agtarap (represented
embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, by her
respectively, are first to be distributed among the husband Abelardo
following: Dagoro and her
Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since daughter Cecilia),
she is Sebastian Agtarap and
deceased, her share shall be Eduardo Agtarap in
inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros their own right,
and Jose in equal shares. dividing the
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of inheritance in equal
the shares.
other half of the property which Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the
pertains to Lucia Mendiettas share. estate. But since she
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. died in 1996
But without issue, 5/8
since he is already deceased (and died of her inheritance
without issue), shall be inherited
his inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired by Gloria
by Joaquin (represented by her
Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. husband Walter de
But Santos and her
since she died in 1996 without issue, daughter
5/8 of her Samantha), Joseph
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria Agtarap and Teresa
(represented Agtarap, (in
by her husband Walter de Santos and representation of
her daughter Milagros brother Jose
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap) and
Agtarap, (in 1/8 each shall be
representation of Milagros brother Jose inherited by Mercedes
Agtarap) and (represented
1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes by her husband
(represented Abelardo Dagoro and
by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter
her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and
Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo, all Eduardo, all surnamed
surnamed Agtarap. Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But o Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since
since he died in 1967, his he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be inheritance shall be acquired
acquired by his wife Priscilla, and by his wife Priscilla, and
children Gloria children
(represented by her husband Walter de Gloria (represented by her
Santos and her daughter Samantha), husband Walter de Santos and
Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal her
shares. daughter Samantha), Joseph
o Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in
(3/4) of equal
the subject properties and its improvements, shall shares.
be distributed as
follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she
85
died
in 1999, her share shall be inherited
by her children namely Mercedes
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x The general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
o Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But probate or
since she died in 1984, an intestate court,
her inheritance shall be relates only to matters
acquired by her husband having to do with the
Abelardo Dagoro and her probate of the
daughter Cecile in equal will and/or settlement
shares. of the estate of
o Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. deceased persons, but
o Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. does not extend to
x Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective MRs the determination of
x CA denied questions of ownership
that arise during the
ISSUE # 1: Whether the RTC was correct in proceedings.15
determining ownership over the subject real The patent rationale for
properties. this rule is that such
court merely exercises
HELD # 1: YES. special and
x As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the limited jurisdiction.16
ownership of the subject As held in several
real properties, we hold that the RTC, cases,17 a probate
as an intestate court, had jurisdiction court or one in
to resolve the same. charge of estate
proceedings, whether
 testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate TCTs state that the lots
or were registered
determine title to properties claimed to in the name of Joaquin
be a part of the estate and which are Agtarap, married to
claimed to belong to outside parties, Caridad Garcia. He also
not by virtue of any right of inheritance admitted in
from the deceased but by title adverse his petition that
to that of the deceased and his estate. Joaquin, prior to
All contracting marriage
that the said court could do as regards with Caridad,
said properties is to determine whether contracted a
or first marriage with
not they should be included in the Lucia. Oppositors to the
inventory of properties to be petition, Joseph and
administered by Teresa,
the administrator. If there is no dispute, however, were able to
there poses no problem, but if there is, present proof before
then the parties, the administrator, and the RTC that TCT Nos.
the opposing parties have to resort to an 38254 and
38255 were derived
ordinary action before a court exercising from a mother title, TCT
general jurisdiction for a final No. 5239, dated March
determination of the conflicting claims of title. 17, 1920, in
x However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as the name of
justified by FRANCISCO VICTOR
expediency and convenience. BARNES Y JOAQUIN
o First, the probate court may provisionally AGTARAP, el primero
pass upon in an casado con Emilia
intestate or a testate Muscat, y el Segundo
proceeding the question of con Lucia Garcia
inclusion in, or exclusion Mendietta (FRANCISCO
from, the inventory of a VICTOR BARNES y
piece of property without JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the
prejudice to the final first married to Emilia
determination of ownership Muscat, and
in a separate action.18 the second married to
o Second, if the interested parties are all Lucia Garcia
heirs to the estate, Mendietta).21 When
or the question is one of TCT No. 5239 was
collation or advancement, divided between
or the parties consent to Francisco Barnes and
the assumption of Joaquin Agtarap, TCT
jurisdiction by the probate No. 10864, in the
court and the rights of name of Joaquin
third parties are not Agtarap, married to
impaired, then the Lucia Garcia Mendietta,
probate court is was issued for a
competent to resolve parcel of land,
issues on ownership.19 identified as Lot No.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends 745 of the Cadastral
to matters Survey of Pasay,
incidental or Cadastral Case No. 23,
collateral to G.L.R.O. Cadastral
the Record No. 1368,
settlement consisting of 8,872
and square meters. This
distribution of same lot was covered
the estate, by TCT No. 5577
such as the (32184)22 issued on
determinatio April 23, 1937, also in
n of the the name of Joaquin
status of Agtarap, married to
each heir and Lucia Garcia
whether the Mendietta.
property in x The findings of the RTC and the CA
the inventory show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and
is subsequently, on
conjugal or February 9, 1926,
exclusive Joaquin married
property of the Caridad. It is worthy to
deceased note that TCT No. 5577
spouse.20 (32184) contained an
x We hold that the general rule does not apply to the annotation, which reads
instant case considering that
the parties are all heirs of Joaquin o Ap-4966 - NOTA: Se ha
and that no rights of third parties enmendado el presente
will be certificado de
impaired by the resolution of the titulo, tal
ownership issue. More importantly, como
the aparece,
determination of whether the subject tanchando
properties are conjugal is but collateral las
to the probate courts jurisdiction to palabras
settle the estate of Joaquin. "con Lucia
x It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his Garcia
verified petition for judicial Mendiet[t]
settlement of Joaquins estate, he a" y
alleged that the subject properties were poniendo
owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the en su
 lugar, entre lineas y en
tinta Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by
encarnada, las palabras "en en segundas nuptias con Caridad
segundas nupcias con Garcia, referring to the second marriage of
Caridad Garcia", Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be
en complimiento de un orden gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the
de fecha 28 de abril de replacement of Caridads name in TCT No.
1937, dictada 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left,
por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, as her estate, one-half (1/2)
juez del Juzgado de Primera conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucias
Instancia share in the property covered by the
de Rizal, en el expediente said TCT was carried over to the properties
cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. covered by the certificates of title
Cad. Record derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos.
No. 1368; copia de cual 38254 and 38255. And as found by
orden has sido presentada both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by
con el No. 4966 her compulsory heirs - Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros,
del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, and Jose.
archivada en el Legajo T-No. x Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that
32184. when the
o Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23 marriage is dissolved by the death of the
x Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto husband or the wife, the
de la Costa, presiding community property shall be inventoried,
judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase administered, and liquidated,
con Lucia Garcia and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or
intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have
died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings
of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to
determine whether the properties
are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
partnership to determine the
estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph
and Teresa institute a settlement
proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the
same should be consolidated
with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin,
being Lucias spouse.24 Accordingly,
the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia,
with respect to the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject
of this case, to her compulsory
heirs.
x Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as
correctly found by the RTC and
the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo
that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255
conclusively show that the owners of the
properties covered therein were
Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the
registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap
casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia,
deserves scant consideration. This
cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the
said TCTs. Indeed, simple
possession of a certificate of title is not
necessarily conclusive of a holders true
ownership of property.25 A certificate of title
under the Torrens system aims to
protect dominion; it cannot be used as an
instrument for the deprivation of
ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the
properties were registered in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is
not sufficient proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses
coverture.27 The phrase "married
to Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin
as the registered owner, and does not
necessarily prove that the realties are
their conjugal properties.28
x Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate
could have already been
settled in 1965 after the payment of the
inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the
inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the
estate of a deceased person. As provided in
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
o SECTION 1. When order for distribution of
residue made. -- When
the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to
the estate in accordance with law,
 have been paid, the court, on being the children of Jose was never questioned
the application of the executor or administrator, or by
of a person Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon even admitted this in their petitions, as well
notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21,
persons entitled to the same, 1995 hearing.29
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding
which each is of fact in its November 21, 2006
entitled, and such persons may demand and Decision.30
recover their x Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and
respective shares from the executor or Walter de Santos are not
administrator, or any other heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be
person having the same in his possession. If there sustained. Per its October 23, 2000
is a controversy Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of Agtarap de Santos died on May 4,
the deceased 1995, and was later substituted in the
person or as to the distributive share to which each proceedings below by her husband Walter
person is entitled under the law, the controversy de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. de Santos, Georgina Samantha
x No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on
above September 16, 1995, Abelardo
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to
distributees, or any of intervene, alleging that he is the
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the
conditioned for the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro,
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. and his answer in intervention. The RTC later
x Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the granted the motion, thereby
payment admitting his answer on October 18, 1995.31
of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of The CA also noted that, during the
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. hearing of the motion to intervene on October
The records of these cases do not show that these were 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo
complied with in 1965. did not interpose any objection when the
x As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph intervention was submitted to the RTC
and Teresa, for resolution.32
suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to x Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there
be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that appears no compelling reason
Sebastian did not present clear and to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph,
convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to Teresa, Walter de Santos,
exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative 86
allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa
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together with
Joaquins estate, the
and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully respective estates of
participated in the estate of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Joaquin. It was Mercedes, and
incumbent upon Sebastian to Gloria. A perusal of
present competent evidence to the November 21,
refute his and 2006 CA Decision
Eduardos admissions that Joseph would
and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and readily show that the
thus disposition of the
rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely properties related only
object to the participation of Walter to the settlement
de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. of the estate of
Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do Joaquin. Pursuant to
so. Section 1, Rule 90 of
Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and the Rules of Court, as
Abelardo Dagoro had the right to cited above, the RTC
participate in the estate in was specifically
representation of the Joaquins granted jurisdiction to
compulsory heirs, Gloria and determine who are
Mercedes, respectively.33 the lawful heirs of
x This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration Joaquin, as well as their
that the CA erred in settling, respective shares after
the payment
 of the obligations of the estate, as a next of
enumerated in the said provision. The kin of the
inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, decedent,
Mercedes, and Gloria in the has no
distribution of the shares was merely interest in
a necessary consequence of the the estate
settlement of Joaquins estate, they to justify his
being his legal heirs. appointmen
t as
ISSUE # 2: Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction over administrat
the estate of Milagros Agtarap and was or thereof
correct in distributing the said estate, considering
the allegation with respect to the existence
of her will.
ISSUE: Whether Emilio III may
still qualify as administrator
HELD # 2: NO. DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF of his grandmothers estate,
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE considering that he is an
PROCEEDINGS. illegitimate child.
x However, we agree with Eduardos position that the
CA erred in distributing HELD: NO.
Joaquins estate pertinent to the share x To begin with, the case at bar
allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo reached us on the issue of who, as between
was able to show that a separate Emilio
proceeding was instituted for the III and Isabel, is better
probate of the will allegedly executed by qualified to act as
Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, administrator of the
Pasay City.34 While there has been no decedents estate. We
showing that the alleged will of Milagros, did not choose.
bequeathing all of her share from Considering merely his
Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, demonstrable interest
has already been probated and in the subject estate,
approved, prudence dictates that this we ruled that Emilio III
Court refrain from distributing Milagros should likewise
administer the estate of
share in Joaquins estate.
his
x It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on
January 15, 2010, per his illegitimate
Certificate of Death.35 He is survived grandmother,
by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) Cristina, as a co-
and his children Joaquin Julian B. administrator. In the
Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. context of this
Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.). case, we have to
x Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed make a choice and
November 21, 2006 Decision therefore, reconsider
and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of our decision of 16
the CA should be affirmed with June 2010.
modifications such that the share of x The general rule in the appointment
of administrator of the estate of a decedent
Milagros shall not yet be distributed
is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of
until after the final determination of
the Rules of Court:
the probate of her purported will, and
o SEC. 6. When and to
that Sebastian shall be represented
whom letters of administration
by his compulsory heirs.
granted. - If
no
executor is
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL
named in
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent G.R. No.
the will, or
183053 October 10, 2012
the
Special Second Division
executor or
executors
FACTS:
are
x This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
incompete
respondent of SCs decision in G.R.
nt, refuse
No. 183053 dated June 16, 2010,
the trust,
directing the issuance of joint
or fail to
letters of administration to both
give bond,
petitioner and respondent.
or a person
x Respondent pleads for sole administratorship based
dies
on her status as a
intestate,
legitimate grandchild of decedent Cristina
administrat
o Contends that the explicit provisions of
Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules ion shall be
of Court on the order of granted:
preference for the (a) To the
surviving husband
issuance of letters of
or wife, as the case
administration cannot be
may
ignored and that Article
b
992 of the Civil Code must
e
be followed
,
o Asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and
o
disloyalty to the estate,
r
thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-
n
administrator thereof
e
o Bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate
x
grandchild and
t
therefore, not an heir of the
decedent; (2) corollary
o
thereto, Emilio III, not being
f
 kin, or both, in
the discretion of wife, or next of kin,
the requests to have
court, or to such appointed, if
person as such competent and
surviving willing to serve;
husband or (b) If such surviving husband or
wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected
by
them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the
husband
or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days
after the death of the
person to apply for
administration or to
request that
administration be
granted to some other
person, it may be
granted to
one or more of the
principal creditors, if
competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor
competent and willing
to serve, it may be
granted to such other
person as the court
may select.
x Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an
order of
preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the
next of kin and the creditors in the
appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence.8
x The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrators
interest in the estate.9 This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule
78 takes into account in establishing the order
of preference in the appointment
of administrator for the estate. The rationale
behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest
and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.10 In all,
given that the rule speaks of an
order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a
decedents estate must demonstrate not only
an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate.
x To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the
surviving spouse in the
administration of a decedents estate
presupposes the surviving spouses interest in
the conjugal partnership or community property
forming part of the decedents estate.11
Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir of a decedent12
which evinces as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate of a decedent,
aside from her share in the conjugal
partnership or absolute
community property.
x It is to this requirement of observation of the order of
preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedents
estate, that the appointment of co-
administrators has been allowed, but as an
exception. We again refer to Section
6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which
specifically states that letters of
 administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and thereof. Thus, we
the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section held that justice and equity demands that the
2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an two (2) factions among the non-
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may an instituted heir (Matias) and
administer the trust alone, x x x." intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be
x In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more represented in the management
than one of the decedents estate.19
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested x Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete,
therein.13 We where we held that
recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of
of a decedent or the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a
the determination of a persons suitability for the office of compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her
judicial administrator of any hand in the administration of the estate
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court prior to the probate of the will would be unfair
exercising the power of appointment.14 to her proprietary interests."20
x Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in x Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our
Philippine ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21
and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment where we allowed the appointment of the
of co- surviving spouse and legitimate
administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and children of the decedent as co-administrators.
perhaps at all However, we drew a distinction between the
times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest
justice and equity of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the o In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of
management of the deceased Gregorio
the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, Ventura is Juana Cardona while
from any cause, an the next of kin are: Mercedes and
intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all Gregoria Ventura and Maria and
interested persons Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin"
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the has been defined as those
best interests of the persons who are entitled under
estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of the
an estate desires statute of distribution to the
to have another competent person associated with him in the decedents property
office.18 (citations
x In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment omitted). It is generally said
of that "the nearest of kin,
special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for whose
the probate of interest in the estate is more
the decedents will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized preponderant, is preferred in the
Matias special choice of administrator. Among
interest in the decedents estate as universal heir and executrix members of a class the strongest
designated in the 87
instrument who should not be excluded in the administration
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
Hence,
under
ground for preference is the the
amount or preponderance aforestated
of interest. As between preference
next of kin, the nearest of provided in
kin is to be preferred." Section 6 of
(citations omitted) Rule 78, the
o As decided by the lower court and person
sustained by the Supreme Court, or persons
Mercedes and Gregoria to be
Ventura are the appointed
legitimate children of administrat
Gregorio Ventura and or are Juana
his wife, the late Cardona, as
Paulina Simpliciano. the
Therefore, as the surviving
nearest of kin of spouse, or
Gregorio Ventura, they Mercedes
are and
entitled to preference Gregoria
over the illegitimate Ventura as
children of Gregorio nearest of
Ventura, namely: Maria kin, or Juana
and Miguel Ventura. Cardona
 and Mercedes and Gregoria universal
Ventura in the heir
discretion of the Court, in and
order to represent both executrix
interests.22 designated
(Emphasis supplied) in the will,
x In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained which we
that the order of considered
preference in the appointment of an to be a
administrator depends on the "special
attendant facts and circumstances. In interest"
that case, we affirmed the legitimate deserving
childs appointment as special protection
administrator, and eventually as regular during the
pendency
administrator, of the decedents estate of the
as against the surviving spouse who the appeal.
Quite
lower court found unsuitable. significantly
Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good , since the
law, we lower court
pointed out that unsuitableness for in Matias
appointment as administrator may had
consist in already
adverse interest of some kind or deemed it
hostility to those immediately best to
interested in the appoint
estate. more than
x In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a one special
running theme of heirs administrat
squabbling over the estate of a or, we
decedent. We found no reason to set found grave
aside the abuse of
probate courts refusal to appoint as discretion
special co-administrator Diaz, even if he in the act of
had the
a demonstrable interest in the estate of lower court
the decedent and represented one of the in ignoring
the
factions of heirs, because the evidence applicant's
weighed by the probate court pointed to distinctive
Diazs being remiss in his previous duty status in
as co-administrator of the estatein the the
early part of his administration. selection of
Surveying the previously discussed another
cases of special
Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus: administrat
o Respondents cannot take comfort in the or.
cases of Matias v. o In Corona we gave
Gonzales, Corona v. Court of "highest consideration" to the
Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit "executri
v. x's
Ramolete, cited in the choice of
assailed Decision. Contrary Special
to their claim, Administ
these cases do not establish rator,
an absolute right consideri
demandable from the ng her
probate court to appoint own
special co-administrators inability
who would to serve
represent the respective and the
interests of squabbling heirs. wide
Rather, the latitude
cases constitute precedents of
for the authority of the discretion
probate court given her
to designate not just one but by the
also two or more special co- testatrix in
administrators for a single her will," for
estate. Now whether the this
probate court Court to
exercises such prerogative compel her
when the heirs are fighting appointmen
among t as special
themselves is a matter left co-
entirely to its sound administrat
discretion. or. It is also
o Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona manifest
and Vda. de Dayrit hinge from the
upon factual circumstances decision in
other than the incompatible Corona that
interests of the heirs which the
are glaringly absent from presence of
the instant case. In conflicting
Matias this Court ordered interests
the appointment of a special among the
co- heirs
administrator because of the therein was
applicant's status as the not per se
 the key factor in the
designation of a second
special administrator as this
fact was taken into account
only to disregard or, in the
words of Corona, to
"overshadow" the objections
to the appointment on
grounds of "impracticality
and lack of kinship."
o Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the
designation of the wife of
the decedent as special co-
administrator because it was
"our
considered opinion that
inasmuch as petitioner-wife
owns
one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too,
is a
compulsory heir of her
husband, to deprive her of
any hand
in the administration of the
estate prior to the probate of
the will would be unfair to
her proprietary interests."
The
special status of a surviving
spouse in the special
administration of
an estate was also
emphasized in Fule v. Court
of Appeals where
we held that the widow
would have more interest
than any other
next of kin in the proper
administration of the entire
estate since
she possesses not only the
right of succession over a
portion of the
exclusive property of the
decedent but also a share in
the conjugal
partnership for which the
good or bad administration
of the estate
may affect not just the fruits
but more critically the naked
ownership thereof. And in
Gabriel v. Court of Appeals
we
recognized the distinctive
status of a surviving spouse
applying as
regular administrator of the
deceased spouse's estate
when we
counseled the probate court
that "there must be a very
strong case
to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the
administration."
o Clearly, the selection of a special co-
administrator in Matias, Corona
and Vda. de Dayrit was
based upon the
independent proprietary
interests and moral
circumstances of the
appointee that were not
necessarily related to the
demand for representation
being
repeatedly urged by
respondents.26 (Emphasis
supplied)
x In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally
declared the mandatory
character of the rule on the order of
preference for the issuance of letters of
administration:
o Evidently, the foregoing provision of the
Rules prescribes
the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of
administration, it categorically
seeks out the surviving
spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in
appointing an administrator. It
would be a grave abuse of
discretion for the probate court
to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and
sufficient reason
therefor.27
x Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we
expounded on the legal
contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
o Finally, it should be noted that on the
matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of
the decedent. When the law
speaks of "next of kin," the
reference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of
distribution, to the decedent's
property; one whose relationship is
such that he is entitled
to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In
resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for
letters of administration is a next of
kin or an heir of the
decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A
separate action will only
result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon
this consideration, the trial
court acted within bounds when it
looked into and passed upon the
claimed relationship of respondent
to the late Francisco Angeles.29
x Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into
consideration the size of, and
benefits to, the estate should respondent
therein be appointed as co-
administrator. We emphasized that where the
estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate
and perplexing one to settle, the appointment
of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
x In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on
Emilio IIIs
demonstrable interest in the estate and
glossed over the order of
preference set forth in the Rules. We
gave weight to Emilio IIIs
demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate and
without a closer scrutiny
of the attendant facts and circumstances,
directed co-administration
thereof. We are led to a review of such position
by the foregoing survey of
cases.
x The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of
interest in the estate to be
settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration
thereof. Neither does squabbling among
the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
set forth in Section 6, Rule
 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of management of Cristinas estate,
a deceased has not looked after the
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest estates welfare and has acted to
in said estate of the damage and prejudice
the one to be appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabels thereof.
unassailable interest x Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that
in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren Emilio IIIs demonstrable
and undoubted interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-
nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co- administrator thereof, the
administrator of the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out
same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
entirely to the Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio
sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and IIIs appointment as administrator of the
the attendant subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after
circumstances of the case.33 the welfare of the subject estate and has
x Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of actually acted to the damage and prejudice
this case thereof as evidenced by the following:
even as we reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent o 1. Emilio III, despite several orders from
greater interest in the estate of Cristina. the probate court for a
x These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of complete inventory, omitted in
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of the partial inventories34 he filed
Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the
other. therewith properties of the
o 1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity estate35 including several
between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on parcels of
the other, land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry,
traced back from the time their paternal shares of stock, motor vehicles,
grandparents were alive, and other personal properties,
which can be characterized as adverse interest of contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph
some kind by, or a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately o 2. Emilio III did not take action on both
interested in the occasions against
estate; Federicos settlement of the
o 2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and decedents estate which
Emilio III working harmoniously as co- adjudicated to
administrators may himself a number of properties
result in prejudice to the decedents estate, properly belonging to said estate
ultimately delaying 88
settlement thereof; and
o 3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the
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o 4. While some properties
have found their way to Emilio
(whether wholly or III, by
partially), and which reason of falsified
contained a declaration documents;38
that the decedent did not x Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations
leave any descendants or that he was lackadaisical in assuming and
heirs, except for Federico, performing the functions of
entitled to succeed to her administrator of Cristinas estate:
estate.37 o 1. From the time of the
RTCs Order appointing Emilio
x In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012
III as
requiring Emilio III to
administrat
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
or, Isabel,
o 1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the
assets until November in her
14, 2002; pleadings
o 2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did before the
not include several RTC, had
properties of the decedent; vigorously
o 3. That properties belonging to the opposed
decedent have found their way Emilio IIIs
to different individuals or assumption
persons; several of that
properties to Federico office,
Suntay himself; and arguing
 that "the decision of the RTC Emilio III, the testimony
dated 9 November 2001 is of Federico
not among the judgments and the other
authorized by the Rules of witnesses for Federico
Court which may be and Emilio III that
immediately implemented or Isabel and her siblings
executed;" were estranged from
o 2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an their grandparents
inventory was due to Isabels further drive home the
vociferous objections to point that Emilio
Emilio IIIs attempts to act as III bears hostility
administrator towards Isabel. More
while the RTC decision was importantly, it appears
under appeal to the Court of detrimental to the
Appeals; decedents estate to
o 3. The complained partial inventory is only appoint a co-
initiatory, inherent in administrator (Emilio
the nature thereof, and one III) who has shown an
of the first steps in the adverse interest of
lengthy process of some kind or hostility
settlement of a decedents to those, such as herein
estate, such that it cannot respondent
constitute a complete and Isabel, immediately interested in the
total listing of the said estate.
decedents properties; and
o 4. The criminal cases adverted to are x Bearing in mind that the issuance of
trumped-up charges where letters of administration is simply a
Isabel, as private preliminary order to
complainant, has been facilitate the
unwilling to appear and settlement of a
testify, leading the Judge of decedents estate,
the Regional Trial Court, we here point out
Branch 44 of Mamburao, that Emilio III is not
Occidental Mindoro, to warn without remedies to
the prosecutor of a protect his interests
possible motu propio dismissal of the in the estate of the
cases decedent. In Hilado
x While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels v. Court of
explanation for the blamed delay Appeals,39 we
in the filing of an inventory and his mapped out as
exposition on the nature thereof, partial among the allowable
as opposed to complete, in the course of participation of "any
the settlement of a decedents estate, interested persons"
we do not find any clarification on or "any persons
Isabels accusation that Emilio III had interested in the
deliberately omitted properties in the estate" in either
inventory, which properties of Cristina testate or intestate
he knew existed and which he claims to proceedings:
be knowledgeable about. o 4. Section 640 of Rule 87,
x The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase which allows an individual
his unsuitability as interested in
administrator rooted in his failure to the estate
"make and return x x x a true and of the
complete deceased
inventory" which became proven fact "to
when he actually filed partial complain to
inventories the court of
before the probate court and by his the
inaction on two occasions of Federicos concealmen
exclusion of Cristinas other t,
compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and embezzlem
her siblings, from the list of heirs. ent, or
x As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts conveyance
a bond and executes an of any asset
oath to faithfully discharge the duties of of the
settling the decedents estate with the decedent,
end in view of distribution to the heirs, if or of
any. This he failed to do. The foregoing evidence of
circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission the
and inaction become even more decedents
significant title or
and speak volume of his unsuitability as interest
administrator as it demonstrates his therein;"
interest adverse to those immediately o 5. Section 1041 of Rule
interested in the estate of the 85, which requires notice of the
decedent, time and
Cristina. place
x In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the of the
pleadings, and the exami
protracted litigation, is the inescapable nation
fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel and
allowa
have a deep aversion for each nce of
other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it the
becomes highly Admini
impractical, nay, improbable, for the strator
two to work as co-administrators of their s
accou
grandmothers estate. The allegations of
 nt "to persons
interested;"
o 6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which
requires the court to give
notice "to the persons
interested" before it may
hear and grant a petition
seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and
o 7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any
person interested in the
estate" to petition for an
order for the distribution of
the residue of the estate of
the decedent, after all
obligations are either
satisfied or provided for.44
x In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise
avail of the remedy found in
Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
o Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept
resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal. -
If an executor or administrator
neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according to
law, or to perform an order or
judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules,
or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust,
the court may remove him, or, in
its discretion, may permit him to
resign. When an executor or
administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor
or administrator may administer
the trust alone, unless the court
grants letters to someone to act
with him. If there is no remaining
executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to
any
suitable person.
x Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we
exercise judicial restraint: we
uphold that the question of who are the heirs
of the decedent Cristina is not yet
upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the
curtain bar rule is inapplicable in
resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
administer the estate of the
decedent.
x Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
o Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that
judicial restraint impels us
to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares
of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering
that the question on who will
administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be
settled.
x Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same
issue remains good law:
o The declaration of heirs made by the lower
court is premature,
although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are
entitled to
succeed the deceased. The
estate had hardly been
judicially
opened, and the proceeding has
not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which
must come after the inheritance is
liquidated.
x Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not
depart from the foregoing
admonition:
o Sec. 1. When order for distribution of
residue is made. - x x x. If
there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
x No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of
the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.45
x Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the
Supplemental Comment46
of Emilio III questioning the Special Second
Division which issued the 18 April
2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that
"the operation of the Special Second
Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void"
as the Second Division in Manila
 had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the
petition filed by
him:
o 7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division
in
Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division
of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be
two Second Divisions of the
Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court
in Manila, and another Special Second Division
acting independently of the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila.47
x For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in
Baguio is not
a different division created by the Supreme Court.
x The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16
June
2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has
a different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachuras
retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
o Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or
clarification of
decisions or signed resolutions and all other
motions and incidents
subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. -
Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a
signed
resolution and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon
by the ponente and the other
Members of the Division who participated in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
o If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the
Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself
from acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a new ponente who
shall be chosen
among the new Members of the Division who
participated in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution and
who concurred
therein. If only one Member of the Court who
participated and
concurred in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution
remains, he or she shall be designated as the new
ponente.
o If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which
rendered the
decision or signed resolution has retired, is no
longer a Member of
the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or
herself from
acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she
shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement
Member who
shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a
new Justice is
appointed as replacement for the retired
Justice. Upon the
appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall
replace the
designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special
Division.
o Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be
filled by
raffle from among the other Members of the Court
to constitute a Special Division of five (5)
Members.
o If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that
rendered
the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of
the
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Court, the case shall be raffled
to any Member of the Court
and the
motion shall be acted upon by
him or her with the
participation of
the other Members of the
Division to which he or she
belongs.
o If there are pleadings, motions or
incidents subsequent to the
denial of the motion for
reconsideration or
clarification, the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente on
record with the participation
of the other Members of the
Division to which he or she
belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is
to be taken up by the Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
x As regards the operation thereof in
Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue
for the Supreme Court's summer session
held last April.
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their
capacities as President and Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Philippines
International Life Insurance Company, and
FILIPINO LOAN
ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M.
AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y.
ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the
Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA.
DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
Administratrix, and other persons/ public
officers acting for and in their behalf,
respondents.
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
THIRD DIVISION
 o an urgent motion to declare
FACTS: void ab initio the memorandum of
x Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine agreement dated March 4,
International Life Insurance 1982.
Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. o a motion to declare the partial
o At the time of the companys nullity of the extrajudicial
incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned settlement
ninety percent (90%) of the of the decedents estate
subscribed capital stock. o an urgent motion to declare
x Dr. Ortaez died void ab initio the deeds of sale of
x Heirs are as follows: Philinterlife shares of stock
o wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), x Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion
o three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale
and Antonio Ortaez) and of the Philinterlife shares of
o five illegitimate children by Ligaya stock and (2) the release of
Novicio (herein private Ma. Divina Ortaez-
respondent Ma. Divina Enderes as special
Ortaez-Enderes and her administratrix of the
siblings Jose, Romeo, Philinterlife shares of stock on
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, the
all surnamed Ortaez) ground that there were no
x Rafael Ortaez a petition for letters of longer any shares of stock for
administration of the intestate estate of her to administer.
Dr. Ortaez before CFI QC Br 85 x CFI denied the OMNIBUS motion of Jose
x Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings o Under the Godoy case, supra,
filed an opposition to the petition it was held in substance that a sale
for letters of administration of a property of the
o in a subsequent urgent motion, estate without an
prayed that the intestate court Order of the probate
appoint a special administrator court is void and
x Judge Ernani Cruz Pao (then presiding judge of passes no title to the
Branch 85) appointed Rafael purchaser. Since the
and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators of sales in
their fathers estate question were
x Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory entered into by
of the estate of their father Juliana S. Ortaez
which included, among other and Jose S.
properties, 2,0293 shares of stock in Ortaez in their
Philippine personal capacity
International Life Insurance Company without prior
(hereafter Philinterlife), representing approval of the
50.725% of the companys outstanding capital Court, the same is
stock. not binding upon
x Juliana S. Ortaez (wife) then claimed that she the Estate.
owned 1,0144 Philinterlife o In consonance with the Order
shares of stock as her conjugal share in of this Court dated August 11, 1997
the estate, sold said shares with right to DENYING the approval of the
repurchase in favor of herein petitioner sale of Philinterlife shares of
Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), stocks
represented by its president, herein
petitioner Jose C. Lee
o failed to repurchase the shares of
stock within the stipulated
period, thus ownership thereof
was consolidated by petitioner
FLAG in its name.
x Jose Ortaez (acting in his personal capacity)
then claimed that he owned the
remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of
stocks as his inheritance share in the
estate, sold said shares with right to
repurchase also in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG, represented by its
president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee
x Years before BUT during the pendency of the
present case, uliana Ortaez and
her two children, Special Administrators
Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a
memorandum of agreement dated March
4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez,
partitioning the estate (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
o This was the basis of the number of
shares separately sold by
Juliana Ortaez on April
15, 1989 (1,014 shares)
and by Jose Ortaez on
October 30, 1991 (1,011
shares) in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG.
x Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings
(hereafter referred to as private
respondents Enderes et al.)
filed a motion for appointment of
special administrator of
Philinterlife shares of stock
o CFI granted
x Special Administratrix Enderes filed the ff
motions:

and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-
Enderes as Special Administratrix,
the "Urgent Motion to Declare Void
Ab Initio Memorandum of
Agreement" dated December 19,
1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially
resolved insofar as the
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the
Philinterlife shares of stock are
concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c),
10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the
Memorandum of Agreement.
o WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the
Memorandum of
Agreement dated March 4, 1982
executed by Juliana S. Ortaez,
Rafael S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez
as partially void ab initio
insofar as the
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the
Philinterlife
shares of stocks are concerned.
x Jose filed a Rule 65 before the CA
x CA dismissed
o ruling that there was no legal justification
whatsoever for the
extrajudicial partition of the estate by
Jose Ortaez, his brother
Rafael Ortaez and mother Juliana
Ortaez during the pendency of
the settlement of the estate of Dr.
Ortaez, without the requisite
approval of the intestate court, when it
was clear that there were
other heirs to the estate who stood to be
prejudiced thereby.
Consequently, the sale made by Jose
Ortaez and his mother
Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of
stock they invalidly
appropriated for themselves, without
approval of the intestate
court, was void
x Jose filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o SC dismissed
x Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a
motion for execution of
the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11
and August 29, 1997 because the orders of the
intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the
Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court) had long became final
o CFI granted
x Lee and Aggabao filed Rule 65 before the CA
o Petitioners alleged that the intestate court
gravely abused its
discretion in (1) declaring that the
ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife
shares of stock was null and void; (2)
ordering the execution of its order
declaring such nullity and (3) depriving
the petitioners of their right to due
process.
x CA dismissed outright
x Lee and Aggabao filed Rule 45 before the SC
x Lee and Aggabao filed MR
o SC granted; reinstated their petition
x Special Administratrix Enderes filed a motion to direct the
branch clerk of
court in lieu of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao
to reinstate the name of Dr. Ortaez in the stock and
transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the
corresponding stock certificate pursuant to Section
10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that
"the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of
the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done
shall have the effect as if done by the party."
o CFI granted
ruling that there was no
prohibition for the intestate
court to execute its
orders inasmuch as
the appellate
court did not issue
any TRO or writ of
preliminary
injunction.
x Lee and Aggabao filed Rule 65 before the CA
o CA denied
o Lee and Aggabao filed MR
o Pending before the CA
x Lee and Aggabao filed Rule 45 before the SC
o Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao,
representing Philinterlife
and FLAG, assail before us not
only the validity of the writ of
execution issued by the intestate
court dated July 7, 2000 but also
the validity of the August 11,
1997 order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares of stock made
by Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez, in their personal
capacities and without court
approval, in favor of petitioner
FLAG.
ISSUE # 1: Whether Lee and Aggabao may still reopen the issue
of nullity of the subject sale.
HELD # 1: NO.
x We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of
nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor
because this was already settled a long
time ago by the Court of Appeals in its
decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively
upheld by us in our resolution dated
October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177
dismissing the petition for review on a
technicality and thereafter denying the
motion for reconsideration on January 13,
1999 on the ground that there was no
compelling reason to reconsider said
denial.18 Our decision became final on
February 23, 1999 and was accordingly
entered in the book of entry of judgments.
For all intents and purposes
therefore, the nullity of the sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock made by
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez in favor of
petitioner FLAG is already a closed
case. To reopen said issue would set a bad
precedent, opening the door wide
open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate
unfavorable decisions no end. This is
completely inimical to the orderly and
efficient administration of justice.
x What we have here is a situation where some of the
heirs of the decedent
without securing court approval have
appropriated as their own personal
property the properties of [the] Estate,
to the exclusion and the extreme
prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In
other words, these heirs, without court
approval, have distributed the asset of the
estate among themselves and
proceeded to dispose the same to third
parties even in the absence of an order
of distribution by the Estate Court. As
admitted by petitioners counsel, there was
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acknowledged natural children of
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is
absolutely no legal justification for this admittedly known to
action by the heirs. There being no legal the parties to the Memorandum
justification, petitioner has no basis for of Agreement before they
demanding that public respondent [the executed the same.
intestate court] approve the sale of the This much was admitted by
Philinterlife shares of the Estate by petitioners counsel during the
Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of the Filipino oral argument. xxx
Loan Assistance Group. x Given the foregoing facts, and the
x It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the applicable jurisprudence, public respondent
Memorandum of Agreement dated can never be faulted for not
March 4, 1982 (see Annex 7 of the approving. . . the subsequent
Comment). . . are not the only heirs sale by the petitioner [Jose
claiming Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana
an interest in the estate left by Dr. Ortaez] of the Philinterlife
Juvencio P. Ortaez. The records of this shares
case. belonging to the Estate of
. . clearly show that as early as March 3, Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez."
1981 an Opposition to the Application (pages 3-4 of Private
for Issuance of Letters of Administration Respondents
was filed by the acknowledged natural Memorandum; pages 243-
children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez with 244 of the Rollo)
Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim by the x Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
 was executed
excess or want of jurisdiction
between petitioner
committed by respondent judge. and private
respondent without
ISSUE # 2: Whether the intestate court notice and approval
was correct in nullifying the subject sale. of the probate
court. Even after
HELD # 2: YES. the sale,
x From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana administratrix Aurora
Ortaez, and her three sons, Carreon still included
Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all the three fishponds
surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered as
into a among the real
memorandum of agreement properties of the
extrajudicially partitioning the estate in her
intestate estate inventory submitted
among themselves, despite their on August 13, 1981.
knowledge that there were other In fact, as stated by
heirs or the Court of Appeals,
claimants to the estate and before final petitioner, at the
settlement of the estate by the intestate time of the sale of
court. Since the appropriation of the the fishponds in
estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and question,
her knew that the same
children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio were part of the
Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale estate under
thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third administration.
party (FLAG), without court approval, was o The subject properties
likewise void. therefore are under the jurisdiction
x An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation of the
in the property under probate court which
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil according to our
Code which provides that possession of settled jurisprudence
hereditary property is deemed transmitted has the
to the heir without interruption from authority to approve
the moment of death of the decedent.20 any disposition
However, an heir can only alienate such regarding properties
portion of the estate that may be allotted under
to him in the division of the estate by administration. . .
the probate or intestate court after final More emphatic is the
adjudication, that is, after all debtors declaration We made
shall have been paid or the devisees or in
legatees shall have been given their Estate of Olave vs.
shares.21 This means that an heir may Reyes (123 SCRA
only sell his ideal or undivided share in 767) where We
the estate, not any specific property stated that
therein. In the present case, Juliana when the estate of
Ortaez the deceased person
and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties is already the subject
of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of a
of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of testate or intestate
petitioner FLAG. This they could not proceeding, the
lawfully administrator cannot
do pending the final adjudication of the enter into
estate by the intestate court because of any transaction
the undue prejudice it would cause the involving it without
other claimants to the estate, as what prior approval of the
happened in the present case. probate
x Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific court.
properties of the estate, without o Only recently, in Manotok
court approval. It is well-settled that Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
court approval is necessary for the (149
validity of any disposition of the SCRA 174), We held
decedents estate. In the early case of that the sale of an
Godoy vs. immovable property
Orellano,22 we laid down the rule that belonging to the
the sale of the property of the estate by estate of a
an administrator without the order of the decedent, in a
probate court is void and passes no special proceedings,
title to the purchaser. And in the case of
Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,23 we ruled needs court
that: approval. . . This
o [I]t must be emphasized that the pronouncement
questioned properties (fishpond) finds support in the
were included in the inventory previous case of
of properties of the estate Dolores Vda. De Gil
submitted vs. Agustin Cancio
by then Administratrix Fausta (14 SCRA
Carreon Herrera on November 797) wherein We
14, emphasized that it is
1974. Private respondent within the
was appointed as jurisdiction of a
administratrix of the probate court to
estate on March 3, 1976 in approve the sale of
lieu of Fausta Carreon properties of a
Herrera. On deceased
November 1, 1978, the person by his
questioned deed of sale of prospective heirs
the fishponds
 before final adjudication. x x
x property of the deceased,
o It being settled that property under which is not authorized by the
administration needs the probate
approval of the probate court is null and void and title
court before it can be does not pass to the purchaser.
disposed of, any o There is hardly any doubt that the
unauthorized disposition probate court can declare null
does not bind the estate and void the disposition of the
and is null and property under administration,
void. As early as 1921 in made by private respondent, the
the case of Godoy vs. same having been effected
Orellano (42 Phil without
347), We laid down the rule authority from said court. It is the
that a sale by an probate court that has the power
administrator of to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89),
hence, a fortiori, it is said court
that can declare it null and void
for
as long as the proceedings had
not been closed or terminated. To

uphold petitioners contention

that the probate court cannot
annul
the unauthorized sale, would
render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said
court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2
SCRA 755). (emphasis
ours)
x Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate
property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval
and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be
annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action
to annul the unauthorized
disposition.

ISSUE # 3: Whether the intestate court may execute its order

nullifying the sale.

HELD # 3: YES.
x We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court
has the power to
execute its order with regard to the nullity
of an unauthorized sale of estate property,
otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property
would be meaningless. In
other words, enforcement is a necessary
adjunct of the intestate or
probate courts power to annul unauthorized
or fraudulent transactions
to prevent the dissipation of estate property
before final adjudication.
x Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate
court nullifying the sale was
affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342
dated June 23, 1998 and subsequently by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177
dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the
decision of the Supreme Court was
entered in the book of entry of judgments on
February 23, 1999. Considering the
finality of the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the
appellate courts, it was correct for private
respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes to thereafter move for a writ of
execution and for the intestate court to
grant it.
x Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG,
however, contend that the
probate court could not issue a writ of
execution with regard to its order
nullifying the sale because said order
was merely provisional:
o The only authority given by law is for
respondent judge to
determine provisionally whether
said shares are included or
 excluded in the inventory In ordering
the execution of the orders, respondent
judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and grossly violated settled
law and
jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination
by a probate or
intestate court of whether a property is
included or
excluded in the inventory of the estate
being provisional in
nature, cannot be the subject of
execution.24 (emphasis
ours)
x Petitioners argument is misplaced. There is no question,
based on the facts of
this case, that the Philinterlife shares of stock were
part of the estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortaez from the very start as in fact these
shares were included in the
inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by
Rafael Ortaez after he
and his brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed special
administrators by the
intestate court.25
x The controversy here actually started when, during the
pendency of the
settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his wife
Juliana Ortaez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of
stock in favor petitioner FLAG without the approval
of the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold
the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor
of FLAG without the approval of the intestate court.
x We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or
exclusion of properties in
the inventory of the estate because there is no
question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr.
Juvencio Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here
with the effect of the sale made by the decedents
heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being
so, the contention of petitioners that the
determination of the intestate court was merely
provisional and should have been threshed out in a
separate proceeding is incorrect.
x The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that
the writ of
execution should not be executed against them
because they were not notified, nor they were
aware, of the proceedings nullifying the sale of the
shares of
stock.

x We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein

petitioner FLAG can
be struck down by the intestate court after a clear
showing of the nullity of the
alienation. This is the logical consequence of our
ruling in Godoy and in several
subsequent cases.26 The sale of any property of the
estate by an administrator
or prospective heir without order of the probate or
intestate court is void and
passes no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et
al. vs. Hon. Melencio
Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered
the probate court to cancel the transfer certificate of
title issued to the vendees at the instance of the
administrator after finding that the sale of real
property under probate proceedings was made
without the prior approval of the court. The
dispositive portion of our decision read:
o IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the assailed
Order dated February 18, 1981 of the
respondent Judge approving
the questioned Amicable Settlement is
declared NULL and VOID
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and hereby SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the sale in
favor of Sotero
Dioniosio III and by the
latter to William Go is
likewise declared
NULL and VOID. The Transfer
Certificate of Title issued to
the latter is hereby ordered
cancelled.
x It goes without saying that the increase in
Philinterlifes authorized capital stock,
approved on the vote of petitioners non-
existent shareholdings and obviously
calculated to make it difficult for Dr.
Ortaezs estate to reassume its
controlling interest in Philinterlife, was
likewise void ab initio.
x Petitioners next argue that they were denied due
process.
o We do not think so.
x The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known
only to them, did not appeal
the decision of the intestate
court nullifying the sale of shares
of stock in their
favor. Only the vendor, Jose
Ortaez, appealed the case. A
careful review of the
records shows that petitioners
had actual knowledge of the
estate settlement
proceedings and that they knew
private respondent Enderes was
questioning
therein the sale to them of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
x It must be noted that private respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes filed
before the intestate court (RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 85) a
"Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio
Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife
Shares of Stock" on March 22,
1996. But as early as 1994,
petitioners already knew of the
pending settlement
 proceedings and that the shares they themselves to be
bought were under the administration by the common law
wife and
the intestate court because private illegitimate children of
respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes the late Ortaez; that
and on March 4, 1982, the
her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a surviving spouse
case against them at the Securities and Juliana Ortaez, on
Exchange Commission on November 7, her behalf and for her
1994, docketed as SEC No. 11-94-4909, minor
for annulment of transfer of shares of son Antonio, executed
stock, annulment of sale of corporate a Memorandum of
properties, annulment of subscriptions on Agreement with her
increased capital stocks, accounting, other
inspection of corporate books and records sons Rafael and Jose,
and damages with prayer for a writ of both surnamed
preliminary injunction and/or temporary Ortaez, dividing the
restraining order.27 In said case, estate
Enderes and her mother questioned the of the deceased
sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to composed of his one-
petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in half (1/2) share in the
fact, in his resolution dated March 24, conjugal properties;
1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the that in the said
intestate court to rule on the validity of Memorandum of
the sale of shares of stock sold to Agreement, Jose S.
petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez acquired as
Ortaez: his share of the
o Petitioners also averred that. . . the estate the 1,329
Philinterlife shares of Dr. shares of stock in
Juvencio Ortaez who died, in Philinterlife; that on
1980, are part of his estate March 4, 1982,
which is Juliana and Rafael
presently the subject matter of assigned their
an intestate proceeding of the respective shares of
RTC stock in Philinterlife
of Quezon City, Branch 85. to Jose; that
Although, private respondents contrary to the
[Jose Lee contentions of
et al.] presented the petitioners, private
documents of partition respondents Jose Lee,
whereby the foregoing Carlos Lee, Benjamin
share of stocks were allegedly Lee and Alma
partitioned and conveyed to Aggabao
Jose S. became stockholders
Ortaez who allegedly of Philinterlife on
assigned the same to the March 23, 1983 when
other private Jose
respondents, approval of S. Ortaez, the
the Court was not principal stockholder
presented. Thus, the at that time, executed
assignments to the private a deed
respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of sale of his shares of
of the subject shares of stock to private
stocks are void. respondents; and that
o With respect to the alleged the
extrajudicial partition of the shares of right of petitioners to
stock owned by the late question the
Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we Memorandum of
rule that the Agreement and
matter properly belongs the acquisition of
to the jurisdiction of the shares of stock of
regular court private respondent is
where the intestate barred by
proceedings are currently prescription.29
pending.28 x Also, private respondent-Special
x With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer Administratrix Enderes offered additional proof
dated as early as March 24, 1995 of actual knowledge of the
recognizing the jurisdiction of the intestate settlement proceedings by
court to determine the validity of the petitioners which
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Dr. petitioners never denied: (1) that
Ortaez and the subsequent sale by the petitioners were represented by
heirs of the decedent of the Philinterlife Atty. Ricardo
shares of stock to petitioners, how can Calimag previously hired by the
petitioners claim that they were not aware mother of private respondent
of the intestate proceedings? Enderes to initiate
x Furthermore, when the resolution of the SEC cases against petitioners Jose
hearing officer reached the Lee and Alma Aggabao for the
Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R. nullification of the
128525), herein petitioners who were sale of the shares of stock but
respondents therein filed their answer said counsel made a conflicting
which contained statements showing that turn-around and
they knew of the pending intestate appeared instead as counsel of
proceedings: petitioners, and (2) that the
o [T]he subject matter of the complaint deeds of sale
is not within the jurisdiction executed between petitioners
of the SEC but with the and the heirs of the decedent
Regional Trial Court; Ligaya (vendors Juliana
Novicio and Ortaez and Jose Ortaez) were
children represented acknowledged before Atty.
Ramon Carpio who,
during the pendency of the settlement
proceedings, filed a motion for the
approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares
of stock to the Knights of Columbus
Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion
was, however, later abandoned).30 All
this sufficiently proves that petitioners,
through their counsels, knew of the
pending settlement proceedings.
x Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such
as libel (Criminal Case No.
97-7179-81), grave coercion (Criminal Case
No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No.
Q-96-67919) against private respondents
mother Ligaya Novicio who was a director
of Philinterlife,31 all of which criminal cases
were related to the questionable sale to
petitioners of the Philinterlife shares of
stock.
x Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept
petitioners claim of denial of
due process. The essence of due process is
the reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Where the opportunity to be heard has been
accorded, there is no denial of due
process.32 In this case, petitioners knew of
the pending instestate
proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio
Ortaezs estate but for reasons they alone
knew, they never intervened. When the court
declared the nullity of the sale, they did not
bother to appeal. And when they were
notified of the
motion for execution of the Orders of the
intestate court, they ignored the same.
Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the
blame.
x Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our
ruling in G.R. No. 128525
entitled Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes vs.
Court of Appeals, dated December 17,
1999, where we allegedly ruled that the
intestate court "may not pass upon the
title to a certain property for the purpose of
determining whether the same
should or should not be included in the
inventory but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to final decision in
a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the parties."
x We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No.
128525. The issue therein was
whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the resolution of the SEC that
Enderes et al. were not entitled to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals
was correct in affirming the resolution of the
SEC denying the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction because injunction is
not designed to protect contingent rights.
Said case did not rule on the issue of the
validity of the sale of shares of stock
belonging to the decedents estate without
court approval nor of the validity of the writ
of execution issued by the intestate court.
G.R. No. 128525 clearly involved a different
issue and it does not therefore apply to the
present case.
x Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them
are hereby warned not to
further delay the execution of the Orders of
the intestate court dated August 11 and
August 29, 1997.

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,

Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former
Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES,
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA
ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
G.R. No.
118671

January 29,
1996
SECOND
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Hilario M. Ruiz (during his lifetime) executed a
holographic will naming as his
heirs
o his only son, Edmond Ruiz,
o his adopted daughter, private respondent
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes,
 o his three granddaughters, private respondents
Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children
of Edmond Ruiz
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate
x Hilario died
x The estate was distributed BUT Edmond DID NOT take any
action for the
probate of his father's holographic will.
x Maria Pilar Ruiz (4 years after the death) filed petition for
probate before RTC
Pasig and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz
o Edmond opposed
x During the pendency of the action, one of the properties of
the estate the
house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV,
Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4
was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third
persons.
x RTC ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of
Court the rental
deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property.
o Edmond turned over the amount of
P348,583.56, representing
the balance of the rent after deducting
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance
expenses on the estate
x Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will
x RTC admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance
of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing
of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00
x Letters testamentary were then issued
x Edmond Ruiz (as executor) filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds."
o Prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes
opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs"
and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate
Will." Montes prayed for the release of
the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
and for the distribution of the testator's
properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments,
in accordance with the provisions of the
holographic will.
x RTC denied
o It thus ordered the release of the rent payments
to the decedent's
three granddaughters. It further ordered
the delivery of the titles to and possession
of the properties bequeathed to the three
granddaughters and respondent Montes
upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
x Edmond filed an MR

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deductible from their share in the
inheritance.
o alleging that he actually filed his o The court, however, held in
opposition to respondent Montes's abeyance the release of the titles to
motion for release of rent respondent Montes
payments which and the three
opposition the court failed granddaughters until
to consider. the lapse of six
o Petitioner likewise reiterated his months from the date
previous motion for release of of first publication of
funds the notice to
o manifested that he was withdrawing creditors
his motion for release of funds x Edmond filed Rule 65 before CA
in view of the fact that o CA dismissed
the lease contract over x Edmond filed Rule 45
the Valle Verde property
had been renewed for ISSUE : Whether the intestate court after
another year admitting the will to probate but before
x RTC ordered the release of the funds to Edmond payment of
but only "such amount as the estate's debts and obligations, has the
may be necessary to cover the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the
expenses of administration and funds
allowances for support" of the of the estate for the support of the testator's
testator's three granddaughters grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the
subject to collation and
titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all among the heirs or
properties of the estate to the executor of the will. legatees, upon
compliance
HELD # 1: NO as to the grant of allowance with the
x On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 conditions set
of the Revised Rules of Court forth in Rule 90
provides: of these
o Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and Rules.17
family. The widow and x And Rule 90 provides that:
minor or incapacitated o Sec. 1. When order for
children of a deceased person, distribution of residue made.
during the settlement of the When
estate, shall receive therefrom the debts, funeral
under the direction of the charges, and
court, such allowance as are expenses of
provided by law. administration the
x Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the allowance to the
widow and the minor or widow, and
incapacitated children of the deceased the inheritance tax if
right to receive allowances for support any, chargeable to
during the settlement of estate the estate in
proceedings. He contends that the accordance with
testator's law, have been
three granddaughters do not qualify for paid, the court, on
an allowance because they are not the application of
incapacitated and are no longer minors the executor or
but of legal age, married and gainfully administrator, or of
employed. In addition, the provision a person
expressly states "children" of the interested in the
deceased which excludes the latter's estate, and after
grandchildren. hearing upon notice
x It is settled that allowances for support under shall assign the
Section 3 of Rule 83 residue of the estate
should not be limited to the "minor or to the persons
incapacitated" children of the entitled to the same,
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil naming them
Code of the Philippines, the and the
substantive law in force at the time of the proportions or
testator's death, provides parts, to which
that during the liquidation of the conjugal each is
partnership, the deceased's entitled, and
legitimate spouse and children, such persons
regardless of their age, civil status or may demand
gainful employment, are entitled to and recover
provisional support from the funds their
of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the respective shares
fact that the right and duty to support, from the executor or
especially the right to education, subsist administrator, or any
even beyond the age of majority.15 other
x Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled person having the
to provisional support same in his
from the funds of the decedent's possession. If there is
estate. The law clearly limits the a controversy
allowance to "widow and children" before the court as to
and does not extend it to the who are the lawful
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of heirs of the deceased
their minority or incapacity.16 person or as to the
It was error, therefore, for the appellate distributive shares to
court to sustain the probate which each person is
court's order granting an allowance to the entitled under the
grandchildren of the testator pending law, the controversy
settlement of his estate. shall be heard and
decided as in
HELD # 2: NO as to the release of titles. ordinary cases.
x Respondent courts also erred when they ordered o No distribution shall be
the release of the titles of the allowed until the payment of the
bequeathed properties to private obligations
respondents six months after the date above-mentioned has been
of first publication of notice to creditors. made or provided for, unless
An order releasing titles to properties of the
the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following
conditions:
o Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special
proceedings.
Nothwithstanding a pending
controversy or appeal in
proceedings
to settle the estate of a
decedent, the court may, in
its discretion
and upon such terms as it
may deem proper and just,
permit that
such part of the estate as
may not be affected by the
controversy
or appeal be distributed

distributees, or any of them, give a
bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the
court directs.18
x In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the
estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been
paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only
if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet
those
obligations.19
x In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of
the titles to the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to
the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the
notice to
creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice"
to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no
debts when he died but the
taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid,
much less ascertained. The
estate tax is one of those obligations that must be
paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid,
the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or
make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in
the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was
issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
x It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order
the
release of the titles six months after admitting the
will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as
to its due execution and extrinsic
validity21 and settles only the question of whether
the testator, being
of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with
the formalities
prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic
validity and efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise
or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.23
x The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was
controverted by petitioner
before the probate court in his Reply to Montes'
Opposition to his motion for
release of funds24 and his motion for
reconsideration of the August 26, 1993
order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of
the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's
will included the estate of his
mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an
intestate heir of his mother.
The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to
who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court
shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in
ordinary cases.26
HELD # 3: NO as to the grant of all properties to the executor.
x Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed
order deprived him
of his right to take possession of all the real and
personal properties of the estate. The right of an
executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of
the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the
debts and expenses of administration,"27 Section
3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
o Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain
whole estate to
pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. An executor or administrator
shall have the right to the possession
and
management of the real as
well as the personal estate of
the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses for
administration.28
x When petitioner moved for further release of the
funds deposited with the clerk
of court, he had been previously granted by
the probate court certain amounts for repair
and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and
payment of the real estate taxes thereon.
But petitioner moved again for the
release of additional funds for the same
reasons he previously cited. It was
correct for the probate court to require
him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration
before releasing any further money in his
favor.
x It was relevantly noted by the probate court that
petitioner had deposited with it
only a portion of the one-year rental
income from the Valle Verde property.
Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding
rents after renewal of the lease.29
Neither did he render an accounting of
such funds.
x Petitioner must be reminded that his right of
ownership over the properties of his
father is merely inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds
of the estate in his hands are trust funds and
he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign
to himself and possess all his parents'
properties and the fruits thereof without
first submitting an inventory and appraisal of
all real and personal properties of
the deceased, rendering a true account of
his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations
and estate tax, all of which are
subject to a determination by the court as to
their veracity, propriety and
justness
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
G.R. No.
149926
February 23,
2005
SECOND
DIVISION
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thereafter
FACTS: up to
x First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and May 31,
Efraim M. Santibaez entered 2 1985
loan agreements o in the amount of P123,156.00
o in the amount of P128,000.00 which intended for the balance of the
was intended for the payment purchase price of
of the purchase price of another unit of Ford
one (1) unit Ford 6600 6600 Agricultural All-
Agricultural All- Purpose Diesel
Purpose Diesel Tractor Tractor, with
Efraim and his son, accessories, and one
Edmund executed a (1) unit Howard
promissory Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
note in favor of Again, Efraim and
the FCCC, the his son, Edmund,
principal sum executed a
payable promiss
in five equal ory
annual note for
amortizations of the said
P43,745.96 due amount
on May 31, 1981 in favor
and every May
 of the defunct Union
FCCC Savings and
x Efraim died, leaving a holographic will Mortgage Bank to
x testate proceedings commenced before RTC Iloilo which the FCCC
Br. 7 had assigned its
x Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as assets and
the special administrator of the liabilities. The
estate of the decedent court also agreed
x During the pendency of the testate proceedings, to the contention
the surviving heirs, Edmund and of
his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, respondent Florence
executed a Joint Agreement8 dated July S. Ariola that the list
22, of assets and
1981, wherein they agreed to divide liabilities of
between themselves and take possession the FCCC assigned to
of Union Savings and
the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) Mortgage Bank did
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor not
for Florence. clearly refer to the
o Each of them was to assume the decedents account.
indebtedness of their late father Ruling that the joint
to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor agreement executed
respectively taken by them. by the heirs was null
x Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with and void, the trial
Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed court held that the
by and between FCCC and Union Savings petitioners cause of
and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as action against
the assignor, among others, assigned all respondent Florence
its assets and liabilities to Union S. Ariola must
Savings and Mortgage Bank. necessarily fail.
x UnionBank sent demand letter to Edmund x UnionBank appealed to CA
o This was unheeded x CA affirmed RTC
x UnionBank filed action for sum of money o The appellate court found
against the heirs of Efraim that the appeal was not meritorious
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence before the RTC and
Makati Br. 150 held that the
x Summonses were issued against both, but the one petitioner should
intended for Edmund was not have filed its claim
served since he was in the United with the probate
States and there was no information on court as provided
his address or the date of his return to under Sections 1 and
the Philippines.12 5, Rule 86 of the
o Accordingly, the complaint was Rules of
narrowed down to respondent Court. It further held
Florence S. Ariola. that the partition
x Florence filed answer
made in the
o alleged that the loan documents did agreement was
not bind her since she was not
null and void, since no
a party thereto
valid partition may be
o Considering that the joint agreement had until after the will
signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved
has been probated.
by the probate court, it
According to the CA,
was null and
page 2, paragraph (e)
void; hence, she was not
of
liable to the petitioner the holographic will
under the joint covered the subject
agreement. properties (tractors)
x Case was unloaded and re-raffled to RTC Makati Br in
63
generic terms
x RTC dismissed
when the
o The trial court found that the claim of
deceased referred
the petitioner should have
to them as "all
been filed with the probate
other
court before which the testate
properties."
estate of the late Efraim
Moreover, the
Santibaez was pending, as
active
the sum of money
participation of
being claimed was an
respondent
obligation incurred by the said
Florence S. Ariola in the case
decedent. The trial court also
did not amount to a waiver.
found that the Joint
Agreement apparently
ISSUE # 1: Whether the partition in the Agreement
executed by his heirs, Edmund
executed by the heirs is valid.
and Florence, on July 22,
1981, was, in
HELD # 1: NO.
effect, a partition of the
x At the outset, well-settled is the rule that
estate of the decedent.
a probate court has the
However, the said
jurisdiction to determine
agreement was void,
all the properties of the
considering that it had not
deceased, to
been approved by
determine whether they
the probate court, and that
there can be no valid should or should not be
partition until included in the
after the will has been inventory or list of properties to be
administered.20 The said court is
probated. The trial court
further declared
that petitioner failed to
prove that it was the now
 primarily concerned with the administration, ISSUE # 2: Whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of
liquidation and distribution of the the deceased is valid.
estate.21
x In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid HELD # 2: NO.
partition among the heirs x The question that now comes to fore is whether the
until after the will has been probated: heirs assumption of the
o In testate succession, there can be no valid indebtedness of the decedent is binding.
partition among the We rule in the negative. Perusing the
heirs until after the will has been joint agreement, it provides that the heirs
probated. The law enjoins the as parties thereto "have agreed to
probate of a will and the public requires divide between themselves and take
it, because unless a will is possession and use the above-described
probated and notice thereof given to the chattel and each of them to assume the
whole world, the right of a person to indebtedness corresponding to the
dispose of his property by will may be chattel taken as herein after stated which is
rendered in favor of First Countryside Credit
nugatory. The authentication of a will Corp."29 The assumption of liability was
decides no other question conditioned upon the happening of an
than such as touch upon the capacity event, that is, that each heir shall take
of the testator and the possession and use of their respective
compliance with those requirements or share under the agreement. It was made
solemnities which the law prescribes for dependent on the validity of the
the validity of a will.22 partition, and that they were to assume the
x This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be indebtedness corresponding to the
partitioned are the same chattel that they were each to receive. The
properties embraced in the will.23 In the present partition being invalid as earlier
case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive
holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the any such tractor. It follows
provision which reads as follows: then that the assumption of liability cannot be
o (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I given any force and
own and may be effect.
discovered later after my demise, x The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
shall be distributed in the proportion decedent.l^vvphi1.net The
indicated in the immediately petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
preceding paragraph in favor of Efraim Santibaez, should have thus
Edmund and Florence, my children. filed its money claim with the probate court
x We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is in accordance with Section 5, Rule
an all-encompassing 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
provision embracing all the properties left by the o Section 5. Claims which must be filed
decedent which might have under the notice. If not filed
escaped his mind at that time he was making his barred; exceptions. All claims
will, and other properties he for money against the
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the decedent,
three (3) subject tractors. This arising from contract, express
being so, any partition involving the said tractors or implied, whether the same
among the heirs is not valid. be
The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and due, not due, or contingent, all
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, claims for funeral expenses for
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its the last sickness of the decedent,
execution, there was already a pending proceeding and judgment for money against
for the the decedent, must be filed
probate of their late fathers holographic will within the time limited in the
covering the said tractors. notice;
x It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already otherwise they are barred
acquired jurisdiction forever, except that they may
over all the properties of the deceased, including the be set forth as counterclaims
three (3) tractors. To in any action that the
dispose of them in any way without the probate executor or
courts approval is tantamount administrator may bring against
to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot the claimants. Where an
allow.26 Every act executor
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs or administrator commences an
and legatees or devisees is action, or prosecutes an action
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to already commenced by the
be a sale, an exchange, a deceased in his lifetime, the
compromise, or any other transaction.27 Thus, in debtor may
executing any joint agreement set forth by answer the claims he
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial has against the decedent, instead
partition, as in the case at of presenting them independently
bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot to the court as herein provided,
just divest the court of its and mutual claims may be set off
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is against each other in such action;
within the jurisdiction of and if final judgment is rendered
the probate court to determine the identity of the in favor of the defendant, the
heirs of the decedent.28 In the amount so determined shall be
instant case, there is no showing that the signatories considered the true balance
in the joint agreement were against the estate, as though the
the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, claim had been presented directly
the probate of the will before the court in the
was still pending before the court and the latter had administration proceedings.
yet to determine who the Claims not yet due, or contingent,
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and may be approved at their present
respondent Florence S. Ariola value.
to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors 94
was a premature act, and
prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors
who may have a valid claim
against the estate of the deceased.
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
`The law strictly
requires
x The filing of a money claim against the decedents the prompt
estate in the probate presentation and
court is mandatory.30 As we held in disposition of the
the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. claims
Herrera:31 against the decedent's
o This requirement is for the purpose estate in order to
of protecting the settle the affairs
estate of the deceased by of the estate as soon
informing the executor or as possible, pay off its
administrator of the claims debts and
against it, thus enabling him distribute the
to residue.32
examine each claim and to x Perusing the records of the case, nothing
determine whether it is a therein could hold private respondent
proper Florence S. Ariola accountable
one which should be allowed. for any liability incurred by her
The plain and obvious design late father. The
of the rule is the speedy documentary evidence
settlement of the affairs of the presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the
deceased and the early continuing guaranty
delivery of the property to the agreement, were executed and
distributees, legatees, or heirs. signed only by the late
 Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. D
As the petitioner failed to file its money I
claim with the probate court, at most, it V
may only go after Edmund as co-maker I
of the decedent under the said S
promissory notes and continuing I
guaranty, of course, subject to any O
defenses Edmund may have as against N
the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of FACTS:
Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve x Eliseo Quiazon died intestate
into the matter further. x Respondent, claiming to be the natural
child of Eliseo and represented by her
ISSUE # 3: Whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on mother, Eliseos
the obligation of the deceased. common law spouse,
filed for petition for
HELD # 3: NO. letters of
x We agree with the finding of the trial court that administration
the petitioner had not sufficiently x Petitioners, previous spouse and children,
shown that it is the successor-in-interest respectively, of Eliseo, opposed said
of the Union Savings and Mortgage petition
Bank to which the FCCC assigned its x Respondent impugned the validity of
assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that
its it was bigamous for having been
complaint alleged that "by virtue of the contracted during the subsistence
Deed of Assignment dated August 20, of the latters marriage with one
1981 executed by and between First Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union x RTC issued letters
x CA affirmed
Bank of the Philippines"34 However, o In validating the findings of
the documentary evidence35 clearly the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
reflects that the parties in the deed of that
assignment with assumption of liabilities Elise was able to
were the FCCC, and the Union Savings prove that Eliseo and
and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity Lourdes lived
of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. together as
Nowhere can the petitioners husband and wife by
participation establishing a
therein as a party be found. Furthermore, common residence
no documentary or testimonial at No. 26
evidence was presented during trial to Everlasting Road,
show that Union Savings and Mortgage Phase 5, Pilar Village,
Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Las Pias City, from
Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court 1975
declared in its decision: up to the time of
o [T]he court also finds merit to the Eliseos death in
contention of defendant that 1992. For purposes
plaintiff failed to prove or of fixing the
did not present evidence to venue of the
prove that settlement of
Union Savings and Eliseos estate, the
Mortgage Bank is now the Court of Appeals
Union Bank of the upheld the conclusion
Philippines. Judicial notice reached by the RTC
does not apply here. "The that the decedent
power to take judicial notice is was a resident of Las
to [be] exercised by the Pias City.
courts with caution; care must x Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SC
be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every ISSUE # 1: Whether the petition was
reasonable doubt upon the properly laid in Las Pias City, considering
subject should be promptly the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that
resolved in he was a resident of Capas, Tarlac.
the negative." (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA HELD # 1: YES.
504).36 x Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
x This being the case, the petitioners personality to Court, the petition for letters of
file the complaint is wanting. administration of the estate
Consequently, it failed to establish its of a decedent should be filed
cause of action. Thus, the trial court did in the RTC of the province
not err in dismissing the complaint, and where the decedent resides
the CA in affirming the same. at the time of his death:

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON

and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON,
Respondent.
G.R.
No.
18912
1

July
31,
2013
SECON
D

o Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.
- If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
x The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules - the lifetime of the parties to the
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a persons actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
x Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias
City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of
his estate may be laid in the said city.
x In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the
petitioners harp on the
entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident
of Capas, Tarlac where
they insist his estate should be settled. While the
recitals in death certificates can
be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the
time of his death, the
contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972
up to the time of his death in 1995.
This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia
before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20
That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners
position that Eliseo spent the final
days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her
children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners submission that the
lower courts findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record. Factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court
ISSUE # 2: Whether the CA correctly ruled on the validity
of the marriage between Amelia and
Eliso.
HELD # 2: YES.
x Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that
the Court of Appeals erred
in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as
void ab initio. In a void marriage, it
was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights.
Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void
marriage can be questioned even beyond
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that
at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in
effect was the Civil Code, and not the
Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to
the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers
marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing
void from voidable marriages, to wit:
o Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after
the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the
parties and their
offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or
defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void
marriage.24
x It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage,
no marriage has taken place
and it cannot be the source of rights, such
that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
95
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
x Contrary to the position taken by the
petitioners, the existence of a previous
x Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that marriage between Amelia and
Elise, whose successional rights Filipito was sufficiently
would be prejudiced by her fathers established by no less than the
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the Certificate of Marriage issued by
existence of such marriage even after the the Diocese of Tarlac and signed
death of her father. The said marriage by the
may be questioned directly by filing an officiating priest of the Parish of
action attacking the validity thereof, or San Nicolas de Tolentino in
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
proceeding for the settlement of the certificate is a competent
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in evidence of marriage and the
the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a certification from the National
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action Archive that no information
for the declaration of the absolute nullity relative to the said
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, marriage exists does not
and the death of either party to the said diminish the probative value of
marriage does not extinguish such cause the entries therein. We
of action. take judicial notice of the fact
x Having established the right of Elise to impugn that the first marriage was
Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we celebrated more than
now proceed to determine whether or 50 years ago, thus, the
not the decedents marriage to Amelia is possibility that a record of
void for being bigamous. marriage can no longer be
 found in the National Archive, given
the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence
of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the
latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore,
void ab initio
ISSUE # 3: Whether Respondent Elise Quiazon
has shown any interest in the Petition for Letters
of Administration.
HELD # 3: YES.
x Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
petitioners contention that Elise
has not shown any interest in the Petition for
Letters of Administration.
x Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court
lays down the preferred persons
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
o Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If
no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving
husband or wife, as the case
may
be, or next of kin,
or both, in the x An "interested party," in estate
discretion of the proceedings, is one who would be
court, or to such
person as such
surviving husband
or wife, or next of
kin, requests to
have appointed, if
competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving
husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next
of kin, or the
person selected x In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory
by heir who stands to be
them, be
incompetent or
unwilling, or if the
husband
or widow, or next
of kin, neglects
for thirty (30)
days
after the death of
the person to
apply for
administration or
to request that
administration be
granted to some
other person, it
may be granted
to
one or more of
the principal
creditors, if
competent
and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such
creditor competent and willing
to serve, it may
be granted to
such other
person as the
court may
select.
x Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79
provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested
person, thus:
o Sec. 2. Contents of petition
for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of
administration must
be filed by an
interested person
and must show, so
far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The
jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names,
ages, and residences of
the heirs, and
the
name
s and
reside
nces
of the
credit
ors, of
the
deced
ent;
(c) The probable
value and character of
the property
of the estate;
(d) The name of
the person for whom
letters of
administration are
prayed.
o But no defect in the petition
shall render void the issuance of
letters of administration.
benefited in the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim
against
the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase
"next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the
decedent Is
such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as
distributees.28
benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be
an
interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record
produced
by Elise to prove her filiation to
Eliseo, the petitioners pounding
on her
lack of interest in the
administration of the decedents
estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this
Court to reverse the findings of
the
Court of Appeals. Certainly, the
right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
founded
on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to
her
legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a
vested
right in the distribution of Eliseos
estate as one of his natural
children,
Elise can rightfully be considered
as an interested party within the
purview of the law.
 o Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of
Maximino filed a Petition
with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the intestate
estate of
Maximin
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, RTC initially granted BUT
namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA set aside
SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO o Heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint
MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA with the RTC against the
MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, heirs of Donata for the
namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO partition, annulment, and
CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, recovery of possession of
CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES real property
LAGBAS, Respondents. RTC decided in favor of
G.R. No. 150175 Heirs of Maximino
CA affirmed RTC
SC reversed CA (this is the
February 5, 2007 decision subject of the
THIRD DIVISION present MR)

FACTS: ISSUE # 1: Whether Donatas misrepresentations constituted

x This is an MR of SCs March 2006 decision which reads:
o IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed
Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated
31 August 2001, affirming the Decision
of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794,
dated 28 September 1986, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of
possession filed by the heirs of
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794 is hereby DISMISSED.
x Said MR was filed by respondents, heirs of Maximino R.
Briones
x Parties to the case are:
o Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-
Briones (Donata),
consisting of
her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-
Aguila (Rizalina);
Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil
(Erlinda); and
the other nephews and nieces of
Donata, in
representation of her two
other sisters who had also
passed away.
o Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of
the late Maximino
Briones (Maximino), composed of
his nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, in
representation of
the deceased siblings of Maximino
x Antecedent facts:
o Deceased Maximino was married to Donata BUT
they had NO
children
o Maximino died
o Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle
her husbands
estate before CFI Cebu
o CFI appointed Donata as administratix
o CFI then awarded ownership over the
properties to Donata
o Donata died
o Erlinda (Donatas niece) instituted with the RTC
a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata
o Erlinda and husband appointed as
administrators
o Erlinda then claimed ownership over the
properties
fraud.
HELD # 1: NO.
x As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence
of any trust relations
between petitioners and respondents
shall be examined in the light of Article
1456 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that, "[i]f property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property
comes." Hence, the foremost question to be
answered is still whether an implied
trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code
had been sufficiently established
in the present case.
x In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since
there was insufficient
evidence to establish that Donata
committed fraud. It should be remembered
that Donata was able to secure certificates
of title to the disputed properties by virtue
of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No.
928-R (the proceedings she instituted to
settle Maximinos intestate estate), which
declared her as
Maximinos sole heir. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, the Court accorded to Special
Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of
regularity and validity.
Reproduced below are the relevant portions15 of the
Decision -
o At the onset, it should be emphasized
that Donata was able to
secure the TCTs covering the real
properties belonging to the
estate of Maximino by virtue of a
CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952.
It is undisputed that the said CFI
Order was issued by the CFI in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
instituted by Donata herself, to
settle the intestate estate of
Maximino. The petitioners, heirs
of
Donata, were unable to present a
copy of the CFI Order, but this is
not surprising considering that it
was issued 35 years prior to the
filing by the heirs of Maximino of
their Complaint in Civil Case No.
96
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
allegation
of fraud
CEB-5794 on 3 March by the
1987. The existence of heirs of
such CFI Order, Maximino
nonetheless, cannot be did not
denied. It was recorded pertain to
in the Primary the
Entry Book of the Register of CFI Order,
Deeds on 27 June 1960, at but to the
1:10 p.m., as Entry No. manner or
1714. It was annotated on procedure
the TCTs covering the real by which
properties as having it was
declared Donata the sole, issued
absolute, and in favor of
exclusive heir of Maximino. Donata.
The non-presentation of the Moreover,
actual CFI the non-
Order was not fatal to the presentati
cause of the heirs of Donata on of the
considering CFI
that its authenticity and Order,
contents were never contrary to
questioned. The the
 declaration by the RTC, ,
does not amount to a willful
suppression of evidence w
that would give rise to the a
presumption that it s
would be adverse to
the heirs of Donata if a
produced. x x x. c
o The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, t
issued in Special i
Proceedings No. 928-R, n
effectively settled the g
intestate estate of
Maximino by declaring i
Donata as the sole, n
absolute, and exclusive
heir of her deceased t
husband. The issuance by h
the CFI of the said e
Order, as well as its
conduct of the entire l
Special Proceedings No. a
928-R, enjoy the w
presumption of validity f
pursuant to the Section u
3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of l
the Revised Rules of Court,
reproduced e
below - x
SEC. 3. Disputable e
presumptions. - The following r
presumptions c
are i
satisfactory if s
uncontradicted e
, but may be
contradicted o
and overcome f
by other
evidence: j
x (m) That official u
duty has been regularly r
performed; i
x (n) That a court, or s
judge acting as d
s i
u c
c t
h i
, o
n
w .
h o By reason of the
e foregoing provisions, this Court
t must presume, in
h the
e absence of
r any clear
and
i convincing
n proof to the
contrary,
t that
h the CFI in
e Special
Proceeding
P s No. 928-R
h had
i jurisdiction
l of the
i subject
p matter
p and the
i parties,
n and to
e have
s rendered
a
o judgment
r valid in
every
e respect;
l and it
s could not
e give
w credence
h to the
e following statements
r made by the Court of
e Appeals in its Decision.
x There was totally no evidentiary basis for the and was, in fact,
foregoing pronouncements. First of admitted by the
all, the Petition filed by Donata for petitioners; that the
Letters of Administration in Special copy submitted is a
Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI certified true copy of
was not even referred to nor presented the said Order; and
during the course of the trial of Civil that the said Order
Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. may provide new
How information vital to a
then could the Court of Appeals make a just resolution of the
finding that Donata willfully excluded present case, this
from the said Petition the names, ages, Court is compelled to
and residences of the other heirs of consider the same as
Maximino? Second, there was also no part of the evidence
evidence showing that the CFI actually on record.
failed to send notices of Special x The CFI Order17 in question reads in
Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of full as -
Maximino o This is with reference to
or that it did not require presentation of the Motion of the
proof of service of such notices. It Administratrix, dated
should be remembered that there January 5,
stands a presumption that the CFI 1960, that
Judge had she be
regularly performed his duties in declared
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which the sole
included heir of her
sending out of notices and requiring the deceased
presentation of proof of service of such husband,
notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did Maximino
not propound sufficient evidence to Suico
debunk such presumption. They only Briones, the
made a general denial of knowledge of latter
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least having died
until 1985. There was no testimony or without
document presented in which the heirs any
of Maximino categorically denied legiti
receipt mate
of notice from the CFI of the pendency ascen
of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The dant
only evidence on record in reference to nor
the absence of notice of such desce
proceedings was the testimony of ndant
Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the , nor
heirs of any
Maximino, x x x. legiti
x Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering mate
that she was not testifying broth
on matters within her personal er or
knowledge. The phrase "I dont think" sister,
is a clear indication that she is merely neph
voicing out her opinion on how she ews
believed her uncles and aunts would or
have acted had they received notice of niece
Special s.
Proceedings No. 928-R. o At the hearing of this
x It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, incident today, nobody
the Court was proceeding appeared to resist the
from an evaluation of the evidence motion, and based on the
on record, which did not include an uncontradicted testimony
actual of Donata G.
copy of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents
only
submitted a certified true copy
thereof on 15 June 2006, annexed to
their
Supplemental Reply to petitioners
opposition to their motion for
reconsideration
of this Courts Decision. Respondents
did not offer any explanation as to why
they belatedly produced a copy of the
said Order, but merely claimed to have
been "fortunate enough to obtain a
copy" thereof from the Register of
Deeds of
Cebu.16
x Respondents should be taken to task for springing new
evidence so late into the
proceedings of this case. Parties should
present all their available evidence at
the
courts below so as to give the opposing
party the opportunity to scrutinize and
challenge such evidence during the
course of the trial. However, given that
the
existence of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in
issue
 a full and fair
Ortiz that she was the nearest surviving relative opportunity to present their
of the deceased respective positions and refute
Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the latters each
death, and other's submissions under the
pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the new Civil prescribed requirements,
Code of the conditions
Philippines, the Court hereby declares the aforesaid and limitations. Adjective law is
Donata G. Ortiz not the counterfoil of substantive
the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of law. In fact, there is a symbiotic
the deceased relationship between them. By
Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby entitled complying faithfully with the Rules
to inherit all the of Court, the bench and the bar
residue of this estate after paying all the obligations are better able to discuss, analyze
thereof, which and understand substantive
properties are those contained in the Inventory, rights and duties and
dated October 2, consequently to more effectively
1952.1awphi1.net protect and enforce them. The
x From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to other alternative is judicial
deduce that anarchy.
the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 o Thus, compliance with the procedural rules
October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It was the is the general rule, and
inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix abandonment thereof should only
of Maximinos intestate estate, which was dated 2 be done in the most exceptional
October 1952.18 Other than such observation, this Court finds circumstances. The presumptions
nothing in the CFI Order which could change its original position relied upon by this Court in the
in the Decision under instant case are disputable
consideration. presumptions, which are
x While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still satisfactory,
had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order unless contradicted or overcome
that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate by evidence. This Court finds that
proceedings, it the evidence presented by
should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether respondents failed to overcome
testate the
or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,19 and that the publication given presumptions.
in the x Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that
newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set she was her husbands
for the sole heir, it was not established that she did so
hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as
notice to the for this Court to conclude that she indeed
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the committed fraud. This
hearing on Court again brings to the fore the delay by
the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication which respondents filed the present
requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the case, when the principal actors involved,
purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the particularly, Donata and Maximinos
deceased of the siblings, have already passed away and their
existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially lips forever sealed as to what truly
those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the transpired between them. On the other hand,
petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily Special Proceedings No. 928-R
or involuntarily made. took place when all these principal actors
x This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the were still alive and each would have
intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial been capable to act to protect his or her own
court. As this Court right to Maximinos estate. Letters
pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI of Administration of Maximinos estate were issued in
judge conducted favor of Donata as early as
the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question was
encompassed in such issued only on 15 January 1960. The intestate
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the proceedings for the settlement of Maximinos
intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any estate were thus
allegation or concrete proof that the pending for almost eight years, and it is the
CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the burden of the respondents to
notice of the establish that their parents or grandparents,
intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of Maximinos surviving siblings, had
compliance therewith. absolutely no knowledge of the said
Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why proceedings all these years. As established
Maximinos in Ramos v. Ramos,21 the degree of proof to
siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate establish fraud in a case where the
proceedings of principal actors to the transaction have already
their brother. passed away is proof beyond
x In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official reasonable doubt, to wit -
duty and o "x x x But length of time necessarily
lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the obscures all human evidence;
questioned Order, and as it thus removes from the
dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for parties all the immediate means to
respondents allege, verify the nature of the original
sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to their share in transactions, it operates by way of
the inheritance in presumption, in favor of innocence,
favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the and against imputation of
establishment of rules fraud. It would be unreasonable,
of procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. after a great length of time, to
Court of Appeals20 require exact proof of all the
o Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and minute circumstances of any
expeditious transaction, or to expect a satisfactory
administration of justice by providing for a explanation of every
practical system by 97
which the parties to a litigation may be accorded
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ought not
lightly to be imputed
difficulty, real or apparent, to the living; for, the
with which it may be legal presumption is
encumbered. The the
most that can fairly be other way; as to the
expected, in such cases, if the dead, who are not
parties are here to answer for
living, from the frailty of themselves, it would
memory, and human infirmity, be the height of
is, that the injustice and cruelty,
material facts can be given to
with certainty to a common disturb their ashes,
intent; and, and violate the
if the parties are dead, and sanctity of the grave,
the cases rest in confidence, unless the
and in evidence of fraud be
parol agreements, the most clear, beyond a
that we can hope is to arrive reasonable doubt
at (Prevost vs.
probable conjectures, and to Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.],
substitute general 481, 498).
presumptions of x Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that
law, for exact knowledge. she was Maximinos sole heir does
Fraud, or breach of trust,
 constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify have been
abandonment of the CFI Order, dated contemplated by the
15 January 1960,22 considering the parties, the intention
nature of intestate proceedings as being as to which is to be
in rem and the disputable presumptions found in the nature of
of the regular performance of official their transaction, but
duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by not expressed in the
the CFI in rendering the questioned deed or instrument of
Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special conveyance" (89 C.J.S.
Proceedings No. 928-R. 725).
Examples of
ISSUE # 2: Whether the right of the Heirs of Maximino resulting trusts are
to recover their shares from the latters estate is found in Article
imprescriptible. 1448 to 1455 of
the Civil Code. See
HELD # 2: NO. Padilla vs. Court of
x Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatas Appeals, L-31569,
misrepresentation constitutes September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA
fraud that would impose upon her the 168, 179).
implied trust provided in Article 1456 of o On the other hand, a
the Civil Code, this Court still cannot constructive trust is a trust "raised
sustain respondents contention that by
their right to recover their shares in construction of law, or
Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is arising by operation of
already settled in jurisprudence that an law." In a more
implied trust, as opposed to an express restricted sense and
trust, is subject to prescription and as
laches. contradistinguished
x The case of Ramos v. Ramos23 already provides from a resulting trust,
an elucidating discourse on the a
matter, to wit - constructive trust is
o "Trusts are either express or implied. "a trust not created
Express trusts are created by by any words, either
the intention of the trustor or expressly or impliedly
of the parties. Implied trusts evincing a direct
come intention to create a
into being by operation of trust,
law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). but by the
"No express construction of equity
trusts concerning an in order to satisfy the
immovable or any interest demands of
therein may be justice. It does not
proven by oral evidence. arise by agreement or
An implied trust may be intention but by
proven by oral evidence" operation of law." (89
(Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457). C.J.S. 726-727). "If a
o "No particular words are required for person obtains legal
the creation of an express title to property by
trust, it being sufficient that a fraud or concealment,
trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; courts of equity will
Art. impress upon the title
1444; Tuason de Perez vs. a so-called
Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. constructive trust in
Dalandan, favor of the
L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 defrauded party." A
SCRA 543, 546). "Express constructive trust is
trusts are not a trust in the
those which are created by technical
the direct and positive acts of sense (Gayondato vs.
the Treasurer of the P.I.,
parties, by some writing or 49 Phil. 244; See Art.
deed, or will, or by words 1456, Civil Code).
either o There is a rule that a trustee
expressly or impliedly cannot acquire by prescription the
evincing an intention to ownership of property
create a trust" (89 entrusted to him
C.J. S. 122). (Palma vs. Cristobal,
o "Implied trusts are those which, 77
without being expressed, are Phil. 712), or that an
deducible from the nature of action to compel a
the transaction as matters trustee to convey
of intent, or which are property
superinduced on the registered in his
transaction by operation of name in trust for the
law as matters of equity, benefit of the cestui
independently of the qui trust
particular intention of the does not prescribe
parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They (Manalang vs. Canlas,
are ordinarily subdivided 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal
into resulting and vs.
constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810),
722). or that the defense of
o "A resulting trust is broadly defined as prescription cannot
a trust which is raised or be
created by the act or set up in an action to
construction of law, but in its recover property held
more restricted sense it is a by a person in trust
trust raised by implication of for
law and presumed always to the benefit of another
(Sevilla vs. De los
 Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or
that property held in trust can he does not acquire by
be recovered by the prescription the property held
beneficiary in trust.
regardless of the lapse of time Thus, Section 38 of Act 190
(Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. provides that the law of
64; prescription
Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. does not apply "in the case of
122, 126; Juan vs. Zuiga, 62 a continuing and subsisting
O.G. trust"
1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado,
vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs.
1962. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira
See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs.
Phil. 31, 37).
o That rule applies squarely to express Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895,
trusts. The basis of the rule is 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs.
that the possession of a trustee is not Santos,
adverse. Not being adverse, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
o The rule of imprescriptibility of the action
to recover property held
in trust may possibly apply to
resulting trusts as long as the
trustee has not repudiated the
trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs.
Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3;
Martinez vs. Grao, 42 Phil. 35;
Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G.
11033, 16 SCRA 849).
x
o The rule of imprescriptibility was
misapplied to constructive trusts
(Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava
and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153.
Compare with Cuison vs.
Fernandez and Bengzon, 105
Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De
Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).
o Acquisitive prescription may bar the
action of the beneficiary
against the trustee in an
express trust for the
recovery of the
property held in trust where
(a) the trustee has
performed
unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the
cestui qui trust; (b) such
positive acts of repudiation
have been
made known to the cestui qui
trust and (c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive
(Laguna vs. Levantino, supra;
Salinas vs.
Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare
with the rule regarding co-
owners
found in the last paragraph of
Article 494, Civil Code; Casaas
vs.
Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs.
De Guzman, L-19060, May 29,
1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
o With respect to constructive trusts, the
rule is different. The
prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on
constructive
trust is now settled (Alzona vs.
Capunitan, L-10228, February 28,

1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De

Guzman, supra; Claridad vs.
Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales
vs. Jimenez, L-19073, January 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boaga vs.
Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason
& Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539,
January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84).
Prescription may supervene in an
implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-
22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449,
January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs.
Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 371).
 o And whether the trust is resulting or constructive,
its enforcement
may be barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-
889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs.
Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare
with Mejia vs.
Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]
x A present reading of the Quion24 and Sevilla25 cases,
invoked by respondents,
must be made in conjunction with and guided
accordingly by the principles established in the
afore-quoted case. Thus, while respondents
right to
inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at
the time of Maximinos death, their enforcement of
said right by appropriate legal action may be barred
by the prescription of the action.
x Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed
properties based on
implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code, which reads -
o ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by
law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
x Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law
(specifically, in this case, by
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents
had 10 years within which
to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in
Maximinos properties. The
next question now is when should the ten-year
prescriptive period be reckoned
from. The general rule is that an action for
reconveyance of real property based
on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration
and/or issuance of the title
to the property,26 not only because registration under
the Torrens system is a
constructive notice of title,27 but also because by
registering the disputed
properties exclusively in her name, Donata had
already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to
the same.
x By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in
Special Proceedings No.
928-R, Donata was able to register and
secure certificates of title over the
disputed properties in her name on 27 June
1960. The respondents filed with the RTC
their Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of the disputed real
properties, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years
after the registration of the said properties in
the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents
action for recovery of possession of the
disputed properties had clearly prescribed.
x Moreover, even though respondents Complaint
before the RTC in Civil Case No.
CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the
disputed properties, it does not make
their action to enforce their right to the said
properties imprescriptible. While as
a general rule, the action for partition
among co-owners does not prescribe so
long as the co-ownership is expressly or
impliedly recognized, as provided for in
Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to
emphasize that Donata had never
recognized respondents as co-owners or co-
heirs, either expressly or impliedly.28 Her
assertion before the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R that she was
Maximinos sole heir necessarily excludes
recognition of some other co-owner or
co-heir to the inherited properties;
Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of
action for partition of property owned in
common does not apply to the case at
bar.
ISSUE # 3: Whether such right of the Heirs of Maximino
is likewise limited by the principle of
laches.
98
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respondents action for
recovery of the disputed
HELD # 3: YES. properties because of laches.
x Other than prescription of action, respondents This Court pointed out
right to recover possession of the therein31 that -
disputed properties, based on implied
trust, is also barred by laches. The o In further support of their
defense contention of fraud by Donata, the
of laches, which is a question of inequity heirs
in permitting a claim to be enforced, of Maximino even
applies independently of prescription, emphasized that
which is a question of time. Prescription Donata lived along
is statutory; laches is equitable.29 the same
x Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right street as some of the
for an unreasonable and siblings of Maximino
unexplained length of time, warranting a and, yet, she failed to
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or inform them of the
declined to assert it. This equitable CFI Order, dated [15
defense is based upon grounds of public January 1960], in
policy, which requires the Special
discouragement of stale claims for the Proceedings No. 928-
peace of society.30 R, and the issuance
x This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its in her name of new
Decision the basis for barring TCTs
 covering the real properties
which belonged to the estate
of
Maximino. This Court,
however, appreciates such
information
differently. It actually works
against the heirs of Maximino.
Since
they only lived nearby,
Maximinos siblings had ample
opportunity
to inquire or discuss with
Donata the status of the
estate of their
deceased brother. Some of the
real properties, which
belonged to
the estate of Maximino, were
also located within the same
area as
their residences in Cebu City,
and Maximinos siblings could
have
regularly observed the actions
and behavior of Donata with
regard
to the said real properties. It is
uncontested that from the
time of
Maximinos death on 1 May
1952, Donata had possession
of the
real properties. She managed
the real properties and even
collected rental fees on some
of them until her own death on
1 void.
November 1977. After
Donatas death, Erlinda took
possession of
the real properties, and
continued to manage the
same and collect
the rental fees thereon.
Donata and, subsequently,
Erlinda, were so
obviously exercising rights of
ownership over the real
properties, in
exclusion of all others, which
must have already put the
heirs of
Maximino on guard if they
truly believed that they still
had rights
thereto.
o The heirs of Maximino knew he died
on 1 May 1952. They even
attended his wake. They did
not offer any explanation as
to why
they had waited 33 years
from Maximinos death
before one of
them, Silverio, filed a
Petition for Letters of
Administration for the
intestate estate of Maximino
on 21 January 1985. After
learning
that the intestate estate of
Maximino was already settled
in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, they waited another
two years, before
instituting, on 3 March
1987, Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, the
Complaint for partition,
annulment and
recovery of the real
property belonging to
the estate of
Maximino. x x x
x Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted
paragraphs, as well as
respondents conduct before this Court,
particularly the belated submission of
evidence and argument of new
issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a
penchant for delayed action,
without any proffered reason or
justification for
such delay.
x It is well established that the law serves
those who are vigilant and diligent and
not those who sleep when the
law requires them to act. The
law does not encourage laches,
indifference, negligence or
ignorance. On the contrary, for
a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he
must show that he is not guilty
of any of the aforesaid failings
ISSUE # 4: Whether the subject CFI Order
dated January 15, 1960 declaring Donata
as the sole heir of Maximino is VOID.
HELD # 4: NO.
x Respondents presented only in their Reply
and Supplemental Reply to the
petitioners Opposition to their
Motion for Reconsideration the
argument that the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R is void
and, thus, it cannot have any
legal effect. Consequently, the
registration of the
disputed properties in the name
of Donata pursuant to such
Order was likewise
o This Court is unconvinced.
x In the jurisprudence referred to by the
respondents,33 an order or judgment is
considered void when
rendered by the court without
or in excess of its jurisdiction
or in violation of a mandatory
duty, circumstances which
are not present in the case at
bar.
x Distinction must be made between a void
judgment and a voidable one, thus -
o "* * * A voidable judgment is
one which, though not a mere
nullity,
is liable to be made
void when a person
who has a right to
proceed
in the matter takes
the proper steps to
have its invalidity
declared.
It always contains
some defect which
may become fatal. It
carries
within it the means of
its own overthrow. But
unless and until it is
duly annulled, it is
attended with all the
ordinary
consequences of a
legal judgment. The
party against whom it
is given may escape
its
effect as a bar or an
obligation, but only by
a proper application to
have it vacated or
reversed. Until that is
done, it will be
efficacious
as a claim, an
estoppel, or a source
of title. If no
proceedings are
ever taken against it,
it will continue throughout its
life to all intents it will be sustained by the
a valid sentence. If emanating ordinary presumptions of
from a court of general regularity, and it is not open to
jurisdiction, impeachment in any collateral
action. * * *"
o But it is otherwise when the judgment is
void. "A void judgment is
in legal effect no judgment. By it
no rights are divested. From it no
rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all
proceedings
founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor
bars any
one. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are
void. The parties attempting to
enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. The purchaser at a
sale by virtue of its authority finds
himself without title and without
redress." (Freeman on Judgments,
sec. 117, citing Campbell vs.
McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs.
Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs.
Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs.

Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418;

Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed,
549;
Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35
Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2
Dill.,
312; Commercial Bank of
Manchester vs. Martin, 9
Smedes & M.,
613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan.,
259. See also Cornell vs.
Barnes, 7
Hill, 35; Dawson and Another
vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs.
Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs.
Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs.
Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
o It is not always easy to draw the line of
demarcation between a
void judgment and a voidable
one, but all authorities agree
that
jurisdiction over the subject-
matter is essential to the
validity of a
judgment and that want of such
jurisdiction renders it void and a

mere nullity. In the eye of the

law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs.

Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs.

Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs.

Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and

McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440;
Central Bank of Georgia vs.
Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs.
Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co.
vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co.,
111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber,
4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6
Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene
[Iowa], 374.)34
x The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata
on the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the case, namely, the
intestate estate of Maximino. Donatas
fraud and misrepresentation may have
rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960, voidable, but not void on its face.
Hence, the said Order, which already
became final and executory, can only be set
aside by direct action to annul and
enjoin its enforcement.35 It cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack as is
 being done in this case. Note that respondents
Complaint before the RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession
of the disputed properties. The annulment sought in
the Complaint was not that
of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the
certificates of title over the
properties issued in Donatas name. So until and
unless respondents bring a
direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
and attain a favorable judgment therein, the
assailed Order remains valid and binding.
x Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul
an order or
judgment based on fraud must be brought within
four years from the discovery
of the fraud.36 If it is conceded that the respondents
came to know of Donatas
fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the
RTC proceedings which
they instituted for the settlement of Maximinos
estate, then their right to file an
action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by
Donata for the settlement of Maximinos estate), has
likewise prescribed by present time.

RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant, vs. NICOLASITO S.

SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.
A.M. No. P-01-1448

June 25, 2013

EN BANC

FACTS:
x Trinidad Sabidong, complainant Rodolfos mother, is one of
the longtime
occupants of the subject property
x The said lot was part of the and subject of an ejectment suit
filed by the Hodges
Estate which was pending before the MTCC Iloilo Br 4 (where
Solas was the CoC)
o Sabidongs among the named defendants
therein
x MTCC ordered defendants to vacate and pay
x Sola submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11
and 12
o Hodges Estate rejected
in view of an application to purchase
already filed by
the actual occupant of Lot
12, "in line with the policy of
the Probate Court to give
priority to the actual
occupants in awarding approval of
Offers".
x Sola submitted another offer Purchase on installment Lot 11
o approved upon the courts observation that the
occupants of the
subject lots "have not manifested their
desire to purchase the lots they are
occupying up to this date and considering
time restraint and considering further,
that the sales in favor of the x x x offerors
are most beneficial to the estate x x x".
x Lot 11 was subsequently conveyed to Sola for the total
purchase price of
P50,000
o TCT was then issued
x MTCC issued a writ of demolition (to execute its decision)
x Rodolfo filed a complaint against Sola before SC
o asserting that as court employee respondent
cannot buy property
in litigation (consequently he is not a
buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and
grave abuse of authority
o The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of
Court III, MTCC,
Iloilo City, has knowledge, by reason of his
position that in 1983
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
of the estate and
that he needed a
Hodges Estate was downpayment right
ejecting occupants of its away. All the while,
land. x x x Taking the Sabidong family
advantage of this inside (who
information that the land were carpenters,
subject of an laundrywomen, a
ejectment case in the janitor, persons who
Municipal Trial Court in belong to
Cities, Iloilo City, the underprivileged)
whom respondent is a relied on the
Clerk of Court III, the representations of
respondent the
surreptitiously offered to buy the said respondent that he
lot in litigation was authorized to
o respondent met with the family of the facilitate the sale,
complainant and negotiated with more
for the sale of the property reason that
and transfer of the title in respondent
favor of the represented himself
latter. Respondent made the as the City Sheriff;
complainant and his family x Rodolfo instituted criminal case for
believed estafa AND civil case for annulment of
that he is the representative title, damages and injunction
 o BOTH dismissed (5) Justices,
x OCA found Sola guilty of violating the rule judges, prosecuting
under Art 1491 CC (re prohibited attorneys, clerks of
sales); recommended suspension superio
x SC referred to administrative case to Executive r and
Judge Hortillo (RTC Iloilo) inferior
x EJ required Sola to file memorandum courts,
x Sola filed memorandum and
o maintained that his purchase of the other
subject land is not covered by officers
the prohibition in paragraph 5, and
Article 1491 of the Civil Code. employ
He ees
pointed out that he bought connec
Lot 11-A a decade after the ted
MTCC of with
Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the
the ejectment of Priscila admini
Saplagio and stratio
Trinidad Sabidong from the n of
subject lot. He insisted that justice,
public trust the
was observed when property
complainant was accorded his and
right of first rights in
refusal in the purchase of Lot litigation
11-A, albeit the latter failed or levied
to avail said right. Asserting
that he is a buyer in good upon an
faith and for value, executio
respondent cited the n before
dismissal of the cases for the
Estafa and court
annulment of title and within
damages which whose
complainant filed against jurisdicti
him on or
x Sola then compulsory retired BUT his benefits territory
were not released they
x OCA found respondent liable for serious and exercise
grave misconduct and dishonesty their
and recommended the forfeiture of respecti
respondents salary for six months, ve
which shall be deducted from his functions;
retirement benefits this
o his unilateral acts of extinguishing the prohibition
contract to sell and forfeiting includes
the amounts he received the act of
from complainant and acquiring
Saplagio without by
due notice, respondent failed assignmen
to act with justice and t and shall
equity. He apply to
found respondents denial to lawyers,
be anchored merely on the with
fact that respect to
he had not issued receipts the
which was belied by his property
admission that and rights
he had asked money for the which
expenses of partitioning Lot may be
11 from the object
complainant and Saplagio. of any
Since their PAG-IBIG loan litigation
applications in which
did not materialize, they may
complainant should have take part
returned the amounts given by virtue
to him by complainant and of their
Saplagio profession
.
ISSUE: Whether the subject sale is among those x The rationale advanced for the prohibition
prohibited under Art 1491 of the CC, is that public policy disallows the
considering the position of Sola that the subject transactions in view of the
matter thereof is no longer in litigation. fiduciary relationship involved,
i.e., the relation of trust and
HELD: YES. confidence and the peculiar
x Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code control exercised by these
prohibits court officers such as clerks persons.32 "In so providing, the
of court from acquiring property Code tends to prevent fraud, or
involved in litigation within the more precisely, tends not to give
jurisdiction or territory of their courts. occasion for fraud, which is what
Said provision reads: can and must be done."33
o Article 1491. The following persons x For the prohibition to apply, the sale or
cannot acquire by purchase, assignment of the property
even at a public or judicial must take place during the
auction, either in person or pendency of the litigation
through the mediation of involving the property.34
another: Where the property is acquired
 after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the Civil Code attaches.35
x In the case at bar, when respondent purchased
Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994,
the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31,
1983 had long become final. Be that as
it may, it can not be said that the
property is no longer "in litigation" at that
time considering that it was
part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc.
No. 1672).
x A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or
litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the
judge.36 A property forming part of the
estate under judicial settlement continues
to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring
the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the
order for the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated.37 The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all
the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.38 Since there is no evidence
to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of
Iloilo, Branch 27, had already
been closed and terminated at the time of
the execution of the Deed of Sale
With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994,
Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
x This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11
in favor of respondent did
not violate the rule on disqualification to
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No.
1672 was then pending before another court
(RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of
Court.
x On the charges against the respondent, we find him
liable for dishonesty and
grave misconduct.
x Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior as
well as gross negligence by a public
officer. To warrant dismissal from
service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous
and not trifling. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. The misconduct
must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public
officers official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties
of the office.39
x Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack
of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness."40
x In this case, respondent deceived complainants
family who were led to believe
that he is the legal representative of the
Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of
such power to intercede for overstaying
occupants of the estates properties like
complainant. Boasting of his position as a
court officer, a City Sheriff at that,
complainants family completely relied on
his repeated assurance that they will not
be ejected from the premises. Upon
learning that the lot they were
occupying was for sale and that they had to
negotiate for it through respondent,
complainants family readily gave the
amounts he demanded and, along with
Saplagio, complied with the requirements
for a loan application with PAG-IBIG.
All the while and unknown to complainants
family, respondent was actually
working to acquire Lot 11 for himself.
x Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the
Hodges Estate for the sale of
the property to him, he collected as down
payment P5,000 from complainants
family in July 1986. Four months later, on
November 18, 1986, the probate court
approved respondents offer to purchase Lot
11. The latter received further down
payment from complainant in the amount of
P10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or
before the Deed of Sale with Mortgage41
dated November 21, 1994 could be
executed in respondents favor.
x Thereafter, respondent demanded P3,000 from
complainant supposedly for the
subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter and
the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until
respondent obtained title over said lot that
the same was subdivided into Lots
11-A and 11-B. The records42 of the case
show that the Subdivision Plan dated
 April 25, 1996, duly approved by the Land
Management Services (DENR)
subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11-B, was
inscribed on February 28, 1997 - two years after
TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was issued in
respondents name on December 5, 1994.
x Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of P2,000 to
defray the
expenses for documentation and transfer of title in
complainants name. In the
latter instance, while it may be argued that
respondent already had the capacity
to sell the subject property, the sum of all the
circumstances belie an honest
intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to
complainant. We note the inscription in TCT No. T-
1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges that respondent
executed a Request dated February 19, 1997 "for the
issuance of separate titles in the name of the
registered owner."44 Soon after, TCT No. T-11646745
covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T-11646846 covering
Lot 11-B were issued in the name of
respondent on February 28, 1997 - only eight
months after he executed the Contract to Sell47
in favor of complainant on June 3, 1996.
x Respondents bare denials were correctly disregarded by the
Court Administrator
in the light of his own admission that he indeed asked
money from both
complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on record
clearly established that by
misrepresenting himself as the estates representative
and as a court officer
having the power to protect complainants family from
eviction, respondent was
able to collect sums totaling P20,000 from
complainants family. Even after the
latter realized they were duped since respondent was
already the owner of Lot
11, they still offered to buy the property from him.
Respondent, however,
changed his mind and no longer wanted to sell the
property after nothing
happened to the loan applications of complainant and
Saplagio. This subsequent
unilateral cancellation by respondent of the contract
to sell with complainant may
have been an afterthought, and plainly unjustified,
based merely on his own
assumption that complainant could not make full
payment. But it did not negate
the deception and fraudulent acts perpetrated against
complainants family who
were forced into submission by the constant threat of
eviction. Such acts
constitute grave misconduct for which respondent
should be held answerable.
x Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on
September 10, 2007,
for this additional administrative case he should be
fined in an amount equivalent
to his salary for six months which shall likewise be
deducted from his retirement
benefits.

B. Escheats [Rule 91]

Section 1. When an by whom petition filed. When a person

dies intestate, seized of real property in the Philippines, leaving
no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the
Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the deceased last resided or in
which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting
forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be
declared escheated.
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Section 2. Order for hearing. If the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, which date shall be not more than six
(6) months after the entry of the order, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for six (6) successive
weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the
province, as the court shall be deem best.
Section 3. Hearing and judgment. Upon
satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the person died
intestate, seized of real or personal property in the
Philippines, leaving no heir or person
entitled to the same, and no sufficient cause being
shown to the contrary, the court shall adjudge that
the estate of the estate of the deceased in the
Philippines, after the payment of just debts and
charges, shall escheat; and shall, pursuant to
law, assign the personal estate to the
municipality or city where he last resided in
the Philippines, and the real estate to the
municipalities or cities, respectively, in which
the same is situated. If the deceased never
resided in the Philippines, the whole estate
may be assigned to the respective
municipalities or cities where the same is
located. Shall estate shall be for the benefit of
public schools, and public charitable
institutions and centers in said municipalities
or cities.
The court, at the instance of an interested
party, or on its own motion, may order the
establishment of a permanent trust, so that
the only income from the property shall be
used.
Section 4. When and by whom claim to
estate filed. If a devisee, legatee, heir,
widow, widower, or other person entitled to
such estate appears and files a claim thereto
with the court within five (5) years from the
date of such judgment, such person shall have favor, and a certification from the
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipal treasurer that she had
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the been
proceeds after deducting reasonable charges for the declaring the land as her and
care of the estate; but a claim not made within the her husband's property for
said time shall be forever barred. tax purposes since
1993.21
1. Definition x For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico
presented a Deed of Donation22 dated
January 4, 1984, showing
2. Historical Background and Legal Basis
that the lot was given to him
by Fermina and according to
3. Actions for Reversions him, he immediately took
possession in 1985 and
Section 5. Other actions for escheat. Until continues in possession up
otherwise provided by law, actions reversion or to the present.23
escheat of properties alienated in violation of the
Constitution or of any statute shall be governed by
this rule, except that the action shall be instituted in
the province where the land lies in whole or in part.

CASTORIO ALVARICO, petitioner, vs.

AMELITA L. SOLA, respondent.
G.R. No. 138953 June 6, 2002
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
x Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of
respondent Amelita Sola while
Fermina Lopez is petitioner's aunt, and also
Amelita's adoptive mother
x Bureau of Lands approved and granted the
Miscellaneous Sales Application
(MSA) of Fermina over the subject land in
Waterfront, Cebut City
x Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication
and Transfer of Rights3 over
Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to
assume all the obligations, duties, and
conditions imposed upon Fermina under
the MSA
x Amelita then paid to the Bureau of Lands the
amount of P282,900
x BL issued an order approving the transfer of
rights and granting the
amendment of the application from Fermina to
Amelita
o OCT was issued
x Castorio filed an action for reconveyance
against Amelita.
o He claimed that on January 4, 1984,
Fermina donated the land to
him
o immediately thereafter, he took
possession of the same.
o He averred that the donation to him
had the effect of withdrawing
the earlier transfer to Amelita
x Amelita filed Answer
o maintained that the donation to
petitioner is void because Fermina
was no longer the owner of
the property when it was
allegedly
donated to petitioner, the
property having been
transferred earlier
to her.13
o She added that the donation was void
because of lack of approval
from the Bureau of Lands,
and that she had validly
acquired the land as
Fermina's rightful heir.
o She also denied that she is a trustee
of the land for petitioner.
x RTC in favor of Castorio
x CA reversed RTC
x Castorio filed a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE # 1: Who between Castorio and Amelita has a better

claim to the land?

HELD # 1: Amelita.
x To prove she has a better claim, respondent
Amelita Sola submitted a copy of
OCT No. 3439 in her name and her
husband's,19 a Deed of Self-Adjudication
and Transfer of Rights20 over the property
dated 1983 executed by Fermina in her
 disputed property in bad faith, only the
x Petitioner further contests the CA ruling that declared as a State can institute reversion proceedings
private document said under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.28
Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, despite Thus:
the fact that a certified true o Sec. 101.All actions for reversion to the
and correct copy of the same was obtained from Government of lands of
the Notarial Records Office, the public domain or
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City on June 11, 1993 and improvements thereon shall be
acknowledged before Atty. Numeriano instituted by the Solicitor General
Capangpangan, then Notary Public for Cebu.24 or the officer acting in his stead,
x Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of in the proper courts, in the name
the parties, we find of the Republic of the Philippines.
that no reversible error was committed by the x In other words, a private individual may not bring an
appellate court in holding that action for reversion or any
herein petitioner's complaint against respondent action which would have the effect of
should be dismissed. The canceling a free patent and the
evidence on record and the applicable law corresponding certificate of title issued on
indubitably favor respondent. the basis thereof, such that the land
x Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the covered thereby will again form part of the
New Civil Code, which public domain. Only the Solicitor
provide: General or the officer acting in his stead may
o Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or do so.29 Since Amelita Sola's
more different title originated from a grant by the
donees shall be governed by the government, its cancellation is a
provisions concerning the sale of the matter between the grantor and the
same thing to two or more different grantee.30 Clearly then, petitioner
persons. has no standing at all to question the validity
o Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been of Amelita's title. It
sold to different follows that he cannot "recover" the property
vendees, the ownership shall be because, to begin with,
transferred to the person who may have he has not shown that he is the rightful
first taken possession thereof in good owner thereof.1wphi1.nt
faith, if it should be x Anent petitioner's contention that it was the
movable property. intention of Fermina for Amelita to
Should it be immovable property, the hold the property in trust for him, we held
ownership shall that if this was really the intention of
belong to the person Fermina, then this should have been clearly
acquiring it who in good stated in the Deed of Self-
faith first recorded it in the Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of
Registry of Property. Donation executed in 1984, or in a
Should there be no inscription, the subsequent instrument. Absent any
ownership shall persuasive proof of that intention in any
pertain to the person who written instrument, we are not prepared to
in good faith was first in accept petitioner's bare allegation
the possession; and, in the concerning the donor's state of mind.
absence thereof, to the
person who presents the _________________________________
oldest title, provided there is
good faith. (Emphasis GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP
supplied.)
x Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she
[RULES 92-100, as amended by AM 03-02-05-SC]
registered the land
in her name and, based on the abovementioned 1. Venue vs. Jurisdiction [Rule 92]
rules, he has a better right over
the property because he was first in material Section 1. Where to institute proceedings.
possession in good faith. However, Guardianship of a person or estate of a
this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola minor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of
in acquiring the title is First Instance of the province, or in the
devoid of evidentiary support. For one, the execution justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the
of public documents, as in municipal court chartered city where
the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the the minor or incompetent persons resides, and if he
presumption of regularity, resides in a foreign country, in the Court
hence convincing evidence is required to assail and of First Instance of the province wherein his property or
controvert them.25 Second, the party thereof is situated;
it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued in 1989 provided, however, that where the value of the
in the name of Amelita. It property of such minor or incompetent exceeds that
requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or municipal
defeat the Original Certificate court, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Court
of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of First Instance.
of regularity of
issuance.26 A Torrens title, once registered, serves as In the City of Manila the proceedings shall be instituted in
notice to the whole world. All persons must take the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
notice and no one can plead ignorance of its Court.
registration.27
Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." Under
ISSUE # 2: Whether Castorio corrected resorted to an action for reversion. this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
HELD # 2: NO. hospitalized lepers,
x Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to
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Henedino M. Brondial)

Section 1. Who may petition for

prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit
and
exploitation.
Section 3. Transfer of venue. The court taking
cognizance of a guardianship
proceeding, may transfer the same to the court of
another province or municipality wherein the ward
has acquired real property, if he has transferred
thereto his bona-fide residence, and the latter court
shall have full jurisdiction to continue the
proceedings, without requiring
payment of additional court fees.
appointment of guardian for resident.
Any
relative, friend, or other person on behalf
of a resident minor or incompetent who
has no
parent or lawful guardian, or the minor
himself if fourteen years of age or over,
may petition the court having jurisdiction
for the appointment of a general guardian
for the person or
estate, or both, of such minor or
incompetent. An officer of the Federal
Administration of the
United States in the Philippines may also file
a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the
Director of Health, in favor of an insane
person who should be hospitalized, or in
favor of an
isolated leper.

2. Appointments, Kinds, Qualifications [Rule 93]

Section 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the 3. Requirement [Rule 94]
appointment of a general guardian must show, so
far as known to the petitioner: Section 1. Bond to be given before
issuance of letters. Amount. Condition.
(a) The jurisdiction facts; Before a guardian appointed enters upon the
execution of his trust, or letters of
(b) The minority or incompetency guardianship issue, he shall give a bond, in
rendering the appointment necessary or such sum as the court directs, conditioned
convenient; as follows:

(c) The names, ages, and residence of the

relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the
person having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of

guardianship.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the

petition or verification shall render void the issuance
of letters of guardianship.

Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice

thereof. When a petition for the appointment of a
general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time
and place for hearing the same, and shall cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province,
including the minor if above 14 years of age or the
incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special
notice thereof to be given.

Section 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested

person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the
petition on the ground of majority of the alleged
minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the
insuitability of the person for whom letters are
prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed,
or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to
any suitable person named in the opposition.

Section 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue.

At the hearing of the petition the alleged in
competent must be present if able to attend, and it
must be shown that the
required notice has been given. Thereupon the courts
shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of
their respective allegations, and, if the person in
question is a minor, or
incompetent it shall be appoint a suitable guardian
of his person or estate, or both, with the powers
and duties hereinafter specified.

Section 6. When and how guardian for non-resident

appointed. Notice. When a person liable to be put
under guardianship resides without the Philippines
but the estate
therein, any relative or friend of such person, or any
one interested in his estate, in
expectancy or otherwise, may petition a court
having jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian
for the estate, and if, after notice given to such
person and in such manner as the court deems
proper, by publication or otherwise, and hearing, the
court is satisfied that such non-resident is a minor or
incompetent rendering a guardian necessary or
convenient, it may appoint a guardian for such
estate.

Section 7. Parents as guardians. When the

property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the
father of the mother, without the necessity
of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian.
When the property of the child is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother
shall be considered guardian of the child's
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under this rules, and shall file the
petition required by section 2 hereof. For good reasons
the court may, however, appoint
another suitable person.

Section 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or

judgments under this rule shall be served upon
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the minor or incompetent person resides or where
his property or part thereof is situated.

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3)
months, a true and complete inventory of all the estate, real and
personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession or
knowledge of any other person for him;
(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to
manage and dispose of the estate according to these rules for
the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper care,
custody, and education of the ward;
(c) To render a true and just account of all the estate of
the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived
therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same,
at the time designated by these rules and such other times as
the courts directs, and at the expiration of his trust to settle his
accounts with the court and deliver and pay over all the estate,
effects, and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from him on
such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.
Section 2. When new bond may be required and old
sureties discharged.
Whenever it is deemed necessary, the court may require a
new bond to be given by the
guardian, and may discharge the sureties on the old bond
from further liability, after due
notice to interested persons, when no injury can result
therefrom to those interested in the
estate.
Section 3. Bonds to be filed. Actions thereon. Every bond
given by a guardian shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the
court, and, in case of the breach of a condition thereof, may be
prosecuted in the same proceeding or in a separate action for the
use and benefit of the ward or of any other person legally
interested in the estate.
direct, and a careful investigation as to the necessity
and propriety of the proposed action.
Section 6. Proceedings when the person suspected of
embezzling or concealing
property of ward. Upon complaint of the guardian or
ward, or of any person having
actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward
as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that
anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a
written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate,
the court may cite the suspected person to appear for
examination touching such money, goods, interest, or
instrument, and make such orders as will secure
the estate against such embezzlement,
concealment or conveyance.
Section 7. Inventories and accounts of guardians, and
appraisement of estates. A guardian must render to
the court an inventory of the estate of his ward within
three (3)
months after his appointment, and annually after such
appointment an inventory and account,
the rendition of any of which may be compelled upon the
application of an interested person.
Such inventories and accounts shall be sworn to by the
guardian. All the estate of the ward
described in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the
appraisement the court may request
the assistance of one or more of the inheritance tax
appraisers. And whenever any property of the ward not
included in an inventory already rendered is discovered,
or suceeded to, or
acquired by the ward, like proceedings shall be had for
securing an inventory and
appraisement thereof within three (3) months after such
discovery, succession, or acquisition.

4. Power and Duties [Rule 96] Section 8. When guardian's accounts presented for
settlement. Expenses and compensation allowed.
Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian
appointment, and as often thereafter as may be
appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his
required, a guardian must present his account to the
ward, and the management of his estate, or the
court for settlement and allowance. In the settlement of
manangement of the estate only, as the case may be. The
the account, the guardian, other than a parent, shall be
guardian of the estate of a non-
allowed the amount of his reasonable expenses incurred
resident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward
in the execution of his trust and also such compensation
within the Philippines, and
for his services as the court deems just, not exceeding
no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed
fifteen per centum of the net income of the ward.
shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
102
Section 2. Guardian to pay debts of ward. Every guardian
must pay the ward's just debts out of his personal estate and the
income of his real estate, if sufficient; if not, then out of his real
estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or encumbrance
thereof.

Section 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear

in actions for ward. A guardian must settle all accounts of his
ward, and demand, sue for, and receive all debts due him, or
may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and
give discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just
dividend of the estate and effects; and he shall appear for and
represent his ward in all actions and special proceedings, unless
another person be appointed for that purpose.

Section 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied

to maintenance of
ward. A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally
and without the waste, and
apply the income and profits thereof, so far as may be necessary,
to the comfortable and
suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be
any; and if such income and
profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell
or encumber the real estate,
upon being authorized by order so to do, and apply to such of
the proceeds as may be
necessary to such maintenance.

Section 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition

proceedings after
hearing. The court may authorized the guardian to join in an
assent to a partition of real
or personal estate held by the ward jointly or in common with
others, but such authority shall
only be granted after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of
the ward as the court may
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(a) the surviving grandparent and

5. Termination [Rule 97]
Section 1. Petition that competency of ward be
adjudged, and proceedings
thereupon. A person who has been declared
incompetent for any reason, or his guardian,
relative, or friend, may petition the court to have his
present competency judicially
determined. The petition shall be verified by oath,
and shall state that such person is then
competent. Upon receiving the petition, the court
shall fix a time for hearing the questions
raised thereby, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the guardian of the person
so declared incompetent, and to the ward. On the
trial, the guardian or relatives of the ward,
and, in the discretion of the court, any other person,
may contest the right to the relief
demanded, and witnesses may be called and
In case several grandparents
survive, the court shall select
examined by the parties or by the court on
its
own motion. If it be found that the person is
no longer incompetent, his competency shall
be
adjudged and the guardianship shall cease.
Section 2. When the guardian removed or
allowed to resign. New appointment. When
a guardian becomes insane or otherwise
incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty
(30) days after it is due to render an account
or make a return, the court may, upon
reasonable notice to the
guardian, remove him, and compel him to
surrender the estate of the ward to the
person
found to be lawfully entitled thereto. A
guardian may resign when it appears proper to
allow
the same; and upon his resignation or removal the
court may appoint another in his place.
Section 3. Other termination of guardianship. The
marriage or voluntary
emancipation of a minor ward terminates the
guardianship of the peson of the ward, and shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though
he were of age, but he cannot borrow
the money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother,
or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. The guardian of any person may be
discharged by the court when it appears, upon
the application of the ward or otherwise, that the
guardianship is no longer necessary.
(e) availability to exercise the powers
and duties of a guardian for the full
period of the guardianship;
(f) lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and
(g) ability to manage the property of the minor.
Sec. 6. Who may be appointed guardian
of the person or property, or both, of a
minor. - In default of parents or a court-
appointed guardian, the court may
appoint a
guardian of the person or property, or
both, of a minor, observing as far as
practicable, the following order of
preference:

Section 4. Record to be kept by the justice of the

peace or municipal judge.
When a justice of the peace or municipal court
takes cognizance of the proceedings in
pursuance of the provisions of these rules, the
record of the proceedings shall be kept as in the
Court of First Instance.

Section 5. Service of judgment. Final orders of

judgments under this rule shall be served upon
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the minor or incompetent person resides or where
his property or part thereof is situated.

AM 03-02-05-SC
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule shall

apply to petitions for guardianship over the person
or property, or both, of a minor. chan robles virtual
law library
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the person and
property of their unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment.
In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the
provisions of the Family Code on
guardianship.

Sec. 2. Who may petition for appointment of guardian.

- On grounds authorized by
law, any relative or other person on behalf of a minor,
or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over,
may petition the Family Court for the appointment of a
general guardian over the person or property, or both,
of such minor. The petition may also be filed by the
Secretary of Social Welfare and Development and by
the Secretary of Health in the case of an insane minor
who needs to be hospitalized.

Sec. 3. Where to file petition. - A petition for

guardianship over the person or property, or both, of
a minor may be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the minor
actually resides. If he resides in a foreign country,
the petition shall be flied with the Family Court of
the province or city where his property or any part
thereof is situated.

Sec. 4. Grounds of petition. - The grounds for the

appointment of a guardian over the person or
property, or both, of a minor are the following:

(a) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents;

(b) suspension, deprivation or termination of parental
authority; chan robles virtual law library
(c) remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter
Is found unsuitable to exercise parental authority;
or
(d) when the best interests of the minor so require.cralaw

Sec. 5. Qualifications of guardians. - In appointing a

guardian, the court shall consider the guardians:

(a) moral character; chan robles virtual law library

(b) physical, mental and psychological condition;
(c) financial status;
(d) relationship of trust with the minor;
any of them taking Into account all relevant considerations;
(b) the oldest brother or sister of the minor over twenty-one Sec. 12. When and how a guardian of the property for
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; non-resident minor is
(c) the actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of appointed; notice. - When the minor resides outside the
age, unless unfit or disqualified; Philippines but has property in the
and Philippines, any relative or friend of such minor, or any
(d) any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, one interested in his property, in
would serve the best interests of the minor. expectancy or otherwise, may petition the Family Court
for the appointment of a guardian over
Sec. 7. Contents of petition. - A petition for the appointment of the property.
a general guardian must allege the following:
Notice of hearing of the petition shall be given to the
(a) The jurisdictional facts; minor by publication or any other means
(b) The name, age and residence of the prospective ward; as the court may deem proper. The court may dispense
(c) The ground rendering the appointment necessary or convenient; with the presence of the non-resident
library minor.
(d) The death of the parents of the minor or the termination,
deprivation or suspension of their parental authority; If after hearing the court is satisfied that such non-
(e) The remarriage of the minors surviving parent; resident is a minor and a guardian is necessary or
(f) The names, ages, and residences of relatives within the 4th convenient, it may appoint a guardian over his
civil degree of the minor, and of persons having him in their property.
care and custody;
(g) The probable value, character and location of the property of the Sec. 13. Service of final and executory judgment or
minor; and order. - The final and executory judgment or order shall
(h) The name, age and residence of the person for whom letters of be served upon the Local Civil Registrar of the
guardianship are prayed. municipality or city where the minor resides and the
Register of Deeds of the place where his property or
The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a part thereof is situated shall annotate the same in the
certification against forum shopping. corresponding title, and report to the court his
However, no defect in the petition or verification shall render compliance within fifteen days from receipt of the order.
void the issuance of letters of
guardianship. Sec. 14. Bond of guardian; amount; conditions. - Before
he enters upon the execution of his trust, or letters of
Sec. 8. Time and notice of hearing. - When a petition for the guardianship issue, an appointed guardian may be
appointment of a general required to post a
guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for its bond in such sum as the court shall determine and conditioned as
hearing, and shall cause reasonable follows:
notice to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition,
including the minor if he is (a) To make and return to the court, within three
fourteen years of age or over, and may direct other general or months after the issuance of his letters of
special notice to be given. guardianship, a true and complete Inventory of all the
property, real and personal, of his ward
Sec. 9. Case study report. - The court shall order a social worker which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to
to conduct a case study of the minor and all the prospective the possession or knowledge of any
guardians and submit his report and recommendation to the other person in his behalf;
court for its guidance before the scheduled hearing. The social (b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to
worker may intervene on behalf of the minor if he finds that the manage and dispose of the property according to this
petition for guardianship should be denied. rule for the best interests of the ward, and to provide
for his proper care, custody and education;
Sec. 10. Opposition to petition. - Any interested person may (c) To render a true and Just account of all the property
contest the petition by filing a written opposition based on such of the ward in his hands, and of all
grounds as the majority of the minor or the unsuitability of the proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the
person for whom letters are prayed, and pray that the petition be management and disposition of the same,
denied, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any at the time designated by this rule and such other times
suitable person named in the opposition. as the court directs; and at the
expiration of his trust, to settle his accounts with the
Sec. 11. Hearing and order for letters to issue. - At the hearing court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects,
of the petition, it must be shown that the requirement of notice and monies remaining in his hands, or due from him on
has been complied with. The prospective ward shall be such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;
presented to the court. The court shall hear the evidence of the and
parties in support of their respective allegations. If warranted, (d) To perform all orders of the court and such other duties as
the court shall appoint a suitable guardian of the person or may be required by law.
property, or both, of the minor.

At the discretion of the court, the hearing on guardianship may be

103
closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be
released without its approval.
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Sec. 15. Where to file the bond; action thereon. - The
bond posted by a guardian shall
be filed in the Family Court and, In case of breach of
any of its conditions, the guardian may
be prosecuted in the same proceeding for the
benefit of the ward or of any other person
legally interested in the property.
Whenever necessary, the court may require the
guardian to post a new bond and may discharge
from further liability the sureties on the old bond
after due notice to interested persons, if no
injury may result therefrom to those interested in
the property.
Sec. 16. Bond of parents as guardians of property
of minor. - If the market value of
the property or the annual Income of the child
exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned
shall furnish a bond In such amount as the court may
determine, but in no case less than ten per centurn
of the value of such property or annual income, to
guarantee the performance of the
obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond
shall be flied in the Family Court of the place
where
the child resides or, if the child resides in a
foreign country, in the Family Court of the
place
where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a
summary special proceeding In which all
incidents and
issues regarding the performance of the
obligations of a general guardian shall be
heard and
resolved.
Sec. 17. General duties of guardian. - A
guardian shall have the care and custody of
the person of his ward and the management
of his property, or only the management of
his
property. The guardian of the property of a reasonable time and place therein specified
nonresident minor shall have the management of all and show cause why the petition should not
his property within the Philippines. be granted.

A guardian shall perform the following duties: Sec. 21. Hearing on return of order; costs. -
At the time and place designated in the
(a) To pay the just debts of the ward out of the order to show cause, the court shall hear
personal property and the income of the real the allegations and evidence of the
property of the ward, If the same is sufficient; petitioner and
otherwise, out of the real property of the ward upon next of kin, and other persons interested,
obtaining an order for its sale or encumbrance; together with their witnesses, and grant or
(b) To settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, deny the petition as the best interests of the
sue for, receive all debts due him, or may, ward may require.
with the approval of the court, compound for the
same and give discharges to the debtor on Sec. 22. Contents of order for sale or
receiving a fair and just dividend of the property and encumbrance and its duration; bond. - If, after
effects; and to appear for and represent
the ward in all actions and special proceedings, full examination, it is necessary, or would be
unless another person is appointed for that beneficial to the ward, to sell or encumber the
purpose; property, or some portion of it, the court shall
(c) To manage the property of the ward frugally and order such sale or encumbrance the proceeds
without waste, and apply the income and profits of
thereon, insofar as may be necessary, to the which shall be expended for the maintenance
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward; or the education of the ward, or invested as
and if such income and profits be insufficient for that the
purpose, to sell or encumber the real or personal circumstances may require. The order shall
property, upon being authorized by the court to do so; specify the grounds for the sale or
(d) To consent to a partition of real or personal encumbrance
property owned by the ward jointly or in and may direct that the property ordered sold
common with others upon authority granted by the be disposed of at public sale, subject to such
court after hearing, notice to relatives of
the ward, and a careful investigation as to the
necessity and propriety of the proposed action;
(e) To submit to the court a verified inventory of the
property of his ward within three months after his
appointment, and annually thereafter, the rendition of
which may be required upon the application of an
interested person;
(f) To report to the court any property of the
ward not included in the inventory which is
discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the
ward within three months after such
discovery, succession, or acquisition; and
(g) To render to the court for its approval an
accounting of the property one year from his
appointment, and every year thereafter or as
often as may be required.
Sec. 18. Power and duty of the court - The court may:
(a) Request the assistance of one or more
commissioners in the appraisal of the property of
the ward reported in the initial and subsequent
inventories;
(b) Authorize reimbursement to the guardian, other
than a parent, of reasonable expenses
incurred in the execution of his trust, and allow
payment of compensation for his services as
the court may deem just, not exceeding ten per
centum of the net income of the ward, if any;
otherwise, in such amount the court determines to be
a reasonable compensation for his
services; and
(c) Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of
any person having actual or prospective
interest in the property at the ward, require any
person suspected of having embezzled,
concealed, or disposed of any money, goods or
interest, or a written instrument belonging to
the ward or his property to appear for examination
concerning any thereof and issue such
orders as would secure the property against such
embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.

Sec. 19. Petition to sell or encumber property. - When

the income of a property under
guardianship is insufficient to maintain and educate
the ward, or when it is for his benefit that
his personal or real property or any part thereof be
sold, mortgaged or otherwise encumbered,
and the proceeds invested in safe and productive
security, or in the improvement or security
of other real property, the guardian may file a verified
petition setting forth such facts, and
praying that an order issue authorizing the sale or
encumbrance of the property.

Sec. 20. Order to show cause. - If the sale or

encumbrance is necessary or would be beneficial to
the ward, the court shall order his next of kin and all
person/s interested in the property to appear at a

conditions as to the time and manner of payment, and security
where a part of the payment is deferred. The original bond of the
guardian shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of
the proceeds of the sale or encumbrance, but the court may, if
deemed expedient, require an additional bond as a condition for
the sale or encumbrance. The authority to sell or
encumber shall not extend beyond one year, unless renewed by the
court.
Sec. 23. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct
management of
property. - The court may authorize and require the guardian to
invest the proceeds of sales
or encumbrances, and any other money of his ward in his hands,
in real or personal property,
for the best interests of the ward, and may make such other
orders for the management,
investment, and disposition of the property and effects, as
circumstances may warrant.
Sec. 24. Grounds for removal or resignation of guardian. - When
a guardian becomes
insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is found
thereafter to be unsuitable,
or has wasted or mismanaged the property of the ward, or has
failed to render an account or
make a return for thirty days after it is due, the court may, upon
reasonable notice to the
guardian, remove him as such and require him to surrender the
property of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled
thereto.
The court may allow the guardian to resign for justifiable
causes.
Upon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the
court shall appoint a new one.
No motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless
the guardian has submitted the proper accounting of the
property of the ward and the court has approved the same.
Sec. 25. Ground for termination of guardianship. - The court
motu proprio or upon verified motion of any person allowed to
file a petition for guardianship may terminate the
guardianship on the ground that the ward has come of age or
has died. The guardian shall notify the court of such fact
within ten days of its occurrence.
Guardian ad litem- that which is appointed by the
court not necessarily in a guardianship proceeding,
because this guardian ad litem is only on a temporary
basis with a specific duty to perform.
Q: Which court has jurisdiction over a petition for
guardianship?
A: Exclusively and originally cognizable by the Family
Court (RTC specifically
designated as a Family Court because of RA 8369 ).
There is no inferior court
here.
However, in settlement of estate, jurisdiction may
be lodged in inferior courts depending on the gross
value of the estate.
The venue is the residence of the ward. If the
ward has no residence and the guardianship
application is over the property of the ward, the
venue is where the property is situated/
located.
Take note that the venue here is the residence of the
ward as distinguished from the venue in adoption,
which is the residence of the adopter. Bakit? Because
in adoption, the result is that the adoptee will become
the child of the adopter for all legal intents and
purposes. But here, it is the guardian that goes to the
ward as the relation here is only of a temporary
character.
You file a guardianship proceeding only on 2 grounds:
M
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Sec. 26. Service of final and executory judgment or order. - The

final and executory I
judgment or order shall be served upon the Local Civil Registrar
n
of the municipality or city
where the minor resides and the Register of Deeds of the
c
province or city where his property o
or any part thereof is situated. Both the Local Civil Registrar m
and the Register of Deeds shall p
enter the final and executory judgment or order in the e
appropriate books in their offices. t
e
Sec. 27. Effect of the rule. - This Rule amends Rules 92 to 97 n
inclusive of the Rules of c
Court on guardianship of minors. Guardianship of
incompetents who are not minors shall
y
continue to be under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and governed .
by the Rules of Court.
The term incompetent here is different from that in
Sec. 28. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on May 1, 2003 settlement of estate. Here, incompetent refers to:
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not Sec. 2. Meaning of the word incompetent. Incompetent
later than April 15, 2003. includes:
OLD LECTURE
104
Rule 92 Guardianship
The fundamental difference is that in guardianship,
the subject is still alive. In settlement of estate, the
subject matter is already dead.

Three Kinds of Guardians:

Judicial guardian - that appointed by the court in a judicial
proceeding for legal guardianship
Legal guardian guardian by operation of law; not just
appointed by any court. (ex.: parents of minor children)
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Those suffering from the penalty of civil
interdiction (a penalty attached to conviction);
Hospitalized lepers;
Prodigals (one who is a spendthrift; wastes money or
property on things without reserving any for himself
and before you know it, he is not only a prodigal son
but also a grasa man.);
Deaf and Dumb unable to read and write;
Those of unsound mind although they have lucid
intervals;
Persons not of unsound mind but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves or manage their property.
A minor, under the age of 18, can be the subject of
guardianship.
Case of Evangelista: The petition for
guardianship was granted by the court
and Caniza was appointed as the
guardian of Evangelista. As a guardian,
remember the rights, the guardian can sue
and be sued, can collect debts, can
manage the properties of the ward. So one
of his actions here was to ask the
Estradas to vacate the premises owned by
the ward. Judgment was rendered in
favor of plaintiff, but on appeal, it was
reversed and on appeal again from the
order of reversal, it was sustained. That is
why it went up to the Supreme Court.
But pending the appeal with the CA, the
ward died. This is a case for ejectment.
The issue here is that considering that there
is no more guardianship because
death terminates guardianship, hence, the
case must be dismissed because the
party appellant is not the proper party-in-
interest. The SC said No. Even if death
terminates guardianship, in this particular
case, it is contrary to the principle of
equity of justice if we have to start all over again.
The case is already with us, so
remand of the case to the lower court would be a
waste of time and more
importantly, they found from the record that Caniza
was one of the heirs of the ward. Hence, there is
still a party-in-interest even if there is no settlement
of the estate. Ang importante ay pag guardian ka
tapos heir ka din, there is no need for the settlement
of the estate.

NOTE: Remember that you find that also in Sec.

16 of Rule 3: Substitution of Parties (without a
need of appointing an administrator or executor of
the estate in the substitution of parties.). That is
the doctrine laid down in this case.

Q: Who can initiate a petition for guardianship?

A: Anybody who has interest in the person of or
property of the ward. If you cannot establish any
interest in the person of or in the property of the
ward, you cannot file a petition for guardianship.

Buyena vs. Ledesma: In this case, they were

able to establish interest. They were both single
and they were living together.

You have to establish interest. The Rule says,

friends, relatives, or any person who has interest.

Q: What is the procedure?

A: File a petition with a court of competent
jurisdiction in the proper venue. And the court will
issue an order setting the case for hearing. If there
are oppositors, then they can file their opposition.
Remember, this is a special proceeding and
jurisdiction is always acquired through publication.
After trial, there will be
decision either allowing or disallowing guardianship.
In other word, appointing a guardian or not
appointing a guardian.
The guardian now enters into the guardianship
after he has filed the necessary bond. The duties
and responsibilities of a guardian are similar to
that of an
executor or administrator .

Q: Can he sell the properties of his ward?

A: Yes. Even without permission from the
court if the property involved is personal
property. But, if it is real property, just like, an
executor or
administrator, he has to get permission from the
court. Only with the permission
of the court will the sale of real property be
considered a valid sale. It is not only
permission of the court which is required, but also
notice to all interested parties.
In guardianship, the absence of notice, even with
permission of the court, still
renders the sale void.

Q: In what instances may guardianship be terminated?

A: Death also terminates guardianship, but the
general rule is that if the ground for the appointment
of the guardian ceases, then guardianship ceases
as well.. If the minor is already of age (remember,
even the minor himself can ask for
guardianship). This is an exception regarding lack
of a minors legal personality to sue. If the ground
is based on incompetency and it is established that
the
ward is already competent, or that he was
insane, but now, he is no longer insane; a
petition for termination of guardianship may be
filed.

Q: Should the legal guardian file guardianship

proceedings over the person and property of their
minor children?
A: Yes if the property of the war, which is their own children, is objection to the appointment of
worth more than P50T. If they sell the property of their ward, Amparo as guardian because
even if they are the legal guardians, the sale of the property is she
thinks that the latter dislikes
void.
her. She further added that
there
Q: Distinction between a guardian and a trustee were a number of letters
A: The distinction between a guardian and a trustee is that the allegedly written by Julieta to
latter has the legal title while the guardian has no legal title of Amparo
the property. So that the trustee can negotiate and encumber which showed Julietas
the property under trust. Although the same trustee may either sentiments regarding certain
be a trustee and a beneficiary at the same time. matters.
Nevertheless, not one of the
nearest of kin of Julieta opposed
A trust relationship can either be express if there is a trust
the
agreement between parties or implied if it is by operation of law. petition. As a matter of fact, her
Examples of trust by operation of law is when parents die sisters signified their conformity
without a will and then some children are still minors,
whoever is the guardian of the minor holds the property for thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyenas
and in behalf of the mere conjecture that Amparo
minors in trust. So that you will note that the guardian here, dislikes
being the trustee, her is no sufficient reason why
the petition should be denied.
may not be a party to a written trust agreement but he cannot
Neither does it make Amparo
dispose the minor's property without consent of the court for the unsuitable and unfit to perform
reason that he is only in trust for the ces qui trust. Even in the the
absence of a written contract, there is a trust duties of a guardian. On the
relationship by operation of law. contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who
could
be considered as to have an
adverse interest to that of
CASES Julieta if it
is true that 50% of Julietas
holdings at the Makati Medical
PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner, vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent. Center
G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003 has been transferred to her as
THIRD DIVISION alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit
A.
FACTS: o By and large, the qualification of Amparo
x Amparo filed with RTC Makati PETITION FOR LETTERS OF to act as guardian over
GUARDIANSHIP[1] the person and properties of
over the person and properties of her sister Julieta Julieta has been duly established.
o Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati As a
Medical Center sister, she can best take care of
where she is under medical attention for Julietas concerns and well being.
old age, general debility, and a mini- Now that Julieta is in the twilight
stroke of her life, her family should be
x Pilar filed an opposition given the opportunity to show
o petition lacked factual and legal basis in that their love and affection for her
Julieta Ledesma is without however denying Pilar
competent and sane and there is Goyena access to her
absolutely no need to appoint a guardian considering the special bond of
to take charge of her person/property. friendship between the two.
She is very able to take charge of her Needless to say, the oppositor
affairs, and this is clearly evident from at 90 years of age could not be
her said to be physically fit to attend
letters to the petitioner to all the needs of Julieta.
o Amparo is unfit to be a guardian since her and x RTC denied ensuing MR
Julietas interests x Pilar appealed to CA
are antagonistic x CA affirmed RTC
x RTC found Julieta incapable; appointed AMPARO as o Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has
guardian not shown the authenticity
o A perusal of the records shows that petitioner and due execution of the letters
(Amparo) is 72 years which purport to show the
of age, the youngest sister of Julieta. existence of a rift between Julieta
Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar and her family and dissatisfaction
Goyena, 90 years of age has been the as to how the businesses were
close friend and managed. At any rate, while it is
companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta correct to say that no person
was with Oppositor when she suffered her should be appointed guardian if
first stroke in Makati in 1991 which was his
the
reason why Julieta had to give up the 105
management of their
hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not
disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when
she had her second stroke in the U.S. In
short, the
special bond of friendship existing
between Julieta and the
Oppositor cannot be denied. Now that
Julieta is unable to manage her personal
life and business concerns due to senility
and vascular dementia, the oppositor
wants to be appointed her guardian or
else Bart Lacson, Fely Montelibano and
Jose T. Revilla.
o It is interesting to note that the oppositor has
interposed her
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the need for the
appointment of a
interest conflict with those of person to guard her
the ward (Guerrero vs. Teran, sisters
13 Phil. interests,
212), there are really no initiated the
antagonistic interests to speak petition for
of between guardianship.
petitioner [Amparo] and We see no
Julieta, they being co-owners indication that
of certain petitioner is
properties. There is also animated by a
no showing that desire to
petitioners business prejudice
decisions in the past had Julietas health as
resulted in the prejudice well as financial
of Julieta. interests. In point of
o While the oppositor may have been fact, it was
very close to Julieta, there is oppositor-appellant
no sufficient showing that who had initially
petitioner is hostile to the concealed the
best interests deteriorating
of the latter. On the contrary, state of mind of Julieta from
it was the petitioner who, the court. Oppositors
realizing advanced age of
 90 years also militate against When
her assuming the the
guardianship of the findings
incompetent. The oppositor of the
has declared that she is not Court of
interested Appeals
to be appointed legal are
guardian (p.21[,] Appellants contrary
Brief, Rollo, p. to those
59). But the persons that she of the
points to as being better trial
choices as court; (8)
Julietas guardian over the When
appellee have not acted, nor the
even findings
indicated, their desire to of facts
act as such. In any case, are
We see no cogent conclusio
reason why We should ns
reverse the well- without
reasoned citation
disquisition of the trial court. of
x CA denied ensuing MR specific
x Pilar filed a Rule 45 before the SC evidence
on
ISSUE: Whether the alleged antagonistic interests which
render Amparo unfit to be appointed as guardian of they are
Julieta. based;
(9) When
HELD: NO. the facts
x Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in set forth
support of petitioners position require in
a review of the evidence, hence, not the
proper for consideration in the petition petition
at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked as well as
to go over the proofs presented by the in the
parties and analyze, assess, and weigh petitioner
them to ascertain if the trial court and s main
appellate court were correct in and
according them superior credit.[10] reply briefs are
x That the issues raised are factual is in fact not disputed by
admitted by petitioner in her Reply the respondents;
dated August 30, 2001:[11] and
o Although the general rule is that this (10) When
Honorable Court is not a trier the
of facts, its jurisdiction being findings of
limited to reviewing and fact of the
revising only errors of law, it Court of
is nonetheless subject to the Appeals is
following exceptions which premised
have been laid down in a on the
number of decisions of this supposed
Honorable Court: absence
(1) When the conclusion is of
a finding grounded evidence
entirely on and is
speculation, contradict
surmises and ed by the
conjectures; (2) evidence
When the on record
inference made is (Emphasis
manifestly supplied);
mistaken, (Rollo,
absurd or 350-351)
impossible; (3) x Petitioner claims that there is no doubt
When there is that the instant petition falls within the
grave abuse above-stated exceptions because
of discretion; (4) the findings of the Court of
When the Appeals are clearly belied by the
judgment is evidence on record.[12]
based on a x In the selection of a guardian, a large
misapprehension discretion must be allowed the
of facts; (5) judge who deals directly with
When the the parties.[13] As this Court
findings of said:
facts are o As a rule, when it
conflicting; (6) appears that the judge has
When the Court exercised care and
of Appeals, diligence in selecting
in making its the guardian, and has
findings, went given due
beyond the consideration
issues of the to the reasons for and
case and the against his action
same is contrary which are urged by
to the admissions the
of interested parties,
both appellants his action should
and appellee; (7) not be disturbed
unless it is made
 very clear that he has
fallen into grievous error.
[14]
x In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that
the lower courts committed any
error.
x Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v.
Sotelo[15] with respect to the
existence of antagonistic interests
between respondent and Julieta. In that
case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as
creditor and mortgagee of the
minor-wards properties (a house and lot)
is antagonistic to the interest of the
wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriels
appointment as guardian was erroneous.
For while he sought to foreclose the
wards properties as creditor and
mortgagee
on one hand, he had to, on the other
hand, endeavor to retain them for the
wards as their guardian. Added to that
was Gabriels appointment as guardian
without him informing the guardianship
court that he held a mortgage on the
properties. Furthermore, he deliberately
misinformed the said court that the first
mortgagee was the Santa Clara
Monastery when it was him. None of the
said circumstances obtain in the present
case.
x Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of
Julieta to establish her claim that
there existed[16] a rift between the two
which amounts to antagonistic interests.
The first letter[17] sent by Julieta to
respondent which reads:
o x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree
with me (Julieta) my
decision is right to let us divide as
soon as possible, so we will have
capital each of us to work, and
keep the Hda, for [sic]
generation to generation.
o For the last time I will repeat even if I
have to kneel before you
and Carlos I have no interest
anymore in any future
investment due to my age and
being single and alone in life. I
would like to be able to enjoy
whatever monies that correspond
to me. I would like to have
enough money as a reserve for
any future need that I might have
like hospitalization, travel, buying
whatever I like, etc. etc. (Letter
to appellee; Exhibit 2)
x merely shows Julietas lack of interest in future
investments, not
necessarily a business disagreement, and
certainly not per se amounting to
antagonistic interests between her and
respondent to render the latter unsuitable
for appointment as guardian.
x The second letter[18] which reads:
o My mind is still clear to tell you about
Fortuna when I had my
stroke I was confined in MMC for
one month. If I am not mistaken
you did not visit me. One day
Carlos came to visit me and
asked me this question. Do you
think you will be able to continue
managing the Hda? I answered
him I dont know it all depends
on
my sickness. Carlos said who do
you want to take your place? I
said I want Cheling
Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said
O.K. He asked
Pilar can you contact Cheling?
Tell him to call me or see me.
The
nephew of Cheling was a
resident in MMC through him
Pilar was
able to contact Cheling and gave
him Carlos message. So I thought
all the time it was agreeable. I left
for USA for treatment. To my
surprise when I came back from
USA it was not Cheling, but you
(appellee) took over the
management as you requested.
Carlos did
not tell me but decided in your
favor. x x x (Letter to appellee;
Exhibit 3; emphasis supplied)
x shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when
she was confined at the
Makati Medical Center on account of her
stroke, 2) there was disagreement as to who
should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring
a certain Cheling
Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over
management of the hacienda with
their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting
her. No inference as to the existence
of antagonistic interests between
respondent and Julieta can thus be made.
x The third letter[19] which reads:
o x x x Carlos went to the house before I
left and asked from me
twenty thousand (20,000) shares
of San Carlos Milling which you
gave because I wanted to sell
all.xxx If he does not sell or
cannot sell, just arrange to send
them back to me. Amparing
since I came here to America and
Vancouver my requests have
been ignored. Everyone is
suspecting that Pilar is the one
ordering or
commanding me that is not true.
What I asked from Julio is just to
 report to me or send me reports so I can
follow up from here. But
up to now he has ignored my requests x
x x. (Letter to appellee
Exhibit 4)
x has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower
courts erred in finding
that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as
guardian. The letter in fact discloses, that it was
Julietas nephew Julio Ledesma, and not respondent,
who ignored the request.
x As for the fourth letter[20] which reads:
o I want all of you to know that whatever decision
now and in the
future I want to do nobody can stop me
especially regarding my properties,
money, etc. I will be the only one to
dispose of it
because it is mine. You said to Raul you
are going to court, you are most welcome
x x x. (Letter to Connie, Exhibit 5)
x it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The
letter is not even
addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-in-
law of Julieta).
x Petitioners assertion that respondents intent in instituting the
guardianship
proceedings is to take control of Julietas properties
and use them for her own benefit[21] is purely
speculative and finds no support form the records.
x The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of
Julieta also lacks
merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the
Makati Medical Center where
she was confined after she suffered a stroke does
not necessarily show her
hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by
the trial court, cited in the
present petition, that Julieta was still placed under
the care of doctors[22] after
she checked out and was returned to the hospital
when she suffered another
stroke.
x Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at
bar, to wit: 1)
Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of
respondent as guardian
before the trial court because, among other reasons,
she felt she was disliked by
respondent,[23] a ground which does not render
respondent unsuitable for
appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of
mind of Julieta before the trial court,[24] which is
reflective of a lack of good
faith.
x Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the
suitability of Amparo for
appointment as guardian not having been successfully
contested.

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal

guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his
wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
G.R. No.
110427.
February 24,
1997 THIRD
DIVISION

FACTS:
x RTC QC Br. 107 declared Carmen, a 94 yo retired
pharmacist and UP
professor, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
niece, Amparo

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"bequeathed" to the
Estradas the house
o She was so adjudged because of her and lot in question.
advanced age and physical x MTC decided in favor of Amparo (and
infirmities which Carmen)
included cataracts in x Estradas appealed to RTC
both eyes and senile x RTC reversed MTC
dementia o held that the "action by which
o Amparo was appointed as guardian the issue of defendants' possession
x Amparo (in her capacity as guardian of Carmen) should be resolved
filed an ejectment suit before is accion publiciana,
MTC QC Br. 35 against spouses Pedro and Leonora the obtaining
Estrada factual and legal
x Estradas filed their answer situation **
o declared that they had been living in demanding
Caiza's house since the adjudication by
1960's; that in consideration such plenary action
of their faithful service they for recovery of
had been possession
considered by Caiza as her cognizable in the
own family, and the latter first instance by the
had in fact Regional Trial
executed a holographic will Court."
on September 4, 1988 by x Amparo (in her capacity as guardian of
which she Carmen) appealed to CA
 x CA affirmed RTC in toto
o Caiza sought to have the Court of
Appeals reverse the decision of
October 21, 1992, but failed in
that attempt. In a decision[10]
promulgated on June 2, 1993,
the Appellate Court[11]
affirmed the
RTC's judgment in toto. It
ruled that (a) the proper
remedy for
Caiza was indeed an accion
publiciana in the RTC, not an
accion
interdictal in the MetroTC,
since the "defendants have
not been in
the subject premises as mere
tenants or occupants by
tolerance,
they have been there as a sort
of adopted family of Carmen
Caiza,"
as evidenced by what
purports to be the holographic
will of the
plaintiff; and (b) while "said
will, unless and until it has
passed
probate by the proper court,
could not be the basis of
defendants'
claim to the property, ** it is
indicative of intent and desire
on the
part of Carmen Caiza that
defendants are to remain and
are to
continue in their occupancy
and possession, so much so
that
Caiza's supervening
incompetency can not be said
to have vested
in her guardian the right or
authority to drive the
defendants out."
x Amparo (in her capacity as guardian of Carmen)
filed a Rule 45 before the SC
x Carmen died during the pendency of the appeal
o aforementioned guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, and Ramon C.
Nevado, her niece and
nephew, respectively -- were
by this Court's leave,
substituted for her
ISSUE # 1: Whether Amparo had the capacity to file
the ejectment suit against the Estradas
considering the allegation that Carmen has already
devised to the Estradas the subject house.
HELD # 1: YES.
x The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to
them by Caiza clearly denotes
her intention that they remain in
possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.
x A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior
to the testator's death, it may
be changed or revoked;[29] and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
"No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court"
(ART. 838, id.).[30] An owner's intention
to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is
not inconsistent with the former's taking
back possession in the meantime for
any reason deemed sufficient. And that in
this case there was sufficient cause for
the owner's resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate
income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.
x Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a
competent court the general guardian of
both the person and the estate of
her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her
Letters of
Guardianship[31] dated
December 19, 1989 clearly
installed her as the "guardian
over the person and properties of
the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA
with full
authority to take possession of
the property of said incompetent
in any province
or provinces in which it may be
situated and to perform all other
acts necessary
for the management of her
properties ** "[32] By that
appointment, it
became Evangelista's duty to care
for her aunt's person, to attend to
her physical and spiritual needs,
to assure her well-being, with
right to
custody of her person in
preference to relatives and
friends.[33] It also
became her right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise
control
over, Caiza's property, both real
and personal, it being recognized
principle that the ward has no
right to possession or control of
his
property during her
incompetency.[34] That right to
manage the
ward's estate carries with it the
right to take possession thereof
and
recover it from anyone who
retains it,[35] and bring and
defend such
actions as may be needful for this
purpose. [36]
x Actually, in bringing the action of
desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to
"the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward"
explicitly imposed on her by
Section 4, Rule
96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
o "SEC. 4. Estate to be
managed frugally, and proceeds
applied to
maintenance of
ward. A guardian
must manage the
estate of his
ward frugally and
without waste, and
apply the income
and profits
thereof, so far as
maybe necessary, to
the comfortable and
suitable maintenance
of the ward and his
family, if there be any;
and if
 not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted
such income and profits be by her through her guardian.[41] That
insufficient for that purpose, the action, not being a purely personal one,
guardian may sell or encumber the survived her death; her heirs have taken her
real estate, upon being place and now represent her interests in the
authorized by order to do so, and apply appeal at bar.
to such of the proceeds as may be
necessary to such maintenance."
x Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's ONG vs. CA 401 SCRA
defenses in the
ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR,
when, in forcible entry and VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND
question of ownership in his VICTORIA D. ILLUT-
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be PIALA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND
resolved without deciding JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY,
the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Respondents.
Municipal Trial Courts, and G.R. No.
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the 194366
undoubted competence to
resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine
the issue of possession." October 10,
2012
ISSUE # 2: Whether Carmens death rendered Amparo SECOND
incapacitated to continue litigating for said deceased. DIVISION

HELD # 2: NO. (Amparo may still pursue the case NOT as a FACTS:
guardian BUT in substitution for the deceased) x Anuncacion contracted 2 marriages during her
x As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the lifetime:
pendency of this o With Gonzalo 2 children
appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss Eutropia and Victoria
the petition, arguing that o With Enrique 5 children
Caiza's death automatically terminated the Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda,
guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista Douglas and Rosa
lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased x Anuncacion died intestate
to have legal personality to represent her in the x Enrique (in his capacity and as GUARDIAN of minor
present appeal. The motion is without merit. children Rosa and Douglas)
x While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of AND Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda
guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the executed an EJ settlement
death of either the guardian or the ward,[38] the rule o adjudicating among themselves
affords no advantage to the the said homestead properties, and
Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen thereafter, conveying themto the
Caiza, is one of the latter's late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and
only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses
nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. Uy)for a consideration of P
On their motion and by Resolution of this Court[39] of 80,000.00.
June 20, 1994, they were x Children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment
in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in of sale of the said
place of the deceased, in homestead properties against spouses Uy
accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: (later substituted by their heirs) before
[40] the RTC
o "SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and x Heirs of Uy filed their Answer
the claim is not o countered that the sale took place
thereby extinguished, the court shall beyond the 5-year prohibitory
order, upon proper notice, the period from the issuance of the
legal representative of the deceased to homestead patents.
appear and be substituted o They also denied knowledge of Eutropia
for the deceased within a period of thirty and Victorias
(30) days, or within such exclusionfrom the extrajudicial
time as may be granted. If the legal settlement and sale of the
representative fails to appear subject
within said time, the court may order the properties, and interposed
opposing party to procure further the defenses of
the appointment of a legal representative prescription and
of the deceased within a laches.
time to be specified by the court, and the x RTC in favor of the CHILDREN OF ENRIQUE
representative shall o ruled that while the sale occurred beyond
the 5-year prohibitory
immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the period, the sale is still void
deceased. The court charges because Eutropia and Victoria
involved in procuring such were
deprived of their hereditary rights
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The and that Enrique had no judicial
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to authority to sell the shares of his
be minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
substituted for the deceased, without x CA reversed RTC
requiring the appointment of an executor o It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria
had no knowledge of the
or administrator and the court may
extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
subject properties and as
heirs.
x To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. 107
Caiza's demise did
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Henedino M. Brondial)
hischildren, holding
that as co-owners,
such, were not bound by they have the right
it, the CA found it to dispose of their
unconscionable to respective shares as
permit the annulment of they consider
the sale considering necessary or fit.
spouses Uys While recognizing
possession thereof for 17 Rosa and Douglas to
years, and that Eutropia be minors at that
and Victoria time, they were
belatedly filed their action deemed to have
in 1997, or more than two ratified the sale when
years from they failed to
knowledge of their exclusion question it upon
as heirs in 1994 when their reaching the age of
stepfather died. It, however, majority. It also found
did not preclude the excluded laches to have set in
heirs from because of their
recovering their legitimes from their inaction for a long
co-heirs. period of time.
o declared the extrajudicial settlement
and the subsequent sale as ISSUE: Whether the sale made by
valid and binding with Enrique was valid considering that the
respect to Enrique and
said sale was purportedly made in behalf of the Any act of disposition or
latters children. alienation, or any reduction in the
substance
HELD: YES except insofar as the shares of Eutropia, of the patrimony of child, exceeds
Victoria and Douglas are concerned the limits of administration.13
because (1) Eutropia and Victoria were not under Thus,
Enriques guardianship AND (2) although a father or mother, as the natural
Douglas was under Enriques guardianship, he did guardian of the minor under
not ratify the said sale upon reaching parental
majority age. authority, does not have the
x However, while the settlement of the estate is null power to dispose or encumber the
and void, the subsequent sale property of the latter. Such
of the subject properties made by power is granted by law only to
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia a judicial guardian of the wards
and Visminda, in favor of the respondents property and even then only
is valid but only with respect to their with courts prior approval
proportionate shares therein. It cannot secured in accordance with the
be denied that these heirs have acquired proceedings set forth by the
their respective shares in the properties Rules of Court.14
of Anunciacion from the moment of her x Consequently, the disputed sale entered
death11and that, as owners thereof, into by Enrique in behalf of his minor
they can very well sell their undivided children without the proper
share in the estate.12 judicial authority, unless
x With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were ratified by them upon
minors at the time of the execution reaching the age of
of the settlement and sale, their majority,15 is unenforceable
natural guardian and father, in accordance with Articles
Enrique, 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil
represented them in the Code which provide:
transaction. However, on the o ART. 1317. No one may
basis of the laws contract in the name of another
prevailing at that time, Enrique was without
merely clothed with powers of being authorized
administration and bereft of any authority by the latter or
to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the unless he has by
estate of their mother, Anunciacion. law a right to
x Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in represent him.
force at the time of the A contract
execution of the settlement and sale, provide: entered into in the
o ART. 320. The father, or in his absence name of another by one
the mother, is the legal who has
administrator of the property no
pertaining to the child under authority
parental authority. If the or legal
property is worth more than represent
two thousand pesos, the ation, or
father or mother shall give a who
bond subject to the approval has acted
of the Court of First Instance. beyond
o ART. 326. When the property of the his
child is worth more than two powers,
thousand pesos, the shall be
father or mother shall unenforce
be considered a able,
guardian of the childs unless it
property, subject to is ratified,
the duties and expressly
obligations of or
guardians under the impliedly,
Rules of Court. by the
x Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court person
also provides: on whose
o SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. - When behalf it
the property of the child has been
under parental authority is executed,
worth two thousand pesos or before it
less, the is
father or the mother, without revoked
the necessity of court by the
appointment, other
shall be his legal guardian. contracti
When the property of the ng party.
child is worth o ART. 1403. The following
more than two thousand contracts are unenforceable, unless
pesos, the father or the they
mother shall be are ratified:
considered guardian of the (1) Those entered
childs property, with the into the name of
duties and another person by
obligations of guardians one who
under these Rules, and shall has been
file the petition required by given no
Section 2 hereof. For good authority
reasons, the court may, or legal
however, appoint another represent
suitable persons. ation, or
x Administration includes all acts for the who has
preservation of the property acted
and the receipt of fruits according to the
natural purpose of the thing.
 beyond his
powers;
x Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and
gives sanction to some unauthorized
act or defective proceeding,
which without his sanction would not
be binding on him. It is this
voluntary choice, knowingly made, which
amounts to a ratification of
what was theretofore unauthorized, and
becomes the authorized act of
the party so making the ratification.16 Once
ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when
the person knowingly received benefits from
it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects
from the moment it was constituted,17 as it
has a retroactive effect.
x Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the
extrajudicial settlement of the
estate with absolute deed of sale. In
Napoleon and Rosas Manifestation18
before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they
stated:
o "Concerning the sale of our parcel of land
executed by our father,
Enrique Neri concurred in and
conformed to by us and our
other
two sisters and brother (the
other plaintiffs), in favor of
Hadji
Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja
Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both
confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all
of us
and therefore the sale was
absolutely valid and enforceable
as far
as we all plaintiffs in this case are
concerned;" (Underscoring
supplied)
x In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and
Rosa also alleged:
o "That we are surprised that our names
are included in this case
since we do not have any
intention to file a case against
Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
and their family and we respect
and acknowledge the validity of
the Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale dated July 7, 1979;"
(Underscoring supplied)
x Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted
ratification of the settlement of the
estate and the subsequent sale, thus,
purging all the defects existing at the time of
its execution and legitimizing the conveyance
of Rosas 1/16 share in the
estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The
same, however, is not true with respect to
Douglas for lack of evidence showing
ratification.
x Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement
with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique,
Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the
homestead properties have effectively been
disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can
only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell
and the buyer can as a consequence acquire
no more than what the seller can legally
transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the
Civil Code is relevant, which provides:
o Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another
person
in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But
the
effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to
him
in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
x Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs
became pro indiviso co-
owners of the homestead properties with
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
 retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They
were deemed to be holding
the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
under an implied constructive
trust for the latters benefit, conformably with Article
1456 of the Civil Code
which states:"if property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property
comes." As such, it is only fair,
just and equitable that the amount paid for their
shares equivalent to P
5,000.0021 each or a total of P 15,000.00 be
returned to spouses Uy with legal
interest.
x On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners
that the present
action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul
the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the
CA, the prescriptive period
of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court reckoned from the
execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of
their lawful participation in
the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for
the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in
accordance with Article 1410 of
the Civil Code.
x However, the action to recover property held in trust
prescribes after 10 years
from the time the cause of action accrues,22
which is from the time of actual notice in case of
unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia,
Victoria and
Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of
their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed
to refute.
Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within
the prescriptive period of 10
years.

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO

OROPESA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS:
x Nilo filed before the RTC a petition to declare him and one
Ms. Louie Ginez as
guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent)
Cirilo Oropesa
o the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years
already having suffered a stroke on April
1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his
judgment and memory [were] impaired
and such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the (respondent) was
observed to have had lapses in memory
and judgment, showing
signs of failure to manage his property
properly; that due to his
age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property
wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around
him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa
Agamata, his girlfriend.
x RTC ordered a social worker to study the case
x Social worker submitted his findings BUT WITHOUT findings
on respondent
Cirilo, as the latter refused to talk to the social worker
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
within the
contemplation of
x Cirilo then filed an Opposition to the petition for Section 2 Rule 92.
guardianship
x Nilo (after presenting his witnesses) FAILED to file a HELD: NO.
Formal Offer of Evidence x Petitioner comes before the Court
x Cirilo filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the arguing that the assailed rulings of the
petitioner to have waived the Court
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and of Appeals should be
the presentation of his Evidence Closed set aside as it allegedly
since they were not formally offered; committed grave and
(2) To Expunge the Documents of the reversible
Petitioner from the Record; and (3) error when it affirmed
To Grant leave to the Oppositor to the erroneous decision
File Demurrer to Evidence of the trial court which
o RTC granted purportedly
x Cirilo filed a demurrer disregarded the
o RTC granted; denied ensuing MR overwhelming evidence
x Nilo appealed to CA presented by him
x CA affirmed RTC; denied ensuing MR showing respondents
x Nilo filed a Rule 45 before the SC incompetence.
x In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we
ISSUE: Whether Cirilo may be laid out the nature and purpose of
considered as an incompetent person guardianship in the following wise:
 o A guardianship is a trust relation of the visiting
most sacred him to file
character, in which one a loan
person, called a "guardian" applicatio
acts for another called the n with the
"ward" whom the law Armed
regards as Forces of
incapable of managing his the
own affairs. A guardianship Philippine
is designed to further the s Savings
wards well-being, not that and
of the guardian. It is Loan
intended to preserve the Associatio
wards property, as well as n, Inc.
to render any assistance (AFPSLAI)
that the ward may for
personally require. It has payment
been stated that while of his
custody involves hospital
immediate care and bills,
control, guardianship when, as
indicates not only those far as his
responsibilities, but those of children
one in loco parentis as knew, he
well.11 had
x In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a substanti
qualified guardian if the al
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an amounts
incompetent. of
x A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court money in
tells us that persons who, various
though of sound mind but by reason banks
of age, disease, weak mind or sufficient
other similar causes, are incapable of to cover
taking care of themselves and his
their property without outside aid are medical
considered as incompetents who may expenses;
properly be placed under guardianship. o c. Respondents residence
The full text of the said allegedly has been left
provision reads: dilapidated due to
o Sec. 2. Meaning of the word lack of care and
"incompetent." - Under this rule, the management;
word "incompetent" o d. The realty taxes for
includes persons suffering respondents various properties
the penalty of civil remain
interdiction or who are unpaid
hospitalized lepers, and
prodigals, deaf therefo
and dumb who are unable re
to read and write, those petition
who are er and
of unsound mind, even his
though they have lucid sister
intervals, were
and persons not being of suppos
unsound mind, but by edly
reason of compel
age, disease, weak mind, led to
and other similar causes, pay the
cannot, without outside aid, necess
take care of themselves and ary
manage their property, taxes;
becoming thereby an easy o e. Respondent allegedly
prey for deceit and instructed petitioner to sell his
exploitation. Nissan
x We have held in the past that a "finding that a person Exalta
is incompetent car for
should be anchored on clear, positive the
and definite evidence."12 We reason
consider that evidentiary standard that the
unchanged and, thus, must be applied former
in the would be
case at bar. purchasin
x In support of his contention that respondent is g
incompetent and, therefore, another
should be placed in guardianship, vehicle,
petitioner raises in his but when
Memorandum13 the following factual the car
matters: had been
o a. Respondent has been afflicted with sold,
several maladies and has responde
been sickly for over ten (10) years nt did
already; not
o b. During the time that respondent was procure
hospitalized at the St. another
Lukes Medical Center vehicle
after his stroke, he and
purportedly requested refused to
one of his former account
colleagues who was
 for the money earned from
the sale of the old car; x Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner
o f. Respondent withdrew at least and cited petitioners lack
$75,000.00 from a joint account of material evidence to support his claims.
under his name and his According to respondent, petitioner
daughters without the did not present any relevant documentary or
latters knowledge or testimonial evidence that would
consent; attest to the veracity of his assertion that
o g. There was purportedly one occasion respondent is incompetent largely due
where respondent took a to his alleged deteriorating medical and
kitchen knife to stab mental condition. In fact, respondent
himself upon the points out that the only medical document
"orders" of his girlfriend presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed
during one of their competent to run his personal affairs and
fights; administer his properties.
o h. Respondent continuously allows his Portions of the said document, entitled
girlfriend to ransack his "Report of Neuropsychological
house of groceries Screening,"15 were quoted by respondent
and furniture, in his Memorandum16 to illustrate
despite protests that said report in fact favored respondents
from his children.14 claim of competence, to wit:
x General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino,
he enjoyed and
participated meaningfully in conversations
and could be quite elaborate in his
responses on many of the test items. He
spoke in a clear voice and his
articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
x General Oropesa performed in the average range on
most of the domains that
were tested. He was able to correctly perform
mental calculations and keep track
of number sequences on a task of attention. He
did BEST in visuo-constructional
tasks where he had to copy geometrical
designs using tiles. Likewise, he was
able to render and read the correct time on the Clock
Drawing Test. x x x.
x x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he
was able to suggest effective
solutions to problem situations. x x x.17
x With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his
documentary evidence, his
proof of his fathers incompetence
consisted purely of testimonies given by
himself and his sister (who were claiming
interest in their fathers real and
personal properties) and their fathers
former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert
medical testimony, were insufficient to
convince the trial court of petitioners
cause of action and instead lead it to grant
the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.
x Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural
lapse in failing to make a
formal offer of evidence, his documentary
proof were comprised mainly of
certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his fathers and his
sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of
real estate taxes on their co-owned properties,
which do not in any way relate to
his fathers alleged incapacity to make
decisions for himself. The only medical
document on record is the aforementioned
"Report of Neuropsychological
Screening" which was attached to the petition
for guardianship but was never
identified by any witness nor offered as
evidence. In any event, the said report,
as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best,
for although the report had
negative findings regarding memory lapses on
the part of respondent, it also
contained findings that supported the view
that respondent on the average was
indeed competent.
x In an analogous guardianship case wherein the
soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the
occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a
person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary [and that] the
 observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence Court of Appeals,
establishing the persons state of mental sanity will will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule,
suffice."18 such findings by the lower courts
x Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which are entitled to great weight and respect, and
denied are deemed final and conclusive on
petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts this Court when supported by the evidence on
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court record."22 We therefore adopt the
highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own factual findings of the lower court and the Court
documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, of Appeals and rule that the
likewise, the trial court grant of respondents demurrer to evidence
made known its own observation of respondents physical and was proper under the circumstances obtaining
mental state, to in the case at bar.
wit: x Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
o The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical o Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After
expert the plaintiff has completed
which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not the presentation of his
have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity evidence, the defendant may
to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, move for
Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological dismissal on the ground that
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, upon the facts and the law the
(1) performs on plaintiff has shown no right to
the average range in most of the domains that relief. If his motion is denied, he
were tested; (2) is shall have the right to present
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide evidence. If the motion is granted
solutions to but on appeal the order of dismissal
problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. is reversed he shall be deemed to
Oropesa have waived the right to present
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for evidence.
mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and x A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by
orientation. It is the observation of the Court that one of the parties in an
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.19 (Citation action, to the effect that the evidence which
omitted; emphasis supplied.) his adversary produced is
x It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be insufficient in point of law, whether true or
raised in a not, to make out a case or sustain
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier the issue."23 We have also held that a
of facts."20 We demurrer to evidence "authorizes a
only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional judgment on the merits of the case without
circumstances;21 the defendant having to submit
however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is
also long settled 109
that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
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G.
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evidence on his part, as he would No
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs .
evidence shows that he is not entitled 19
to the relief sought."241wphi1 19
x There was no error on the part of the trial court 93
when it dismissed the petition
for guardianship without first
De
requiring respondent to present his
ce
evidence
m
precisely because the effect of
be
granting a demurrer to evidence
r
other than
5,
dismissing a cause of action is,
20
evidently, to preclude a defendant
12
from
FIR
presenting his evidence since, upon the
ST
facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
DI
no right to relief.
VI
SI
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO
ON
BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO,
Respondents.
FACTS:
x Abad (Mauras nephew) filed a petition for residing in the same
guardianship over the person and dwelling place or
properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with RTC municipality as that
Dagupan of the ward or
o Maura, who is single, more than incompetent, and that
ninety (90) years old and a the Vancil vs. Belmes
resident of Rizal Street, case cited by the
Poblacion, Mangaldan, court a quo which
Pangasinan, is in held that "courts
dire need of a guardian who should not appoint as
will look after her and her guardians
business persons who are not
affairs. Due to her advanced within the
age, Maura is already sickly jurisdiction of our
and can courts" pertains to
no longer manage to take persons who are not
care of herself and her residents of the
properties country.
unassisted thus becoming an easy o However, we do not find that
prey of deceit and exploitation the court a quo, by deciding to
x Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a Motion for Leave to appoint the oppositor-
Intervene, together with an appellee as guardian,
Opposition-in- Intervention has fallen into
x Leonardo Biason (also a nephew) filed a Motion grievous
for Leave to File Opposition to error.
the Petition and attached therewith o For one, the oppositor-
his Opposition to the Appointment appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is
of also a
Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the relative, a nephew
Person and Properties of Maura B. of the
Abad incompetent.
o alleged that he is also a nephew of There are no vices
Maura and that he was not of character which
notified of the pendency of have been
the petition for the established as to
appointment of the disqualify him from
latters guardian. He being appointed as
vehemently opposed the a guardian.
appointment of Abad o Anent the claim of the
as Mauras guardian as he petitioner-appellant that he has
cannot possibly perform his been
duties as expressly chosen by
such since he resides in her aunt to be her
Quezon City while Maura guardian as
maintains her abode in evidenced by
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. her testimony,
Biason prayed that he be although it could be
appointed as Mauras given weight, the
guardian since he was same could
previously granted by the not be heavily relied
latter with a power of upon, especially
attorney to manage her considering the
properties alleged
x RTC denied Abads petition; appointed BIASON mental state of the
as Mauras guardian incompetent due to her
x Abad filed an MR advanced age.
o RTC denied x Abad filed an MR
x Abad appealed to CA o CA denied
o argued that the RTC erred in x Abad filed a Rule 45 before the SC
disqualifying him from being x Maura filed a Motion for Leave to
appointed as Mauras Intervene together with a Petition-in-
guardian despite the fact that Intervention
he has all the qualifications o He asseverated that the
stated under the Rules. That issues raised in the petition pertain
he was not a resident of to the
Mangaldan, Pangasinan irregularity in the
should not be a ground for his appointment of
disqualification as he had Biason as
actively and efficiently guardian which
managed the he
affairs and properties of believed had
his aunt even if he is been rendered
residing in Metro moot and
Manila. Moreover, he was academic by the
expressly chosen by latters
Maura to be her death. He also
guardian supported Mauras
o averred that no hearing was prayer for the
conducted to determine the termination of the
qualifications of Biason prior guardianship by
to his appointment as asseverating that her
guardian. He claimed that the act of filing of a
RTC also overlooked Mauras petition-in-
express objection to Biasons intervention is
appointment indicative of the fact
x CA affirmed RTC that she is of sound
o The petitioner-appellant may have mind and that she
been correct in arguing that
there is no legal requirement
that the guardian must be
 can competently manage her
business affairs.
ISSUE: Whether Abad may still question Biasons
qualifications as guardian of Maura.
HELD: NO.
x Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the
RTCs decision despite the fact
that it did not hold any hearing to determine
whether Biason possessed all the
qualifications for a guardian as provided by
law. Further, he was not given the
opportunity to submit evidence to
controvert Biasons appointment.16
x Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on
the sole basis of his
residence. He emphasizes that it is not a
requirement for a guardian to be a resident of
the same locality as the ward, or to be living
with the latter under the same roof in order to
qualify for the appointment. The more
significant considerations are that the person
to be appointed must be of good moral
character and must have the capability and
sound judgment in order that he may be able
to take care of the ward and prudently
manage his assets.17
x Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant
petition, Biason died. On May
11, 2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and
Motion,18 informing this Court that
Biason passed away on April 3, 2012 at SDS
Medical Center, Marikina City due to
multiple organ failure, septic shock,
community acquired pneumonia high risk,
prostate CA with metastasis, and attached a
copy of his Death Certificate.19
Maura averred that Biasons death rendered
moot and academic the issues
raised in the petition. She thus prayed that
the petition be dismissed and the
guardianship be terminated.
x On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution,20
requiring Abad to comment
on the manifestation filed by Maura.
Pursuant to the Resolution, Abad filed his
Comment21 on August 9, 2012 and
expressed his acquiescence to Mauras
motion to dismiss the petition. He
asseverated that the issues raised in the
petition pertain to the irregularity in the
appointment of Biason as guardian
which he believed had been rendered moot
and academic by the latters death.
He also supported Mauras prayer for the
termination of the guardianship by
asseverating that her act of filing of a
petition-in-intervention is indicative of the
fact that she is of sound mind and that she
can competently manage her
business affairs.
o We find Mauras motion meritorious.
x An issue or a case becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value. In such cases, there
is no actual substantial relief to which the
petitioner would be entitled and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.22
x In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the
CA Decision dated August
28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19,
2010, which dismissed his appeal from
the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of
the RTC and denied his motion for
reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he
was challenging Biasons qualifications and
the procedure by which the RTC appointed
him as guardian for Maura.
However, with Biasons demise, it has
become impractical and futile to proceed
with resolving the merits of the petition. It is
a well-
established rule that the relationship of
guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of
either the guardian or the ward.23 The
supervening event of death rendered it
pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biasons appointment since the juridical tie
between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
 disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for
that matter, any substantial relief.1wphi1
x Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Mauras belief that
the petition has lost
its purpose and even consented to Mauras
prayer for the dismissal of the
petition.

TRUSTEES [RULE 98]

1. Parties

2. Kinds/ Classes

Section 1. Where trustee appointed. A trustee necessary to

carry into effect the
provisions of a will on written instrument shall be appointed by
the Court of First Instance in
which the will was allowed, if it be a will allowed in the
Philippines, otherwise by the Court of
First Instance of the province in which the property, or some
portion thereof, affected by the
trust is situated.

Section 2. Appointment and powers of trustees under will.

Executor of former
trustee need not administer trust. If a testator has omitted
in his will to appoint a
trustee in the Philippines, and if such appointment is
necessary to carry into effect the
provisions of the will, the proper Court of First Instance may, after
notice to all persons
interested, appoint a trustee who shall have the same rights,
powers, and duties, and in whom
the estate shall vest, as if he had been appointed by the testator.
No person succeeding to a
trust as executor or administrator of a former trustee shall be
required to accept such trust.

Section 3. Appointment and powers of new trustee under written

instrument.
When a trustee under a written instrument declines, resigns, dies
or removed before the
objects of the trust are accomplished, and no adequate provision
is made in such instrument
for supplying the vacancy, the proper Court of First Instance may,
after due notice to all
persons interested, appoint a new trustee to act alone or jointly
with the others, as the case
may be. Such new trustee shall have and exercise the same
powers, right, and duties as if he
had been originally appointed, and the trust estate shall vest in
him in like manner as it had
vested or would have vested, in the trustee in whose place he is
substituted and the court
may order such conveyance to be made by the former trustee or
his representatives, or by the
other remaining trustees, as may be necessary or proper to vest
the trust estate in the new
trustee, either or jointly with the others.

Section 4. Proceedings where trustee appointed abroad.

When land in the
Philippines is held in trust for persons resident here by a trustee
who derives his authority
from without the Philippines, such trustee shall, on petition filed
in the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is situated, and after due notice
to all persons interested, be
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ordered to apply to the court for appointment as
trustee; and upon his neglect or refusal to comply
with such order, the court shall declare such trust
vacant, and shall appoint a new trustee in whom
the trust estate shall vest in like manner as if he
had been originally
appointed by such court.
Section 5. Trustee must file bond. Before entering
on the duties of his trust, a trustee
shall file with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction
of the trust a bond in the amount fixed
by the judge of said court, payable to the Government
of the Philippines and sufficient and
available for the protection of any party in
interest, and a trustee who neglects to file such
bond shall be considered to have declined or
resigned the trust; but the court may until
further order exempt a trustee under a will from
giving a bond when the testator has directed
or requested such exemption and may so exempt any
trustee when all persons beneficially
interested in the trust, being of full age,
request the exemption. Such exemption may
be
cancelled by the court at any time and the trustee
required to forthwith file a bond.
Section 6. Conditions included in bond.
The following conditions shall be deemed to
be part of the bond whether written therein
or not;
(a) That the trustee will make and
return to the court, at such time as it may
order,
a true inventory of all the real and personal
estate belonging to him as trustee, which at
the
time of the making of such inventory shall
have come to his possession or knowledge;
(b) That he will manage and
dispose of all such estate, and faithfully
discharge his trust in relation thereto,
according to law and the will of the testator
or the provisions of the instrument or order under earned for managing
which he is appointed; their several trust
accounts
(c) That he will render upon oath at least x Atty. Concepcion then requested Belson
once a year until his trust is fulfilled, Securities, Inc. (Belson) to deliver to
unless he is excused therefrom in any year by the him, as Advent Capitals
court, a true account of the property in his rehabilitation receiver, the
hands and the management and disposition thereof, P7,635,597.50 in cash
and will render such other accounts as dividends that Belson held
the court may order; under the Alcantaras Trust
Account 95-013
(d) That at the expiration of his trust he will o claimed that the dividends, as
settle his account in court and pay over and deliver trust fees, formed part of Advent
all the estate remaining in his hands, or due from him Capitals assets
on such settlement, to the person or persons entitled x Belson refused
to thereto. o citing the Alcantaras
objections as well as the absence of
But when the trustee is appointed as a successor to a an
prior trustee, the court may dispense with the making appropriate order from the
and return of an inventory, if one has already been rehabilitation court
filed, and in such case the condition of the bond shall x Atty. Concepcion filed a motion before
be deemed to be altered accordingly. the rehabilitation court to direct Belson
to release the money to him.
Section 7. Appraisal. Compensation of trustee. o As rehabilitation receiver, he
When an inventory is required to be had the duty to take custody and
returned by a trustee, the estate and effects control of Advent
belonging to the trust shall be appraised and the Capitals assets,
court may order one or more inheritance tax such as the sum of
appraisers to assist in the appraisement. The money that Belson
compensation of the trustee shall be fixed by held on behalf of
the court, if it be not determined in the Advent Capitals
instrument creating the trust. Trust Department

Section 8. Removal or resignation of trustee. The

proper Court of First Instance may, upon petition of
the parties beneficially interested and after due notice
to the trustee and hearing, remove a trustee if such
removal appears essential in the interest of the
petitioner. The court may also, after due notice to all
persons interested, remove a trustee who is insane or
otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
evidently unsuitable therefor. A trustee, whether
appointed by the court or under a written instrument,
may resign his trust if it
appears to the court proper to allow such resignation.

Section 9. Proceedings for sale or encumbrance of

trust estate. When the sale or
encumbrance of any real or personal estate held in
trust is necessary or expedient, the court
having jurisdiction of the trust may, on petition and
after due notice and hearing, order such
sale or encumbrance to be made, and the re-
investment and application of the proceeds
thereof in such manner as will best effect the objects
of the trust. The petition, notice,
hearing, order of sale or encumbrance, and record of
proceedings, shall conform as nearly as may be to
the provisions concerning the sale or encumbrance
by guardians of the property of minors or other
wards.

CASES

ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE

CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NICASIO I.
ALCANTARA and EDITHA I. ALCANTARA,
Respondents.
G.R. No.
183050

January
25, 2012
THIRD
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Advent Capital filed a petition for rehabilitation
before RTC Makati
x RTC appointed one Atty. Danilo L. Concepcion
as rehabilitation receiver
x Atty. Concepcion conducted an audit
o found that respondents Nicasio and
Editha Alcantara (collectively,
the Alcantaras) owed Advent
Capital P27,398,026.59,
representing
trust fees that it supposedly

x Alcantaras filed an Opposition
o claimed that the money in the trust account
belonged to them
under their Trust Agreement8 with Advent Capital
o Atty. Concepcion could not claim any right or
interest in the
dividends generated by their
investments since Advent Capital
merely held these in trust for the
Alcantaras, the trustors-
beneficiaries
o IN OTHER WORDS, the rehabilitation court DOES
NOT have
jurisdiction over the subject dividends
x RTC granted Atty. Concepcions motion
o under Rule 59, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, a
receiver has the
duty to immediately take possession
of all of the corporations
assets and administer the same for
the benefit of corporate
creditors. He has the duty to collect debts
owing to the corporation, which debts
form part of its assets. Complying with the
rehabilitation courts order and Atty.
Concepcions demand letter, Belson
turned over the subject dividends to
him
x Alcantaras filed a Rule 65 before the CA
x CA granted the petition
o ruled that the Alcantaras owned those dividends.
They did not form
part of Advent Capitals assets as
contemplated under the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Interim Rules).
o the rehabilitation proceedings in this case
referred only to the
assets and liabilities of the company
proper, not to those of its
Trust Department which held assets
belonging to other people.
o Moreover, even if the Trust Agreement provided
that Advent
Capital, as trustee, shall have first lien
on the Alcantaras financial
portfolio for the payment of its trust
fees, the cash dividends in
Belsons care cannot be summarily
applied to the payment of such
charges.
o To enforce its lien, Advent Capital has to file a
collection suit.
o The rehabilitation court cannot simply enforce the
latters claim by
ordering Belson to deliver the money to it
x Atty. Concepcion filed an MR
o CA denied
x Atty. Concepcion filed a Rule 45 before the SC
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Concepcion, in his capacity as Advent
Capitals receiver, can rightfully collect the subject dividends
which are allegedly the subject matter of the trust agreement
between the latter and the Alcantaras.
HELD: NO.
x Advent Capital asserts that the cash dividends in Belsons
possession formed part
of its assets based on paragraph 9 of its Trust
Agreement with the Alcantaras, which states:
o 9. Trust Fee: Other Expenses - As compensation
for its services
hereunder, the TRUSTEE shall be entitled
to a trust or management fee of 1 (one) %
per annum based on the quarterly
average
market value of the Portfolio or a
minimum annual fee of
P5,000.00, whichever is higher. The said
trust or management fee
shall automatically be deducted
from the Portfolio at the end of
each calendar quarter. The
TRUSTEE shall likewise be
reimbursed
for all reasonable and necessary
expenses incurred by it in the
discharge of its powers and
duties under this Agreement, and
in all
cases, the TRUSTEE shall have a
first lien on the Portfolio for the
payment of the trust fees and
other reimbursable expenses.
x According to Advent Capital, it could automatically
deduct its management fees
from the Alcantaras portfolio that they
entrusted to it. Paragraph 9 of the Trust
Agreement provides that Advent Capital
could automatically deduct its trust fees
from the Alcantaras portfolio, "at the end of
each calendar quarter," with the
corresponding duty to submit to the
Alcantaras a quarterly accounting report
within 20 days after.13
x But the problem is that the trust fees that Advent
Capitals receiver
was claiming were for past quarters. Based
on the stipulation, these
should have been deducted as they became
due. As it happened, at the
time Advent Capital made its move to
collect its supposed management fees, it
neither had possession nor control of the
money it wanted to apply to its claim.
Belson, a third party, held the money in the
Alcantaras names. Whether it
should deliver the same to Advent Capital or
to the Alcantaras is not clear. What is clear is
that the issue as to who should get the same
has been seriously
contested.
x The practice in the case of banks is that they
automatically collect their
management fees from the funds that their
clients entrust to them for
investment or lending to others. But the
banks can freely do this since it holds or
has control of their clients money and since
their trust agreement authorized the
automatic collection. If the depositor contests
the deduction, his remedy is to
bring an action to recover the amount he
claims to have been illegally deducted
from his account.
x Here, Advent Capital does not allege that Belson had
already deducted the
management fees owing to it from the
Alcantaras portfolio at the end of each
calendar quarter. Had this been done, it may
be said that the money in Belsons
possession would technically be that of
Advent Capital. Belson would be holding
such amount in trust for the latter. And it
would be for the Alcantaras to institute
an action in the proper court against Advent
Capital and Belson for misuse of its
funds.
x But the above did not happen. Advent Capital did not
exercise its right to cause
the automatic deduction at the end of every
quarter of its supposed management fee
when it had full control of the dividends. That
was its fault. For their part, the Alcantaras
had the right to presume that Advent Capital
had
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deducted its fees in the manner stated
in the contract. The burden of proving
that the fees were not in fact collected
lies with Advent Capital.
x Further, Advent Capital or its rehabilitation
receiver cannot unilaterally decide to
apply the entire amount of cash dividends
retroactively to cover the accumulated
trust fees. Advent Capital merely
managed in trust for the benefit of the
Alcantaras the latters portfolio, which
under Paragraph 214 of the Trust
Agreement, includes not only the
principal but also its income or
proceeds. The trust property is only
fictitiously attributed by law to the
trustee "to the extent that the rights and
powers vested in a nominal owner shall
be used by him on behalf of the real
owner."15
x The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-
beneficiary. In this
case, the trustors-beneficiaries
are the Alcantaras. Thus, Advent
Capital could not dispose of the
Alcantaras portfolio on its own.
The
income and principal of the
portfolio could only be withdrawn
upon the
Alcantaras written instruction or
order to Advent Capital.16 The
latter
could not also assign or encumber
the portfolio or its income without
the written consent of the
Alcantaras.17 All these are
stipulated in the Trust
Agreement.
x Ultimately, the issue is what court has
jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the
conflicting claims of the parties
over the dividends that Belson
held in trust for
their owners. Certainly, not the
rehabilitation court which has not
been given the
 power to resolve ownership disputes Omnibus
between Advent Capital and third parties. Credit Line
Neither Belson nor the Alcantaras are its Agreement
debtors or creditors with interest in the (Agreement)6
rehabilitation. between LBP and
x Advent Capital must file a separate action for ACDC on
collection to recover the October 29, 1996
trust fees that it allegedly earned and, o ACDC used the Letters of
with the trial courts Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the
authorization if warranted, put the money Agreement to buy
in escrow for payment to construction materials
whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed o respondents, as officers and
to collect the trust fees at the representatives of ACDC, executed
end of each calendar quarter as stated in trust receipts7 in
the contract, all it had against connection with the
the Alcantaras was a claim for payment construction
which is a proper subject for materials, with a total
an ordinary action for collection. It cannot principal amount of
enforce its money claim by P52,344,096.32.
simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation o The trust receipts matured,
case for delivery of money but ACDC failed to return to LBP the
belonging to the Alcantaras but in the proceeds of the
possession of a third party. construction projects
x Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non- or the construction
adversarial in nature, materials subject of
and do not contemplate adjudication of the trust receipts.
claims that must be threshed o LBP sent ACDC a demand
out in ordinary court proceedings. letter,8 dated May 4, 1999, for the
Adversarial proceedings similar to that in payment of its
ordinary courts are inconsistent with the debts, including
commercial nature of a rehabilitation those under the
case. The latter must be resolved quickly Trust Receipts
and expeditiously for the sake of the Facility in the
corporate debtor, its creditors and other amount of
interested parties. Thus, the Interim P66,425,924.39.
Rules "incorporate the concept of o When ACDC failed to comply
prohibited pleadings, affidavit evidence with the demand letter, LBP filed
in lieu the
of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings affidavit-complaint.
instead of the traditional approach of x Respondents filed a joint affidavit
receiving evidence, and the grant of o they signed the trust receipt
authority to the court to decide the case, documents on or about the same
or any incident, on the basis of affidavits time
and documentary evidence."18 LBP and ACDC executed the
x Here, Advent Capitals claim is disputed and loan documents;
requires a full trial on the o their signatures were required
merits.1wphi1 It must be resolved in a by LBP for the release of the loans.
separate action where the Alcantaras o The trust receipts in this case
claim and defenses may also be do not contain (1) a description of
presented and heard. Advent Capital the goods placed
cannot say that the filing of a separate in trust, (2) their
action would defeat the purpose of invoice values,
corporate and (3) their
rehabilitation. In the first place, the maturity dates, in
Interim Rules do not exempt a violation of
company Section 5(a) of
under rehabilitation from availing of P.D. 115.
proper legal procedure for collecting
debt
that may be due it. Secondly, Court
records show that Advent Capital had in
fact sought to recover one of its assets by
filing a separate action for replevin
involving a car that was registered in its name.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C.
KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO, and
NAPOLEON O. GARCIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
x Respondents are the officers and representatives
of Asian Construction and
Development Corporation (ACDC), a
corporation incorporated under
Philippine law and engaged in the
construction business
x Landbank filed a complaint for estafa against
respondents before the
Prosecutors Office Makati
o the LBPs Account Officer for the
Account Management
Development, Edna L. Juan,
stated that LBP extended a
credit
accommodation to ACDC
through the execution of an
 not have been guilty of
o alleged that ACDC acted as a subcontractor for misappropriating any payment.
government x Landbank filed a Rule 45 before the SC
projects such as the Metro Rail x Respondents (while the case was pending before the
Transit, the Clark Centennial SC) filed an MD
Exposition and the Quezon Power o informed the Court that LBP had already
Plant in Mauban, Quezon. assigned to Philippine
Its clients for the construction Opportunities for Growth and
projects, which were Income, Inc. all of its rights, title
the general contractors of and interests in the loans subject
these projects, have not of this case in a Deed of Absolute
yet paid them; Sale dated June 23, 2005
thus, ACDC had yet to receive the o also stated that Avent Holdings
proceeds of the Corporation, in behalf of ACDC, had
materials that were the already settled ACDCs
subject of the trust receipts obligation to LBP on October 8,
and were allegedly used for 2009.
these constructions. Included as Annex "A" in this
As there were no proceeds received motion was a certification21
from these issued by the Philippine
clients, no misappropriation Opportunities for Growth and
thereof could have taken Income, Inc.,
place. stating that it was LBPs
x Makati Prosecutor dismissed the complaint successor-in-interest insofar as
o He pointed out that the evidence presented by the trust receipts in this case are
LBP failed to state concerned and that Avent
the date when the goods described in Holdings
the letters of credit were actually Corporation had already settled
released to the possession of the the claims of LBP or obligations
respondents. of ACDC arising from these trust
o Section 4 of P.D. 115 requires that the goods receipts
covered by trust
receipts be released to the possession ISSUE: Whether the subject transactions may properly be
of the entrustee after the considered as trust receipts so as to render the herein
latters execution and delivery to the respondents liable for estafa.
entruster of a signed trust
receipt. HELD: NO.
o He adds that LBPs evidence also fails to show the x Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt
date when the transaction in this manner:
trust receipts were executed since all the trust o Section 4. What constitutes a trust
receipts are undated receipt transaction. A trust
x Landbank filed an MR receipt transaction, within the
o Makati Prosecutor denied meaning of this Decree, is any
x Landbank appealed to DOJ transaction by and between a
x DOJ reversed Makati Prosecutor person referred to in this Decree
o pointed out that there was no question that the as
goods covered by the entruster, and another person
the trust receipts were received by referred to in this Decree as
ACDC. He likewise adopted LBPs entrustee, whereby the entruster,
argument that while the subjects of the who owns or holds absolute title
trust receipts were not mentioned in the or security interests over certain
trust receipts, they were listed in the specified goods, documents or
letters of credit referred to in the trust instruments, releases the same to
receipts. the possession of the entrustee
o He also noted that the trust receipts contained upon the latter's execution and
maturity dates and delivery to the entruster of a
clearly set out their stipulations. signed
o He further rejected the respondents defense that document called a "trust receipt"
ACDC failed to wherein the entrustee binds
remit the payments to LBP due to the himself to hold the designated
failure of the clients of ACDC to pay them goods, documents or instruments
x Respondents filed an MR in
o DOJ denied trust for the entruster and to sell
x Respondents filed a petition for review before the CA or otherwise dispose of the
x CA reversed DOJ goods, documents or instruments
o Applying the doctrine in Colinares, it ruled that with the obligation to turn over
this case did not to the entruster the proceeds
involve a trust receipt transaction, but a thereof to the extent of the
mere loan. It emphasized that amount
construction materials, the subject of the owing to the entruster or as
trust receipt appears in the trust receipt or the
transaction, were delivered to ACDC even
before the trust receipts goods, documents or instruments
were executed. It noted that LBP did not themselves if they are unsold or
offer proof that the goods not otherwise disposed of, in
were received by ACDC, and that the trust accordance with the terms and
receipts did not contain conditions specified in the trust
a description of the goods, their invoice receipt, or for other purposes
value, the amount of the substantially equivalent to any of
draft to be paid, and their maturity dates. the following:
It also adopted ACDCs
argument that since no payment for the 112
construction projects had
been received by ACDC, its officers could
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r
e
1. In the case of goods or t
documents, (a) to sell the a
goods or i
procure their n
sale; or (b) to
manufacture or i
process the t
goods with the s
purpose of
ultimate sale: t
Provided, That, i
in the case of t
goods delivered l
under e
trust receipt for
the purpose of o
manufacturing v
or e
processing r
before its
ultimate sale, t
the entruster h
shall e
 goods whether they were aware of
in its original or the fact that there
processed form was no way they
until the could recover the
entrustee has buildings or
complied fully constructions for
with his which the materials
obligation under subject of the
the trust receipt; alleged trust
or (c) to receipts had been
load, unload, used. Notably,
ship or tranship despite the
or otherwise allegations in the
deal with affidavit-
them in a complaint wherein
manner LBP sought the return
preliminary or of the construction
necessary to materials,28 its
their demand letter dated
sale[.] May 4, 1999 sought
x There are two obligations in a trust receipt the payment of the
transaction. The first is balance but failed
covered by the provision that refers to to ask, as an
money under the obligation to deliver alternative, for the
it (entregarla) to the owner of the return of the
merchandise sold. The construction materials
second is covered by the provision or the
referring to merchandise received buildings where these materials had
under the obligation to return it been used.29
(devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under x The fact that LBP had knowingly
the Trust Receipts Law,22 intent to authorized the delivery of construction
defraud is presumed when (1) the materials
entrustee fails to turn over the to a construction site
proceeds of the sale of goods covered of two government
by the trust receipt to the entruster; or projects, as well as
(2) when the entrustee fails to return unspecified
the goods under trust, if they are not construction sites,
disposed of in accordance with the repudiates the idea
terms of the trust receipts.23 that LBP intended to
x In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the be the owner of
part of the trustee exist those construction
in the alternative - the return of the materials. As a
proceeds of the sale or the return or government financial
recovery of the goods, whether raw or institution, LBP
processed.24 When both parties enter should
into an agreement knowing that the have been aware that
return of the goods subject of the the materials were to
trust receipt is not possible even without be used for the
any fault on the part of the construction of an
trustee, it is not a trust receipt immovable property,
transaction penalized under Section 13 as well as a property
of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually of the public domain.
agreed upon by the parties As an
would be the return of the proceeds of immovable property,
the sale transaction. This the ownership of
transaction becomes a mere loan,25 whatever was
where the borrower is obligated constructed with
to pay the bank the amount spent for those
the purchase of the goods. materials would
x Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order presumably belong to
to judge the intention of the owner of the land,
the contracting parties, their under Article 445
contemporaneous and subsequent of the Civil Code
acts shall be principally considered." which provides:
Under this provision, we can o Article 445. Whatever is
examine the built, planted or sown on the
contemporaneous actions of the land of
parties rather than rely purely on the another
trust and the
receipts that they signed in order to improveme
understand the transaction through nts or
their repairs
intent. made
x We note in this regard that at the onset of these thereon,
transactions, LBP knew that belong to
ACDC was in the construction the owner
business and that the materials that it of the land,
sought to subject to
buy under the letters of credit were to the
be used for the following projects: the provisions
Metro Rail Transit Project and the Clark of the
Centennial Exposition Project.26 LBP following
had articles.
in fact authorized the delivery of the x Even if we consider the vague
materials on the construction sites for possibility that the materials, consisting of
these cement, bolts and
projects, as seen in the letters of credit reinforcing steel bars,
it attached to its complaint.27 Clearly, would be used for the
construction of a
 movable property, the ownership of
these properties would still pertain to possession of the trustee until they are sold.
the government and not remain with But the goods and the materials
the bank as they would be classified as that are used for a construction project are
property of the public domain, which is defined by the often placed under the control and
Civil Code as: custody of the clients employing the
o Article 420. The following things are contractor, who can only be compelled to
property of public dominion: return the materials if they fail to pay the
(1) Those intended for public contractor and often only after the
use, such as roads, requisite legal proceedings. The contractors
canals, rivers, difficulty and uncertainty in claiming these
torrents, ports materials (or the buildings and structures
and bridges which they become part of), as soon as the
constructed by bank demands them, disqualify them from
the State, banks, being covered by trust receipt agreements.
shores, x Based on these premises, we cannot consider the
roadsteads, and agreements between the
others of similar parties in this case to be trust receipt
character; transactions because (1) from the start,
(2) Those which belong to the the parties were aware that ACDC could not
State, without being possibly be obligated to reconvey to
for public use, LBP the materials or the end product for which
and are they were used; and (2) from the moment the
intended for materials were used for the government
some public projects, they became
service or for public, not LBPs, property.
the development x Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an
of the national action for estafa should not be
wealth. brought against the respondents, who are
x In contrast with the present situation, it is liable only for a loan. In passing, it is useful to
fundamental in a trust note that this is the threat held against
receipt transaction that the person borrowers that Retired Justice Claudio
who advanced payment for the Teehankee emphatically opposed in his
merchandise becomes the absolute dissent in People v. Cuevo,32 restated in Ong
owner of said merchandise and v. CA, et al.:33
continues as owner until he or she is o The very definition of trust receipt x x x
paid in full, or if the goods had sustains the lower
already been sold, the proceeds courts rationale in dismissing
should be turned over to him or to the information that the
her.30 contract covered by a trust
x Thus, in concluding that the transaction was a loan receipt is merely a secured
and not a trust loan. The goods imported by the
receipt, we noted in Colinares that the small importer and retail
industry or line of work that the dealer through the banks
borrowers were engaged in was financing remain of their own
construction. We pointed out that the property and risk and the old
borrowers capitalist orientation of
were not importers acquiring goods for putting them in jail for estafa
resale.31 Indeed, goods sold in retail are for non-payment of the
secured loan (granted after
often within the custody or control of the they had been fully
trustee until they are purchased. In the investigated by the bank as good
case of materials used in the credit risks) through the fiction of
manufacture of finished products, these the trust receipt device should no
finished longer be
products - if not the raw materials or permitted in this day and age.
their components - similarly remain in x As the law stands today, violations of Trust Receipts
the Law are criminally
punishable, but no criminal complaint for
violation of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation with P.D. 115,
should prosper against a borrower who was not
part of a genuine trust receipt transaction.
x Misappropriation or abuse of confidence is absent in
this case.
x Even if we assume that the transactions were trust
receipts, the complaint
against the respondents still should have
been dismissed. The Trust Receipts
Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of
confidence in the handling of money
or goods to the prejudice of another,
regardless of whether the latter is the
owner or not. The law does not singularly
seek to enforce payment of the loan, as
"there can be no violation of [the] right
against imprisonment for non-
payment of a debt."34
x In order that the respondents "may be validly
prosecuted for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code,35 in relation with Section 13 of
the Trust Receipts Law, the following elements
must be established: (a) they
received the subject goods in trust or under
the obligation to sell the same and
to remit the proceeds thereof to [the trustor],
or to return the goods if not sold;
 (b) they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the
proceeds of the sale; (c) they performed such acts with abuse
of confidence to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank; and
(d) demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the
remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold
goods."36
x In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in the
handling of the
construction materials.
x In this case, the misappropriation could be committed should the
entrustee fail
to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by
the trust receipt
transaction or fail to return the goods themselves. The
respondents could not
have failed to return the proceeds since their allegations that
the clients of ACDC had not paid for the projects it had
undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had never
been questioned or denied by LBP. What can only be
attributed to the respondents would be the failure to return the
goods subject of the trust receipts.
x We do not likewise see any allegation in the complaint that ACDC had
used the
construction materials in a manner that LBP had not
authorized. As earlier
pointed out, LBP had authorized the delivery of these materials
to these project
sites for which they were used. When it had done so, LBP
should have been
aware that it could not possibly recover the processed
materials as they would
become part of government projects, two of which (the Metro
Rail Transit
Project and the Quezon Power Plant Project) had even become
part of the
operations of public utilities vital to public service. It clearly had
no intention of
getting these materials back; if it had, as a primary government
lending
institution, it would be guilty of extreme negligence and
incompetence in not
foreseeing the legal complications and public
inconvenience that would arise
should it decide to claim the materials. ACDCs
failure to return these materials
or their end product at the time these "trust
receipts" expired could not be
attributed to its volition. No bad faith, malice,
negligence or breach of contract
has been attributed to ACDC, its officers or
representatives. Therefore, absent
any abuse of confidence or misappropriation
on the part of the respondents, the
criminal proceedings against them for estafa
should not prosper.
x In Metropolitan Bank,37 we affirmed the city
prosecutors dismissal of a
complaint for violation of the Trust Receipts
Law. In dismissing the complaint, we
took note of the Court of Appeals finding that
the bank was interested only in
collecting its money and not in the return of the
goods. Apart from the bare
allegation that demand was made for the
return of the goods (raw materials that
were manufactured into textiles), the bank had
not accompanied its complaint
with a demand letter. In addition, there was no
evidence offered that the
respondents therein had misappropriated or
misused the goods in question.
x The petition should be dismissed because the OSG did
not file it and the civil
liabilities have already been settled.
x The proceedings before us, regarding the criminal
aspect of this case, should be
dismissed as it does not appear from the records that
the complaint was filed
113
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
and the
Court of
with the participation or consent of Appeals
the Office of the Solicitor General in all
(OSG). criminal
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book proceedi
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 ngs;
provides that: represen
o Section 35. Powers and Functions. t the
The Office of the Solicitor Govern
General shall represent the ment
Government of the and its
Philippines, its officers
agencies and in the
instrumentalities and its Supre
officials and agents in any me
litigation, proceedings, Court,
investigation or matter the
requiring the Court
services of lawyers. x x x It of
shall have the following Appeal
specific powers and functions: s and
(1) Represent the all
Government in the Supreme other
Court courts
 or tribunals in ACDC. These facts have not been
all civil actions disputed by LBP. Therefore, we
and special can reasonably conclude that LBP
proceedings in no longer has any claims against
which the ACDC, as regards the subject
Government or matter of this case, that would
any officer entitle it to file a civil or criminal
thereof in his action.
official capacity
is a party.
(Emphasis ADOPT
provided.) ION
x In Heirs of Federico C. Delgado v. Gonzalez,38 we
ruled that the preliminary AND
investigation is part of a criminal CUSTO
proceeding. As all criminal proceedings DY OF
before MINOR
the Supreme Court and the Court of S
Appeals may be brought and defended
[RULE
by
only the Solicitor General in behalf of the S 99-
Republic of the Philippines, a criminal 100]
action brought to us by a private party
alone suffers from a fatal defect. The RULE 99 (Adoption and Custody)
present petition was brought in behalf of
LBP by the Government Corporate Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to
Counsel to protect its private interests. adopt another or have the custody of a
Since the representative of the "People of minor shall present his petition to the
the Philippines" had not taken any part of Court of First Instance of the province, or
the case, it should be the municipal or justice of the peace court
dismissed.1wphi1 of the city or municipality in which he
x On the other hand, if we look at the mandate resides.
given to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel, we In the City of Manila, the proceedings
find that it is limited to the civil shall be instituted in the Juvenile and
liabilities arising from the crime, and is Domestic Relations Court.
subject to the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. Section 2. Contents of petition. The
Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules petition for adoption shall contain the
Governing the Exercise by the Office of same allegations required in a petition
the Government Corporate Counsel of its for guardianship, to wit:
Authority, Duties and Powers as Principal
Law Office of All Government Owned or (a) The jurisdictional facts;
Controlled Corporations, filed before the
Office of the National Administration (b) The qualification of the adopter;
Register on September 5, 2011, reads:
o Section 2. Extent of legal assistance - (c) That the adopter is not disqualified by
The OGCC shall represent law;
the complaining GOCC in all
stages of the criminal (d) The name, age, and residence of
proceedings. The legal the person to be adopted and of his relatives
assistance extended is not of the persons who have him under their care;
limited to the preparation of
appropriate sworn (e) The probable value and character of the
statements but shall estate of the person to be adopted.
include all aspects of an
effective private Section 3. Consent of adoption. There
prosecution including shall be filed with the petition a written
recovery of civil liability consent to the adoption signed by the child, if
arising from the crime, subject fourteen years of age or over and not
to the control and supervision incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if
of the public prosecutor. any, and by each of its known living parents
x Based on jurisprudence, there are two exceptions who is not insane or
when a private party hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such
complainant or offended party in a child, or if there is no such parents by the
criminal case may file a petition
with this Court, without the intervention of
the OSG: (1) when there is
denial of due process of law to the
prosecution, and the State or its
agents refuse to act on the case to the
prejudice of the State and the
private offended party;39 and (2) when
the private offended party
questions the civil aspect of a decision of
the lower court.40
x In this petition, LBP fails to allege any
inaction or refusal to act on the part of the
OSG, tantamount to a denial of due
process. No explanation appears as to
why
the OSG was not a party to the case.
Neither can LBP now question the civil
aspect of this decision as it had already
assigned ACDCs debts to a third person,
Philippine Opportunities for Growth and
Income, Inc., and the civil liabilities
appear to have already been settled by
Avent Holdings Corporation, in behalf of
 child under seven years of age shall be separated from
general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is its mother, unless the court finds there
in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or are compelling reasons thereof.
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer of such
asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is Section 7. Proceedings as to vagrant or abused
illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its child. When the parents of any minor child are
father to the adoption shall not be required. dead, or by reason of long absence or legal or
physical disability have
If the person to be adopted is of age, only his or her consent abandoned it, or cannot support it through vagrancy,
and that of the spouse, if any, shall be required. negligence, or misconduct, or neglect or
refuse to support it, or treat it with excessive harshness
Section 4. Order for hearing. If the petition and consent filed or give it corrupting orders, counsels,
are sufficient in form and or examples, or cause or allow it to engage in begging,
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the or to commit offenses against the law,
petition, shall fix a date and place the proper Court of First Instance, upon petition filed by
for the hearing thereof, which shall not be more than six (6) some reputable resident of the
months after the entry of the province setting forth the facts, may issue an order
order, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published requiring such parents to show cause, or,
before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive if the parents are dead or cannot be found, requiring the
weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the fiscal of the province to show cause,
province, as the court shall deem best. at a time and place fixed in the order, why the child
should not be taken from its parents, if
Section 5. Hearing and judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in living; and if upon the hearing it appears that the
open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has allegations of the petition are true, and that
been published as directed, that the allegations of it is order taking it from its parents, if living; and
petition are true, and that it is a proper case for adoption and the committing it to any suitable orphan asylum,
petitioner or petitioners are children's home, or benevolent society or person to be
able to bring up and educate the child properly, the court shall ultimately placed, by adoption or
adjudge that thenceforth the otherwise, in a home found for it by such asylum, children's
child is free from all legal obligations of obedience and home, society, or person.
maintenance with respect to its natural
parents, except the mother when the child is adopted by her Section 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or
husband, and is, to all legal judgments under this rule shall be served by the clerk
intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner or petitioners, upon the civil registrar of the city or municipality wherein
and that its surname is changed to that the petitioner or the court issuing the same is situated.
petitioners. The adopted person or child shall thereupon become
the legal heir of his parents by adoption and shall also remain the
legal heir of his natural parents. In case of the death of the RULE 100 (Rescission and Revocation)
adopted person or child, his parents and relatives by nature, and
not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. Section 1. Who may file petition; grounds. A minor or
other incapacitated person may, through a guardian or
Section 6. Proceedings as to the child whose parents are guardian ad litem, petition for the rescission or revocation
separated. Appeal. of his or her adoption for the same causes that authorize
When husband and wife are divorce or living separately and the deprivation of parental authority.
apart from each other, and the
question as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children The adopter may, likewise, petition the court for the
of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by rescission of revocation of the adoption in any of these
petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the cases:
court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall
award the care, custody, and (a) If the adopted person has attempted against the file
control of each such child as will be for its best interest, of the adopter;
permitting the child to choose which
parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless (b) When the adopted minor has abandoned the
the parent so chosen be unfit home of the adopter for more than three (3) years;
to take charge of the child by the reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, (c) When by other acts the adopted person has
or poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both parents are repudiated the adoption.
improper persons to have
the care, custody, and control of the child, the court may either Section 2. Order to answer. The court in which the
designate the paternal or petition is filed shall issue an order
maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or requiring the adverse party to answer the petition within
sister, or some reputable and fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to copy thereof. The order and a copy of the petition shall be
any suitable asylum, children's served on the adverse party in such manner as the court
home, or benevolent society. The court may in conformity with may direct
the provisions of the Civil Code
order either or both parents to support or help support said child, Section 3. Judgment. If upon trial, on the day set
irrespective of who may be therefor, the court finds that the allegations of the
its custodian, and may make any order that is just and reasonable petition are true, it shall render judgment ordering
permitting the parent who the rescission or
is deprived of its care and custody to visit the child or have revocation of the adoption, with or without costs, as justice
temporary custody thereof. Either requires.
parent may appeal from an order made in accordance with the 114
provisions of this section. No
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)

(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one

who has no proper parental care or
guardianship or whose
Section 4. Service of Judgment. A certified copy 1. The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
of the judgment rendered in
accordance with the next preceding section shall be Republic Act No. 8552 February 25, 1998
served upon the civil registrar concerned, within
thirty (30) days from rendition thereof, who shall AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND
forthwith enter the action taken by the court in the POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF
register. FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 5. Time within which to file petition. A
minor or other incapacitated person Be it enacted by the Senate and House
must file the petition for rescission or revocation of of Representatives of the Philippines in
adoption within the five (5) years following Congress assembled::
his majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of
the adoption, within the five (5) years ARTICLE I
following the recovery from such incompetency. GENERAL PROVISIONS

The adopter must also file the petition to set aside Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the
the adoption within five (5) years from the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998."
time the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission
or revocation of the same took place.
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - (a) It is hereby authority due to abandonment;
declared the policy of the State to substantial,
ensure that every child remains under the care continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or
and custody of his/her parent(s) and be incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.
provided with love, care, understanding and
security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. Only when such
efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate
placement or adoption within the child's extended
family is available shall adoption by an unrelated
person be considered.

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and

adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the
tenets set forth in the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to
the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.
Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or
adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned,
or abandoned.

(c) It shall also be a State policy to:

(i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from

making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her
parental authority over his/her child;

(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from

his/her biological parent(s);

(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to

disturb his/her parental authority and custody over
his/her adopted child.

Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental

authority shall be administratively or judicially
declared so as to establish the status of the child as
"legally available for adoption" and his/her custody
transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to any duly licensed and accredited
child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity
shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent
placement of the child;

(iv) Conduct public information and educational

campaigns to promote a positive environment for
adoption;

(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within

government and private sector agencies to
handle adoption inquiries, process domestic
adoption applications, and offer adoption-related
services including, but not limited to, parent
preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling; and

(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve

the child's identity and culture in his/her
native land, and only when this is not available shall
intercountry adoption be considered as a
last resort.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of

this Act, the following terms shall be defined as:

(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.

(b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a

child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily
committed to the Department or to a duly licensed
and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency,
freed of the parental authority of his/her biological
parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of
rescission of adoption.

(c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose

parent(s) knowingly and willingly relinquishes
parental authority to the Department.

(d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose

parent(s), known or unknown, has been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental
parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) L
continuous months and has been judicially declared as such. I
G
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a I
social worker oversees the B
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and I
adoptee in stabilizing their filial L
relationship. I
T
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Y
Development.
Section 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited
agency by the Department to provide comprehensive child (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full
welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
adoptive parents, and preparing the adoption home study. turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care
agency by the Department that provides twenty four (24)-hour for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected, or family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
voluntarily committed children. between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
making it appear in the birth records that a certain child was
born to a person who is not his/her biological mother, causing (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
such child to lose his/her true identity and status. stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations
ARTICLE II with the Republic of the Philippines,
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least
three (3) continuous years prior to
Section 4. Counseling Service. - The Department shall provide the filing of the application for adoption and maintains
the services of licensed social workers to the following: such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
(a) Biological Parent(s) - Counseling shall be provided to the his/her diplomatic or consular office or
parent(s) before and after the birth of his/her child. No binding any appropriate government agency that he/she has the
commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee
allowed for the biological to enter his/her country as his/her
parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the
adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling requirements on residency and certification
and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may
biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for be waived for the following:
adoption.
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
hurried decisions are made and all consanguinity or affinity; or
alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each
alternative have been provided. (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) - Counseling sessions,
adoption fora and seminars, among others, shall be provided to (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting. relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) Prospective Adoptee - Counseling sessions shall be
provided to ensure that he/she understands the nature and (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on termination of the guardianship and clearance of
adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of his/her financial accountabilities.
maturity.
115
Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). - It shall be the duty of
the Department or
the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the
child to exert all efforts to
locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail,
the child shall be registered as
a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings
where he/she shall be
declared abandoned.

Section 6. Support Services. - The Department shall develop

a pre-adoption program which shall include, among others,
the above mentioned services.

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Henedino M. Brondial)
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years
of age who has been administratively or
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following judicially declared available for adoption;
cases:
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of other spouse;
the other; or
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own qualified adopter to improve his/her
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that status to that of legitimacy;
the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or (d) A person of legal age if, prior to
the adoption, said person has been
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. consistently considered and treated
by the adopter(s) as his/her own
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse child since minority;
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the (e) A child whose adoption has been previously
spouses. rescinded; or

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. - The following may be (f) A child whose biological or adoptive
adopted: parent(s) has died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6)
months from the time of death of said
parent(s).
Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
documents and records pertaining to the
adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved
by the Department.
Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. - No
petition for adoption shall be finally granted
until the adopter(s) has been given by the
court a supervised trial custody period for at
least
six (6) months within which the parties are
expected to adjust psychologically and
emotionally
to each other and establish a bonding
relationship. During said period, temporary
parental
authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of The court may motu proprio or upon motion
age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter of any party reduce the trial period if it finds
and the latter's spouse, if any; and the same to be in the best interest of the
adoptee, stating the reasons for the
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be reduction of the period. However, for alien
adopted. adopter(s), he/she must complete the six
(6)-month trial custody except for those
A enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
R
T If the child is below seven (7) years of
I age and is placed with the prospective
C adopter(s)
L through a pre-adoption placement
E authority issued by the Department, the
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Section 10. Hurried Decisions. - In all proceedings

for adoption, the court shall require
proof that the biological parent(s) has been
properly counseled to prevent him/her from
making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety
to give up the child, and to sustain that all measures
to strengthen the family have been exhausted and
that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own
home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.

Section 11. Case Study. - No petition for adoption

shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social
worker of the Department, the social service office of
the local government unit, or any child-placing or
child-caring agency has made a case study of the
adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the
adopter(s), and has submitted the report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition.

At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case

study, the concerned social worker shall
confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity
and registered name of the adoptee. If the
birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil
Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the
concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee
is registered.

The case study on the adoptee shall establish that

he/she is legally available for adoption and that the
documents to support this fact are valid and
authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s)
shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that
the adoption is in the best
interest of the child.

The Department shall intervene on behalf of the

adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case
studies, that the petition should be denied. The
case studies and other relevant
 may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article
adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) 919 of the Civil Code.
is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with the
prospective adopter(s). Section 20. Effects of Rescission. - If the petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
Section 13. Decree of Adoption. - If, after the publication of the biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
order of hearing has been Department shall be
complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
petition, and after consideration The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s)
of the case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
custody report and the evidence
submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel
qualified to adopt, and that the the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and
adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a restore his/her original birth certificate.
decree of adoption shall be
entered which shall be effective as of the date the original Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to
petition was filed. This provision adoption, but only as of the date of
shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights
of the decree of adoption to acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be
protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the respected.
name by which the child is to be
known. All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall
be without prejudice to the penalties imposable under
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. - An amended certificate of the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly
birth shall be issued by the proven.
Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the ARTICLE VII
child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
The original certificate of
birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the Section 21. Violations and Penalties. - (a) The penalty of
issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be imprisonment ranging from six
sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or
issued to the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an a fine not less than Fifty thousand
amended issue. pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. - All discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person
hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and shall not be who shall commit any of the following
open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the acts:
adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any
other agency or institution participating in the adoption (i) obtaining consent for an adoption through
proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material
inducement, or other similar acts;
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third
person is necessary for purposes connected with or arising out (ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided
of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, by the law for adoption; or
the court may merit the necessary information to be released, 116
restricting the purposes for which it may be used.

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

Section 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the

biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

Section 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the

legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to
them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee
is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.

Section 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the

adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However,
if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the
law on testamentary
succession shall govern.

ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION

Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. - Upon petition of

the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be
rescinded on any of the following
grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt
on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be

subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
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AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES

(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger,
abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious
registration of the birth of a child under the name(s)
of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s)
shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and
a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).
Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who,
in violation of his/her oath of office, shall cooperate
in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall
suffer the penalties herein prescribed and also the
penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations
relating to the confidentiality and integrity
TO GOVERN INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION OF
of records, documents, and communications
of adoption applications, cases, and processes
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to
two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not
more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00),
at the discretion of the court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than
that prescribed for the consummated
offense under this Article shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to
commit any of the acts
herein enumerated. Acts punishable under
this Article, when committed by a syndicate
or where it involves two (2) or more children
shall be considered as an offense
constituting child trafficking and shall merit
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Acts punishable under this Article are deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined
under this Article. Penalties as are herein
provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties
which may be imposed for the same acts punishable
under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and
proclamations.
Section 27. Separability Clause. - If any
provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other provisions not
affected thereby shall remain valid and
subsisting.
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. - This Act
shall take effect fifteen (15) days following
its complete publication in any newspaper
of general circulation or in the Official
Gazette.

When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be Approved: February 25, 1998
deported immediately after service of sentence and
perpetually excluded from entry to the country. 2.
Any government official, employee or functionary who
Inter-
shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions
of this Act, or who shall conspire with private
individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed Count
penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing
civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, ry
That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or
criminal, said government official, employee, or Adopti
functionary concerned shall automatically suffer
suspension until the resolution of the case. on Act
Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. - A
person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act,
of
simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for
such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was 1995
made for the best interest of the child and that he/she
has been REPUB
consistently considered and treated by that person
as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, LIC
further, That the application for correction of the
birth registration and petition for adoption ACT
shall be filed within five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter:
NO.
Provided, finally, That such person complies with the
procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and
other requirements as determined by the Department. 8043

ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. -

There shall be established an
Adoption Resources and Referral Office under the
Department with the following functions: (a)
monitor the existence, number, and flow of children
legally available for adoption and
prospective adopter(s) so as to facilitate their
matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information
and educational campaign on domestic adoption; (c)
keep records of adoption proceedings;
(d) generate resources to help child-caring and child-
placing agencies and foster homes
maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in
collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption Board
and other concerned agencies. The office shall be
manned by adoption experts from the public and
private sectors.

Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -

Within six (6) months from the
promulgation of this Act, the Department, with the
Council for the Welfare of Children, the
Office of Civil Registry General, the Department of
Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, and two (2)
private individuals representing child-placing and
child-caring agencies shall formulate the necessary
guidelines to make the provisions of this Act
operative.

Section 25. Appropriations. - Such sum as may be

necessary for the implementation of the provisions of
this Act shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment
into law and thereafter.

Section 26. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential

decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation
contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended
accordingly.
FILIPINO CHILDREN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to
act as the central authority in matters
ARTICLE I relating to inter-country adoption. It shall act as the
GENERAL PROVISIONS policy-making body for purposes of
carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation
Sec. 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Inter-Country and coordination with the Department, the different
Adoption Act of 1995." child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies,
as well as non-
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy governmental organizations engaged in child-care and placement
of the State to provide activities. As such, it shall:
every neglected and abandoned child with a family that will
provide such child with love and a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse,
care as well as opportunities for growth and development. exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other
Towards this end, efforts shall be practice in connection with adoption which is harmful,
exerted to place the child with an adoptive family in the detrimental, or prejudicial to the child;
Philippines. However, recognizing
that inter-country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens b) Collect, maintain, and preserve confidential
not presently allowed by law information about the child and the adoptive
to adopt Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by parents;
qualified Filipino citizens or
aliens, the State shall take measures to ensure that inter-country c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate
adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to completion of adoption of the child through
the child's best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her authorized and accredited agency;
fundamental rights. cdt
d) Prevent improper financial or other gain in
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act. the term: connection with an adoption and deter improper
practices contrary to this Act;
a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of
adopting a Filipino child by e) Promote the development of adoption services including
a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad post-legal adoption; cd i
where the petition is filed, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of f) License and accredit child-caring/placement
adoption is issued outside the Philippines. agencies and collaborate with them in the placement
of Filipino children;
b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age
unless sooner emancipated by g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency
law. in the placement of Filipino children in their own
country; and
c) Department refers to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development of the Republic of the Philippines. h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the
child-caring and placement agency or adoptive agency
d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a
Department of Social Welfare and Development. acd finding of violation of any provision under this Act.

e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State
welfare agency or a licensed adoption agency in the country of
the adopting parents which provide comprehensive social
services and which is duly recognized by the Department.
f) Legally-free child means a child who has been
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department, in
accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the
adoptive child and the applicant to promote a mutually
satisfying parent-child relationship.
h) Board refers to the Inter-country Adoption Board.
ARTICLE II
THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD
Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. - The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary of the Department as ex
officio Chairman, and six (6) other members to be
appointed by the
President for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years:
Provided, That there shall be appointed
one (1) psychiatrist or psychologist, two (2) lawyers who
shall have at least the qualifications
of a regional trial court judge, one (1) registered social
worker and two (2) representatives
from non-governmental organizations engaged in child-
caring and placement activities. The
members of the Board shall receive a per diem allowance
of One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for each
meeting attended by them: Provided, further, That no
compensation shall be paid for more than four (4)
meetings a month.

Sec. 4. The Inter-Country Adoption Board. - There is hereby

117
created the Inter-Country
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Sec. 6. Powers and Functions of the Board. - The Board shall have the following
powers and functions: e) to determine the form and contents of the
application for inter-country adoption;
a) to prescribe rules and regulations as it may
deem reasonably necessary to carry out g) to institute systems and procedures
the provisions of this Act, after consultation and to prevent improper financial gain in
upon favorable recommendation of the connection with adoption and deter
different agencies concerned with the child-caring, placement, improper practices which are contrary to this
and adoption; Act;

b) to set the guidelines for the convening h) to promote the development of

of an Inter-country Adoption Placement adoption services, including post-legal
Committee which shall be under the direct adoption
supervision of the Board; services, cd

c) to set the guidelines for the manner by i) to accredit and authorize foreign
which selection/matching of prospective adoptive private adoption agencies which have
parents and adoptive child can be made; demonstrated
professionalism, competence and have
d) to determine a reasonable schedule of fees consistently pursued non-profit objectives to
and charges to be exacted in connection with the engage in
application for adoption; the placement of Filipino children in their own
country: Provided, That such foreign private
agencies are duly authorized and accredited by their
own government to conduct inter-country adoption:
Provided, however, That the total number of
authorized and accredited foreign
private adoption agencies shall not exceed one hundred (100)
a year;
j) to take appropriate measures to ensure
confidentiality of the records of the child, the natural
parents and the adoptive parents at all times;
k) to prepare, review or modify, and thereafter,
recommend to the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Memoranda of Agreement respecting
inter-country adoption consistent with
the implementation of this Act and its stated goals,
entered into, between and among foreign
governments, international organizations and
recognized international non-governmental
organizations;
l) to assist other concerned agencies and the
courts in the implementation of this Act, particularly
as regards coordination with foreign persons,
agencies and other entities involved in the process of
adoption and the physical transfer of the child; and
Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. - An alien or a
Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad
may file an application for inter-country
adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years
of age and at least sixteen (16) years older
than the child to be adopted, at the time of
application unless the adoptor is the parent
by nature of the child to be adopted or the
spouse of such parent:
b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for
the adoption;
c) has the capacity to act and assume
all rights and responsibilities of parental
authority
under his national laws, and has undergone
the appropriate counseling from an accredited
counselor in his/her country;
d) has not been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;

m) to perform such other functions on matters

relating to inter-country adoption as may be
determined by the President.

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Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort.

- The Board shall ensure that all
possibilities for adoption of the child under the
Family Code have been exhausted and that
inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the
child. Towards this end, the Board shall
set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be
taken to place the child in the Philippines
before the child is placed for inter-country adoption:
Provided, however, That the maximum
number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall
not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five
(5) years.

Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. - Only a legally

free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption. In order that such child may be
considered for placement, the following
documents must be submitted to the Board:
cdasia

a) Child study;

b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of

abandonment/death certificate of parents;

d) Medical evaluation /history;

e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

f) Recent photo of the child.

f) is in a position to provide the proper care and
support and to give the necessary moral values and example
to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as
embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations
issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has
diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited
agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable
Philippine laws.
Sec. 10. Where to File Application. - An application to adopt a
Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board,
through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an
authorized and
accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive
parents, which application shall be in accordance with the
requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the Board. cdasia
The application shall be supported by the following documents
written and officially translated in English.
a) Birth certificate of applicant(s);
b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable;
c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children
above ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement;
d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a
duly licensed physician and
psychologist;
country adoption and to support the activities of the
Board.
Sec. 14. Supervision of Trial Custody. - The
governmental agency or the authorized and
accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents
which filed the application for inter-
country adoption shall be responsible for the trial
custody and the care of the child. It shall
also provide family counseling and other related
services. The trial custody shall be for a
period of six (6) months from the time of placement.
Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall a
decree of adoption be issued in the said country a copy
of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the
records of the child.
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall
submit to the governmental agency or
the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in
turn transmit a copy to the Board, a
progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress
report shall be taken into consideration in deciding
whether or not to issue the decree of adoption. aisa dc
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system
by which Filipino children sent abroad for trial custody
are monitored and checked as reported by the
authorized and accredited
inter-country adoption agency as well as the
repatriation to the Philippines of a Filipino child whose
adoption has not been approved.
Sec. 15. Executive Agreements. - The Department of
Foreign Affairs, upon representation of the Board, shall
cause the preparation of Executive Agreements with
countries of the
118

e) Income tax returns or any document showing

the financial capability of the
applicant(s);

f) Police clearance of applicant(s);

g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the

applicant's employer and a
member of the immediate community who have known the
applicant(s) for at least five (5)
years; and

h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s)

and his immediate family; The Rules of Court shall apply

in case of adoption by judicial proceedings.

Sec. 11. Family Selection/Matching. - No child shall be matched

to a foreign adoptive
family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be
adopted locally. The clearance,
as issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the
meetings, shall form part of the
records of the child to be adopted. When the Board is ready to
transmit the Placement
Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption
agency and all the travel
documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any
one of them, shall personally
fetch the child in the Philippines.

Sec. 12. Pre-adoptive Placement Costs. - The applicant(s) shall

bear the following costs incidental to the placement of the child;

a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the

residence of the applicant(s) abroad, including all travel expenses
within the Philippines and abroad; and

b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination

and psychological evaluation required, and other related
expenses.

Sec. 13. Fees, Charges and Assessments. - Fees, charges, and

assessments collected by the Board in the exercise of its
functions shall be used solely to process applications for inter-
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foreign adoption agencies to ensure the legitimate
concurrence of said countries in upholding the Sec. 16. Penalties. - a) Any person who shall
safeguards provided by this Act. knowingly participate in the conduct or
carrying out of an illegal adoption, in
A violation of the provisions of this Act, shall
R be punished
T with a penalty of imprisonment ranging from
I six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
C years and/or a fine of not less than Fifty
L thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more
E than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200.000), at the
I discretion of the court. For purposes of this
V Act,
an adoption is illegal if it is effected in any
manner contrary to the provisions of this Act
P or
E established State policies, its implementing
N rules and regulations, executive
A agreements, and
L other laws pertaining to adoption. Illegality
T may be presumed from the following acts:
I
1) consent for an adoption was acquired
through, or attended by coercion, fraud,
improper material inducement;
2) there is no authority from the Board to effect
adoption;
3) the procedures and safeguards placed under
the law for adoption were not complied
with; and
4) the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to
danger, abuse and exploitation.
b) Any person who shall violate established
regulations relating to the confidentiality and
integrity of records, documents and communications
of adoption applications, cases and processes shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a
fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000),
but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at
the discretion of the court.
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
Sec. 22. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved, June 7, 1995.
3. Rules Of Adoption [AM No. 02-6-
02, dated July 31, 2002 effective
August 22, 2002]
a. Who may adopt? [Section 4]
b. Who may be adopted? [Section
5]
c. Venue and Jurisdiction [Sections
6 & 20]

A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that

prescribed for the consummated felony under this
Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the
attempt to commit any of the acts herein
enumerated. cdasia

Acts punishable under this Article, when committed

by a syndicate or where it involves two or more
children shall be considered as an offense
constituting child trafficking and shall merit the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Acts punishable under this Article are deemed

committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined
under this Article. Penalties as are herein
provided shall be in addition to any other penalties
which may be imposed for the same acts punishable
under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and
proclamations.

Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. - Any

government official, employee or functionary
who shall be found guilty of violating any of the
provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire
with private individuals shall, in addition to the
above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in
accordance with existing civil service laws, rules
and regulations: Provided, That upon the
filing of a case, either administrative or criminal,
said government official, employee or
functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension
until the resolution of the case.

ARTICLE V
FINAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 18. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The

Inter-country Adoption Board, in coordination with the
Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of
Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Justice, after
due consultation with agencies involved in child-care
and placement, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to implement the provisions of this
Act within six (6) months after its effectivity.

Sec. 19. Appropriations. - The amount of Five

million pesos (P5,000,000) is hereby
appropriated from the proceeds of the Lotto for
the initial operations of the Board and
subsequently the appropriations of the same shall
be included in the General Appropriations Act for
the year following its enactment.

Sec. 20. Separability Clause. - If any provision, or part

hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the
provision not otherwise affected, shall remain valid
and subsisting. cd i5

Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. - Any law, decree,

executive order, administrative order or rules and
regulations contrary to, or inconsistent with the
 with unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered
A. Domestic Adoption in the Civil Register as a foundling.

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule covers the
domestic adoption of Filipino
children.
Sec. 2. Objectives. - (a) The best interests of the child shall be the
paramount consideration
in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in
accordance with Philippine laws,
the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child,
UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to
Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally,
and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.
(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance
through foster care or
adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected,
orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall:
(i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody
of his parents and is provided with love, care, understanding
and security for the full and harmonious development of his
personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no
appropriate placement or
adoption within the childs extended family is available shall
adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
(f) Abandoned child refers to one who has no proper
parental care or guardianship or whose parents have
deserted him for a period of at least six (6) continuous
months and has been
judicially declared as such.
(g) Dependent child refers to one who is without a
parent, guardian or custodian or one whose parents,
guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to
be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent
upon the public for support.
(h) Neglected child is one whose basic needs have
been deliberately not attended to or inadequately
attended to, physically or emotionally, by his
parents or guardian.
(i) Physical neglect occurs when the child is
malnourished, ill-clad and without proper
shelter.
(j) Emotional neglect exists when a child is raped,
seduced, maltreated, exploited,
overworked or made to work under conditions not
conducive to good health or made to beg in the streets or
public places, or placed in moral danger, or exposed to
drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices.

(ii) safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions
in relinquishing their parental authority over their child;
(iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological
parents;
(iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to
promote a positive environment for adoption;
(k) Child-placement agency refers to an agency
duly licensed and accredited by the
Department to provide comprehensive child welfare
services including, but not limited to,
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(v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the
capacity to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption
applications and offer adoption-related services including, but not
limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and
counseling;

(vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the childs

identity and culture in his native
land, and only when this is not available shall inter-country
adoption be considered as a last
resort; and

(vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their

parental authority and custody over their adopted child.
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority
shall be administratively or judicially declared so as to establish
the status of the child as legally available for adoption and his
custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-
placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be authorized
to take steps for the permanent placement of the child.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:

(a) Child is a person below eighteen (18) years of age at the

time of the filing of the petition for adoption.

(b) A child legally available for adoption refers to a child who

has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing or
child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his
biological parents, or in case of rescission of adoption, his
guardian or adopter(s).

(c) Voluntarily committed child is one whose parents

knowingly and willingly relinquish parental authority over
him in favor of the Department.

(d) Involuntarily committed child is one whose parents,

known or unknown, have been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority
over him due to abandonment;
substantial, continuous or repeated neglect and abuse; or
incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.

(e) Foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child

whose parents, guardian or
relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or
charitable or similar institution
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available to encourage the biological parents
to keep the child.
receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the
prospective adoptive parents and preparing the (o) Child Study Report refers to a study
adoption home study report. made by the court social worker of the
childs legal
(l) Child-caring agency refers to an agency duly status, placement history, psychological,
licensed and accredited by the Department that social, spiritual, medical, ethno-cultural
provides 24-hour residential care services for background
abandoned, orphaned, neglected or and that of his biological family needed in
voluntarily committed children. determining the most appropriate
placement for
(m) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare him.
and Development.
(p) Home Study Report refers to a study
(n) "Deed of Voluntary Commitment refers to the made by the court social worker of the
written and notarized instrument motivation
relinquishing parental authority and committing the and capacity of the prospective adoptive
child to the care and custody of the parents to provide a home that meets the
Department executed by the childs biological parents needs of a
or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by child.
the childs legal guardian, to be witnessed by an
authorized representative of the Department after (q) Supervised trial custody refers to the
counseling and other services have been made period of time during which a social worker
oversees the adjustment and emotional
readiness of both adopters and adoptee in stabilizing
their filial relationship. (3) The guardian with respect to the
ward after the termination of the
(r) Licensed Social Worker refers to one who guardianship and clearance of his
possesses a degree in bachelor of science in social financial accountabilities.
work as a minimum educational requirement and
who has passed the government licensure Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
examination for social workers as required by following cases:
Republic Act No. 4373.
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
(s) Simulation of birth is the tampering of the civil one spouse by the other spouse; or
registry to make it appear in the birth records that a
certain child was born to a person who is not his
biological mother, thus causing such child to lose his
true identity and status.

(t) Biological Parents refer to the childs mother and father

by nature.

(u) Pre-Adoption Services refer to psycho-social

services provided by professionally-trained
social workers of the Department, the social
services units of local governments, private and
government health facilities, Family Courts, licensed
and accredited child-caring and child-
placement agencies and other individuals or entities
involved in adoption as authorized by the
Department.

(v) Residence means a persons actual stay in the

Philippines for three (3) continuous years
immediately prior to the filing of a petition for
adoption and which is maintained until the
adoption decree is entered. Temporary
absences for professional, business, health, or
emergency reasons not exceeding sixty (60)
days in one (1) year does not break the
continuity requirement.

(w) Alien refers to any person, not a Filipino

citizen, who enters and remains in the
Philippines and is in possession of a valid
passport or travel documents and visa.

SEC. 4. Who may adopt. - The following may adopt:

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of

full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude; who is
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older
than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his children in keeping with
the means of the family. The requirement of a 16-year
difference between the age of the
adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is
the spouse of the adoptees parent;

(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as

above-stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he
has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of
the petition for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered,
that he has been certified by his diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government
agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his
country, and that his government allows the
adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child.
Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the aliens qualification
to adopt in his country may be waived for
the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a

relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino
spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks

to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouse.

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his
consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses.
SEC. 5. Who may be adopted. - The following may be adopted:
(1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been
voluntarily committed to the
Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or
judicially declared available for
adoption;
(2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse;
(3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the
status of the former to that of legitimacy;
(4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to
the adoption, said person has
been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as
their own child since minority;
(5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died:
Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6)
months from the time of death of said parents.
(7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules.
Sec. 6. Venue. - The petition for adoption shall be filed with the
Family Court of the province or city where the prospective
adoptive parents reside.
(i) is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity
or affinity; or
(ii) seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or
(iii) is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouse.
3) If the adopter is the legal guardian of the adoptee,
the petition shall allege that
guardianship had been terminated and the guardian had
cleared his financial accountabilities.
4) If the adopter is married, the spouse shall be a co-petitioner
for joint adoption except if:
(a) one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other, or
(b) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child and the other spouse signified written consent
thereto, or
(c) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
5) If the adoptee is a foundling, the petition shall allege
the entries which should appear in his birth certificate,
such as name of child, date of birth, place of birth, if
known; sex, name and citizenship of adoptive mother
and father, and the date and place of their marriage.
6) If the petition prays for a change of name, it shall
also state the cause or reason for the change of
name.
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Sec. 7. Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall be verified and

specifically state at the
heading of the initiatory pleading whether the petition contains an
application for change of
name, rectification of simulated birth, voluntary or
involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child as
abandoned, dependent or neglected.

1) If the adopter is a Filipino citizen, the petition shall allege the following:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) That the petitioner is of legal age, in possession of full civil

capacity and legal rights; is of good moral character; has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; is
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children;
is at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee or is the
spouse of the adoptees parent; and is in a position to support
and care for his children in
keeping with the means of the family and has undergone pre-
adoption services as required by Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8552.

2) If the adopter is an alien, the petition shall allege the following:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) Sub-paragraph 1(b) above;

(c) (c) That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines;

(d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular

office or any appropriate
government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his
country and his government allows the adoptee to enter his
country as his adopted child and reside there permanently as an
adopted child; and

(e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to
the filing of the petition and he maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered.
The requirements of certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt in his country and of
residency may be waived if the alien:
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(a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a
In all petitions, it shall be alleged: simulated birth;

(a) The first name, surname or names, age and
residence of the adoptee as shown by his record
of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and
school records.
(b) That the adoptee is not disqualified by law to be adopted.
(b) The simulation of birth was made prior to
the date of effectivity of Republic Act No.
8552 and the application for rectification of
the birth registration and the petition for
adoption were filed within five years from
said date;

(c) The probable value and character of the estate of the (c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the
adoptee. best interests of the adoptee; and

(d) The first name, surname or names by which the
adoptee is to be known and registered in the Civil
Registry.
A certification of non-forum shopping shall be
included pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sec. 8. Rectification of Simulated Birth. - In case the
petition also seeks rectification of a simulated of
birth, it shall allege that:
(d) The adoptee has been consistently considered
and treated by petitioner as his own child.
Sec. 9. Adoption of a foundling, an
abandoned, dependent or neglected child. -
In
case the adoptee is a foundling, an
abandoned, dependent or neglected child,
the petition
shall allege:
(a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling, abandoned,
dependent or neglected;
(b) The names of the parents, if known, and their
residence. If the child has no known or living
parents, then the name and residence of the
guardian, if any;
(c) The name of the duly licensed child-placement
agency or individual under whose care the child is in
custody; and
(d) That the Department, child-placement or
child-caring agency is authorized to give its
consent.
Sec. 10. Change of name. - In case the petition also
prays for change of name, the title or caption must
contain:
(a) The registered name of the child;
(b) Aliases or other names by which the child has been
known; and
(c) The full name by which the child is to be known.
Sec. 11. Annexes to the Petition. - The following
documents shall be attached to the
petition:
A. Birth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the
case may be, and school records showing the
name, age and residence of the adoptee;
B. Affidavit of consent of the following:
1. The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
2. The biological parents of the child, if known, or the
legal guardian, or the child-placement
agency, child-caring agency, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody
of the child;
3. The legitimate and adopted children of the adopter and of
the adoptee, if any, who are ten
(10) years of age or over;
4. The illegitimate children of the adopter living
with him who are ten (10) years of age or over;
and
5. The spouse, if any, of the adopter or adoptee.
C. Child study report on the adoptee and his biological
parents;
D. If the petitioner is an alien, certification by his
diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he has the legal
capacity to adopt in his country and that his
government allows the adoptee to enter his country
as his own adopted child unless exempted under
Section 4(2);
E. Home study report on the adopters. If the adopter
is an alien or residing abroad but qualified to adopt,
the home study report by a foreign adoption agency
duly accredited by the Inter-Country Adoption Board;
and
F. Decree of annulment, nullity or legal
separation of the adopter as well as that of the
biological parents of the adoptee, if any.
Sec. 12. Order of Hearing. - If the petition and
attachments are sufficient in form and
substance, the court shall issue an order which
shall contain the following:
(1) the registered name of the adoptee in the birth
certificate and the names by which the adoptee has
been known which shall be stated in the caption;
(2) the purpose of the petition;
(3) the complete name which the adoptee will use if the petition
is granted;
(4) the date and place of hearing which shall be set
within six (6) months from the date of the issuance of the
order and shall direct that a copy thereof be published
before the date of
hearing at least once a week for three successive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province or
city where the court is situated; Provided, that in case of
application for
change of name, the date set for hearing shall not be
within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice nor within thirty (30) days prior to an election.
The newspaper shall be selected by raffle under the supervision
of the Executive Judge.
(5) a directive to the social worker of the court, the social
service office of the local government unit or any child-
placing or child-caring agency, or the Department to
prepare and submit child and home study reports before
the hearing if such reports had not been attached to the
petition due to unavailability at the time of the filing of
the latter; and
(6) a directive to the social worker of the court to
conduct counseling sessions with the
biological parents on the matter of adoption of the
adoptee and submit her report before the date of
hearing.
At the discretion of the court, copies of the order of
hearing shall also be furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General through the provincial or city prosecutor, the
Department and the
biological parents of the adoptee, if known.
If a change in the name of the adoptee is prayed for
in the petition, notice to the Solicitor General shall be
mandatory.
Sec. 13. Child and Home Study Reports. - In preparing
the child study report on the
adoptee, the concerned social worker shall verify with
the Civil Registry the real identity and
registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the
adoptee was not registered with the Civil
Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the social worker
to register the adoptee and secure a certificate of
foundling or late registration, as the case may be.
The social worker shall establish that the child is legally
available for adoption and the documents in support
thereof are valid and authentic, that the adopter has
sincere intentions and that the adoption shall inure to
the best interests of the child.
In case the adopter is an alien, the home study report
must show the legal capacity to adopt and that his
government allows the adoptee to enter his country as
his adopted child in the absence of the certification
required under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8552.
If after the conduct of the case studies, the social worker
finds that there are grounds to deny the petition, he shall
make the proper recommendation to the court,
furnishing a copy thereof to the petitioner.
Sec. 14. Hearing. - Upon satisfactory proof that the order
of hearing has been published and jurisdictional
requirements have been complied with, the court shall
proceed to hear the
petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must
personally appear and the former must testify before
the presiding judge of the court on the date set for
hearing.
The court shall verify from the social worker and
determine whether the biological parent has been
properly counseled against making hasty decisions
caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child; ensure
that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted;
and
ascertain if any prolonged stay of the child in his own home will
be inimical to his welfare and
interest.

Sec. 15. Supervised Trial Custody. - Before issuance of the decree

of adoption, the court
shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of
at least six (6) months within
which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and
emotionally to each other and
establish a bonding relationship. The trial custody shall be
monitored by the social worker of
the court, the Department, or the social service of the local
government unit, or the child-
placement or child-caring agency which submitted and prepared
the case studies. During said period, temporary parental
authority shall be vested in the adopter.

The court may, motu proprio or upon motion of any party,

reduce the period or exempt the
parties if it finds that the same shall be for the best interests of
the adoptee, stating the
reasons therefor.

An alien adopter however must complete the 6-month trial custody

except the following:

a) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative

within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

b) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or

c) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt

jointly with his or her spouse the latters relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity.
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the
prospective adopter through a pre-adoption placement authority
issued by the Department, the court shall order that the
prospective adopter shall enjoy all the benefits to which the
biological parent is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed
with him.

The social worker shall submit to the court a report on the

result of the trial custody within two weeks after its
termination.

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Sec. 16. Decree of Adoption. - If the supervised trial
custody is satisfactory to the parties
and the court is convinced from the trial custody
report and the evidence adduced that the
adoption shall redound to the best interests of the
adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be
issued which shall take effect as of the date
the original petition was filed even if the
petitioners die before its issuance.
The decree shall:
A. State the name by which the child is to be known and
registered;
B. Order:
1) the Clerk of Court to issue to the adopter a
certificate of finality upon expiration of the 15-
day reglementary period within which to appeal;
2) the adopter to submit a certified true copy of the
decree of adoption and the certificate of
finality to the Civil Registrar where the child
was originally registered within thirty (30)
days
from receipt of the certificate of finality. In
case of change of name, the decree shall be
submitted to the Civil Registrar where the court
issuing the same is situated.
3) the Civil Registrar of the place where the adoptee
was registered:
a. to annotate on the adoptees original certificate of
birth the decree of adoption within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the certificate of finality;
b. to issue a certificate of birth which shall
not bear any notation that it is a new or
amended certificate and which shall show,
among others, the following: registry
number, date of
registration, name of child, sex, date of birth,
place of birth, name and citizenship of
adoptive mother and father, and the date
and place of their marriage, when
applicable;
c. to seal the original certificate of birth in the civil render judgment ordering the rescission of
registry records which can be opened only upon adoption, with or without costs, as justice
order of the court which issued the decree of requires.
adoption; and

d. to submit to the court issuing the decree of

adoption proof of compliance with all the
foregoing within thirty days from receipt of the
decree.
If the adoptee is a foundling, the court shall order the
Civil Registrar where the foundling was
registered, to annotate the decree of adoption on the
foundling certificate and a new birth
certificate shall be ordered prepared by the Civil Registrar in
accordance with the decree.

Sec. 17. Book of Adoptions. - The Clerk of Court shall

keep a book of adoptions showing the date of
issuance of the decree in each case, compliance by
the Civil Registrar with Section 16(B)(3) and all
incidents arising after the issuance of the decree.

Sec. 18. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and

Records. - All hearings in adoption cases, after
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements shall
be confidential and shall not be open to the public.
All records, books and papers relating to the
adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department, or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be
kept strictly confidential.

If the court finds that the disclosure of the

information to a third person is necessary for
security reasons or for purposes connected with or
arising out of the adoption and will be for the best
interests of the adoptee, the court may, upon proper
motion, order the necessary information to be
released, restricting the purposes for which it may
be used.

Sec. 19. Rescission of Adoption of the Adoptee. - The

petition shall be verified and filed by the adoptee
who is over eighteen (18) years of age, or with the
assistance of the
Department, if he is a minor, or if he is over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, by
his guardian or counsel.

The adoption may be rescinded based on any of

the following grounds committed by the
adopter:

1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment

by the adopter despite having undergone
counseling;

2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;

3) sexual assault or violence; or

4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental

obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall
not be subject to rescission by the
adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.

Sec. 20. Venue. - The petition shall be filed with

the Family Court of the city or province where the
adoptee resides.

Sec. 21. Time within which to file petition. - The

adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the petition for
rescission or revocation of adoption within five (5)
years after he reaches the age of majority, or if he
was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within
five (5) years after recovery from such incompetency.

Sec. 22. Order to Answer. - The court shall issue an

order requiring the adverse party to
answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof. The order and copy
of the petition shall be served on the adverse party in
such manner as the court may direct.

Sec. 23. Judgment. - If the court finds that the

allegations of the petition are true, it shall

The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological
parent of the adoptee, if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated and declare that the reciprocal rights and
obligations of the adopter and the adoptee to each other shall
be extinguished.
The court shall further declare that successional rights shall
revert to its status prior to adoption, as of the date of
judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior
to judicial rescission shall be respected.
It shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in
his original birth or foundling certificate.
The court shall further order the Civil Registrar where the
adoption decree was registered to
cancel the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate his
original birth or foundling
certificate.
Sec. 24. Service of Judgment. - A certified true copy of the
judgment together with a government maintains a similarly authorized and
certificate of finality issued by the Branch Clerk of the Court
which rendered the decision in
accordance with the preceding Section shall be served by the
petitioner upon the Civil
Registrar concerned within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
certificate of finality. The Civil Registrar shall forthwith enter the
rescission decree in the register and submit proof of
compliance to the court issuing the decree and the Clerk of
Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decree.
The Clerk of Court shall enter the compliance in accordance with Section
17 hereof.
c) that he has the capacity to act and assume all
rights and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone the
appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor
in his country;
d) that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
e) that he is eligible to adopt under his national law;
f) that he can provide the proper care and support and
instill the necessary moral values and example to all his
children, including the child to be adopted;
g) that he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child,
as embodied under Philippine laws and the U. N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by
the rules and regulations issued to implement the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8043;
h) that he comes from a country with which the
Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
accredited agency and that adoption of a
Filipino child is allowed under his national laws; and
i) that he possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided in this Rule, in Republic
Act No. 8043 and in all other applicable Philippine
laws.
Sec. 31. Annexes. - The petition for adoption shall contain
the following annexes written and officially translated in
English:
122

SEC. 25. Repeal. - This supersedes Rule 99 on Adoption and

Rule 100 of the Rules of Court.

B. Inter-Country Adoption

Sec. 26. Applicability. - The following sections apply to inter-

country adoption of Filipino children by foreign nationals and
Filipino citizens permanently residing abroad.

SEC. 27. Objectives. - The State shall:

a) a) consider inter-country adoption as an alternative means of

child care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive
family or cannot, in any suitable manner, be cared for in the
Philippines;

b) ensure that the child subject of inter-country adoption enjoys

the same protection accorded to children in domestic adoption;
and

c) take all measures to ensure that the placement arising

therefrom does not result in improper financial gain for
those involved.

Sec. 28. Where to File Petition. - A verified petition to adopt a

Filipino child may be filed by a foreign national or Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad with the Family Court having
jurisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be
found.

It may be filed directly with the Inter-Country Adoption Board.

Sec. 29. Who may be adopted. - Only a child legally available

for domestic adoption may be the subject of inter-country
adoption.

Sec. 30. Contents of Petition. - The petitioner must allege:

a) his age and the age of the child to be adopted, showing that he is at
least twenty-seven
(27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the
child to be adopted at the time of application, unless the
petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the
spouse of such parent, in which case the age difference does not
apply;

b) if married, the name of the spouse who must be joined as

co-petitioner except when the adoptee is a legitimate child of
his spouse;
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We are only going to study 2

a) Birth certificate of petitioner;
b) Marriage contract, if married, and, if applicable,
the divorce decree, or judgment dissolving the
marriage;
c) Sworn statement of consent of petitioners
biological or adopted children above ten (10) years
of age;
d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of
the petitioner certified by a duly licensed physician
and psychologist;
e) Income tax returns or any authentic document
showing the current financial capability of the
petitioner;
fundamental questions on
adoption. Who may be
f) Police clearance of petitioner issued within six (6)
months before the filing of the petitioner;
g) Character reference from the local
church/minister, the petitioners employer
and a member of the immediate community
who have known the petitioner for at least
five (5) years;
h) Full body postcard-size pictures of the petitioner
and his immediate family taken at least six
(6) months before the filing of the petition.
Sec. 32. Duty of Court. - The court, after
finding that the petition is sufficient in form
and substance and a proper case for inter-
country adoption, shall immediately transmit
the petition to the Inter-Country Adoption
Board for appropriate action.
SEC. 33. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on A: The place where the adoptive
August 22, 2002 following its publication in a parents reside.
newspaper of general circulation.
NOTE: Here, the meaning of residence
is the actual habituation of the
OLD LECTURE
petitioner.
ADOPTION
Background of adoption: The rule on
adoption has been amended several times
and even the rules on procedure, which you
find in 99 and 100 are no longer
applicable. They have been repealed
expressly. As early as the mid-70s when the
Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) was
enacted, it already amended the
rules on adoption. PD 603 was also
amended by the Family Code. But all these
are no longer applicable in toto because of
the new laws on adoption which
should be the subject matter of today's
section. The laws applicable now is not even
the Civil Code per se, but rather it should be
RA 8562, the Domestic
Adoption Law of 1998 and the Inter Country
Adoption Law of 1995 (RA 8043).
These are the substantive law governing
adoption. Our concern is the rule on
adoption.

AM 02-6-02SC, dated July 2002, is the new rule on

Adoption.

Q: Who may be adopted only?

A: General Rule: one who is legally available for
adoption.

Q: Who are legally available for adoption?

A: Those who are voluntarily committed and/or
involuntarily committed.

The parents or guardians of these persons

have voluntarily surrendered their parental
or guardianship authority to the DSWD.

Q: Who are those involuntarily committed?

A: Judicially or administratively deprived.
Minors, whose parents or guardians are
administratively or judicially deprived of their
authority over these persons. They are
involuntarily committed. And within that
concept, you have the abandoned, the
dependents, and neglected children.

Q: What is a child-placement agency as

distinguished from a child-caring
agency?
A: The distinction is in the services that
they cater. Pag placement, it is to
provide comprehensive child welfare
services including, but not limited to,
receiving applications for adoption,
evaluating the prospective adoptive parents,
and preparing the adoption home study while
pag caring, it is like Hospicio de San Jose,
which provides 24 hour residential care
services for abandoned,
orphaned, neglected or voluntarily committed
therein.

Q: Which court has jurisdiction over a

petition for adoption?
A: It is the Family Court. RTC is not even a
totally and perfectly correct answer because
it may be another RTC.

Q: What is the venue?

adopted and who may adopt. Once you perfect evidence and cross-examination. Wala namang
that we can go to another summons sa adoption.
lesson.
Q: How do you
Q: Who may adopt? Or who is a qualified establish your
prospective adopter? financial capacity?
A: A: Certificate of
1. Any Filipino Citizen employment, income
2. Any alien tax returns.
3. Guardian, with respect to the ward. And
remember, there is no qualification as to the Q: When we speak of age gap, the miracle
citizenship of the guardian. The only qualification is number is 16, why? What is sought to be
that the guardianship must have ended AND his avoided by this age gap?
accountability as a guardian has been completed. Yun A: To avoid temptation. You look at the
lang ang qualification. history of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which was adopted from the
Q: Now let's go to the Filipino, what Civil Code of Spain. And being of
are the qualifications? European origin, there is that also a 16 year old
A: gap. Malalaking bulas ang mga european and
1. of legal age; they seek adoption as a means of having
2. he must possess full civil capacity and legal rights; mistresses.
3. of good moral character;
4. has not been convicted of any crime involving moral Q: Who may be adopted?
turpitude; A: General Rule: one who is legally available for
5. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring or adoption.
children;
6. financially capable or economically capable; Q: Who are legally available for adoption?
7. at least 16 years older than the adoptee. A: There are 7. So that minority is not an
absolute requirement to be adopted.
NOTE: When one is of legal age, a minor cannot Relationship is not even a disqualification on
adopt. Because he must be capable of the part of the adoptee. because they can be
unquestionable demonstration. Under the Rules on adopted.
Evidence, the court can either take judicial notice of
that because he is capable of What I would like to emphasize is the doctrine
unquestionable demonstration. laid down in Cang v CA, which is
that consent must be given either by the
Q: What does possession of full civil capacity and legal prospective adoptee, if he is at least 10
rights mean?
A: Give me a person who is not possessed of full civil 123
capacity and legal right. A
convicted person which has received an additional
penalty of civil interdiction.

Q: How about a deaf-mute? Is a deaf-mute in

possession of full civil capacity? A: Under the rules, a
deaf-mute who is not able to read and write is not in
possession of full civil capacity, thus it is incapable of
contracting obligations.

Q: A person caught urinating, and charged of

urinating in public. Is this not moral turpitude?
A: Urinating or defecating in public is an offense
and not a crime. The requirement speaks of one
who has not been convicted of a crime, which is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code.

Q: But if you are charged of Rape, can you

not adopt?
A: No. Because it speaks of conviction. You
must first be convicted.

But if you are convicted of homicide, recent

jurisprudence say, you can still adopt because it is not a
crime of moral turpitude. So tatlo, there must be a
crime,
there must be conviction, and it must be of moral turpitude.

Q: How do you establish your emotional and

psychological capacity?
A: Clearances to show that you have not been convicted
from a crime of moral turpitude. Clearances from RTC,
police, PNP, barangay, MTC, etc. And these clearances
will ought to show that you are of good moral character,
that you are emotionally and psychologically
capacitated, subject of course to presentation of
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Over and above this, an alien is also required:
1. he must have continuously
years old, or parents, or guardians, or the resided in the Philippines 3 years prior
DSWD. Without that consent, as laid down in to the filing of the adoption;
this doctrine, adoption is null and void. 2. he must have a
So you can adopt even your own certification from his consular
child. You can even adopt your own official that he is in possession of
grandchildren just like what Juan full civil capacity;
Ponce Enrile did to his grandchildren. 3. his country of origin must have
diplomatic relations with our country;
Q: Another person who may adopt is a 4. his country of origin must
foreigner, and he may adopt under the allow the adoptee to become a
domestic adoption law or the inter-country citizen of
adoption law. What are the his country;
requirements? 5. that his country of origin
A: So all the requirements applied to a Filipino allows the adoptee to enter the
prospective adopter are also required of an country of origin of the adopter;
alien. Therefore, he must be of legal age, in
possession of full civil capacity and legal Q: Where should he file
rights, of good moral character, not convicted this petition for
of a crime involving moral turpitude, etc.
adoption? (Section 28)
A:
1. It may be filed by a foreign
national or Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad with the Family Court
having jurisdiction over the place where the
child resides or may be found;
2. It may be filed directly with the Inter-
Country Adoption Board.
When an alien files a petition before the Inter-
Country Adoption Board, the alien
will come here in the Philippines and will bring
the adoptee and the social worker
back to his country of origin for the trial
custody of 6 months will happen there.
This is purposely done by the law, because
there is an objective of
discouragement. To discourage the adoption
of Filipino citizens by aliens. In fact that is
only allowed if the prospective adoptee
cannot be adopted by a Filipino. Filipinos have
the preference of adopting.
Under the rules, it is mandatory
that the petitioner must appear and
testify.
Similar to an annulment of marriage
case, there can be no stipulation of
facts
here or confessions of judgment.
There must be actual presentation of
evidence here. And basic requirement
here is the consent given by the
adoptee, the
parents or the guardians of the adoptee.
Q: After the hearing, may the court
render judgment now?
A: The judgment referred to here is
not similar to the judgment that we
have
ordinarily because the judgment
here is always subject to the
issuance of

Q:
What
constit
utes
the
allegati
ons?
A:
1. Jurisdictional facts;
2. legal capacity of the prospective adopter
and the adoptee;

In the case of Republic v. Hernandez

(1997), the SC said that the petition for
adoption does not carry with it the change
of name of the adoptee. With the
present rules on adoption specifically
under Section 10, this doctrine does not
apply anymore. This is a good bar question.
So you can now have joinder of
causes of action in special proceedings, in
effect. Dati wala. So you can now join in your
prayer, asking for a change of name and for
adoption. Let me emphasize, it is a change of
name and not a change of surname because
change of surname is an automatic effect of
adoption.

Q: After you have filed a petition for adoption,

what happens now?
A: There would be a case study, where it is
immediately assigned to a social worker.
Under present dispensation in our jurisdiction,
every family courts is now provided with a
social worker. Because a petition for adoption
is exclusively cognizable by the Family Courts.

Q: For what purpose is this?

A: One is the home study report and the
other is the case study report. The home
study report is about assigning to the
social worker of the respective adoptee
and the case study report is about the
prospective adopter.

The general objective of adoption, why it

is allowed under the rules, is that which
leads to the benefit of the adoptee.
another decree of adoption. Ang finality dito is not the sister-in-law of Anna Marie) filed for the
finality of the judgment but rather the finality of the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children
o Their petition bears the signature
decree of adoption.
of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his
Q: When is the decree of adoption issued? adoption; Anna Marie likewise
A: After complying with the 6 month trial custody. filed an affidavit of consent
Again, this is another undertaking of the DSWD. Tignan alleging that her husband had
niyo, the home or case study report is before the "evaded his legal obligation to
support" his children
decision is rendered, but before a decree of adoption is
x Herbert learned about the petition and went back to
rendered kailangan pa ng isa pang report which is the PH
trial custody report. x Herbert filed an Opposition to the petition
o Although the Clavanos were financially
Q: For how long? capable of supporting the
A: General Rule: 6 months. children while his finances were
"too meager" compared to
Exception: when it is in the best interest of the
theirs, he could not "in
child; the petition during the conscience, allow anybody to
hearing is that the prospective adoptee is already strip him of his
living with the adopter. parental authority over his beloved
children
x RTC issued an Order
Q: After the decree of adoption has become final
o finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
and executory, what is the relinquished custody over
next? the children and, therefore, such
A: There should be a new birth certificate issued. custody should be transferred to
Remember that one of the the father
rights of a party in litigation is the right to a speedy o directed the Clavanos to deliver custody
over the minors to
and public trial. But this
petitioner
adoption proceeding is exceptional because even the x RTC then rendered a decision AGAINST HERBERT
documents there are public records but are not open to o the oppositor Herbert Cang has
the public, not anybody can get it including the new abandoned his children. And
birth certificate issued to the adopter. abandonment of a child by its
parent is commonly specified by
statute as a ground for
NOTE: But take note that under the rule on rescission dispensing with his consent to its
of adoption, the issued certificate of the civil adoption.
registrar's office is cancelled in favor of the old birth o Indeed, in such case, adoption will be
certificate, which means that the old birth certificate is allowed not only without the
not deleted, but remains in the record. And this is the consent of the parent, but even against
his opposition
reason of the confidential nature of the
x Herbert appealed to CA
proceedings. x CA affirmed RTC
124
Q: What is adoption?
A: It is a judicial proceeding whereby the relationship of
paternity and filiation is established. AS simple as that.

According to a noted professor, when a decree of

adoption is final and executory, there is the total and
absolute cut of any legal relationship between the
natural parent and the child.

Under the new rules, the adopter cannot rescind the

adoption but only disinherit the adopted child. An
adopted child has all the rights of a legitimate child.

CASES

HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 105308

September 25, 1998

THIRD DIVISION

FACTS:
x Herbert and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on Jan 27,
1973, begot 3
children,
o Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony
x Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital
affair with Wilma Soco
x Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation
o RTC granted
x Herbert left for the US
o Was granted a divorce decree there
o also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie
x Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano (respectively
the brother and
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presence, his
care and the
o Art. 188 of the Family Code requires opportunity to display
the written consent of the voluntary affection.
natural parents of the child to The issue of
be adopted. It has been held abandonment is
however that the consent of amply covered by the
the parent who has discussion of the first
abandoned the error.
child is not necessary (Dayrit x Herbert filed an MR
vs. Piccio; Santos vs. o CA denied
Ananzanso). In x Herbert filed a Rule 45 before the SC
adoption cases, abandonment
connotes any conduct on the ISSUE # 1: Whether RTC acquired
part of jurisdiction over the subject petition
the parent to forego parental for adoption, considering the lack of
duties and relinquish parental consent of Herbert
claims
to the child, or the neglect or HELD # 1: YES.
refusal to perform the natural x Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides
and o Art. 31. Whose Consent is
legal obligations which parents Necessary. The written consent
owe their children (Santos vs. of the following to the
Ananzanso, supra), or the adoption shall be necessary:
withholding of the parent's
 (1) The person to (2) The
be adopted, if fourteen parents by nature of the
years of age or, over; child, the
(2) The natural l
parents of the child or his e
legal guardian of g
the Department a
of Social Welfare l
or any duly
licensed child g
placement agency u
under a
whose care the child may r
be; d
(3) The natural i
children, fourteen years and a
above, of the adopting n
parents. (Emphasis ,
supplied)
x On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. o
Aquino issued r
Executive Order No. 91 amending
Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the t
Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus h
amended, Article 31 read: e
o Art. 31. Whose Consent is
Necessary. The written consent p
of the following to the adoption shall r
be necessary: o
(1) The person to p
be adopted, if fourteen e
years of age or over; r
(2) The natural
parents of the child or his g
legal guardian o
after receiving v
counselling and e
appropriate social r
services from the n
Ministry of Social m
Services and e
Development or n
from a duly t
licensed child-
placement i
agency; n
(3) The Ministry of s
Social Services and t
Development or r
any duly licensed u
child-placement m
agency under e
whose care and n
legal custody the t
child a
may be; l
(4) The natural i
children, fourteen years and t
above, of the adopting y
parents. (Emphasis ;
supplied) (3) The
x Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the legitimate and adopted
established rule is children, ten
that the statute in force at the time of the yea
commencement of the action determines rs
the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such, of
when private age
respondents filed the petition for or
adoption on September 25, 1987, the ove
applicable law was the Child and Youth r, of
Welfare Code, as amended by Executive the
Order No. 91. ado
x During the pendency of the petition for adoption ptin
or on August 3, 1988, g
the Family Code which amended the par
Child and Youth Welfare Code took ent
effect. Article 256 of the Family Code or
provides for its retroactivity par
"insofar as it does not prejudice or impair ent
vested or acquired rights in accordance s;
with the Civil Code or other laws." As (4) The
amended by the Family Code, the illegitimate children, ten
statutory provision on consent for years of
adoption now reads: age or
o Art. 188. The written consent of the over,
following to the adoption of the
shall be necessary: adopti
(1) The person to ng
be adopted, if ten years parent
of age or over; s, if
 living with
said parent x As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of
and the law, the written consent of
latter's the natural parent is indispensable for the
spouse, if any; validity of the decree of adoption.
and Nevertheless, the requirement of written
(5) The spouse, if consent can be dispensed with if the
any, of the person parent has abandoned the child 13 or that
adopting or to be such parent is "insane or hopelessly
adopted. (Emphasis intemperate." The court may acquire
supplied) jurisdiction over the case even, without the
x Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that written consent of the parents or one of the
notwithstanding the amendments parents provided that the petition for
to the law, the written consent of the adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
natural parent to the adoption has exemption from compliance
remained a requisite for its validity. therewith. This is in consonance with the
Notably, such requirement is also liberality with which this Court treats the
embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as procedural aspect of adoption. Thus, the
follows:
Court declared:
o Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. o . . . . The technical rules of pleading
There shall be filed with the should not be
petition a written consent stringently applied to adoption
to the adoption signed by proceedings, and it is
the child, if deemed more important that the
fourteen years of age or petition should contain
over and not incompetent, facts relating to the child and its
and by the parents, which may give
child's spouse, if any, and by information to those interested,
each of its known living than that it should be
parents who is not insane or formally correct as a pleading.
hopelessly intemperate or Accordingly, it is generally held
has not abandoned the child, that a petition will confer
or if the child is in the jurisdiction if it substantially
custody of an orphan complies with
asylum, the adoption statute, alleging all
children's home, or facts necessary to give the court
benevolent society or jurisdiction. 14
person, by the proper x In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of
officer or officers of such the natural mother was
asylum, home, or society, attached to the petition for adoption.
or by such Petitioner's consent, as the natural
persons; but if the child is father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
illegitimate and has not been sufficiently alleged the fact
recognized, the consent of its of abandonment of the minors for adoption
father to the adoption shall by the natural father as
not be required.
follows:
(Emphasis supplied) o 3. That the children's mother,
sister of petitioner
RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given
her express consent to this
adoption, as shown by Affidavit of
Consent, Annex "A". Likewise,
the written consent of Keith Cang,
now 14 years of age appears on
page 2 of this petition; However,
the father of the children, Herbert

Cang, had already left his wife

and children and had already
divorced the former, as evidenced
by the xerox copy of the
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by
the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex "B") which
was filed at the instance of Mr.
Cang, not long after he
abandoned his family to live in
the United
States as an illegal immigrant. 15
x The allegations of abandonment in the petition for
adoption, even
absent the written consent of petitioner,
sufficiently vested the lower
court with jurisdiction since abandonment of
the child by his natural
parents is one of the circumstances under
which our statutes and
jurisprudence 16 dispense with the
requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.

ISSUE # 2: Whether Herbert abandoned his minor

children so as to dispense with his consent in the
petition for the adoption of said children.

HELD # 2: NO.
x However, in cases where the father opposes the
adoption primarily because his
 consent thereto was not sought, the matter of
whether he had abandoned his
child becomes a proper issue for determination. The
issue of abandonment
by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue
that an adoption
court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the
oppositor natural
father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he
did not abandon
his child may the petition for adoption be considered
on its merits.
x As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and
binding upon this
Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to
examine or contrast the oral
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
18 However, although this
Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to
review and reverse the factual
findings of the lower courts if it that these do not
conform to the evidence on
record. 19
x In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the
exceptions to the
rule that factual findings of the trial court are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal
are the following:
o (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
o (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
o (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises
or conjectures;
o (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on
misapprehension of facts;
o (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
o (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
o (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those
of the trial court;
o (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
o (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different
conclusion and
o (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
x This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have
elicited a different conclusion 21 on the issue of
whether petitioner has so abandoned his children,
thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
x In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake
entirely, to
forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this
word to the root
idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity
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abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone,
with which a thing or body is thus without financial and
put in the control of another, hence, moral desertion, is not
the tantamount to
meaning of giving up absolutely, abandonment. 24
with intent never to resume or claim While admittedly,
one's petitioner was
rights or interests. 22 In reference to physically absent as he
abandonment of a child by his was then in the United
parent, the act of abandonment States, he was not
imports "any conduct of the parent remiss in his natural
which evinces a settled purpose to and legal obligations of
forego all parental duties and love, care and
relinquish all parental claims to the support for his
child." It means "neglect or refusal to children. He
perform the natural and legal maintained regular
obligations of care and support which communication with
parents owe their children." 23 his wife and
x In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's children through
conduct did not manifest a letters and telephone.
settled purpose to forego all parental He used to send
duties and relinquish all parental claims packages by mail and
catered to their whims.
over his children as to, constitute
x Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented award custody of a
certifications of banks in the child to the natural
U.S.A. showing that even prior to the mother or to a foster
filing of the petition for adoption, he had mother, this Court
deposited amounts for the benefit of his said:
children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies o This court should avert
of checks sent by petitioner to the the tragedy in the years to
children from 1985 to 1989. come of having
x These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, deprived
therefore, quite surprising why mother and
the courts below simply glossed son of the
over these, ignoring not only beautiful
evidence on association
financial support but also the s and
emotional exchange of sentiments tender,
between imperishabl
petitioner and his family. Instead, the e
courts below emphasized the memories
meagerness engendere
of the amounts he sent to his children d by the
and the fact that, as regards the bank relationshi
deposits, these were "withdrawable by p of parent
him alone." Simply put, the courts and child.
below attached a high premium to the We should
prospective adopters' financial status not take
but totally brushed aside the possible away from
repercussion of the adoption on the a mother
emotional and psychological well-being the
of the children. opportunity
x True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by
his uncle and aunt. of bringing
However, his seeming steadfastness on up her own
the matter as shown by his testimony is child even
contradicted by his feelings towards his at the cost
father as revealed in his letters to him. It of extreme
sacrifice
is not at all farfetched to conclude that due to
Keith's testimony was actually the effect poverty
and lack of
of the filing of the petition for adoption means; so
that would certainly have engendered that
confusion in his young mind as to afterwards,
the capability of his father to she may be
sustain the lifestyle he had been
used to. able to look
x The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional back with
attachment to the children. pride and a
This is hardly surprising for, from the sense of
very start of their young lives, the satisfaction
children at her
were used to their presence. Such sacrifices
attachment had persisted and certainly, and her
the efforts,
young ones' act of snuggling close to however
private respondent Ronald Clavano was humble, to
not make her
indicative of their emotional detachment dreams of
from their father. Private respondents, her little
being the uncle and aunt of the children, boy come
could not but come to their succor true. We
when they needed help as when Keith should not
got sick and private respondent forget that
Ronald spent for his hospital bills. the
x In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental relationshi
authority p
cannot be entrusted to a person simply between a
because he could give the child a larger foster
measure of material comfort than his mother
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court and a child
of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded is not
custody of a minor illegitimate child to natural but
his mother who was a mere secretary artificial. If
and market vendor instead of to his the child
affluent father who was a married man, turns out
not solely because the child opted to go to be a
with his mother. The Court said: failure or
o Daisie and her children may not be forgetful of
enjoying a life of affluence that what its
private respondent foster
promises if the child lives parents had
with him. It is enough, done for
however, that petitioner is him, said
earning a decent living parents
and is able to support her might yet
children according to her count and
means. appraise
x In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted (sic) all that
with the issue of whether to they have
done and
 spent for him and with
regret consider all of it as a
dead loss, and even rue the
day they
committed the blunder of
taking the child into their
hearts and their
home. Not so with a real
natural mother who never
counts the cost
and her sacrifices, ever
treasuring memories of her
associations
with her child, however
unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and
blood count......
x In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that
"(I)n ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code
to take into account all relevant considerations." Thus,
in awarding custody of
the child to the father, the Court said:
o A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case
indicates that Teresita, or at
least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the "torture and
agony" of a mother separated from her
children and the humiliation
she suffered as a, result of her character
being made a key issue in
court rather than the feelings and future,
the best interests and
welfare of her children. While the bonds
between a mother and her
small child are special in nature, either
parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain
if deprived of custody.
One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of
the other parent. It is not so much
the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the
welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.
(Emphasis supplied) 29
x Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if
financial
consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children.
There should be a holistic approach to the
matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and
spiritual
needs of the child. 30 The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner
abandoned his family needs more evidentiary
support other than his inability to
provide them the material comfort that his
admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that
his children would not miss his guidance and
counsel if they were given to
adopting parents. The letters he received from
his children prove that petitioner
maintained the more important emotional tie
between him and his children. The
children needed him not only because he could
cater to their whims but also
because he was a person they could share with
their daily activities, problems
and triumphs.
x The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did
not look beyond petitioner's
"meager" financial support to ferret out other
indications on whether petitioner had in fact
abandoned his family. The omission of said
courts has led us to
examine why the children were
subjected to the process of adoption,
notwithstanding the proven ties that
bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out
the fact that the welfare of the children was not
exactly the "paramount consideration" that
impelled Anna Marie to consent to their
adoption.
x In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said
that leaving the children in
the country, as she was wont to travel abroad
often, was a problem that would
naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In
other words, the adoption appears
to be a matter of convenience for her because
Anna Marie herself is financially
capable of supporting her children. 31 In his
testimony, private respondent
Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of
the country for two years and came home
twice or three times, 32 thereby manifesting
the fact that it was she who actually left her
children to the care of her relatives. It was bad
enough that their father left their children when
he went abroad, but when their mother
followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
worsened. The Clavano family must have
realized this. Hence, when the family first
discussed the adoption of the children, they
decided that the prospective adopter should be
Anna Marie's brother Jose. However, because
he had children of his own, the family decided
to devolve the task upon private respondents.
33
x This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to
care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald
Clavano commutes between Cebu and
Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria
Clara, is an international flight
stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could "take
care of the children while their parents are
away," 35 thereby indicating the
 evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the children's
surname changed
to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the
United States as it
would be difficult for them to get a visa if their surname were
different from his.
36 To be sure, he also testified that he wanted to spare the
children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
x Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent
Ronald,
his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the
inescapable conclusion
that they just wanted to keep the children away from their
father. One of the
overriding considerations for the adoption was allegedly the
state of Anna Marie's
health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and
suffers from a heart
ailment. However, she herself admitted that her health condition
was not that
serious as she could still take care of the children. 37 An
eloquent evidence of
her ability to physically care for them was her employment at
the Philippine
Consulate in Los Angeles 38 she could not have been
employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that
the Clavanos' attempt at depriving
petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their
notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact
expressed fear that her children would "never be at ease with
the wife of their father." 39
x Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a
womanizer
and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was
telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being
comparatively conservative and
traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it does
not countenance
womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the
baneful effects such
irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court
place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish
between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the
actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour
cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that
petitioner was
necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional wisdom and
common human
experience show that a "bad" husband does not necessarily
make a "bad" father.
That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly
speaking, a sufficient
ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to
parental authority over
the children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and
concern for his children
when he took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower
court expressing
his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning
about it. He
traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love
for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in
the United States.
44
x Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide
by the
agreement with his wife on the support of the children.
Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United States. As such, he
could not have procured gainful
employment. Private respondents failed to refute petitioner's
testimony that he
did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal home,
45 pursuant to
their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the
proceeds of the sale redounded to the
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benefit of his family, particularly his
children. The proceeds may not have
lasted long but there is ample evidence to
show that thereafter, petitioner tried to
abide by his agreement with his wife and
sent his family money, no matter how
"meager."
x The liberality with which this Court treats matters
leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of the law to ensure
the rights and privileges of the adopted
child arising therefrom, ever
mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper
context and perspective. The Court's
position, should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences
beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to
approve adoption proceedings is
not to be
anchored solely on best interests
of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the
parents over the child. 47
x In this regard, this Court notes private
respondents' reliance on the
manifestation/compromise
agreement between petitioner
and Anna Marie which became
the basis of the decree of legal
separation. According to private
respondents' counsel, 48 the
authority given to Anna Marie
by that decree to
enter into contracts as a result
of the legal separation was "all
embracing" 49
and, therefore, included giving
her sole consent to the adoption.
This conclusion is however,
anchored on the wrong premise
that the authority given to the
 innocent spouse to enter into contracts
that obviously refer to their conjugal
properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of
the children. Such conclusion is as devoid
of a legal basis as private respondents'
apparent reliance on the decree of legal
separation for doing away with
petitioner's consent to the adoption.
x The transfer of custody over the children to Anna
Marie by virtue of the decree
of legal separation did not, of necessity;
deprive petitioner of parental authority
for the purpose of placing the children up
for adoption. Article 213 of the Family
Code states: ". . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court." In awarding
custody, the court shall take into account
"all relevant considerations, especially
the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
x If should be noted, however, that the law only
confers on the innocent spouse
the "exercise" of parental authority.
Having custody of the child, the innocent
spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing
and care. The innocent spouse shall have
the right to the child's services and
earnings, and the right to direct his
activities and make decisions regarding
his care and control, education, health and
religion. 50
x In a number of cases, this Court has considered
parental authority, the joint
exercise of which is vested by the law
upon the parents, 51 as . . . a mass of
rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose
of the children's physical preservation
and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their hearts and
senses. As regards parental authority,
"there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor."
o Parental authority and responsibility
are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by
law. The
right attached to parental
authority, being purely
personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of
adoption,
guardianship and
surrender to a children's
home or an orphan
institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a
minor to
another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a who has apparently remained a
document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the
law still disallows the same.
o The father and mother, being the
natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are
duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody
and company. 52 (Emphasis
supplied)
x As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be
deemed as having been
completely deprived of parental
authority, notwithstanding the award of
custody to Anna Marie in the legal
separation case. To reiterate, that award
was arrived at by the lower court
on the basis of the agreement of
the spouses.
x While parental authority may be waived,
as in law it may be subject to
a compromise, 53 there was no
factual finding in the legal
separation
case that petitioner was such an
irresponsible person that he
should be
deprived of custody of his children
or that there are grounds under
the
law that could deprive him of
parental authority. In fact, in the
legal
separation case, the court
thereafter ordered the transfer
of custody over the
children from Anna Marie back
to petitioner. The order was
not implemented
because of Anna Marie's motion
for reconsideration thereon. The
Clavano family also vehemently
objected to the transfer of
custody to the petitioner, such
that the latter was forced to file a
contempt charge against them.
54
x The law is clear that either parent may
lose parental authority over the child only
for a valid reason. No such
reason was established in the
legal separation case. In the
instant case for adoption, the
issue is whether or not
petitioner had
abandoned his children as to
warrant dispensation of his
consent to their
adoption. Deprivation of parental
authority is one of the effects of a
decree of
adoption. 55 But there cannot be
a valid decree of adoption in this
case precisely
because, as this Court has
demonstrated earlier, the finding
of the courts below
on the issue of petitioner's
abandonment of his family was
based on a
misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation,
of facts on record.
x As regards the divorce obtained in the
United States, this Court has ruled in
Tenchavez v. Escao 56 that a
divorce obtained by Filipino
citizens after the
effectivity of the Civil Code is not
recognized in this jurisdiction as it
is contrary to
State policy. While petitioner is
now an American citizen, as
regards Anna Marie
Filipino citizen, the divorce has no
legal effect.
x Parental authority is a constitutionally
protected State policy borne out of
established customs and tradition of our
people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of

Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial rights of an
illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed
the opinion that:
o Parents have the natural right, as well as the
moral and legal duty,
to care for their children, see to their
upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority
and responsibility may not be unduly
denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the
parents are estranged and their affection
for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably
remain unchanged. Neither the law not
the courts allow this affinity to suffer
absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well being of the
child.
x Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the
Civil Code, there
has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in
adoption proceedings, not so
much on the need of childless couples for a child, as
on the paramount interest,
of a child who needs the love and care of parents.
After the passage of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the
discernible trend has impelled
the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on
Intercountry, Adoption 58 and
Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the
domestic adoption of Filipino children. 59
x The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these
recent laws,
such as the following policies in the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998":
o (a) To ensure that every child
remains under the care
and custody of his/her parent(s) and be
provided with love, care, understanding
and security towards the full and
harmonious
development of his/her personality. 60
o (b) In all matters relating to the care,
custody and
adoption of a child, his/her interest shall
be the paramount consideration in
accordance with the tenets set forth in
the United Nations (UN) Convention on
the Rights of the Child. 61
o (c) To prevent the child from unnecessary
separation
from his/her biological parent(s). 62
x Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United
Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
government and its officials are duty bound to
comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to
instant case are the following provisions:
o States Parties shall respect the responsibilities,
rights and duties of
parents . . . to provide, in a manner
consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the
exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present
Convention. 63
o States Parties shall respect the right of the child
who is separated
from one or both parents to maintain
personal relations and direct contact with
both parents on a regular basis, except if
it is contrary to the child's best interests.
64
o A child whose parents reside in different States
shall have the right
to maintain on a regular basis, save in
exceptional circumstances
personal relations and direct contacts
with both parents . . . 65
o States Parties shall respect the rights and duties
of the parents . . .
to provide direction to the child in the
exercise of his or her right in
a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child. 66
x Underlying the policies and precepts in international
conventions and
the domestic statutes with respect to children
is the overriding
principle that all actuations should be in the
best interests of the child.
This is not, however, to be implemented in
derogation of the primary
right of the parent or parents to exercise
parental authority over him.
The rights of parents vis--vis that of their
children are not antithetical
to each other, as in fact, they must be
respected and harmonized to the
fullest extent possible.
x Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown
up. Keith and Charmaine
are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony
is approaching eighteen, the age of
majority. For sure, they shall be endowed
with the discretion to lead lives
independent of their parents. This is not to
state that this case has been
rendered moot and academic, for their
welfare and best interests regarding their
adoption, must be determined as of the time
that the petition for adoption was
filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it
was filed without the required consent
of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of
the Intestate Estate of Deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F.
TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong,"
respondents.
G.R. No.
135216
August
19, 1999
THIRD
DIVISION
FACTS:
x Tomasa, being the surviving spouse of Dr. Alfredo E.
Jacob was appointed as
special administratix of the estate of said
deceased in the settlement proceedings
therefor before RTC Tiagon, CamSur
x Pedro (claiming to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo) filed a motion for
intervention
o Claimed that he is the sole surviving heir
o questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa
and his adoptive father Alfredo.
x Tomasa filed an opposition to said motion
x Tomasa likewise filed an action for injunction with
damages
o questioning appellee's claim as the legal
heir of Alfredo
x RTC (settlement proceedings) rendered a decision
IN FAVOR OF PEDRO
x Tomasa appealed to CA
x CA affirmed RTC in toto
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o We disagree.
x As a rule, the factual findings of the trial
x Tomasa filed a Rule 45 before the SC court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts,
ISSUE: Whether Pedro was able to establish because it had the opportunity to
that he was the legally-adopted son of the observe the
deceased. demeanor of witnesses and to
note telltale signs indicating the
HELD: NO. truth or the falsity
x In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was of a testimony. The rule, however,
adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the is not applicable to the present
signature of Judge Moya appearing on the case, because
Adoption Order was valid, the Court of it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera,
Appeals relied on the presumption that the not the ponente, who heard the
judge had acted in the regular testimonies of
performance of his duties. The the two expert witnesses. Thus,
appellate court also gave credence the Court examined the records
to the and found that
testimony of respondents the Court of Appeals and the trial
handwriting expert, for "the court "failed to notice certain
assessment of the relevant facts
credibility of such expert witness rests which, if properly considered, will
largely on the discretion of the trial court . justify a different conclusion."36
Hence, the
. . "35 present case is an exception to
 the general rule that only questions of law Moya were not
may written by one and
be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37 the same person.
x Central to the present question is the authenticity On the basis of my
of Judge Moya's signature on findings
the questioned Order of Adoption. To that I would point
enlighten the trial court on this matter, out in detail, the
two expert witnesses were presented, one difference in the
for petitioner and one for Respondent writing
Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on characteristics
respondents expert and brushed aside [was] in the
the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 structural pattern
Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial of letters which is
judges action by arguing that the very apparent as
Deposition was ambiguous. He contends shown in the
that Judge Moya could not remember photograph as the
whether the signature on the Order was capital letter
his and cites the following portion as "J".43
proof:39 x It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a
o Q. What was you[r] response, disinterested party, his services having
sir? been sought without any
o A: I said I do not remember. compensation. Moreover, his
x Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, competence was
because it took the judge's recognized even by Respondent
testimony out of its context. Considered Pilapils expert witness, Atty.
with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Desiderio Pagui.44
Moya's statements contained no x Other considerations also cast doubt on
ambiguity. He was clear when he the claim of respondent. The alleged
answered the queries in the following Order was purportedly made in
manner: open court. In his Deposition,
o Atty. Benito P. Fabie however, Judge
o Q. What else did she tell Moya declared that he did not
you[?] dictate decisions in adoption
o A. And she ask[ed] me if I cases. The only
remembered having issued decisions he made in open
the order. court were criminal cases, in
o Q. What was your response which the accused
sir[?] pleaded guilty.45 Moreover,
o A. I said I do not Judge Moya insisted that the
remember.40 branch where he was
x The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest assigned was always indicated
that Judge Moya was unsure of in his decisions and orders; yet
what he was declaring. In fact, the questioned
he was emphatic and categorical Order did not contain this
in the subsequent exchanges information. Furthermore,
during the Deposition: Pilapils conduct gave no
o Atty. Benito P. Fabie indication that he recognized his
o Q. I am showing to you this own alleged adoption, as shown
Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] by the
will you please recall whether documents that he signed and
you issued this Order and other acts that he performed
whether thereafter.46 In the
the facsimile of the signature same vein, no proof was
appearing thereon is your presented that Dr. Jacob had
signature. treated him as an adopted
o A. As I said, I do not child. Likewise, both the Bureau of
remember having issued such an Records Management47 in Manila
order and the signature and the
reading Jose[;] I cant make Office of the Local Civil
out clearly Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines
what comes after the Sur,48 issued
name[;] Jose Moya is not Certifications that there was no
my signature.41 record that Pedro Pilapil had
x Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever been adopted by
issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown
the signature over his name, he positively
declared that it was not his.
x The fact that he had glaucoma when his
Deposition was taken does not discredit
his statements. At the time, he could
with medication still read the
newspapers;
upon the request of the defense counsel,
he even read a document shown to
him.42 Indeed, we find no reason - and
the respondent has not presented any -
to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
x Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the
expert testimony of NBI
Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who
declared:
o Atty. Paraiso
o Q And were you able to determine
[w]hat purpose you had in
your examination of this document?
o A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion,
[I] stated that the
questioned and the
standard signature Jose L.

Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent.49
x The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person
claiming such relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil
failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
SECOND DIVISION
FACTS:
x Spouses Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y
Andrade filed a petition
to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran before RTC
Pasig
o In the very same petition, private respondents
prayed for the
change of the first name or said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same
being the name with which he was
baptized in keeping with religious
tradition and by which he has been
called by his adoptive family, relatives
and friends since May 6, 1993 when he
arrived at private respondents'
residence
x Republic filed an opposition
o opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same
petition for adoption
x RTC decided IN FAVOR of the SPOUSES
o WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran is freed from
all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to
his natural parents, and for all legal
intents and purposes shall be
known as Aaron Joseph Munson y
Andrade, the legally adopted
child of Van Munson and Regina Munson
effective upon the filing of
the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon
as the decree of adoption
becomes final and executory, it shall be
recorded in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila pursuant to Section
8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103,
respectively, of the Rules of
Court, and shall be annotated in the
record of birth of the adopted
child, which in this case is in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, where the
child was born. Likewise, send a copy of
this Order to the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for
its appropriate action
consisten(t) herewith
x Republic directly appealed to SC via Rule 45
ISSUE # 1: Whether the LAST name of the adoptee may be
changed in the same petition for
adoption.
HELD # 1: YES.
x It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded
his jurisdiction
when he additionally granted the prayer for the
change of the given or proper name of the adoptee
in a petition for adoption.
x Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition
for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in substance and
purpose, are different from and are not related to
each other, being respectively governed by distinct
sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both
reliefs, namely, a decree of
adoption and an authority to change the giver or
proper name of the adoptee, the respective
proceedings for each must be instituted separately,
and the
substantive and procedural requirements
therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the
Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364
to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for change of
name, must correspondingly be complied
with. 10
x A perusal of the records, according to petitioner,
shows that only the laws and
rules on adoption have been observed, but
not those for a petition for change of
name. 11 Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of
the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of
right, to conform with that of the
adopter and as a natural consequence of
the adoption thus granted. If what is
sought is the change of the registered
given or proper name, and since this
would involve a substantial change of one's
legal name, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and
adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied. 12
x Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed
the petition for adoption
with a prayer for change of name predicated
upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows
permissive joinder of causes of action in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is
argued that there is no prohibition in the
Rules against the joinder of adoption
and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action
in a single petition. Further, the conditions
for permissive joinder of causes of
action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper
venue and joinder of parties, have
been met. 13
x Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to
the rule regarding change of
name in view of the natural interest of the
State in maintaining a system of
identification of its citizens and in the orderly
administration of justice. 14 Private
respondents argue otherwise and invoke a
liberal construction and application of the
Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee
being the primordial concern that should be
addressed in the instant proceeding. 15
x On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance
in holding that -
o Furthermore, the change of name of the
child from Kevin
Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph
should not be treated
strictly, it appearing that no rights
have been prejudiced by
said change of name. The strict
and meticulous observation
of the requisites set forth by Rule
103 of the Rules of Court
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Henedino M. Brondial)
obviate any possible
doubts on the intent of
is indubitably for the petitioners, the prayer
purpose of preventing fraud, for change of
ensuring that neither State name was caused to be
nor any third person should published together with
be the petition for
prejudiced by the grant of adoption. 16
the petition for change of x Art. 189 of the Family Code
name under said rule, to a enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
petitioner of discernment. effects of
x The first name sought to be changed belongs to an adoption:
infant barely over a year old. o (1) For civil
Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil purposes, the adopted shall be
rights nor engaged in any contractual deemed to be
obligations. Neither can he nor a
petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to legitima
have any te child
immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for of the
seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands adopter
s and
to reason that there is no way that the both
state or any person may be so shall
prejudiced by the action for change of acquire
Kevin Earl's first name. In fact, to the
 reciprocal rights and requirements for a
obligations arising from special proceeding for
the relationship of parent change of name under
and child, including the Rule 103 of the Rules of
right of the adopted to Court, wherein the
use the surname of the sufficiency of the
adopters; reasons or grounds
o (2) The parental authority of the therefor can be
parents by nature over threshed out and
the adopted shall terminate accordingly
and be vested in the determined.
adopters, except x Under Rule 103, a petition for change
that if the adopter is the of name shall be filed in the regional trial
spouse of the parent by court of the province
nature of the where the person
adopted, parental desiring to change his
authority over the name resides. It
adopted shall be shall be signed and
exercised jointly by both verified by the person
spouses; and desiring his name to be
o (3) The adopted shall remain an changed or by
intestate heir of his some other person in
parents and other blood relatives. his behalf and shall
x Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of state that the petitioner
right and obligation, has been a
to bear the surname of the adopter, bona fide resident of
upon issuance of the decree of the province where the
adoption. It is the change of the petition is filed for at
adoptee's surname to follow that of least three
the adopter which is the natural and years prior to such
necessary consequence of a grant of filing, the cause for
adoption and must specifically be which the change of
contained in the order of the court, in name is sought, and
fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. the name asked for. An
order for the date and
ISSUE # 2: Whether a petition to change the place of hearing shall
FIRST name of the prospective adoptee and a be made
petition for adoption may correctly be joined. and published, with the
Solicitor General or the
HELD # 2: NO. proper provincial or city
x However, the given or proper name, also known as the
first or Christian name, of prosecutor appearing
the adoptee must remain as it was for the Government at
originally registered in the civil register. such hearing. It is only
The upon
creation of an adoptive relationship does satisfactory proof of
not confer upon the adopter a the veracity of the
license to change the adoptee's allegations in the
registered Christian or first name. The petition and the
automatic change thereof, premised reasonableness of the
solely upon the adoption thus causes for the change
granted, is beyond the purview of a of name that the court
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere may
incident in nor an adjunct of an adjudge that the name
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer be changed as prayed
therefor furtively inserted in a petition for in the petition, and
for adoption, as in this case, cannot shall
properly be granted. furnish a copy of said
x The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil judgment to the civil
register should be used in the registrar of the
adoption proceedings in order to vest municipality
the court with jurisdiction to hear and concerned who shall
determine the same, 17 and shall forthwith enter the
continue to be so used until the court same in the civil
orders register.
otherwise. Changing the given or x A petition for change of name being a
proper name of a person as recorded proceeding in rem, strict
in the compliance with all the
civil register is a substantial change in requirements therefor
one's official or legal name and cannot is indispensable in
be authorized without a judicial order. order to vest the court
The purpose of the statutory procedure with jurisdiction for its
authorizing a change of name is simply adjudication. 19 It is an
to have, wherever possible, a record of independent and
discrete special
the change, and in keeping with the proceeding, in and by
object of the statute, a court to which itself, governed
the by its own set of rules.
application is made should normally A fortiori, it cannot be
make its decree recording such granted by means of
change. 18 any
x The official name of a person whose birth is registered other proceeding. To
in the civil register is the consider it as a mere
name appearing therein. If a change incident or an offshoot
in one's name is desired, this can only of
be done by filing and strictly another special
complying with the substantive and proceeding would be
procedural to denigrate its role
and
 significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial
law system.
x The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring
defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change
of name of the adoptee, 20 all of
which
taken together cannot but lead to the
conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for
change of name as would rightfully
deserve
an order therefor. It would be
procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for
adoption to effect a change of name in the
absence of the corresponding petition for the
latter relief at law.
x Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by
any stretch of imagination
and liberality, be justified under the rule
allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.
Moreover, the reliance by private respondents
on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et al.
21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. 22 is
misplaced. A
restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on
joinder of causes of action would, therefore,
appear to be called for.
x By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of
causes of action, is meant
the uniting of two or more demands or rights of
action in one action; the
statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration. 23 It is the union of two or more
civil causes of action, each of which could be
made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff
may under certain circumstances join several
distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
24
x As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a
party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct
causes of action. The joinder of separate
causes of action, where allowable, is
permissive and not mandatory in the absence
of a contrary statutory provision, even though
the causes of action arose from the same
factual setting and might under applicable
joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes
and rules governing joinders are intended to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice
wherever this may be done without prejudice
to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these
ends, they are liberally construed. 26
x While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the
option of a party
litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules
allows causes of action to be joined in one
complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of
action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between
the parties, or are for
demands for money or are of the same
nature and character. x The objectives of the rule
or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where
the same parties and subject matter are to
be dealt with by effecting in one
action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy and litigation
between the parties involving one subject
matter, and to expedite the disposition
of litigation at minimum cost. The provision
should be construed so as to avoid
such multiplicity, where possible, without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants.
Being of a remedial nature, the provision
should be liberally construed, to the
end that related controversies between the
same parties may be adjudicated at one time;
and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable, 27 with the end in view of
promoting the efficient administration of
justice. 28
x The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of
causes of action is to
encourage joinder of actions which could
reasonably be said to involve kindred
rights and wrongs, although the courts have
not succeeded in giving a standard
definition of the terms used or in developing a
rule of universal application. The
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of
action, legal or equitable, where
there is some substantial unity between them.
29 While the rule allows a plaintiff
 to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should
nevertheless be
some unity in the problem presented and a common question of
law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is
not authorized. 30
x Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso
subjecting it
to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems
presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32
x Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no
express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for
change of name,
we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present
any common
question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their
joinder. In short,
these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder
under our Rules.
x As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -
o A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in
substance and
purpose, are different from each other. Each
action is
individually governed by particular sets of laws
and rules. These two proceedings involve
disparate issues. In a
petition for adoption, the court is called upon to
evaluate
the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications
to bring
up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs.
Republic,
99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or
affected for what is looked into is the propriety and
reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17
SCRA 253).
o . . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be
separately
assessed and determined for neither action is
dependent on the
other. 33
x The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may
be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of
relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue
and joinder of parties
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
x These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed
out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an
action for
change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to
each other
and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties.
While
what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed
adopter's fitness and
qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may
only prosper upon
proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the
change requested.
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Fitness to adopt is not determinative of
the sufficiency of reasons justifying a
change of name. And similarly, a change
of first name cannot be justified in view of
a finding that the proposed adopter was
found fit to adopt. There is just no way
that the two actions can connect and find
a common ground, thus the
joinder would be improper.
x In contending that adoption and change of name
may be similarly sought in one
petition, private respondents rely upon
Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4,
Comment)
x We however submit that these citations are non
sequitur. In both cases, the fact
of intimacy and relatedness of the issues
is so pronounced. In Peyer, an
application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with
the action to transfer the management of
conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an
action for declaration of heirship was
deemed a clear condition
precedent to an action to recover
the land subject of partition and
distribution proceeding.
However, the commonality of
relationship which stands out in
both cases does not characterize
the present action for adoption
and change of name. Thus the
rulings in Peyer and Briz find no
place in the case at bar.
x Besides, it is interesting to note that
although a joinder of the two actions was,
in Briz, declared feasible, the
Supreme Court did not indorse an
automatic
joinder and instead remanded the
matter for further proceedings,
granting leave
to amend the pleadings and
implead additional parties-
defendants for a complete
determination of the controversy
(Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770).
Such
 cautionary stance all the more emphasizes long been recognized that strict
that although joinders are generally compliance with the Rules of
accepted, they are not allowed where the Court is indispensable for the
conditions are not satisfactorily met. prevention of
34 needless delays and for the
x It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed orderly and expeditious dispatch
joinder in this instance will make of judicial business.
for a complete determination of all 37
matters pertaining to the coetaneous x Procedural rules are not to be disdained
grant of adoption and change of name of as mere technicalities that may be
the adoptee in one petition. As already ignored at will to suit the
stated, the subject petition was grossly convenience of a party. Adjective
insufficient in form and substance with law is important in
respect to the prayer for change of name ensuring the effective
of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding enforcement of substantive rights
multiplicity of suits which underscores the through the orderly and
rule on permissive joinder of causes of speedy administration of justice.
action is addressed to suits that are These rules are not intended to
intimately related and also present hamper litigants
interwoven and dependent issues which or complicate litigation but,
can be most expeditiously and indeed to provide for a system
comprehensively settled by having just under which a suitor
one judicial proceeding, but not to suits may be heard in the correct form
or actions whose subject matters or and manner and at the prescribed
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or time in a
diverse such that they are best taken up peaceful confrontation before a judge
individually. whose authority they acknowledge. 38
x In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 the Court x It cannot be overemphasized that
clarified the rule on procedural rules have their own wholesome
permissive joinder of causes of action: rationale in the orderly
o The rule is clearly permissive. It does administration of justice. Justice
not constitute an obligatory has to be administered
rule, as there is no positive according to the Rules in order
provision of law or any rule of to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
jurisprudence which compels or whimsicality.
a party to join all his causes of 39 We have been cautioned and
action reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that: 40
and bring them at one and the o Rules of procedure are
same time. Under the present intended to ensure the orderly
rules, administration of
the provision is still that the justice and the
plaintiff may, and not that he protection of
must, substantive rights in
unite several causes of action judicial and
although they may be extrajudicial
included in proceedings. It is a
one of the classes specified. mistake to propose
This, therefore, leaves it to the that substantive law
and adjective law are
plaintiff's option whether the contradictory to each
causes of action shall be
joined in the other or, as has often
same action, and no been suggested, that
unfavorable inference may be enforcement of
drawn from his procedural rules
failure or refusal to do so. He should never be
may always file another action permitted if it
based will result in
on the remaining cause or prejudice to the
causes of action within the substantive
prescriptive rights of the
period therefor. (Emphasis litigants. This is
supplied.) not
x The situation presented in this case does not exactly true; the
warrant exception from the Rules concept is much
under the policy of liberal misunderstood. As
construction thereof in general, and a matter of fact,
for change of name in particular, as the policy of the
proposed by private respondents and courts is to give
adopted by both kinds of law,
respondent judge. Liberal construction of as
the Rules may be invoked in situations complementing each
wherein there may be some excusable other, in the just and
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, speedy resolution of
provided that the same does not subvert the
the essence of the proceeding and dispute between the
connotes at least a reasonable attempt parties. Observance
at compliance with the Rules. Utter of both substantive
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rights
rationalized by harking on the policy of is equally guaranteed
liberal construction. by due process,
x The Court is not impervious to the frustration that whatever the source
litigants and lawyers alike of such
would at times encounter in procedural
bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of
indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to
ensure its proper dispensation. 36 It has
 and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in
rights, be it the Constitution itself or which he adjudicated this
only a statute or a rule of case may be characterized as a regrettable
court. abdication of the duty to uphold the
o . . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
when for the
most persuasive of reasons they may be ISSUE # 3: Whether there is ground to change the FIRST name of
relaxed to relieve a litigant the adoptee.
of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his HELD # 3: NO.
thoughtlessness in not complying with the x Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court
procedure prescribed to grant the petition for
change of name without citing or proving any lawful
................................................................... ground. Indeed, the only
. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of justification advanced for the change of name was
technicalities, this the fact of the adoptee's
does not mean that the Rules of Court may be baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which
ignored at will and he has been known since
at random to the prejudice of the orderly he came to live with private respondents. 45
presentation and x Private respondents, through a rather stilted
assessment of the issues and their just resolution. ratiocination, assert that upon the
Justice eschews grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso
anarchy. facto assumed a new
o Only exceptionally in very extreme identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph
circumstances, when a rule which was the name given
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the
becomes its great change of his first name as
hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely
application thereof confirms the designation by
frustrates rather than promotes substantial which he is known and called in the community in
justice, will which he lives. This largely
technicalities deserve scant consideration from echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the
the court. In such child Aaron Joseph was
situations, the courts are empowered, even symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as
obligated, to suspend adoptive parents, have as
the operation of the rules. 41 much right as the natural parents to freely select the
x We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited first name of their adopted
upon private child. 46
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the x The lower court was sympathetic to herein private
change in the respondents and ruled on this
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. point in this manner:
We are hard put to o As adoptive parents, petitioner like other
descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of parents may freely select
the adoptee to his the first name given to his/her child as it
welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency is only the surname to
that would justify an which the child is entitled that is fixed by
exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State law
that stands to be
...................................................................
prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural o The given name of the minor was Kevin
interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the Earl, a name given for no
efficacious other purpose than for identification
maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens. purposes in a birth certificate
x The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that by a woman who had all intentions of
the violation of or giving him away. The naming
failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law of the minor as Aaron Joseph by
prevents the proper petitioners upon the grant of their
determination of the questions raised by the parties with petition for adoption is symbolic of
respect to the merits of naming the minor at birth. 47
the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, x We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis
such questions as for this attenuated ruling of
relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
down for the trial x It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a
court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public person's name is a word or
policy. 42 They are combination of words by which he is known and
matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be identified, and distinguished
changed or from others, for the convenience of the world at large
regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to in addressing him, or in
an action for their speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
singular convenience. 43 as well as public interest
x In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness that every person must have a name. The name of an
in the application individual has two parts:
of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the the given or proper name and the surname or family
appropriate name. The giver or proper
proceeding: name is that which is given to the individual at birth
o . . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. or at baptism, to distinguish
One should not him from other individuals. The surname or family
confuse or misapply one procedure for another name is that which identifies
lest we create the family to which he belongs and is continued from
confusion in the application of the proper remedy. parent to child. The given
x Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets name may be freely selected by the parents for the
aimed at achieving child, but the surname to
stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 48
prerogatives by granting 130
the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported
by both statutory
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be changed is the true or official
name recorded in the civil
x By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth register. As earlier
must be entered in the civil mentioned, a petition for change
register. The official name of a person is of name being a proceeding in
that given him in the civil register. That rem, impressed
is his name in the eyes of the law. 49 And as it is with public interest, strict
once the name of a person is officially compliance with all the requisites
entered in the civil register, Article 376 of therefor in
the same Code seals that identity with order to vest the court with
its precise mandate: no person can jurisdiction is essential, and
change his name or surname without failure therein renders
judicial the proceedings a nullity. 52
authority. This statutory restriction is x It must likewise be stressed once again
premised on the interest of the State in that a change of name is a privilege, not
names borne by individuals and entities for a matter of right, addressed to
purposes of identification. 50 the sound discretion of the court
x By reason thereof, the only way that the name of which has the
person can be changed legally duty to consider carefully the
is through a petition for change of name under consequences of a change of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. name and to deny
51 For purposes of an application for the same unless weighty reasons
change of name under Article 376 of the are shown. Before a person can
Civil Code and correlatively implemented be authorized
by Rule 103, the only name that may to change his name, that is, his
 true or official name or that which surname
appears in his to which the child is
birth certificate or is entered in the civil entitled that is fixed
register, he must show proper and by law
reasonable cause or any convincing reason which
may justify such change. 53 ...................................
x Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the The given name
following grounds as being sufficient of the minor was Kevin
to warrant a change of name: Earl, a name
o (a) when the name is ridiculous, given for no other
dishonorable or extremely difficult purpose than for
to write or pronounce; identification
o (b) when the change results as a legal purposes in a
consequence of legitimation birth certificate
or adoption; by a woman who
o (c) when the change will avoid had
confusion; all the intentions
o (d) when one has continuously used of giving him
and been known since away. The naming
of
childhood by a Filipino name and was
unaware of alien parentage; the minor as
Aaron Joseph by
o (e) when the change is based on a
petitioners upon
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
grant
name to erase signs of
of their petition
former alienage, all in
for adoption is
good faith and without
symbolic of
prejudice to anybody; naming
and the minor at birth.
o (f) when the surname causes o and supposedly based on the
embarrassment and there is no authority of Republic vs. Court of
showing that the desired Appeals and Maximo Wong,
change of name was for a supra, painfully misapplies
fraudulent the ruling
purpose or that the therein enunciated.
change of name would x The factual backdrop of said case is not at
prejudice public all analogous to that of the case at
interest. 54 bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner
x Contrarily, a petition for change of name Maximo Wong sought the change of his
grounded on the fact that one was surname which he acquired by virtue of
baptized by another name, under which the decree of adoption granted in favor
he has been known and which he used, of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion
has been denied inasmuch as the use of Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of
baptismal names is not sanctioned. 55 majority, he filed a petition in court to
For, in truth, baptism is not a condition change his surname from Wong to Alcala,
sine qua non to a change of name. 56 which was his surname prior to the
Neither does the fact that the petitioner adoption. He adduced proof that the use
has been using a different name and has of
become known by it constitute proper and the surname Wong caused him
reasonable cause to legally authorize a embarrassment and isolation from friends
change of name. 57 A name given to a and
person in the church records or relatives in view of a suggested Chinese
elsewhere or by which be is known in ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim
the community - when at variance with Filipino residing in a Muslim community,
that entered in the civil register - is thereby hampering his business and
unofficial and cannot be recognized as social life, and that his surviving adoptive
his mother consented to the change of
real name. 58 name sought. This Court granted the
x The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade petition and regarded the change of the
us to depart from such rulings surname as a mere incident in, rather
of long accepted wisdom and than the object of, the adoption.
applicability. The only grounds offered to
justify
the change of name prayed for was that
the adopted child had been baptized as
Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious
faith of private respondents and that
it was the name by which he had been
called and known by his family, relatives
and friends from, the time he came to
live with private respondents. 59 Apart
from suffusing their pleadings with
sanctimonious entreaties for compassion,
none of the justified grounds for a change
of name has been alleged or
established by private respondents. The
legal bases chosen by them to bolster
their cause have long been struck down
as unavailing for their present purposes.
For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his
baptismal name, instead of his name
registered in the civil register, would be to
countenance or permit that which has
always been frowned upon. 60
x The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge,
as expressed in his assailed
order that -
o (a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like
other parents may freely
select the first name given to
his/her child as it is only the
 without prejudice to, private respondents'
x It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, privilege to legally change the proper or
not the given name, given name of their adopted child, provided
and the legal consequences thereof in view of the that the same is exercised, this time, via a
adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a proper petition for change of name. Of
petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with course, the grant thereof is conditioned on
ample strict compliance with all jurisdictional
proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to requirements and
reinforce the imperative satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
necessity of seeking relief under and through the therefor.
legally prescribed procedures.
x Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
o Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA
situation wherein P. CARANTO, respondents.
a child is being named for the first time G.R.
by his natural parent, as No.
against one wherein, a child is previously 103
conferred a first name by 695
his natural parent, and such name is .
subsequently sought to be Mar
disregarded and changed by the adoptive ch
parents. In the first case, there is no 15,
dispute that natural parents have the 199
right to freely 6
select and give the child's first name for SEC
every person, including ON
juridical persons, must have a name D
(Tolentino, A., Commentaries DIVI
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. SIO
I, 1987 edition, page N
721). In the second case, however, as in
the case at bar, private FACTS:
respondents, in their capacities as x Carantos filed a petition to adopt Midael C. Mazon
adopters, cannot claim a right to with prayer for the
name the minor adoptee after such right correction of the minors first name Midael to Michael
to name the child had before RTC Cavite
already been exercised by the natural o Michael was then fifteen years old, who
parent. Adopting parents had been living with
have not been conferred such right by private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since
law, hence, the right he was seven years old
assertes by private respondents herein x SolGen filed an opposition
remains but illusory. o insofar as it sought the correction of the
Renaming the adoptee cannot be name of the child from
claimed as a right. It is merely a Midael to Michael.
privilege necessitating judicial consent o He argued that although the correction
upon compelling grounds. sought concerned only a
61 clerical and innocuous error, it
x The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up could not be granted because the
to adoption insofar petition was basically for
as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption adoption, not the correction of an
and ensures to the adopted child the rights and entry in the civil registry under
privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and x RTC ruled IN FAVOR of the CARANTOS
interest of the adopted child, 62 should be understood o dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor
in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or General. on the ground
misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond that Rule 108 of the Rules of
the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Court (Cancellation or Correction
x The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to of Entries in the Civil Registry)
select the proper or applies only to the correction of
given name of the child presupposes that no other entries concerning the civil status
name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil of persons.
register. Once such name is registered, regardless o It cited Rule 108 which provides that any
of the reasons for such choice and even if it be person interested in an
solely for the purpose of act, event, order or decree
identification, the same constitutes the official name. concerning the civil status of
This effectively the
authenticates the identity of the person and must persons which has been
remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling recorded in the civil register,
reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its may file a
change may merit judicial approval. verified petition for the
x While the right of a natural parent to name the child is cancellation or correction of
recognized, guaranteed any entry
and protected under the law, the so-called right of relating thereto.
an adoptive parent to re- o It held that the correction of names in the
name an adopted child by virtue or as a civil registry is not one
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble of the matters enumerated in
intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of Rule 108, 2 as entries subject
in law and to cancellation or correction.
o According to the trial court, the error
consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
could be corrected in the
repeat, the change of the
same proceeding for adoption to
surname of the adoptee as a result of the
prevent multiplicity of actions,
adoption and to follow that of the
and inconvenience to the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the
petitioners.
proper or given name.
x SolGen appealed to CA
Furthermore, factual realities and legal
x CA affirmed RTC in toto
consequences, rather than sentimentality and
symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court. 131
x Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely
foreclose and is
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includes prayer to change the first name of
the prospective adoptee.
o ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic,
[2] invoked by the petitioner HELD #1: YES.
in support of its plea that the x The first issue is whether on the facts
trial court did not acquire stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
jurisdiction over the case, the private respondents petition
was inapplicable because for adoption. Petitioners
that case involved a contention is that the
substantial error. trial court did not acquire
o Like the trial court, it held that to jurisdiction over the petition for
require the petitioners to file a adoption because the
separate petition for notice by publication did not
correction of name would state the true name of the minor
entail additional child. Petitioner
time and expenses for them invokes the ruling in Cruz v.
as. well as for the Government Republic.[3] There the petition for
and the adoption and the
Courts. notice published in the
x SolGen filed a Rule 45 before the SC newspaper gave the baptismal
name of the child -
ISSUE # 1: Whether the RTC has acquired (Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, name in the record of birth
considering that the subject petition for adoption (Rosanna E. Bucoy).
it was held that this was a
 substantial defect in the petition and the ;
published (m)
order of hearing. Indeed there was a judi
question of identity involved in that case. cial
Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a determin
different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, ation of
as common experience would indicate. filiation;
x The present case is different. It involves an (n)
obvious clerical error in the voluntary
name of the child sought to be adopted. emancip
In this case the correction ation of a
involves merely the substitution of the minor;
letters ch for the letter d, so and (o)
that what appears as Midael as given changes
name would read Michael. Even of name.
the Solicitor General admits that the x This case falls under letter (o), referring to
error is a plainly clerical one. changes of name. Indeed, it has been
Changing the name of the child from the uniform ruling of this
Midael C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon Court that Art. 412 of the Civil
cannot possibly cause any confusion, Code - to implement which
because both names can be read and Rule 108 was inserted in the
pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) rules of Court in 1964 - covers
and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The those
purpose of the publication requirement is harmless and innocuous
to give notice so that those who have any changes, such as correction of
objection to the adoption can make their a name that is clearly
objection known. That purpose has been misspelled.[4] Thus, in Yu vs.
served by publication of notice in this Republic[5] it was held that to
case. change Sincio to
x For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly Sencio which merely involves the
granted the petition for adoption substitution of the first vowel i in
of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the the first name
Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision into the vowel e amounts merely
of the trial court, correctly did so. to the righting of a clerical error.
In Labayo-
ISSUE # 2: Whether the RTC correctly granted Rowe v. Republic[6] it was held
the prayer to change the name of said that the change of petitioners
prospective adoptee. name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a
HELD #2: NO. mere innocuous alteration
x With regard to the second assignment of error in wherein a summary proceeding is
the petition, we hold that both appropriate.
the Court of Appeals and the trial court x Rule 108 thus applies to the present
erred in granting private respondents proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule provides:
prayer for the correction of the name o 3. Parties. - When cancellation
of the child in the civil registry. or correction of an entry in the civil
x Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 register is sought,
of the Rules of Court applies the civil registrar
to this case and because its provision was and all persons who
not complied with, the decision of the have or claim any
trial court, insofar as it ordered the interest which would
correction of the name of the minor, is be affected thereby
void and without force or effect. shall be made
x The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule parties to the
108 to be applicable only to proceeding.
the correction of errors concerning the x The local civil registrar is thus required to
civil status of persons. Rule 108, 2 plainly be made a party to the
states: proceeding. He is an
o 2. Entries subject to cancellation or indispensable party, without
correction. - Upon good and whom no final
valid grounds, the determination of the case can
following entries in the be had.[7] As he was not
civil register may be impleaded in this
cancelled or corrected: case much less given notice of
(a) births; (b) marriages; the proceeding, the decision of
(c) deaths; (d) legal the trial court,
separation; (e) judgments insofar as it granted the prayer
of annulments of for the correction of entry, is
marriage; void. The absence
(f) judgments of an indenpensable party in a
declaring case renders ineffectual all the
marriages proceeding
void from the subsequent to the filling of the
beginning; complaint including the
(g) judgment.[8]
legitimations;
(h)
adoptions; (i)
acknowledg
ments of
natural
children; (j)
naturalizati
on; (k)
election,
loss or
recovery of
citizenship;
(l) civil
interdiction
 contract executed by Susana in
x Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry favor of Godofredo to support
published as required by the
Rule 108, 4 which reads: tenancy relationship.
o 4. Notice and publication. - Upon filling of the Furthermore, the DARAB
petition, the court declared the other
shall, by an order, fix the time and Kasunduan as void by relying on
place for the hearing of the the evaluation of the Provincial
same, and cause reasonable notice Adjudicator as to the legal
thereof to be given to the incapacity of Librada to enter into
persons named in the petition. The court such a
shall also cause the order to be published contract.
once a week for three (3) consecutive x Eugenio filed an MR
weeks in a newspaper of general o DARAB denied
circulation in the province. x Eugenio appealed to CA
x While there was notice given by publication in this case, it o CA affirmed DARAB
was notice of the x Eugenio filed a Rule 45 before the SC
petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule o contended that Leonida is a mere ward of
99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of Godofredo and
the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in Librada, thus, not a legal heir
addition the correction of his name in the civil
registry was also being sought. The local civil ISSUE: Whether Eugenio correctly questioned Leonidas
registrar was thus deprived of notice and, status as an adoptive child of
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. Godofredo in the present Rule 45 petition that stemmed
x The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil from a proceeding on tenancy before
registrar as an the DARAB.
indispensable party and to give notice by publication
of the petition for correction of entry was to render HELD: NO.
the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the x It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally
correction of entry was concered, null and void for attacked.20 Well-
lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his
subject matter book "Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted
that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. the provisions of the Civil Code of the
GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. Philippines. He explained thus:
REYES, Petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO o The legitimacy of the child cannot be
(deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, Respondents. contested by way of defense
G.R. No. 175080 or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different
purpose.
November 24, 2010 The necessity of an
FIRST DIVISION independent action directly
impugning the
FACTS: legitimacy is more clearly
x Eugenio is the registered owner of the subject property expressed in the Mexican code
located in Bulacan, which (article
has been adjudicated to him by virtue of an 335) which provides: "The
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following contest of the legitimacy of a
the death of his parents. child by
x Mauricios filed a complaint before the DARAB the husband or his heirs must be
o alleging that they were the legal heirs of one made by proper complaint before
Godofredo Mauricio,
the lawful and registered the competent court; any contest
tenant of Eugenio through his made in any other way is void."
predecessors-in-interest to the This principle applies under our
subject land Family Code. Articles 170 and
o Contended that Eugenio caused the preparation 171
of a document of the code confirm this view,
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 because they refer to "the action
September 1994 to eject respondents to
from the subject property but such impugn the legitimacy." This
Kasunduan was void, considering that action can be brought only by the
Librada was illiterate and said husband or his heirs and
Kasunduan was neither read nor within the periods fixed in the
explained to her present articles.21
x Eugenio filed his answer x In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
o contended, among others, that no tenancy Negros Occidental,22 the
relationship existed Court stated that legitimacy and filiation
between him and respondents and can be questioned only in a direct action
that Leonida had no legal seasonably filed by the proper party, and
personality to file the present suit. not through collateral attack.23
x Provincial Adjudicator in favor of the MAURICIOS x The same rule is applied to adoption such that it
o concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of cannot also be made
Eugenio, and Librada, subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v.
being the surviving spouse, should
Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that
be maintained in peaceful
possession of the subject land.
x DARAB in favor of the MAURICIOS
132
o banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan
or the leasehold
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A
T
adoption cannot be assailed collaterally O
in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedents estate.25 Furthermore, in B
Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared .
that
the legality of the adoption by the C
testatrix can be assailed only in a A
separate T
action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject I
to collateral attack.27 N
x Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to D
leave out the status of I
Leonida from the case for annulment of G
the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors ,
petitioners cause.
p
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY e
ASTORGA GARCIA t
H i
O t
N i
O o
R n
er o First, it is necessary to
. preserve and maintain
G. Stephanies filiation
R. with her
N natural
o. mother
1 because
4 under
8 Article
3 189 of
1 the
1. Family
M Code,
ar she
ch remains
3 to be an
1, intestate
2 heir of
0 the
0 latter.
5 Thus, to
THIRD DIVISION prevent
any
FACTS: confusio
x Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor n and
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy needless
Astorga Garcia; the allegations are: hardship
o Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 in the
o that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; future,
o that Stephanie has been using her her
mothers middle name and relations
surname; and hip or
o that he is now a widower and qualified to proof of
be her adopting parent. that
He prayed that Stephanies relations
middle name Astorga be hip with
changed to "Garcia," her her
mothers surname, and that natural
her surname "Garcia" be mother
changed to "Catindig," his should
surname be
x RTC granted the petition maintain
o Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code ed.
of the Philippines, the o Second, there is no law
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE expressly prohibiting Stephanie
NATHY CATINDIG. to use the
x Honorato moved for clarification and/or surname
reconsideration of her
o praying that Stephanie should be allowed natural
to use the surname of mother as
her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle her middle
name name.
x RTC denied What the
x Honorato filed directly a Rule 45 before the SC law does
not
ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption prohibit, it
by her natural father, use the surname of her allows.
natural mother as her middle name. o Last, it is customary for
every Filipino to have a middle
HELD: YES. name,
x Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in which is
depriving Stephanie of a middle ordinarily
name as a consequence of adoption the
because: (1) there is no law prohibiting surname
an of the
adopted child from having a middle mother.
name in case there is only one This
adopting custom
parent; (2) it is customary for every has
Filipino to have as middle name the been
surname recognize
of the mother; (3) the middle name or d by the
initial is a part of the name of a person; Civil Code
(4) adoption is for the benefit and best and
interest of the adopted child, hence, Family
her right to bear a proper name should Code. In
not be violated; (5) permitting fact, the
Stephanie to use the middle name Family
"Garcia" (her mothers surname) avoids Law
the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) Committe
her continued use of "Garcia" as her es agreed
middle name is not opposed by either that "the
the Catindig or Garcia families. initial or
x The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor surname
General (OSG), agrees with of the
petitioner that Stephanie should be mother
permitted to use, as her middle should
name, the surname of her natural immediat
mother for the following reasons: ely
precede
 the surname of the father
so o "Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated
that the second name, if children shall principally use
any, will be before the the surname of the father.
surname of the o Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the
mother."7 surname of the adopter.
x We find merit in the petition. o Art. 369. Children conceived before the
o Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law - decree annulling a voidable
x For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is marriage shall principally use the surname
the designation by which he of the father.
is known and called in the community o Art. 370. A married woman may use:
in which he lives and is best known. It (1) Her maiden first name and
is surname and add her
defined as the word or combination of husband's surname, or
words by which a person is (2) Her maiden first name and
distinguished her husband's
from other individuals and, also, as the surname or
label or appellation which he bears for (3) Her husband's full name,
the convenience of the world at large but prefixing a word
addressing him, or in speaking of or indicating that she is his wife,
dealing with him.8 It is both of such as Mrs.
personal as well as public interest o Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage,
that every person must have a and the wife is the
name. guilty party, she shall resume her
x The name of an individual has two parts: maiden name and surname. If
o (1) the given or proper name and she is the innocent spouse, she
o (2) the surname or family name. may resume her maiden name and
The given or proper name is
that which is given to surname. However, she may
the individual choose to continue employing her
at birth or at former husband's surname, unless:
baptism, to (1) The court decrees
distinguish otherwise, or
him from other (2) She or the former husband
individuals. is married again to
The surname another person.
or family o Art. 372. When legal separation has been
name is that granted, the wife shall
which continue using her name and
identifies the surname employed before the
family to legal separation.
which he o Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
belongs and is husband's surname as
continued though he were still living, in accordance
from parent to with Article 370.
child. The o Art. 374. In case of identity of names and
given name may surnames, the younger
be freely person shall be obliged to use such
selected by the additional name or surname as will
parents for the avoid confusion.
child, but the o Art. 375. In case of identity of names and
surname to surnames between
which the child ascendants and descendants, the
is word Junior can be used only by
entitled is fixed by law.9 a son. Grandsons and other direct
x Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides male descendants shall either:
the substantive rules which (1) Add a middle name or the
regulate the use of surname10 of an mother's surname,
individual whatever may be his (2) Add the Roman numerals II,
status in life, i.e., whether he may be III, and so on.
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted o Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name
child, a -
married woman or a previously married woman, or a x As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
widow, thus: regulating the
use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent
as to what middle name a child
may use.
x The middle name or the mothers surname is only
considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of
names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, in which case, the middle
name or the mothers surname shall be
added.
x Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle
name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that "an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
o "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be
deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations
 arising from the relationship of parent and child, Article 364, which reads:
including the right of the adopted to use the o Legitimate and legitimated children shall
surname of the adopters; principally use the
x However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil surname of the father.
Code o Justice Puno pointed out that many names
and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code change through no
recognized the Filipino choice of the person himself
custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his precisely because of this
middle name. In the misunderstanding. He then cited
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law the following example: Alfonso
Committees, the Ponce Enriles correct surname is
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of Ponce since the mothers surname
the mother is Enrile but everybody calls him
should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus: Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez
o "Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference Davids family name is Gutierrez
between the use by the wife of the surname and and his mothers surname is David
that of the but they all call him Justice David.
child because the fathers surname indicates the o Justice Caguioa suggested that the
family to proposed Article (12) be
which he belongs, for which reason he would insist modified to the effect that it shall
on the be mandatory on the child to use
use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if the surname of the father but he
he may use the surname of the
wants to, the child may also use the mother by way of an initial or a
surname of the middle name. Prof. Balane stated
mother. that they take note of this for
o Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use inclusion in the Chapter on Use of
the Surnames since in the proposed
surname of the mother, how will his name be Article (10) they are just
written? Justice enumerating the rights of
Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his legitimate children so that the
point is that it details can be covered in the
should be mandatory that the child uses the appropriate chapter.
surname of the father and permissive in the case of
the surname of the mother. 133
x Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the
present
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name, if any, will be
before the
o Justice Puno remarked that there is surname of the
logic in the simplification mother. Prof. Balane
suggested by Justice Caguioa added that this is
that the surname of the father really the
should always be last because Filipino way. The
there are so many traditions Committee approved
like the the suggestion."12
American tradition where (Emphasis supplied)
they like to use their second x In the case of an adopted child, the law
given name and the Latin provides that "the adopted shall bear
tradition, which is also the surname of the adopters."13
followed by the Chinese Again, it is silent whether he can
wherein they even include the Clan use a middle
name. name. What it only expressly
o Justice Puno suggested that they allows, as a matter of right and
agree in principle that in the obligation, is for
Chapter on the Use of the adoptee to bear the surname
Surnames, they should say of the adopter, upon issuance of
that initial or the decree of
surname of the mother should adoption.14
immediately precede the o The Underlying Intent of
surname of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted
the father so that the second Child
x Adoption is defined as the process of making a
child, whether related
or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar
to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The
modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish
a relationship of paternity and filiation,
but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.17 This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the
Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted
the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and
that its underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act
No.
8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these
rights and privileges for the adopted.20
x One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted
is deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the
Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of
RA 8552.23
x Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother, as discussed
above. This is
consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
x Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanies continued use of her
mothers surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her
maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and
Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.
x Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs.
Stephanie is closely attached to both
her
mother and father. She calls them
"Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are
one
normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mothers surname
as her middle name will not only sustain
her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma
of her illegitimacy.
o Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption -
x It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of
adoption.25 The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration,26 hence,
every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of
the
law.27
x Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code
provides that:
o "In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws,
it is
presumed that the
lawmaking body
intended right and
justice to
prevail."
x This provision, according to the Code
Commission, "is necessary so that it may
tip the scales in favor of right and
justice when the law is doubtful
or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the
law."28
x Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to
use, as middle name her
mothers surname, we find no
reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
________________________________________________
PROCEEDINGS FOR
HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE
PERSONS [RULE 101]
Section 1. Venue, Petition for commitment.
A petition for the commitment of a
person to a hospital or other place for the
insane may be filed with the Court of First
Instance
of the province where the person alleged to
be insane is found. The petition shall be filed
by
the Director of Health in all cases where, in
his opinion, such commitment is for the
public
welfare, or for the welfare of said person who,
in his judgment, is insane and such person or
the one having charge of him is opposed to
his being taken to a hospital or other place
for the
insane.
Section 2. Order for hearing. If the
petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose
of the petition, shall fix a date for the
hearing
 (d) A copy of the commitment or cause of
thereof, and copy of such order shall be served on the person detention of such person, if it can be procured without
alleged to be insane, and to the one having charge him, or on impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the
such of his relatives residing in the province or city as the judge imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority,
may deem proper. The court shall furthermore order the sheriff to such fact shall appear.
produce the alleged insane person, if possible, on the date of the
hearing. 3. Disallowance or Discharge of Writ
Section 3. Hearing and judgment. Upon satisfactory proof, in Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
open court on the date authorized. If it appears that the
fixed in the order, that the commitment applied for is for the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
public welfare or for the welfare custody of an officer under process
of the insane person, and that his relatives are unable for any issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
reason to take proper custody or order of a court of record, and that
and care of him, the court shall order his commitment to such the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
hospital or other place for the render the judgment, or make the
insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health. The order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
court shall make proper appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
provisions for the custody of property or money belonging to discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
the insane until a guardian be properly appointed. process,
judgment, or order. Not shall anything in this rule be
Section 4. Discharge of insane. When, in the opinion of the held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
Director of Health, the person ordered to be committed to a with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or
hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may
judgment.
file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which
ordered the commitment.
4. Preliminary Citation vs. Writ
Section 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. It shall be
the duty of the Section 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require.
provincial fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to In case of imprisonment or
prepare the petition for the restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to him,
Director of Health and represent him in court in all proceedings and shall command him to have the
arising under the provisions of body of the person restrained of his liberty before the
this rule. court or judge designated in the writ at
the time and place therein specified. In case of
imprisonment or restraint by a person not an
H officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall
command him to take and have the
A body of the person restrained of his liberty before the
B court or judge designated in the writ at
E the time and place therein specified, and to summon the
A person by whom he is restrained
S then and there to appear before said court or judge to
show the cause of the imprisonment or
C
restraint.
O
R 5. The Return: When Evidence; When Plea
P
U Section 10. Contents of return. When the person to
S be produced is imprisoned or
[R restrained by an officer, the person who makes the
U return shall state therein, and in other
LE cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found
shall state, in writing to the court or judge before whom
10 the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocably:
2]
(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or
1. Definition and Nature or Scope power, or under restraint;

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as

otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus 134
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.

2. Requisites for Application

Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. Application

for the writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by
the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on
his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the person in whose behalf the

application is made is imprisoned or restrained on his
liberty;

(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so

imprisoned or restrained; or,
if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be
described by an assumed
appellation, and the person who is served with the writ shall be deemed
the person intended;

(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

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(b) If he has the party in his custody or
power, or under restraint, the authority and the true
and whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a
copy of the writ, order execution, or other process, if
any, upon which the party is held;
(c) If the party is in his custody or power
or is restrained by him, and is not
produced, particularly the nature and gravity of
the sickness or infirmity of such party by
reason of which he cannot, without danger, be
bought before the court or judge;
(d) If he has had the party in his custody or
power, or under restraint, and has transferred such
custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom,
at what time, for what cause, and by what authority
such transfer was made.
Section 11. Return to be signed and sworn to.
The return or statement shall be
signed by the person who makes it; and shall
also be sworn by him if the prisoner is not
produced, and in all other cases unless the
return is made and signed by a sworn public
officer in his official capacity.
Section 12. Hearing on return.
Adjournments. When the writ is returned
before one judge, at a time when the court
is in session, he may forthwith adjourn the
case into the
court, there to be heard and determined. The
court or judge before whom the writ is
returned or adjourned must immediately
proceed to hear and examine the return, and
such other
matters as are properly submitted for
consideration, unless for good cause shown
the hearing is adjourned, in which event the
court or judge shall make such order for the
safekeeping of the person imprisoned or
restrained as the nature of the case requires.
If the person
imprisoned or restrained is not produced
because of his alleged sickness or infirmity,
the court or judge must be satisfied that it is
so grave that such person cannot be produced Q: What is a preliminary citation as
without compared to the writ of habeas
danger, before proceeding to hear and dispose of
corpus or the peremptory writ?
the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall
disregard matters of form and technicalities in A: Preliminary citation is a citation to
respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a the government officer having the
court or officer authorized to commit by law. person in his custody to show cause
why the writ of habeas corpus should
Section 13. When the return evidence, and when only not issue (detention not patently
a plea. If it appears that the
illegal).
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment
in pursuance of law, the return shall be Preemptory writ is issued when
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the cause of the detention
restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty appears to be patently illegal
by any alleged private authority, the return shall be and the non-compliance
considered only as a plea of the facts wherewith is punishable.
therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must
prove such facts.

OLD LECTURE

Q: What is the constitutional provision about habeas

corpus?
A: The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion or when public safety
requires it. It is not the writ which is
suspended but the privilege.

Q: What is a writ of habeas corpus?

A: It is an order or judicial process directed to
the person to show cause for the reason of
detention.

Q: By that definition, it is directed in two conditions,

which are:
A:
1. illegal detention or confinement;
2. illegal withholding of custody
from a person entitled thereto.
It is directed to someone who commits
an act of either illegal detention or
confinement or illegal withholding of custody from a
person entitled thereto.

Q: What is an example of the first instance?

A: Violation of the constitution, whereby a
person is deprived or restrained of his liberty
or not afforded a right to due process, or an
order from an authority
which has no jurisdiction.

Q: What is an example of the second instance?

A: Malimit itong mangyari within the family,
where the mother or father fights over for
the custody of the child.

Q: If a woman leaves the parental home in

order to stay with her
paramour, can the parents file a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus?
A: It depends. If the child is a minor, a writ
of habeas corpus is available. But when a
child comes of age, the writ of habeas
corpus is not available.

Q: Suppose a judge renders a judgment

penalizing a person with
imprisonment of 6 years 1 month and 1 day,
and then the convict has
already stayed for more than that period of
time, is the writ available?
A: Yes, the writ is available because that is the
immediate remedy. Although you can also file
certiorari but it is no longer immediate here.
Because what do you intend to annul there?
wala.
In preliminary citation, it is not mandatory where the x Subsequently, after attending a corporate meeting in
court may dispense with the issuance of the preliminary Baguio City, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo
citation and go directly to the issuance of the writ of City and instead lived at Cleveland
habeas corpus. Condominium, Makati.
x Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus.
A person in custody of another, restraining the liberty of She alleged that
another, must give a respondents refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband
return upon receipt of the writ of habeas corpus. That
and prohibited Potenciano from
return can either be prima returning to Antipolo City.
facie evidence of the detention or a plea of the facts x CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda but ordered
stated therein, in the that the writ of habeas corpus
previously issued be recalled and the herein
return.
petition for habeas corpus be
dismissed for lack of unlawful restraint or
Q: What does this mean? (Section 13)
detention of the subject of the petition.
A: The content of the return as to whether it is a plea
only or prima facie ISSUE: Whether a wife may compel her husband to live
evidence of detention, they distinguish as to who has with her in conjugal bliss by way writ of a writ of habeas
burden of proof. If the corpus.
return contains prima facie evidence of the detention,
HELD: NO.
then petitioner has the
x The evidence shows that there was no actual and
burden of proof to show that the detention is illegal. But effective detention or
if it is only a plea of the deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios
facts stated in the return, then the one who has the liberty that would justify the issuance of the
custody of the person has writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
the burden of proof. is about 86 years of age, or under
medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated.
So a writ of habeas corpus is directed to a jail warden. Soundness of mind does not hinge on
When the jail warden age or medical condition but on the
prepares the return, which is brought to the court, he capacity of the individual to discern his
says that this person is actions.
under a commitment order, merong desisyon ang x After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded
that there was no unlawful
korte that this one should be
restraint on his liberty.
imprisoned because he was denied bail although is x The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer
appeal is still pending. That is Potenciano Ilusorio did not
prima facie evidence of the cause of his detention, and request the administrator of the Cleveland
when that is submitted to Condominium not to allow his wife and
the court, the applicant has the burden to establish that other children from seeing or visiting him.
He made it clear that he did not object to
that commitment order
seeing them.
is illegal. x As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the
Court of Appeals observed
But if the return, it says well i am taking custody of this that he was of sound and alert mind, having
child because i am the answered all the relevant questions to the
father, that is not a commitment order or judicial order, satisfaction of the court.
x Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the
that is coming from a capacity to make choices. In
private person. Therefore, that is not prima facie this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
evidence but only a plea of the residence and the people he opts to see or
facts stated therein. Hence, the father will show that he live with. The choices he made may not
has the right to take appeal to some of his family
custody of the child and not anymore the petitioner. members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made
it clear before the Court of Appeals that he
CASES was not prevented from leaving his

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and 135

SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789

May 12, 2000

FIRST DIVISION

FACTS:
x Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony
and lived together
for a period 30 years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Out of their marriage,
the spouses had 6 children.
x The children, Sylvia and Erlinda alleged that during the time
Potenciano arrived
from US and lived with Erlinda for 5 months, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg
instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
x Erlinda then filed with RTC a petition for guardianship over
the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment.
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house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on
his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
x With his full mental capacity coupled with the parent to visit a minor child but
right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio the right of a wife to visit a
may not be the subject of visitation rights husband. In case the husband
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will refuses to see his wife for private
deprive him of his right to privacy. reasons, he is at liberty to do so
Needless to say, this will run against his without threat of any penalty attached to
fundamental constitutional right. the exercise of his right.
x The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when x No court is empowered as a judicial
it awarded visitation rights in a authority to compel a husband to live with
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda his wife. Coverture cannot be
never even prayed for such right. The enforced by compulsion of a writ
ruling is not consistent with the finding of habeas corpus carried out by
of subjects sanity. sheriffs or by any other mesne
x When the court ordered the grant of visitation process. That is a matter beyond
rights, it also emphasized that the judicial authority and is best left
same shall be enforced under penalty of to the man and womans free
contempt in case of violation or refusal choice.
to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked
power is unnecessary. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
x The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
case did not involve the right of a POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA K. x Marriage is definitely for two loving adults
ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN who view the relationship with "amor
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents. gignit amorem respect, sacrifice
G.R. and a continuing commitment to
No. togetherness, conscious of its
13978 value as a sublime social
9 institution

July
19,
2001
FIRST
DIVISI ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs.
ON SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
FACTS: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-
x This is an MR to the decision in the 2000 case GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA,
above. respondents.
G
ISSUE: Whether Article XII of the 1987 Constitution .
and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code may be R
used by petitioner-movant as leverage so that the .
Court may declare that she and
deceased spouse should have lived together. N
o
HELD: NO.
.
x One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody
of her husband was that
1
respondents Lin and Sylvia were
4
illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio
8
to
4
fraudulently deprive her of property
6
rights out of pure greed.[14] She
8
claimed
.
that her two children were using their
sick and frail father to sign away
J
Potenciano and Erlinda' s property to
a
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia.
n
She also argued that since Potenciano
u
retired as director and officer of Baguio
a
Country Club and Philippine Oversees
r
Telecommunications, she would logically
y
assume his position and control. Yet,
Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling 2
the corporations.[15] 8
x The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved ,
during the hearing at the Court
of Appeals on March 23, 1999.[16] 2
Potenciano himself declared that he was 0
not prevented by his children from 0
seeing anybody and that he had no 3
objection to seeing his wife and other
children whom he loved.
x Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from E
various ailments. Thus, N
Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the
mental capacity to decide for himself. B
Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be A
brought before the Supreme Court so N
that we could determine his mental C
state.
x We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs.
was mentally incapacitated to HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
choose whether to see his wife or not. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Again, this is a question of fact that has respondents.
been decided in the Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 148769. January 28, 2003
x As to whether the children were in fact taking
control of the corporations, these EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs.
are matters that may be threshed out HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
habeas corpus. respondents.
x The law provides that the husband and the wife G.R. No. 149116. January 28, 2003
are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.[20] The sanction therefor is
the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" to
enforce consortium.[21]
x Obviously, there was absence of empathy
between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed
and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process.
FACTS: present evidence in opposition to
x This case stemmed from a plunder case filed by the People his petition for bail; and,
against Serapio premised on the failure of the
among others People to adduce strong
x Serapio (member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal evidence of petitioner's guilt of
Counsel of the Erap plunder, that he be granted
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit provisional liberty on bail after
foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly due proceedings.
for the purpose of providing educational x SB denied the motion to quash
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but x Serapio filed a Rule 65 before the SC
deserving Muslim youth and students, and support
to research and advance studies of young Muslim ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to
educators and due process in the plunder case and should thus be
scientists) received on its behalf a donation in the released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million)
from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson HELD: NO.
through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte x On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
o He then turned over the said amount to the Sandiganbayan committed a
Foundations treasurer grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
who later deposited it in the excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
Foundations account with the deferred the hearing of his petition for bail
Equitable PCI Bank to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date
x Gov. Singson then publicly accused then President Joseph and entered a plea of not guilty for him
E. Estrada and his when he refused to be
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, arraigned. He insists that the Rules on
including its operation on the illegal numbers Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not
game known as jueteng require that he be arraigned first prior to the
o Several criminal complaints were then filed conduct of bail hearings since the
against several persons latter can stand alone and must, of necessity,
including Serapio be heard immediately.55 Petitioner
x Ombudsman issued a joint resolution recommending, inter maintains that his arraignment before the bail
alia, that Joseph hearings are set is not necessary
Estrada, petitioner and several others be charged since he would not plead guilty to the offense
with the criminal offense of charged, as is evident in his earlier
plunder statements insisting on his innocence during
o Serapio received a copy of the resolution on April the Senate investigation of the
5, 2001 jueteng scandal and the preliminary
x Serapio (the ff day) filed an MR before the Office of the investigation before the Ombudsman.56
Ombudsman (OO) Neither would the prosecution be
o likewise filed on said date, this time with the prejudiced even if it would present all its
Sandiganbayan, an evidence before his arraignment because,
Urgent Omnibus Motion: under the Revised Penal Code, a
(a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating
of Warrant of only if made prior to the presentation of
Arrest and Further Proceedings; evidence for the prosecution,57 and
(b) To Conduct a Determination of petitioner admitted that he cannot
Probable Cause;
repudiate the evidence or proceedings
(c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion
taken during the bail hearings because
for
Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Reconsideration and/or
Court expressly provides that
Reinvestigation; and
evidence present during bail hearings are
(d) To Direct the Ombudsman to
automatically reproduced during the
Conduct a
trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures the
Reinvestigation of the
prosecution that he is willing to be
Charges against
arraigned prior to the posting of a bail bond should he
accused Edward Serapio
be granted bail.59
x OO denied the MR on the ground that the Information has
already been filed x The People insist that arraignment is necessary
before bail hearings may be
with the SB
commenced, because it is only upon
x SB issued warrants of arrest
arraignment that the issues are joined. The
x Serapio filed an application for bail
People stress that it is only when an accused
x BUT before the same could actually be heard, SB ordered the
pleads not guilty may he file a
arraignment of the
petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to
other accused
the charge, there would be no more
x Serapio (BEFORE SB could resolve the pending motions [for
the quashal of need for him to file said petition. Moreover,
information, for fixing of bail, for arraignment etc]) since it is during arraignment that
filed with the SC a Petition for Habeas Corpus and the accused is first informed of the precise
charge against him, he must be
Certiorari
arraigned prior to the bail hearings to
o praying that the Court declare void the
questioned orders, prevent him from later assailing the
validity of the bail hearings on the ground
resolutions and actions of the
Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was that he was not properly informed of
thereby effectively denied of his right to the charge against him, especially
due process. considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114
o Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a of
writ of 136
habeas corpus; that the People be
declared to have waived their right to
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not guilty had
been entered by
the Revised Rules of Court, evidence the
presented during such proceedings are Sandiganbayan
considered automatically reproduced at on his behalf,
the trial.60 Likewise, the arraignment of thereby
rendering the
accused prior to bail hearings issue as to
diminishes the possibility of an whether an
accused's flight arraignment is
from the jurisdiction of the necessary before
Sandiganbayan because trial in the
absentia may be had conduct of bail
only if an accused escapes after he has hearings in
been arraigned.61 The People also petitioner's case
contend that the conduct of bail moot, the Court
hearings prior to arraignment would takes this
extend to opportunity to discuss
an accused the undeserved privilege of the controlling
being appraised of the prosecution's precepts thereon
evidence before he pleads guilty for pursuant to its
purposes of penalty reduction.62 symbolic function of
x Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July educating the bench
10, 2001 and a plea of and bar.63
x The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The abuse of its discretion
arraignment of an accused is amounting to excess of
not a prerequisite to the conduct of jurisdiction in ordering
hearings on his petition for bail. A the arraignment of
person is allowed to petition for bail as petitioner before
soon as he is deprived of his proceeding with the
liberty by virtue of his arrest or hearing of his petition
voluntary surrender.64 An accused for bail.
need not wait for his arraignment x With respect to the second issue of
before filing a petition for bail. x In Lavides whether petitioner may file a motion to
vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on quash during the
the issue of whether an pendency of his
accused must first be arraigned before petition for bail,
he may be granted bail. Lavides petitioner maintains
involved that a
an accused charged with violation of motion to quash and
Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The a petition for bail are
not inconsistent, and
Special Protection of Children Against may proceed
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination independently of each
Act), an offense punishable by other. While he agrees
reclusion temporal in its medium with the prosecution
period to that a motion to quash
reclusion perpetua. The accused may in some instances
therein assailed, inter alia, the trial result in the
court's termination of the
imposition of the condition that he criminal
should first be arraigned before he is proceedings and in the
allowed to post bail. We held therein release of the accused
that "in cases where it is authorized, bail therein, thus rendering
should be granted before arraignment, the
otherwise the accused may be petition for bail moot
precluded from filing a motion to and academic, he
quash."66 opines that such is not
x However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be always the case;
taken to mean hence, an accused in
that the hearing on a petition for bail detention cannot be
should at all times precede forced to speculate on
arraignment, because the rule is that a the outcome of
person deprived of his liberty a motion to quash and
by virtue of his arrest or voluntary decide whether or not
surrender may apply for bail as soon to file a petition for bail
as he is deprived of his liberty, even or to
before a complaint or information withdraw one that has
is filed against him.67 The Court's been filed.69 He also
pronouncement in Lavides should be insists that the grant of
understood in light of the fact that the a motion to
accused in said case filed a petition for quash does not
bail as well as a motion to quash the automatically result in
informations filed against him. Hence, the discharge of an
we accused from
explained therein that to condition the detention nor render
grant of bail to an accused on his moot an application for
arraignment would be to place him in a bail under Rule 117,
position where he has to choose Section 5 of
between (1) filing a motion to quash and the Revised Rules of
thus delay his release on bail because Court.70
until his motion to quash can be x The Court finds that no such
resolved, his arraignment cannot be inconsistency exists between an application
held, and of an
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to accused for bail and
quash so that he can be arraigned at his filing of a motion
once and thereafter be released on bail. to quash. Bail is the
This would undermine his constitutional security given for the
right not to be put on trial except upon release of a person in
a valid complaint or Information the custody of the law,
sufficient to charge him with a crime furnished by him or a
and his right to bail.68 bondsman, to
x It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first guarantee his
arraigned before appearance before
the conduct of hearings on his any court as required
application for bail. For when bail is a under the conditions
matter of right, an accused may set forth under the
apply for and be granted bail even Rules of Court.71 Its
prior to arraignment. The ruling in purpose is to obtain
Lavides also implies that an the
application for bail in a case involving provisional liberty of a
an offense punishable by person charged with
reclusion perpetua to death may also an offense until his
be heard even before an accused conviction while at the
is arraigned. Further, if the court finds same time securing
in such case that the accused is his appearance at the
entitled to bail because the evidence trial.72 As stated
against him is not strong, he may earlier, a
be granted provisional liberty even prior person may apply for
to arraignment; for in such a bail from the moment
situation, bail would be "authorized" that he is deprived of
under the circumstances. In fine,
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
 his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender.73
x On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information
is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point
of law, or for defects which are apparent
in the face of the Information.74 An
accused may file a motion to quash the
Information, as a general rule, before arraignment.75
x These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each
other. Certainly, the right of an
accused right to seek provisional
liberty when
charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when charged with an
offense punishable by such penalties but
after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is
found not to be strong, does not
preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense. It
must be conceded, however, that if a motion to
quash a criminal
complaint or Information on the ground
that the same does not charge any
offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered
released, the petition for bail of an accused may
become moot and academic.
x We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is
mandatory that the hearings on
the petitions for bail of petitioner and accused
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal
Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case
as against former President Joseph
E. Estrada be heard jointly.
x Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings
would negate his right to
have his petition for bail resolved in a
summary proceeding since said hearings
might be converted into a full blown trial on
the merits by the prosecution.76
x For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings
will save the court from
having to hear the same witnesses and the
parties from presenting the same evidence
where it would allow separate bail hearings
for the accused who are charged as co-
conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
x In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused
in Criminal Case No. 26558
to participate in the bail hearings, the
Sandiganbayan explained that the directive
was made was in the interest of the speedy
disposition of the case. It stated:
o " x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the
accused other than the
accused Serapio were to be
excused from participating in
the
hearing on the motion for bail of
accused Serapio, under the
pretext that the same does not
concern them and that they will
participate in any hearing
where evidence is presented by
the
prosecution only if and when
they will already have filed their
petitions for bail, or should they
decide not to file any, that they
will participate only during the
trial proper itself, then everybody
will be faced with the daunting
prospects of having to go through
the process of introducing the same
witness and pieces of evidence two
times, three times or four times, as
many times as there are petitions
for bail filed. Obviously, such
procedure is not conducive to the
speedy termination of a case.
Neither can such procedure be
characterized as an orderly
proceeding."78
x There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the
hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed
by different accused or that a petition for bail
of an accused be
heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The
matter of whether or not to conduct a joint
hearing of two or more petitions for
bail filed by two different accused or to conduct
a hearing of said petition jointly
with the trial against another accused is
addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
x It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan
must take into account not only the convenience of the
State, including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The
Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the
cases and of the
factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other
accused. After all, if
this Court may echo the observation of the United States
Supreme Court, the
State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our
historic individual protections, including those surrounding
criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not
become careless or complacent when that fashion has become
rampant over the earth.79
x It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80 this Court held
that in a
petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a
summary hearing,
meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. The
court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the
weight that
ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor
will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
offered therein. It
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference
to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the
hearing.
x A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of
course
avoid duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and
the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused,
especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having
conspired in the commission of the same crime and the
prosecution adduces essentially the same evident against
them. However, in the
cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail
of petitioner with
the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada
is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former
president in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the
proceeding assumes a completely different
dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As
against former
President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown
trial which is
antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover, following
our ruling in Jose
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada
can only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged
in sub-paragraph
(a) of the amended Information since it is not clear from the
latter if the accused
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to
assist Joseph
Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can
only be charged
with having conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-
paragraph (a) by
"receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances, money x x x
from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal
gambling.81 Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the
prosecution needs to
adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the charge of
plunder is
strong are those related to the alleged receipt or collection of money
from illegal
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unduly delay the
determination of the
gambling as described in sub- issue
paragraph (a) of the amended of the right of
Information. With petitioner to obtain
the joinder of the hearing of provisional liberty and
petitioner's petition for bail and the seek relief from this
trial of the Court if his petition is
former President, the latter will have the denied by the
right to cross-examine intensively and respondent court. The
extensively the witnesses for the indispensability of the
prosecution in opposition to the petition speedy resolution of an
for bail application for bail was
of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce succinctly explained by
evidence in support of his petition after Cooley in his treatise
the Constitutional
prosecution shall have concluded its Limitations, thus:
evidence, the former President may o "For, if there were any
insist on mode short of confinement
cross-examining petitioner and his which would
witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of with
petitioner's bail petition with the trial reasonable
of former President Joseph E. Estrada certainty
will insure the
be prejudicial to petitioner as it will attendance
 of the accused to which provide:
answer the accusation, it o "Sec. 7 Capital offense or
would not be justifiable to an offense punishable by
inflict upon him reclusion
that indignity, when the perpetua
effect is to subject him in a or life
greater or imprisonm
lesser degree, to the ent, not
punishment of a guilty bailable.
person, while as yet it is not No
determined that he has not person
committed any crime."82 charged
x While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal with a
Case No. 26558, is capital
empowered "to proceed with the trial of offense, or
the case in the manner it determines an offense
best conducive to orderly proceedings punishabl
and speedy termination of the case,"83 e by
reclusion
the Court finds that it gravely abused perpetua
its discretion in ordering that the or life
petition imprison
for bail of petitioner and the trial of ment,
former President Joseph E. Estrada be shall be
held admitted
jointly. It bears stressing that the to bail
Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in when
its May evidence
4, 2001 Order the "pre-eminent of guilt is
position and superiority of the rights of strong,
[petitioner] to have the matter of his regardles
provisional liberty resolved . . . without s of the
unnecessary delay,"84 only to make a stage of
volte face and declare that after all the the
criminal
hearing of petition for bail of petitioner prosecuti
and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial on.
as against former President Joseph E. o Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of
Estrada should be held simultaneously. right, exception. All persons
In ordering that petitioner's petition for in custody
bail to be heard jointly with the trial of shall be
the case against his co-accused former admitted
President Joseph E. Estrada, the to bail as
Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further a matter
and unnecessary delay in the resolution of right,
thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In with
fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed sufficient
sureties,
a grave abuse of its discretion in or
ordering a simultaneous hearing of released
petitioner's on
petition for bail with the trial of the case recogniza
against former President Joseph E. nce as
Estrada on its merits. prescribed
x With respect to petitioner's allegations that the by law or
prosecution tried to delay the bail this
hearings by filing dilatory motions, the Rule x x x
People aver that it is petitioner and his (b) and
co-accused who caused the delay in the before
trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their conviction
filing of numerous manifestations and by the
pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.85 Regional
They assert that they filed the motion for Trial Court
joint bail hearing and motion for earlier of
arraignment around the original an offense
schedule for the bail hearings which was not
on May 21-25, 2001.86 punishabl
x They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in e by
capital offenses.87 In death,
support thereof, they cite Article III, Sec reclusion
13 of the Constitution, which states that perpetua
or life
o "All persons, except those charged with imprisonm
offenses punishable by ent."89
reclusion perpetua when x Irrefragably, a person charged with a
evidence of guilt is capital offense is not absolutely denied the
strong, shall before opportunity to
conviction be bailable by obtain provisional
sufficient sureties, or be liberty on bail
released on pending the
recognizance as may be judgment of his
provided by law. The right to case. However, as
bail shall not be impaired to such person,
even when the privilege of bail is not a matter
the writ of habeas corpus is of right but is
suspended. Excessive bail discretionary upon
shall not be required."88 the court.90 Had the
x The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the rule been otherwise,
Revised Rules of Court the Rules would not
 have provided for an application for
bail by a person charged with a capital is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the
offense under Rule 114, Section 8 application for bail. However, when the
which states: evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes
o "Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. a matter of right.94
At the hearing of an x In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a
application for bail filed by a matter of right at this
person who is in custody for stage of the proceedings. Petitioner's claim that
the the prosecution had refused
commission of an offense to present evidence to prove his guilt for
punishable by death, purposes of his bail application and that
reclusion perpetua, or life the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a
imprisonment, the hearing thereon is not borne by the
prosecution has the burden records. The prosecution did not waive,
of showing that the evidence expressly or even impliedly, its right to
of guilt is strong. The adduce evidence in opposition to the petition
evidence presented during for bail of petitioner. It must be
the bail hearing shall be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already
considered automatically scheduled the hearing dates for petitioner's
reproduced at the trial but, application for bail but the same were reset
upon motion of either party, due to pending incidents raised in several
the court may recall any motions filed by the parties, which incidents
witness for additional had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail
examination unless the latter hearings. The bail hearing was eventually
is dead, outside the scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10,
Philippines, or otherwise 2001 but the hearing did not push through due
unable to testify."91 to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
x Under the foregoing provision, there must be a x The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's
showing that the evidence of application for bail is
guilt against a person charged with a therefore not imputable solely to the
capital offense is not strong for the court Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution.
to Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is
grant him bail. Thus, upon an application evident from the following list of motions filed
for bail by the person charged with a by him and by the prosecution:
capital offense, a hearing thereon must x Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even
be conducted, where the prosecution in cases where the
must be accorded an opportunity to prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
discharge its burden of proving that opposition to an application for bail by
the an accused charged with a capital offense, the
evidence of guilt against an accused trial court is still under duty to
is strong.92 The prosecution shall be conduct a hearing on said application.101
accorded the opportunity to present all The rationale for such requirement was
the evidence it may deem necessary explained in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz
for (supra), citing Basco vs.
this purpose.93 When it is satisfactorily Rapatalo:102
demonstrated that the evidence of o "When the grant of bail is discretionary,
guilt the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the
accused is
strong. However, the determination
of whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with
the judge. This discretion by the
very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court
at
the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not
duly
exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt
be
submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-
examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal."103
x Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from
detention until the
Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his
application for bail and
resolve the same in his favor. Even then,
there must first be a finding
that the evidence against petitioner is not
strong before he may be
granted bail.
x Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus for
petitioner, he contends that he is entitled to
the issuance of said writ because
the State, through the prosecution's refusal
to present evidence and by the
 Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to
discharge its
burden of proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the
capital offense of
plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution
launched "a seemingly
endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent
the conduct of bail
hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner's
arraignment before
the commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail
hearings for
petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact
that it was only
petitioner who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it
would present its
evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief,
meaning that the
bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution
presented its entire
case upon the accused; and argued that petitioner's motion to
quash and his
petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner
should choose to
pursue only one of these two remedies.104 He further claims
that the
Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and
resolutions postponing the
bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to
due process of
law.105
x Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of
new orders
canceling the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not
render moot and
academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
since said orders
have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioner's right
to bail.106 He
argues further that the fact that he was arrested and is
detained pursuant to
valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the
remedy of habeas
corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa
vs. Enrile,107
where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances
where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.108
x However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because
petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended information
which
was earlier filed in court,109 the warrant of arrest issuant
pursuant
thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to
the
authorities.110
x As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an
officer
under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do
so.111 In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by
the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to
a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized
as "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to
cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes."112 Thus, in
previous
cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while
initially
valid under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even
though the
persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of
their
liberty.114
x The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in
favor of
petitioner. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie
where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
issued by a court which had jurisdiction
to issue the same115 applies, because
petitioner is under detention pursuant
to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001
after the filing by the Ombudsman of
the
amended information for plunder
against petitioner and his co-
accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities
on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued.
x The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas
corpus will lie where the
deprivation of liberty which was initially
valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no
application in the present case because
the hearing on petitioner's application for
bail has yet to commence. As
stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail
cannot be pinned solely on the
Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution
for that matter. Petitioner himself
is partly to be blamed. Moreover,
a petition
for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting
one's
right to bail.117 It cannot be
availed of where accused is
entitled to bail
not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the
latter
has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail,118 or has
not
even exercised said discretion.
The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court
where the criminal case is
 pending an
and to allow hearings thereon to proceed. "angry
x The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not and
only be unjustified violent
but would also preempt the mob
Sandiganbayan's resolution of the armed
pending application for bail of petitioner. with
The recourse of petitioner is to explosiv
forthwith proceed with the hearing on his es,
application for bail. firearms,
bladed
weapons
, clubs,
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and stones
CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY and
HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO other
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, deadly
respondents. weapons
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 "
assaultin
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. ANGELO g and
REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., attempti
respondents. ng to
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001 break
into
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY Malaca
HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO ang
VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and x This case is a consolidation of 4 petitions,
P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, viz:
respondents. o (1) G. R. No. 147780 for
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001 prohibition, injunction, mandamus,
and
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, habeas corpus (with
petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, an urgent
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES application for the
OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL issuance of
DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE temporary
NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL restraining order
LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents. and/or writ of
G preliminary
. injunction)
R filed by Panfilio M.
. Lacson, Michael Ray
N B. Aquino, and
o Cezar O.
. Mancao;
1 o (2) G. R. No. 147781 for
4 mandamus and/or review of the
7 factual basis for the
8 suspension of the
1 privilege of the writ
0 of habeas corpus,
with prayer for the
suspension of the
M privilege of the
a writ of habeas
y corpus, with
1 prayer for a
0 temporary
, restraining order
2 filed by Miriam
0 Defensor-
0 Santiago;
1 o (3) G. R. No. 147799 for
prohibition and injunction with
E prayer for
N a writ of
B preliminary
A injunction and/or
N restraining order
C filed by Ronaldo A.
Lumbao; and
FACTS: o (4) G. R. No. 147810 for
x President GMA issued Proclamation No. 38 certiorari and prohibition filed by
declaring that there was a state of the
rebellion in the National Capital Region political party Laban ng
o Likewise issued General Order No. 1 Demokratikong Pilipino.
directing the Armed Forces of x President GMA then ordered the lifting
the Philippines and the of the declaration of a "state of
Philippine National Police to rebellion" in Metro Manila.
suppress the o Accordingly, the instant
rebellion in the National petitions have been rendered moot
Capital Region. Warrantless and
arrests of academic
several alleged leaders and x DOJ Sec claimed that the warrantless
promoters of the "rebellion" arrests were grounded on general
were instructions to law
thereafter effected enforcement officers and
This AROSE from an
incident when she was faced by
military agencies to implement
Proclamation No. 38
o [I]t is already the declared intention of
the Justice Department and
police authorities to obtain
regular warrants of arrests
from the
courts for all acts committed
prior to and until May 1,
2001 which
means that preliminary investigations
will henceforth be conducted.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the application for the issuance of writ of HC
is proper.
HELD # 1: NO.
x In connection with their alleged impending
warrantless arrest, petitioners
Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the
"appropriate court before whom the
informations against petitioners are filed be
directed to desist from arraigning
and proceeding with the trial of the case,
until the instant petition is finally
resolved." This relief is clearly premature
considering that as of this date, no
complaints or charges have been filed
against any of the petitioners for any
crime. And in the event that the same are
later filed, this Court cannot enjoin
criminal prosecution conducted in accordance
with the Rules of Court, for by that time any
arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly
issued warrant.
x As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure
orders issued against them
be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be
noted that petitioners are not
directly assailing the validity of the subject
hold departure orders in their petition.
They are not even expressing intention to
leave the country in the near future.
The prayer to set aside the same must be
made in proper proceedings initiated
for that purpose.
x Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad
cautelam in support of
their application for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, it is
manifest that the writ is not called for
since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint
(Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149
[1991]), a matter which remains
speculative up to this very day.
ISSUE # 2: Whether mandamus is a proper remedy.
HELD # 2: NO.
x The petition herein is denominated by petitioner
Defensor-Santiago as one for
mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to
petitions for mandamus that the legal right of
the petitioner to the performance of a
particular act which is sought to be compelled
must be clear and complete. Mandamus will
not issue unless the right to relief is clear at
the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro,
85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time,
petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown
that she is in imminent danger of being
arrested without a
warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have
categorically stated that petitioner will not be
arrested without a warrant.
DISCOURSE ON HABEAS CORPUS AND
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS (Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Kapunan in Lacson vs. Perez)
x Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, the power to call out
the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless
violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion.9
In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or
invasion, the President may, when public
safety requires, also (a) suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, or
(b) place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. However, in the
exercise of this calling out power as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
the Constitution does not require the
President to make a declaration of a "state
of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless
violence or invasion). The term "state
of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is
vague and amorphous and does not
 give the President more power than what the
Constitution says, i. e, whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice
Mendoza observed during the
hearing of this case, such a declaration is "legal
surplusage." But whatever the
term means, it cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally-protected rights, such
as the right to due process,10 the rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances,11
and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures,12 among others.
x In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13 the
Court held that:
o x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out
power, on
one hand, and the power to suspend
the privilege of the
write of habeas corpus and to declare
martial law, on the
other hand) places the calling out
power in a different
category from the power to declare
martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped
together the three powers and
provided for their revocation and
review without any
qualification. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
o The reason for the difference in the treatment of
the
aforementioned powers highlights the
intent to grant the President
the widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the "calling out"
power because it is considered as the
lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the power to
impose martial law, both of
which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights
and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating affirmation by Congress
and, in appropriate cases, review by this
Court.
x On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a
"state of rebellion"
is to arrest persons without warrant and detain them
without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional
safeguards for the citizens' civil liberties, the so-called
"state of rebellion" partakes the nature of martial law
without declaring on its face, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye so as
to
practically make it unjust and oppressive, it is within
the prohibition of the
Constitution.14 In an ironic sense, a "state of
rebellion" declared as a subterfuge
to effect warrantless arrest and detention for an
unbailable offense places a
heavier burden on the people's civil liberties than the
suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus the declaration of martial
law because in the latter
case, built-in safeguards are automatically set on
motion: (1) The period for
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
o SECTION 1. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty,
martial law or suspension is limited to a or property
period not exceeding sixty day; (2) The without
President is mandated to submit a due
report to Congress within forty-eight process
hours of law,
from the proclamation or suspension; nor
(3) The proclamation or suspension is shall
subject to review by Congress, which any
may revoke such proclamation or person
suspension. If Congress is not in be
session, it shall convene in 24 hours denied
without the
need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of equal
the factual basis thereof or its extension protecti
on of
is subject to review by the Supreme the
Court in an appropriate proceeding.15 laws.
x No right is more fundamental than the right to life and x And to assure the fullest protection of
liberty. Without these the right, more especially against
rights, all other individual rights may government impairment, Section 2
thereof provides:
not exist. Thus, the very first section in
our Constitution's Bill of Rights, Article
III, reads:
 o SEC. 2. The right of the people to be t
secure in their persons, i
houses, papers, and effects n
against unreasonable g
searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any t
purpose shall be inviolable, o
and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue c
except upon probable cause o
to be determined personally m
by the judge after m
examination under oath or i
affirmation of the t
complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, a
and particularly describing n
the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be o
seized. f
x Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes f
the President e
or any person acting under her direction n
to make unwarranted arrests. The s
existence of "lawless violence, invasion e
or rebellion" only ;
authorizes the President to call out (b) When an
the "armed forces to prevent or offense has just
suppress lawless violence, invasion been committed
or rebellion." and he
x Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of h
habeas corpus or the a
declaration of martial law authorizes the s
President to order the arrest of any
person. The only significant p
consequence of the suspension of the r
writ of habeas corpus is to divest the o
courts of the power to issue the writ b
whereby the detention of the person is a
put in issue. It does not by itself b
authorize the President to order the l
arrest of a person. And even then, the e
Constitution in Section 18, Article VII
makes the following qualifications: c
o The suspension of the privilege of the writ a
shall apply only u
to persons judicially s
charged for rebellion e
or offenses inherent in
or directly connected t
with invasion. o
o During the suspension of the privilege of
the writ, any person thus b
arrested or detained shall e
be judicially charged l
within three days, i
otherwise he shall be e
released. v
x In the instant case, the President did not suspend the e
writ of habeas
corpus. Nor did she declare martial b
law. A declaration of a "state of a
rebellion," at most, only gives notice s
to the nation that it exists, and e
that the armed forces may be called to d
prevent or suppress it, as in fact she did.
Such declaration does not justify any o
deviation from the Constitutional n
proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. p
x As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a e
warrant issued by a court. r
In very circumscribed instances, s
however, the Rules of Court allow o
warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule n
113 provides: a
o SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when l
lawful. - A police officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, k
arrest a person: n
(a) When, in his presence, the o
person to be arrested w
has l
commit e
ted, is d
actually g
commit e
ting, or
is o
attemp
 f facts or
circumstances x Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested
that the person without warrant for acts of
to be arrested rebellion ostensibly under Section 5 of Rule
has committed 113. Respondents' theory is based on Umil vs.
it; and Ramos,17 where this Court held:
o In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and o The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
(b) above, the person conspiracy or proposal to
arrested without a commit such crimes, and
warrant shall be crimes or offenses committed
forthwith delivered to in
the nearest police furtherance thereof or in
station or jail and shall connection therewith constitute
be proceeded against in direct
accordance with assault against the State and
section 7 of Rule 112. are in the nature of continuing
x It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the crimes.18
constitutional norm x Following this theory, it is argued that under Section
enshrined in the Bill of Rights that a 5(a), a person who "has
person may only be arrested on the committed, is actually committing, or is
strength of a warrant of arrest issued by attempting to commit" rebellion and may be
a "judge" after determining "personally" arrested without a warrant at any time so long
the as the rebellion persists.
existence of "probable cause" after x Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests
examination under oath or affirmation therein, although effected
of the complainant and the witnesses a day or days after the commission of the
he may produce. Its requirements violent acts of petitioners therein,
should, were upheld by the Court because at the
therefore, be scrupulously met: time of their respective arrests, they
o The right of a person to be secure against were members of organizations such as the
any unreasonable Communist Party of the Philippines,
seizure of his body and any the New Peoples Army and the National United
deprivation of his liberty is a Front Commission, then outlawed
most basic groups under the Anti-Subversion Act. Their
and fundamental one. The mere membership in said illegal
statute or rule which allows organizations amounted to committing
exceptions the offense of subversion19 which
to the requirement of justified their arrests without warrants.
warrants of arrests is strictly x In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to
construed. Any be arrested for their
exception must clearly fall alleged participation in the "rebellion" on May
within the situations when 1, 2001 are members of an
securing a outlawed organization intending to overthrow
warrant would be absurd or the government. Therefore, to
is manifestly unnecessary justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
as provided by the Rule. We there must be a showing that the
cannot liberally construe persons arrested or to be arrested has
the rule on arrests committed, is actually committing or is
without warrant or extend its attempting to commit the offense of
application beyond the rebellion.20 In other words, there must be
cases an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking
specifically provided by law. place in the presence of the arresting
To do so would infringe upon officer. In United States vs. Samonte,21 the
personal liberty and set back term" in his [the arresting officer's]
a basic right so often presence" was defined thus:
violated and so deserving of o An offense is said to be committed in the
full protection.16 presence or within the
x A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police view of an arresting officer or
officer had facts and private citizen when such officer
circumstances before him which, had or person sees the offense, even
they been before a judge, would though at a distance, or hears
constitute the disturbance created thereby
adequate basis for a finding of probable and proceeds at once to the
cause of the commission of an offense scene thereof; or the offense is
and that the person arrested is probably continuing, or has not been
guilty of committing the offense. That is consummated, at the time the arrest is
why the Rules of Criminal Procedure made.2
require that when arrested, the person x This requirement was not complied with particularly in
"arrested has committed, is actually the arrest of Senator
committing, or is attempting to commit Enrile. In the Court's Resolution of May 5, 2001
an in the petition for habeas corpus filed by
offense" in the presence of the arresting Senator Enrile, the Court noted that the sworn
officer. Or if it be a case of an offense statements of the
which had "just been committed," that policemen who purportedly arrested him
the police officer making the arrest "has were hearsay.23 Senator Enrile was
arrested two (2) days after he delivered
personal knowledge of facts or allegedly seditious speeches.
circumstances that the person to be Consequently, his arrest without warrant
arrested has cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which
committed it." states that an arrest without a warrant is
lawful when made after an
offense has just been committed and the
arresting officer or private person has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person arrested has committed
the offense.
x At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being
inapplicable to the cases
at bar, Umil is not without any strong dissents. It merely re-
affirmed Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile,24 a case decided during the Marcos martial
law regime.25 It
cannot apply when the country is supposed to be under the
regime of freedom
and democracy. The separate opinions of the following Justices
in the motion for reconsideration of said case26 are apropos:
o FERNAN C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be
allowed if
the arresting officers are not sure
what particular
provision of law had been violated
by the person
arrested. True it is that law
enforcement agents and even
prosecutors are not all adept at the
law.
However, erroneous perception, not
to mention
ineptitude among their ranks,
especially if it would
result in the violation of any right of a
person, may
not be tolerated. That the arrested
person has the
"right to insist during the pre-trial or
trial on the
merits" (Resolution, p. 18) that he was
exercising a right which the arresting
officer considered as
contrary to law, is beside the point. No
person should be subjected to the
ordeal of a trial just because the law
enforcers wrongly perceived his
action.27
(Underscoring supplied)
o GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion
Insofar as G.R. NO. 81567 is concerned, I joint
the
other dissenting Justices in their
observations
regarding "continuing offenses." To base
warrantless
arrests on the doctrine of continuing
offense is to give
a license for the illegal detention of
persons on pure
suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or
sedition are
political offenses where the line between
overt acts
and simple advocacy or adherence to a
belief is
extremely thin. If a court has convicted
an accused of
rebellion and he is found roaming
around, he may be
arrested. But until a person is proved
guilty, I fail to
see how anybody can jump to a personal
conclusion
that the suspect is indeed a rebel and
must be picked
up on sight whenever seen. The grant of
authority in
the majority opinion is too broad. If
warrantless
searches are to be validated, it should
be Congress
and not this Court which should draw
strict and
narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-
rebels who are
critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be
indiscriminately
lumped up with those actually taking up
arms against
the Government.

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
instead of
securing
The belief of law warrants
enforcement authorities, no of arrest
matter for his
how well- apprehens
grounded on past ion.28
events, that the (Undersco
petitioner would ring
probably shoot supplied)
other policemen o CRUZ, J., concurring and
whom he may dissenting:
meet does not I submit that the
validate affirmation by this Court
warrantless of the
arrests. I cannot Garcia-
understand why Padilla
the authorities decision
preferred to bide to justify
their time, await the
the petitioner's illegal
surfacing from arrests
underground, and made in
ounce on him with the
no legal authority cases
 before us is a a crime,
step back to that begun or
shameful past committe
when individual d
rights were elsewher
wantonly and e,
systematically continued
violated by the to be
Marcos committe
dictatorship. It d by the
seem some of us person
have short arrested
memories of that in the
repressive regime, presence
but I for one am of the
not one to forget arrestin
so soon. As the g officer.
ultimate defender The
of the capacity
Constitution, for
this Court mischief
should not of such
gloss over the a
abuses of utilizatio
those who, out n of the
of mistaken "continu
zeal, would ing
violate crimes"
individual doctrine
liberty in the , is
dubious name infinitely
of increased
national security. where the
Whatever their crime
ideology and even charged
if does not
it be hostile to consist of
ours, the unambigu
petitioners are ous
entitled to the criminal
protection of the acts with
Bill of Rights, no a definite
more and no less beginning
than any other and end
person in this in time
country. That is and
what space
democracy is all (such as
about.29 the
(Underscoring killing
supplied) or
o FELICIANO, J., concurring and wound
dissenting: ing of
12. My final submission, is a
that, the doctrine of perso
"continuing n or
crimes," which kidnap
has its own ping
legitimate and
function to serve illegal
in our criminal detent
law ion or
jurisprudence, arson)
cannot be but
invoked for rather
weakening and or
dissolving the such
constitutional problem
guarantee atic
against offenses
warrantless as
arrest. member
Where no overt ship in
acts comprising or
all or some of affiliatio
the n with
elements of the or
offense charged becomi
are shown to ng a
have member
been committed of, a
by the person subversi
arrested without ve
warrant, the associ
"continuing ation
crime" doctrine or
should not be organi
used to dress up zation.
the pretense that For in
such cases, e
the s
overt ,
constitutive
acts may be
morally neutral a
in s
themselves, s
and the e
unlawfulness s
of the acts a s
function of the m
aims or e
objectives of the n
organization t
involved. Note, s
for instance, the ,
following acts
which constitute l
prima facie o
evidence of a
"membership in n
any subversive s
association:"
x a) Allowing o
himself to be listed r
as a
mem i
ber in n
any
book a
or n
any y
of the
lists, o
recor t
ds, h
corre e
spond r
ence,
or
any f
other o
docu r
ment m
of the s
organ ;
izatio x f)
n; Conferring
x b) Subjecting with officers
himself to the or other
discipline of m
suc e
h or m
ass b
oci e
atio r
n or s
org
aniz o
atio f
n in
any s
for u
m c
wh h
ats
oev a
er; s
x c) Giving s
financial o
contribution to such c
as i
so a
ci t
at i
io o
n n
or
or o
g r
a
ni
za o
ti r
o g
n a
in n
d i
u z
 ation very freedoms which make our
in policy worth protecting and
furth saving.30
eran (Underscoring supplied)
ce of
any
plan
or
enter
prise
there
of;
x g) Preparing
documents,
pamphlets,
lea
flet
s,
boo
ks,
or
any
oth
er
typ
e of

pub
lica
tion
to
pro
mot
e
the
obj
ecti
ves
and
pur
pos
es
of
suc
h
ass
ocia
tion
or
org
aniz
atio
n;
x k)
Participating in any
way in the
activit
ies,
planni
ng
action
,
object
ives,
or
purpo
ses of
such
associ
ation
or
organization.
x It may well be, as the majority implies, that the
constitutional rule against
warrantless arrests and seizures makes
the law enforcement work of police
agencies more difficult to carry out. It is
not our Court's function, however, and
the Bill of Rights was not designed, to
make life easy for police forces but rather
to protect the liberties of private
individuals. Our police forces must simply
learn
to live with the requirements of the Bill of
Rights, to enforce the law by
modalities which themselves comply with
the fundamental law. Otherwise they
are very likely to destroy, whether
through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal,
the
 on the extent of protection
x It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the given by constitutional
fateful day of May guarantees.
1, 2001 up to the present. If respondents have x Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the
ample evidence against Court, considered the last
petitioners, then they should forthwith file the bulwark of democracy, for relief. If we do not
necessary criminal complaints in act promptly, justly and fearlessly, to whom
order that the regular procedure can be followed will they turn to?
and the warrants of arrest
issued by the courts in the normal course. When
practicable, resort to the ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA, petitioner, vs. THE CITY
warrant process is always to be preferred because PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY and THE PRESIDING
"it interposes an orderly JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu City,
procedure involving 'judicial impartiality' whereby a respondents.
neutral and detached G.R. No. 175864 June 8, 2007
magistrate can make informed and deliberate THIRD DIVISION
determinations on the issue of
probable cause."31 FACTS:
x The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges x PDEA Regional Office VII received information that
are supposed to Lovely Impal Adam was
possess is precisely the reason the framers of the engaged in illegal drug trafficking activities
1987 Constitution have in Cebu City and neighboring cities and
reposed upon them alone the power to issue municipalities
warrants of arrest. To vest the x PDEA conducted an entrapment operation
same to a branch of government, which is also x Adam was then detained in the Cebu City Jail for
charged with prosecutorial alleged violation of Section 5,
powers, would make such branch the accused's Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
adversary and accuser, his judge and jury.32 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
x A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State Act of 2002
of its burden of x Inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
proving probable cause. The declaration does not the case
constitute a substitute for x City Prosecutor disapproved
proof. It does not in any way bind the courts, which x DOJ Sec found no probable cause to hold Adam
must still judge for itself the liable for the offense charged
existence of probable cause. Under Section 18, Article o directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
VII, the determination of to withdraw the
the existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of information
proclaiming martial law or A very thorough and careful
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas scrutiny of the records,
corpus rests for which the particularly the
President is granted ample, though not absolute, affidavit of arrest,
discretion. Under Section 2, reveals that no
Article III, the determination of probable cause is a payment was ever
purely legal question of made by the police
which courts are the final arbiters. officers for the
x Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have supposed object of
announced that the lifting the buy-bust
of the "state of rebellion" on May 7, 2001 does not operations. The
stop the police from making police officers have
warrantless arrests.33 If this is so, the pernicious not even alleged in
effects of the declaration on their affidavits
the people's civil liberties have not abated despite that payment was
the lifting thereof. No one made to respondent
exactly knows who are in the list or who prepared the in exchange
list of those to be arrested for the shabu. No
for alleged complicity in the "continuing" crime of buy-bust money was
"rebellion" defined as such by ever
executive fiat. The list of the perceived leaders, presented. The
financiers and supporters of the certificate of
"rebellion" to be arrested and incarcerated could inventory does not
expand depending on the show
appreciation of the police. The coverage and duration any buy-bust money.
of effectivity of the orders of arrest are thus so open- These stick out like a
ended and limitless as to place in constant and sore
continuing peril the people's Bill of Rights. It is of no thumb in the case at
small significance that four of he petitioners are bar.
opposition candidates for the Senate. Their Suffice it to say that one of
campaign the essential elements to
activities have been to a large extent immobilized. be established in
If the arrests and orders of the prosecution of
arrest against them are illegal, then their the drug "buy-
Constitutional right to seek public bust" cases, that is,
"the delivery of the
office, as well as the right of he people to choose
thing sold
their officials, is violated.
and the payment
x In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the
issues raised in therefore" is
these cases affecting as they do the basic liberties wanting. It was
aptly
of the citizens enshrined in our Constitution, it
said in the case of
behooves us to rule thereon now, instead of
People v. Alilin, 206
relegating the cases to trial courts which
SCRA 773,
unavoidably may come up with conflicting
that: "To sustain a
dispositions, the same to reach this Court inevitably
conviction for
for final ruling. As we aptly pronounced in Salonga
selling prohibited
vs. Cruz Pao:34
drugs, the same
o The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding
and controlling must be clearly and
unmistakably
constitutional principles, precepts,
established."
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar 141
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)

criminal
prosecution
and secure
freedom.
When a
prisoner
petitions
x PDEA filed an MR x A writ of habeas corpus extends to all
o DOJ Sec denied cases of illegal confinement or detention in
x Judge Ingles (PJ of RTC Cebu Br 58) GRANTED the which any person is
Motion to Withdraw deprived of his
Information and ordered the RELEASE of the accused liberty, or in which
x Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition the rightful custody of
before the SC praying for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of any person is
Adam withheld from the
person entitled to it.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of HC should still be Its essential object
issued considering that RTC Cebu has already and
ordered Amads release. purpose is to inquire
into all manner of
HELD: NO. involuntary restraint
and to relieve a
 person from it if such restraint is allegedly
illegal. The singular function of a invalid,
petition the
for habeas corpus is to protect and remedy
secure the basic freedom of available
physical liberty.7 to her is
x In the instant case, records show that Adam has been not a
released upon petition
order of the trial judge on January 26, for
2007. Therefore, the petition has habeas
become moot corpus
but a
petition
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE to quash
HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY the
PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and warrant
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION of arrest
(DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents. or a
G.R. petition for
No. a
1607 reinvestiga
39 tion of the
case by
the
July Municipal
17, Judge or
2013 by the
FIRS Provincial
T Fiscal.
DIVIS o Section 5, Rule 112 of the
ION Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure
FACTS: provides
x Mangila (and 7 others) were charged with that the
syndicated estafa in violation of Municipal
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code Judge who
AND with violations of Section 7(b) of conducted
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers the
and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) filed preliminar
before MTCC Puerto Princesa y
o The complaints arose from the recruiting investigati
and promising of on shall
employment by Mangila and transmit
the others to the private his
complainants resolution,
as overseas contract together
workers in Toronto, Canada, with the
and from the record of
collection of visa the case,
processing fees, including
membership fees and on- the
line application the private warrant of
complainants without arrest, to
lawful authority from the the
Philippine Overseas Provincial
Employment Prosecutor,
Administration (POEA) who shall
x Judge P conducted PI on June 17, 2003 review the
o Found probable cause same and
o Issued warrants of arrest against Mangila order the
et al without bail release of
x Mangila arrested and detained in NBI on June 18, an
2003 accused
x Mangila then filed a petition for HC before the SC who is
o Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not detained if
have the authority to no
conduct the preliminary probable
investigation; that the cause is
preliminary found
investigation he conducted against
was not yet completed when him.
he issued Thus, the
the warrant of arrest; and proper
that the issuance of the remedy
warrant of arrest available to
was without sufficient petitioner
justification or without a is for her to
prior finding of file
probable cause with
x CA denied petition the
o As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus Provi
will not be granted ncial
where relief may be had or Pros
could have been procured ecut
by resort to another or a
general remedy. As pointed moti
out in Luna vs. Plaza, if on
petitioner is detained by to
virtue of a warrant of be
arrest, which is
 released from
detention on the
grounds alleged in
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for HC is the proper
remedy in the present case considering that
Mangila was detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest issued by MTCC Puerto Princesa
HELD: NO.
x Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process
cannot be inquired into
through habeas corpus.
x The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been
devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. In
Caballes v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court
discoursed on the nature of the
special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following
manner:
o A petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed
by Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, as
amended. In Ex Parte
Billings, it was held
that habeas
corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It
seeks the enforcement of
civil rights. Resorting to the
writ is not to
inquire into the criminal act
of which the complaint is
made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the
act
and the immediate purpose
to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The rule
applies even when instituted
to arrest a
for a writ of habeas corpus, he
thereby commences a suit and
prosecutes a case in that
court.
x Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error;
nor intended as
substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot
take the place of
appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ
cannot be used to investigate and
consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus
proceeding is addressed to the question
of whether the proceedings and the assailed
order are, for any reason, null and
void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where
the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted
in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before
resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another
case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be
issued as a writ of error or as a
means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of
jurisdiction occurring during the course of the
trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and
liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where
restraint is under legal process,
mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in
such cases, the restraint is not
illegal.
x Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to
a proceeding in
rem when instituted for the sole purpose
of having the person of restraint
presented before the judge in order that
the cause of his detention may be
inquired into and his statements final. The writ
of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon
the person who holds him
in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority.
Hence, the only parties
before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the
petitioner in custody, and the only
question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the
petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be
denied if the petitioner fails to show facts
that he is entitled thereto ex merito
justicias.
x A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a
"palladium of liberty," is a
prerogative writ which does not issue as a
matter of right but in the
sound discretion of the court or judge. It is,
however, a writ of right on
proper formalities being made by proof. Resort
to the writ is not to inquire
into the criminal act of which a complaint is
made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate
purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only
object of the writ of habeas corpus
ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality
of the restraint under which a
person is held.11 (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
x The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of
the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is
that the writ will not issue
where the person in whose behalf the writ is
sought is out on bail, or is
 in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge
with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record.12
x There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged
against
Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan,
as the Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations
involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly
provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
o Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations.
- The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their
assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
o Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall
include
all crimes cognizable by the proper court in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
x Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of
arrest during the preliminary investigation even without
awaiting its
conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and
under
oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of
searching
questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and
that there
was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1wphi1 In the context
of this
rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against
Mangila and
her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangilas
petition for habeas
corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of
the warrant
issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
x It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC
and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was
removed
only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-
SC.
x With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of
the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not
an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on
her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and
pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into
through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by
Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13
o The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to
have
the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of
justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under
lawful authority.
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and that
the court or judge
The function of habeas corpus, had jurisdiction to
where the party who has issue the process,
appealed to its aid is in render the
custody under process, does judgment, or make
not extend beyond an inquiry the order, the writ
into the jurisdiction of the shall not be allowed;
court by which it was issued or if
and the validity of the process the jurisdiction
upon its face. It is not a writ of appears after the
error. xxx (Bold underscoring writ is allowed, the
supplied for emphasis) person shall
x Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of not be discharged by
Court explicitly states: reason of any
o Section 4.When writ not allowed or informality or defect
discharge authorized. If it in the
appears that the person process, judgment, or
alleged to be restrained of order. Nor shall
his liberty is in anything in this rule
the custody of an officer be held
under process issued by a to authorize the
court or judge discharge of a person
or by virtue of a judgment or charged with or
order of a court of record, convicted of
 an offense in the Philippines, 3. Hearing
or of a person suffering 4. Judgment
imprisonment
5. R.A. 9048 (as amended by R.A. 10172) and
under lawful judgment. (Bold
underscoring supplied for
IRRs
emphasis)
x Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws RULE 103
supposedly committed by Judge Change of Name
Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the
Court on her entitlement to the issuance Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to
of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists change his name shall present the petition to
that the illegality and invalidity of the the Court of First Instance of the province in
warrant of arrest because of its having which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to
been issued without an exhaustive the
examination of the complainants and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
witnesses in writing and under oath;
without a prior finding of probable cause; Section 2. Contents of petition. A
and without consideration of the petition for change of name shall be
necessity for its issuance in order not to signed and verified by the person desiring
frustrate the ends of justice were enough his name changed, or some other person
reasons for granting the writ of habeas on his behalf, and shall set forth:
corpus.14
o Mangila fails to persuade. (a) That the petitioner has been
x To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of a bona fide resident of the province
arrest after examining where the petition is filed for at least
Palayon, one of the complainants against three (3) years prior to the date of such
Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the filing;
investigating judge, considered Palayons
evidence sufficient for finding probable (b) The cause for which the change of the
cause against her and her cohorts, which petitioner's name is sought;
finding the Court justifiably presumes
from his act of referring the case and its (c) The name asked for.
records to the Office of the City
Prosecutor on the day immediately Section 3. Order for hearing. If the
following the preliminary investigation petition filed is sufficient in form and
he conducted, her petition for habeas substance,
corpus could not be the proper remedy the court, by an order reciting the purpose
by which she could assail the adequacy of the petition, shall fix a date and place
of the adverse finding. Even granting for the
that there was a failure to adhere to the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
law or rule, such failure would not be copy of the order be published before the
the equivalent of a violation of her hearing at
constitutional rights.15
x Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to
impugn the issuance of the
warrant of arrest by hinting that the
investigating judge did not at all consider
the necessity of determining the
existence of probable cause for its
issuance due
to time constraints and in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, for that
consideration was presumed.
x And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but
was still subject to the review by the
public prosecutor who had the power to
order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should beultimately found
against her. In the context of the rule,
Mangila had no need to seek the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her
release from detention. Her proper
recourse was to bring the supposed
irregularities attending the
conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the issuance of the
warrant for her arrest to the attention of
the City Prosecutor, who had been
meanwhile given the most direct access
to the entire records of the case, including
the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinans transmittal of them to the
City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17
We agree with the CA, therefore, that the
writ of habeas corpus could not be used
as a substitute for another available
remedy.

CHANGE OF NAME [RULE 103] vs.

CORRECTION/ CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES
[RULE 108]

1. Venue vs. Jurisdiction

2. Contents of Petition/ Grounds

least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as
the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not
be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
month after the last
publication of the notice.
Section 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at
the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
Section 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court
on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that
the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears
for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance
with the prayer of the petition.
Section 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered
in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of
the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
RULE 108
Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon
good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Section 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
Section 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Section 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which
the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
Section 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for.
In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotated the same in
his record.
R.A. 9048
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 March 22, 2001
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY
AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE
CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname - No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 2. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
(1) "City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head
of the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality, as the case may be, who is appointed as
such by the city or municipal mayor in accordance
with the provisions of existing laws.
(2) "Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the
petition and who has direct and personal interest in the
correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry
or change of first name or nickname in the civil register.
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(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.
(4) "Civil Register" refers to the various registry
books and related certificates and documents kept in
the archives of the local civil registry offices,
Philippine Consulates and of the Office of the Civil
Registrar General.
(5) "Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator
of the National Statistics Office which is
the agency mandated to carry out and administer the
provision of laws on civil registration.
(6) "First name" refers to a name or
nickname given to a person which may
consist of one or more names in addition to
the middle and last names.
Section 3. Who May File the Petition and
Where. - Any person having direct and
personal interest in the correction of a clerical
or typographical error in an entry and/or
change of first name or nickname in the civil
register may file, in person, a verified petition
with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to
be corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to
another place in the country and it would not
be practical for such party, in terms of
transportation expenses, time and effort to
appear in
person before the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be corrected or
changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with
the local civil registrar of the place where the
interested party is presently residing or domiciled.
The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the
petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing
or domiciled in foreign countries may file their
petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine
Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors
and/or change of first names or nicknames may be
availed of only once.
Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. - The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
shall examine the petition and its
supporting documents. He shall post the
petition in a
conspicuous place provided for that
purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after
he finds the petition and its supporting
documents sufficient in form and
substance.
The city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general shall act on the petition
and shall
render a decision not later than five (5)
working days after the completion of the
posting
and/or publication requirement. He shall
transmit a copy of his decision together
with the
records of the proceedings to the Office of
the Civil Registrar General within five (5)
working days from the date of the decision.

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname

to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been

habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that by that first name or nickname in the
community: or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. - The

petition shall be in the form of an
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any
person authorized by the law to administer
oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary
to establish the merits of the petition and
shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is
competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry
or entries, which are sought to be
corrected and/or the change sought to be made.

The petition shall be supported with the following documents:

(1) A certified true machine copy of the

certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be
corrected or changed.

(2) At least two (2) public or private documents

showing the correct entry or entries upon which
the correction or change shall be based; and

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city

or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the
approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the

petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be
published at least once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a
certification from the appropriate law enforcement
agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal
record.

The petition and its supporting papers shall be

filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as
follows: first copy to the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar, or the consul general;
second copy to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General; and third copy to the petitioner.

Section 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil

Registrar or the Consul General. -
The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general to whom the petition is presented
Section 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. -
The civil registrar
general shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the
decision granting a petition,
exercise the power to impugn such decision by way of an
objection based on the following
grounds:
(1) The error is not clerical or typographical;
(2) The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is
substantial or controversial as it affects the civil status of a
person; or
(3) The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of
a person does not fall under Section 4.
The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the city or
municipal civil registrar or the
consul general of the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt
of the notice thereof, the city
or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall notify the
petitioner of such action.
The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil registrar
general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power to
impugn the decision of the city or municipal civil registrar or
of the consul general within the period prescribed herein, such
decision shall become final and executory.
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may either appeal
the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court.
Section 8. Payment of Fees. - The city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general shall be authorized to collect
reasonable fees as a condition for accepting the petition. An
indigent petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of the
said fee.
Section 9. Penalty Clause. - A person who violates any of the
provisions of this Act shall,
upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years but not more
than twelve (12) years, or a fine of not less than Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) but not
more than One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or
both, at the discretion of the
court.
In addition, if the offender is a government official or employee
he shall suffer the penalties provided under civil service laws,
rules and regulations.
Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The civil
registrar general shall, in consultation with the Department of
Justice, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the
Supreme Court Administrator, the University of the Philippines
Law Center and the
Philippine Association of Civil Registrars, issue the necessary
rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of this Act not later than three
(3) months from the effectivity of this
law.
Section 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code and other
laws.
Section 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion or
provision of this Act is declared void or
unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions
thereof shall not be affected by such
declaration.
Section 13. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 14. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after its
complete publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: March 22, 2001
R.A. 10172
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10172
AN ACT FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR
THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN
THE DAY AND MONTH IN THE DATE OF BIRTH OR SEX OF A
PERSON APPEARING IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT
NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR
THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED NINETY FORTY-EIGHT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9048,
hereinafter referred to as the Act, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry
in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations."
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Section 2. Section 2, paragraph (3) of the Act is likewise amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
Section 3. Section 5 of the Act is hereby amended to
(1) xxx xxx read as follows:

(2) xxx xxx "SEC. 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. -

(3) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of
day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the
person or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however,
That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner."
The petition for correction of a clerical or
typographical error, or for change of first
name or nickname, as the case may be,
shall be in
the form of an affidavit, subscribed and
sworn to before any person authorized by
law to
administer oaths. The affidavit shall set
forth facts necessary to establish the merits
of the
petition and shall show affirmatively that
the petitioner is competent to testify to the
matters
stated. The petitioner shall state the
particular erroneous entry or entries, which
are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought
to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the
certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be
corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents
showing the correct entry or entries upon which
the correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city
or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the
approval of the petition.
No petition for correction of erroneous entry
concerning the date of birth or the sex of a
person shall be entertained except if the petition is
accompanied by earliest school record or
earliest school documents such as, but not limited to,
medical records, baptismal certificate
and other documents issued by religious authorities;
nor shall any entry involving change of
gender corrected except if the petition is
accompanied by a certification issued by an
accredited government physician attesting to the fact
that the petitioner has not undergone
sex change or sex transplant. The petition for change
of first name or nickname, or for
correction of erroneous entry concerning the day and
month in the date of birth or the sex of
a person, as the case may be, shall be published at
least once a week for two (2) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification
from the appropriate law enforcements, agencies that
he has no pending case or no criminal record.
The petition and its supporting papers shall be
filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as
follows: first copy to the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar, or the consul general;
second copy to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General; and third copy to the petitioner."
Section 4. Section 8 of the Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 8. Payment of Fees. - The city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general shall be authorized to
collect reasonable fees as a condition for accepting
the petition. An indigent petitioner shall be exempt
from the payment of the said fee.
The fees collected by the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general pursuant to this Act
shall accrue to the funds of the Local Civil Registry
Office concerned or the Office of the Consul General
for modernization of the office and hiring of new
personnel and procurement of supplies, subject to
government accounting and auditing rules."
Section 5. Separability Clause. - If any provision of
this Act shall at any time be found to be
unconstitutional or invalid, the remainder thereof
not affected by such declaration shall remain in full
force and effect.
Section 6. Repealing Clause. - Any laws, decrees, rules
or regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 7. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: AUG 15 2012
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2001
Subject: RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048
Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 9048, which took effect
on 22 April 2001, the following rules and regulations are
hereby promulgated for the information, guidance and
compliance of all concerned parties.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that "No person
can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.". Article 412 of the same Code provides
that "No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without a judicial order.".
Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412.
Section 1 of this amendatory law
provides: "No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.".
As provided under Section 10 of Republic Act No.
9048, the Civil Registrar General
promulgated these rules and regulations, in
consultation with the representatives from the
Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Office of the Supreme Court
Administrator, University of the Philippines Law
Center and Philippine Association of Civil
Registrars.
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 1. Authority to correct clerical or typographical error
and to change first name
or nickname. - The city/municipal civil registrar, Consul
General, including the Clerk of the
Shari'a Court in his capacity as District or Circuit
Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces,
Revocations of Divorces and Conversions, are
hereby authorized to correct clerical or
typographical error and to change first name or
nickname in the civil register.
Rule 2. Definition of terms. - As used in this Order, the following
terms shall mean:
2.1. City or Municipal Civil Registrar (C/MCR) -
Refers to the head of the local civil registry office (LCRO)
of the city or municipality, as the case may be, who is
appointed by the city or municipal mayor in accordance
with the provisions of existing laws.
2.2. Consul General (CG) - Refers to an official
of the Department of Foreign Affairs
who has been issued the consular commissions by the
President and/or the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. In a foreign service establishment of the
Philippines where there is no Consul
General, the civil registration function and duties herein
provided for the Consul General shall
be exercised and performed by the Consul or Vice
Consul who should be similarly issued
consular commissions by the President and/or the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs.
2.3. District/Circuit Registrar (D/CR) - Refers to
the Clerk of the Shari'a District or
Circuit Court acting in the performance of its civil
registration function with regard to Muslim
Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces and
Conversions under Title VI, Book Two of
Presidential Decree No. 1083 which is otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
2.4. Civil Registrar General (CRG) - Refers
to the Administrator of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) which is the agency mandated to
carry out and administer the provisions of laws on civil
registration.
2.5. Local Civil Registry Office (LCRO) - Refers to an
office or department in the city or municipal government that is
mandated to perform civil registration function.
2.6. Petitioner - Refers to a natural person filing the
petition and who has direct and personal interest in the
correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry or
change of first name or nickname in the civil register.
2.7. Indigent petitioner - Refers to a destitute, needy
and poor individual who is certified as such by the social
welfare and development office of the city/municipal
government.
2.8. Clerical or typographical error - Refers to a mistake
committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil
register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner.
2.9. First name - Refers to the name or
nickname given to a person which may consist of
one or more names in addition to the middle and
last names.
2.10. Civil Register - Refers to the various registry
books and related certificates and documents
kept in the archives of the LCROs, Philippine
Consulates, Office of the Civil Registrar General,
and Shari'a District/Circuit Courts.
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2.11. Newspaper of general circulation - Refers to a
newspaper that is published for the dissemination of
local news and general information; that has a bona
fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that
is published at regular intervals.
2.12. Record-keeping civil registrar (RKCR) - Refers to
the C/MCR in whose archive is kept the record, which
contains the error to be corrected or the first name to
be changed. This term shall be used only in cases
involving migrant petitioner.
2.13. Petition-receiving civil registrar (PRCR) - Refers
to the C/MCR of the city or municipality where the
petitioner resides or is domiciled and who receives
the petition on behalf of the RKCR in the case of a
migrant petitioner.
2.14. Migrant petitioner (MP) - Refers to a petitioner
whose present residence or domicile is different
from the place where the civil registry record to be
corrected was registered.
2.15. Spouse - Refers to one's legal wife or legal
husband.
2.16. Guardian - Refers to a person lawfully
invested with the power, and charged with
the
duty, of taking care of the person and
managing the property and rights of
another person,
who, for defect of age, understanding, or self-
control, is considered incapable of
administering his own affairs. This term may
refer also to those who, under Article 216 of
the Family Code, are authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in
default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian. These persons are the following:
2.16.1. The surviving grandparent, as provided in
Article 214 of the Family Code;
2.16.2. The oldest brother or sister, over
twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified;
and
 5.6.8. Action taken or decision
2.16.3. The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Rule 3. Who may file the petition. - Any person of

legal age, having direct and personal
interest in the correction of a clerical or
typographical error in an entry and/or change of first

name or nickname in the civil register, may file the

petition. A person is considered to have
direct and personal interest when he is the owner of
the record, or the owner's spouse,
children, parents, brothers, sisters,
grandparents, guardian, or any other person
duly
authorized by law or by the owner of the
document sought to be corrected: Provided,
however, That when a person is a minor or
physically or mentally incapacitated, the petition
may be filed on his behalf by his spouse, or any of
his children, parents, brothers, sisters,
grandparents, guardians, or persons duly
authorized by law.

Rule 4. Where to file the petition. - The verified

petition may be filed, in person, with the LCRO of the
city or municipality or with the Office of the Clerk of
the Shari'a Court, as the case may be, where the
record containing the clerical or typographical error to
be corrected, or first name to be changed, is
registered.

When the petitioner had already migrated to another

place within the Philippines and it would not be
practical for such party, in terms of transportation
expenses, time and effort to appear in person before
the RKCR, the petition may be filed, in person, with
the PRCR of the place where the migrant petitioner is
residing or domiciled.

Any person whose civil registry record was

registered in the Philippines, or in any Philippine
Consulate, but who is presently residing or
domiciled in a foreign country, may file the
petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulate, or in
accordance with Rule 3.

Rule 5. Processing of the petition. - The C/MCR shall:

5.1. Examine the petition as to

completeness of requirements and supporting
documents as required under Rule 8.

5.2. Determine whether or not the civil registry

document, which is the subject of the petition, forms
part of the civil register of his office. If it is part of the
civil register of his office, he shall assume jurisdiction,
otherwise, Rule 6 shall apply.

5.3. Receive the petition upon payment of the

prescribed fees by the petitioner.

5.4. Ensure that posting or publication

requirement is complied with in accordance
with Rule 9.

5.5. Investigate and consider any third party

intervention to the petition.

5.6. Enter all petitions in the appropriate

record book, as may be prescribed by the CRG,
indicating therein, among others, the following
information:

5.6.1. Petition number

5.6.2. Name of petitioner

5.6.3. Type of petition

5.6.4. Date of petition

5.6.5. Date of receipt

5.6.6. Entry sought to be corrected/changed

5.6.7. Correction/Change made

5.7 Act on the petition within five (5) working days after 6.1.2. Receive the petition upon payment by the
the completion of the petitioner of prescribed fees as required under Rule
posting and/or publication requirement. In case the C/MCR, CG or 18.
D/CR approves the petition, he shall render his decision in a
prescribed form in triplicate copies, indicating therein the entry 6.1.3. Ensure that posting or publication of the petition
sought to be corrected or the first name sought to be changed in as required under Rule 9 is complied
the civil register, and the corresponding correction or change with.
made.
6.1.4. Endorse the petition and its supporting
5.8 Deny the petition for correction of clerical or documents, including the filing fee in postal money
typographical error based on any of the following grounds: order or in any other mode of payment to the RKCR.

5.8.1. The supporting documents are not authentic and genuine. 6.2. The RKCR shall perform the following:

5.8.2. The C/MCR has personal knowledge that a similar petition 6.1.1. Examine the petition as to completeness of
is filed or pending in court or in any other LCRO. requirements and supporting documents as required
under Rule 8 and as transmitted by the PRCR.
5.8.3. The petition involves the same entry in the same
document, which was previously corrected or changed 6.1.2. Observe the procedures under
under this Order.
Rule 5.5 to Rule 5.9.
5.8.4. The petition involves the change of the status, sex, age
or nationality of the petitioner or of any person named in the Insofar as applicable, Rule 6 shall be
document.
observed also by the CG and D/CR.
5.8.5. Such other grounds as the C/MCR may deem not proper for
correction. Rule 7. Availment of the privilege. - The correction of
clerical or typographical error shall be availed of only
5.9. In the case of petition for change of first name or once with respect to a particular entry or entries in the
nickname, the C/MCR shall same civil registry record. However, with regard to the
deny the petition based on any of the following grounds, in change of first name or nickname in the birth
addition to Rule 5.8.1 to Rule certificate, the privilege shall be availed of only once
5.8.3: subject to Rule 12 hereunder.

5.9.1. The first name or nickname sought to be changed is Rule 8. Form and content of the petition. - The petition
neither ridiculous, nor tainted with dishonor nor extremely shall be in the prescribed form of
difficult to write or pronounce. an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person
authorized by law to administer oath.
5.9.2. The new first name or nickname sought to be adopted has The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish
not been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner, and the merits of the petition and shall
he has not been publicly known by that first name or nickname show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to
in the community. testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state
the particular erroneous entry or entries sought to be
5.9.3. There is no confusion to be avoided or created with the use corrected or the first name sought to be changed, and
of the registered first name or nickname of the petitioner. the correction or change to be made.

5.10. Record the decision in the appropriate record book as
mentioned in Rule 5.6, and shall transmit said decision together
with the records of proceedings to the OCRG within five (5)
working days after the date of decision.
Insofar as applicable, Rule 5 shall be observed also by the CG and D/CR.
Rule 6. Procedures for migrant petitioner. - When the petition is
for or from a person who is a resident or domiciled in a place
different from the place where the document sought to be
corrected was registered, the following procedures shall be
observed:
8.1. The petition for the correction of
clerical or typographical error shall be supported
with the following documents:
8.1.1. A certified true machine copy of the
certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be
corrected or changed;
8.1.2. At least two (2) public or private documents
showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based;

6.1. The PRCR shall perform the following: 146

6.1.1. Examine the petition as to completeness of requirements

and supporting documents as required under Rule 8.
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8.2.2.3. Philippine National Police

8.1.3. Notice or certification of posting 8.2.3. Affidavit of publication from the publisher and a
copy of the newspaper clipping.
8.1.4. Other documents which the petitioner or the
C/MCR, or the CG, or D/CR may consider relevant 8.3. The C/MCR, CG or D/CR shall
and necessary for the approval of the petition. not accept a petition unless all
requirements and supporting documents
8.2. In case of change of first name or are complied with by the petitioner.
nickname, the petition shall be supported with the
following documents and shall comply with the 8.4. The petition and its supporting
following requirements: documents shall be filed in three (3) copies,
and upon acceptance, shall be distributed as
8.2.1. Documents required under Rule 8.1. follows:

8.2.2. A clearance or a certification that the owner
of the document has no pending
administrative, civil or criminal case, or no criminal
record, which shall be obtained from the
following:
8.4.1. First copy to the concerned C/MCR, CG or D/CR,
8.4.2. Second copy to the OCRG, and
8.4.3. Third copy to the petitioner.

8.2.2.1. Employer, if employed Rule 9. Posting and publication of the

petition. - The petition shall be posted by
8.2.2.2. National Bureau of Investigation the
concerned C/MCR, CG or D/CR in a
conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten
(10)
consecutive days after he finds the petition and its
supporting documents sufficient in form
and substance.
For a change of first name, the petition shall,
in addition to the above-stated posting
requirements, be published at least once a
week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. As proof of
publication, the petitioner shall attach to the
petition a clipping of the publication and an
affidavit of publication from the publisher of the
newspaper where publication was made.
In the case of migrant petitioner, the petition shall be
posted first at the office of the PRCR for
ten (10) consecutive days before sending it to the
RKCR. Upon receipt, the RKCR shall post
again the petition in his office for another ten (10)
consecutive days. When the petition is for a change of
first name, the migrant petitioner shall publish the
petition in a newspaper of
general and national circulation.
In the case where a person's civil registry record or
records were registered in the Philippines
or in any of the Philippine Consulates, but the
persons presently resides or is domiciled in a
foreign country, posting and/or publication, as the
case may be, shall be done in the place
where the petition is filed and in the place where the
record sought to be corrected is kept.
Rule 10. Duties of the C/MCR. - The C/MCR shall have the
following duties:
10.1. Examine the petition and its supporting documents.
10.2. If necessary, conduct investigation by
interviewing and asking probing questions to the
petitioner.
10.3. Post the petition in a conspicuous place
provided for that purpose for ten (10)
consecutive days after he finds the petition and its
supporting documents sufficient in form and
substance.
10.4. Act on the petition and render a decision not
later than five (5) working days after the
completion of the posting and/or publication
requirement.
10.5. Transmit a copy of the decision together
with the records of the proceedings to the OCRG
within five (5) working days after the date of the
decision.
10.6. Perform such other duties and functions as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of R.A. 9048.
Insofar as applicable, the CG and the D/CR shall
perform the duties of the C/MCR as provided for
under this Rule.
Rule 11. Duties and powers of the CRG. - The CRG
shall have the following duties and
powers:
11.1. Impugn the decision of the C/MCR or CG or
D/CR within ten (10) working days after receipt of
the decision granting the petition based on any of
the following grounds:
11.1.1. The error is not clerical or typographical.
11.1.2. The correction of an entry in the civil
register is substantial or controversial as it
involves the change of the age, sex, nationality
or civil status of a person.
11.1.3. The petition for correction of clerical or
typographical error was not posted, or the petition
for change of first name was not published as
required under Rule 9.
11.1.4. The basis used in changing the first name or
nickname of the person does not fall under any of
the following circumstances:
11.1.4.1. The name or nickname is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce.
11.1.4.2. The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first
name or nickname in the community.
11.1.4.3. The change of first name or nickname will avoid
confusion.
11.1.5. The C/MCR does not have authority to take cognizance of
the case.
11.2. Notify the C/MCR or the CG or the D/CR of the
action taken on the decision not later than ten (10)
working days from the date of impugning or
approving the decision.
11.3. Act on all appeals or reconsideration duly filed by the
petitioner.
11.4. Devise or cause to be devised the forms
necessary or required for the effective
implementation of this Order.
11.5. Perform such other duties and functions as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of R.A. 9048.
Rule 12. Effect of approving the petition for change of
name. - When the petition for a
change of first name is approved by the C/MCR or CG or
D/CR and such decision has not been
impugned by the CRG, the change shall be reflected in
the birth certificate by way of marginal
annotation. In case there are other civil registry records of
the same person which are affected
by such change, the decision of approving the change of
first name in the birth certificate,
upon becoming final and executory, shall be sufficient to
be used as basis in changing the first name of the same
person in his other affected records without need for filing
a similar petition. In such a case, the successful petitioner
shall file a request in writing with the concerned
C/MCR, CG or D/CR to make such marginal
annotation, attaching thereto a copy of the
decision.
Rule 13. Effect of denying the petition. - Where the
petition is not granted by the C/MCR, CG or D/CR, as the
case may be, the petitioner may either appeal the
decision to the CRG
within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision,
or file the appropriate petition with
the proper court. In case the petitioner opts to appeal
the decision to the CRG, the latter shall
render decision within thirty (30) calendar days after
receipt of the appeal. The CRG shall
furnish the C/MCR, CG or D/CR a copy of the decision
not later than ten (10) working days after the date of
the decision.
Rule 14. Appeal. - When the petition is denied by the
C/MCR, the petitioner may appeal the decision to the
CRG, in which case, the following guidelines shall be
observed:
14.1. The adversely affected petitioner shall file the
notice of appeal to the concerned C/MCR within ten (10)
working days after the receipt of the latter's decision.
14.2. The C/MCR shall, within five (5) working days
after the receipt of the notice of appeal from the
petitioner, submit the petition and all supporting
documents to the CRG.
14.3. The CRG shall render decision on the appeal within
thirty (30) calendar days after receipt thereof. The
decision of the CRG shall be transmitted to the concerned C/MCR
within ten (10) working days after the date of the decision. Within
ten (10) working days after receipt of the decision, the C/MCR
shall notify the petitioner and shall carry out the decision.
14.4. When the petitioner fails to seasonably file the appeal,
the decision of the C/MCR disapproving the petition shall
become final and executory, and the only option left for the
petitioner shall be to file the appropriate petition with the
proper court.
14.5. The petitioner may file the appeal to the CRG on any of the
following grounds:
14.5.1. A new evidence is discovered, which when presented,
shall materially affect, alter, modify or reverse the decision of
the C/MCR.
14.5.2. The denial of the C/MCR is erroneous or not supported with
evidence.
14.5.3. The denial of the C/MCR is done with grave abuse of authority or
discretion.
Insofar as applicable, Rule 14 shall be observed in the case of a
petition denied by the CG or
D/CR.
Rule 15. Failure of the CRG to impugn. - If the CRG fails
to impugn the decision of the C/MCR, CG or D/CR
within ten (10) working days after receipt of the
decision granting the petition, such decision shall
become final and executory.
Rule 16. Effect of impugning the decision. - Where
the decision of the C/MCR, CG or D/CR is impugned
by the CRG, the petitioner may appeal the decision
by way of
reconsideration with the latter within fifteen (15)
working days from receipt of the decision
and shall be based only on the ground of new evidence
discovered, or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court. The decision which shall
be rendered by the CRG within thirty
(30) calendar days after receipt of the appeal shall be final and
executory.
Rule 17. Recording, filing and retrieval of decision. - The
CRG shall prescribe the proper recording, filing and
retrieval system of the decisions.
147
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Rule 18. Authority to collect filing and other fees. - The
C/MCR or the D/CR is hereby
authorized to collect from every petitioner a filing fee
in the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) for the correction of clerical or
typographical error, and three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00) for change of first name or nickname. An
indigent petitioner as defined under Rule
2.7, shall be exempt from the payment of said fee.
In the case of a petition filed with the CG, a filing fee
of fifty U.S. dollars ($50.00) or its equivalent value in
local currency for the correction of clerical or
typographical error, and one hundred fifty U.S.
dollars ($150.00) or its equivalent value in local
currency for the change of first name, shall be
collected.
In the case of a migrant petitioner for correction of
clerical or typographical error, there shall
be a service fee of five hundred pesos (P500.00) to
be collected by the PRCR. In case the
petition is for change of name, the service
fee is one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). The
service fee shall accrue to the city or
municipal government of the PRCR. The PRCR
shall also collect the filing fee from the
migrant petitioner, which shall be in the form
of postal money order or other form of
payment which shall be payable to and
transmitted to the RKCR, together with the
petition and supporting documents.
When the petitioner files petition for
correction of clerical or typographical error,
simultaneously with a petition for change of
first name, and the same document is
involved,
the petitioner shall pay only the amount
corresponding to the fee for the petition for
change of
first name.
The local legislative body shall ratify the fees
herein prescribed upon effectivity of this
Order. Prior to ratification by the local
legislative body, all fees collected in
connection with this Order shall go to the LCRO trust family name you cannot avail of RA
fund: Provided, however, That the fees prescribed 9048.
herein shall be uniform in all cities and municipalities
in the country, and in all Philippine Consulates.
Q: What are the grounds?
Rule 19. Penalty clause. - A person who violates any of A:
the provisions of R.A. No. 9048 and of this Order shall,
upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not
less than six (6)
years but not more than twelve (12) years, or a fine
of not less than ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court. In addition, if the offender is
a government official or employee, he
shall suffer the penalties provided under existing
civil service laws, rules and regulations.

Rule 20. Periodic review. - The Civil Registrar

General may call for periodic review of the IRR as
may be necessary.

Rule 21. Retroactivity clause. - This Order shall have

retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code and other
laws.

Rule 22. Separability clause. - If any portion or

provision of this Order is declared void or
unconstitutional, the remaining portions or
provisions thereof shall not be affected by such
declaration.

Rule 23. Repealing clause. - All circulars,

memoranda, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Rule 24. Effectivity clause. - This Order shall

take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

APPROVED this 24th day of July 2001

OLD LECTURE

RULE 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) and 108

(CORRECTION OF ENTRIES) are still
applicable. They have only been amended but
are not yet repealed by RA 9048.
Therefore, an affected person can avail of
Rule 103 or Rule 108 without RA 9048
being violated.

RA 9048 is known as administrative

procedure of changing one's name or nick
name or administrative procedure of
correcting an entry in a document.
Therefore, being administrative, it is
extrajudicial. In case of Rules 103 and 108,
they are judicial processes.

Q: Which courts have jurisdiction over Rules 103 and

108?
A: RTC

Q: Venue?
A: Residence in case of change of name.
Where the registry is located in case of
correction of entries.

Q: What are the amendments to these two

rules brought about by RA
9048?
A: Remember that RA 9048 speaks only of
names and nickname but when Rule
103 says change of name, it does not only
refer to name or nick name but also
to family name. So if you want to change the
The same grounds. Under RA 9048, the same grounds: 200
1. That the name is ridiculous. If your name is 2
FIR
Lucifer, you can have it changed under Rule 103 or RA
ST
9048. DIV
2. Tainted with dishonor. If your name is ISI
Osama Bin Laden, you can have it changed. ON
3. Your name is very difficult to pronounce or
write. If your name is FACTS:
x Lourdes filed a petition before RTC QC seeking to
supercalifragilisticexpialidocious.
correct the following entries
4. That you are known by the name in the community. in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian:
5. To avoid confusion. o first, the surname "Borbon" should be
6. To avoid foreign alienage. changed to "Eleosida;"
So the same grounds either under Rule 103 or RA 9048. o second, the date of the parents' wedding
should be left blank; and
o third, the informant's name should be
Under Rule 108, you have to correct entries in a "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida,"
document. And the enumerated instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon."
public documents where entries have had are as many x Lourdess arguments:
as possible. Those which o she gave birth to her son out of wedlock
are in the custody of the register of deeds. If the change on May 24, 1992;
o that she and the boy's father, Carlos
are substantial, you Borbon, were never married;
cannot avail RA 9048 but Rule 108. You can only avail o and that the child is therefore illegitimate
of RA 9048 if the change sought is clerical or and should follow the
typographical in nature. mother's surname.
x The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon
City and Carlos Villena
Q: Name is Maria Cecilia when in her birth certificate
Borbon as respondents.
it shows as Ma. Cecilia, is that typographical or x RTC issued 1st order
clerical error? o Let copies of this notice be furnished the
A: There is no error there. What you have to seek is petitioner, and together
change of name because Ma is different from Maria with copies of the petition,
Cecilia. There is no error there. respondent Carlos Villena
Borbon; the Offices of the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City
You cannot avail of RA 9048 if it will change sex, status, and the Solicitor General, who
or nationality. If there is error you can change it under are given fifteen (15) days from
Rule 108 and not RA 9048. notice of the
petition, or from the last date of
Q: Suppose you do it under Rule 108, and it was publication of such notice,
within
denied. Where do you appeal or what is the remedy?
which to file their opposition
A: The remedy is to go to the Civil Registrar General thereto, if any. In the event that
who is the Manager of the National Census the
Administrative Office. It is not an appeal but a motion Solicitor General may not be
for able to appear on the scheduled
reconsideration. If the civil registrar affirms the hearing, to designate the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to
denial, you file a PETITION under Rule 108.
appear for and in behalf of the
State.
Q: Going back to RA 9048, A was born in Quezon City, x SolGen DID NOT file opposition
he now resides x RTC issued 2nd order
in Baguio City. Should he go to Quezon City in order to
file under RA 148
9048?
A: No, he has to file it in Baguio and under the rules
the two civil registrar, that of Baguio and Quezon city
will coordinate. It also can be done abroad, by filing
the same with the Philippine Consulate, it is a matter
of communication.

NOTE: Appeal in RA 9048 is with the Civil Registrar

General. Although it is not
really an appeal, it is a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal under Rule 103 or 108
is ordinary/ regular appeal. In RA 9048, it is not really an
appeal, wala naman
kasi appeal sa administrative remedies, you use the
word appeal for facilitation
of better understanding. But that is not an appeal,
motion for reconsideration
siguro.

CASES

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her

minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs.
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS
VILLENA BORBON, respondents.
G.R. No.
130277

May 9,
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A HARMLESS AND
INNOCUOUS
o Considering that there is no opposition NATURE like:
filed despite notice to the misspelled name,
Solicitor General as occupation of the
contained in the notice of parents, etc., may
hearing dated April be the subject of a
23, 1997 requiring that office judicial
to file their opposition, if any, order
to the (contemplated
petition for correction of under Article 412
entries in the birth certificate of the New Civil
of minor Code),
child Charles Christian authorizing
Eleosida, the petitioner will changes or
be allowed to corrections and:
present compliance with the NOT as may affect
jurisdictional requirements the
and at the same time initially CIVIL STATUS,
present evidence on July 23, NATIONALITY OR
1997, at 8:30 CITIZENSHIP OF THE
o'clock in the morning PERSONS INVOLVED.
x RTC then dismissed the petition o In the present case, it is very
o It is an established jurisprudence that, clear that the changes desired by
only CLERICAL ERRORS OF the
 petitioner will ultimately civil status, citizenship or
affect the CIVIL STATUS OF nationality of
CHARLES a party, it is deemed substantial,
CHRISTIAN, as she wants the and the procedure to be adopted
Court to Direct the Civil is
Registrar of adversary.10 This is our ruling in
Quezon City to substitute her Republic vs. Valencia11 where we
maiden name, ELEOSIDA, held that
with that even substantial errors in a civil
of BORBON; to delete the registry may be corrected and the
information supplied in ITEM true
12, facts established under Rule 108
respecting the date and provided the parties aggrieved by
place of marriage of parents, the
on the error avail themselves of the
ground that she was never appropriate adversary
married to respondent proceeding. An
CARLOS appropriate adversary suit or
VILLENA BORBON and amend proceeding is one where the trial
the information in ITEM 14, court has
respecting the name of the conducted proceedings where all
informant, from MA. relevant facts have been fully and
LOURDES E. properly
BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. developed, where opposing
ELEOSIDA, and is indicative counsel have been given
of opportunity to demolish the
petitioner's intention and opposite party's case, and where
device to establish that the evidence has been thoroughly
CHARLES weighed and
CHRISTIAN's civil status as considered. The Court further laid
ILLEGITIMATE. down the procedural
o With the petition's ultimate purpose requirements to make
on the part of petitioner to the proceedings under Rule 108
secure judicial order, which adversary, thus:
would authorize a change in o "The pertinent sections of
the civil status of CHARLES Rule 108 provide:
CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds SEC. 3. Parties.
the action When cancellation or
improper. The matters correction of
desired to be cancelled an
and/or changed by petitioner entry
cannot be considered falling in the
under the ambit of the civil
words 'clerical errors of a harmless regist
and innocuous nature.' er is
x Lourdes filed a Rule 45 before the SC sough
x SC required the Civil Registrar AND BORBON to t, the
Comment civil
x SolGen filed a manifestation in lieu of a regist
comment rar
o The OSG submitted that even and
substantial errors in the civil registry all
may be corrected provided perso
that the parties aggrieved by ns
the error who
avail themselves of the have
appropriate adversary or
proceeding. Thus it claim
argued that even if the any
petition seeks the correction intere
and eventual st
change in the civil status of which
Charles Christian, the same would
can be be
ordered by the court as long affect
as all the parties who may be ed
affected by the entries are there
notified and represented. by
x Borbon DID NOT file his comment shall
be
ISSUE: Whether corrections of entries in the made
certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of partie
the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of s to
Court, may be allowed even if the errors the
to be corrected are substantial and not merely proce
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous eding.
nature. 1wp
hi1.n
HELD: YES. t
x We find merit in the petition. SEC. 4. Notice and
x Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides publication.Upon the
the procedure for cancellation or filing of the
correction of entries in the civil registry. petition,
The proceedings under said rule the court
may either be summary or adversary in shall, by
nature. If the correction sought to an order,
be made in the civil register is clerical, fix the
then the procedure to be adopted is time and
summary. If the rectification affects the place for
 the hearing of the
same, and cause o Thus, the persons who must be made
reasonable parties to a proceeding
notice thereof to concerning the cancellation or
be given to the correction of an entry in the
persons civil register are
named in the (1) the civil registrar, and
petition. The (2) all persons who have or
court shall also claim any interest which
cause the would be affected thereby.
order to be o Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes
published once in the duty of the court to
a week for three (1) issue an order fixing the
93) time and place for the
consecutive hearing of the petition, and
weeks in a (2) cause the order for
newspaper of hearing to be published once
general a week for three
circulation in the province. (3) consecutive
SEC. 5. Opposition.The weeks in a
civil registrar and any newspaper of
person having or general
claiming any circulation in the
interest under the province.
entry whose o The following are likewise entitled to
cancellation or oppose the petition:--(1) the
correction is civil registrar, and (2) any
sought may, person having or claiming any
within fifteen (15) interest under the entry whose
days from notice, cancellation or correction is
file his opposition sought.
thereto. o If all these procedural requirements have
been followed, a
petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as
'summary'. xxx"12
x It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought
to be made by petitioner are
not merely clerical or harmless errors but
substantial ones as they would affect
the status of the marriage between
petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian.
Changes of such nature, however,
are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in
Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with. The records
show that upon receipt of the
petition, the trial court issued a notice of
hearing setting the hearing on June 26,
1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118,
Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial
court likewise ordered the publication of said
notice once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation and its posting in
selected places in Metro Manila. The notice
stated that the petitioner shall prove
her petition during said hearing and all other
persons having or claiming any
interest thereon shall also appear and show if
there is any reason why the
petition should not be granted. Respondents
Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor
General were all furnished with a
copy of the notice of hearing together with a
copy of the petition. On June 26,
1997, the trial court issued a second order
giving the petitioner an opportunity to
show compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements and to present evidence
during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The
foregoing satisfy all the
requirements of Rule 108 to make it an
adversary proceeding. It was therefore
an error for the trial court to dismiss the
petition motu proprio without allowing
the petitioner to present evidence to support
her petition and all the other
persons who have an interest over the matter
to oppose the same
 o with respect to his childrens birth
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLITO I. KHO, certificate, he prayed that the
MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO- date of his and his wifes
SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and marriage be corrected from April
KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents. 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the
G.R. No. 170340 date appearing in their marriage
certificate.
o Additional prayers in AMENDED PETITION:
June 29, 2007 Carlitos second name of
SECOND DIVISION "John" be deleted from his
record of birth; and
FACTS: that the name and citizenship
x Carlito (and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy of Carlitos father in his
Moira) filed before (Carlitos) marriage
the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for certificate be
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan corrected from
City to effect changes in their respective birth "John Kho" to "Juan
certificates and impleading therein the Local Civil Kho" and "Filipino" to
Registrar of Butuan City "Chinese,"
o Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor respectively
children, Kevin x The petition was published for three consecutive
and Kelly, to order the correction of weeks4 in Mindanao Daily
some entries in their birth Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation
certificates. x Civil Registrar stated her observations and
o he requested the correction in his birth certificate suggestions to the proposed
of the citizenship corrections in the birth records of Carlito
of his mother to "Filipino" instead of and his siblings but interposed no
"Chinese," as well as the objections to the other amendments
deletion of the word "married" x RTC directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City
opposite the phrase "Date of to correct the entries in the
marriage of parents" because his record of birth of Carlito, as follows:
parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco o (1) change the citizenship of his mother
(Epifania), were allegedly not legally from "Chinese" to
married. "Filipino";
o same request to delete the "married" status of o (2) delete "John" from his name; and
their parents from
their respective birth certificates was
149
made by Carlitos siblings Michael,
Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira
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o faulting the trial court in
granting the petition for correction
o (3) delete the word "married" opposite of
the date of marriage of his entries in the subject
parents. documents despite
o The last correction was ordered to be the failure of
effected likewise in the birth respondents
certificates of respondents Michael, to implead the
Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira minors mother,
o ordered the correction of the birth Marivel, as an
certificates of the minor children indispensable party
of Carlito to reflect the date and to offer sufficient
of marriage of Carlito and evidence to warrant
Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as the corrections with
January 21, 2000, instead of regard to the
April 27, 1989, and the questioned "married"
name "Maribel" as "Marivel." status of Carlito and
o the corrections ordered pertained to his siblings parents,
the alteration of the name of and the latters
Carlitos father from citizenship.
"John Kho" to "Juan Kho" o also faulted the trial court for
and the latters ordering the change of the name
citizenship from "Filipino" "Carlito John Kho" to
to "Chinese." "Carlito Kho" for non-
x Republic appealed to CA compliance with
 jurisdictional requirements for Butuan City, and
a change of name under Rule that the title of the
103 of the Rules of Court. petition did not
x CA affirmed RTC state Carlitos
o The CA found that Rule 108 of the aliases and his true
Revised Rules of Court, which name as "Carlito
outlines the proper John I. Kho."
procedure for o Petitioner concludes that the
cancellation or correction same jurisdictional defects attached
of entries in the civil to
registry, was observed in the change of name of
the case. Carlitos father.
o Regarding Carlitos minor children
Kevin and Kelly, the appellate ISSUE # 1: Whether the changes sought
court held that the in the present petition are substantial in
correction of their nature thereby warranting an adversary
mothers first name from proceeding.
"Maribel" to "Marivel" was
made to rectify an HELD # 1: YES.
innocuous error. x It can not be gainsaid that the petition,
o As for the change in the date of the insofar as it sought to change the
marriage of Carlito and citizenship of Carlitos mother as
Marivel, albeit the CA it appeared in his birth certificate
conceded that it is a and delete the "married" status of
substantial alteration, it held Carlitos parents in his and his
that the date would not siblings respective birth
affect the minors filiation certificates, as well as change
from the date of marriage of Carlito
"legitimate" to and Marivel
"illegitimate" considering involves the correction of not just
that at the time of their clerical errors of a harmless and
respective births in 1991 innocuous
and 1993, their father nature.10 Rather, the changes
Carlitos first entail substantial and
marriage was still subsisting as it had controversial amendments.
been annulled only in 1999. x For the change involving the nationality of
o In light of Carlitos legal impediment Carlitos mother as reflected in his
to marry Marivel at the time birth certificate is a grave and
they were born, their important matter that has a
children Kevin and Kelly bearing and effect on the
were illegitimate. It followed, citizenship and nationality not
the CA went on to state, that only of the parents, but also of
Marivel was not an the
indispensable party to the offspring.11
case, the minors having been x Further, the deletion of the entry that
Carlitos and his siblings parents were
represented by their father "married" alters their filiation
as required under Section 5 from "legitimate" to
of Rule 39 of the Revised "illegitimate," with significant
Rules of Court. implications on their
o Further, the CA ruled that although successional and other rights.
Carlito failed to observe the x Clearly, the changes sought can only be
requirements of Rule 103 of granted in an adversary proceeding.
the Rules of Court, he had Labayo-Rowe v. Republic12 explains the
complied raison d etre:
nonetheless with the o x x x. The philosophy behind
jurisdictional requirements this requirement lies in the
for correction of fact that the books
entries in the civil registry making up the civil
under Rule 108 of the Rules register and all
of Court. documents relating
The petition for correction of thereto shall be prima
entry in Carlitos birth record, facie evidence of
it noted, the facts therein
falls under letter "o" of the contained. If the
enumeration under Section 2 entries in the civil
of Rule register could be
108. corrected or changed
x Republic filed a Rule 45 before the SC through mere
o since the changes sought by summary proceedings
respondents were substantial in and not through
nature, they could only be appropriate action
granted through an wherein all parties
adversarial who may be affected
proceeding in which by the entries are
indispensable parties, notified or
such as Marivel and represented, the door
respondents parents, to fraud or other
should have been notified mischief
or impleaded.
o further contends that the jurisdictional
requirements to change
Carlitos name under
Section 2 of Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court were not
satisfied because the
Amended Petition failed to
allege Carlitos prior three-
year bona fide residence in
 the court shall, by an order, fix
would be set open, the consequence the time and place for the
of which might be hearing
detrimental and far reaching. x x x of the same, and cause
(Emphasis supplied) reasonable notice thereof to be
given to
ISSUE # 2: Whether a petition under Rule 108 may prosper, the persons named in the
considering that the said changes are substantial in nature. petition. The court shall also
cause the
HELD # 2: YES. order to be published once in a
x In Republic v. Valencia,13 however, this Court ruled, and has week for three (3) consecutive
since weeks in a newspaper of general
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a circulation in the province.
civil registry may be corrected through a petition o SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar
filed under Rule 108.14 and any person having or
x It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is claiming any interest under the
not for the entry whose cancellation or
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and correction is sought may, within
innocuous nature, but one fifteen (15) days from notice of
involving nationality or citizenship, which is the petition, or from the last date
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, of publication of such notice, file
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding his opposition thereto. (Emphasis
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a and underscoring supplied)
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be x There is no dispute that the trial courts Order19
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. setting the petition for hearing
This Court adheres to the principle that even and directing any person or entity having
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected interest in the petition to oppose it was
and the true facts established provided the parties posted20 as well as published for the
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the required period; that notices of hearings
appropriate adversary proceeding. were duly served on the Solicitor General, the
x What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" city prosecutor of Butuan and the
Blacks Law Dictionary local civil registrar; and that trial was
defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows: conducted on January 31, 2002 during
o One having opposing parties; contested, as which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf
distinguished of the OSG, actively participated by cross-
from an ex parte application, one of which examining Carlito and Epifania.
the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded ISSUE # 3: Whether the failure to implead Marivel and
the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x Carlitos parents is fatal to the cause of Kho et al.
x 15 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied) HELD # 3: NO.
x The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, x A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of
otherwise known as Appeals.21 That case
"An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil stemmed from a petition for correction of
Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or entries in the birth certificate of a
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect
Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need the name of her real father (Armando
of Judicial Order," has been Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her
considered to lend legislative affirmation to the surname. The petition was granted
judicial precedence by the trial court.
that substantial corrections to the civil status of o Barco, whose minor daughter was
persons recorded in allegedly fathered also by
the civil registry may be effected through the filing Gustilo, however, sought to annul
of a petition under the trial courts decision, claiming
Rule 108.16 that she should have been made
x Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito17 observed that a party to the petition for
the obvious effect correction. Failure to implead
of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the her deprived the RTC of
administrative jurisdiction, she contended.
correction of clerical or typographical errors or o In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court
change of first name or nickname in entries in the held that the publication of
civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the the order of hearing under
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the
in appropriate adversarial proceedings. failure to implead an
x When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are indispensable party.
thus followed, the o The essential requisite for allowing
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections of entries
substantial corrections to the entries of the civil in the civil registry is that the
register is satisfied.18 The pertinent provisions of Rule true facts be established in an
108 of the Rules of Court read: appropriate adversarial
o SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction proceeding. This is embodied in
of an entry in the Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules
civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar of Court, which states:
and all persons who have or claim any Section 3. Parties. - When
interest which would be affected thereby cancellation or correction
shall be of an entry in the civil register
made parties to the proceeding. is sought, the civil
o SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing 150
of the petition,
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o Yet, even though Barco was
not impleaded in the petition,
registrar and the Court of
all persons Appeals correctly
who have or pointed out that the
claim any defect was cured by
interest which compliance with
would be Section 4, Rule 108,
affected which requires
thereby shall notice by
be made publication x x x.
parties to the
proceeding. o The purpose precisely of
o Undoubtedly, Barco is among the Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the
parties referred to in Section 3 of whole world to the
Rule 108. Her interest was subsequent
affected by the petition for judgment on the
correction, as any judicial petition.
determination that June was The sweep of the
the daughter of decision would
Armando would affect her cover even parties
wards share in the estate of who
her father. should have been
x x x. impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108,
 but were inadvertently left respondents Amended Petition,
out. x x x likewise stated that it has no
o Verily, a petition for correction is an record of marriage between Juan
action in rem, an action Kho and Epifania.29 Under the
against a thing and not circumstances, the deletion of
against a person. The the word "Married" opposite the
decision on the "date of marriage of parents" is
petition binds not only the warranted.
parties thereto but the whole x With respect to the correction in Carlitos
world. An birth certificate of his name from
in rem proceeding is validated "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the
essentially through same was properly granted
publication. under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Publication is notice to the Court. As correctly pointed out by
whole world that the the CA, the cancellation or
proceeding has for correction of entries involving
its object to bar indefinitely all changes of name falls under
who might be minded to letter "o" of the following
make an provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:30
objection of any sort against o Section 2. Entries subject to
the right sought to be cancellation or correction. Upon
established. It good and valid
is the publication of such grounds, the
notice that brings in the following entries in
whole world as a the civil register
party in the case and vests may be cancelled
the court with jurisdiction to or corrected: (a)
hear and births; (b)
decide it.22 marriages; (c)
x Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary deaths; (d)
to rule on whether Marivel or legal
respondents parents should have been separation; (e)
impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It judgments of
may not be amiss to mention, however, annulment of
that during the hearing on January 31, marriage; (f)
2002, the city prosecutor who was acting judgments
as representative of the OSG did not raise declaring
any objection to the non-inclusion of marriages void
Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to from the
the proceeding. beginning; (g)
x Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that legitimations; (h)
Marivel was unaware of the adoptions; (i)
proceedings to correct the entries in her acknowledgments of
childrens birth certificates, especially natural children; (j)
since the notices, orders and decision of naturalization; (k)
the trial court eHe were all sent to the election, loss or
residence23 she shared with Carlito and recovery of
the children. citizenship; (l) civil
x It is also well to remember that the role of the interdiction; (m)
court in hearing a petition to judicial determination
correct certain entries in the civil registry of
is to ascertain the truth about the facts filiation; (n) voluntary
recorded therein.24 emancipation of a
x With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and minor; and (o)
Marivel, their certificate of changes of name.
marriage25 shows that indeed they (Emphasis and
were married on January 21, 2000, not underscoring
on supplied)
April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, x Hence, while the jurisdictional
Carlito declared that the date "April 27, requirements of Rule 103 (which
1989" was supplied by his helper, adding governs petitions for
that he was not married to Marivel at change of name) were
the time his sons were born because his not complied with,
previous marriage was annulled only in observance of the
1999.26 Given the evidence presented by provisions of Rule 108
respondents, the CA observed that the suffices to effect the
minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, correction sought for.
the correction would bring about no x More importantly, Carlitos official
change at all in the nature of their filiation. transcript of record from the Urious College in
x With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting Butuan City,31 certificate of
that she declared at the witness eligibility from the Civil Service
stand that she was not married to Commission,32 and
Juan Kho who died in 1959.27 Again, voter registration record33
that testimony was not challenged by satisfactorily show that he has
the city prosecutor. been known by his
x The documentary evidence supporting the first name only. No prejudice is
deletion from Carlitos and his siblings thus likely to arise from the
birth certificates of the entry "Married" dropping of the
opposite the date of marriage of their second name.
parents, moreover, consisted of a x The correction of the mothers citizenship
certification issued on November 24, from Chinese to Filipino as appearing
1973 by in Carlitos birth record was also
St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest proper. Of note is the fact that
Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho during the cross
and Epifania had been living together as examination by the city
common law couple since 1935 but prosecutor of Epifania, he did not
have never contracted marriage legally.28 deem fit to question
x A certification from the office of the city registrar, her citizenship. Such failure to
which was appended to
oppose the correction prayed for, which
certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any
way change the adversarial nature of the
proceedings.
x Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of
Carlitos siblings uniformly
stated the citizenship of Epifania as
"Filipino." To disallow the correction in
Carlitos birth record of his mothers
citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of
the siblings who are unquestionably born of
the same mother and father.
x Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of
course, is the correction of the
name of Carlitos wife from "Maribel" to
"Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or
typographical, which is not only visible to
the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding34 considering that the name
reflected in the marriage certificate of
Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
x Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing
the appellants Christian
name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely
to the righting of a clerical error. The change
of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu
to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a
mere innocuous alteration, which can be
granted through a summary proceeding.36
The same ruling holds true with respect to the
correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of
his fathers name from "John Kho" to "Juan
Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the
name "Juan Kho" was
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito
and of his siblings.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION
OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as
JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN
LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his
mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners, vs. CEBU CITY
CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar
OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.
G.R.
No.
159
966
.
Mar
ch
30,
200
5
SEC
ON
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DIVI
SIO
N

FACTS:
x Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who
were SUBSEQUENTLY married to each other
and executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the childs name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang
x They planned to stay in SG where Julian would be
studying
x Julian (represented by mother Anna Lisa) filed a
petition for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the
Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
PRAYING that his middle name be dropped
o Since it is a practice in SG that middle
names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in
a persons name
o out of fear that Julian will be
discriminated against
o Julian and his sister might also be asking
whether they are brother
and sister since they have different
surnames.
 o Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin
language since
they do not have the letter "R" but if
there is, they pronounce it as
"L."
x RTC denied the petition
o found that the reason given for the change of
name sought in the
petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may
be discriminated against when studies in
Singapore because of his middle name
did not fall within the grounds recognized
by law.
o ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the
child.
o Since the State has an interest in the name of a
person, names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate
children have the right to
bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, and
there is no reason why
this right should now be
taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a
minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner
Julian reaches the age of
majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle
name
x Julian filed an MR
x RTC denied
o The dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving
due recognition to or application of the
laws of Singapore instead
of Philippine law which is controlling.
That the change of name
would not prejudice public interest or
would not be for a fraudulent purpose
would not suffice to grant the petition if
the reason for the change of name is itself
not reasonable
x Julian filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o arguing that the trial court has decided a
question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court,
that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is
contrary to Article 1747 of the Family
Code.
o Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and
mixed marriages,
there is a need for the Supreme Court
to rule on the matter of dropping of
family name for a child to adjust to
his new
environment, for consistency and
harmony among siblings, taking into
consideration the "best interest of the
child."8
o It is argued that convenience of the child is a
valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not
prejudice the State and
others. Petitioner points out that the
middle name "Carulasan" will
cause him undue embarrassment and
the difficulty in writing or
pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his
social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges
that it is error for the trial court to have
denied the petition for
change of name until he had reached the age of
majority for him to

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the
middle
decide the name to use, name
contrary to previous "Carulas
cases9 decided by an" is in
this Court that allowed a the best
minor to petition for interest
change of name. of
x SC required SolGen to comment petitione
x SolGen filed comment r, since
o positing that the trial court correctly mere
denied the petition for change convenie
of name. The OSG argues nce is
that under Article 174 of not
the Family Code, sufficient
legitimate children have to
the right to bear the support
surnames of their father a
and mother, and such petition
right cannot be denied by for
the mere expedient of change
dropping the same. of name
o According to the OSG, there is also no
showing that the dropping of
 and/or cancellation of prejudi
entry.12 ce
o The OSG also adds that the petitioner has public
not shown any interest.16
compelling reason to justify x In granting or denying petitions for
the change of name or the change of name, the question of proper
dropping of and
the middle name, for that reasonable cause
matter. Petitioners is left to the sound
allegation that the discretion of the
continued use of the middle court. The
name may result in evidence
confusion and presented need
difficulty is allegedly more only be
imaginary than real. The satisfactory to the
OSG reiterates its argument court and not all
raised before the trial court the best
that the dropping of the evidence available.
childs middle name could What is involved is
only trigger much deeper not a mere matter
inquiries of allowance or
regarding the true parentage of petitioner. disallowance of the
o Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister request, but a
named Jasmine Wei judicious evaluation
Wang, there is no of the sufficiency
confusion since both use and
the surname of their propriety of the
father, Wang. Even justifications
assuming that it is advanced in
customary in Singapore to support thereof,
drop the middle name, it mindful of the
has also not been shown consequent results
that the use of in the event of its
such middle name is grant and with the
actually proscribed by sole prerogative for
Singaporean law making such
determination
ISSUE # 1: Whether the grounds cited by Julian are sufficient in being lodged in the
granting his petition. courts.17

HELD # 1: NO. ISSUE # 2: Whether a person may be allowed to

x The Court has had occasion to express the view that drop his middle name.
the State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and HELD # 2: NO.
entities for purposes of identification, x The petition before us is unlike other
and petitions for change of name, as it does not
that a change of name is a privilege and simply seek to change
not a right, so that before a person can the name of the minor
be authorized to change his name given petitioner and adopt
him either in his certificate of birth or another, but instead
civil registry, he must show proper or seeks to drop the
reasonable cause, or any compelling middle name
reason which may justify such altogether. Decided
change. Otherwise, the request cases in this
should be denied.14 jurisdiction involving
x The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is petitions for change of
that there be name usually deal
proper and reasonable cause for with requests for
which the change is sought.15 To change of surname.
justify a request for change of name, There are only a
petitioner must show not only some handful of cases
proper or compelling reason therefore involving requests
but also that he will be for change of the
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. given name18 and
x Among the grounds for change of name which have none on requests for
been held valid are: changing or
o (a) when the name is ridiculous, dropping of the middle
dishonorable or extremely difficult name. Does the law
to write or pronounce; allow one to drop the
o (b) when the change results as a legal middle name from
consequence, as in his registered
legitimation; name? We have to
o (c) when the change will avoid confusion; answer in the
o (d) when one has continuously used and negative.
been known since x A discussion on the legal significance
childhood by a Filipino name, and was of a persons name is relevant at this point.
unaware of alien parentage; We quote, thus:
o (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino o For all practical and
name to erase signs of legal purposes, a man's name
former alienage, all in good is the
faith and without designati
prejudicing anybody; on by
and which he
o (f) when the surname causes is known
embarrassment and there is no and
showing that the called in
desired change of name the
was for a fraudulent communit
purpose or that the y in
change of name would
which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the
word or
combination of words by
which a person is
distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he
bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing
him, or in
speaking of or dealing with
him. Names are used merely
as one
method of indicating the
identity of persons; they are
descriptive of
persons for identification,
since, the identity is the
essential thing
and it has frequently been held
that, when identity is certain, a
variance in, or misspelling of,
the name is immaterial.
x The names of individuals usually have two parts: the
given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name.
o The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at
birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals.
o The name or family name is that which
identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by
the parents for the child; but the
surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
x A name is said to have the following characteristics:
o (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being
confused with others.
o (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for
nobody can be without
a name.
o (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable,
at least at the
start, and may be changed
only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings.
o (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter
vivos or mortis causa.
o (5) It is imprescriptible.19
x This citation does not make any reference to middle
names, but this does not
mean that middle names have no practical or
legal significance. Middle names
serve to identify the maternal lineage or
filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may
have the same given
name and surname as he has.
x Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate
and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the
father.20 The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the
mother,21 while illegitimate children shall
use the surname of their mother, unless
their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the fathers
surname.22
x Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose
filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his
mothers surname, and does not have a middle
name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as
such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument
that he bears both his mothers
surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status
as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
illegitimate child.
x Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the
birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in
the certificate. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
x Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best
interest to drop his middle name
as this would help him to adjust more easily
to and integrate himself into Singaporean
society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24
which, however, are not apropos both.
x In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter
of a Filipino mother,
 Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita,
sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina
Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the
following considerations: she had elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other
siblings who had also
elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers
surname; she was
embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill
feeling against the
Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing
that the change
of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will
prejudice public
interest.
x In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado,
an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed
the petition in her
behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon,
taking the surname
of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband.
The Court held
that a petition for change of name of an infant should be
granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child.
The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for
the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of
illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the
surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates
that every person
be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests
of the State or of
other people.
x Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174
of the
Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the
surnames of the father
and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could
use only one family
name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the
petitioner therein, the
legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon,
sought to change her
name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name
as registered in
the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had
been using since
childhood, in her school records and in her voters registration).
The trial court
denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling
that while Article
364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child,
should principally use
the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to
choose to use the
surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the
Court found that
there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid
confusion.
x Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name
against
the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least,
and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
x The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases
are not at
all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from
the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were
already of age when
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registration records; thus,
denying the petition would only
they filed their petitions for change of result to confusion.
name. Being of age, they are considered x Calderon, on the other hand, granted the
to have exercised their discretion and petition for change of name filed by a
judgment, fully knowing the effects of mother in behalf of her
their illegitimate minor child.
decision to change their surnames. It can Petitioner cites this case to
also be unmistakably observed that the buttress his argument that he
reason for the grant of the petitions for does not have to reach the
change of name in these two cases was age of majority to
the presence of reasonable or compelling petition for change of name.
grounds therefore. The Court, in However, it is manifest in
Oshita, recognized the tangible Calderon that the Court, in
animosity most Filipinos had during granting the petition for change
that time of name, gave paramount
against the Japanese as a result of consideration to the best
World War II, in addition to the fact of interests of the minor petitioner
therein petitioners election of Philippine therein.
citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted x In the case at bar, the only reason
the petition since the petitioner had advanced by petitioner for the
been known since childhood by a name dropping his middle name is
different from her registered name and convenience. However, how
she had not used her registered name in such change
her school records and voters of name would make his
 integration into Singaporean society (2) a directive to
easier Leon, Cecilia and
and convenient is not clearly established. Lucille, all
That the continued use of his surname
middle name would cause confusion and d Titular,
difficulty does not constitute as
proper and reasonable cause to drop it guardian
from his registered complete s of the
name. minor
x In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering Patrick,
the nebulous foundation to
on which his petition for change of name submit
is based, it is best that the matter of Parick to
change of his name be left to his DNA
judgment and discretion when he testing
reaches the to
age of majority.26 As he is of tender age, determi
he may not yet understand and ne his
appreciate the value of the change of his paternity and
name and granting of the same at this filiation; and
point may just prejudice him in his rights (3) the
under our laws. declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. Patrick
BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners, as
vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN stated
CITY, NEGROS in his
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR birth
BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA certific
TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents. ate
G.R. No. and, for
181174 this
purpos
e, the
December declara
4, 2009 tion of
FIRST the
DIVISION marriag
e of
FACTS: Lucille
x Cristina and Pablo were married on January 4, and
1978 Pablo
o 2 children: Paolo and Janelle as
x Pablo died in an accident bigamo
x Lucille went to the wake AND began introducing us.
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza x Patrick filed an MD on the ground of
as her son with Pablo lack of jurisdiction
x Cristina found Patricks birth certificate x RTC granted MD; dismissed the case
o Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN o dismissed the petition without
CELESTIAL TITULAR prejudice, it holding that in a
o Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge special
(sic) by the father Pablito proceeding for
Braza on January 13, 1997" correction of entry,
o Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of the court, which is
subsequent marriage of not acting as a family
parents on April 22, 1998 at court under the
Manila. Henceforth, the child Family Code, has no
shall be jurisdiction over an
known as Patrick Alvin action to annul the
Titular Braza (Emphasis and marriage of Lucille
underscoring and Pablo, impugn
supplied) the
x Cristina likewise found a marriage certificate legitimacy of
showing that Lucille and Pablo Patrick, and order
were married on April 22, 1998 Patrick to be
x Cristina (and children) filed a petition to correct subjected to a DNA
the entries in the birth record test, hence, the
of Patrick in the Local Civil Register controversy should
before RTC Himamaylan City, be ventilated in an
Negros Occidental ordinary
o Contending that Patrick could not adversarial action.
have been legitimated by the x Cristina (and children) filed an MR
supposed marriage between o RTC denied
Lucille and Pablo, said x Cristina (and children) filed a Rule 45
marriage being bigamous on before the SC
account of the valid and
subsisting marriage between ISSUE: Whether the RTC may correctly nullify
Ma. Cristina and Pablo, marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation
petitioners prayed for in a petition under Rule 108.
(1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth
record with
respect to his
legitimation, the
name of the
father and his
acknowledgmen
t, and the use of
the last name
"Braza";
 adversarial in nature, upheld the lower
HELD: NO. courts grant of the petition.
x Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil x It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases
Code15 charts the are vastly different from
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may those obtaining in the present case.
be cancelled or corrected.
The proceeding contemplated therein may generally
be used only to correct ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO,
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which PHILIPPINES, respondent.
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the G.R. No.
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a 174689
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the October 22,
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious 2007 FIRST
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial DIVISION
proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.16 FACTS:
x The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court x Silverio was born a male with Rommel Jacinto Dantes
clearly show that Silverio as his registered
petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between name
Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous x He is a male transsexual
and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with o underwent psychological examination,
which they ask the court to order Patrick to be hormone treatment and
subjected to a DNA test. breast augmentation in US
x Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is o underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in
for the correction of Bangkok, Thailand
Patricks birth records17 and that the rest of the o was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
prayers are merely incidental
and reconstruction surgeon in the
thereto.
Philippines, who issued a medical
x Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is
actually to seek certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone
the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as
the
void for being
procedure
bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which
x He then lived as a female and was engaged to be
causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but
married
by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March
x Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code,
name and sex in his birth
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a
certificate before RTC Manila Br. 8
Family Court as expressly provided in said
o sought to have his name in his birth
Code.1avvphi1
certificate changed from
x It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
as well as
from "male" to "female."
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
x RTC GRANTED
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
o Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that
and not through collateral attack such as the petition granting the petition would
filed before the court a quo.
be more in consonance with the
o Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is
principles of justice and equity.
misplaced.
With his sexual [re-assignment],
x Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against
petitioner, who has always felt,
the first wife for
thought and acted like a woman,
the return of one-half of the death benefits received
now possesses the physique of a
by the first after the death
female. Petitioners misfortune to
of the husband. Since the second wife contracted
be trapped in a mans body is not
marriage with the husband
his own doing and should not be
while the latters marriage to the first wife was still
in any way taken against him.
subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two
o Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no
marriages, it being essential to the determination of
harm, injury [or] prejudice
who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
will be caused to anybody or
x In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the
the community in granting
contention that
the
the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before
petition. On the contrary,
the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy,
granting the petition would
the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are
bring the
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in
their records of birth but to establish that they are 153
not the latters children, hence, there was nothing to
impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh
Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
cancellation of the name of Keh
Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother and the
substitution thereof with "Tiu
Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the
collateral attack was allowed
and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding
contemplated under Rule
108.
x In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who
sought the
correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that
their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because
their
parents were never legally married. Again,
considering that the changes sought to be made
were substantial and not merely innocuous, the
Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
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law allowing the
change of either name
much-awaited happiness or sex in the
on the part of the certificate of birth on
petitioner and her the ground of sex
[fianc] and the reassignment through
realization of their surgery. Thus, the
dreams. Court of Appeals
o Finally, no evidence was presented to granted the Republics
show any cause or ground to petition, set aside the
deny the present petition decision of the trial
despite due notice and court and ordered the
publication thereof. Even dismissal of SP Case
the State, through the No.
[OSG] has not seen fit to 02-105207. Petitioner
interpose any moved for
[o]pposition. reconsideration but it
x Republic filed a Rule 65 before CA was denied.
o It alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the ISSUE # 1: Whether Silverios name may be changed
birth certificate by reason of sex in view of his sex reassignment.
alteration.
x CA reversed RTC HELD # 1: NO.
o It ruled that the trial courts decision x Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment
lacked legal basis. There is no as the ground for his petition for change
 of name and sex. As found by the trial court: diffic
o Petitioner filed the present petition not ult to
to evade any law or write
judgment or any infraction or
thereof or for any unlawful pron
motive but solely for the ounc
purpose of making his birth e;
records compatible with his (2) The new first
present sex. (emphasis name or nickname has
supplied) been
x Petitioner believes that after having acquired the habitually
physical features of a female, and
he became entitled to the civil registry changes continuou
sought. sly used
o We disagree. by the
x The State has an interest in the names borne by petitioner
individuals and and he
entities for purposes of identification.11 has been
A change of name is a privilege, not a publicly
right.12 Petitions for change of name are known by
controlled by statutes.13 In this that first
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code name or
provides: nickname in the
o ART. 376. No person can change his community; or
name or surname without (3) The change
judicial authority. will avoid confusion.
x This Civil Code provision was amended by RA x Petitioners basis in praying for the
9048 (Clerical Error Law). In change of his first name was his sex
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: reassignment. He intended to
o SECTION 1. Authority to Correct make his first name compatible
Clerical or Typographical Error and with the sex he
Change of First Name or thought he transformed
Nickname. - No entry in a himself into through surgery.
civil register shall be However, a change of
changed or corrected name does not alter ones legal
without a judicial order, capacity or civil status.18 RA
except for clerical or 9048 does not
typographical errors and sanction a change of first name
change of first name or on the ground of sex
nickname which can be reassignment.
corrected or changed by the Rather than avoiding confusion,
concerned city changing petitioners first name
or municipal civil registrar or for his declared
consul general in accordance purpose may only create grave
with the complications in the civil registry
provisions of this Act and its and the public
implementing rules and interest.
regulations. x Before a person can legally change his
x RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 given name, he must present proper
It vests the power and or reasonable cause or any
authority to entertain petitions for compelling reason justifying such
change of first name to the city or change.19 In addition, he must
municipal civil registrar or consul show that he will be prejudiced by
general concerned. Under the law, the use of his
therefore, true and official name.20 In this
jurisdiction over applications for change of case, he failed to show, or even
first name is now primarily lodged with allege, any
the aforementioned administrative prejudice that he might suffer as
officers. The intent and effect of the law is a result of using his true and
to exclude the change of first name from official name.
the x In sum, the petition in the trial court in so
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of far as it prayed for the change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or petitioners first name was not
Correction of Entries in the Civil within that courts primary
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until jurisdiction as the
and unless an administrative petition petition should have been filed
for change of name is first filed with the local civil registrar
and subsequently denied.15 It likewise concerned, assuming
lays down the corresponding it could be legally done. It was
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, an improper remedy because the
the remedy and the proceedings proper remedy
regulating change of first name are was administrative, that is, that
primarily administrative in nature, provided under RA 9048. It was
not judicial. also filed in the
x RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which wrong venue as the proper
change of first name may be venue was in the Office of the
allowed: Civil Registrar of
o SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of Manila where his birth certificate
First Name or Nickname. - The is kept. More importantly, it had
petition for change of first no merit since
name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds
the first name or nickname to
be ridiculous,
tainted with
dishonor or
extremely
 (16) changes of name.
the use of his true and official name does not x The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of under Article 407 of the Civil
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so Code include even those that occur
far as the change of his first name was concerned. after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can
ISSUE # 2: Whether Silverios sex in his birth certificate may be changed justify the conclusion that it covers the
under RA 9048. correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
HELD # 2: NO. x To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
x The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth remove the faults or
certificate is error from" while to change means "to
a legal issue and the court must look to the replace something with
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of something else of the same kind or with
the Civil Code provides: something that serves as a substitute."26 The
o ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be birth certificate of petitioner contained no
changed or error. All entries therein, including those
corrected without a judicial order. corresponding to his first name and sex, were
x Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was all correct. No correction is necessary.
amended by RA x Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are the civil registry of certain
involved. The correction or acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments
change of such matters can now be made through of illegitimate children and
administrative proceedings naturalization), events (such as births,
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA marriages, naturalization and deaths) and
9048 removed from the judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction annulments of marriage, declarations
of such errors.22 Rule of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
108 now applies only to substantial changes and naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
corrections in entries civil interdiction, judicial determination of
in the civil register.23 filiation and changes of name). These
x Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or acts, events and judicial decrees produce
typographical error" is: legal consequences that touch upon
x SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
following terms shall person. Their effects are expressly
mean: sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
o (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a reassignment is not among those acts or
mistake events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
committed in the performance of clerical recognized nor even mentioned by
work in writing, copying, any law, expressly or impliedly.
transcribing or typing an entry in the x "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the
civil register that is harmless legal situation (that is, the sum
and innocuous, such as misspelled name total of capacities and incapacities) of a
or misspelled place of person in view of his age, nationality and his
birth or the like, which is visible to the family membership.27
eyes or obvious to the x The status of a person in law includes all his personal
understanding, and can be corrected or qualities and relations,
changed only by reference more or less permanent in nature, not
to other existing record or records: ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
Provided, however, That no his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
correction must involve the change of being married or not. The
nationality, age, status or sex of the comprehensive term status include such
petitioner. (emphasis supplied) matters as the beginning and end of
x Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the legal personality, capacity to have rights in
change of general, family relations, and its
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
a substantial adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule and sometimes even succession.28
108 of the Rules of (emphasis supplied)
Court.
x The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and 154
correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:24
o ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
o ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the
civil register:
(1) Births;
(2) marriages;
(3) deaths;
(4) legal separations;
(5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages
void from the
beginning;
(7) legitimations;
(8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural
children;
(10) naturalization;
(11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and
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be sufficient for the
registration of a birth
x A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage in the civil register.
and family relations. It Such
is a part of a persons legal capacity declaration shall be
and civil status. In this connection, exempt from
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: documentary stamp
o ART. 413. All other matters pertaining tax and shall
to the registration of civil be sent to the local
status shall be governed by special civil registrar not later
laws. than thirty days after
x But there is no such special law in the Philippines the birth, by the
governing sex physician or midwife
reassignment and its effects. This in attendance at the
is fatal to petitioners cause. x birth or by either
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 parent of the newborn
(the Civil Register Law) provides: child.
o SEC. 5. Registration and certification o In such declaration, the
of births. - The declaration of person above mentioned shall
the physician or midwife in certify to the
attendance at the birth or, in following facts: (a)
default date and hour of
thereof, the declaration of birth; (b) sex and
either parent of the newborn nationality of infant;
child, shall (c) names,
 citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother
alone; (d) civil status of
parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be
required in the regulations to
be issued.
x Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is
a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth.29
Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of
the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination
of a persons sex made at the time of his
or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
x When words are not defined in a statute they are
to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the
Civil Register Law and laws concerning
the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being
no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum
of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between
male and female."33 Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young"34
and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do
not
include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words
that are employed in a statute which had
at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language
of the Civil Register Law was enacted
in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the
term
"sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the
category "female."
x For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus,
there is no legal basis for his petition for
the correction or change of the entries in
his birth certificate.
ISSUE # 3: Whether equity may be invoked by
Silverio in seeking the change of his name and
sex.
HELD # 3: NO.
x The trial court opined that its grant of the petition
was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
o This is wrong.
x The changes sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male
fianc. However, marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a
special
contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman.37
One of its
essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a
male and a female.38 To grant
the changes sought by petitioner
will
substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family
relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has
undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-
female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there
are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the
provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under
the Revised
Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41
among others. These laws
underscore the
public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially
affected if
petitioners petition were to be
granted.
x It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code
mandates that "[n]o judge or
court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the
law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts
is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
x In our system of government, it is for the
legislature, should it choose to do so,
to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of
the effects of sex reassignment.
The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute-
based.
x To reiterate, the statutes define who may
file petitions for change of first name
and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry,
where they may be
filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be
presented and what
procedures shall be observed.
If the legislature intends to
confer on a person
 not implead the local civil registrar. Section
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
to change his name and sex to conform with his registrar and all persons who have or claim
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying any interest which would be affected thereby
down the guidelines in turn governing the shall be made parties to the proceedings.
conferment of that privilege. Likewise, the local civil
x It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a registrar is required to be made a party in
protocol on when a a proceeding for the correction of
person may be recognized as having successfully name in the civil registry. He is an
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority indispensable party without whom no final
to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. determination of the case can be had.[12]
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It Unless all possible indispensable
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co- parties were duly notified of the
equal branch of government, Congress. proceedings, the same shall be considered
x Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to as
a life of happiness, falling much too short of the requirements
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No of the rules.13 The corresponding
argument about that. The petition should also implead as
Court recognizes that there are people whose respondents the civil registrar and all other
preferences and orientation do not persons who may have or may claim to have
fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of any interest that would be affected
social convention and thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve Court which states that courts shall construe
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the Rules liberally to promote their
the legislature, not by the courts. objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JENNIFER there is substantial compliance with
B. CAGANDAHAN, Respondent Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy
G.R. No. of the petition to the local civil
166676 registrar.
September 12, x The determination of a persons sex appearing in his
2008 SECOND birth certificate is a legal
DIVISION issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of
FACTS: the Civil Code provides:
x Jennifer Cagandahan was born a female o ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall
o She then developed male characteristics AND be changed or corrected
was diagnosed with without a judicial order.
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) x Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this
which is a condition where provision was amended by
persons thus afflicted possess both male Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical
and female characteristics or typographical errors are
o her ovarian structures had minimized, she has involved. The correction or change of such
stopped growing matters can now be made through
and she has no breast or menstrual development administrative proceedings and without the
o for all interests and appearances as well as in need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act
mind and emotion, No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
she has become a male person 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
x Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
Birth Certificate before substantial changes and corrections in
RTC Siniloan, Laguna Br 33 entries in the civil register.18
x RTC GRANTED x Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
o The Court is convinced that petitioner has registry involving the change of
satisfactorily shown that sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. error. It is a substantial change for which
Petitioner has adequately the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
presented to the Court very clear and the Rules of Court.19
convincing proofs for the x The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code
granting of his petition. It was medically and correctable under Rule
proven that petitioners 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
body produces male hormones, and first in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
his body as well as his Code:
action and feelings are that of a male. o ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial
He has chosen to be male. decrees concerning the civil
He is a normal person and wants to be status of persons shall be recorded in the
acknowledged and civil register.
identified as a male. o ART. 408. The following shall be entered
x Republic filed a Rule 45 before SC in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3)
ISSUE: Whether Cangandahans petition should prosper deaths; (4) legal
considering the circumstances obtaining. separations;
(5)
HELD: YES. annulments of
x The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for marriage; (6)
non-compliance judgments
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court declaring
because respondents petition did marriages
void from the
155
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
determina
tion of
beginning; filiation;
(7) (15)
legitimation voluntary
s; (8) emancipat
adoptions; ion of a
(9) minor;
acknowledg and (16)
ments of changes
natural of name.
children; x The acts, events or factual errors
(10) contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
naturalizati Code include even those that occur after
on; (11) birth.20
loss, or x Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This
(12) condition causes the early or
recovery of "inappropriate" appearance of
male characteristics. A person,
citizenship; like
(13) civil respondent, with this condition
interdiction produces too much androgen, a
; (14) male
judicial hormone. A newborn who has XX
 chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
has a
(1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia
often appearing more male than female;
(2) normal internal structures of the
female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as
the
child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000
to
18,000 children are born with CAH.
x CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve
intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the
term "intersexuality" to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either
male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose
sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. An organism with
intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
x Intersex individuals are treated in different ways
by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.[23] Since the rise of
modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with
ambiguous external genitalia have had
their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.[24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to
be treated, whether by surgery and/or by
taking lifetime medication in order to
mold the individual as neatly as possible
into the category of either male or
female.
x In deciding this case, we consider the
compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial.
"It has been suggested that there
is some middle ground between the sexes,
a no-mans land for those individuals
who are neither truly male nor truly
female."[25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels
that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this
Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
x In the instant case, if we determine respondent to
be a female, then there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine,
based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent
to be other than female, then a change in
the subjects birth certificate entry is in
order.
x Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a
mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents
body system
naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and
the phenotypic features of a male.
x Ultimately, we are of the view that where
the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender
classification
would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the
age
of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent
here
thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body
produces high
levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant
biological
support for considering him
as being male. Sexual
development in cases of
intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
x Respondent here has simply let nature
take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born
with. And
accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have
undergone treatment and taken
steps, like taking lifelong
medication,[26] to force his
body into the categorical mold
of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in
respondents
development to reveal more
fully his male characteristics.
x In the absence of a law on the matter, the
Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately
private as ones sexuality and
lifestyle
preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due
to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing
to undergo treatment in order to
become or
remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to
undergo
treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species.
Respondent is the
one who has to live with his
intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right
to the pursuit of happiness and
of health. Thus, to him should
belong the
primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that
respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show
that classifying
respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who
are equally
entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid
and justified the
 respondents position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
x In so ruling we do no more than give respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondents congenital condition
and his mature decision to be a male.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, vs. DR.
NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
G.R.
198010
August 12,
2013 THIRD
DIVISION
FACTS:
Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in
this case.
x As for respondents change of name under Rule 103,
this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter
of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial
courts grant of
respondents change of name from Jennifer
to Jeff implies a change of
a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence
that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change
will conform with the change of the entry in
his birth certificate from
female to male.
No.
x Uys birth certificate shows that her full name is
"Anita Sy" when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma
S. Lugsanay."
o Her passport and other IDs all bear the
name "Norma S.
Lugsanay."
x Uy then filed Petition for Correction of Entry in her
Certificate of Live Birth (for
correction of NAME) before RTC Gingoog City
o allegedly filed earlier a petition for
correction of entries with the
Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to
effect the
corrections on her name and
citizenship which was
supposedly
granted
o BUT NSO did not make the necessary
corrections
o She also alleged that she is an
illegitimate child considering that
her parents were never married,
so she had to follow the surname
of her mother.10
o She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese,
and all her siblings bear the surname
Lugsanay and are all Filipinos
x RTC granted
o The RTC concluded that respondents
petition would neither
prejudice the government nor any
third party. It also held that the
names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and
"Anita Sy" refer to one and the
same person, especially since the
Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog
City has effected the correction.
Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been
known since childhood as "Norma
Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino
citizen, the RTC granted the
petition
to avoid confusion
x Republic appealed to CA
x CA affirmed RTC in toto
 o The CA held that respondents failure to implead blood siblings who bear the surname
other "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship
indispensable parties was cured upon the of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The
publication of the Order changes, however, are obviously not mere
setting the case for hearing in a clerical as they touch on respondents filiation
newspaper of general circulation and citizenship. In changing her
for three (3) consecutive weeks and by surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of
serving a copy of the notice her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is
to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the surname of her mother), she, in effect,
the City Prosecutors changes her status from legitimate to
Office.17 illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship
o As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on from Chinese to Filipino, the same
respondents affects her rights and obligations in this
filiation, the CA ruled in favor of country. Clearly, the changes are
respondent, considering that her substantial.
parents were not legally married and x It has been settled in a number of cases starting with
that her siblings birth Republic v. Valencia20 that
certificates uniformly state that their even substantial errors in a civil registry
surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship may be corrected and the true facts
is Filipino established provided the parties aggrieved
x Republic filed an MR by the error avail themselves of the
o CA denied appropriate adversary proceeding.21 The
x Republic filed a Rule 45 before the SC pronouncement of the Court in that case is
illuminating:
ISSUE: Whether Uys failure to implead indispensable parties, o It is undoubtedly true that if the subject
viz, her parents and siblings, was cured by the subsequent matter of a petition is not
publication. for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and
HELD: NO. innocuous nature, but one
x In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in involving nationality or
her birth certificate, citizenship, which is
particularly those pertaining to her first name, indisputably substantial as well
surname and citizenship. She as controverted, affirmative relief
sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name
which she has been known cannot be granted in a
for since childhood, including her legal documents proceeding summary in nature.
such as passport and school However, it
and professional records. She likewise relied on the 156
birth certificates of her full
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Henedino M. Brondial)
is also true that a right in law
may be enforced and a wrong
may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is
used. This Court adheres to
the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected
and the true facts
established provided the
parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. x x
x Rules of
x What is meant by "appropriate adversary
proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
o One having opposing parties;
contested, as distinguished from an
ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the
other party, and
afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption
proceeding.22
x In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA
relied on the Courts conclusion in
Republic v. Kho,23 Alba v. Court
of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court
of Appeals,25
that the failure to implead
indispensable parties was cured
by the publication of
the notice of hearing pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Court. In Republic v. Kho,26
petitioner therein appealed
the RTC decision
granting the petition for
correction of entries despite
respondents failure to
implead the minors mother as
an indispensable party. The
Court, however, did
 not strictly apply the provisions of Rule general default and eventually
108, because it opined that it was highly granted respondents petition
improbable that the mother was unaware deleting the entry on the date and
of the proceedings to correct the place of marriage of parties;
entries in her childrens birth certificates correcting his surname from
especially since the notices, orders and "Magpayo" to "Coseteng";
decision of the trial court were all sent to deleting the entry
the residence she shared with them.27 "Coseteng" for middle name; and
x In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda
nothing wrong with the trial Magpayo,
courts decision granting the petition for Jr." in the space for his father. The
correction of entries filed by respondent Republic of the Philippines,
although the proceedings was not through the OSG,
actually known by petitioner. In that case, assailed the RTC decision on the
petitioners mother and guardian was grounds that the corrections
impleaded in the petition for correction made on
of entries, and notices were sent to her respondents birth certificate had
address appearing in the subject birth the effect of changing the civil
certificate. However, the notice was status from
returned unserved, because apparently legitimate to illegitimate and must
she no longer lived there. Thus, when only be effected through an
she allegedly learned of the granting of appropriate
the petition, she sought the annulment of adversary proceeding. The Court
judgment which the Court denied. nullified the RTC decision for
Considering that the petition for respondents
correction of entries is a proceeding in failure to comply strictly with the
rem, the procedure laid down in Rule 108
Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction of the Rules of
over the person of the petitioner is, Court. Aside from the wrong
therefore, not required and the remedy availed of by respondent
absence of personal service was cured as he filed a
by the petition for Change of Name
trial courts compliance with Rule 108 under Rule 103 of the Rules of
which requires notice by publication.29 Court, assuming that
x In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court he filed a petition under Rule 108
addressed the question of whether which is the appropriate remedy,
the court acquired jurisdiction over the petition
petitioner and all other indispensable still failed because of improper
parties venue and failure to implead the
to the petition for correction of entries Civil Registrar of
despite the failure to implead them in said Makati City and all affected
parties as respondents in the
case. While recognizing that petitioner case.
was indeed an indispensable party, the x In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed
failure to implead her was cured by a petition for the cancellation and
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 annulment of the birth
which requires notice by publication. In so certificate of respondent on the
ruling, the Court pointed out that the ground that the same
petitioner in a petition for correction was made as an instrument of
cannot be presumed to be aware of all the crime of simulation of birth
the parties whose interests may be and, therefore,
affected by the granting of a petition. It invalid and spurious, and it
emphasized that the petitioner therein falsified all material entries
exerted earnest effort to comply with the therein. The RTC issued
provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the an order setting the case for
publication of the notice of hearing was hearing with a directive that the
considered to have cured the failure to implead same be published
indispensable parties. and that any person who is
x In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of interested in the petition may
Gingoog City who interpose his comment
was impleaded as respondent in the or opposition on or before the
petition below. This, scheduled hearing. Summons was
notwithstanding, the RTC granted her likewise sent to
petition and allowed the correction sought the Civil Register of Manila. After
by respondent, which decision was which, the trial court granted the
affirmed in toto by the CA. petition and
o We do not agree with the RTC and the nullified respondents birth
CA. certificate. Few months after,
x This is not the first time that the Court is respondent filed a
confronted with the issue involved in petition for the annulment of
this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and judgment claiming that she and
Barco, the Court has addressed the same her guardian were
in not notified of the petition and
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila the trial courts decision, hence,
v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. the latter was
Republic.33 issued without jurisdiction and in
x In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that violation of her right to due
his parents were never process. The Court
legally married, respondent therein annulled the trial courts decision
filed a petition to change his name for failure to comply with the
from requirements of
"Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Rule 108, especially the non-
Magpayo," the name appearing in his impleading of respondent herself
birth whose birth
certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson certificate was nullified.1wphi1
Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice
setting the petition for hearing was
published and there being no opposition
thereto, the trial court issued an order of
 MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
x In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
the correction of OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
entries in the birth certificates of her children, REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
status from "married" to "single," and the date and SECOND DIVISION
place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage."
The Court modified the trial courts decision by FACTS:
nullifying the portion thereof which directs the change x Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who
of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her married respondent Maria Paz
child, because it was the OSG only that was made Galela Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004.
respondent and the proceedings taken was summary o The marriage did not sit well with
in nature which is short of what is required in cases petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki
where substantial alterations are sought. could not bring his wife to Japan where he
x Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is resides.
Anita Sy, that she is a x In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Maekara.
Sotera Lugsanay. In filing x Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
the petition, however, she seeks the correction of and Maekara were married
her first name and surname, on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her x Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
citizenship from "Chinese" reestablish their
to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have relationship.
impleaded and notified not x In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan
only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents
and siblings as the which declared the marriage between
persons who have interest and are affected by the Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
changes or bigamy.
x Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
corrections respondent wanted to make.
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign
x The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
newspaper of Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
x RTC dismissed the petition
general circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature of the o citing the provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity
proceedings taken.37
of Void Marriages and
x A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
shows that the Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: SC) which provides that a
o one given to the persons named in the petition petition for declaration of
and absolute nullity of void marriage
o another given to other persons who are not may be filed solely by the
named in the husband or the wife, in this case
petition but nonetheless may be either Maekara or Marinay.
considered interested or affected x Fujiki filed an MR
parties.38 o argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Summons must, therefore, be served Correction of Entries in the
not for Civil Registry) of the Rules of
the purpose of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is
vesting the courts the "procedural
with jurisdiction but implementation" of the Civil
to comply with the Register Law (Act No. 3753) in
requirements of fair play and relation to Article 413 of the
due process to afford the Civil Code.
person concerned the o The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on
the "successful petitioner
opportunity to protect his
for divorce or annulment of
interest if he so chooses.39
x While there may be cases where the Court held that the marriage to send a copy of the
failure to implead and final decree of the court to the
notify the affected or interested parties may be local registrar of the
cured by the publication of the municipality where the dissolved
notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by or annulled marriage was
petitioners in bringing to court solemnized."
all possible interested parties.40 Such failure was o Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
likewise excused where the entries in the civil registry
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections relating to "marriages,"
proceedings;41 when there is no actual or "judgments of annulments of
presumptive awareness of the existence of the marriage"
interested and "judgments declaring
parties;42 or when a party is inadvertently left out.43 marriages void from the
x It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition beginning" are
for cancellation or subject to cancellation or correction. The
correction of an entry in the civil register involves petition in the RTC sought
substantial and controversial 157
alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108
ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in
the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set
open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching
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x Fujiki filed a Rule 45 before the SC
x SolGen filed a Comment
(among others) to annotate o contended that the petition to
the judgment of the Japanese recognize the Japanese Family
Family Court
Court on the certificate of judgment may be made in a
marriage between Marinay Rule 108 proceeding.
and Maekara. o Corpuz v. Santo Tomas: The
x RTC denied MR recognition of the foreign divorce
o The RTC considered the petition as a decree may be made
collateral attack on the in a Rule 108
validity of marriage between proceeding itself, as
Marinay and Maekara. The the object
trial court held that this is a of special
"jurisdictional ground" to proceedings (such as
dismiss the petition.28 that in Rule 108 of
Moreover, the verification and the Rules of
certification against forum Court) is precisely
shopping of the petition was to establish the
not authenticated as required status or right of a
under Section 529 of A.M. No. party or a
02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also particular fact.
warranted the o While Corpuz concerned a
"immediate dismissal" of the petition foreign divorce decree, in the
under the same provision. present
 case the Japanese Family successors in interest by a
Court judgment also subsequent title."
affected the civil Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
status of the parties, of Court states that "the judgment
especially Marinay, who is a or final order may be repelled by
Filipino citizen. evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
o The Solicitor General asserted that want of notice to the party,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
the procedure to record of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
"[a]cts, events and courts exercise limited review on
judicial decrees foreign judgments. Courts are not
concerning the civil allowed to delve into the merits of
status of persons" in a foreign judgment.
the civil registry as x Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng
required by Article 407 of the Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
Civil Code. In other words, foreign divorce decrees
"[t]he law requires the entry between a Filipino and a
in the civil registry of judicial foreign citizen if they are
decrees that successfully proven under
produce legal consequences the rules of evidence.64
upon a persons legal Divorce involves the
capacity and dissolution of a marriage, but
status x x x." The Japanese the recognition of a foreign
Family Court judgment divorce decree does
directly bears not involve the extended
on the civil status of a procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-
Filipino citizen and should 10-SC or the rules of
therefore be ordinary trial. While the
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 Philippines does not have a
proceeding. divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a
ISSUE # 1: Whether the Rule on Declaration of foreign divorce decree under the
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and second paragraph of Article 26 of
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11- the Family Code, to capacitate a
10-SC) is applicable in the present case. Filipino citizen to remarry when
his or her foreign spouse obtained
HELD # 1: NO. a divorce decree abroad
x The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void x There is therefore no reason to disallow
Marriages and Annulment of Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10- Japanese Family Court judgment
SC) does not apply in a petition to nullifying the marriage between
recognize a foreign judgment relating to Marinay and
the status of a marriage where one of Maekara on the ground of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign bigamy. While the Philippines has
country. no divorce law, the
x For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign Japanese Family Court judgment
judgment relating to the status of a is fully consistent with Philippine
marriage where one of the parties is a public policy,
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner as bigamous marriages are
only needs to prove the foreign judgment declared void from the beginning
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be under Article 35(4)
more specific, a copy of the foreign of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
judgment may be admitted in evidence crime under Article 349 of the
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Revised Penal
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. the existence of the Japanese
x A foreign judgment relating to the status of a Family Court judgment in
marriage affects the civil status, accordance with Rule 132,
condition and legal capacity of its Sections 24 and 25, in relation
parties. However, the effect of a to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
foreign Rules of Court.
judgment is not automatic. To extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the ISSUE # 2: Whether the Regional Trial Court
Philippines, Philippine courts must can recognize the foreign judgment in a
determine if the foreign judgment is proceeding for cancellation or correction of
consistent with domestic public policy and entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
other mandatory laws. of the Rules of Court.
x A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of
the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
x Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates
a "presumptive evidence of a right
as
between the parties and their
 necessary to prevent circumvention of the
HELD # 2: YES. jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
x Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
proof of fact of the 8369), as a petition for
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding cancellation or correction of entries in the
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil civil registry may be filed in the Regional
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Trial Court "where the corresponding civil
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] registry is located." In other words, a Filipino
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular mere expedient of changing his entry of
fact." marriage in the civil registry.
x Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life x However, this does not apply in a petition for
which are recorded correction or cancellation of a civil
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act registry entry based on the recognition of a
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence foreign judgment annulling a
such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor of the foreign country. There is
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared neither circumvention of the substantive and
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree procedural safeguards of marriage
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule Family Courts under R.A. No.
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
the status or right of a party or a particular fact." not an action to nullify a marriage.
x Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: It is an action for Philippine courts to
o Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person recognize the effectivity of a foreign
interested in any judgment, which presupposes a case which
act, event, order or decree concerning the was already tried and decided under
civil status of persons which has been foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-
recorded in the civil register, may file a 10-SC does not apply in a petition
verified petition for the cancellation or to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
correction of any entry relating thereto, bigamous marriage where one of the
with the Regional Trial Court of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
province where the corresponding civil Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied) jurisdiction of the foreign court.
x Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court ISSUE # 3: Whether RTC can recognize the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Rules of Court.
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of HELD # 3: YES.
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil x In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese City, Negros Occidental, this
Family Court. Court held that a "trial court has no
x There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
material interest in proceeding for cancellation or correction of
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
contracted and the property Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt x can be questioned only in a direct
that he is interested in the action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage relied on Braza in dismissing the
in the civil registry, which petition for recognition of foreign judgment as
compromises the public record of his marriage. a collateral attack on the marriage between
The interest derives from the Marinay and Maekara.
substantive right of the spouse not only to x Braza is not applicable because Braza does not
preserve (or dissolve, in limited involve a recognition of a foreign
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
also to protect his property where one of the parties is a citizen of the
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he foreign country.
contracts marriage. These x To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of
property interests in marriage include the right to be an entry in the
supported "in keeping with civil registry cannot substitute for an action
the financial capacity of the family" and preserving to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
the property regime of the necessary to prevent circumvention of the
marriage. substantive and
x The case of Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan procedural safeguards of marriage under the
City, Negros Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Occidental where the Court held that a "trial court and other related laws. Among these
has no jurisdiction to nullify safeguards are the requirement of proving
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or the limited grounds for the dissolution of
correction of entry under marriage,83 support pendente lite of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
case at bar because Braza partition and distribution of the
does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment 158
nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
x To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry
in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related
laws.
x A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also
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There is neither circumvention of
the substantive and procedural
properties of the spouses,85 and the safeguards of marriage under
investigation of the public prosecutor to Philippine law, nor of the
determine collusion.86 A direct action jurisdiction of Family
for declaration of nullity or annulment of Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment
marriage is also necessary to prevent is not an action
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the to nullify a marriage. It is an
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act action for Philippine courts to
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a recognize the
petition for cancellation or correction of effectivity of a foreign judgment,
entries in the civil registry may be filed in which presupposes a case which
the Regional Trial Court "where the was
corresponding civil registry is located."87 already tried and decided under
In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot foreign law. The procedure in A.M.
dissolve his marriage by the mere No. 02-
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the 11-10-SC does not apply in a
civil registry. petition to recognize a foreign
x However, this does not apply in a petition for judgment annulling
correction or cancellation a bigamous marriage where one
of a civil registry entry based on the of the parties is a citizen of the
recognition of a foreign judgment foreign country.
annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
 Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the foreign judgment does not
jurisdiction of the foreign court. contravene domestic public policy.
x Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction A critical difference
on Philippine courts to extend between the case of a foreign
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to divorce decree and a foreign
a Filipino spouse without undergoing judgment nullifying a
trial to determine the validity of the bigamous marriage is that
dissolution of the marriage. The second bigamy, as a ground for the nullity
of marriage, is fully
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family consistent with Philippine public
Code provides that "[w]here a marriage policy as expressed in Article
35(4) of the Family
between a Filipino citizen and a Code and Article 349 of the
foreigner is validly celebrated and a Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
divorce is spouse has the
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the option to undergo full trial by
alien spouse capacitating him or her to filing a petition for declaration of
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have nullity of
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-
In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court 10-SC, but this is not the only
recognized the legislative intent of the remedy available
second paragraph of Article 26 which is to him or her. Philippine courts
"to avoid the absurd situation where the have jurisdiction to recognize a
Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign judgment
alien spouse who, after obtaining a nullifying a bigamous marriage,
divorce, is no longer married to the without prejudice to a criminal
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his prosecution for
or her country. The second paragraph of bigamy.
Article 26 of the Family Code only x In the recognition of foreign judgments,
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the Philippine courts are incompetent to
effects of a foreign divorce decree substitute their judgment on
precisely because the Philippines does not how a case was decided under
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot foreign law. They
try the case on the merits because it is cannot decide on the "family
tantamount to trying a case for divorce. rights and duties, or on the
x The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a status, condition and
corrective measure to address the legal capacity" of the foreign
anomaly that results from a marriage citizen who is a party to the
between a Filipino, whose laws do not foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are
allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, limited to the question of
whose laws allow divorce. The whether to extend the
anomaly effect of a foreign judgment in
consists in the Filipino spouse being the Philippines. In a foreign
tied to the marriage while the foreign judgment relating to the status of
spouse is free to marry under the laws a marriage involving a citizen of a
of his or her country. The correction is foreign country, Philippine courts
made by extending in the Philippines only decide whether to extend its
the effect of the foreign divorce decree, effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii
which is already effective in the expressed in Article 15 of the
country where it was rendered. The Civil Code.
second x For this purpose, Philippine courts will
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family only determine
Code is based on this Courts decision o (1) whether the foreign
in judgment is inconsistent with an
Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared overriding public policy in the
that the Filipino spouse "should not be Philippines; and
discriminated against in her own o (2) whether any alleging party
country if the ends of justice are to be is able to prove an extrinsic
served."91 ground to repel the
x The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code foreign judgment, i.e.
applies in a marriage between a want of jurisdiction,
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a want of notice to the
foreign judgment nullifying the party, collusion,
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The fraud, or clear
Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad mistake of law
to declare the marriage void on the or fact.
ground of bigamy. The principle in the x If there is neither inconsistency with
second paragraph of Article 26 of the public policy nor adequate proof
Family Code applies because the foreign to repel the judgment,
spouse, after the foreign judgment Philippine courts should, by
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to default, recognize
remarry under the laws of his or her the foreign judgment as part of
country. If the foreign judgment is not the comity of nations. Section
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino 48(b),
spouse will be discriminatedthe Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
foreign spouse can remarry while the states that the foreign
Filipino spouse cannot remarry. judgment is
x Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines to the extent that the
 adversary proceeding
already "presumptive evidence of a right between required. Considering that
the parties." Upon respondents identity was used
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right by an
becomes conclusive and the unknown person to contract
judgment serves as the basis for the correction or marriage with a Korean
cancellation of entry in the national, it
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign would not be feasible for
judgment nullifying a bigamous respondent to institute an
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a action for
new status, right and fact92 that needs to be declaration of nullity of
reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will marriage since it is not one
be an of the void marriages under
inconsistency between the recognition of the Articles 35 and 36 of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public Family Code
records in the Philippines.1wphi1 x Republic filed a Rule 45 before the SC
x However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous ISSUE # 1: Whether Rule 108 applies only in cases where
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for there are errors in entries sought to be cancelled or
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal corrected.
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a HELD # 1: NO.
ground for extinction
of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the ISSUE # 2: Whether the cancellation of all entries in the
Revised Penal Code. wife portion of the alleged marriage contract results in
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the declaration of nullity of the subject marriage.
"[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run HELD # 2: NO.
when the offender is absent from the Philippine x It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings
archipelago." and a hearing may be
x Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no dispensed with, and the remedy [is]
longer sees the need to granted upon mere application or motion.
address the questions on venue and the contents and However, a special proceeding is not
form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, always summary. The procedure laid
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. inclusion as parties of all persons who may
OLAYBAR, Respondent. G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014 claim interest which would be affected by
THIRD DIVISION the
cancellation or correction; it also requires
FACTS: the civil registrar and any
x Upon requesting for a Certificate of No Marriage from the person in interest to file their opposition, if
NSO, respondent any; and it states that
learned that she was allegedly married to a Korean although the court may make orders
national named Ye Son Sune before the MTCC. expediting the proceedings, it is
x Denying having contracted said marriage and personally after hearing that the court shall either
knowing said Ye Son dismiss the petition or issue an
Sune, respondent filed with the RTC Cebu a Petition order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, procedural requirements
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof, in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
impleading both Local Civil Registrar of Cebu and the alleged adversary proceeding to
husband effect substantial corrections and changes in
x RTC granted respondents petition entries of the civil
o Finding that the signature appearing in the register.22
subject marriage x In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of
contract was not that of respondent, the the certificate of marriage
court found basis in are admittedly the personal circumstances of
granting the latters prayer to straighten respondent. The latter, however,
her record and rectify the terrible claims that her signature was forged and she
mistake was not the one who contracted
x Republic filed an MR on the ff grounds: marriage with the purported husband. In
o (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical other words, she claims that no such
and other marriage was entered into or if there was, she
innocuous errors in the marriage was not the one who entered into
contract for it to fall within the such contract. It must be recalled that when
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of respondent tried to obtain a
Court; and CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that
o (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune.
the wife portion of She then sought the cancellation of entries
the alleged marriage contract is, in in the wife portion of the
effect, declaring the marriage void ab marriage certificate.
initio x In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule
x RTC denied MR 108, respondent made the
o RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
cognizance of cases for alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
correction of entries even on substantial
159
errors under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court being the appropriate
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certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
parties-respondents. It is likewise was established
undisputed that the procedural that, as she claimed in her
requirements petition, no such marriage was
set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. celebrated.
The Office of the Solicitor General was x Indeed the Court made a pronouncement
likewise notified of the petition which in in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v.
turn authorized the Office of the City Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Prosecutor to participate in the Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
proceedings. More importantly, trial was Registrar of Quezon City, and the
conducted where respondent herself, the Administrator and Civil Registrar
stenographer of the court where the General of the National Statistics
alleged marriage was conducted, as well Office24 that:
as a document examiner, testified. o To be sure, a petition for
Several documents were also considered correction or cancellation of an
as evidence. With the testimonies and entry in the civil
other evidence presented, the trial court registry cannot
found that the signature appearing in substitute for an
the subject marriage certificate was action to invalidate a
different from respondents signature marriage. A direct
appearing in some of her government action is necessary
issued identification cards.23 The court to
thus made a categorical conclusion that prevent
respondents signature in the marriage circumvention of
 the substantive and
procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws.
Among these
safeguards are the
requirement of proving the
limited
grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and
children, the liquidation,
partition
and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and
the
investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or
annulment of
marriage is also necessary to
prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family
Courts Act of
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation
or
correction of entries in the
civil registry may be filed in
the Regional
Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is
located. In
other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage
by the
mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the
civil
registry.
x Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such
evidence was presented to show
the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming
evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of
such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established
that the only "evidence" of marriage
which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court
where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the
parties
had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction
of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of
marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
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Section 1. Appointment of representative.
When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown,
and without having left an agent to administer
his
property, or the power conferred upon the
agent has expired, any interested party,
relative or
friend may petition the Court of First Instance
of the place where the absentee resided
before
his dis-appearance, for the appointment of a
person to represent him provisionally in all
that
may be necessary. In the City of Manila, the
petition shall be filed in the Juvenile and
Domestic
Relations Court.
Section 2. Declaration of absence; who may
petition. After the lapse of two (2) years
from his disapperance and without any news
about the absentee or since the receipt of the
last news, or of five (5) years in case the
absentee has left a person in charge of the
administration of his property, the
declaration of his absence and appointment
of a trustee or administrative may be
applied for by any of the following:
(a) The spouse present;
(b) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an
authentic copy of the same.
(c) The relatives who would succeed by the law of
intestacy; and
(d) Those who have over the property
of the absentee some right
subordinated to the condition of his
death.
Section 3. Contents of petition. The
petition for the appointment of a
representative, or for the declaration of
absence and the appointment of a trustee or
an administrator, must
show the following:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the
heirs instituted in the will, copy of which
shall be presented, and of the relatives who
would succeed by the law of intestacy;
(c) The names and residences of creditors and others who may 1. Writ of Amparo
have any adverse interest over the property of the absentee;
A
(d) The probable value, location and character of the property belonging .
to the absentee. M
.
Section 4. Time of hearing; notice and publication thereof.
When a petition for the appointment of a representative, or for N
the declaration of absence and the appointment of a trustee or o
administrator, is filed, the court shall fix a date and place for the .
hearing thereof where all concerned may appear to contest the
petition. 0
7
Copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for the hearing -
shall be served upon the known heirs, legatees, devisees, 9
creditors and other interested persons, at least ten (10) days -
before the day of the hearing, and shall be published once a week 1
for three (3) consecutive weeks prior to the time designated for 2
the hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province -
or city where the absentee resides, as the court shall deem best. S
C
Section 5. Opposition. Anyone appearing to contest the petition
shall state in writing his grounds therefor, and serve a copy
thereof on the petitioner and other interested parties on or before (
the date designated for the hearing. 2
5
Section 6. Proof at hearing; order. At the hearing, compliance
with the provisions of S
section 4 of this rule must first be shown. Upon satisfactory e
proof of the allegations in the p
petition, the court shall issue an order granting the same and t
appointing the representative, e
trustee or administrator for the absentee. The judge shall take m
the necessary measures to b
safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall e
specify the powers, obligations r
and remuneration of his representative, trustee or administrator,
regulating them by the rules concerning guardians. 2
0
In case of declaration of absence, the same shall not take effect 0
until six (6) months after its 7
publication in a newspaper of general circulation designated by )
the court and in the Official
Gazette. THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Section 7. Who may be appointed. In the appointment of a SECTION 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is
representative, the spouse a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation. If the liberty and security is violated or threatened with
absentee left no spouse, or violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
if the spouse present is a minor or otherwise incompetent, any or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
competent person may be
appointed by the court. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
In case of declaration of absence, the trustee or administrator of
the absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with SEC. 2. Who May File. - The petition may be filed by the
the preceding paragraph. aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:
Section 8. Termination of administration. The trusteeship or
administration of the Any member of the immediate family, namely: the
property of the absentee shall cease upon order of the court spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved
in any of the following cases: party;

(a) When the absentee appears personally or by Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
means of an agent; aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
(b) When the death of the absentee is mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear; or

(c) When a third person appears, showing Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's institution, if there is no known member of the
property by purchase or other title. immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.

In these cases the trustee or administrator shall cease in the The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends
performance of his office, and the property shall be placed at the right of all other authorized parties
the disposal of whose may have a right thereto. to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition
by an authorized party on behalf of
the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others,
______________________________________ observing the order established herein.

160
PREROGATIVE WRITS
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to determine the cause, manner,

SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed on
any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court
of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge
thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court
or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of
Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable
before such court or any justice thereof, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act
or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred.
location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any
When issued by the Supreme Court or any
of its justices, it may be returnable before
such
Court or any justice thereof, or before the
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or
any of
their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of
the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements
occurred.
SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. - The petitioner shall
be exempted from the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees when filing the petition.
The court, justice or judge shall docket the
petition and act upon it immediately.
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. - The petition
shall be signed and verified and shall allege
the following:
 to recover and preserve evidence
The personal circumstances of the petitioner; related to the death or disappearance
of the person
The name and personal circumstances of the identified in the petition which may
respondent responsible for the threat, act or aid in the prosecution of the person or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, persons
the respondent may be described by an assumed responsible;
appellation;
to identify witnesses and obtain
The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved statements from them
party violated or threatened with violation by an concerning the death or
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how disappearance;
such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;

The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the

names, personal circumstances, and addresses of
the investigating authority or individuals, as well as
the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;

The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to

determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.

SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the

petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if
on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court;
or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for
summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
later than seven (7) days from the date of its
issuance.

SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the

Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses
to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same,
shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for
contempt without prejudice to other
disciplinary actions.

SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be

served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or
by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge
who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally
on the respondent, the rules on substituted service
shall apply.

SEC. 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72)

hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall
file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits which shall, among other
things, contain the following:

The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did

not violate or threaten with violation the right to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through
any act or omission;

The steps or actions taken by the respondent to

determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission;

All relevant information in the possession of the

respondent pertaining to the threat, act or
omission against the aggrieved party; and

If the respondent is a public official or employee, the

return shall further state the actions that have been
or will still be taken:

to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

 SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or
disappearance; to identify and apprehend the person or persons judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.

involved in the death or disappearance; and to bring the
suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the
investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition
shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge
may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the
issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions
from the parties.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed
and given the same priority as petitions for habeas
SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All corpus.
defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be
deemed waived. SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or
at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or
SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
pleadings and motions are prohibited:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. - The court, justice or
Motion to dismiss; judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, immediate family be protected in a government agency
affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; or by an accredited person or private institution capable
of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is
Dilatory an organization, association or
institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule,
motion for the protection may be extended to the officers
involved.
postponeme
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and
nt; Motion for private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party
a bill of and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
particulars;
The accredited persons and private institutions shall
Counter comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
claim or
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon
cross- verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession or control of a designated land or
claim; other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
Third- property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

party The motion shall state in detail the place or places to

be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
complai testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of
the enforced
nt; disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

Reply; If the motion is opposed on the ground of national

security or of the privileged nature of the information,
Motion to declare the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
respondent in
The movant must show that the inspection order is
default; necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved
party alleged to be threatened or violated.
Intervention;
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons
Memorandum; authorized to make the inspection and the date, time,
place and manner of making the inspection and may
Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days
interim relief orders; and after the date of its issuance, unless extended for
justifiable reasons.
Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
161
against any interlocutory order.
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SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This

(c) Production Order. - The court, justice or judge,
upon verified motion and after due
hearing, may order any person in possession, custody
or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, or objects in digitized
or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return,
to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the
movant.
Rule shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe
other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. - The court,
justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio,
may refer the witnesses to the Department of
Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6981.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of The court, justice or judge may also refer
national security or of the privileged nature of the the witnesses to other government
information, in which case the court, justice or judge agencies, or to accredited persons or
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine private institutions capable of keeping and
the merit of the opposition. securing their safety.

SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to

Respondent. - Upon verified motion of the
respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice
or judge may issue an inspection order or production
order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding
section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall
be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the defenses of the
respondent.
SEC. 16. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may
order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or
who makes a false return, or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order
of the court to be punished for contempt. The
contemnor may be
imprisoned or imposed a fine.
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of
Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity
must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee
must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot
invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed to evade responsibility or
liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render
judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations
in the petition are proven by
rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.
SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. -
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is
not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. - This Rule
shall govern cases involving extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending
in the trial and appellate courts.
SEC. 27. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect
on October 24, 2007, following its publication in
three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
NOTES (Based on the Annotations of
Riguera and Albano; includes Authors own
comments and research)
x Amparo protection
o Borrowed from the Mexican law
x BASIS and NATURE: The "amparo de libertad"
transcends the
protection of habeas corpus. Once
a lawsuit is filed under Habeas
Corpus, Rule 102, Rules of Court,
the defendants, government
officers would merely submit the
usual defense of alibi or non-
custody of the body sought to be
produced.
o The 1987 Philippine
Constitution, however, empowers
the
Supreme Court of the
Philippines to promulgate amparo
and Habeas Data, as part of
the Rules of Court expressly:
Promulgate rules
concerning the protection
and
enforcement of constitutional
rights.
x Grounds:
o Extralegal killings
o Enforced disappearances

Writ of Amparo Writ of Habeas Corpus

the confinement OR
there is no color of withholding of restraint has
legality as to the a color of legality in that it
disappearance/ killing of is usually done under a
the party process or commitment
order

Writ of Amparo Search Warrant

protective; to protect
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the A as to purpose one's right to L,L,S
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be perio
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege dic
shall be denied. as to
revie concurrent RTC, SB, CA,
w ofjurisdiction SC
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the the
final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under archi where the threat or act was committed
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or vedas to venue
law or both. cases private/ public person
as to person
shall
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working be initiating
days from the date of notice of the adverse made personalty is merely
judgment. by as to seizure inspected or copied
theof personalty
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas ampa
corpus cases. ro
court
SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court that
shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if shall,
motu
upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid
cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to
appear due to threats on their lives.
criminal prosecution y seized
if
p
MTC/RTC where the crime s within
e
was committed (venue h the
r
being jurisdictional in criminal cases) a conte
s
l mplati
o
where the crime was l on of
n
committed Sectio
a
b n 3
l
e Rule
the police t
126
proprio or upon motion by any party, order their x May be enforced anywhere
revival when ready for further proceedings. The x CANNOT implead the President of the PH
petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon pursuant to the doctrine of
failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two presidential immunity (Rubrico vs. Pres GMA)
(2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order x MAY include the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP
archiving the case. Director,
notwithstanding their clear non-
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the involvement in the extralegal killing/
Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived
cases under this Rule not later than the first week
disappearance for the purpose of
of January of every year. determining who the author is
(Rubrico vs. Pres GMA)
SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This x Return must be made within 5 working days
Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate from receipt of the writ
criminal, civil or administrative actions. o General denial by the
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When
respondent is NOT allowed x Interim
a criminal action has been commenced, no Reliefs available:
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The o Temporary
reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in Protection Order
the criminal case. (TPO)
By
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ
motion or motu
of amparo. proprio
So that the aggrieved
SEC. 23. Consolidation. - When a criminal party or his immediate
action is filed subsequent to the filing of a family may be
petition for the writ, the latter shall be protected by a
consolidated with the criminal action.
government
When a criminal action and a separate civil action institution OR an
are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of accredited person
amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the or agency
criminal action. o Inspection Order (IO)
Upon verified motion
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule AFTER hearing (litigated
shall continue to apply to the disposition of the
motion)
reliefs in the petition.
For the inspection and
photographing of the
property or
relevant
object or
operation
thereto
DEFENSE of respondent:
national security or
evidentiary privilege
162
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r
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x REMEDY: n
conduct an in g
camera
hearing
o

I
n
o
c n
a e
m
e c
r o
a n
d
h u
e c
a t
e
 d evidentiary
privilege
i x
n
s REMEDY:
i conduct
d an in
e camera
t heari
h ng
e o
Witnes
c s
h Protec
a tion
m Order
b (WPO)
e
r
s

o By
f motion
or
t motu
h propri
e o
For the referral
of the witness to
j DOJs WPO
u o
d r
g
e o
t
w h
h e
e r
r
e g
b o
y v
e
t r
h n
e m
e
n
p t
u
b a
l g
i e
c n
c
i i
s e
s
e
x o
c r
l
u
a
d
n
e
d
a
o Production Order (PO)
c
Upon verified motion
c
AFTER hearing (litigated
r
motion)
e
For the production of
d
designated objects for
i
inspection or copying
t
DEFENSE of
respondent: national e
security or d
 person reasonable mind
or might accept as
agenc adequate to support a
y conclusion
x These interim reliefs may only be granted x DILIGENCE required on the part of
by the court BEFORE the the respondent in performing his
determination of the amparo duty:
petition. Thus, after absolving the o Ordinary if the
respondents in the petition, the respondent is a private
court can no longer grant any individual
interim relief in favor of the o Extraordinary if the
petitioner. (Yano vs. Sanchez) respondent is a public officer/
x NATURE Of proceedings SUMMARY employee
o BUT this petition is THUS, the
NOT governed by the presumption of
Rule on regularity cannot
Summary be invoked by
Procedure (RSP), thus: him
An MD on any ground x If the respondent failed to discharge
is PROHIBITED (vs. in his burden of substantial
RSP where MD evidence, will the WA automatically
may be allowed issue?
on the ground o No. The
of lack of petitioner must be
jurisdiction or able to discharge
failure to his own
undergo burden of
barangay conciliation proof. (Yano vs.
proceedings) Sanchez)
Any counterclaim is x CRIMINAL BAR RULE
PROHIBITED (vs. in RSP o Where a
where compulsory criminal case has
counterclaims are already been
allowed) instituted, a
Petition for Relief is petition for
ALLOWED (vs. in RSP issuance of WA
where it is prohibited) cannot be filed
An MR of an separately.
interlocutory order is (Authors note)
PROHIBITED REMEDY of the
while an MR of respondent in
a final order/ the
judgment is petition:
ALLOWED (vs. raise
in RSP where it litis
is the reverse) pendenti
x A writ of amparo is not the proper remedy a as an
in child custody cases affirmati
where the biological mother, ve
after surrendering her child to defense
the (conside
DSWD for purposes of adoption ring that
and after the said childs an MD is
adoption a
has already been granted, prohibite
changes her mind and seeks d
custody of the child. (Caram vs. motion)
Segui) o Corollarily,
x REMEDY against an order issuing WA when the petition
APPEAL for WA has been
o Within 5 working days from filed, a
receipt of the order separate
o OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIES criminal case may
MR or MNT still be filed
Appeal in such cases
should be filed within 5
working days
from receipt
of order
denying the
MR/MNT
x QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE (for both
petitioner and respondent)
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
o Definition: that amount
of relevant evidence which a
 REMEDY of the petitioner: State or by persons or groups
motion to of persons acting with the authorization, support or
consolidate the two acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
actions before the court concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
where the criminal disappeared person, which places such person outside
action is pending the protection of the law.
o BUT this is without prejudice to
the filing of a separate (c) Order of Battle refers to a document made by the
civil action if grounded on Article military, police or any law enforcement
agency of the government, listing the names of persons
32 of the Civil Code and organizations that it perceives to
x WA shall not lie against a Hold Departure Order be enemies of the State and which it considers as
where a criminal legitimate targets as combatants that it
action is already pending and the petition for could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic
WA was filed and international law.
separately. The remedy of the petitioner is to
(d) Victim refers to the disappeared person and any
file a motion to lift the individual who has suffered harm as a direct result of
HDO before the court where the criminal an enforced or involuntary disappearance as defined
action is pending. (Reyes in letter (b) of this
vs. Gonzales) Section.
x NOTA BENE: The Rule on Writ of Amparo is SCs
answer to the Section 4. Nonderogability of the Right Against
Enforced or Involuntary
absence of any legislative measure to curb
Disappearance. -The right against enforced or
extrajudicial killings and enforced involuntary disappearance and the
disappearances fundamental safeguards for its prevention shall not
o HOWEVER, on DEC 21, 2012 Pres. be suspended under any circumstance including
NoyNoy approved an political instability, threat of war, state of war or
SB/HB and passed the same as other public emergencies.
REPUBLIC ACT NO.
Section 5. "Order of Battle" or Any Order of Similar
10353 entitled AN ACT Nature, Not Legal Ground, for Enforced or Involuntary
DEFINING AND PENALIZING Disappearance. - An "Order of Battle" or any order of
ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY similar nature, official or otherwise, from a superior
DISAPPEARANCE officer or a public authority causing the
commission of enforced or involuntary disappearance is
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10353 unlawful and cannot be invoked as a
justifying or exempting circumstance. Any person
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING ENFORCED receiving such an order shall have the right
OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE to disobey it.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives Section 6. Right of Access to Communication. - It shall be
of the Philippines in Congress assembled: the absolute right of any person deprived of liberty to
have immediate access to any form of communication
Section 1. Short Title. -This Act shall be known as the "Anti- available in order for him or her to inform his or her
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012. family, relative, friend, lawyer or any human rights
organization on his or her whereabouts and condition.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. -The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human Section 7. Duty to Report Victims of Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance. - Any
rights for which highest priority shall be given to the person, not being a principal, accomplice or accessory,
enactment of measures for the enhancement of the right of all
people to human dignity, the who has an information of a case of
prohibition against secret detention places, solitary 163
confinement, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention, the provision for penal and civil
sanctions for such violations, and
compensation and rehabilitation for the victims and their
families, particularly with respect to
the use of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiate the
free will of persons abducted, arrested, detained, disappeared or
otherwise removed from the effective protection of the law.

Furthermore, the State adheres to the principles and standards

on the absolute condemnation
of human rights violations set by the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and various international
instruments such as, but not limited to, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), to which the Philippines is a State party.

Section 3. Definitions. -For purposes of this Act, the following

terms shall be defined as
follows:

(a) Agents of the State refer to persons who, by direct provision of

the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
government, or shall perform in the government or in any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class.

(b) Enforced or involuntary disappearance refers to the arrest,

detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the
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enforced or involuntary disappearance or who shall
learn of such information or that a person
is a victim of enforced or involuntary disappearance,
shall immediately report in writing the
circumstances and whereabouts of the victim to any
office, detachment or division of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), the Department of National Defense (DND),
the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) or any human rights organization and,
if known, the victims family, relative, or lawyer.
Section 8. Duty to Certify in Writing on the
Results of Inquiry into a Reported
Disappeared Persons Whereabouts. -In case a
family member, relative, lawyer,
representative of a human rights organization or
a member of the media inquires with a
member or official of any police or military
detention center, the PNP or any of its agencies,
the AFP or any of its agencies, the NBI or
any other agency or instrumentality of the
government, as well as any hospital or
morgue, public or private, on the presence or
whereabouts of a reported victim of enforced
or involuntary disappearance, such member
or official shall immediately issue a
certification in writing to the inquiring person
or entity on the presence or absence and/or
information on the whereabouts of such
disappeared person, stating, among others, in
clear and unequivocal manner the date and
time of inquiry, details of the inquiry and the
response to the inquiry.
Section 9. Duty of Inquest/Investigating
Public Prosecutor or any Judicial or
Quasi-Judicial Official or Employee. -Any
inquest or investigating public prosecutor,
or any judicial or quasi-judicial official or
employee who learns that the person
delivered for inquest or preliminary
investigation or for any other judicial
process is a victim of enforced or
involuntary disappearance shall have the
duty to immediately disclose the victims detention or confinement facilities, and
whereabouts to his or her immediate family, the list of detainees or persons deprived
relatives, lawyer/s or to a human rights of liberty under their respective
organization by the most expedient means. jurisdictions to the CHR.

Section 10. Official Up-to-Date Register of All Section 12. Immediate Issuance and
Persons Detained or Confined. - All Compliance of the Writs of Habeas Corpus,
persons detained or confined shall be placed solely
in officially recognized and controlled Amparo and Habeas Data. - All
places of detention or confinement where an official proceedings pertaining to the issuance of
up-to-date register of such persons shall be the writs of
maintained. Relatives, lawyers, judges, official
bodies and all persons who have legitimate interest
in the whereabouts and condition of the persons
deprived of liberty shall have free access to the
register.

The following details, among others, shall be recorded, in the

register:

(a) The identity or name, description and address of the

person deprived of liberty;

(b) The date, time and location where the person

was deprived of liberty and the identity of the
person who made such deprivation of liberty;

(c) The authority who decided the deprivation of

liberty and the reasons for the deprivation of liberty
or the crime or offense committed;

(d) The authority controlling the deprivation of liberty;

(e) The place of deprivation of liberty, the date

and time of admission to the place of
deprivation of liberty and the authority
responsible for the place of deprivation of liberty;

(f) Records of physical, mental and psychological

condition of the detained or confined person before
and after the deprivation of liberty and the name and
address of the physician who
examined him or her physically, mentally and medically;

(g) The date and time of release or transfer of the

detained or confined person to another place of
detention, the destination and the authority
responsible for the transfer;

(h) The date and time of each removal of the detained

or confined person from his or her cell,
the reason or purpose for such removal and the date
and time of his or her return to his or her
cell;

(i) A summary of the physical, mental and medical

findings of the detained or confined person after each
interrogation;

(j) The names and addresses of the persons who visit

the detained or confined person and the date and
time of such visits and the date and time of each
departure;

(k) In the event of death during the deprivation of

liberty, the identity, the circumstances and cause of
death of the victim as well as the destination of the
human remains; and

(l) All other important events bearing on and all

relevant details regarding the treatment of the
detained or confined person.

Provided, That the details required under letters (a)

to (f) shall be entered immediately in the register
upon arrest and/or detention.

All information contained in the register shall be

regularly or upon request reported to the CHR or any
other agency of government tasked to monitor and
protect human rights and shall be made available to
the public.

Section 11. Submission of List of Government

Detention Facilities. -Within six (6) months from
the effectivity of this Act and as may be requested
by the CHR thereafter, all government agencies
concerned shall submit an updated inventory or
list of all officially recognized and controlled
 done with the abuse of official
habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data shall be dispensed functions.
with expeditiously. As such, all
courts and other concerned agencies of government shall give (d) The penalty of prision correctional and its
priority to such proceedings. accessory penalties shall be imposed against persons
who defy, ignore or unduly delay compliance with any
Moreover, any order issued or promulgated pursuant to order duly issued or
such writs or their respective proceedings shall be promulgated pursuant to the writs of habeas
executed and complied with immediately. corpus, amparo and habeas data or their
respective proceedings.
Section 13. Visitation /Inspection of Places of Detention and,
Confinement. -The CHR or its duly authorized representatives (e) The penalty of arresto mayor and its accessory
are hereby mandated and authorized to conduct regular, penalties shall be imposed against any person who
independent, unannounced and unrestricted visits to or shall violate the provisions of Sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and
inspection of all places of detention and confinement. 10 of this Act.

Section 14. Liability of Commanding Officer or Superior. - The Section 16. Preventive Suspension/Summary
immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP Dismissal. -Government officials and personnel who
or the immediate senior official of the PNP and other law are found to be perpetrators of or participants in any
enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the manner in the
crime of enforced or commission of enforced or involuntary disappearance as
involuntary disappearance for acts committed by him or her a result of a preliminary investigation
that shall have led, assisted, conducted for that purpose shall be preventively
abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the suspended or summarily dismissed from the
commission thereof by his or her service, depending on the strength of the evidence so
subordinates. If such commanding officer has knowledge of or, presented and gathered in the said
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that preliminary investigation or as may be recommended by the
an enforced or involuntary disappearance is being investigating authority.
committed, or has been committed by subordinates or by
others within the officers area of Section 17. Civil Liability. -The act of enforced or
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take involuntary disappearance shall render its perpetrators
preventive or coercive action either and the State agencies which organized, acquiesced in
before, during or immediately after its commission, when he or or tolerated such
she has the authority to disappearance liable under civil law.
prevent or investigate allegations of enforced or involuntary
disappearance but failed to prevent or investigate such Section 18. Independent Liability. -The criminal liability
allegations, whether deliberately or due to negligence, shall of the offender under this Act
also be held liable as principal. shall be independent of or without prejudice to the
prosecution and conviction of the said
Section 15. Penal Provisions. - (a) The penalty of reclusion offender for any violation of Republic Act No. 7438,
perpetua and its accessory penalties shall be imposed upon otherwise known as "An Act Defining
the following persons: Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation as well as the
(1) Those who directly committed the act of enforced or involuntary Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating
disappearance; Officers, and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof; Republic Act No. 9745, otherwise
(2) Those who directly forced, instigated, encouraged or induced known as "An Act Penalizing Torture and Other Cruel,
others to commit the act of enforced or involuntary Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and
disappearance; Prescribing Penalties
Therefor"; and applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
(3) Those who cooperated in the act of enforced or involuntary 164
disappearance by committing another act without which the act
of enforced or involuntary disappearance would not have been
consummated;

(4) Those officials who allowed the act or abetted in the

consummation of enforced or
involuntary disappearance when it is within their power to
stop or uncover the commission
thereof; and

(5) Those who cooperated in the execution of the act of enforced

or involuntary disappearance by previous or simultaneous acts.

(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties

shall be imposed upon those who shall commit the act of
enforced or involuntary disappearance in the attempted stage as
provided for and defined under Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code.

(c) The penalty of reclusion temporal and its accessory

penalties shall also be imposed upon persons who, having
knowledge of the act of enforced or involuntary disappearance
and
without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner:

(1) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to

profit from the effects of the act of enforced or involuntary
disappearance;

(2) By concealing the act of enforced or involuntary

disappearance and/or destroying the effects or instruments
thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or

(3) By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the

principal/s in the act of enforced
or involuntary disappearance, provided such accessory acts are
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Section 19. Nonexclusivity or Double Jeopardy
Under International Law. - Any investigation, trial
and decision in any Philippines court, or body for
any violation of this Act shall; be without prejudice
to any investigation, trial, decision or any other
legal or
administrative process before any appropriate
international court or agency under applicable
international human rights and humanitarian law.
Section 20. Exemption from Prosecution. - Any
offender who volunteers information that leads to the
discovery of the victim of enforced or involuntary
disappearance or the
prosecution of the offenders without the victim being
found shall be exempt from any criminal and/or civil
liability under this Act: Provided, That said offender
does not appear to be the
most guilty.
Section 21. Continuing Offense. - An act constituting
enforced or involuntary
disappearance shall be considered a
continuing offense as long as the perpetrators
continue to conceal the fate and whereabouts
of the disappeared person and such
circumstances have not been determined with
certainty.
Section 22. Statue of Limitations Exemption.
- The prosecution of persons responsible
for enforced or involuntary disappearance
shall not prescribe unless the victim
surfaces alive.
In which case, the prescriptive period shall
be twenty-five (25) years from the date of
such
reappearance.
Section 23. Special Amnesty Law
Exclusion. - Persons who are changed with
and/or guilty of the act of enforced or
involuntary disappearance shall not
benefit from any special amnesty law or
other similar executive measures that shall
exempt them from any penal proceedings
or sanctions.

Section 24. State Protection - The State, through its
appropriate agencies, shall ensure the safety of all
persons involved in the search, investigation and
prosecution of enforced or involuntary
disappearance including, but not limited to, the
victims, their families,
complainants, witnesses, legal counsel and
representatives of human rights organizations and
media. They shall likewise be protected from any
intimidation or reprisal.
Section 25. Applicability of Refouler. -No person shall
be expelled, returned or extradited to another State
where there are substantial grounds to believe that
such person shall be in danger of being subjected to
enforced or involuntary disappearance. For purposes
of
determining whether such grounds exist, the
Secretary of the Department, of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) and the Secretary of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in coordination with the
Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all
relevant considerations including where applicable
and not limited to, the existence in the requesting
State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human rights.
organizations, shall jointly promulgate the
rules and
regulations for the effective implementation
of this Act and shall ensure the full
dissemination of the same to the public.
Section 29. Suppletory Applications. - The
applicable provisions of the Revised Penal
Code shall have suppletory application insofar
as they are consistent with the provisions of
this
Act.
Section 30. Appropriations. -The amount of
Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) is hereby
appropriated for the initial implementation of
this Act by the CHR. Subsequent fluids for
the continuing implementation of this Act
shall be included in the respective budgets
of the CHR and the DOJ in the annual
General Appropriations Act.

Section 26. Restitution and Compensation to

Victims of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance
and/or Their Immediate Relatives. -The victims of
enforced or
involuntary disappearance who surface alive shall be
entitled to monetary compensation,
rehabilitation and restitution of honor and reputation.
Such restitution of honor and reputation
shall include immediate expunging or rectification of
any derogatory record, information or
public declaration/statement on his or her person,
personal circumstances, status, and/or
organizational affiliation by the appropriate
government or private agency or agencies
concerned.

The immediate relatives of a victim of enforced or

involuntary disappearance, within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, may also claim for
compensation as provided for under Republic Act No.
7309, entitled "An Act Creating a Board of Claims
under the Department of Justice for Victims of Unjust
Imprisonment or Detention and Victims of Violent
Crimes and For Other Purposes", and other relief
programs of the government.

The package of indemnification for both the

victims and the immediate relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity shall
be without prejudice to other legal
remedies that may be available to them.

Section 27. Rehabilitation of Victims and/or Their

Immediate Relatives, and
Offenders. - In order that the victims of enforced or
involuntary disappearance who surfaced
alive and/or their immediate relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity,
may be effectively reintegrated into the mainstream
of society and in the process of
development, the State, through the CHR, in
coordination with the Department of Health, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) and the concerned nongovernment
organization/s, shall provide them with appropriate
medical care and rehabilitation free of
charge.

Toward the attainment of restorative justice, a parallel

rehabilitation program for persons who have
committed enforced or involuntary disappearance
shall likewise be implemented without cost to such
offenders.

Section 28. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -

Within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, the DOJ, the DSWD, the CHR,
the Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND) and the Families of
Desaparecidos for Justice (Desaparecidos), in
consultation with other human rights
 demolish their
house/s to allow
Section 31. Separability Clause. -If for any reason, any section the private
or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, respondents to
such other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall effectively take
remain in full force and effect. actual possession
of
Section 32. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive the land.
orders, rules and regulations and other issuances or parts x Sheriff of RTC issued the Notice to Vacate and for
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby Demolition
repealed, amended or modified accordingly. x Petitioners filed this petition before the SC praying
for 3 remedies:
Section 33. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen o a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
(15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of the Revised Rules of Court;
general circulation or the Official Gazette, which shall not be o the issuance of a writ of habeas data
later than seven (7) days after the approval thereof. under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data; and finally,
o the issuance of the writ of amparo under
CASES the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY x Petitioners contentions:
M. ASUNCION, o "29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m.
LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL armed men sporting 12
TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND gauge shot guns intruded into
MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL the property of the defendants
ROSARIO, in his [the land in dispute]. They were
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON not in uniform. They fired their
DELA CRUZ, in his capacity shotguns at the defendants.
as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed Later the following day at 2:00
in Boracay Island, a.m. two houses of the
represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE defendants were burned to
COURT OF APPEALS IN ashes.
CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. o 30. These armed men [without uniforms]
LOURDES T. SANSON, removed the barbed wire
respondents. fence put up by defendants to
G.R. No. 182484 protect their property from
intruders. Two of the armed
men trained their shotguns at
June 17, 2008 the defendants who resisted
EN BANC their intrusion. One of them
who was identified as SAMUEL
FACTS: LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years
x Spouses Sanson filed before the MCTC Buruanga-Malay, old, single, and a resident of
Aklan a complaint for Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired
forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the twice.
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction o 31. The armed men torched two houses
against the herein petitioners of the defendants reducing
o (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. them to ashes. [...]
35813 of a o 32. These acts of TERRORISM and
1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at (heinous crime) of ARSON were
Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, reported by one of the HEIRS OF
Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The
o (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors terrorists trained their shotguns
when the and fired at minors namely IVAN
petitioners - armed with bolos and GAJISAN and MICHAEL
carrying suspected firearms and together MAGBANUA, who resisted their
with unidentified persons numbering 120 intrusion.
- entered the disputed land by force and Their act is a blatant violation of
intimidation, without the private the law penalizing Acts of
respondents' permission and against the Violence
objections of the private against women and children,
respondents' security men, and built which is aggravated by the use of
thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure. high-powered weapons.
x MCTC ruled in favor of Spouses Sanson
x Petitioners appealed to RTC ISSUE # 1: Whether a writ of amparo should issue.
x Spouses Sanson prayed for issuance of WPI
o RTC granted HELD # 1: NO.
x Petitioners filed an MR x To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
o RTC denied originally conceived as
x Spouses Sanson filed a motion for demolition a response to the extraordinary rise in the
o RTC granted number of killings and
issued via a Special Order10 a writ of enforced disappearances, and to the
demolition to be perceived lack of available and
implemented fifteen (15)
days after the Sheriff's 165
written notice to the
petitioners to voluntarily
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
o (b) The name and personal
circumstances of the respondent
effective remedies to address these responsible for
extraordinary concerns. It is the threat, act or
intended to address violations of or omission, or, if
threats to the rights to life, liberty the name is
or security, as an extraordinary and unknown or
independent remedy beyond those uncertain, the
available under the prevailing Rules, or as respondent may
a remedy supplemental to be described by
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to an assumed
protect concerns that are purely appellation
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ o (c) The right to life, liberty
that we shall issue on and security of the aggrieved
amorphous and uncertain grounds. party violated or
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of threatened with
Amparo - in line with the extraordinary violation by an
character of the writ and the reasonable unlawful act or
certainty that its issuance demands - omission of the
requires that every petition for the respondent, and how
issuance such threat or
of the writ must be supported by justifying violation is committed
allegations of fact, to wit: with the attendant
o "(a) The personal circumstances of the circumstances
petitioner;
 detailed in supporting poking and shooting incident
affidavits; involving one of the security
o (d) The investigation conducted, if guards;
any, specifying the names, o (f) Certification issued by
personal circumstances, and Police Officer Christopher R.
addresses of the Mendoza,
investigating authority or narrating that a
individuals, as well as the house owned by
manner and conduct of the Josiel Tapuz, Jr.,
investigation, together with rented by a
any report; certain Jorge
o (e) The actions and recourses taken Buenavente, was
by the petitioner to accidentally
determine the fate or burned by a fire."
whereabouts of the aggrieved x On the whole, what is clear from these
party and the identity of the statements - both sworn and unsworn - is
person responsible for the the overriding involvement of
threat, act or property issues as the petition
omission; and traces its roots to
o (f) The relief prayed for. questions of physical possession
The petition may include a of the property disputed by the
general prayer for other private parties.
just and equitable If at all, issues relating to the
reliefs."22 right to life or to liberty can
The writ shall issue if the hardly be discerned
Court is preliminarily except to the extent that the
satisfied with the occurrence of past violence has
prima facie been alleged. The
existence of the right to security, on the other
ultimate hand, is alleged only to the
facts determinable extent of the threats
from the and harassments implied from
supporting the presence of "armed men
affidavits that bare to the waist"
detail the and the alleged pointing and
circumstances of firing of weapons. Notably, none
how and to what of the
extent a supporting affidavits compellingly
threat to or show that the threat to the rights to
violation of the life, liberty and security of the
rights to life, petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
liberty and
security of the x A closer look at the statements
aggrieved party shows that at least two of them - the
was or is being statements
committed. of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and
x The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present Melanie Tapuz are practically
case is anchored on the factual identical and
allegations heretofore quoted,23 that are unsworn. The Certification by
essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on
the petition. These allegations are the other hand,
supported by the following documents: simply narrates what had been
o "(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 reported by one Danny Tapuz y
of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Masangkay, and
Umambong, Ariel Gac, even mentions that the burning
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo of two residential houses was
Pinaranda, "accidental."
supporting the factual x As against these allegations are the cited
positions of the petitioners, MCTC factual findings in its decision in
id., petitioners' the forcible entry case which
prior possession, private rejected all the petitioners'
respondents' intrusion and factual claims. These findings are
the illegal acts significantly complete and
committed by the private detailed, as they were made
respondents and their under a full-
security guards on blown judicial process, i.e., after
19 April 2006; examination and evaluation of
o (b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia the contending parties' positions,
Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the evidence and arguments and
illegal acts (firing of guns, based on the report of a court-
etc.) committed by a appointed commissioner.
security guard against x We preliminarily examine these
minors - descendants of conflicting factual positions under the backdrop
Antonio Tapuz; of a dispute (with incidents giving
o (c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie rise to allegations of violence or
Tapuz y Samindao, essentially threat
corroborating Nemia's affidavit; thereof) that was brought to and
o (d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 ruled upon by the MCTC;
issued by Police Officer subsequently brought
Jackson Jauod regarding the to the RTC on an appeal that is
incident of petitioners' still pending; still much later
intrusion into the disputed brought to the
land; appellate court without conclusive
o (e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 results; and then brought to us on
issued by Police Officer Allan
R. Otis, narrating the interlocutory incidents involving a
altercation between the Tapuz plea for the issuance of the writ of
family and the security guards amparo
of the private respondents,
including the gun-
 ISSUE # 2: Whether a writ of habeas data should issue.
that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may
render the pending RTC appeal HELD # 2: NO.
moot. x Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
x Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from requires the following material
satisfied with the prima allegations of ultimate facts in a petition
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would for the issuance of a writ of habeas
justify the issuance of a writ of data:
amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a o "(a) The personal circumstances of the
continuing threat to petitioner and the
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents respondent;
alleged appear to o (b) The manner the right to privacy is
us to be purely property-related and focused on the violated or threatened and
disputed land. how it affects the right to life,
Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and liberty or security of the
hold the alleged perpetrators criminally aggrieved
accountable, the remedy may lie more in the party;
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than o (c) The actions and recourses taken by
on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ the petitioner to secure the
of amparo. data or information;
x Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the o (d) The location of the files, registers or
MCTC findings, as our databases, the government
action may carry the unintended effect, not only of office, and the person in charge,
reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the in possession or in control of the
appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of data or information, if known;
nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, o (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may
though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the include the updating,
orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal rectification, suppression
that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to or destruction of the
weaken or negate. database or information
x Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but or files kept by the
consider too at this respondent.
point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the In case of threats, the relief
petitioners' present recourse may include a prayer for
via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere an order enjoining the act
subterfuge to negate the assailed complained of; and
orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify o (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just
and equitable."
before the appellate court
x Support for the habeas data aspect of the present
because of the use of an improper remedial measure.
petition only alleges that:
We discern this from the
o "1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT
petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above;
OF HABEAS DATA is
from their obvious act of
prayed for so that the PNP may
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the
release the report on the burning
extraordinary remedies of
of the homes of the petitioners
the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds
and the acts of violence
that are far from forthright
employed against them by the
and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when
private respondents, furnishing
recourses in the ordinary course of
the Court and the petitioners
law fail because of deficient legal representation or
with copy of the same;
the use of improper remedial
o 66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF
measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of
HABEAS DATA commanding
amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will
the Philippine National Police
suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of
[PNP] to produce the police
amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied
report pertaining to the
for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process,
burning of the houses of the
or when it will inordinately interfere with these
petitioners in the land in
processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
dispute and likewise the
x While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ
investigation report if an
of Amparo provides
investigation was conducted by the PNP."
for rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for
x These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on
the effect of earlier-
Writ of Habeas Data
filed criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petitions for the
petition fatally deficient.
issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations
criminal and civil
of unjustified or unlawful
action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an
violation of the right to privacy related to
orderly procedure
the right to life, liberty or
for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ
security. The petition likewise has not
of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel
alleged, much less demonstrated, any
recourses.
need for information under the control of
x Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process
police authorities other than those it
dealing directly
has already set forth as integral annexes.
with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of
The necessity or justification for the
violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and 166
directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima
facie showing that the right to
life, liberty or security - the personal concern that the
writ is intended to protect
- is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper
case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the
co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.
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Henedino M. Brondial)
1
8
issuance of the writ, based on the 2
insufficiency of previous efforts made 7
to 9
secure information, has not also been 5
shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is
nothing more than the "fishing
J
expedition" that this Court - in the
u
course of drafting the Rule on
n
habeas data - had in mind in defining
e
what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not. In these lights, the
5
outright denial of the petition for the
,
issuance of the writ of habeas data is
fully in order.
2
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ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, 8
MARRIETA PIA, petitioners, vs. NAPICO
HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I - XIII, INC., ET AL.,
respondents. E
G.R. N
No.
 BAN previous
C rulings of
this
FACTS: Honorabl
x Canlas et al are settlers in a certain parcel of land e
situated in Barangay Supreme
Manggahan, Pasig City. Court in
x They were the losing parties in the case of G.R. these
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, cases,
177038 G.R. Nos.
o Their dwellings/houses have either 177448,
been demolished as of the time 180768,
of filing of the petition, or is 177701
about to be demolished and
pursuant to a court 177038.
judgment. Inherent
x Canlas et al filed a petition for issuance of WA in the
before the SC powers
o Alleged that the subject land titles of the
invoked against them are Supreme
spurious Court of
It is therefore the ardent the
initiatives of the herein Philippine
Petitioners, by s is to
way of the said modify,
prayer for the reverse
issuance and set
of the Writ of aside,
Amparo, that even its
these unprincipled own
Land previous
Officials be decision,
summoned to that can
answer their not be
participation in thwarted
the issuances of nor
these fraudulent influenced
and spurious by any
titles, one,
NOW, in the hands but, only
of the Private on the
Respondents. The basis of
Courts of Justice, merits
including this and
Honorable evidence.
Supreme This is
Court, are likewise the
being made to purpose
believe that said of this
titles in the petition
possession of for the
the Private Writ of
Respondents Amparo.
were issued
untainted with ISSUE: Whether the remedy of writ of amparo was
frauds properly resorted to.
o BUT, in the same petition, they prayed
that the judgment in G.R. HELD: NO.
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, x The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
177038 be reversed o Section 1. Petition. - The
That, Petitioners herein petition for a writ of amparo is a
knew before hand that: there remedy
can be no available to any
motion for person whose right to
reconsideration life, liberty and
for the second or security is
third time to be violated or
filed before this threatened with
Honorable violation by an
Supreme Court. unlawful act or
As such omission
therefore, of a public official or
Petitioners herein employee, or of a
private individual or
are aware of the entity.
opinion that this The writ shall
present petition cover extralegal killings
should not in any and enforced
way be treated dis
as such motions ap
fore pe
reconsideration. ar
Solely, this an
petition is only ce
for s
the possible or
issuance of the thr
writ of amparo, ea
although ts
it might affect the th
 ereof.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
x The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue
of a final judgment
of the court, which in this case was
affirmed with finality by this Court
in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701,
177038, is not included among
the enumeration of rights as stated in the
above-quoted Section 1 for
which the remedy of a writ of amparo is
made available. Their claim to
their dwelling, assuming they still have
any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them,
does not constitute right to life, liberty
and security. There is, therefore, no legal
basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo.
x Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners
claim to the land in question is
not alleged in the petition at all. The
Court can only surmise that these rights
and interest had already been threshed
out and settled in the four cases cited
above. No writ of amparo may be issued
unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected.
x Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall
issue the writ upon the filing
of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought
to issue said writ.
o Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon
the filing of the petition,
the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the
issuance of
the writ if on its face it ought
to issue. The clerk of court
shall issue
the writ under the seal of the
court; or in case of urgent
necessity,
the justice or the judge may
issue the writ under his or her
own
hand, and may deputize any officer or
person to serve it.
o The writ shall also set the date and
time for summary hearing of
the petition which shall not
be later than seven (7) days
from the date of its
issuance.
x Considering that there is no legal basis for its
issuance, as in this case, the writ
will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed
outright.
x This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made
available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest
possible rights of any person, which is
his or her right to life, liberty and security.
The Court will not spare any time or
effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the
Court will also not waste its precious time
and effort on matters not covered by
the writ.
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO
BAGTAS, RUPERTO
BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES,
ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO
PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR
S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L.
BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and
JOHN DOES, Petitioners, vs. DR.
AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T.
CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
EN BANC
FACTS:
x Spouses Amanda Cruz and Ferdinand Cruz leased a
parcel of land in Barrio
Guinhawa, Malolos, Bulacan
x Provincial Government of Bulacan demanded the
Cruzes to leave the premises
because the same shall be used for local projects
x Spouses refused
x Province filed an unlawful detainer case before
MTC Bulacan
x MTC in favor of Province
o Judgment became final and executory
x HOWEVER, Spouses refused to vacate
x Spouses filed cases against the Province and the
judges who presided over
the case
x One of the cases filed by the Spouses was an
injunction case with a prayer for
WPI
x RTC Br 10 issued WPI
o Ordered the REMAND of the
determination of the issues raised by
the petitioners on the issued
writ of demolition to the
MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
o Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19,
2005 Order treats, as a
suspensive condition for the
lifting of the permanent
injunction, the determination of
the boundaries of the property,
the Province
returned the issue for the
consideration of the MTC. In a
Geodetic Engineers Report
submitted to the MTC on August
31, 2007, the metes and bounds
of the property were indicated.
x MTC approved the report re metes and bounds;
declared that the WPI is
ineffective
x Province filed another motion for demolition
o MTC granted
x Spouses filed a motion before Branch 10 of the
RTC for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for
hearing on January 25, 2008
o RTC issued TRO (despite the earlier
implementation of the writ
of demolition)
x Spouses then took possession of the premises
x Police Officer Castillo (deployed by Province)
entered the property as
instructed by virtue of a memorandum issued by
Governor Joselito R. Mendoza
x Spouses refused to turn over the property
x Spouses filed Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data
with RTC Br 10
 o Respondents averred that despite the Permanent
Injunction,
petitioners unlawfully entered the
property with the use of heavy
equipment, tore down the barbed wire
fences and tents,6 and
arrested them when they resisted
petitioners entry; and that as
early as in the evening of February 20,
2008, members of the
Philippine National Police had
already camped in front of the
property.
x RTC issued the subject writs
o Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence
that the facts
and circumstances of the alleged
offenses examined into on Writs
of Amparo and Habeas Data that there
have been an on-going
hearings on the verified Petition for
Contempt, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this
Court for alleged violation
by the respondents of the Preliminary
Injunction Order dated July
16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-
M-2002, hearings were
held on January 25, 2008, February 12
and 19, 2008, where the
respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008
continuance, however, in
the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008,
police officers, some
personnel from the Engineering
department, and some civilians
proceeded purposely to the Pinoy
Compound, converged therein
and with continuing threats of bodily
harm and danger and stone-
throwing of the roofs of the homes
thereat from voices around its
premises, on a pretext of an ordinary
police operation when
enterviewed [sic] by the media then
present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the
afternoon of February 21, 2008,
zoomed in on the
petitioners, subjecting them to bodily
harm, mental torture,
degradation, and the debasement of a
human being, reminiscent of
the martial law police brutality, sending
chill in any ordinary citizen
o "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commitment Orders and
waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for
Direct assault; Crim. Case
No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass;
and Crim. Case No. 08-78
for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED
illegal, null and void, as
petitioners were deprived of their
substantial rights, induced by
duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence.
Accordingly, the

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Henedino M. Brondial)
effect on October 24, 2007
which coincided with the
commitment orders and celebration of
waivers are hereby SET United Nations Day and
ASIDE. The affirmed the Courts
temporary release of commitment towards
the petitioners is internationalization of human
declared ABSOLUTE. rights. More than three months
x Province filed Rue 45 before SC later or on
February 2, 2008, the Rule on
ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly issued the writs of the Writ of Habeas Data was
amparo and habeas data, considering that (1) the promulgated.
petition involves property rights and (2) there is x Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
already a pending criminal case before MTC Br 1. Amparo provides:
o Section 1. Petition. - The
HELD: NO. petition for a writ of amparo is a
x The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered remedy
to promulgate rules for the available to any
protection and enforcement of person whose right to
constitutional rights.13 In view of life, liberty and
the security is violated or
heightening prevalence of threatened with
extrajudicial killings and enforced violation by an
disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of unlawful act or
Amparo was issued and took omission of a public
 official or employee, or of a x Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v.
private individual or entity. Del Rosario:16
The writ shall cover extralegal o To start off with the basics,
killings and enforced the writ of amparo was originally
disappearances or threats conceived as a
thereof. (Emphasis and response to the
underscoring supplied) extraordinary rise in
x Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data the number of
provides: killings and enforced
o Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of disappearances, and
habeas data is a remedy to the perceived lack
available to any person of
whose right to privacy in life, available and
liberty or effective remedies to
security is violated or address these
threatened by an unlawful extraordinary
act or omission of concerns. It is
a public official or employee intended to
or of a private individual or address violations
entity of or threats to the
engaged in the gathering, rights to life, liberty
collecting or storing of data or security, as an
or extraordinary and
information regarding the independent remedy
person, family, home and beyond those
correspondence of the available under the
aggrieved party. (Emphasis prevailing Rules, or
and as a remedy
underscoring supplied) supplemental to
x From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage these Rules. What it
of the writs is limited is not, is a writ to
to the protection of rights to life, liberty protect concerns
and security. And the writs cover not only that are purely
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or property or
omissions. commercial.
x Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 Neither is it a writ
teaches: that we shall issue
o As the Amparo Rule was intended to on amorphous
address the intractable and uncertain
problem of "extralegal grounds.
killings" and "enforced Consequently, the
disappearances," its Rule on the Writ of
coverage, in its present form, Amparo - in line
is confined to these two with the
instances or extraordinary
to threats thereof. "Extralegal character of the
killings" are "killings writ and
committed the reasonable
without due process of law, certainty that its
i.e., without legal safeguards issuance demands -
or judicial requires that every
proceedings." On the other petition for the
hand, "enforced issuance of the writ
disappearances" are must be supported
"attended by the following by justifying
characteristics: an arrest, allegations of fact, to
detention or wit:
abduction of a person by a The writ shall
government official or issue if the Court is
organized groups preliminarily
or private individuals acting satisfied
with the direct or indirect with the
acquiescence prima
of the government; the refusal facie
of the State to disclose the existence
fate or of the
whereabouts of the person ultimate
concerned or a refusal to facts
acknowledge determina
the deprivation of liberty ble from
which places such persons the
outside the supportin
protection of law.15 (Underscoring g
supplied, citations omitted) affidavits
x To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, that
respondents must detail the
meet the threshold requirement that circumsta
their right to life, liberty and nces of
security is violated or threatened with how and
an unlawful act or omission. to what
Evidently, the present controversy extent a
arose out of a property dispute threat to
between the Provincial Government or
and respondents. Absent any violation
considerable nexus between the acts of the
complained of and its effect on rights to
respondents right to life, liberty and life, liberty
security, the Court will not delve on the and
propriety of petitioners entry into the security of
property.
 the aggrieved
party was or is property disputed
being by the private
committed.17 parties. If at all,
(Emphasis and issues relating to
italics in the the right to life or
original, to liberty can
citation hardly be
omitted) discerned except
o Tapuz also arose out of a property to the extent that
dispute, albeit between private the
individuals, with the occurrence of past
petitioners therein branding violence has been
as "acts of terrorism" the alleged. The
therein respondents alleged right to security, on
entry into the disputed land the other hand, is
with armed men in tow. The alleged only to
Court therein held: the extent of the
On the whole, what is treats and
clear from these statements - harassments implied
both sworn and from
unsworn - is the the presence of
overriding "armed men bare to
involvement of the waist" and
property issues the alleged pointing
as the petition and firing of weapons.
traces Notably,
its roots to none of the
questions of supporting affidavits
physical compellingly show
possession of the that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty
and security
of the petitioners is
imminent or
continuing.18
(Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
x It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not
show any actual violation,
imminent or continuing threat to their life,
liberty and security. Bare allegations
that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and
in contempt of court, there and then
willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the
use of force and intimidation entered
and forcibly, physically manhandled the
petitioners (respondents) and arrested
the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will
not suffice to prove entitlement to
the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able
to post bail for the offenses a day after their
arrest.20
x Although respondents release from confinement
does not necessarily
hinder supplication for the writ of amparo,
absent any evidence or even an allegation in
the petition that there is undue and
continuing
restraint on their liberty, and/or that there
exists threat or intimidation
that destroys the efficacy of their right to be
secure in their persons,
the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
x That respondents are merely seeking the protection
of their property rights is
gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:
o 11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa
harap ng mga heavy
equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing
kautusan ng RTC Branch
10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at
RTC ORDERS DATED February
12, 17 at 19 2008) upang
ipaglaban ang dignidad ng
kautusan ng
korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo
ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa
"PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming
nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming
karapatan sa lupa na 45 years
naming "IN POSSESSION."
(Underscoring supplied)
x Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ
of habeas data when it is not
even alleged that petitioners are gathering,
collecting or storing data or
 information regarding their person, family, home
and correspondence.
x As for respondents assertion of past incidents21
wherein the Province allegedly
violated the Permanent Injunction order, these
incidents were already raised in
the injunction proceedings on account of which
respondents filed a case for
criminal contempt against petitioners.22
x Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and
habeas data, or on
February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a
petition for habeas corpus which was considered
moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC
and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
x More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr.,
likewise filed a
petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before
the Sandiganbayan, they
alleging the commission of continuing threats by
petitioners after the issuance of
the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for
insufficiency and forum
shopping.
x It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse
and have in
fact taken full advantage of the legal system with
the filing of civil, criminal and administrative
charges.231avvphi1
x It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs
of
amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies
which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution
of a final and executory decision in a property
dispute.
x At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of
amparo and habeas
data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after
they were arrested in flagrante delicto and
proceeded against in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the
arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a
defense that may be set up by respondents during
trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and
habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may,
however, be made available to the aggrieved party
by motion in the criminal proceedings

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police

(PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG);
Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director
of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.
ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-
in-Fact, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182498

December 3, 2009
EN BANC

FACTS:
x Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (a consultant for the World Bank
and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme) went to Jolo,
Sulu with one Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB
scholar, from a seminar in Zamboanga City.
x They checked-in at ASY Pension House
x Kunnong went on an errand but upon his return, Tagitis was
no longer there
x The receptionist said that Tagitis went out to buy food at
around 12:30 in the
afternoon and even left his room key with the desk; advised
Kunnong to wait

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
o [The respondent] has
exhausted all administrative
x Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, avenues and
(UP professor of Muslim studies remedies but to no
and Tagitis fellow student avail, and under the
counselor at the IDB) circumstances, [the
reported Tagitis disappearance respondent] has no
to the Jolo Police Station other plain, speedy
x Wife Mary Jane Tagitis (through Atty. Arcilla) and adequate
filed a petition for writ of remedy to
amparo with CA against Lt. Gen. protect and get the
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, release of subject
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Engr. Morced Tagitis
Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); from
Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, the illegal clutches of
Criminal Investigation and Detention the [petitioners],
Group their intelligence
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, operatives
Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency and the like which
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional are in total violation
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben of the subjects
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force human and
Comet [collectively referred to as constitutional rights,
petitioners]
 except the issuance of a weight" in the
WRIT OF AMPARO. intelligence world. It
x CA issued the writ also labeled as
o directed the petitioners to file their "suspect" Col.
verified return within seventy- Kasims subsequent
two (72) hours from service of the writ and belated retraction
x Razon et al filed return of his statement that
o denied any involvement in or the
knowledge of Tagitis alleged military, the police, or
abduction. the CIDG was involved
o They argued that the allegations of in the abduction of
the petition were incomplete Tagitis.
and did not constitute a cause o characterized as "too
of action against them; were farfetched and unbelievable" and "a
baseless, or at best bedlam
speculative; and were merely of speculation"
based on hearsay police theories
evidence painting the
x The disappearance of Tagitis was admitted disappearance as
x CA directed Gen. Goltiao - as the officer in "intentional" on
command of the area of the part of Tagitis.
disappearance - to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS He had no
x CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor previous brushes
whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS with the law or any
was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in record of
handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 overstepping the
o (1) the first hearing would bounds of any trust
be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga regarding money
City; entrusted to him; no
o (2) the second hearing would be to student of the IDB
mobilize intelligence with Abu scholarship program
Sayyaf and ARMM; and ever came forward to
o (3) the third hearing would be to complain that he or
mobilize the Chief of Police of she did not get his or
Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of her stipend.
Police of Zamboanga City o The CA also found no basis for
and other police the police theory that Tagitis was
operatives "trying to escape
x Task Force submitted report from the clutches of
o [Based] on reliable information from his second wife," on
the Office of Muslim Affairs in the
Manila, Tagitis has reportedly basis of the
taken and carried away respondents
more or less Five Million testimony that Tagitis
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) was a Muslim who
deposited and entrusted to could have many
his [personal] bank wives under the
accounts by the Central Muslim faith, and
Office of IDB, that there was
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi "no issue" at all when
Arabia, which [was] intended the latter divorced
for the IDB Scholarship his first wife in order
Fund. to
x CA in favor of Tagitis marry the second.
o Confirming that the disappearance of o Finally, the CA also ruled out
Tagitis was an "enforced kidnapping for ransom by the Abu
disappearance" under the Sayyaf or by the
United Nations (UN) ARMM paramilitary
Declaration on the as the cause for
Protection of All Persons Tagitis
from Enforced disappearance, since
Disappearances the respondent, the
o when military intelligence pinpointed police and the
the investigative arm of the military
PNP (CIDG) to be involved noted that there was
in the abduction, the no acknowledgement
missing-person case of Tagitis abduction
qualified as an enforced or
disappearance. demand for payment
o The conclusion that the CIDG was of ransom - the usual
involved was based on the modus operandi of
respondents testimony, these terrorist
corroborated by her groups.
companion, Mrs. o Based on these
Talbin. considerations, the CA thus
o The CA noted that the information extended the privilege
that the CIDG, as the police of the writ to Tagitis
intelligence arm, was and his family, and
involved in Tagitis directed the CIDG
abduction came from no Chief,
less than the military - an Col. Jose Volpane
independent agency of Pante, PNP Chief
government. Avelino I. Razon,
o The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw Task Force
report" from Col. Kasims Tagitis heads Gen.
asset, pointing to the CIDGs Joel Goltiao and Col.
involvement in Tagitis abduction. Ahiron Ajirim, and
o The CA held that "raw reports" from PACER
an "asset" carried "great
 course state the ultimate facts constituting
Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert the cause of action,
extraordinary diligence omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an
and efforts to protect the life, liberty and Amparo petition, however, this
security of Tagitis, with requirement must be read in light of the
the obligation to provide monthly reports nature and purpose of the
of their actions to the CA. proceeding, which addresses a situation of
At the same time, the CA dismissed the uncertainty; the petitioner
petition against the then may not be able to describe with certainty
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen how the victim exactly disappeared, or
Alexander Yano and Gen. who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it him or her, or where the victim is
was PNP-CIDG, not the detained, because these information may
military, that was involved. purposely be hidden or covered up by
x Razon et al filed an MR those who caused the disappearance. In this
o CA denied type of situation, to require
x Razon et al filed a Rule 45 before the SC the level of specificity, detail and precision
that the petitioners
ISSUE # 1: Whether the petition filed before the CA was sufficient in form apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule
and substance. is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations
HELD # 1: YES. of the constitutional
x In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the rights to life, liberty and security.
respondents Amparo x To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings
petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated while addressing the unique
Section 5(c), (d), and Amparo situation, the test in reading
(e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners the petition should be to determine
allege that the respondent whether it contains the details
failed to: available to the petitioner under the
o 1) allege any act or omission the petitioners circumstances, while presenting a cause of
committed in violation action showing a violation of the
of Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security; victims rights to life, liberty and security
o 2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was through State or private party action.
abducted, the The petition should likewise be read in its
persons responsible for his totality, rather than in terms of its
disappearance, and the respondents isolated component parts, to determine if the
source of information; required elements - namely, of the
o 3) allege that the abduction was committed at disappearance, the State or private action,
the petitioners and the actual or threatened
instructions or with their consent; violations of the rights to life, liberty or security - are
o 4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in present.
Zamboanga x In the present case, the petition amply recites in its
alleged to have custody over her husband; paragraphs 4 to 11 the
o 5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
her accusations; dropped out of sight after engaging in
o 6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the normal activities, and thereafter was
petitioners in the nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate
performance of their duties in the him. The petition alleged, too, under its
investigation of Tagitis paragraph 7, in relation to
disappearance; and paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to
o 7) specify what legally available efforts she took reliable information, police operatives were
to determine the the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
fate or whereabouts of her husband. clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life,
x A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified liberty and security were violated when he
and shall allege, was "forcibly taken and
among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75 boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of
o (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the burly men believed to be police intelligence
aggrieved party operatives," and then taken "into custody by
violated or threatened with violation by the respondents police intelligence
an unlawful act or omission operatives since October 30, 2007,
of the respondent, and how such threat or specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga
violation is committed City, x x x held against his will in an earnest
with the attendant circumstances detailed attempt of the police to involve and connect
in supporting affidavits; [him] with different terrorist groups."77
o (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying x These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded
the names, ultimate facts within the
personal circumstances, and addresses pleaders knowledge about Tagitis
of the investigating authority or disappearance, the participation by agents of
individuals, as well as the manner and the State in this disappearance, the failure of
conduct of the investigation, together the State to release Tagitis or to provide
with any report; sufficient information about his whereabouts,
o (e) The actions and recourses taken by the as well as the actual
petitioner to determine violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its
party and the identity of the person statement of a cause of action.
responsible for the threat, act or x If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this
omission; and defect is its lack
x The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) of supporting affidavit, as required by Section
to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
actual violation of
a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of 169
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Henedino M. Brondial)
hearings held on January 7 and
17 and February 18, 2008 to
Owing to the summary nature of the swear to and flesh
proceedings for the writ and to facilitate out the allegations of the
the resolution of the petition, the Amparo petition. Thus, even on this
Rule incorporated the requirement for point, the petition cannot
supporting affidavits, with the annotation be faulted.
that these can be used as the affiants x Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires
direct testimony.78 This requirement, that prior investigation of an
however, should not be read as an alleged disappearance must
absolute one that necessarily leads to the have been made, specifying the
dismissal of the petition if not strictly manner
followed. Where, as in this case, the and results of the investigation.
petitioner has Effectively, this requirement
substantially complied with the seeks to
requirement by submitting a verified establish at the earliest
petition sufficiently detailing the facts opportunity the level of
relied upon, the strict need for diligence the public
the sworn statement that an affidavit authorities undertook in relation
represents is essentially fulfilled. with the reported
We note that the failure to attach the disappearance.79
required affidavits was fully cured when o We reject the petitioners
argument that the respondents
the respondent and her witness (Mrs. petition
Talbin) personally testified in the CA
 did not comply with the
Section 5(d) requirements of
the Amparo
Rule, as the petition specifies
in its paragraph 11 that
Kunnong and
his companions immediately
reported Tagitis
disappearance to the
police authorities in Jolo, Sulu
as soon as they were
relatively
certain that he indeed had
disappeared. The police,
however, gave them the
"ready answer" that Tagitis
could have been abducted by
the Abu Sayyaf group or other
anti-government groups. The
respondent also alleged in
paragraphs 17 and 18 of her
petition
that she filed a "complaint"
with the PNP Police Station in
Cotobato
and in Jolo, but she was told
of "an intriguing tale" by the
police
that her husband was having
"a good time with another
woman."
The disappearance was
alleged to have been
reported, too, to no
less than the Governor of the
ARMM, followed by the
respondents
personal inquiries that yielded
the factual bases for her
petition.80
x These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify
that reports have been made
to the police authorities, and that
investigations should have followed.
That the petition did not state the
manner and results of the investigation
that the
Amparo Rule requires, but rather
generally stated the inaction of the police,
their
failure to perform their duty
investigate, or at the very least, their
reported
failed efforts, should not be a reflection
on the completeness of the petition. To
require the respondent to elaborately
specify the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority, as well the
manner and conduct of the
investigation is an overly strict
interpretation of Section 5(d), given the
respondents frustrations in securing
an investigation with meaningful
results. Under these
circumstances, we are more than
satisfied that the allegations of the
petition on the investigations undertaken
are sufficiently complete for purposes of
bringing the petition forward.
x Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the
use of a petition -
that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a
proper cause of action - as a means to
"fish" for evidence.81 The
petitioners contend that the
respondents petition did not specify
what "legally available efforts were taken
by the respondent," and that there was
an "undue haste" in the filing of the
petition when, instead of cooperating
with authorities, the respondent
immediately invoked the Courts
intervention.
o We do not see the respondents
petition as the petitioners view it.
x Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo
petitioner (the
respondent in the present case)
allege "the actions and recourses
taken to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and
the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or
omission."
The following allegations of the
respondents petition duly
outlined the actions
she had taken and the
frustrations she encountered,
thus compelling her to file
her petition.
o 7. Soon after the student left
the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of
the pension house
to take his early
lunch but while
out on the
street, a couple of
burly men
believed to be
police intelligence
operatives,
forcibly took him
and boarded the
latter on a motor
vehicle then sped
away without the
knowledge of his
student,
Arsimin Kunnong;
o 10. When Kunnong could not
locate Engr. Tagitis, the former
sought the help of
another IDB scholar
and reported the
matter to the local
police agency;
o 11. Arsimin Kunnong,
including his friends and
companions in Jolo,
exerted efforts in
trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis and when he
reported the matter
to the police
to authorities in Jolo, he
was immediately
given a ready
answer that Engr.
Tagitis could [have
been] abducted by
the Abu Sayyaf
group and other
groups known to be
fighting against the
government;
o 12. Being scared with these
suggestions and insinuations of the
police officers,
Kunnong reported the
matter to the
[respondent](wife of
Engr. Tagitis) by
phone and other
responsible
officers and
coordinators of the
IDB Scholarship
Programme in the
Philippines who
alerted the office of
the Governor of
ARMM who
was then preparing to
attend the OIC
meeting in Jeddah,
Saudi
Arabia;
o 13. [The respondent], on the
other hand, approached some of
her
co-employees with
the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos
City,
Davao del Sur, who likewise o 15. According to reliable information
sought help from some of received by the [respondent],
their friends subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
in the military who could help custody of police intelligence
them find/locate the operatives, specifically with the
whereabouts of CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City,
her husband; being
held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to
involve
and connect Engr. Tagitis with
the different terrorist groups;
o 17. [The respondent] filed her complaint
with the PNP Police
Station at the ARMM in Cotobato
and in Jolo, as suggested by her
friends, seeking their help to
find her husband, but [the
respondents] request and
pleadings failed to produce any
positive
results
o 20. Lately, [respondent] was again
advised by one of the
[petitioners] to go to the
ARMM Police Headquarters
again in
Cotobato City and also to
the different Police
Headquarters
including the police headquarters
in Davao City, in Zamboanga City,

in Jolo, and in Camp Crame,

Quezon City, and all these places
have
been visited by the [respondent]
in search for her husband, which
entailed expenses for her trips to
these places thereby resorting her

to borrowings and beggings [sic]

for financial help from friends and
relatives only to try complying to
the different suggestions of these
police officers, despite of which,
her efforts produced no positive
results up to the present time;
o 25. [The respondent] has exhausted all
administrative avenues and
remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances,
[respondent] has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to
protect and get the release of
subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from

the illegal clutches of [the

petitioners], their intelligence
operatives
and the like which are in total
violation of the subjects human
and
constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
x Based on these considerations, we rule that the
respondents petition for the Writ
of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance
and that the Court of Appeals had every
reason to proceed with its consideration of
the case.

ISSUE # 2: Whether Engr. Tagistis may have been

subjected to extralegal killing and/or
enforced disappearance so as to render his case
within the ambit of a writ of amparo.

HELD # 2: YES.
x The present case is one of first impression in the use
and application of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced
disappearance situation. For a deeper
appreciation of the application of this
Rule to an enforced disappearance
situation, a brief look at the
historical context of the writ and
enforced disappearances would be
very helpful.
x The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from 170
State action first
attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel
Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7,
1941.82 The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a
State
policy, was directed at persons in occupied
territories "endangering German security"; they
were transported secretly to Germany where they
disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize
the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited
government officials from providing information
about the fate of these targeted persons.83
x In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced
disappearances resurfaced,
shocking and outraging the world when individuals,
numbering anywhere from
6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared"
during the military regime
in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin
America, and the issue
became an international concern when the world
noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that
continent under Operation
Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s
and 1980s. The escalation of
the practice saw political activists secretly arrested,
tortured, and killed as part of
governments counter-insurgency campaigns. As this
form of political brutality
became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin
American media
standardized the term "disappearance" to describe
the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86
which literally means the "disappeared ones."87
x In general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance"
cases:
o 1) those of people arrested without witnesses or
without
positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;
o 2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested
without an
appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for
weeks or months while their families are
unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities
deny having them in
custody until they eventually reappear in
one detention center or
another; and
o 3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have
disappeared until
their lifeless bodies are later discovered.88
x In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall
within the first
two categories,89 and 855 cases were recorded
during the period of martial
law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595
remained missing, 132 surfaced
alive and 127 were found dead. During former
President Corazon C. Aquinos
term, 820 people were reported to have
disappeared and of these, 612 cases
were documented. Of this number, 407 remain
missing, 108 surfaced alive and
97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during
former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87
cases were reported, while
the three-year term of former President Joseph E.
Estrada yielded 58 reported
cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental
organization, reports that as of
March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a
total of 193 victims of
enforced disappearance under incumbent President
Gloria M. Arroyos
administration. The Commission on Human Rights
records show a total of 636
verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985
to 1993. Of this number,
406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were
found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.90 Currently, the United
Nations Working Group on
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
o JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I
believe that first and foremost
Enforced or Involuntary we should
Disappearance91 reports 619 come up or
outstanding cases of formulate a
enforced or involuntary disappearances specific
covering the period December 1, 2007 definition
to November 30, 2008 [for]
x Enforced Disappearances in PH extrajudicia
x The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ l killings
shall cover extralegal killings and
and enforced disappearances or enforced
threats thereof."93 We note that disappeara
although nces. From
the writ specifically covers "enforced that
disappearances," this concept is definition,
neither defined nor penalized in this then we
jurisdiction. The records of the can
Supreme Court Committee on the proceed to
Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal formulate
that the drafters of the Amparo Rule the rules,
initially considered providing an definite
elemental definition of the concept of rules
enforced disappearance:94 concerning
the same.
 o CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, constitutional
there is no law mandate to
penalizing extrajudicial promulgate "rules
killings and enforced concerning the
disappearances so initially protection and
also we have to [come up enforcement of
with] the nature of these constitutional rights,
extrajudicial killings and pleading,
enforced practice and procedure
disappearances [to be in all courts,"100 since
covered by the Rule] extrajudicial killings
because our and enforced
concept of killings and disappearances, by
disappearances will define their nature and
the purpose, constitute
jurisdiction of the courts. So State or private party
well have to agree among violation of the
ourselves about the nature constitutional rights of
of killings and individuals to life,
disappearances for liberty and security.
instance, in other Although the Courts
jurisdictions, the rules only power is strictly
cover state procedural and as such
actors. That is an element does not diminish,
incorporated in their concept increase or modify
of substantive rights, the
extrajudicial killings and legal protection that
enforced disappearances. In the Court can
other provide can be very
jurisdictions, the concept meaningful through the
includes acts and omissions procedures it sets in
not only of addressing
state actors but also of non extrajudicial killings
state actors. Well, more and enforced
specifically in disappearances. The
the case of the Philippines Court, through its
for instance, should these procedural rules, can
rules include set the procedural
the killings, the standards and thereby
disappearances which may directly compel
be authored by let us the public authorities
say, the NPAs or the leftist to act on actual or
organizations and others. So, threatened violations
again we of constitutional
need to define the nature of rights. To state the
the extrajudicial killings and obvious, judicial
enforced intervention can make
disappearances that will be a difference - even if
covered by these rules. only procedurally - in a
[Emphasis situation when the very
supplied] 95 same investigating
x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several public
bills filed in the House of authorities may have
Representatives96 and in the Senate97 had a hand in the
on extrajudicial killings and enforced threatened or actual
disappearances, and resolved to do violations of
away with a clear textual definition of constitutional rights.
these terms in the Rule. The Committee x Lest this Court intervention be
instead focused on the nature and misunderstood, we clarify once again that
scope of the concerns within its power we
to address and provided the appropriate do not rule on any
remedy therefor, mindful that an issue of criminal
elemental definition may intrude into culpability for the
the ongoing legislative efforts.98 extrajudicial
x As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and killing or enforced
enforced disappearance. This
disappearances in this jurisdiction are is an issue that
not crimes penalized separately from requires criminal
the component criminal acts action before our
undertaken to carry out these criminal courts
killings and enforced disappearances based on our
and are now penalized under the existing penal laws.
Revised Penal Code and special laws.99 Our
The simple reason is that the intervention is in
Legislature has not spoken on the determining whether
matter; the determination of what acts an enforced
are criminal and what the disappearance has
corresponding penalty these criminal taken place and who is
acts should carry are matters of responsible or
substantive law that only the accountable for this
Legislature has the power to enact disappearance, and to
under the countrys constitutional define and impose the
scheme and power structure. appropriate remedies
x Even without the benefit of directly applicable to address it. The
substantive laws on extra-judicial burden for the public
killings and enforced authorities to
disappearances, however, the discharge in these
Supreme Court is not
powerless to act under its own
situations, under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, is twofold.
o The first is to ensure that all efforts at
disclosure and
investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect
contempt from this Court
when governmental efforts
are less than what the
individual situations require.
o The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his or her
liberty and security restored.
In these senses, our orders
and directives relative to
the writ are
continuing
efforts that are
not truly
terminated until
the extrajudicial
killing or
enforced
disappearance
is fully
addressed by
the complete
determination of
the fate and the
whereabouts of
the
victim, by the
production of
the disappeared
person
and the
restoration of
his or her liberty
and security,
and, in the proper
case, by the
commencement of
criminal action
against the guilty
parties
x Enforced Disappearances in International Law
x From the International Law perspective, involuntary or
enforced disappearance is
considered a flagrant violation of human
rights.101 It does not only violate the right to
life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it
affects their families as well through the denial
of their right to information regarding the
circumstances of the disappeared family
member. Thus, enforced
disappearances have been said to be "a double
form of torture," with "doubly
paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are
kept ignorant of their own fates,
while family members are deprived of knowing
the whereabouts of their detained
loved ones" and suffer as well the serious
economic hardship and poverty that in
most cases follow the disappearance of the
household breadwinner.102
x The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of
"Disappeared Persons" in
December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The
Resolution expressed the General
Assemblys deep concern arising from "reports
from various parts of the world
relating to enforced or involuntary
disappearances," and requested the "UN
Commission on Human Rights to consider the
issue of enforced disappearances with a view
to making appropriate recommendations."103
x In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious
practice of enforced
disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Declaration).104 This
Declaration, for the first time, provided in
its third preambular clause a working
description of enforced disappearance, as
follows:
o Deeply concerned that in many countries,
often in a persistent
manner, enforced disappearances
occur, in the sense that persons
are arrested, detained or abducted
against their will or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by officials
of different branches or levels of
Government, or by organized
groups or private individuals acting
on behalf of, or with the support,
direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government,
followed by a refusal to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the
persons concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of
their liberty, which places such
persons outside the protection of the law.
[Emphasis supplied]
x Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the
UN General Assembly
adopted the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105
The Convention was opened for
signature in Paris, France on February 6,
2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined
enforced disappearance as follows:
o For the purposes of this Convention,
"enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons
or
groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the
 deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate member of the UN, bound by its Charter
or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which and by the various conventions we
place such a person outside the protection of the signed and ratified, particularly the
law. [Emphasis supplied] conventions touching on humans rights.
x The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged
that there to "promote universal respect for, and
is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance107 and observance of, human rights and fundamental
that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one freedoms for all without
shall be subjected to enforced distinctions as to race, sex, language or
disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, religion."112 Although no universal
internal political agreement has been reached on the
instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State precise extent of the "human rights and
Parties to codify fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by
enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued
appropriate penalties the Declaration on enforced disappearance,
under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of and this Declaration
relatives of the states:114
disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the o Any act of enforced disappearance is an
truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on offence to dignity. It is
the progress and results of the condemned as a denial of the
investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced purposes of the Charter of the
disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes United
of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts Nations and as a grave and flagrant
of the victim are established. violation of human rights and
x To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, fundamental freedoms proclaimed
so that in the Universal Declaration of
the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing Human Rights and reaffirmed and
enforced developed in international
disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, instruments in this field. [Emphasis
however, is supplied]
not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore o As a matter of human right and
mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a fundamental freedom and as a
violation of policy matter made in a UN
the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Declaration, the ban on enforced
Supreme disappearance cannot but have its
Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its effects on the country, given our
rule- own adherence to "generally
making powers. accepted principles of international
x Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the law as part of the law of the
Court is land."115
guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the 171
Philippines is a
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
deeme
d to
x In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care have
Association of the the
Philippines v. Duque III,116 we held that: force of
o Under the 1987 Constitution, international domest
law can become ic law.
part of the sphere of [Empha
domestic law either by sis
transformation supplie
or incorporation. The d]
transformation method x We characterized "generally accepted
requires that principles of international law" as norms of
an international law be general or
transformed into a domestic customary
law international law
through a constitutional that are binding on
mechanism such as all states. We held
local further:117
legislation. The o [G]enerally accepted
incorporation method principles of international law,
applies when, by by virtue of the
mere constitutional incorpora
declaration, tion
international law is clause of
 the Constitution, form alleged
part of the laws of criminal is
the land even if they do within its
not derive from treaty territory
obligations. The and
classical formulation in it does not
international law sees those proceed to
customary rules extradite
accepted as binding result him," which
from the combination [of] can be
two elements: interpreted
the established, widespread, as
and consistent practice on establishin
the part of g universal
States; and a psychological jurisdiction
element known as the among the
opinion juris sive parties to
necessitates (opinion as to the Inter-
law or necessity). Implicit in American
the latter Convention
element is a belief that the .124 At
practice in question is present,
rendered Colombia,
obligatory by the existence Guatemala,
of a rule of law requiring it. Paraguay,
[Emphasis in the original] Peru and
x The most widely accepted statement of sources of Venezuela
international law today is have
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the enacted
International Court of Justice, which separate
provides that the Court shall apply laws in
"international custom, as evidence of a accordanc
general e with the
practice accepted as law."118 The Inter-
material sources of custom include American
State Conventio
practice, State legislation, international n and
and national judicial decisions, recitals have
in defined
treaties and other international activities
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the involving
same enforced
form, the practice of international disappear
organs, and resolutions relating to legal ance to be
criminal.1251avvphi1
questions in the UN General o Second, in Europe, the
Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as European Convention on
"evidence" Human Rights has
of international law,120 these sources no
identify the substance and content of explicit
the provision
obligations of States and are indicative dealing
of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" with the
protectio
requirements of international law.121 n against
We note the following in these respects: enforced
o First, barely two years from the adoption disappea
of the Declaration, the rance.
Organization of American The
States (OAS) General European
Assembly adopted the Court of
Inter-American Convention Human
on Enforced Disappearance Rights
of (ECHR),
Persons in June however,
1994.122 State parties has
undertook under this applied the
Convention "not to Convention
practice, permit, or in a way
tolerate the forced that
disappearance of provides
persons, even in ample
states of emergency protection
or for the
suspension of individual underlying
guarantees."123 One of the rights
key provisions includes the affected by
States obligation to enact enforced
the crime of forced disappear
disappearance in their ance
respective national through
criminal laws and to the
establish jurisdiction Conventio
over such cases when ns Article
the crime was 2 on the
committed within their right to
jurisdiction, when the victim life; Article
is a national of 3 on the
that State, and "when the prohibition
 of torture; Article 5 on the
right to "(m)embers can no
liberty and security; Article longer contend that
6, paragraph 1 on the right they do not know what
to a fair human rights they
trial; and Article 13 on the promised in the Charter
right to an effective to promote." Moreover,
remedy. A leading a U.N. Declaration is,
example demonstrating the according to one
protection afforded by the authoritative
European definition, "a formal
Convention is Kurt v. and solemn
Turkey,126 where the ECHR instrument, suitable
found a violation for rare occasions
of the right to liberty and when principles of
security of the disappeared great and lasting
person when importance are
the applicants son being enunciated."
disappeared after being Accordingly, it has
taken into custody by been observed
Turkish forces in the Kurdish that the Universal
village of Agilli in November Declaration of Human
1993. It Rights "no
further found the applicant longer fits into the
(the disappeared persons dichotomy of binding
mother) to treaty
be a victim of a violation of against non-binding
Article 3, as a result of the pronouncement,' but is
silence of rather an authoritative
the authorities and the statement of the
inadequate character of the international
investigations community."
undertaken. The ECHR also Thus, a
saw the lack of any Declaration
meaningful creates an
investigation by the State as a violation of expectation of
Article 13.127 adherence, and
o Third, in the United States, the status of "insofar as the
the prohibition on expectation is
enforced disappearance as gradually justified by
part of customary State practice, a
international law is declaration may by
recognized in the most custom become
recent edition of recognized as
Restatement of the Law: laying down rules
The Third,128 which binding upon the
provides that "[a] State States." Indeed,
violates international several commentators
law if, as a matter of State have concluded that
policy, it practices, the
encourages, or Universal Declaration
condones (3) the murder has become, in toto,
or causing the a part of binding,
disappearance of customary
individuals."129 We international law.
significantly note that in a [Citations
related matter that omitted]
finds close identification o Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an
with enforced disappearance effective domestic
- the matter remedy) of the International
of torture - the United States Convention on Civil and Political
Court of Appeals for the Rights
Second (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is
Circuit Court held in Filartiga both a signatory and a State
v. Pena-Irala130 that the Party, the UN Human Rights
prohibition Committee, under the Office of
on torture had attained the the High Commissioner for
status of customary Human Rights, has stated that
international law. the act of enforced
The court further elaborated disappearance violates Articles
on the significance of UN 6 (right to life), 7
declarations, (prohibition on torture, cruel,
as follows: inhuman or degrading treatment
These U.N. declarations are or punishment) and 9 (right to
significant because they liberty and security of the
specify with person) of the ICCPR, and the act
great precision may also amount to a crime
the obligations against
of member humanity.131
nations under o Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998
the Charter. Rome Statute establishing
Since their the International Criminal
adoption, Court (ICC) also covers
enforced
disappearances insofar as
they are defined as crimes
against
humanity,132 i.e., crimes
"committed as part of a widespread
 or disappearance.
systematic attack against any civilian population, o 9) the right to protection and assistance to
with knowledge of the family;
the attack." While more than 100 countries have o 10) the right to an adequate standard of
ratified the Rome living;
Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory o 11) the right to health; and
and has not o 12) the right to education [Emphasis
yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome supplied]
Statute has x Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a
been incorporated in the statutes of other state party, provides:
international and hybrid o Article 2
tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the o 3. Each State Party to the present
Special Panels Covenant undertakes:
for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the (a) To ensure that any person
Extraordinary Chambers whose rights or
in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the freedoms as herein
implementing recognized are violated
legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of shall have an effective
the ICC has remedy,
given rise to a number of national criminal notwithstanding that
provisions also covering the
enforced disappearance.135 violation has been
x While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the committed by persons
Convention on acting in an official
enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome capacity;
Statute) and has (b) To ensure that any person
not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific claiming such a
crime, the above remedy shall have
recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State his right thereto
practice has been determined by
repudiated by the international community, so that the competent judicial,
ban on it is now a administrative or
generally accepted principle of international law, which we legislative
should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we authorities, or by
should act upon to the extent already any other
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us. competent authority
x The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of provided for by the
Human legal system of the
Rights, the ICCPR and the International Convention on State, and to develop
Economic, Social and the possibilities of
Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a judicial remedy;
disappearance:136 (c) To ensure that the
o 1) the right to recognition as a person before the law; competent authorities shall
o 2) the right to liberty and security of the person; enforce such
o 3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, remedies when
inhuman granted.
or degrading treatment or punishment; [Emphasis
o 4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed; supplied]
o 5) the right to an identity; x In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights
o 6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees; Committee opined that the
o 7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the
compensation; ICCPR includes the obligation
o 8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances 172
of a
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are
particularly
of the State to investigate ICCPR required
violations promptly, thoroughly, and to give
effectively, effect to the
viz:137 general
o 15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in obligation to
addition to effective investigate
protection of Covenant allegations
rights, States Parties must of
ensure that violations
individuals also have promptly,
accessible and effective thoroughly
remedies to vindicate and
those rights The effectively
Committee attaches through
importance to States independen
Parties' establishing t
appropriate judicial and and
administrative impartial
mechanisms for addressing bodies. A
claims of rights violations failure by a
under State Party
domestic law to
Administrative mechanisms investigate
 allegations of violations protection
could in and of itself give rise to these
to a separate rights
breach of the Covenant. especially
Cessation of an ongoing when they
violation is an are under
essential element of the threat.
right to an effective remedy. Protection
[Emphasis includes
supplied] conducting
x The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the effective
same General Comment investigatio
No. 31 that failure to investigate as ns,
well as failure to bring to justice the organization
perpetrators of ICCPR violations
could in and of itself give rise to a of the
separate breach of the Covenant, government
thus:138 apparatus
o 18. Where the investigations referred to in to extend
paragraph 15 reveal protection
violations of certain to victims of
Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure extralegal
that those responsible killings or
are brought to justice. As enforced
with failure to disappearan
investigate, failure to bring ces (or
to justice perpetrators of threats
such violations could in and thereof)
of itself give rise to a and/or their
separate breach of the families,
Covenant. These and
obligations arise bringing
notably in respect of offenders to
those the bar of
violations recognized justice.
as criminal under The Inter-
either domestic or American
international law, such as Court of
torture and similar cruel, Human
inhuman and Rights
degrading treatment stressed the
(article 7), summary and importance
arbitrary killing of
(article 6) and enforced investigatio
disappearance (articles 7 n in the
and 9 and, Velasquez
frequently, 6). Indeed, the Rodriguez
problem of impunity for Case, viz:
these violations, (The duty to
a matter of sustained investigate) must
concern by the Committee, be undertaken in a
may well be an s
important contributing e
element in the recurrence of r
the violations. i
When committed as part of a o
widespread or systematic u
attack on a s
civilian population, these
violations of the Covenant m
are crimes a
against humanity (see n
Rome Statute of the n
International Criminal e
Court, article 7). r
[Emphasis supplied]
x In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this a
Court, in ruling that the right n
to security of persons is a d
guarantee of the protection of
ones right by the government, n
held that: o
o The right to security of person in this third t
sense is a corollary of
the policy that the State a
"guarantees full respect for s
human rights" under Article
II, Section 11 of the 1987 a
Constitution. As the
government is the chief m
guarantor of order and e
security, the r
Constitutional guarantee of e
the rights to life, liberty and
security of f
person is rendered o
ineffective if government r
does not afford m
 ality
preordained to
be ineffective.
An investigation HELD # 3:
must
have an SUMMARY and
objective and be
assumed by the AKIN TO
State as its
own legal duty, ADMINISTRATI
not as a step
taken by private VE
interests that
depends upon PROCEEDINGS
the initiative of
the victim .
or his family or
upon their offer
of proof, without
an
effective search
for the truth by
the government.
[Emphasis
supplied]
x Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the
ECHR interpreted the
"right to security" not only as a
prohibition on the State against
arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, but also as
the imposition of a positive duty to
afford
protection to the right to liberty. The
Court notably quoted the following
ECHR
ruling:
o [A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only
have been effected in
conformity with the
substantive and procedural
rules of national
law but must equally be in
keeping with the very
purpose of Article
5, namely to protect the
individual from
arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that
individual, it is incumbent on
the
authorities to account for his
or her whereabouts. For this
reason,
Article 5 must be seen as
requiring the authorities to
take effective
measures to safeguard
against the risk of
disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an
arguable claim that
a person has been taken into
custody and has not been
seen since.
[Emphasis supplied]
x These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the
Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, which the Court made
effective on October 24, 2007.
Although the Amparo Rule still has
gaps waiting to be filled through
substantive law, as evidenced
primarily by the lack of a concrete
definition of "enforced
disappearance," the materials cited
above, among others, provide ample
guidance and standards on how,
through the medium of the Amparo
Rule, the Court can provide remedies
and protect the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security that underlie
every enforced disappearance.

ISSUE # 3: What is the nature

of writ of amparo proceedings?

 central to the
x Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged policy of enforced disappearances,
the burden as the absence of any proven
of proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo disappearance makes it easier to
by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall escape the application of legal
discuss briefly the unique standards ensuring the victims
evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance human rights.149 Experience
cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the shows
implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. that government officials typically
x These difficulties largely arise because the State itself - the party whose respond to requests for
involvement is alleged - investigates enforced disappearances. information about desaparecidos by
Past experiences saying that they are not aware
in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are of any disappearance, that the
generally missing people may have fled the
threefold. country, or that their names have
o First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the merely been invented.150
identities of the direct perpetrators.141 Experts x These considerations are alive in our minds, as these
note that abductors are well organized, armed are the difficulties we
and usually members of the military or police confront, in one form or another, in our consideration of
forces, thus: this case.
The victim is generally arrested by the security x Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the
forces nature of an Amparo
or by persons acting under some form proceeding and the degree and burden of
of proof the parties to the case carry, as
governmental authority. In many follows:
countries the units o Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing
that plan, implement and execute the on the petition shall be
program are summary. However, the court,
generally specialized, highly-secret justice or judge may call for a
bodies within the preliminary conference to
armed or security forces. They are simplify the issues and
generally directed determine the
through a separate, clandestine chain possibility of obtaining stipulations and
of command, admissions from the parties.
but they have the necessary o Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard
credentials to avoid or of Diligence Required. -
prevent any interference by the "legal" The parties shall establish their
police forces. claims by substantial evidence.
These authorities take their victims to
secret The respondent
detention centers where they subject who is a private individual
them to must
interrogation and torture without fear prove that ordinary diligence as
of judicial or required by applicable laws, rules
other controls.142 and regulations was observed in
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the performance of duty.
the The respondent who
crime; if there are, these witnesses are is a public official or employee
usually afraid to speak out publicly or must prove that extraordinary
to testify on the diligence as required by
disappearance out of fear for their own applicable
lives.143 We have had occasion to note laws, rules and regulations was
this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. observed in the performance of
Manalo144 when we acknowledged that duty.
"where powerful military officers are The respondent
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses public official or employee
to surface and testify against them cannot invoke the presumption
comes as no surprise." that official duty has been
o Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of regularly
the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the performed or evade responsibility or
central piece of liability.
evidence in an enforced disappearance - i.e., the o Section 18. Judgment. - If the allegations
corpus delicti or in the petition are
the victims body - is usually concealed to effectively proven by substantial evidence,
thwart the the court shall grant the privilege
start of any investigation or the progress of one that of the writ and such reliefs as
may have may be proper and appropriate;
begun.145 The problem for the victims family is otherwise, the privilege shall be
the States virtual denied. [Emphasis supplied]
monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The x These characteristics - namely, of being summary and
Inter-American the use of
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the substantial evidence as the required level of
landmark case of proof (in contrast to the usual
Velasquez Rodriguez146 that inherent to the preponderance of evidence or proof beyond
practice of enforced reasonable doubt in court
disappearance is the deliberate use of the States proceedings) - reveal the clear intent of the
power to destroy framers of the Amparo Rule
the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the to have the equivalent of an administrative
concealment as a proceeding, albeit judicially
clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect conducted, in addressing Amparo situations.
crime.147 The standard of diligence
o Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State required - the duty of public officials and employees to
observe extraordinary
authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is 173
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liberty or security, and the
failure on the part of the
diligence - point, too, to the extraordinary investigating authorities to
measures expected in the protection of appropriately respond.
constitutional rights and in the consequent x The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court
handling and investigation of extra- of Industrial Relations151
judicial killings and enforced provided the Court its first
disappearance cases. opportunity to define the
x Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner substantial evidence required
needs only to properly comply to arrive at a valid decision in
with the substance and form administrative proceedings. To
requirements of a Writ of Amparo directly quote Ang Tibay:
petition, as o Substantial evidence is more
discussed above, and prove the than a mere scintilla. It means
allegations by substantial evidence. such relevant
Once a evidence as a
rebuttable case has been proven, the reasonable mind
respondents must then respond and might accept
prove their defenses based on the as adequate to
standard of diligence required. The support a conclusion.
rebuttable case, of course, must show [citations omitted]
that an enforced disappearance took The
place under statute provides that
circumstances showing a violation of the the rules of evidence
victims constitutional rights to life, prevailing in courts of
 law and equity shall not be reaching a
controlling. The obvious decision.
purpose of this Circumstanti
and similar provisions is to al evidence,
free administrative boards indicia, and
from the presumption
compulsion of technical rules s may be
so that the mere admission of considered,
matter which would be so long as
deemed incompetent in they lead to
judicial proceedings would not conclusions
invalidate the administrative consistent
order. [citations omitted] But with the
this assurance of a desirable facts.
flexibility in administrative o 131. Circumstantial or
procedure does not go so far presumptive evidence is especially
as to justify orders without a important
basis in evidence having in allegations of
rational probative force. disappearances,
[Emphasis supplied because this type of
x In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was repression is
the Courts first petition for a characterized by an
Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the attempt to suppress
full and exhaustive proceedings that the all information about
substantial evidence standard regularly the
requires do not need to apply due to the kidnapping or the
summary nature of Amparo proceedings. whereabouts and
We said: fate of the victim.
o The remedy [of the writ of amparo] [Emphasis
provides rapid judicial supplied]
relief as it partakes of a In concluding that
summary proceeding that the disappearance of
requires Manfredo
only substantial evidence to Velsque
make the appropriate reliefs z
available to the petitioner; it (Manfred
is not an action to determine o) was
criminal guilt requiring proof carried
beyond reasonable doubt, or out by
liability for damages agents
requiring preponderance of who
evidence, or acted
administrative responsibility under
requiring substantial cover of
evidence that will require full public
and exhaustive proceedings. authority,
[Emphasis supplied] the
x Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary IACHR
aspects of Amparo petitions relied on
are the unique difficulties presented by circumsta
the nature of enforced disappearances, ntial
heretofore discussed, which difficulties evidence
this Court must frontally meet if the including
Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to the
achieve its objectives. These evidentiary hearsay
difficulties compel the Court to adopt testimony
standards appropriate and responsive to of
the circumstances, without transgressing Zenaida
the due process requirements that Velsquez
underlie every proceeding. , the
x In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 victims
the IACHR - faced with a lack of sister,
direct evidence that the government of who
Honduras was involved in Velasquez described
Rodriguez disappearance - adopted a Manfredo
relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, s
kidnappin
and established the rule that presumes g on the
governmental responsibility for a basis of
disappearance if it can be proven that the conversat
government carries out a general ions she
practice of enforced disappearances and had with
the specific case can be linked to that witnesses
practice.154 The IACHR took note of the who
realistic fact that enforced saw
disappearances could be proven only Manfredo
through circumstantial or indirect kidnappe
evidence d by men
or by logical inference; otherwise, it was in civilian
impossible to prove that an individual clothes in
had been made to disappear. It held: broad
o 130. The practice of international and daylight.
domestic courts shows that She also
direct evidence, whether told the
testimonial or Court that
documentary, is not the a former
only type of evidence that Honduran
may be legitimately military
considered in official
 had announced
that must be responsive to
Manfredo was the evidentiary
kidnapped by a difficulties
special military faced. On the one
squadron acting hand, we cannot be
under orders of arbitrary in the
the Chief of the admission and
Armed Forces.155 appreciation of
The IACHR evidence, as
likewise arbitrariness entails
considered the violation of rights and
hearsay testimony cannot be
of a second used as an effective
witness who counter-measure; we
asserted only
that he had been compound the
told by a problem if a wrong is
Honduran military addressed by the
officer commission of
about the another wrong. On
disappearance, the other hand, we
and a third cannot be very strict
witness who in our evidentiary
testified that he rules and
had spoken in cannot consider
prison to a man evidence the way we
who do in the usual
identified himself criminal and civil
as Manfredo.156 cases; precisely, the
Velasquez stresses the proceedings
lesson that flexibility is before us are
necessary under administrative in
the unique nature where, as a
circumstances rule, technical rules of
that evidence are not
enforced strictly
disappearance observed. Thus, while
cases pose to we must follow the
the courts; to substantial
have an effective evidence rule, we
remedy, the must observe
standard of flexibility in
evidence considering the
evidence we shall
take into account.
x The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider
all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules
to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words,
we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason - i.e., to the relevance of the evidence
to the issue at hand and its consistency with
all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus,
even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test.
x We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the
consideration of evidence
is not at all novel in the Philippine legal
system. In child abuse cases, Section 28
of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness157 is expressly recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule
allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or
attempted act of sexual abuse in any
criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject
to certain prerequisites and the right
of cross-examination by the adverse party.
The admission of the statement is
determined by the court in light of specified
subjective and objective
considerations that provide sufficient indicia
of reliability of the child witness.158
These requisites for admission find their
counterpart in the present case under
the above-described conditions for the
exercise of flexibility in the consideration
of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
ISSUE # 4: Whether Mary Jane Tagitis was able to
discharge her burden of proving by substantial evidence
the allegation of enforced disappearance.

HELD # 4: YES.
x The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an
enforced
disappearance within the meaning of this term
under the UN Declaration we have cited?
x The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the
arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of
the law."159
x Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance
are essentially fourfold:
o (a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of
liberty;
o (b) carried out by agents of the State or persons
or groups of
persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
o (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared
person; and
o (d) placement of the disappeared person outside
the protection of
the law. [Emphasis supplied]
x We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
disappeared. The
direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went
out of the ASY Pension
House after depositing his room key with the hotel
desk and was never seen nor
heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however,
from all concerned - the
petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police
authorities - is that Tagistis
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was
never seen again. The
respondent injected the causal element in her petition
and testimony, as we shall
discuss below.
x We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives
of PNP CIDG
Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all,
only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was
under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record,
but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct
or circumstantial.
x In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two
sources of information as
her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been
placed under government
custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody).
The first was an unnamed
friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col.
Ancanan), who occupied a high
position in the military and who allegedly
mentioned that Tagitis was in good
hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the
respondent herself and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col.
Ancanan gave them any
information that Tagitis was in government custody.
Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with
the respondent but denied giving her any information
about the disappearance.
x The more specific and productive source of information was
Col. Kasim, whom
the respondent, together with her witness Mrs.
Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote
the relevant portions of the respondents testimony:
o Q: Were you able to speak to other military
officials regarding the
whereabouts of your husband
particularly those in charge of any
records or investigation?

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o Q: And what was the
content of that highly
o A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. confidential report?
Then one military o A: Those alleged activities
officer, Col. Casim, told of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161
me that my husband is [Emphasis
being abducted [sic] supplied]
because he is under x She confirmed this testimony in her
custodial investigation cross-examination:
because he is allegedly o Q: You also mentioned
that you went to Camp
"parang liason ng J.I.",
Katitipan in Davao
sir.
City?
o Q: What is J.I.?
o A: Yes, maam.
o A: Jemaah Islamiah, sir.
o Q: And a certain Col.
o Q: Was there any information that was
Kasim told you that your
read to you during one of
husband was
those visits of yours in that Camp?
abducted and under
o A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of
custodial investigation?
his report because he
o A: Yes, maam.
said those reports are highly confidential,
o Q: And you mentioned
sir.
that he showed you a report?
o Q: Was it read to you then even though
o A: Yes, maam.
you were not furnished a
o Q: Were you able to read
copy?
the contents of that report?
o A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
 o A: He did not furnish me a copy of those terrorism
[sic] report because those because he
[sic] were highly confidential. That is a was under
military report, maam. surveillance
o Q: But you were able to read the contents? from
o A: No. But he read it in front of us, my January
friends, maam. 2007 up
o Q: How many were you when you went to to the time
see Col. Kasim? that he was
o A: There were three of us, maam. abducted.
o Q: Who were your companions? He told us
o A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang that he was
friends nya from Mati City, under
Davao Oriental, maam.162 custodial
o Q: When you were told that your husband investiga
is in good hands, what tion. As
was your reaction and what did you do? Ive said
o A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband earlier,
has a parang meeting with he was
other people na parang mga seen
terorista na mga tao. Tapos under
at the surveilla
end of the report is [sic] nce from
under custodial January.
investigation. So I told him He was
"Colonel, my husband is sick. seen
He is diabetic at talking
nagmemaintain yun to Omar
ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa Patik, a
naghohold sa asawa ko na certain
bigyan siya Santos
ng gamot, maam."163 of
o Q: You mentioned that you received Bulacan
information that Engineer who is
Tagitis is being held by also a
the CIDG in Balik
Zamboanga, did you go Islam
to CIDG Zamboanga to and
verify that information? charged
o A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went with
to Camp Karingal terrorism.
instead. Enough na yun He was
na effort ko because I seen
know that they would carrying
deny it, maam.164 boxes of
x On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. medicines.
Talbin to corroborate her Then we
testimony that her husband was asked him
abducted and held under custodial
how long
investigation by the PNP-CIDG
will he be
Zamboanga City, viz:
in
o Q: You said that you went to Camp
custodial
Katitipan in Davao City
investigati
sometime November 24,
on. He said
2007, who was with you
when you went
until we
there?
can get
o A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
some
o Q: Only the two of you?
informatio
o A: No. We have some other companions.
n. But he
We were four at that
also told
time, sir.
us that he
o Q: Who were they?
cannot
o A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs.
give us
Tagitis and me, sir.
that report
o Q: Were you able to talk, see some other
officials at Camp because it
Katitipan during that time? was a raw
o A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin report. It
Kasim) only, sir. was not
o Q: Were you able to talk to him? official, sir.
o A: Yes, sir. o Q: You said that he was
o Q: The four of you? reading a report, was that
report in
o A: Yes, sir.
docume
o Q: What information did you get from Col.
Kasim during that time? nt form,
o A: The first time we met with [him] I asked in a
him if he knew of the piece of
exact location, if he can paper or
furnish us the location of was it in
Engr. Tagitis. And the
he was reading this report. compute
He told us that Engr. Tagitis r or
is in good what?
hands. He is with the o A: As far as I can see it,
sir, it is written in white bond
military, but he is not certain
paper. I
whether he is
dont
with the AFP or PNP. He has
know
this serious case. He was
if it
charged of
was computerized but
Im certain that it was o Q: When he was reading it to you, was he
typewritten. Im not reading it line by line or
sure if it used he was reading in a summary form?
computer, fax or what, o A: Sometimes he was glancing to the
sir. report and talking to us,
sir.165
o Q: Were you informed as to the place
where he was being kept
during that time?
o A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was
being kept. But he
mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
o Q: After that incident, what did you do if
any?
o A: We just left and as Ive mentioned, we
just waited because that
raw information that he was
reading to us [sic] after the
custodial investigation, Engineer
Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis
supplied]166
x Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the
respondent and her friends, and
that he provided them information based on
the input of an unnamed asset. He
simply claimed in his testimony that the
"informal letter" he received from his
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis
was in the custody of the CIDG. He
also stressed that the information he provided
the respondent was merely a "raw
report" from "barangay intelligence" that still
needed confirmation and "follow
up" as to its veracity.167
x To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins
testimonies were far from perfect,
as the petitioners pointed out. The
respondent mistakenly characterized Col.
Kasim as a "military officer" who told her
that "her husband is being abducted
because he is under custodial investigation
because he is allegedly parang liason
ng J.I." The petitioners also noted that "Mrs.
Talbins testimony imputing certain
statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis
is with the military, but he is not
certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not
worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim
is a high ranking police officer who would
certainly know that the PNP is not part
of the military."
x Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies,
however, what appears clear
to us is that the petitioners never really
steadfastly disputed or presented
evidence to refute the credibility of the
respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin.
The inconsistencies the petitioners point out
relate, more than anything else, to
details that should not affect the credibility of
the respondent and Mrs. Talbin;
the inconsistencies are not on material
points.168 We note, for example, that
these witnesses are lay people in so far as
military and police matters are
concerned, and confusion between the police
and the military is not unusual. As
a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these
indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication169and only tend to strengthen
their probative value, in contrast to
testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing
on every detail; the latter cannot
but generate suspicion that the material
circumstances they testified to were
integral parts of a well thought of and
prefabricated story.170
x Based on these considerations and the unique
evidentiary situation in enforced
disappearance cases, we hold it duly
established that Col. Kasim informed the
respondent and her friends, based on the
informants letter, that Tagitis,
reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been
under surveillance since January
2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial
investigation for complicity with
the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar
Patik and a certain "Santos" of
 Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The
respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies cannot simply be
defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim that he had
destroyed his informants letter, the critical piece of evidence
that supports or negates the parties conflicting claims. Col.
Kasims admitted destruction of this letter - effectively, a
suppression of this evidence -
raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be
proof of what the respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall
call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the
respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
x Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept
this
evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the
disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government
participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for
custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim
was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation
was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies
government intervention through the use of the term "custodial
investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as
Tagitis custodian.
x Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay
evidence -
i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of
the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim
himself) but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant).172
x To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible
evidence of
what it substantively states is to acknowledge - as the
petitioners effectively
suggest - that in the absence of any direct evidence, we
should simply dismiss
the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this
reason is no different
from a statement that the Amparo Rule -
despite its terms - is ineffective, as it
cannot allow for the special evidentiary
difficulties that are unavoidably present
in Amparo situations, particularly in
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not
promulgated with this intent or with the intent
to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. It was promulgated to
provide effective and timely remedies, using
and profiting from local and international
experiences in extrajudicial killings and
enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet
the evidentiary difficulties inherent in
enforced disappearances with the flexibility
that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1
x To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights
it protects, we hold that,
as in Velasquez, we should at least take a
close look at the available evidence to
determine the correct import of every piece of
evidence - even of those usually considered
inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence - taking into
account the surrounding circumstances and the
test of reason that we can use as
basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the
present case, we should at least
determine whether the Kasim evidence before
us is relevant and meaningful to
175
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
IDB, Prof. Matli, early
on informed the Jolo
the disappearance of Tagistis and police that Tagitis
reasonably consistent with other may have taken
evidence in funds given to him in
the case. trust for IDB scholars.
x The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances
surrounded him with an air Prof Matli later on
of mystery. He was reputedly a stated that he never
consultant of the World Bank and a accused Tagitis of
Senior taking away money
Honorary Counselor for the IDB who held in trust,
attended a seminar in Zamboanga although he
and confirmed that the
thereafter proceded to Jolo for an IDB was seeking
overnight stay, indicated by his assistance in
request to locating funds of IDB
Kunnong for the purchase of a return scholars deposited in
ticket to Zamboanga the day after he Tagitis personal
account. Other than
arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records these pieces of
indicates the purpose of his evidence, no other
overnight information exists in
sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the
 the records relating to the personal search in all of its
circumstances of Tagitis. divisions with negative
x The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his results. These, to the
personal circumstances. PNP Chief, constituted
While the Amparo petition recited the exhaustion "of all
that he was taken away by "burly possible
men efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief
believed to be police intelligence General Edgardo M.
operatives," no evidence Doromal, for his part,
whatsoever was also reported
introduced to support this allegation. negative results after
Thus, the available direct evidence is searching "all divisions
that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. and departments [of
of October 30, 2007 - the day he the CIDG] for
arrived in Jolo - and was never seen a person named Engr.
again. Morced N. Tagitis . . .
x The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given and after a diligent and
the dearth of direct thorough
evidence on the above aspects of research, records show
the case, as it supplies the gaps that that no such person is
were being detained in the
never looked into and clarified by CIDG or any
police investigation. It is the of its department or
evidence, too, divisions." PNP-PACER
that colors a simple missing person Chief PS Supt. Leonardo
report into an enforced disappearance A. Espina
case, as it injects the element of and PNP PRO ARMM
participation by agents of the State and Regional Director PC
thus brings into question how the State Superintendent Joel R.
reacted to the disappearance. Goltiao did no better
x Denials on the part of the police authorities, and in their affidavits-
frustration on the part returns, as they
of the respondent, characterize the essentially reported
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in the results of their
Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that directives to their
Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu units to search for
Tagitis.
Sayyaf or other groups fighting the x The extent to which the police
government. No evidence was ever authorities acted was fully tested when the
offered CA
on whether there was active Jolo police constituted Task Force
investigation and how and why the Jolo Tagitis, with specific
police arrived at this conclusion. The directives on what to
respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded do. The
the negative results
answer that he was not missing but was reflected in the Returns
with another woman somewhere. Again, on the writ were again
no evidence exists that this explanation replicated during
was arrived at based on an investigation. the three hearings the
CA scheduled. Aside
As already related above, the inquiry from the previously
with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded mentioned
ambivalent results not useful for "retraction" that Prof.
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only Matli made to correct
the his accusation that
inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded Tagitis took
positive results. Col. Kasims story, money held in trust for
however, students, PS Supt.
confirmed only the fact of his custodial Ajirim reiterated in his
investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest testimony that
or the CIDG consistently
abduction), without identifying his denied any knowledge
abductor/s or the party holding him in or complicity in any
custody. The more significant part of Col. abduction and
Kasims story is that the abduction said that there was no
came after Tagitis was seen talking with basis to conclude that
Omar Patik and a certain Santos of the CIDG or any police
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with unit had
terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, anything to do with the
that disappearance of
Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. Tagitis; he likewise
None of the police agencies considered it
participating in the investigation ever premature to conclude
pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force that Tagitis simply ran
away with the money in
Tagitis to which this information was his
relayed did not appear to have lifted a custody. As already
finger to pursue these aspects of the noted above, the Task
case. Force notably did not
x More denials were manifested in the Returns on the pursue any
writ to the CA made by the investigation about the
petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino personal circumstances
I. Razon merely reported the directives of Tagitis, his
he sent to the ARMM Regional Director background in
and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on relation to the IDB and
Tagitis, and these reports merely the background and
reiterated the open-ended initial report activities of this Bank
of the itself, and the
disappearance. The CIDG directed a reported sighting of
 Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged
custody in Talipapao,
Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever
been made to look into the alleged IDB
funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap
any of the "assets" who are
indispensable in investigations of this
nature. These omissions and negative
results were aggravated by the CA
findings that it was only as late as
January
28, 2008 or three months after the
disappearance that the police
authorities
requested for clear pictures of Tagitis.
Col. Kasim could not attend the trial
because his subpoena was not served,
despite the fact that he was designated
as Ajirims replacement in the latters
last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then
questioned. No investigation - even an
internal one - appeared to have been
made to inquire into the identity of Col.
Kasims "asset" and what he indeed
wrote.
x We glean from all these pieces of evidence and
developments a consistency in
the governments denial of any
complicity in the disappearance of
Tagitis,
disrupted only by the report made
by Col. Kasim to the respondent at
Camp
Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually
denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation for complicity in
terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs
through these developments is the
governments dismissive approach to the
disappearance, starting from the initial
response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial
reports of the disappearance, to
the responses made to the respondent when
she herself reported and inquired
about her husbands disappearance, and even
at Task Force Tagitis itself.
x As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the
investigation was at best
haphazard since the authorities were looking
for a man whose picture they
initially did not even secure. The returns and
reports made to the CA fared no
better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were
confined to searching for custodial
records of Tagitis in their various departments
and divisions. To point out the
obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a
"black" operation because it was
unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record
of custody would ever appear in
the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be
detained in the usual police or CIDG
detention places. In sum, none of the reports
on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the
investigation made. To be sure,
reports of top police officials indicating the
personnel and units they directed to
investigate can never constitute exhaustive
and meaningful investigation, or
equal detailed investigative reports of the
activities undertaken to search for Tagitis.
Indisputably, the police authorities from
the very beginning failed to come up to the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo
Rule requires.
x Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col.
Kasims disclosure,
made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some
government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but
unfounded denials and the haphazard
investigations cannot but point to this
conclusion. For why would the government
and its officials engage in
their chorus of concealment if the intent
had not been to deny what
they already knew of the disappearance?
Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a
feather in the governments cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance?
From this perspective, the evidence and
developments, particularly the Kasim
evidence, already establish a concrete case of
enforced disappearance that the
Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN
Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted,173 the evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the
fact of the enforced disappearance and
government complicity, under a
background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard
handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the
protection of the law - a situation that will subsist
unless this Court acts.
x This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached
are not without precedent
in international enforced disappearance rulings.
While the facts are not exactly the same, the
facts of this case run very close to those of
Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR.
The European tribunal in that case acted on the
basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation
report" in finding that Abdulvahap
Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later
detained by agents (gendarmes)
 of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case justice and assist in their prosecution." The
brought a claim PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose
against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9)
Convention, including testified, is the "investigative
the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
security of a person "investigate and prosecute all
(Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, cases involving violations of the Revised Penal
1993, gendarmes Code, particularly those
apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the considered as heinous crimes."176 Under the
Kurdish Workers PNP organizational structure,
Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major
southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the crimes involving violations of the
apprehension. According to the father, Revised Penal Code and operates against
gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then organized crime groups, unless the
transferred him to another detainment facility. Although President assigns the case exclusively to the
there was no eyewitness evidence of the National Bureau of Investigation
apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case
presented evidence showing that the President ever
corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of directly intervened by assigning the
a post-operation investigation of Tagitis disappearance
report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in exclusively to the NBI.
Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of x Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials
Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a and members were
subsequent interrogation during detention where he was the ones who were remiss in their duties when
accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this the government completely
basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps enforced failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce
disappearance. the Amparo remedy, we refer this
x Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine case back to the CA for appropriate
legal proceedings directed at the monitoring of the
setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and
applied to the unique facts and developments of this case - actions, and the validation of their
we believe and so hold that the government in general, results through hearings the CA may deem
through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the appropriate to conduct. For purposes
Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall
be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of initially present to the CA a plan
Tagitis. of action for further investigation, periodically
x The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act reporting the detailed results of its
No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the investigation to the CA for its consideration
PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to and action. On behalf of this Court,
investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal 176
offenders, bring offenders to
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
Appeals dated March 7, 2008
under the following terms:
the CA shall pass upon: the need for the o a. Recognition that the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disappearance of Engineer Morced
disclosures of matters known to them as N.
indicated in this Decision and as further Tagitis is an
CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners enforced
submissions; the sufficiency of their disappearance
investigative efforts; and submit to this covered by the
Court a quarterly report containing its Rule on the Writ of
actions and recommendations, copy Amparo;
furnished the petitioners and the o b. Without any specific
respondent, with the first report due at pronouncement on exact authorship
the end of the first quarter counted from and
the finality of this Decision. The PNP and responsibility,
the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full declaring the
year to undertake their investigation. The government (through
CA shall submit its full report for the the PNP and the PNP-
consideration of this Court at the end of CIDG) and Colonel
the 4th quarter counted from the finality Julasirim Ahadin
of this Decision. Kasim accountable
x WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the for the enforced
petitioners petition for review disappearance of
on certiorari for lack of merit, and Engineer Morced N.
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Tagitis;
o c. Confirmation of the validity of the investig
Writ of Amparo the Court of ation
Appeals issued; constitu
o d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP te less
Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, than the
through its Chief, directly extraord
responsible for the disclosure inary
of material diligenc
facts known to the e that
government and to their the Rule
offices regarding the on the
disappearance of Engineer Writ of
Morced N. Tagitis, and for the Amparo
conduct and the
of proper investigations using circumsta
extraordinary diligence, with nces of
the this case
obligation to show investigation demand.
results acceptable to this Court; Given the
o e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin unique
Kasim impleaded in this case nature of
and holding him Amparo
accountable with the cases
obligation to disclose and their
information known to him varying
and to his "assets" in attendant
relation with the enforced
disappearance of Engineer circumsta
Morced N. Tagitis; nces,
o f. Referring this case back to the Court these
of Appeals for appropriate directives
proceedings directed at the -
monitoring of the PNP and particular
PNP-CIDG ly, the
investigations, actions and referral
the validation of their back to
results; the PNP and
and the PNP-CIDG shall monitor
initially present to the Court ing by
of Appeals a the CA
plan of action for further - are
investigation, periodically specific
reporting their to this
results to the Court of case
Appeals for consideration and are
and action; not
o g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to standar
submit to this Court a d
quarterly report with its remedi
recommendations, copy es
furnished the that
incumbent PNP and PNP- can be
CIDG Chiefs as applied
petitioners and the to
respondent, with the first every
report due at the end of the Amparo
first quarter counted from the situatio
finality of this Decision; n.
o h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall The dismissal of
have one (1) full year to the Amparo petition
undertake their with respect to
investigations; the Court of Gener
Appeals shall submit its full al
report for the consideration of Alexan
this Court at the end of the der
4th quarter counted from the Yano,
finality of this Decision; Comm
These directives and anding
those of the Court of Appeals Gener
made pursuant to al,
this Decision shall Philipp
be given to, and ine
shall be directly Army,
enforceable and
against, whoever Gener
may be al
the incumbent Ruben
Chiefs of the Rafael,
Philippine National Chief,
Police Anti-
and its Criminal Terrorism
Investigation and Task
Detection Group, Force
under pain of Comet,
contempt from Zamboan
this Court when ga City, is
the hereby
initiatives and AFFIRMED
efforts at .
disclosure and
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National
Police (PNP); Police Chief the disappearance of Tagitis, the
Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal dismissive approach of the police
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); authorities to the report of the
Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, disappearance, as well as the
Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency haphazard investigations
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, conducted that did not translate
Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, into any
vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. meaningful results, to be
FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney- indicative of government
in-Fact, Respondent. complicity in the
G.R. No. disappearance of Tagitis (for
182498 purposes of the Rule on the Writ
of
Amparo).
February o We explained that although the Kasim
16, 2010 evidence was patently
EN BANC hearsay (and was thus
incompetent and inadmissible
FACTS: under our
x This is an MR of the 2009 SC Decision rules of evidence), the unique
o based, among other considerations, evidentiary difficulties posed by
on the finding that Col.
Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. enforced disappearance cases
Kasim) informed the compel us to adopt standards
respondent Mary that
Jean Tagitis (respondent) and were appropriate and
her friends that her husband responsive to the evidentiary
had difficulties
been under surveillance since faced. We noted that while we
January 2007 because an must follow the substantial
informant evidence
notified the authorities, rule, we must also observe
through a letter, that Tagitis flexibility in considering the
was a liaison evidence
for the JI;5 that he was "in that we shall take into account.
good hands" and under x Razon et als contentions:
custodial o First, the petitioners argue that there was
investigation for complicity no sufficient evidence to
with the JI after he was seen conclude that Col. Kasims
talking to one Omar Patik and disclosure unequivocally points
a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, to some
a "Balik Islam" charged with government complicity in the
terrorism (Kasim evidence). disappearance of Tagitis.
o We considered Col. Kasims Specifically,
information, together with the the petitioners contend that this
consistent denials by government Court erred in unduly relying on
authorities of any complicity in the raw information given to Col.
Kasim by a personal intelligence
"asset" without any other
evidence to support it. The
petitioners
also point out that the Court
misapplied its cited cases
(Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,7
Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras,8 and
Timurtas v. Turkey9) to support
its December 3, 2009 decision; in

those cases, more than one

circumstance pointed to the
complicity
of the government and its
agents. The petitioners
emphasize that
in the present case, the
respondent only presented a
"token piece
of evidence" that points to Col.
Kasim as the source of
information
that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation for having been
suspected as a "terrorist
supporter." This, according to the
petitioners, cannot be equated to
the substantial evidence required
by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.10
o Second, the petitioners contend that Col.
Kasims death renders
impossible compliance with the
Courts directive in its December
3,
2009 decision that Col. Kasim be
impleaded in the present case
and
held accountable with the
 obligation to disclose information known
to him and to his "assets" on the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.
The petitioners alleged that Col. Kasim
was killed in an encounter
with the Abu Sayaff Group on May 7,
2009. To prove Col. Kasims
death, the petitioners attached to their
motion a copy of an article
entitled "Abus kill Sulu police director"
published by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on May 8, 2009.11 This
article alleged that "Senior
Supt. Julasirim Kasim, his brother Rosalin,
a police trainee, and two
other police officers were killed in a fire
fight with Abu Sayyaf
bandits that started at about 1 p.m. on
Thursday, May 7, 2009 at
the boundaries of Barangays Kulasi and
Bulabog in Maimbung
town, Sulu." The petitioners also
attached an official copy of
General Order No. 1089 dated May 15,
2009 issued by the PNP
National Headquarters, indicating that
"PS SUPT [Police Senior
Superintendent] Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
0-05530, PRO ARMM, is
posthumously retired from PNP service
effective May 8, 2009."12
Additionally, the petitioners point out
that the intelligence "assets"
who supplied the information that Tagitis
was under custodial
investigation were personal to Col. Kasim;
hence, the movants can no longer comply
with this Courts order to disclose any
information known to Col. Kasim and his
"assets."
ISSUE # 1: Whether Col. Kasim should still be impleaded as a
party to this case considering his death.
HELD # 1: NO.
x We hold that our directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to
the present case
has been rendered moot and academic by his death.
Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
x Paragraph (e) of the dispositive portion of our December 3,
2009 decision
directs:
o e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin
Kasim impleaded in this case
and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and
to his "assets" in relation with
the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
x Undisputably, this directive can no longer be
enforced, and has been rendered
moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's
demise. His intervening death, however,
does not necessarily signify the loss of the
information Col. Kasim may have left behind,
particularly the network of "assets" he
utilized while he was in the
service. Intelligence gathering is not an
activity conducted in isolation, and
involves an interwoven network of informants
existing on the basis of symbiotic
relationships with the police and the military.
It is not farfetched that a
resourceful investigator, utilizing the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access or
reconstruct the information Col.
Kasim received from his "asset" or network of
assets during his lifetime.
x The extinction of Col. Kasims personal accountability
and obligation to disclose
material information, known to him and his
assets, does not also erase the
burden of disclosure and investigation that
rests with the PNP and the CIDG. Lest
this Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that
our holding in our December 3,
2009 Decision that the PNP -- through the
incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-
CIDG, through its incumbent Chief -- are
directly responsible14 for the disclosure
of material facts known to the government
and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct
of proper investigation using
extraordinary diligence still subsists. These
are continuing obligations that will
not truly be terminated until the enforced
disappearance of the victim, Engr.
177
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disappearance of
Tagitis; the dismissive
Morced N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by approach of the police
the responsible or accountable parties, authorities to the
as we directed in our Decision. report of the
disappearance; and the
ISSUE # 2: Whether government complicity in conduct of haphazard
the disappearance of Tagitis was sufficiently investigations that did
shown by the Kasim evidence. not translate into any
meaningful results. We
HELD # 2: YES. painstakingly ruled:
x We see no merit in the petitioners submitted position x To give full meaning to our
that no sufficient evidence Constitution and the rights it protects, we
exists to support the conclusion that the hold that,
Kasim evidence unequivocally points to as in Velasquez, we
some government complicity in the should at least take a
disappearance. Contrary to the close look at the
petitioners available evidence to
claim that our conclusions only relied on determine the correct
Col. Kasims report, our Decision plainly import of every piece
and pointedly considered other of evidence - even of
evidence supporting our conclusion, those usually
particularly considered
the consistent denials by government
authorities of any complicity in the
 inadmissible under the general rules of x Likewise, we see no merit in the
evidence - taking into petitioners claim that the Kasim evidence
account the surrounding circumstances does
and the test of reason that we can use not amount to
as substantial evidence
basic minimum admissibility required by the Rule
requirement. In the present case, we on the Writ of Amparo.
should at least This is not a new issue;
determine whether the Kasim evidence we extensively and
before us is relevant and meaningful to thoroughly considered
the disappearance of Tagistis and and resolved it in our
reasonably consistent with other December 3, 2009
evidence in Decision. At this point,
the case. we need not go into
x The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given another full discussion
the dearth of direct of the justifications
evidence on the above aspects of supporting an
the case, as it supplies the gaps that evidentiary standard
were specific to the Writ of
never looked into and clarified by Amparo. Suffice it to
police investigation. It is the say that we continue
evidence, too, to adhere to the
that colors a simple missing person substantial evidence
report into an enforced disappearance rule that the Rule on the
case, as it injects the element of Writ of Amparo requires,
participation by agents of the State and with
thus brings into question how the State some adjustments for
reacted to the disappearance. flexibility in considering
x We glean from all these pieces of evidence and the evidence presented.
developments a When we
consistency in the governments denial ruled that hearsay
of any complicity in the evidence (usually
disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only considered inadmissible
by the report made by Col. under the general
Kasim to the respondent at Camp rules of evidence) may
Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, be admitted as the
eventually denied that he ever made circumstances of the
the disclosure that Tagitis was under case may
custodial investigation for complicity in require, we did not
terrorism. Another distinctive trait that thereby dispense with
runs through these developments is the substantial
the governments dismissive approach evidence rule; we
to the disappearance, starting from the merely relaxed the
initial response by the Jolo evidentiary rule on the
police to Kunnongs initial reports of admissibility of
the disappearance, to the evidence, maintaining
responses made to the respondent all the time the
when she herself reported and standards of reason and
inquired about her husbands relevance that underlie
disappearance, and even at Task Force every evidentiary
Tagitis itself. situation. This, we did,
x As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the by considering the
investigation was at best totality of the obtaining
haphazard since the authorities were situation and
looking for a man whose picture they the consistency of the
initially did not even secure. The hearsay evidence with
returns and reports made to the CA the other available
fared no better, as the CIDG efforts evidence in the
themselves were confined to case.
searching for custodial records of x We also cannot agree with the
Tagitis in their various departments petitioners contention that we misapplied
and divisions. To point out the obvious, Secretary of Defense v.
if the abduction of Tagitis was a Manalo,15 Velasquez
"black" operation because it was Rodriguez v.
unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no Honduras,16 and
record Timurtas v. Turkey17 to
of custody would ever appear in the support our December
CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be 3, 2009 decision. The
detained in the usual police or CIDG petitioners
detention places. In sum, none of the make this claim with
the view that in these
reports on record contains any cases, more than one
meaningful results or details on the circumstance
depth and pointed to the
extent of the investigation made. To government or its
be sure, reports of top police officials agents as the parties
indicating the personnel and responsible for the
units they directed to investigate disappearance, while
can never we can only point to the
constitute exhaustive and Kasim evidence. A close
meaningful investigation, or reading of
equal detailed our December 3, 2009
investigative reports of the activities Decision shows that it
undertaken to search for Tagitis. rests on more than one
Indisputably, the police authorities from basis.
the very beginning failed to come up to x At the risk of repetition, we stress
the extraordinary diligence that the that other pieces of evidence point the way
Amparo Rule requires. towards our
conclusion,
particularly the
unfounded and consistent denials by
government authorities of any
complicity in the disappearance; the
dismissive
approach of the police to the report
of the disappearance; and the
haphazard
handling of the investigation that did
not produce any meaningful results.
In
cruder but more understandable
language, the run-around given to
the
respondent and the government
responses to the request for
meaningful
investigation, considered in the
light of the Kasim evidence,
pointed to the
conclusion that the Tagitis affair carried a "foul
smell" indicative of government complicity or,
at the very least, an attempt at cover-up and
concealment. This is the situation that the Writ
of Amparo specifically seeks to address.
x Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas, read in
proper perspective, fully
support our findings and conclusions in this case.
x Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual
settings, as enforced
disappearance was no longer a problem in that
case. The enforced
disappearance of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended
when they escaped from captivity and
surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to
be found and remains missing more than two
years after his reported
disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted
in Manalo, however, because of
the continuing threat to the brothers right to
security; the brothers claimed that
since the persons responsible for their enforced
disappearance were still at large
and had not been held accountable, the former
were still under the threat of
being once again abducted, kept captive or
even killed, which threat constituted
a direct violation of their right to security of
person. In ruling that substantial
evidence existed to support the conclusion that
the respondents right to security
had been violated, the Court not only
considered the respondents affidavit and
testimony which positively identified the
perpetrators, but also noted other
evidence showing the ineffective investigation
and protection on the part of the
military. The Court significantly found that:
o Next, the violation of the right to security
as protection by the
government. Apart from the
failure of military elements to
provide protection to respondents
by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture,
they also miserably failed in
conducting an effective
investigation of respondents
abduction as
revealed by the testimony and
investigation report of petitioners
own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben
Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the
7th
Infantry Division.
o The one-day investigation conducted by
Jimenez was very limited,
superficial, and one-sided. He
merely relied on the Sworn
Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and
civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He
was
present at the investigation when
his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but
he did not propound a single
question to ascertain the veracity of
their statements or their
credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given
by the six implicated persons nor
for the family or neighbors of the
respondents.
o In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of
National Defense attested
that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued
a policy directive addressed to the
AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP
should adopt rules of action in the
event the writ of amparo is
issued by a competent court
against any members of the AFP,
 which should essentially include verification of the tolerated enforced disappearances, the police
identity of the customarily used a distinctive form of
aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of kidnapping. Consequently, the IACHR presumed
relevant evidence; that Velasquez disappeared at the "hands of or
identification of witnesses and securing with the acquiescence of those officials within
statements from them; the framework of that practice." Moreover, the
determination of the cause, manner, location and IACHR found that negative inferences may be
time of death or drawn from the fact that the government failed
disappearance; identification and apprehension of to investigate or to inquire into his
the person or disappearance, and thwarted the attempts by
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and the victims family to do so; these according to
bringing of the the Court strongly suggested the governments
suspected offenders before a competent court. involvement in the disappearance, even if there
Petitioner AFP Chief was no direct evidence indicating that the
of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting government kidnapped Velasquez.19 The Court
that he received thus held:
the above directive of respondent Secretary of o iii. In the case of Manfredo Velsquez,
National Defense there were the same type of
and that acting on this directive, he denials by his captors and the
immediately caused to be Armed Forces, the same omissions
issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the of
purpose of the latter and of the Government in
establishing the circumstances of the alleged investigating and revealing his
disappearance and whereabouts, and the same
the recent reappearance of the respondents, and ineffectiveness of the courts where
undertook to three writs of HABEAS corpus
provide results of the investigations to and two criminal complaints
respondents. To this day, were brought ( testimony of
however, almost a year after the policy directive Miguel Angel Pavn Salazar,
was issued by Ramn
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on Custodio Lpez, Zenaida
October 31, 2007, Velsquez, press
respondents have not been furnished the results clippings and
of the documentary evidence ).
investigation which they now seek through the o h. There is no evidence in the record that
instant petition for a writ of amparo. Manfredo Velsquez had
o Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to disappeared in order to join
warrant subversive groups, other than a
the conclusion that there is a violation of letter
respondents right to security as a guarantee of from the Mayor of Langue, which
protection by the government. contained rumors to that effect.
[Emphasis supplied]18 The letter itself shows that the
x Similarly in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Government associated him with
Rights
(IACHR) acknowledged that when the Honduran Government 178
carried out or
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disappeared at
the hands of or
activities it considered a with the
threat to national security. acquiescence of
However, the Government those
did not corroborate the view officials within
expressed in the letter with the framework of
any other evidence. Nor is that practice; and
there any evidence that he (3) the
was kidnapped by common Government of
criminals or other persons Honduras failed
unrelated to the practice of to guarantee the
disappearances existing at human rights
that time." affected by that
o 148. Based upon the above, the Court practice.
finds that the following facts x Finally, in Timurtas, the European Court of
have been proven in this Human Rights (ECHR) altered the
proceeding: (1) a practice prevailing jurisprudence by
of permitting a lesser evidentiary
disappearances carried burden in cases of
out or tolerated by enforced disappearances. The
Honduran officials ECHR dismissed the need for
existed between 1981 direct evidence
and 1984; ( 2) Manfredo previously held necessary in
Velsquez
 the leading case of Kurt v. Turkey,21
and instead
permitted the use of circumstantial
evidence to establish a violation of the
right
to life. It stated that "whether the failure
on the part of authorities to provide a
plausible explanation as to a detainees
fate, in the absence of a body, might
raise issues under Article 2 of the
Convention (right to life), will depend on
the
circumstances of the case and, in
particular, on the existence of sufficient
circumstantial evidence based on
concrete elements, from which it may be
concluded to the requisite standard of
proof that the detainee must be presumed
to have died in custody."22 The ECHR
found that:
o Noting that more than six and a half
years has gone by since
Abdulvahap Timurtas
apprehension and having
regard to all the other
circumstances of the case,
the Court found that the
disappearance of
Abdulvahap Timurtas after
he had been taken into
detention led, in the
circumstances of this case,
to a
presumption that he had
died. No explanation
having been
provided by the
Government as to what
had happened to him
during his detention, the
Government was liable for
his death and
there was a violation of
Article 2 of the Convention.
[Emphasis
supplied]
o Significantly (in the context of the
present case), the ECHR also
noted that the inadequacy
of the investigation into the
disappearance of Timurtas
also constituted a violation
of his right
to life under Article 2 of the
European Convention on
Human
Rights.
x Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in
the three cited cases
are applicable to the present case.
There is the evidence of ineffective
investigation in Manalo and Velasquez
Rodriguez, while in all three was the
recognition that the burden of proof
must be lowered or relaxed (either
through the use of circumstantial or
indirect evidence or even by
logical inference); the requirement for
direct evidence to establish that an
enforced disappearance occurred -- as the
petitioners effectively suggest --
would render it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to prove that an individual
has been made to disappear. In these
lights, we emphasized in our December
3, 2009 Decision that while the need for
substantial
evidence remains the rule, flexibility must
be observed where
appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez
Rodriguez and Timurtas did)
for the protection of the precious rights to
life, liberty and security. This
flexibility, we noted, requires that "we
should take a close look at the
available evidence to determine the
correct import of every piece of
evidence - even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the
general rules of evidence - taking
into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of
reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility
requirement." From these
perspectives, we see no
error that we should rectify or
reconsider.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C.
ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs.
GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO,
GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS
AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT,
PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ.
GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY
GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS
WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND
ROSE, Respondents.
G.R
.
No.
18
91
55
Sep
te
mb
er
7,
20
10
EN
BA
NC
FACTS:
x Melissa is an American citizen with Filipino
descent.
x She enrolled in an exposure program of
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United
States of America (BAYAN-USA) while she
was still in the US
x As such, she volunteered to join members
of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an
initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a
future medical mission
x While on mission, Melissa and her
companions decided to rest in the house of
one Paolo
x Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men
forcibly opened the door, barged
inside and ordered petitioner
and her companions to lie on
the ground face down.12 The
armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception
of their leader, were also
wearing bonnets to conceal
their faces
x Before being blindfolded, Melissa was
able to see the faces of these men
x They were then taken to another place via
a van by her abductors who
introduced themselves as "Dex," "James"
and "RC."
x Melissa was brought to a cell and was
separated from her 2 companions
x She was then informed that she was
being detained because of her alleged
affiliation with the CPP-NPA
x She was tortured while in detention
 ISSUE # 1: Whether then President GMA was correctly
x She was finally released after 6 days BUT she was given a impleaded in the petition for amparo and habeas data
cellphone with a SIM pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility.
card, among others, with which she was contacted thereafter
by her abductors HELD # 1: NO.
x She was also threatened against informing the group x It must be stated at the outset that the use by the
KARAPATAN of her petitioner of the
abduction and torture doctrine of command responsibility as the
x Melissa then filed an Amparo and Habeas Data petition justification in impleading the public
before the CA with the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
ff prayers: inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
o (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or command responsibility is a rule of
even approaching substantive law that establishes liability and,
petitioner and her family; by this account, cannot be a proper legal
o (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of basis to implead a party-respondent in an
detention areas in amparo petition.100
the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, x The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first
Nueva Ecija; to examine command
o (3) respondents be ordered to produce responsibility in the context of an amparo
documents relating to any proceeding, observed that the doctrine is
report on the case of petitioner used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes
including, but not limited to, that:102
intelligence report and operation o The evolution of the command
reports of the 7th Infantry responsibility doctrine finds its
Division, the Special Operations Group of context in the development of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines laws of war and armed
(AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es combats.
prior to, during and subsequent to 19 According to Fr. Bernas,
May 2009; "command responsibility," in its
o (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the simplest
records of the terms, means the
respondents any document pertinent "responsibility of commanders
or connected to Melissa C. for crimes
Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name committed by subordinate
which sounds the same; and members of the armed forces or
o (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner other persons subject to their
her journal, control in international wars or
digital camera with memory card, domestic conflict."103 In this
laptop computer, external hard disk, sense, command responsibility is
IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, properly a form of criminal
stethoscope, complicity. The Hague
medicines and her P15,000.00 cash Conventions of 1907 adopted
x SolGen filed a Return for the respondents; prayed for the doctrine of command
DISMISSAL of the responsibility,104 foreshadowing
petition the present-day precept of
o (a) as against respondent President Gloria holding a superior accountable
Macapagal-Arroyo, in for the atrocities committed by
particular, because of her immunity from suit,52 his
and subordinates should he be
o (b) as against all of the public respondents, in remiss in his duty of control over
general, in view of them.
the absence of any specific allegation in As then formulated, command
the petition that they had participated responsibility is "an omission
in, or at least authorized, the mode
commission of such of individual criminal liability,"
atrocities whereby the superior is made
x CA partly granted the petition responsible for crimes
o gave due weight and consideration to the committed by his subordinates
petitioners version that for failing to
she was indeed abducted and then prevent or punish the
subjected to torture for five (5) straight perpetrators105 (as opposed to
days; CA believed that Melissa was telling crimes he
the truth ordered). (Emphasis in the
o BUT was not convinced that the military or any orginal, underscoring supplied)
other person acting x Since the application of command responsibility
under the acquiescence of the presupposes an
government, were responsible for imputation of individual liability, it is more
the abduction and torture of the aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
petitioner.89 The appellate court administrative case rather than in a summary
stressed that, judging by her own amparo
statements, the petitioner merely proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of
"believed" that the military was behind the writ itself:
her abduction.90 Thus, the o The writ of amparo is a protective
Court of Appeals absolved the public remedy aimed at providing
respondents from any judicial relief consisting of the
complicity in the abduction and torture of appropriate remedial measures
petitioner.91 The petition was likewise and
dismissed as against public respondent directives that may be crafted
President by the court, in order to address
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity specific violations or threats of
from suit. violation of the constitutional
o petitioners prayers for the return of her personal rights
belongings were to life, liberty or security.106
denied.93 Petitioners prayers for While the principal objective of
an inspection order and its
production order also met the proceedings is the initial
same fate determination of whether an
x Melissa filed a Rule 45 before the SC enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats 179
thereof had transpired
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reliefs
available
the writ does not, by so to the
doing, fix liability for such petitioner
disappearance, killing or ; it is not
threats, whether that may be an action
criminal, civil or to
administrative under the determine
applicable substantive criminal
law.107 The rationale guilt
underpinning this peculiar requiring
nature of an amparo writ proof
has been, in turn, clearly set beyond
forth in the landmark case reasonabl
of The Secretary of National e doubt,
Defense v. Manalo:108 or liability
x x x The remedy provides for
rapid judicial relief as it damages
partakes of a requiring
summary preponder
proceeding that ance of
requires only evidence,
substantial or
evidence to make administr
the appropriate ative
 responsibility of blindfolds; conducting
requiring interrogations to elicit communist
substantial inclinations; and the
evidence that will infliction of physical abuse
require full and which, according to her, is
exhaustive consistent with the way
proceedings.109(E enforced disappearances are
mphasis being practiced by the military or
supplied) other state
x It must be clarified, however, that the forces.112
inapplicability of the doctrine of x Moreover, petitioner also claims that she
command responsibility in an amparo was held inside the military camp Fort
proceeding does not, by any Magsaysaya conclusion that she
measure, preclude impleading military was able to infer from the travel
or police commanders on the time required to reach the place
ground that the complained acts in the where she was actually detained,
petition were committed with their direct and also from the sounds of
or indirect acquiescence. In which case, construction, gun-fire and
commanders may be impleadednot airplanes she heard while
actually on the basis of command thereat.113
responsibility but rather on the ground o We are not impressed.
of their responsibility, or at least x The totality of the evidence presented by
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the the petitioner does not inspire
distinct, but interrelated concepts of reasonable conclusion that her
responsibility and accountability were abductors were military or
given special and unique significations in police personnel and that she
relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit: was detained at Fort
o x x x Responsibility refers to the Magsaysay.
extent the actors have been o First. The similarity between
established by the circumstances attending a
substantial evidence particular case of
to have participated abduction with those
in whatever way, by surrounding previous
action or omission, in instances of enforced
an enforced disappearances does
disappearance, as a measure not, necessarily,
of the remedies this Court carry sufficient
shall craft, among them, the weight to prove that
directive to file the the government
appropriate criminal and civil orchestrated such
cases against the responsible abduction. We opine
parties in the proper courts. that insofar as the
Accountability, on the present case is
other hand, refers to the concerned, the
measure of perceived similarity
remedies that should be cannot stand as
addressed to those who substantial evidence
exhibited of the involvement of
involvement in the enforced the government.
disappearance without In amparo
bringing the level of their proceedings, the weight
complicity to the level of that may be
responsibility defined above; accor
or who are imputed with ded to
knowledge relating to the parall
enforced el
disappearance and who circu
carry the burden of mstan
disclosure; or those who ces as
carry, but have failed to evide
discharge, the burden of nce of
extraordinary militar
diligence in the y
investigation of the involv
enforced ement
disappearance. depen
ds
ISSUE # 2: Whether there was sufficient largel
evidence in impleading the herein public y on
respondents. the
availabilit
HELD # 2: NO. y or non-
x At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case availabilit
that the intent of the y of other
petitioner in impleading the public pieces of
respondents is to ascribe some form of evidence
responsibility on their part, based on her that has
assumption that they, in one way or the the
other, had condoned her abduction and potential
torture.111 of directly
x To establish such assumption, petitioner proving
attempted to show that it was the
government agents who were behind her identity
ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls and
attention to the circumstances affiliation
surrounding her abduction and torture of the
i.e., the perpetrat
forcible taking in broad daylight; use of ors. Direct
vehicles with no license plates; utilization
 evidence of
identity, when she managed to see.
obtainable, must To the mind of this
be Court, these
preferred over cartographic sketches
mere have the undeniable
circumstantial potential
evidence based on of giving the greatest
certainty as to the
patterns and true identity
similarity, because and affiliation of
the former petitioners
indubitably offers abductors.
greater certainty Unfortunately
as to the true for the petitioner, this
identity and potential has not
affiliation of the been realized
perpetrators. An in view of the fact
amparo that the faces
court cannot described in such
simply leave to sketches remain
remote and hazy unidentified, much
inference what it less have been
could otherwise shown to be that of
clearly and any military or police
directly personnel.
ascertain. Bluntly stated, the
In the case at bench, abductors were not
petitioner was, in fact, able to proven to be
include in her part of either the
Offer of military or the police
Exhibits,114 the chain of
cartographic command.
sketches115 of o Second. The claim of the petitioner that
several of her she was taken to Fort
abductors whose Magsaysay was not adequately
faces established by her mere estimate
of
the time it took to reach the place
where she was detained and by
the sounds that she heard while
thereat. Like the Court of Appeals,

We are not inclined to take the

estimate and observations of the
petitioner as accurate on its
facenot only because they
were
made mostly while she was in
blindfolds, but also in view of
the
fact that she was a mere
sojourner in the Philippines,
whose
familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel
time required to
reach it is in itself
doubtful.116 With nothing
else but obscure
observations to support it,
petitioners claim that she was
taken to Fort Magsaysay remains
a mere speculation.
x In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a
concrete point that her
abductors were actually affiliated, whether
formally or informally, with the
military or the police organizations. Neither
does the evidence at hand prove that
petitioner was indeed taken to the military
camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of
other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn,
make it virtually impossible to determine
whether the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the
public respondents. On account of this
insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

ISSUE # 3: Whether the return of Melissas personal

belongings was proper in a petition for amparo and
habeas data.

HELD # 3: NO.
x In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above
prayer of the petitioner by
 reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the
public respondents were
involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree
with the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used
to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of
the petitioner for the return of her belongings is
doomed to fail regardless of whether there is
sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
x In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to
return
the personal belongings of the petitioner is already
equivalent to a
conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself
is a substantial relief
that can only be granted once the liability of the
public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already
discussed above, matters
of liability are not determinable in a mere summary
amparo
proceeding.118
x But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the
prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to
be restituted of his property is already subsumed
under the general rubric of property
rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of
amparo.119 Section
1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope
and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection
of property rights.

ISSUE # 4: Whether the inspection of the detention areas of

Fort Magsaysay may properly ordered in the present case.

HELD # 4: NO.
x Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any
military
involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds
no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort
Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a
contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a
"fishing expedition," which was never intended by the
Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of
inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit
position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo
Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for
evidence.
x An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give
support or strengthen
the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in
order to aid the court before
making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an
amparo court may
grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably
determinable from the allegations of the party seeking
the order. While
the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be
inspected be identified
with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a
minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that
the supporting allegations of a party be
sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case.
This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
x Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner
are not strong
enough to make out a prima facie case that she was
detained in Fort Magsaysay,
an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered.
An inspection order cannot
issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

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appropriate legal
measures for the
protection of human
rights,"128 must be
tapped in order to fill
certain investigative
and remedial voids.
raised as an issue in
ISSUE # 5: Whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data should this appeal, this Court
be granted. is constrained to pass
upon and review this
HELD # 5: NO. particular ruling of the
x As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to Court of Appeals in
the petitioner the privilege order to rectify, what
of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining appears to Us, an error
the public respondents from infecting the grant
"distributing x For the proper appreciation of the
or causing the distribution to the public rationale used by the Court of Appeals in
any records in whatever form, reports, granting the
documents or similar papers" relative to privilege of the
the petitioners "alleged ties with the writ of habeas
CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her data, We quote
abduction and torture." Though not hereunder the
 relevant portion125 of its x Needless to state, an indispensable
decision: requirement before the privilege of the writ
o Under these premises, Petitioner prayed may be extended is
that all the records, the showing, at least
intelligence reports and by substantial
reports on the evidence, of an
investigations conducted on actual or threatened
Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa violation of the right
Roxas be produced and to privacy in life,
eventually liberty or
expunged from the records. security of the
Petitioner claimed to be victim.127 This, in
included in the the case at bench,
Governments Order of the petitioner
Battle under Oplan Bantay failed to do.
Laya which listed political x The main problem behind the ruling
opponents against whom of the Court of Appeals is that there is
false criminal charges were actually no evidence on
filed based on made up and record that shows that
perjured information. any of the public
x Pending resolution of this petition and before respondents
Petitioner could testify before Us, had violated or
Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, threatened the right to
Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of privacy of the
the petitioner. The act
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy ascribed
party-list held a press conference where by the Court of Appeals
to the public
they revealed that they received an respondents that would
information from a female NPA rebel have violated or
who threatened the right to
wanted out of the organization, that privacy of the
Petitioner was a communist rebel. petitioner, i.e., keeping
Alcover records of
claimed that said information reached investigations and
them thru a letter with photo of other reports about the
Petitioner petitioners ties with
holding firearms at an NPA training the CPP-NPA,
camp and a video CD of the training was not adequately
exercises. provenconsidering
x Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that that the origin of such
she was the person in said records were
video, there were records of other virtually unexplained
investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or and its existence,
Melissa Roxas which violate her right to clearly, only inferred by
privacy. Without a doubt, reports of the appellate
such nature have reasonable court from the video
connections, one way or another, to and photograph
petitioners abduction where she released by
claimed she had been subjected to Representatives
cruelties and dehumanizing acts which Palparan and
nearly caused her life precisely Alcover in their press
due to allegation of her alleged conference. No
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said evidence on record
report or similar reports are to be even shows that any of
continuously made available to the the public respondents
public, had access to such
Petitioners security and privacy will video or photograph.
certainly be in danger of being x In view of the above considerations,
violated or transgressed by persons the directive by the Court of Appeals
who have strong sentiments or enjoining the public
aversion against respondents from
members of this group. The unregulated "distributing or causing
dissemination of said unverified video the distribution to
CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties the public any records
with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made in whatever form,
reports, documents or
available for public consumption similar papers"
without evidence of its authenticity or relative to the
veracity petitioners "alleged
certainly violates Petitioners right to ties with the CPP-NPA,"
privacy which must be protected by this appears to be devoid
Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to of any legal basis. The
grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ public respondents
of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied). cannot be ordered to
x The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a refrain from
judicial remedy enforcing the distributing
right to privacy, most something that, in the
especially the right to first place, it was not
informational privacy of proven to have. x
individuals.126 The writ Verily, until such
operates to protect a persons time that any of the
right to control public respondents
information regarding himself, were found to be
particularly in the instances actually responsible for
where such the abduction and
information is being collected torture of the
through unlawful means in order petitioner, any
to achieve unlawful ends. inference regarding the
existence of reports
 being kept in violation of the petitioners
right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature.
x For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the
grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
x Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while
telling of its innate
insufficiency to impute any form
of responsibility on the part of the
public
respondents, revealed two
important things that can guide
Us to a proper
disposition of this case. One, that
further investigation with the use
of
extraordinary diligence must be made in
order to identify the perpetrators behind
the abduction and torture of the
petitioner; and two, that the Commission
on
Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate
all
forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights and to
provide
x Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason
why the petitioner was not
able to adduce substantial evidence proving her
allegations of government
complicity in her abduction and torture, may be
attributed to the incomplete and
one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This "awkward"
situation, wherein the very persons alleged to
be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the
same time, the very ones tasked by
law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and
is the main source of the "evidentiary
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any
amparo case.129
x Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule
placed a potent
safeguardrequiring the "respondent who is
a public official or employee" to
prove that no less than "extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until
any of the public respondents is able to show to
the satisfaction of the amparo court that
extraordinary diligence has been observed in
their
investigations, they cannot shed the
allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that
effect.
x With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence,
as required by the
Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the
conduct of the police and military
investigations in the case at bar.
x A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by
Task Group CAROJAN shows
modest effort on the part of the police
investigators to identify the perpetrators
of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are
replete with background checks on
the victims of the abduction, but are, at the
same time, comparatively silent as
to other concrete steps the investigators have
been taking to ascertain the
authors of the crime. Although conducting a
background investigation on the
victims is a logical first step in exposing the
motive behind the abductionits
necessity is clearly outweighed by the need
to identify the perpetrators,
especially in light of the fact that the
petitioner, who was no longer in captivity,
already came up with allegations about the
motive of her captors.
x Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their
investigations solely on
the cooperation or non-cooperation of the
petitionerwho, they claim, was less than
enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be
conceded that the participation of the
petitioner would have facilitated the
progress of Task Group CAROJANs
investigation, this Court believes that the
formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an
excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not
to explore other means or avenues from which
they could obtain relevant
leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the
petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as
adequate evidence before a court of
lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of
valuable investigative leads that
must be pursued and verified, if only to comply
with the high standard of
diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the
conduct of investigations.
x Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task
Group CAROJANs reports
still failed to explain why it never considered
seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus
Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central
witness to the abduction. The
 reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain
from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the
very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not
wearing any mask.1avvphi1
x The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative
material to the
sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may
be pointed out,
were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to,
the CHR pursuant
to the latters independent investigation on the abduction and
torture of the
petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR
sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
x In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that
further
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should
be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this
case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by
the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to
security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy
because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes
to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of
justice.
x To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it
fitting, nay,
necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further
investigations on the
abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR.134 We
note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and
confidence of the
petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation in
the hearings
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be
reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the
CHR have
advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of
advancing farther, in
terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus,
vital for a final
resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem
it just and
appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection
to the petitioner,
also to the CHR.
x Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows
o 1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with
conducting
further investigation regarding the abduction
and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take
the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in
the cartographic
sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts;
and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioners abduction
and torture.
o 2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National
Police
(PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief
of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited
to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the
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investigation and its
corresponding
petitioners abduction and recommendatio
torture, subject to reasonable ns; and to (b)
regulations consistent with the provide or
Constitution and existing laws. continue to
o 3.) Further directing the incumbent provide
Chief of the PNP, or his protection to
successor, to furnish to this the petitioner
Court, the Court of Appeals, during her stay
and the petitioner or her or visit to the
representative, a copy of Philippines, until
the reports of its such time as may
investigations and their hereinafter be
recommendations, other than determined by this
those that are already part of Court.
the records of this case, Accordingly, this
within ninety (90) days from case must be referred
receipt of this decision. back to the
o 4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) Court of
furnish to the Court of Appeals Appeals,
within ninety (90) days from for the
receipt of this decision, a purposes
copy of the reports on its of
monitorin
 g B
compliance with A
the above N
directives and C
determining
whether, in light FACTS:
of any recent x Jonas Joseph T. Burgos - a farmer
reports or advocate and a member of Kilusang
recommendations, Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a
there would chapter of the militant peasant
already be organization Kilusang
sufficient Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) - was
evidence to hold forcibly taken and abducted by a
any of the public group of four
respondents (4) men and a woman from the
responsible or, at extension portion of Hapag
least, Kainan Restaurant, located at
accountable. After the ground floor of Ever Gotesco
making Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
such Quezon City
determination, the x Jonas shouted at the manager Maam
Court of Appeals aktibista lang po ako
shall submit x The security guard tried to intervene but
its own report with upon seeing that the abductors were
recommendation police officers, he backed off
to this Court for o The guard was able to see
final action. The that Jonas was forced into the rear
Court of Appeals portion of a plain
will continue to maroon colored
have jurisdiction Toyota Revo with
over this case in plate number
order to TAB 194
accomplish x Edita, Jonas mother, held a press
its tasks under conference
this decision. x It was later on discovered that plate
number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991
Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. GEN. HERMOGENES Mauro B. Mudlong.
ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO o It was also later confirmed by
P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. employees of the Department of
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL Environment and
CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and Natural Resources
DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, (DENR) that
Respondents. Mudlong was
G.R. No. 178497 February 4, 2014 arrested and his
1991 Isuzu XLT
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. GEN. vehicle was seized
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. on June 24,
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. 2006 by Cpl.
GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL Castro Bugalan
CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and and Pfc. Jose
DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Villea of the 56th
Respondents. Infantry Battalion
G.R. No. 183711 (IB) of the
Philippine Army for
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. GEN. transporting
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. timber without
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. permit.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL o As agreed upon by the DENR
employees and officers of the 56th
CLEMENT, Respondents.
IB, the vehicle with
G.R. No. 183712
the license plate no.
TAB 194 was
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF
impounded in the
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN.
56th IB headquarters
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.; Commanding
whose commanding
General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN.
officer at that time
ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the Philippine
was Lt. Col. Noel
National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO
Clement
RAZON, JR., Respondents.
x Edita filed consolidated petitions for
G
the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
.
Corpus, for Contempt, and for the
R Issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the
. CA
x CA dismissed the petition
N o petitioner presented failed to
o establish her claimed direct
. connection between the
abductors of Jonas and the
1 military
8 o the evidence does not show
3 how license plate number TAB 194
7 (supposedly
1 attached to the 1991
3 Isuzu XLT vehicle
impounded at
the 56th IB
E Headquarters) came
N to be attached to the
getaway
Toyota Revo on April 28,
2007, and whether the two
license plates are one and
the same at all. The CA
emphasized that the
evidence does not indicate
whether the abductors are
members of the
x Edita filed a Rule 45 before the SC
x SC rendered a decision (2010), among others:
military or the police or are
civilians; if they are civilians,
whether they acted on their own
or were following orders, and in
the latter case, from whom
o since the petitioner has established that
the vehicle used in the
abduction was linked to a vehicle
(with license plate number TAB
194) impounded at the
headquarters of the 56th IB, it
became the
burden of the AFP to exercise
extraordinary diligence to
determine
the why and the wherefore of the
loss of the license plate in their
custody and its appearance in a
vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo)
used in Jonas abduction
o branded PNP-CIDGs investigation as
"rather shallow" and
"conducted haphazardly."
o the petitions for habeas corpus and
contempt as against President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must
be dropped since she enjoys
the privilege of immunity from
suit
o DIRECT the Commission on Human
Rights to conduct appropriate
investigative proceedings,
including field investigations -
acting as
the Courts directly
commissioned agency for
purposes of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo - with the
tasks of: (a) ascertaining the
identities of the cartographic
sketches of two of the abductors
as
well as their whereabouts; (b)
determining based on records,
past
and present, the identities and
locations of the persons identified
by State Prosecutor Velasco
alleged to be involved in the
abduction
of Jonas namely: T/Sgt. Jason
Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl.
Maria
Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
(Philippine Air Force), and an alias
T.L., all reportedly assigned with
Military Intelligence Group 15 of
Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; further
proceedings and investigations,
as
may be necessary, should be
made to pursue the lead allegedly
provided by State Prosecutor
Velasco on the identities of
the
possible abductors; (c)
inquiring into the veracity of
Lipios and
Manuels claims that Jonas was
abducted by a certain @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO of the
CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d)
determining based on records,
past and present, as well as
further
investigation, the identities and
whereabouts of @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking
all measures, in the
investigation
of the Burgos abduction, that
may be necessary to live up to
 the
extraordinary measures we require in
addressing an enforced
disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo;
x CHR rendered a report; submitted to CA
x CA in favor of EDITA
o The CA held that the issue in the petition for
habeas corpus is not
the illegal confinement or detention of
Jonas, but his enforced
disappearance. Considering that Jonas
was a victim of enforced
disappearance, the present case is
beyond the ambit of a petition for
habeas corpus.
o As far as the AFP was concerned, the CA held that
the fact that Lt.
Baliaga of the Philippine Army was
positively identified as one of the
abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFPs
lack of serious effort to conduct further
investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP
leaderships accountability.
x Esperon et al filed an MR
x Edita filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
o (1) order the persons named in the sealed
documents to be
impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R.
No. 183713;
o (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the
newly discovered
evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion);
and
o (3) refer the cases to the CA for further hearing
on the newly
discovered evidence.

ISSUE # 1: Whether the CHR should be allowed to view the

subject documents which, as respondents allege, are of
sensitive and confidential nature.

HELD # 1: YES.
x The directive for the submission of the above-mentioned
documents arose from
our determination in our June 22, 2010 Resolution
that the PNP-CIDG failed to identify the cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with
eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the
Court directly commissioned the CHR to continue the
investigation of Jonas abduction and the gathering of
evidence.
x Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a
lead - a claim made
by Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for
Democracy and Justice, that the male abductor of
Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch was
among the
raiders who abducted him and four others, known as the
"ERAP FIVE."
x This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents
embodied in par.
III(i) of the fallo of the Courts July 5, 2011 Resolution
from General Gilberto
Jose C. Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate
General, AFP. Gen. Roa initially
denied this request but eventually complied with the
Courts directive of July 5,
2011 to submit the documents via the September
23, 2011 Manifestation and
Motion and the June 7, 2013 Compliance. In the
same July 5, 2011 Resolution,
the Court made it plain that these documents shall be
released exclusively to the Court for its examination
to determine their relevance to the present case and
the advisability of their public disclosure.
x Pursuant to the Courts October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR
submitted its
March 20, 2012 Progress Report on its
continuing investigation of Jonas
abduction. Attached to this Progress Report was
Virgilio Eustaquios sworn
affidavit stating that: (1) he was one of the victims of
the abduction incident on
May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE"
incident; (2) as a result of
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CHR access to these
requested documents
this incident, they filed a case with the to allow them the
Ombudsman against Commodore opportunity to
Leonardo Calderon and other members ascertain the true
of the Intelligence Service, AFP (ISAFP) identities of the
for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest, persons depicted in
maltreatment of prisoners, grave the cartographic
threats, sketches.
incriminatory machination and robbery; x At this point, we emphasize that the
and (3) the male abductor of Jonas sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to
appearing in the cartographic sketch the resemblance of
shown to him by the CHR was among one of Jonas
the abductors to the
raiders who abducted him and his four abductors of the ERAP
companions because it resembled the FIVE)
cartographic sketch he described in constitutes the
relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on sought-after missing
May link that establishes
22, 2006. the relevance of the
x After reviewing the submissions of both the requested documents
respondents20 and the CHR21 to the present case.
pursuant to the Courts July 5, 2011, We note that this lead
August 23, 2011 and October 11, 2011 may help the
Resolutions, we resolve to grant the CHR ascertain the
 identities of those depicted in the curative remedies
cartographic sketches as rather than on the
two of Jonas abductors (one male and tracking of a specific
one female) who, to this day, remain criminal or the
unidentified. resolution of
x In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the administrative
requested documents, we liabilities. The unique
direct the Clerk of Court of the Supreme nature of
Court to allow the duly-authorized Amparo proceedings
representatives of the CHR to inspect has led us to define
the requested documents in camera terms or concepts
within five (5) days from receipt of this specific to
Resolution. what the proceedings
x The documents shall be examined and compared with seek to achieve. In
the cartographic sketches Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25
of the two abductors of Jonas, we defined
without copying and without what the terms
bringing the "responsibility" and
documents outside the premises "accountability" signify
of the Office of the Clerk of Court in an Amparo case.
of the We said:
Supreme Court. The inspection of the o Responsibility refers to
documents shall be within office hours the extent the actors have
and for a reasonable period of time been
sufficient to allow the CHR to est
comprehensively investigate the lead abli
provided by Eustaquio. she
x To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of d
Amparo, further by
investigation using the standard of sub
extraordinary diligence should be sta
undertaken ntia
by the CHR to pursue the lead provided l
by Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of evi
the ongoing investigation being den
conducted by the Department of Justice ce
(DOJ), to
through the NBI, on the disappearance hav
of Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the e
NBI to coordinate and provide direct par
investigative assistance to the CHR as tici
the pat
latter may require, pursuant to the ed
authority granted under the Courts in
June 22, wh
2010 Resolution. ate
x For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a ver
supplemental investigation way
report to the DOJ, copy furnished the , by
petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs acti
on
of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, or
and all the respondents within sixty omi
days ssio
(60) days from receipt of this Resolution. n,
in
ISSUE # 2: Whether Editas Urgent Ex Parte Motion an
Ex Abundanti Cautela should be granted in that the enf
liability of the herein respondents should be orc
determined. ed
disappeara
HELD # 2: NO. nce, as a
x After reviewing the newly discovered evidence measure of
submitted by the petitioner and
the
considering all the developments of the
remedies
case, including the March 18, 2013 CA
this Court
decision that confirmed the validity of
shall craft,
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in
among
the
them, the
present case, we resolve to deny the
directive to
petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex
file the
Abundanti Cautela.
appropriate
x We note and conclude, based on the developments
criminal
highlighted above, that the
and civil
beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo
cases
has been served in the present case. As
against the
we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ
responsible
merely embodies the Courts
parties in
directives to police agencies to
the proper
undertake specified courses of action to
courts.
address the enforced disappearance of
Accou
an individual. The Writ of Amparo
ntabili
serves both a preventive and a curative
ty, on
role. It is curative as it facilitates
the
the subsequent punishment of
other
perpetrators through the investigation
hand,
and remedial action that it directs.24 refers
The focus is on procedural to the
measu
 re of
remedies that should Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced
be addressed to those disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013
who exhibited decision, the CA found, by substantial
involvement in the enforced evidence, that Lt. Baliaga
disappearance without participated in the abduction on the basis of
bringing the level of their Cabintoys positive identification that
complicity to the level of he was one of the abductors of Jonas who told
responsibility defined him not to interfere because the
above; or who are imputed latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In
with knowledge relating to the same Decision, the CA also
the enforced held the AFP and the PNP accountable for
disappearance and who having failed to discharge the burden
carry the burden of of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
disclosure; or those who the enforced disappearance of
carry, but have failed to Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following
discharge, the burden of directives to address the enforced
extraordinary disappearance of Jonas:
diligence in the o (1) DIRECT the PNP through its
investigation of the investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG,
enforced to identify and locate the abductors
disappearance.26 of Jonas Burgos who are still at
x In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the large and to establish the link
series of calculated between the abductors of Jonas
directives issued by the Court outlined Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5
above and the extraordinary diligence incident;
the o (2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of
CHR demonstrated in its investigations the Armed Forces of the
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Philippines and the Director
Lt. General of the Philippines
Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the National Police, and their
fact that the Regional Trial Court, successors, to ensure the
Quezon continuance of their
City, Branch 216, has already found investigation and coordination
probable cause for arbitrary detention on the enforced disappearance
against Lt. Baliaga and has of Jonas Burgos until the persons
ordered his arrest in connection found responsible are brought
with Jonas disappearance.27 before the bar of justice;
x We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 o (3) DIRECT the Commission on Human
decision already ruled with Rights to continue with its
finality on the entities responsible and accountable (as own independent investigation on
these terms are defined in the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Burgos with the same degree
of diligence required under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
o (4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to extend full
assistance to the Commission
on
Human Rights in the conduct
of the latters investigation;
and
o (5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the
Director General, Philippine
National Police and the
Chairman, Commission on
Human Rights to submit a
quarterly report to the Court on
the results of their respective
investigation.28
x We note that the respondents did not appeal the March
18, 2013 CA decision
and the May 23, 2013 CA resolution
denying their motion for partial
reconsideration.
x Based on the above considerations, in particular, the
final ruling of the CA that
confirmed the validity of the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo and its
determination of the entities responsible for
the enforced disappearance of
Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioners
prayer to issue the writ of Amparo
anew and to refer the case to the CA based on
the newly discovered evidence.
We so conclude as the petitioners request for
the reissuance of the writ and for
the rehearing of the case by the CA would be
redundant and superfluous in light
of: (1) the ongoing investigation being
conducted by the DOJ through the NBI;
(2) the CHR investigation directed by the
Court in this Resolution; and (3) the
continuing investigation directed by the CA
in its March 18, 2013 decision.
x We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo accords the
 Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an
enforced
disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the
writ of
Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial
relief) grant
remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than
expedite the
investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already
determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced
disappearance.
x We clarify that by denying the petitioners motion, we do not thereby
rule on
the admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered
evidence
submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose
any
investigation by the proper investigative and prosecutory
agencies of
the other entities whose identities and participation in the
enforced
disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future
investigations and
proceedings. Considering that the present case has already
reached the
prosecution stage, the petitioners motion should have been
filed with the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of
the government.
x To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioners motion, this
Resolution and its
covered cases to the DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of
filing the
appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the
proper parties, if
warranted, based on the gathered evidence. For this purpose,
we direct the
petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent
Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the
sealed attachments to the Motion,
within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.
x As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by
the DOJ,
through the NBI, of the disappearance of Jonas.
This DOJ investigation is without
prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsmans
exercise of its primary jurisdiction
over the investigation of the criminal
aspect of this case should the case be
determined to be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.29
x As we direct below, further investigation for purposes
of the present proceedings
shall continue to be undertaken by the CHR,
in close coordination with the NBI, for the
completion of the investigation under the
terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the
additional directives under the present
Resolution.
x As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ
of Amparo
proceeding is merely
o to determine whether an enforced
disappearance has taken
place;
o to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and
o to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address
the disappearance.1wphi1
x As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of
Amparo has been served
in the present case with the CAs final
determination of the persons responsible and
accountable for the enforced disappearance
of Jonas and the
commencement of criminal action against Lt.
Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation
and prosecution proceedings are already
beyond the
reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
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without prejudice to
the Office of the
x Based on the above developments, we now hold Ombudsmans
that the full extent of the exercise of its
remedies envisioned by the Rule on primary jurisdiction
the Writ of Amparo has been served over the
and exhausted. investigation
x Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to: should the case be
o (1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos determined to be
Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex cognizable by the
Abundanti Cautela; Sandiganbayan;
o (2) REFER the petitioners Urgent Ex o (3) DIRECT the petitioner to
Parte Motion Ex Abundanti furnish the Department of Justice
Cautela, this Resolution and and
its covered cases to the the National Bureau of
Department of Investigation copies of
Justice for investigation for the her Urgent Ex Parte
purpose of filing the Motion Ex Abundanti
appropriate Cautela, together with
criminal charges in the the sealed
proper courts against the attachments
proper parties if such action to the Motion, within
is warranted by the gathered five (5) days from
evidence. The referral to the receipt of this
Department of Justice is Resolution;
 o (4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the C
Supreme Court to allow the
duly-authorized J
representatives of the a
Commission on Human n
Rights to inspect the u
requested documents in a
camera within five r
(5) days from receipt of this y
Resolution. For this purpose,
the 2
documents shall be examined 2
and compared with the ,
cartographic
sketches of the two abductors 2
of Jonas Burgos without 0
copying and 0
bringing the documents 8
outside the premises of the
Office of the THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court. The inspection of the SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of
documents shall be conducted habeas data is a remedy available to any
within office hours and for a person
reasonable period of time that whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
would allow the Commission security is violated or threatened by an
on unlawful act or
Human Rights to omission of a public official or employee, or
comprehensively investigate of a private individual or entity engaged in
the lead provided by the
Virgilio Eustaquio; gathering, collecting or storing of data or
o (5) DIRECT the National Bureau of information regarding the person, family,
Investigation to coordinate and home and correspondence of the aggrieved
provide direct investigative party.
assistance to the
Commission on Human SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party
Rights as the latter may may file a petition for the writ of habeas
require, pursuant to the data.
authority granted under the However, in cases of extralegal killings and
Court's June 22, 2010 enforced disappearances, the petition may
Resolution. be filed
o (6) REQUIRE the Commission on by:
Human Rights to submit a
supplemental investigation (a) Any member of the immediate family of
report to the Department of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
Justice, copy furnished the children and parents; or
petitioner, the National Bureau
of Investigation, the (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
incumbent Chiefs of the relative of the aggrieved party within the
Armed Forces of the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
Philippines, the Philippine affinity, in default of those mentioned in
National Police and the the preceding
Philippine National Police- paragraph; or
Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, and all the SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be
respondents, within sixty (60) filed with the Regional Trial Court where the
days from receipt of this petitioner or respondent resides, or that
Resolution. which has jurisdiction over the place where
o (7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo the data or information is gathered,
proceeding closed and collected or stored, at the option of the
terminated, without prejudice petitioner.
to the concerned parties'
compliance with the above The petition may also be filed with
directives and subject to the the Supreme Court or the Court of
Court's continuing Appeals or the
jurisdiction to enforce compliance with Sandiganbayan when the action
this Resolution. concerns public data files of
government offices.
2. Writ of Habeas Data
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. -
A When the writ is issued by a Regional
. Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall
be returnable before such court or judge.
M
. When issued by the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may
N be
o returnable before such court or any justice
. thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the
place
0 where the petitioner or respondent resides, or
8 that which has jurisdiction over the place
- where the data or information is gathered,
1 collected or stored.
-
1 When issued by the Supreme Court or any of
6 its justices, it may be returnable before such
- Court or any justice thereof, or before the
S Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any
of its
justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place or that which has jurisdiction over the place where
where the petitioner or respondent resides, the data or information is gathered, collected or
stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the

Philippines.

Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees

shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition
of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon
immediately, without prejudice to subsequent
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen
(15) days from the filing of the petition.

SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas

data should contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the

respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or

threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure

the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the

government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the

updating, rectification, suppression or destruction
of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a

prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the

petition, the court, justice or judge
shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on
its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and
cause it to be served within three (3) days from the
issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or
judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary
hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten
(10) work days from the date of its issuance.

SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. -

A clerk of court who refuses
to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same,
shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for
contempt without prejudice to other
disciplinary actions.

SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be

served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a
person deputized by the court, justice or judge who
shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service.
In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.

SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a

verified written return together with supporting
affidavits within five (5) working days from service of
the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by
the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall,
among other things, contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state

secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of
the source of information of media and others;

(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or

in control of the data or information subject of the
petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the
petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the
purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the
security and confidentiality of the data or information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the
resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the
petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by
making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any
person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or
order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. -
A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the
respondent invokes the defense that the release of the
data or
information in question shall compromise national
security or state secrets, or when the data or
information cannot be divulged to the public due to its
nature or privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The
following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return,
opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
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NOTES (Based on the

Annotations of Riguera and
Albano; includes
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars; SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the
respondent fails to file a return, the court,
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; justice or judge shall proceed to hear the
petition ex parte, granting the petitioner
(f) Third-party complaint; such relief as the petition may warrant
unless the court in its discretion requires
(g) Reply; the petitioner to submit
evidence.
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on
(i) Intervention; the petition shall be summary. However, the
court, justice or judge may call for a
(j) Memorandum; preliminary conference to simplify the issues
and
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
interim relief orders; and admissions from the parties.

(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render
interlocutory order. judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the Authors own comments and research)
allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the
x Venue:
act complained of, or order the deletion,
destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data o Where the petitioner resides OR
or information and grant other relevant o Where the data or
reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, information was allegedly
the privilege of the writ shall be denied. gathered,
stored, or collected
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by
AT THE OPTION of the
the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated
by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working petitioner
days. x Jurisdiction RTC, SC, CA (concurrent)
x Who may file the aggrieved party OR his
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who immediate family or
executed the final judgment shall, within relative within 4th degree
three (3) days from its enforcement, make a
x Return filed within 5 working days OR as
verified return to the court. The return shall
contain a full statement of the proceedings under may be reasonably
the writ and a complete inventory of the extended by the issuing court for justifiable
reasons
x Effects of failure to file return:
o Proceedings to be heard ex parte
o Respondent may be
cited in indirect contempt x Nature
of proceedings, prohibited pleadings,
mode of appeal,
quantum of evidence, hearing in
camera, effect of filing of criminal
action same as in amparo petition
x Petition for habeas data is IMPROPER when
what is sought to
protected are property rights such
as employment. (Meralco vs.
Gopez-Lim)
x The phrase engaged in gathering, collecting,
or storing data and
information does NOT necessarily
mean that the respondent must be in
a business relating thereto. Otherwise,
the writ of habeas data will be
unjustifiably limited to a very small
group of persons. (Vivares vs. St.
Theresas College)
x When the petitioner has no right to expect
privacy, such as when she
uploads her photos on Facebook,
especially when her settings are on
PUBLIC, she may not invoke the writ of
habeas data. (Vivares vs. St. Theresas
College)

HABEAS CORPUS AMPARO

HABEAS DATA

illegal confinement or

violation of right to
database or information, or documents and articles detention OR extralegal privacy
ground killings and
inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with withholding in life,
enforced
copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. of the rightful disappearances liberty
custody of or or
any person threats thereof security
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment is
was enforced and complied with by the respondent, petition violated
as well as all objections of the parties regarding the er party for aggrieved party or
whose relief it or by any threaten
manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
is qualified person thereof
intended OR or entity in
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the by some the ORDER set
return for hearing with due aggrieve
person on his forth in
d party or
behalf Section 2 of Rule
by
any
person
mentione
d
in Section
2 of the
Rule
notice to the parties and act accordingly.

SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the The b e (5) working
final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under perio e days from the
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or d of date of notice of
law or both. appe f the judgment or
al i final order.
shall v
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
p
corpus and amparo cases. u
b
officer or
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing l
person who
of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not respond
illegally
i
preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or ent c
detains and
administrative actions. confines OR
o
unlawfully
f
withholds
rightful custody f
i
c
i
a
l

o
r

e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
,

o
r

o
f

a
private individual
or
public official or employee, entity engaged
in the
or of a private individual or gathering,
collecting or
entity who committed the storing of data or
violation or the threat to information
regarding
violate the person,
family,
home and
co
rr
es
po
n
de
nc
e
of
th
e
ag
gr
ie
ve
d
pa
rt
y

SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a
petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the RT
criminal action. C,
SB, hierarchy of courts)
jurisdict CA
ion absence of RTC
When a criminal action and a separate civil action ,
judges in
are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of SC
(co the province or city
habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with nc
the criminal action. urr
ent
wit
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule ho
shall continue to govern the disposition of the ut
reliefs in the petition. prejudice to the doctrine RTC, SB,
CA, SC
of hierarchy of courts);

(concurrent without
MTC under its special prejudice
to the doctrine of
jurisdiction in the
RTC, SB, CA, SC d trine of hierarchy
(concurrent without o of courts)
prejudice to the c

SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall where the
be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available petitioner
where the petitioner or where
to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal or
the threat, act or
venue responden
case. respondent resides at the omission
t resides,
was committed or
or
option of the petitioner any of its
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the elements that which
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of (application of Rule 4) occurred has
habeas data. jurisdicti
on over
the
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not place
diminish, increase or modify substantive where
rights. the data
or
informati
on is
gathered,
collected
or
stored, at
the option
of
the
petitioner

PhP 500 [Section

SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of docket
PhP 500
7(g)
Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily [Section 7(g)
fees Exempt Rule 141);
Rule 141)
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. indigents
are exempt
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take if issued by
effect on February 2, 2008, following its extent
RTC/ MTC -
publication in three (3) newspapers of within the
of
judicial region anywhere in PH anywhere in PH
general circulation. enforce
where the court
aility
sits; if
[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE issued by SB/
PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE DAILY CA/ SC -
INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008] anywhere in PH

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TPO, WPO,
none (v) R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act;
Production
interim reliefs none
Order,
Inspection
Order

filing of at the time and date
return provided for in the writ
Compensation Act of 2007; and
within 48 hours from
within 5 working days from
receipt of order
within 5 working days within 5 working days (w) R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act;
WHICH may NOT be WHICH MAY be
extended EXCEPT on highly extended reasonably
meritorious grounds for justifiable reasons (x) R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill
Notice
of within 5 working days
from
Appeal receipt of order
SC dismissing the
petition/ denying the MR; via Rule 45
directly to SC

receipt of order dismissing

appeal dismissing the petition/
the petition/ denying the
denying the MR; via

MR; via Rule 45 directly to

(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The No. 7161, Revised Forestry Code and Other Environmental Laws
Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657, Tax (Amending the NIRC); R.A. No. 7308, Seed Industry
Comprehensive Agrarian Laws Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High-Value
Reform Law of 1988; R.A. No. 7160, Incorporated Crops Development
Local Government Code of 1991; R.A. in the
primacy of
applicable applicable
criminal Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Act; R.A.
No. 8048, Coconut Preservation Act;
substantial evidence substantial R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries
not evidence Modernization Act of 1997; R.A. No. 9522, The
applicable
action Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593,
Renewable Energy Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine
quantum of
Biofuels Act; and other existing laws that relate to the
conservation,
preponderance of development, preservation, protection and
proof utilization of the environment and natural
resources.
evidence
Section 3. Objectives. - The objectives of these Rules are:

CASES

x See Tapuz vs. del Rosario on page 6 (n) R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for
x See Castillo vs. Cruz on page 7 Palawan Act;
x See Roxas vs. GMA on pag 21
(o) R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act;
3. Writ of Kalikasan
(p) R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
(q) R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
PART I
(s) R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management
RULE 1 Act;
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(t) R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource
Section 1. Title. These Rules shall be Management Act;
known as "The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases." (u) R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and
Protection Act;
Section 2. Scope. These Rules shall govern the
procedure in civil, criminal and special civil
actions before the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts involving enforcement or
violations of environmental and other related
laws, rules and regulations such as but not
limited to the following:

(a) Act No. 3572, Prohibition Against Cutting of Tindalo, Akli,

and Molave Trees;

(b) P.D. No. 705, Revised Forestry Code;

(c) P.D. No. 856, Sanitation Code;

(d) P.D. No. 979, Marine Pollution Decree;

(e) P.D. No. 1067, Water Code;

(f) P.D. No. 1151, Philippine Environmental Policy of 1977;

(g) P.D. No. 1433, Plant Quarantine Law of 1978;

(h) P.D. No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental

Impact Statement System Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and
for Other Purposes;

(i) R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting,

Destroying or Injuring of Planted or Growing Trees,
Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value
along Public Roads, in Plazas,
Parks, School Premises or in any Other Public Ground;

(j) R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act;

(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;

(l) R.A. No. 7076, Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act;

(m) R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas

System Act including all laws, decrees, orders,
proclamations and issuances establishing protected
areas;
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people 186
to a balanced and healthful
ecology;

(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure

for the enforcement of environmental rights and duties
recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and
regulations, and international agreements;

(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices

ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and redress for
violation of environmental laws; and

(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance

with orders and judgments in environmental cases.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. -

(a) By-product or derivatives means any part taken or

substance extracted from wildlife, in
raw or in processed form including stuffed animals and
herbarium specimens. 1avvphi1

(b) Consent decree refers to a judicially-approved settlement

between concerned parties based on public interest and
public policy to protect and preserve the environment.

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an

environmental case directing any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
to perform an act or series of
acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective
until judgment is fully satisfied.

(d) Environmental protection order (EPO) refers to an order

issued by the court directing or enjoining any person or
government agency to perform or desist from performing an
act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the
environment.

(e) Mineral refers to all naturally occurring inorganic substance in

solid, gas, liquid, or any intermediate state excluding energy
materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive
materials and geothermal energy.

(f) Precautionary principle states that when human activities

may lead to threats of serious
and irreversible damage to the environment that is
scientifically plausible but uncertain,
actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat.

(g) Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to

an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought
against any person, institution or any government agency or local
government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to
harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that
such person, institution or government agency has taken or may
take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the
environment or assertion of environmental rights.

(h) Wildlife means wild forms and varieties of flora and fauna,
in all developmental stages including those which are in
captivity or are being bred or propagated.

PART II
CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 2
PLEADINGS AND PARTIES

Section 1. Pleadings and motions allowed. The pleadings

and motions that may be
filed are complaint, answer which may include compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim,
motion for intervention, motion for discovery and motion for
reconsideration of the judgment.

Motion for postponement, motion for new trial and petition for
relief from judgment shall be allowed in highly meritorious
cases or to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Section 2. Prohibited pleadings or motions. The following

pleadings or motions shall not be allowed:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

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The complaint shall state that it is an
environmental case and the law involved.
(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, The complaint shall also include a
except to file answer, the extension not to exceed certification against forum shopping. If the
fifteen (15) days; complaint is not an
environmental complaint, the presiding judge shall
(d) Motion to declare the defendant in default; refer it to the executive judge for re-raffle.

(e) Reply and rejoinder; and
(f) Third party complaint.
Section 3. Verified complaint. The verified
complaint shall contain the names of the parties,
their addresses, the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for.
The plaintiff shall attach to the verified complaint all
evidence proving or supporting the cause of action
consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, documentary
evidence and if possible, object evidence. The
affidavits shall be in question and answer form and
shall comply with the rules of admissibility of
evidence.
Section 4. Who may file. Any real party in
interest, including the government and
juridical entities authorized by law, may file a
civil action involving the enforcement or
violation of any environmental law.
Section 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a
citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for,
requiring all
interested parties to manifest their
interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff For a citizen suit, the court shall defer the
may publish the order once in a newspaper of a payment of filing and other legal fees
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all that shall serve as first lien on the
affected barangays copies of said order. judgment award.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. Section 13. Service of summons, orders and
9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. other court processes. - The summons,
orders and other court processes may be
Section 6. Service of the complaint on the served by the sheriff, his deputy or other
government or its agencies. - Upon the filing of the proper
complaint, the plaintiff is required to furnish the
government or the appropriate agency, although not
a party, a copy of the complaint. Proof of service
upon the government or the appropriate agency
shall be attached to the complaint.

Section 7. Assignment by raffle. - If there is only one

(1) designated branch in a multiple-
sala court, the executive judge shall immediately
refer the case to said branch. If there are
two (2) or more designated branches, the executive
judge shall conduct a special raffle on the day the
complaint is filed.

Section 8. Issuance of Temporary Environmental

Protection Order (TEPO). - If it
appears from the verified complaint with a prayer
for the issuance of an Environmental
Protection Order (EPO) that the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of the multiple-sala court before
raffle or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
as the case may be, may issue ex parte a
TEPO effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from
date of the receipt of the TEPO by the
party or person enjoined. Within said period, the
court where the case is assigned, shall
conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the TEPO may be extended until the
termination of the case.

The court where the case is assigned, shall

periodically monitor the existence of acts that are the
subject matter of the TEPO even if issued by the
executive judge, and may lift the same at any time as
circumstances may warrant.

The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond

for the issuance of a TEPO.

Section 9. Action on motion for dissolution of

TEPO. - The grounds for motion to dissolve a TEPO
shall be supported by affidavits of the party or
person enjoined which the applicant may oppose,
also by affidavits.

The TEPO may be dissolved if it appears after

hearing that its issuance or continuance would
cause irreparable damage to the party or person
enjoined while the applicant may be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer
and subject to the posting of a sufficient bond by the
party or person enjoined.

Section 10. Prohibition against temporary restraining

order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. - Except the
Supreme Court, no court can issue a TRO or writ of
preliminary
injunction against lawful actions of government
agencies that enforce environmental laws or
prevent violations thereof.

Section 11. Report on TEPO, EPO, TRO or

preliminary injunction. - The judge shall report any
action taken on a TEPO, EPO, TRO or a preliminary
injunction, including its
modification and dissolution, to the
Supreme Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator, within ten (10) days
from the action taken.

Section 12. Payment of filing and other legal fees. -

The payment of filing and other legal fees by the
plaintiff shall be deferred until after judgment unless
the plaintiff is allowed to litigate as an indigent. It shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment award.

court officer or for justifiable reasons, by the counsel or
representative of the plaintiff or any suitable person authorized
or deputized by the court issuing the summons.
Any private person who is authorized or deputized by the court to
serve summons, orders and other court processes shall for that
purpose be considered an officer of the court.
The summons shall be served on the defendant, together with a
copy of an order informing all
parties that they have fifteen (15) days from the filing of an
answer, within which to avail of
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court and
request for admission by
adverse party under Rule 26, or at their discretion, make use of
depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules 27 and
28.
Should personal and substituted service fail, summons by
publication shall be allowed. In the case of juridical entities,
summons by publication shall be done by indicating the names of
the officers or their duly authorized representatives.
Section 14. Verified answer. - Within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of summons, the
defendant shall file a verified answer to the complaint and
serve a copy thereof on the
plaintiff. The defendant shall attach affidavits of witnesses,
reports, studies of experts and all evidence in support of the
defense.
Affirmative and special defenses not pleaded shall be
deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction.
(g) Clarificatory questions from the parties; and
(h) List of cases arising out of the same facts pending
before other courts or administrative
agencies. Failure to comply with the required contents of
a pre-trial brief may be a ground for
contempt.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as
failure to appear at the pre-trial.
Section 3. Referral to mediation. - At the start of the pre-
trial conference, the court shall
inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute;
otherwise, the court shall immediately
refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their
clients, to the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not
available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of
court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral
to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten
(10) days from the expiration of the 30-
day period.
Section 4. Preliminary conference. - If mediation fails, the
court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial. Before
the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer
the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary
conference for the following purposes:

Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted shall (a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross- 187
claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from
service of the answer in which they are pleaded.

Section 15. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail

to answer the
complaint within the period provided, the court shall declare
defendant in default and upon motion of the plaintiff, shall receive
evidence ex parte and render judgment based thereon and the
reliefs prayed for.

RULE 3
PRE-TRIAL

Section 1. Notice of pre-trial. - Within two (2) days from the filing
of the answer to the counterclaim or cross-claim, if any, the
branch clerk of court shall issue a notice of the pre-trial to be held
not later than one (1) month from the filing of the last pleading.

The court shall schedule the pre-trial and set as many pre-
trial conferences as may be
necessary within a period of two (2) months counted from
the date of the first pre-trial
conference.

Section 2. Pre-trial brief. - At least three (3) days before the

pretrial, the parties shall submit pre-trial briefs containing
the following:

(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable

settlement indicating the desired terms thereof or to submit the
case to any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

(c) The legal and factual issues to be tried or resolved. For each
factual issue, the parties shall state all evidence to support their
positions thereon. For each legal issue, parties shall state the
applicable law and jurisprudence supporting their respective
positions thereon;

(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, including

depositions, answers to
interrogatories and answers to written request for admission
by adverse party, stating the purpose thereof;

(e) A manifestation of their having availed of discovery

procedures or their intention to avail themselves of referral to a
commissioner or panel of experts;

(f) The number and names of the witnesses and the substance of their
affidavits;
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Section 7. Effect of failure to

(b) To mark the documents or exhibits to be presented
by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to
the records after comparison with the originals;
(c) To ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts
and admissions on the genuineness and due
execution of the documents marked as exhibits;
(d) To require the parties to submit the depositions
taken under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the
answers to written interrogatories under Rule 25, and
the answers to request for
admissions by the adverse party under Rule 26;
(e) To require the production of documents or things
requested by a party under Rule 27 and the results of
the physical and mental examination of persons
under Rule 28;
appear at pre-trial. - The court shall
not dismiss the
(f) To consider such other matters as may aid in its
prompt disposition;
(g) To record the proceedings in the "Minutes
of Preliminary Conference" to be signed by
both parties or their counsels;
(h) To mark the affidavits of witnesses
which shall be in question and answer form
and shall constitute the direct examination
of the witnesses; and
(i) To attach the minutes together with the marked
exhibits before the pre-trial proper.
The parties or their counsel must submit
to the branch clerk of court the names,
addresses and contact numbers of the
affiants.
During the preliminary conference, the branch clerk
of court shall also require the parties to
submit the depositions taken under Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court, the answers to written
interrogatories under Rule 25 and the answers to
request for admissions by the adverse party
under Rule 26. The branch clerk of court may also
require the production of documents or
things requested by a party under Rule 27
and the results of the physical and mental
examination of persons under Rule 28.
(m) Ask parties to agree on the specific trial
dates for continuous trial, comply with the
one-
day examination of witness rule, adhere to
the case flow chart determined by the court
which shall contain the different stages of
the proceedings up to the promulgation of
the decision and use the time frame for each
stage in setting the trial dates.

Section 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree. -

The judge shall put the parties and their counsels
under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all
pre-trial conferences.

The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the

parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The
judge may issue a consent decree approving the
agreement between the parties in accordance with
law, morals, public order and public policy to protect
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

Evidence not presented during the pre-trial,

except newly-discovered evidence, shall be
deemed waived.

Section 6. Failure to settle. - If there is no full settlement, the

judge shall:

(a) Adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference

as part of the pre-trial proceedings and confirm the
markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and
admissions on the
genuineness and due execution of documents;

(b) Determine if there are cases arising out of the

same facts pending before other courts and order its
consolidation if warranted;

(c) Determine if the pleadings are in order and if not, order

the amendments if necessary;

(d) Determine if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve

the same;

(e) Consider the adding or dropping of parties;

(f) Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint,

answer and other pleadings and attachments thereto,
and the contents of documents and all other evidence
identified and pre-
marked during pre-trial in determining further
admissions;

(g) Obtain admissions based on the affidavits of

witnesses and evidence attached to the
pleadings or submitted during pre-trial;

(h) Define and simplify the factual and legal issues

arising from the pleadings and evidence.
Uncontroverted issues and frivolous claims or
defenses should be eliminated;

(i) Discuss the propriety of rendering a

summary judgment or a judgment based on the
pleadings, evidence and admissions made
during pre-trial;

(j) Observe the Most Important Witness Rule in

limiting the number of witnesses, determining the
facts to be proved by each witness and fixing the
approximate number of hours per
witness;

(k) Encourage referral of the case to a trial by

commissioner under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court or
to a mediator or arbitrator under any of the
alternative modes of dispute resolution governed by
the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution;

(l) Determine the necessity of engaging the

services of a qualified expert as a friend of the
court (amicus curiae); and
complaint, except upon repeated and unjustified failure of
the plaintiff to appear. The Section 5. Period to try and decide. - The court shall
dismissal shall be without prejudice, and the court may have a period of one (1) year from
proceed with the counterclaim. the filing of the complaint to try and decide the case.
Before the expiration of the one-year
If the defendant fails to appear at the pre-trial, the court shall receive period, the court may petition the Supreme Court for the
evidence ex parte. extension of the period for justifiable
cause.
Section 8. Minutes of pre-trial. - The minutes of each pre-trial
conference shall contain matters taken up therein, more The court shall prioritize the adjudication of environmental cases.
particularly admissions of facts and exhibits, and shall be
signed by the parties and their counsel. RULE 5
JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION
Section 9. Pre-trial order. - Within ten (10) days after the
termination of the pre-trial, the court shall issue a pre-trial order Section 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the
setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, the shall include the protection, preservation or
evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be presented and rehabilitation of the
the schedule of trial. Said order shall bind the parties, limit the environment and the payment of attorneys fees, costs
trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require
during the trial. the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or
restoration of the
Section 10. Efforts to settle. - The court shall endeavor to make environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
the parties agree to violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for
compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the that purpose subject to the control of the court.
proceedings before rendition
of judgment. Section 2. Judgment not stayed by appeal. - Any
judgment directing the performance of acts for the
RULE 4 protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
TRIAL environment shall be executory pending appeal unless
restrained by the appellate court.
Section 1. Continuous trial. - The judge shall conduct
continuous trial which shall not exceed two (2) months from Section 3. Permanent EPO; writ of continuing mandamus.
the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order. - In the judgment, the court may convert the TEPO to a
permanent EPO or issue a writ of continuing mandamus
Before the expiration of the two-month period, the judge may directing the performance of acts which shall be effective
ask the Supreme Court for the extension of the trial period for until the judgment is fully satisfied.
justifiable cause.
The court may, by itself or through the appropriate
Section 2. Affidavits in lieu of direct examination. - In lieu of government agency, monitor the execution
direct examination, affidavits marked during the pre-trial of the judgment and require the party concerned to
shall be presented as direct examination of affiants subject submit written reports on a quarterly basis
to cross- examination by the adverse party. or sooner as may be necessary, detailing the progress of
the execution and satisfaction of the
Section 3. One-day examination of witness rule. - The court shall judgment. The other party may, at its option, submit its
strictly adhere to the comments or observations on the
rule that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day, execution of the judgment.
subject to the courts discretion of
extending the examination for justifiable reason. After the Section 4. Monitoring of compliance with judgment and
presentation of the last witness, orders of the court by a
only oral offer of evidence shall be allowed, and the opposing commissioner. - The court may motu proprio, or upon
party shall immediately motion of the prevailing party, order
interpose his objections. The judge shall forthwith rule on the that the enforcement of the judgment or order be
offer of evidence in open court. referred to a commissioner to be appointed by the court.
The commissioner shall file with the court written
Section 4. Submission of case for decision; filing of memoranda. - progress reports on a quarterly basis or more frequently
After the last party has rested its case, the court shall issue an when necessary.
order submitting the case for decision.
Section 5. Return of writ of execution. - The process of
The court may require the parties to submit their respective execution shall terminate upon a sufficient showing that
memoranda, if possible in electronic form, within a non- the decision or order has been implemented to the
extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date the case is satisfaction of the court in accordance with Section 14,
submitted for decision. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The court shall have a period of sixty (60) days to decide the 188
case from the date the case is submitted for decision.
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The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse
party to file an opposition showing the suit is
RULE 6 not a SLAPP, attaching evidence in support
STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION thereof, within a non-extendible period of five
(5) days from receipt of notice that an answer
Section 1. Strategic lawsuit against public has been filed.
participation (SLAPP). - A legal action filed to harass,
vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for
that any person, institution or the government has hearing by the court after issuance of the
taken or may take in the enforcement of order to file
environmental laws, protection of the environment or an opposition within fifteen (15) days from
assertion of environmental rights shall be treated as a filing of the comment or the lapse of the
SLAPP and shall be governed by these Rules. period.

Section 2. SLAPP as a defense; how alleged. - In a Section 3. Summary hearing. - The hearing on
SLAPP filed against a person involved in the the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the nature. The parties must submit all available
environment, or assertion of evidence in support of their respective
environmental rights, the defendant may file an positions.
answer interposing as a defense that the case is a The party seeking the dismissal of the case
SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, must prove by substantial evidence that his
affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of act for
counterclaim, pray for damages, attorneys fees and the enforcement of environmental law is a
costs of suit. legitimate action for the protection,
preservation
and rehabilitation of the environment. The party
filing the action assailed as a SLAPP shall
prove by preponderance of evidence that the
action is not a SLAPP and is a valid claim.
Section 4. Resolution of the defense of a SLAPP. - The
affirmative defense of a SLAPP shall be resolved
within thirty (30) days after the summary hearing. If
the court dismisses the action, the court may award
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit under a
counterclaim if such has been filed. The dismissal
shall be with prejudice.
petition, if the petition is sufficient in form
and substance, the court shall give an
order: (a)
issuing the writ; and (b) requiring the
respondent to file a verified return as
provided in
Section 8 of this Rule. The clerk of court
shall forthwith issue the writ under the seal
of the court including the issuance of a
cease and desist order and other temporary
reliefs effective until further order.

If the court rejects the defense of a SLAPP, the

evidence adduced during the summary hearing shall
be treated as evidence of the parties on the merits of
the case. The action shall proceed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.

PART III
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 7
WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy

available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, peoples
organization, non-governmental organization, or any
public interest group accredited by or registered with
any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated ,
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall

contain the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the

respondent or if the name and personal
circumstances are unknown and uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;

(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated

or threatened to be violated, the act or omission
complained of, and the environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

(d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of

the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence,
scientific or other expert studies, and if possible,
object evidence;

(e) The certification of petitioner under oath that:

(1) petitioner has not commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, and no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (2) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of
its present status; (3) if petitioner should learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, petitioner shall report to the court
that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and

(f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the
issuance of a TEPO.

Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed

with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of
the Court of Appeals.

Section 4. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be

exempt from the payment of docket
fees.

Section 5. Issuance of the writ. - Within three (3)

days from the date of filing of the
 The hearing including the preliminary conference shall
Section 6. How the writ is served. - The writ shall be served upon not extend beyond sixty (60) days and shall be given
the respondent by a the same priority as petitions for the writs of habeas
court officer or any person deputized by the court, who shall corpus, amparo and
retain a copy on which to make a habeas data.
return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally,
the rule on substituted service Section 12. Discovery Measures. - A party may file a
shall apply. verified motion for the following
reliefs:
Section 7. Penalty for refusing to issue or serve the writ. - A clerk
of court who unduly (a) Ocular Inspection; order The motion must show
delays or refuses to issue the writ after its allowance or a court that an ocular inspection order is
officer or deputized person necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation
who unduly delays or refuses to serve the same shall be or the threat as to prejudice the life,
punished by the court for contempt without prejudice to other health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
civil, criminal or administrative actions. provinces. It shall state in detail the place or places to
be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits of
Section 8. Return of respondent; contents. - Within a non- witnesses having
extendible period of ten (10) personal knowledge of the violation or threatened violation of
days after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified environmental law.
return which shall contain all
defenses to show that respondent did not violate or threaten to After hearing, the court may order any person in
violate, or allow the violation possession or control of a designated land or other
of any environmental law, rule or regulation or commit any act property to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting or
resulting to environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. thereon.

All defenses not raised in the return shall be deemed waived.
The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary
evidence, scientific or other
expert studies, and if possible, object evidence, in support of
the defense of the respondent.
A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an
admission thereof.
Section 9. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following
pleadings and motions are prohibited:
The order shall specify the person or persons authorized
to make the inspection and the date, time, place and
manner of making the inspection and may prescribe
other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all parties.
(b) Production or inspection of documents or things;
order - The motion must show that a production order
is necessary to establish the magnitude of the
violation or the threat as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

(a) Motion to dismiss; After hearing, the court may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return; designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible
(c) Motion for postponement; things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars; the return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
The production order shall specify the person or
(f) Third-party complaint; persons authorized to make the production and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection
(g) Reply; and or production and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default. all parties.

Section 10. Effect of failure to file return. - In case the Section 13. Contempt. - The court may after hearing
respondent fails to file a return, the court shall proceed to hear punish the respondent who refuses or
the petition ex parte. unduly delays the filing of a return, or who makes a false
return, or any person who disobeys
Section 11. Hearing. - Upon receipt of the return of the or resists a lawful process or order of the court for
respondent, the court may call a preliminary conference to indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the
simplify the issues, determine the possibility of obtaining Rules of Court.
stipulations or admissions from the parties, and set the petition 189
for hearing.
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Section 14. Submission of case for decision; filing of
memoranda. - After hearing, the court shall issue an
order submitting the case for decision. The court may
require the filing of memoranda and if possible, in its
electronic form, within a non-extendible period of
thirty (30) days from the date the petition is
submitted for decision.
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision, the
court shall render judgment granting or denying the
privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and
desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental
laws resulting in environmental
destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official,
government agency, private person or
entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or
restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official,
government agency, private person or
entity to monitor strict compliance with
the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official,
government agency, or private person or
entity to make periodic reports on the
execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the
right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection,
preservation, rehabilitation or restoration
of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners.
Section 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days
from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment or denial of motion for
reconsideration, any party may appeal to the Section 8. Return of the writ. - The periodic
Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. reports submitted by the respondent
The appeal may raise questions of fact. detailing compliance with the judgment shall
be contained in partial returns of the writ.
Section 17. Institution of separate actions. - The
filing of a petition for the issuance of Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a
the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of final return of the writ shall be made to the
separate civil, criminal or administrative court by the respondent. If the court finds
actions. that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the
RULE 8 satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS docket.

Section 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When

any agency or instrumentality of
the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule
or regulation or a right therein, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty,
attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that
the petition concerns an environmental
law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to
do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully
satisfied, and to pay damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to
perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall
also contain a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping.

Section 2. Where to file the petition. - The petition

shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable
neglect or omission
occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

Section 3. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be

exempt from the payment of docket
fees.

Section 4. Order to comment. - If the petition is

sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue
the writ and require the respondent to comment on
the petition within ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall
be served on the respondents in such
manner as the court may direct, together with a copy
of the petition and any annexes thereto.

Section 5. Expediting proceedings; TEPO. - The

court in which the petition is filed may issue such
orders to expedite the proceedings, and it may also
grant a TEPO for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.

Section 6. Proceedings after comment is filed. -

After the comment is filed or the time
for the filing thereof has expired, the court may
hear the case which shall be summary in
nature or require the parties to submit memoranda.
The petition shall be resolved without
delay within sixty (60) days from the date of the
submission of the petition for resolution.

Section 7. Judgment. - If warranted, the court

shall grant the privilege of the writ of
continuing mandamus requiring respondent to
perform an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other
reliefs as may be warranted resulting from
the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The
court shall require the respondent to submit
periodic reports detailing the progress and execution
of the judgment, and the court may, by
itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate
government agency, evaluate and monitor
compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments
or observations on the execution of the
judgment.
 Individuals deputized by the proper government agency
who are enforcing environmental laws shall enjoy the
PART IV presumption of regularity under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE the Rules of Court when effecting arrests for violations of
environmental laws.
RULE 9
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Section 2. Warrant of arrest. - All warrants of
arrest issued by the court shall be
Section 1. Who may file. - Any offended party, peace officer or accompanied by a certified true copy of the
any public officer charged with the enforcement of an information filed with the issuing court.
environmental law may file a complaint before the proper officer
in accordance with the Rules of Court. RULE 12
CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF
Section 2. Filing of the information. - An information, charging a SEIZED ITEMS, EQUIPMENT,
person with a violation of an environmental law and subscribed PARAPHERNALIA, CONVEYANCES
by the prosecutor, shall be filed with the court. AND INSTRUMENTS

Section 3. Special prosecutor. - In criminal cases, where there is Section 1. Custody and disposition of seized items. -
no private offended party, a counsel whose services are offered The custody and disposition of seized items shall be
by any person or organization may be allowed by the court as in accordance with the applicable laws or rules
special prosecutor, with the consent of and subject to the control promulgated by the concerned government agency.
and supervision of the public prosecutor.
Section 2. Procedure. - In the absence of applicable
RULE 10 laws or rules promulgated by the concerned
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS government agency, the following procedure shall
be observed:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of (a) The apprehending officer having initial custody and
civil liability arising from the offense charged, shall be control of the seized items, equipment, paraphernalia,
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the conveyances and instruments shall physically inventory
complainant waives the civil action, and whenever
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the practicable, photograph the same in the presence of
civil action prior to the criminal the person from whom such items were
action. seized.

Unless the civil action has been instituted prior to the criminal (b) Thereafter, the apprehending officer shall submit
action, the reservation of the right to institute separately the to the issuing court the return of the
civil action shall be made during arraignment. search warrant within five (5) days from date of
seizure or in case of warrantless arrest,
In case civil liability is imposed or damages are awarded, the submit within five (5) days from date of seizure, the
filing and other legal fees shall inventory report, compliance report,
be imposed on said award in accordance with Rule 141 of the photographs, representative samples and other
Rules of Court, and the fees pertinent documents to the public prosecutor for
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award. The appropriate action.
damages awarded in cases where
there is no private offended party, less the filing fees, shall (c) Upon motion by any interested party, the court may
accrue to the funds of the agency charged with the direct the auction sale of seized items, equipment,
implementation of the environmental law violated. The award paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime. The
shall be used for the restoration and rehabilitation of the court shall, after hearing, fix the minimum bid price
environment adversely affected. based on the recommendation of the concerned
government agency. The sheriff shall conduct the
RULE 11 auction.
ARREST
(d) The auction sale shall be with notice to the
Section 1. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace accused, the person from whom the items were
officer or an individual seized, or the owner thereof and the concerned
deputized by the proper government agency may, without government agency.
a warrant, arrest a person:
(e) The notice of auction shall be posted in three
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has conspicuous places in the city or municipality where the
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of
offense; or the crime were seized.

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts 190
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
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(f) The proceeds shall be held in trust and deposited with the government depository bank for
disposition according to the judgment.
RULE 13
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Section 1. Attachment in environmental cases. - The
provisional remedy of attachment under Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court may be availed of in
environmental cases.
Section 2. Environmental Protection Order (EPO);
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) in
criminal cases. - The procedure for and issuance of
EPO and TEPO shall be governed by Rule 2 of these
Rules.
RULE 14
BAIL
Section 1. Bail, where filed. - Bail in the amount fixed
may be filed with the court where
the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any
regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge in the
province, city or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court
of said
place, or if no judge thereof is available,
with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit
trial judge therein. If the court grants bail,
the court may issue a hold-departure
order in appropriate cases.
Section 2. Duties of the court. - Before
granting the application for bail, the judge
must read the information in a language
known to and understood by the accused
and require the accused to sign a written
undertaking, as follows: Section 3. Pre-trial duty of the judge. - During the pre-
trial, the court shall:
(a) To appear before the court that issued the
warrant of arrest for arraignment purposes on the
date scheduled, and if the accused fails to appear
without justification on the date of
arraignment, accused waives the reading of the
information and authorizes the court to enter a plea
of not guilty on behalf of the accused and to set the
case for trial;

(b) To appear whenever required by the court where the case

is pending; and

(c) To waive the right of the accused to be present at

the trial, and upon failure of the accused to appear
without justification and despite due notice, the trial
may proceed in absentia.

RULE 15
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Section 1. Arraignment. - The court shall set the arraignment

of the accused within fifteen
(15) days from the time it acquires jurisdiction
over the accused, with notice to the public
prosecutor and offended party or concerned
government agency that it will entertain plea-
bargaining on the date of the arraignment.

Section 2. Plea-bargaining. - On the scheduled

date of arraignment, the court shall
consider plea-bargaining arrangements. Where
the prosecution and offended party or
concerned government agency agree to the plea
offered by the accused, the court shall:

(a) Issue an order which contains the plea-bargaining arrived

at;

(b) Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the

case, if any; and

(c) Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including

the civil liability for damages.

RULE 16
PRE-TRIAL

Section 1. Setting of pre-trial conference. - After the

arraignment, the court shall set the
pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days. It may
refer the case to the branch clerk of court,
if warranted, for a preliminary conference to be set at
least three (3) days prior to the pre-
trial.

Section 2. Preliminary conference. - The preliminary

conference shall be for the following purposes:

(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the civil

aspect of the case;

(b) To mark the documents to be presented as exhibits;

(c) To attach copies thereof to the records after comparison

with the originals;

(d) To ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts

and admissions on the genuineness and due
execution of documents marked as exhibits;

(e) To consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt

disposition of the case;

(f) To record the proceedings during the preliminary

conference in the Minutes of Preliminary Conference
to be signed by the parties and counsel;

(g) To mark the affidavits of witnesses which shall

be in question and answer form and shall constitute
the direct examination of the witnesses; and

(h) To attach the Minutes and marked exhibits to the

case record before the pre-trial proper. The parties
or their counsel must submit to the branch clerk of
court the names, addresses and contact numbers of
the affiants.
(a) Place the parties and their counsels under oath;
(b) Adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference as part of
the pre-trial proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or
substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness
and due execution of documents, and list object and
testimonial evidence;
(c) Scrutinize the information and the statements in the affidavits
and other documents which form part of the record of the
preliminary investigation together with other documents
identified and marked as exhibits to determine further admissions of facts
as to:
i. The courts territorial jurisdiction relative
to the offense(s) charged; ii. Qualification of
expert witnesses; and
iii. Amount of damages;
(d) Define factual and legal issues;
(e) Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and adhere to
the flow chart determined by the court which shall contain the
time frames for the different stages of the proceeding up to
promulgation of decision;
(f) Require the parties to submit to the branch clerk of
court the names, addresses and contact numbers of
witnesses that need to be summoned by subpoena; and
(g) Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits
the charge but interposes a lawful defense.
Section 4. Manner of questioning. - All questions or statements
must be directed to the
court.
Section 5. Agreements or admissions. - All agreements or
admissions made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and
signed by the accused and
counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.
The agreements covering the
matters referred to in Section 1, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court shall be
approved by the court.
Section 6. Record of proceedings. - All proceedings during the
pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and the
minutes signed by the parties or their counsels.
Section 7. Pre-trial order. - The court shall issue a pre-trial order
within ten (10) days after
the termination of the pre-trial, setting forth the actions taken
during the pre-trial conference,
the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence marked, the
number of witnesses to be
presented and the schedule of trial. The order shall bind the
parties and control the course of
action during the trial.
RULE 17
TRIAL
Section 1. Continuous trial. - The court shall endeavor
to conduct continuous trial which shall not exceed
three (3) months from the date of the issuance of the
pre-trial order.
Section 2. Affidavit in lieu of direct examination. -
Affidavit in lieu of direct examination
shall be used, subject to cross-examination and the right
to object to inadmissible portions of
the affidavit.
Section 3. Submission of memoranda. - The court may
require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and if possible, in electronic form, within a
non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date
the case is submitted for decision.
With or without any memoranda filed, the court
shall have a period of sixty (60) days to
decide the case counted from the last day of the
30-day period to file the memoranda.
Section 4. Disposition period. - The court shall dispose
the case within a period of ten (10) months from the date
of arraignment.
Section 5. Pro bono lawyers. - If the accused cannot afford
the services of counsel or there is no available public
attorney, the court shall require the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to provide pro bono lawyers for the accused.
RULE 18
SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY
Section 1. Subsidiary liability. - In case of conviction of
the accused and subsidiary liability is allowed by law, the
court may, by motion of the person entitled to recover
under judgment, enforce such subsidiary liability against
a person or corporation subsidiary liable under Article
102 and Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULE 19
STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL
CASES
Section 1. Motion to dismiss. - Upon the filing of an
information in court and before
arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the criminal action is
a SLAPP.
Section 2. Summary hearing. - The hearing on the
defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in nature. The
parties must submit all the available evidence in support
of their respective
positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case
must prove by substantial evidence that his acts for the
enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action
for the protection,
191
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PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

preservation and rehabilitation of the Section 1. Applicability. - When

environment. The party filing the action assailed there is a lack of full scientific
as a SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of certainty in establishing a causal
evidence that the action is not a SLAPP. link between human activity and
environmental effect, the court
Section 3. Resolution. - The court shall grant the shall apply the
motion if the accused establishes in the precautionary principle in resolving the case
summary hearing that the criminal case has been before it.
filed with intent to harass, vex, exert undue
The constitutional right of the
pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any
people to a balanced and
person, institution or the government has taken
or may take in the enforcement of environmental healthful ecology shall be given
laws, protection of the environment or the benefit of the doubt.
assertion of environmental rights.
Section 2. Standards for
If the court denies the motion, the court shall application. - In applying the
immediately proceed with the arraignment of the precautionary principle, the
accused. following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to
PART V human life or health; (2) inequity
EVIDENCE to present or future generations;
or (3) prejudice to the
RULE 20 environment without legal
consideration of the environmental rights of those
affected.
P
r
RULE 21 o
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE h
i
Section 1. Photographic, video and similar
evidence. - Photographs, videos and similar b
evidence of events, acts, transactions of wildlife, i
wildlife by-products or derivatives, forest t
products or mineral resources subject of a case e
shall be admissible when authenticated by the d
person who took the same, by some other person
present when said evidence was taken, or by any
other person competent to testify on the accuracy p
thereof. l
e
Section 2. Entries in official records. - Entries in a
official records made in the performance of his duty d
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person i
in performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
n
therein stated. g
s
RULE 22 :
FINAL PROVISIONS o MD (any ground)
o Motion for bill of
Section 1. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take
particulars
effect within fifteen (15) days following
publication once in a newspaper of general o
circulation. Motion
for
Section 2. Application of the Rules of Court. - extensio
The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory n of
manner, except as otherwise provided time for
herein.
filing of
pleading
s
NOTES (Based on the Annotations of
Riguera and Albano; includes Authors
own comments and research)

x Applicability of Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases (RPEC) EXCEPT
civil, criminal, and special civil filing of
actions pending before MTC and an
RTC involving enforcement or ANSWE
violations of environmental and R
other which
related laws, rules and regulations extension
x Venue AND jurisdiction (for issuance of writ of shall not
kalikasan) where exceed 15
the principal case is pending days
x Plaintiff (in any civil action) any real party o Motion to declare
in interest defendant in default
o May also be in the form o Reply
of a class suit for the o Rejoinder
protection
of the minors and
unborn generation (Oposa
vs.
Factoran)
x SC the only court which may issue a TRO or
WPI against lawful
actions of the government enforcing
environmental laws
x Allowed pleadings under RPEC:
o Complaint
o Answer (which may include
compulsory counterclaims)
o Cross claim
o Motion for intervention
o Motion for discovery
o

MR
of
jud
gm
ent
x
 o 3rd party complaint o
x Procedure: Sup
o File complaint port
o Summons ed
o File answer 15 days by
If no answer court shall declare (motu
proprio) the defendant in
doc
default, receive evidence ex
um
parte, and render judgment
ents
based on the pleadings
,
o Mediation within 30 days from receipt of notice
affid
of
avit
referral to mediation
s,
Mediation report within 10 days from
p
the
a
expiration of the 30-day period
p
o Preliminary conference conducted by the BC
e
when
r
mediation fails
s
o Pre-trial
,
Consent Decree a judicially-approved
settlement between the parties
a
based on public interest and public
n
policy to protect and preserve the
d
environment
Evidence NOT presented during pre-trial
o
are
t
waived
h
o Trial proper
e
Environmental Protection Order (EPO)
r
an order issued by the court
directing or
e
enjoining any person of
v
government agency
i
to perform or desist from
d
performing an act in
e
order to protect, preserve or
n
rehabilitate the
c
environment
e
Temporary Environmental Protection
o
Order (TEPO) where the
May
issuance of the EPO is a matter
be
of extreme urgency and the
cou
applicant will suffer grave
pled
injustice and
with
irreparable injury a
x Authors note: THUS, this is
akin
to the preparatory writ of TRO coun
x Issued by the EJ in a multiple- tercl
sala court or the PJ in a aim
single-sala for
court atty
x Valid only for 72 hours from s
receipt of the person enjoined fees
x After the issuance of a TEPO, a etc
hearing must be x If SLAPP defense
conducted for the is invoked in the
resolution of the Answer,
issuance of an the court
EPO shall:
x Bond is NOT necessary o
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Require
Participation (SLAPP) a legal the
action filed to harass vex, exert plaintiff
undue pressure or stifle any legal to
recourse that any person, f
institution, or the government i
has taken or may take in the l
enforcement of environment e
laws, protection of the
environment or h
assertion of environmental rights i
x This may be used as a defense s
by
the defendant C
o
 mment/ C
Oppositio o
n to the m
SLAPP defense within m
5 days from e
receipt of n
such order t
o Set the /
hearing re Opposi
SLAPP tion
defense within
15 days from 192
the filing of
the
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)

R t
e h
n e
d r
e e
r o
n
a
w
d i
e t
c h
i i
s n
i
o 3
n 0
 d a
a
y S
s L
f A
r P
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m
d
t e
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e e
n
s s
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m
m
a
r s
y u
m
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h a
e r
a y
r x
i
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g Quantum
of
( evidence
t on the
h part
i o
s f

d t
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s e
m
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s e
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a e
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d
a
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s t

w (
i t
t o
h
p
p r
r o
e v
j e
u
d t
i h
c a
e t
)
x NATURE of t
the HEARING h
when e
t
h a
e c
r t
e i
o
i n
s
i
 sa rehabili
SL tation,
AP preserv
P) ation of
environ
substantial ment is
evidence IMMEDI
x Quantum of ATELY
evidence on the EXECU
part TORY
of x
the
plai
Unless
ntiff restrained
(to by the
pro appellate
ve court
that (via
the WPI)
acti The judgment
on may CONVERT the
is TEPO into
NO a
T a n
SLA
PP) E
P
prepondera O
nce of
evidence o
r
o Judgment
Reliefs that may be i
granted in a citizen suit: s
x Protection, s
rehabilitation, u
preservation e
of
environmen a
t
x Payment of
w
attys fees
r
x Costs of suit
i
and other
litgation t
expe
nses o
Comp f
el the
violat c
or to o
subm n
it a t
progr i
am re n
restor u
ation i
of n
the g
envir
onme m
nt OR a
to n
contri d
bute a
to a m
speci u
al s
trust o Execution of Judgment
fund Means to
for Monitor Execution
that x Court
purpo may
se require
The judgment for the (by itself
protection, or
 anot x This
her is in the
gov nature of
ern a
men respo
t nsive
age plead
ncy) ing
the x
viol
ator Effect of
to general
sub denial
mit deemed
writ as an
ten admi
repo ssion
rts o When it shall
on a issue within 3
qua days from filing of
rterl the
y petition if the
basi same is sufficient in
s or form and substance
soo o Interim Reliefs:
ner Ocular
re Inspection Order
pro by (litigated)
gres moti
s of on;
exe for
cuti the
on pur
x Winning pos
party may submit e of
co insp
m ecti
me ng
nts the
/ mag
ob nitu
ser de
vat of
ion the
s envi
on ron
th men
e tal
ex dam
ec age
uti Production or
on Inspection of
of Documents
jud of
gm Things
en Order
t by
x Writ of Kalikasan remedy available to (litigate
any person/ entity/ any d)
public interest group which is motion;
accredited involving environmental for the
damage of such magnitude as to purpose
prejudice the life, health or property of
of inhabitants in 2 or more cities or establis
provinces hing the
o Verified petition magnitu
o DOES NOT ipso de of
facto restrain the the
respondent environ
mental
UNLESS a damage
TEPO is issued o Judgment
The latter is required within 60 days
to file a verified return from the filing of
within 10 days from the
the receipt of the writ petition
 REMEDY of the losing
party MR or appeal administrative appeals followed by
via Rule 45 appeal to CA via Rule
within 15 days 43 then appeal to SC via
from receipt of Rule 45. By way of
the exceptions, the same may
judgment be challenged in such
o An Environmental petition when (1) the
Compliance Certificate (ECC) environmental damage is of
may not such magnitude as that
be questioned in a described in the Rules on
petition for writ of kalikasan Writ of Kalikasan and (2)
because when the doctrine of
the proper remedy is the DENR exhaustion of administrative
appeal process, viz, remedies is not violated.
(Paje vs. Casino)
x Writ of Continuing Mandamus a remedy
resorted to when an
agency or government instrumentality
unlawfully neglects to perform a duty
enjoined by law in connection with the
enforcement or
violation of an environmental law,
rule, or right therein OR when
such agency or government
instrumentality unlawfully
excludes
another from the use or enjoyment
of such right where there is no other
PAS remedy
o Venue where the
actionable neglect or omission
was
committed
o Jurisdiction RTC, CA, SC
(concurrent)
o When it shall issue within 10 days
from filing of the
petition if the same is sufficient in
form and substance
o Hearing summary OR court may
require submission of
memoranda

CASE

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG

ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY
OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R.
LEE, GOVERNOR,
PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR.,
VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN
M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT
MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No.
199199

August 27,
2013
EN BANC

FACTS:
x Maricris Dolot et al had protested sometime in 2009
the iron ore mining
operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in
Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco,
located in the Municipality of Matnog, which
was located in the southern tip of
Luzon
o The protest was futile
x Dolot, together with the parish priest of the Holy
Infant Jesus Parish and the
officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa
Matnog filed a petition for continuing
 mandamus, damages and attorneys fees before
RTC Sorsogon
o there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain
the geological
foundation of the municipality
o Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides,
and confronted
with the environmental dangers of
flood hazard, liquefaction,
ground settlement, ground
subsidence and landslide hazard
o the mining operators did not have the required
permit to operate
o Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor
Sally Lee did not
have the authority to issue a small-scale
mining permit in favor of the operators
o the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did
not do anything to protect the interest of
the
people of Matnog
o the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, and the Local
Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed
for the following reliefs
x The prayers in the petition are as follows:
o (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the
respondents to
immediately stop the mining
operations in the Municipality of
Matnog;
o (2) the issuance of a temporary
environment protection order or
TEPO;
o (3) the creation of an inter-agency group
to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site;
o (4) award of damages; and
o (5) return of the iron ore, among others
x The case was referred to the EJ of RTC Sorsogon, his
court being that which was
designated as environmental court
x RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
x Dolot et al filed an MR
x RTC denied the MR
o (1) there was no final court decree, order
or decision yet that the
public officials allegedly failed to
act on, which is a condition for
the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus;
o (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
petitioners therein failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies;
and
o (3) they also failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of
the complaint to the
government or
appropriate agency, as
required by the rules
x Dolot et al filed a Rule 45 before the SC
193
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ISSUE # 1: Whether the petition was correctly filed before the
RTC Sorsogon.
HELD # 1: YES. (As to JURISDICTION - BP 129 provides
that RTC has original jurisdiction over mandamus
petitions. As to VENUE - while venue in this case might
have been incorrect under AM 09-6-8, venue may be
waived)
x In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
the RTC, in its Order dated
September 16, 2011, apparently relied
on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7
defining the territorial areas of the
Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12,
and Administrative Circular (Admin.
Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the
environmental courts "to try and decide
violations of environmental laws x x x
committed within their respective
territorial jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled
that its territorial jurisdiction was limited
within the boundaries of Sorsogon City
and the neighboring municipalities of
Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran
and Juban and that it was "bereft
of jurisdiction to entertain, hear
and decide [the] case, as such
authority rests before another co-
equal court."15
x Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The
RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O.
No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-
2008 and confine itself within its
four corners in determining
whether it had jurisdiction over
the action filed by the petitioners.
x None is more well-settled than the rule
that jurisdiction, which is the power
and authority of the court to
hear, try and decide a case, is
conferred
by law.16 It may either be over
the nature of the action, over the
subject
matter, over the person of the
defendants or over the issues
framed in
the pleadings.17 By virtue of
 Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction
over special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is vested in
the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1)
thereof provides that the RTCs shall
exercise original jurisdiction -
o in the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and
injunction
which may be enforced in
any part of their respective
regions. (Emphasis ours)
x A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was
issued pursuant to Section 18 of
B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court
authority to define the territory over which
a expressed that what the RTC
branch of the RTC shall exercise its
authority. These administrative orders and
circulars issued by the Court merely
provide for the venue where an action
may
be filed. The Court does not have the
power to confer jurisdiction on any
court or tribunal as the allocation of
jurisdiction is lodged solely in
Congress.18 It also cannot be
delegated to another office or agency
of the
Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg.
129, in fact, explicitly states that the
territory thus defined shall be deemed
to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining
the venue of all suits, proceedings or
actions. It was also clarified in Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge
Matas20 that -
o Administrative Order No. 3 [defining
the territorial jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts in
the National Capital Judicial
Region]
and, in like manner, Circular
Nos. 13 and 19, did not per
se confer
jurisdiction on the covered
regional trial courts or its
branches,
such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their
judicial acts. The
administrative order merely
defines the limits of the
administrative area within
which a branch of the court
may exercise its authority
pursuant to the jurisdiction
conferred by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.21
x The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates
only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought
and does not equate to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is intended to accord
convenience to the parties, as it relates to
the place of trial, and does not restrict
their access to the courts.22
Consequently, the RTCs motu proprio
dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction is
patently
incorrect.
x At most, the error committed by the petitioners in
filing the case with
the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper
venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically
states that a special civil action for
continuing mandamus shall be filed
with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over
the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission
occurred x x x."23 In this case, it
appears
that the alleged actionable
neglect or omission occurred in
the Municipality of
Matnog and as such, the petition
should have been filed in the
RTC of Irosin.24
But even then, it does not warrant
the outright dismissal of the
petition by the RTC as venue may
be waived.25 Moreover, the action
filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in
nature where venue is an
essential element of
jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo
v. Commission on Elections,27
the Court even
should have done under the
circumstances
was to transfer the case (an
election protest) to the proper
branch.
Similarly, it would serve the
higher interest of justice28 if the
Court orders the
transfer of Civil Case No. 2011
8338 to the RTC of Irosin for
proper and speedy
resolution, with the RTC applying
the Rules in its disposition of the
case.
x At this juncture, the Court affirms the
continuing applicability of Admin. Circular
No. 23-2008 constituting the
different "green courts" in the
country and setting
the administrative guidelines in
the raffle and disposition of
environmental cases.
While the designation and
guidelines were made in
2008, the same should
operate in conjunction with
the Rules.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the resort to the
remedy of continuing mandamus was
proper,
considering the position of the RTC that
a final decision or order is a condition
precedent
thereto.
HELD # 2: YES.
x In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011,
which resolved the petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, the RTC
further ruled that the
petition was dismissible on
the following grounds: (1)
there is no final court
 issuance of the writ, viz:
decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly o (1) an agency or instrumentality of
failed to act on; government or its officer
(2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to unlawfully neglects the
exhaust administrative remedies; performance of an act or
and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits unlawfully excludes
and furnish a copy of the another from the use or
complaint to the government or appropriate enjoyment of a right;
agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of o (2) the act to be performed by the
the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public government agency,
respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC. instrumentality or its officer
x The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in is specifically enjoined by law
Metropolitan Manila as a
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of duty;
Manila Bay.30 Now cast in o (3) such duty results from an office, trust
stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing or station in connection
mandamus enjoys a with the enforcement or
distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions violation of an environmental
for the law, rule or regulation or a right
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which therein; and
are covered by o (4) there is no other plain, speedy and
Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure adequate remedy in the
under Rule 65 of the Rules course of law.32
of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, x The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil
action that may be availed of
prohibition and mandamus, Section
"to compel the performance of an act
4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed
specifically enjoined by law."33
should be
The petition should mainly involve an
sufficient in form and substance before a court may
environmental and other related
take further
law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The
action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition
RTCs mistaken notion on the
outright. Courts must be
need for a final judgment, decree or order is
cautioned, however, that the determination to give
apparently based on the definition
due course to the petition or
of the writ of continuing mandamus under
dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
must be applied in a
o (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of
by a court in an
the law and always with the
environmental case directing
view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31
any agency or instrumentality of
x Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of
the government or officer
the petition filed
thereof to perform an act or
under Rule 8, Section 1:
series of acts decreed by final
o When any agency or instrumentality of the
judgment which shall remain
government or officer
effective until
thereof unlawfully neglects the
judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis
performance of an act which the
ours)
law specifically enjoins as a duty
x The final court decree, order or decision erroneously
resulting from an office, trust or
alluded to by the
station in connection with the
RTC actually pertains to the judgment or
enforcement or violation of an
decree that a court would eventually render
environmental law rule or regulation or a
in an environmental case for continuing
right therein, or
mandamus and which judgment or decree
unlawfully excludes another from the use
shall subsequently become final.
or enjoyment of such
x Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a
right and there is no other plain, speedy
judgment in conformity with
and adequate remedy in
Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has
the ordinary course of law, the person
become final, the issuing court still
aggrieved thereby may file a
retains jurisdiction over the case to
verified petition in the proper court,
ensure that the government agency
alleging the facts with concerned is performing its tasks as
certainty, attaching thereto supporting mandated by law and to monitor the
evidence, specifying that the effective performance of said tasks. It is
petition concerns an environmental law, only upon full satisfaction of the final
rule or regulation, and judgment, order or decision that a final
praying that judgment be rendered return of the writ shall be made to the
commanding the respondent to court and if the court finds that the
do an act or series of acts until the judgment has been fully implemented, the
judgment is fully satisfied, and satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in
to pay damages sustained by the the court docket.34 A writ of
petitioner by reason of the continuing mandamus is, in essence, a
malicious neglect to perform the duties of command of continuing
the respondent, under compliance with a final judgment as it
the law, rules or regulations. The petition "permits the court to retain
shall also contain a sworn jurisdiction after judgment in order to
certification of non-forum ensure the successful
shopping.1wphi1 implementation of the reliefs mandated
x On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must under the courts decision."35
contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn ISSUE # 3: Whether there is a need to file the present
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also case before the Panel of Arbitrators, in compliance with
necessary that the petitioner must be one who the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies.
is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. 194
x Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that
the petition must
contain substantive allegations specifically
constituting an actionable neglect or omission and
must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis
for the
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Henedino M. Brondial)
mining permits in favor of
these entities; and the
HELD # 3: NO. perceived indifference of the
x The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument DENR and local government
that the petitioners should officials over the issue.
have first filed a case with the Panel of x Resolution of these matters does not
Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction entail the technical knowledge
over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942. and expertise of the members of
x Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the the Panel but requires an
Panel has jurisdiction over exercise of judicial function.
mining disputes.36 But the petition Thus, in Olympic Mines and
filed below does not involve a mining Development Corp. v. Platinum
Group Metals Corporation,37 the
dispute. What was being protested Court stated -
are the alleged negative o Arbitration before the Panel of
environmental Arbitrators is proper only when
impact of the small-scale mining there
operation being conducted by is a disagreement
Antones between the parties
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines as to some provisions
Development Corporation and TR Ore in of the
the Municipality of Matnog; the contract between
authority of the Governor of Sorsogon them, which needs
to issue the interpretation and
the
 application of that particular
knowledge and expertise
possessed by members of that
Panel. It is not proper when
one of the parties
repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or
agreement on the ground of
fraud or oppression as in this
case. The validity of the
contract cannot be subject of
arbitration proceedings.
Allegations of fraud and
duress in the execution of a
contract are matters within
the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature
and require the application
and
interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence which is
necessarily a Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the
judicial function.38
(Emphasis supplied in the
former and ours in
the latter)
x Consequently, resort to the Panel would be
completely useless and unnecessary.
ISSUE # 4: Whether the Judicial Affidavit Rule
is applicable in petitions for continuing
mandamus.
HELD # 4: NO.
x The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling
that the petition is infirm for
failure to attach judicial affidavits. As
previously stated, Rule 8 requires that
the petition should be verified, contain
supporting evidence and must
be accompanied by a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping. There
is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the
inclusion of judicial affidavits,
albeit not prohibited. It is only if the
evidence of the petitioner would consist
of testimony of witnesses that it would
be the time that judicial affidavits
(affidavits of witnesses in the question
and answer form) must be attached to
the petition/complaint.39
ISSUE # 5: Whether the failure of Dolot et al to
furnish the respondents a copy of their petition
is fatal.
HELD # 5: NO.
x Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to
the respondents is not a fatal
defect such that the case should be
dismissed. The RTC could have just
required the petitioners to furnish a
copy of the petition to the
respondents. It should be remembered
that "courts are not enslaved by
technicalities, and they have the
prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty
to reconcile both the need to speedily put
an end to litigation and the parties right
to an opportunity to be heard."
(GARs note: only issue numbers 5 and 6 relate to
Remedial Law re criminal and civil aspects of a
petition for issuance of a writ of kalikasan; the rest
are Political Law topics re State
immunity, the UNCLOS, VFA, and the political question
doctrine)
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic
of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV.
DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus
of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO,
CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON.
NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna
Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D.,
Junk VF A Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ,
PH.D.,
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan
Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES,
Pamalakaya,
GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER
C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E.
SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A.
AFRICA, THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY
JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D.,
A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners, vs. SCOTT H.
SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the
US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity
as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian,
PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL
ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign
Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN,
Secretary,
Department of National Defense, HON.
RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department
of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE
ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine
Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces
of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO
RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA,
Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of
Armed Forces of the Philippines Command
and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine
Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013
Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.
G.R.
No.
206
510
Sept
emb
er
16,
201
4
EN
BAN
C
FACTS:
 o the grounding, salvaging and post-
x Tubbataha, declared as National Marine Park by virtue of salvaging operations of the USS
Proclamation No. 306 Guardian cause and continue
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, to cause environmental
1988, is ocated in the damage of
middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast such magnitude as to affect
of Puerto Princesa City and the provinces of Palawan,
lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global Antique,
center of marine biodiversity. Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
o Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known Occidental, Negros Oriental,
as the Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan,
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
Act of 2009" passed on April 6, 2010 events violate their
"to ensure the protection and constitutional rights to a
conservation of the balanced and healthful
globally significant economic, ecology
biological, sociocultural, o also seek a directive from this Court for
educational and scientific the institution of civil,
values of the Tubbataha administrative and criminal suits
Reefs into perpetuity for for acts committed in violation
the enjoyment of present of environmental laws and
and future generations." regulations in connection with
Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the
the waters of grounding incident.
TRNP is strictly regulated x Only the PH respondents filed their Comment (and
and many human activities NOT the US respondents)
are prohibited and penalized o In their consolidated comment with
or fined, including opposition to the application for
fishing, gathering, a TEPO and ocular inspection
destroying and and production orders,
disturbing the resources respondents assert that:
within the TRNP. ( 1) the grounds relied upon
The law likewise created the for the issuance of a
Tubbataha Protected TEPO or writ of
Area Management Board Kalikasan have
(TPAMB) which shall be the become fait
sole policy-making and accompli as the
permit-granting body of the salvage operations
TRNP. on the USS Guardian
x US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic were already
clearance for the vessel completed;
called USS Guardian, an Avenger-class mine (2) the petition is defective in
countermeasures ship of the US Navy, "to enter and form and substance;
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to (3) the petition improperly
arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of raises issues involving the
routine ship replenishment, VFA between the
maintenance, and crew liberty." Republic of the
o It had a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. Philippines and the
o Then arrived in Subic Bay United States of
o Departed for its next port of call in Makassar, America; and
Indonesia ( 4) the determination of the
x While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the extent of responsibility
northwest side of of the US
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles Government as
east-southeast of Palawan. regards the damage
No cine was injured in the incident, and there have to the
been no reports of leaking Tubbataha Reefs
fuel or oil rests exdusively with
x US actions: the executive
o U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott branch.
Swift expressed x Petitioners filed a motion for early resolution and
regret for the incident in a press statement. motion to proceed ex parte
o US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. against the US respondents.
Thomas, Jr., in a
meeting at the Department of Foreign ISSUE # 1: Whether herein petitioners have legal standing to
Affairs (DFA) "reiterated institute the present petition.
his regrets over the grounding incident
and assured Foreign Affairs HELD # 1: YES.
Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the x Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of
United States will provide justice on a given
appropriate compensation for damage to question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's
the reef caused by the personal and substantial interest in a
ship. case where he has sustained or will sustain
o US Navy-led salvage team finished removing direct injury as a result" of the act
the last piece of being challenged, and "calls for more than
the grounded ship from the coral reef. just a generalized grievance."11
x Herein petitioners (on their behalf and in representation of However, the rule on standing is a
their respective procedural matter which this Court has
sector/organization and others, including minors or 195
generations yet unborn) filed the present petition
before the SC for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-
8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of
environmental laws and regulations in relation to the
grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over
the Tubbataha Reefs against herein respondents
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intergenerational
implications.1wphi1
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like Such right carries with
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and it the correlative duty
legislators when the public interest so to refrain from
requires, such as when the subject impairing the
matter of the controversy is of environment.14
transcendental importance, of x On the novel element in the class suit
overreaching significance to society, or filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa,
of paramount public interest.12 this Court ruled that
x In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we not only do ordinary
recognized the "public citizens have legal
right" of citizens to "a balanced and standing to sue for
healthful ecology which, for the first the enforcement of
time in our constitutional history, is environmental rights,
solemnly incorporated in the they can do so in
fundamental law." We declared that representation of their
the right to a balanced and own and future
healthful ecology need not be written in generations. Thus:
the Constitution for it is o Petitioners minors assert
assumed, like other civil and polittcal that they represent their
rights guaranteed in the Bill of generation as
Rights, to exist from the inception of well as
mankind and it is an issue of generation
transcendental importance with s yet
 unborn. We find no difficulty x In United States of America v. Judge
in ruling that Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of
they can, for themselves, state immunity from suit, as follows:
for others of their o The rule that a state may
generation and for the not be sued without its
succeeding generations, file consent,
a class suit. Their now
personality to sue in expressed
behalf of the succeeding in Article
generations can only be XVI,
based on the Section 3,
concept of of the
intergenerational 1987
responsibility insofar as the Constitutio
right to a balanced and n, is one of
healthful ecology is the
concerned. Such a right, as generally
hereinafter expounded, accepted
considers the "rhythm principles
and harmony of of
nature." Nature means internation
the created world in its al law that
entirety. Such we have
rhythm and harmony adopted
indispensably include, inter as part of
alia, the judicious the law of
disposition, utilization, our land
management, renewal and under
conservation of Article II,
the country's forest, Section 2.
mineral, land, waters, x x x.
fisheries, wildlife, off- x Even without such affirmation, we
shore areas and other would still be bound by the generally
natural resources to the end accepted principles of
that their international law under
exploration, development the doctrine of
and utilization be equitably incorporation. Under
accessible to this doctrine, as
the present a:: well as accepted by the
future generations. majority of states,
Needless to say, every such principles are
generation has a deemed incorporated
responsibility to the next to in the law of every
preserve that rhythm civilized state as a
and harmony for the full condition and
1:njoyment of a balanced consequence of its
and healthful membership in the
ecology. Put a little society of nations.
differently, the minors' Upon its admission to
assertion of their right such society, the state
to a sound environment is automatically
constitutes, at the same obligated to comply
time, the with these principles in
performance of their its relations with other
obligation to ensure the states.
protection of that right x As applied to the local state, the
for the generations to doctrine of state immunity is based on the
come.15 (Emphasis justification
supplied.) given by Justice
x The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Holmes that
Oposa, insofar as it ''there can be no
refers to minors and generations yet legal right
unborn, is now enshrined in the against the
Rules which allows the filing of a authority which
citizen suit in environmental cases. makes the law
The provision on citizen suits in the on which the
Rules "collapses the traditional rule on right
personal and direct interest, on depends."
the principle that humans are [Kawanakoa v.
stewards of Polybank, 205 U.S.
nature."1 349] There are
other practical
ISSUE # 2: Whether SC acquired jurisdiction reasons for the
over the persons of the US respondents enforcement of the
considering that they did not submit any doctrine. In the
pleading or manifestation. case of the foreign
state
HELD # 2: NO. (pursuant to the doctrine of State sought to be impleaded
Immunity which extends to those persons acting in the local jurisdiction,
as agents of their State) the added inhibition is
x The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the expressed
doctrine of sovereign in the maxim par in
immunity or non-suability of the parem, non habet
State,17 is expressly provided in imperium. All states are
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution sovereign equals
which states: and cannot assert
o Section 3. The State may not be sued jurisdiction over one
without its consent. another. A contrary
disposition would, in
the language of a
 celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace
of nations." [De Haber
v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
x While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same,. such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against
them,
the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of
Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a
situation, the state may move to
dismiss the comp.taint on the ground
that it has been filed without its
consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
x Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is
expressed in the Eleventh
Amendment which reads:
o The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
x In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we
further expounded on the
immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local
courts, as follows:
o The precept that a State cannot be sued in
the courts of a foreign
state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then
closely identified with the personal
immunity of a foreign sovereign
from suit and, with the emergence
of democratic states, made to
attach not just to the person of the
head of state, or his
representative, but also distinctly
to the state itself in its sovereign
capacity. If the acts giving rise to a
suit arc those of a foreign
government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting
in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign
from suit without its consent. Suing
a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the
state itself. The proscription is
not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the
maxim -par in parem, non habet
imperium -that all states are
soverr~ign equals and cannot
assert
jurisdiction over one another. The
implication, in broad terms, is
that if the judgment against an
official would rec 1uire the state
itself to perform an affirmative act
to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages
decreed
against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.21 (Emphasis
supplied.)
x In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of
diplomatic immunity, the
privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it
is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction.22
x In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of
the consolidated cases
therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air
Base who was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by two officers of the US
Air Force, and was
eventually dismissed from his employment
when he was charged in court for
violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for
damages filed by the said employee
against the military officers, the latter moved to
dismiss the case on the ground
that the suit was against the US Government
which had not given its consent.
The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed
before this Court, we reversed the RTC and
dismissed the complaint. We held
that petitioners US military officers were acting
in the exercise of their official
 functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against has been said that an action at law
the complainant or suit in equity against a State
and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for officer or the director of a State
discharging department on the ground that,
their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be while claiming to act for the State,
directly impleaded for he violates or invades the
acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent personal and property rights of
to be sued. the plaintiff, under an
x This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from unconstitutional act or under an
being sued in assumption of authority which he
the courts of another State without the former's consent or does not have, is not a suit
waiver has evolved against the State within the
into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and constitutional provision that the
governmental acts State may not be sued without its
(Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts consent." The rationale for this
(Jure gestionis). ruling is that the doctrine of state
Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity immunity cannot be used as an
extends only to acts instrument for perpetrating an
Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is injustice.
proper only when o The aforecited authorities are clear on the
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the matter. They state that
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic the doctrine of immunity from suit
affairs.24 will not apply and may not be
x In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State invoked where the public official is
immunity principle, thus: being sued in his private and
o It is a different matter where the public official is made to personal capacity as an ordinary
account citizen. The cloak of protection
in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and afforded the officers and agents of
injurious to the the government is removed the
rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe moment they are sued in their
Zaldivar in individual capacity. This situation
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. usually arises where the public
vs. Aligaen, official acts without authority or in
etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only excess of the powers vested in
legal acts by its him. It is a well-settled principle of
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or law that a public official may be
officers are liable in his personal private
not acts of the State, and an action against the capacity for whatever damage he
officials or officers may have caused by his act done
by one whose rights have been invaded or violated with malice and in bad faith, or
by such acts, beyond the scope of his authority
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis
the State within supplied.) In this case, the US
the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the 196
same tenor, it
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immunity therefore
bars the exercise of
respondents were sued in jurisdiction by this
their official capacity as Court over the
commanding persons of
officers of the US Navy who respondents Swift,
had control and supervision Rice and Robling.
over the x During the deliberations, Senior Associate
USS Guardian and its crew. Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
The alleged act or omission position that the conduct of the
resulting in US in this case, when its
the unfortunate grounding of warship entered a
the USS Guardian on the restricted area in violation of
TRNP was R.A. No. 10067 and caused
committed while they we:re damage to the TRNP
performing official military reef system, brings the matter
duties. within the ambit of Article 31 of
Considering that the the United
satisfaction of a judgment Nations Convention on the Law
against said officials will of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
require remedial actions and explained that while
appropriation of funds by the historically, warships enjoy
US government, the suit is sovereign immunity from suit as
deemed to be one against the extensions of their
US itself. The principle of State flag State, Art. 31 of the
 UNCLOS creates an exception to this the
rule in cases territorial
where they fail to comply with the sea
rules and regulations of the coastal immediat
State ely.
regarding passage through the latter's o Article 31
internal waters and the territorial sea. Responsibility of
the flag State for
ISSUE # 3: Whether the US is bound to make damage caused by
reparations to PH, considering the formers non- a warship
ratification of the UNCLOS. or other
governme
HELD # 3: YES. nt ship
x According to Justice Carpio, although the US to operated
date has not ratified the for non-
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing commerci
policy the US considers itself bound by al
customary international rules on the purposes
"traditional uses of the oceans" as The flag State
codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned shall bear international
from previous declarations by former responsibility
Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the for any
US judiciary in the case of United States loss or
v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27 damage
x The international law of the sea is generally to the
defined as "a body of treaty rules coastal
arid customary norms governing the uses State
of the sea, the exploitation of its resulting
resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction from the
over maritime regimes. It is a branch of non-
public international law, regulating the complian
relations of states with respect to the uses ce by a
of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a warship
multilateral treaty which was opened for or other
signature on December 10, 1982 at governm
Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by ent ship
the Philippines in 1984 but came into force operated
on November 16, 1994 upon the for non-
submission of the 60th ratification. commerci
x The UNCLOS is a product of international al
negotiation that seeks to balance State purposes
sovereignty (mare clausum) and the with the
principle of freedom of the high seas laws and
(mare regulatio
liberum).29 The freedom to use the ns of the
world's marine waters is one of the oldest coastal
State
customary principles of international concernin
law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal g
State sovereign rights in varying degrees passage
over the different zones of the sea through
which are: 1) internal waters, 2) the
territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) territorial
exclusive sea or
economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It with the
also gives coastal States more or less provision
jurisdiction over foreign vessels s of this
depending on where the vessel is Conventi
located.31 on or
x Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is other
concerned, the Coastal State rules of
exercises sovereignty, subject to the internatio
UNCLOS and other rules of international nal law.
law. Such sovereignty extends to the air o Article 32
space over the territorial sea as well as Immunities of
to its bed and subsoil.32 warships and other
x In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by government ships
Justice Carpio, they continue to operated for non-
enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following commercial
exceptions: purposes
o Article 30 x With such exceptions as are contained in
Non-compliance by subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
warships with the laws and nothing in this Convention
regulations of the coastal affects the immunities of
State warships and other
If any warship does not government ships operated for
comply with the laws and non-commercial purposes.
regulations of the (Emphasis supplied.)
coastal State A foreign warship's
concerning unauthorized entry into our
passage internal waters with resulting
through the damage to marine resources is
territorial sea and one situation in which the
disregards any above provisions may apply.
request But what if the offending
for compliance warship is a non-party to the
therewith which is UNCLOS, as in this case, the
made to it, the US?
coastal State may x An overwhelming majority - over 80% --
require it to leave of nation states are now members of
 UNCLOS, but despite this the US, the
world's leading maritime power, has
not ratified it.
x While the Reagan administration was instrumental
in UNCLOS' negotiation and
drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately
voted against and refrained from signing
it due to concerns over deep seabed
mining technology transfer provisions
contained in Part XI. In a
remarkable, multilateral effort to
induce U.S.
membership, the bulk of UNCLOS
member states cooperated over the
succeeding decade to revise the
objection.able provisions. The revisions
satisfied the Clinton administration, which
signed the revised Part XI implementing
agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994,
President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and
the Part XI implementing agreement to the
Senate requesting its advice and consent.
Despite consistent support from President
Clinton, each of his
successors, and an ideologically diverse
array of stakeholders, the Senate has since
withheld the consent required for the
President to internationally bind the United
States to UNCLOS.

x While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee (SFRC) during
the 108th and 110th Congresses, its progress
continues to be hamstrung by
significant pockets of political ambivalence
over U.S. participation in international
institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress
SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry
included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate
consideration among his highest
priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate
action has been taken on UNCLOS
by the 112th Congress.34
x Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy
statement given by President
Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will
"recognize the rights of the other , states in
the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the
convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights
and freedom of the United States and others
under
international law are recognized by such
coastal states", and President Clinton's
reiteration of the US policy "to act in a
manner consistent with its [UNCLOS]
provisions relating to traditional uses of the
oceans and to encourage other countries to
do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the
"traditional uses of the oceans," and "if
under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the
rights of the other states in the waters off
their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that
"there is more reason to expect it to
recognize the rights of other states in their
internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this
case."
x As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio
emphasizes that
"the US' refusal to join the UN CLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS'
regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which
considers the oceans and deep seabed
commonly owned by mankind," pointing out
that such "has nothing to do with its [the US']
acceptance of
customary international rules on navigation."
x It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge
Advocate General's Corps
publicly endorses the ratification of the
UNCLOS, as shown by the following
statement posted on its official website:
o The Convention is in the national interest
of the United States
because it establishes stable
maritime zones, including a
maximum
outer limit for territorial seas;
codifies innocent passage, transit
passage, and archipelagic sea
lanes passage rights; works
against
"jurisdictiomtl creep" by
preventing coastal nations from
expanding
their own maritime zones; and
reaffirms sovereign immunity of
 warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
o Economically, accession to the Convention would
support our
national interests by enhancing the
ability of the US to assert its sovereign
rights over the resources of one of the
largest
continental shelves in the world.
Further, it is the Law of the Sea
Convention that first established the
concept of a maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200
nautical miles, and recognized
the rights of coastal states to conserve
and manage the natural
resources in this Zone.35
x We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-
membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial
sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international
responsibility" under
Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha
reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-
time ally and trading partner, which has been actively
supporting the country's efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from
its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while
transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling
to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to
cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve
the marine environment as provided in Article 197,
viz:
o Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional
basis
States shall cooperate on a global
basis and, as
appropriate, on a regional
basis, directly or through
competent international
organizations, in formulating
and elaborating international
rules, standards and
recommended practices
and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for
the protection and
preservation of the marine
environment, taking into
account characteristic
regional features.
x In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present
controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the
immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating
the.latter's territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea
immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they
will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.

ISSUE # 4: Whether the US effectively waived its immunity from

suit under the provisions in
the VFA.

HELD # 4: NO.

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x Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of
immunity from suit found in the VFA.
Likewise, they invoke federal statutes in
the US under which agencies of the US
have statutorily waived their immunity to
any action. Even under the common
law tort claims, petitioners asseverate
that the US respondents are liable for
negligence, trespass and nuisance.
o We are not persuaded.
x The VFA is an agreement which defines the
treatment of United States troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines to
promote "common security interests"
between the US and the Philippines in
the region. It provides for the guidelines
to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights
of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.36
The invocation of US federal tort
laws and even common law is
thus improper considering that it
is the VF A which governs
disputes involving US military
ships and crew navigating
Philippine waters in pursuance of
the objectives of the agreement.
x As it is, the waiver of State immunity
under the VF A pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the
present
petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules
that a criminal case against a
person
charged with a violation
of an environmental law
is to be filed separately:
o SEC. 17. Institution of
separate actions.-The filing of a
petition for
 the issuance of the writ of x (b)
kalikasan shall not preclude Directing
the filing of separate civil, the
criminal or administrative respondent
actions. public
o
ISSUE # 5: Whether the SC may properly rule on the f
application or non-application of the VFA provisions on f
criminal jurisdiction as regards the criminal liability of i
the US respondents. c
i
HELD # 5: NO. a
l
ISSUE # 6: Whether the SC may award damages in favor of ,
herein petitioners
g
HELD # 6: NO. o
x In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling v
on the application or e
non-application of criminal jurisdiction m
provisions of the VF A to US m
personnel who may be found responsible e
for the grounding of the USS n
Guardian, would be premature and t
beyond the province of a petition
for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it a
unnecessary at this point to determine g
whether such waiver of State immunity is e
indeed absolute. In the same vein, n
we cannot grant damages which have c
resulted from the violation of y
environmental laws. The Rules allows the ,
recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative p
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in r
a separate civil suit or that deemed i
instituted with the criminal action v
charging the same violation of an a
environmental law.37 t
o Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the e
reliefs which may be granted in
a petition for issuance of a writ of p
Kalikasan, to wit: e
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within r
sixty (60) days from the s
time the petition o
is submitted for n
decision, the
court shall o
render judgment r
granting or
denying the e
privilege of the writ of n
kalikasan. t
The reliefs that may be i
granted under the writ are t
the following: y
x (a) Directing
respondent to t
permanently
o
cease
and
p
desist
r
from
o
commi
t
tting
e
acts or
c
neglec
t
ting
,
the
perfor
p
mance
r
of a
e
duty in
s
violati
e
on of
r
enviro
v
nment
e
al laws
,
resulti
ng in
r
enviro
e
nment
h
al
a
destru
b
ction
i
or
l
damag
i
e;
t
 ate or r
restor i
e the g
environment; h
x (c) Directing t
the respondent
public o
offici f
al,
gov t
ern h
men e
t
age p
ncy, e
priv o
ate p
pers l
on e
or
entit t
y to o
mon
itor a
stric
t
com b
plia a
nce l
with a
the n
deci c
sion e
and d
orde
rs of a
the n
cour d
t;
x (d) Directing h
the respondent e
public a
offici l
al, t
gove h
rnme f
nt u
agen l
cy,
or e
priva c
te o
pers l
on or o
entit g
y to y
mak
e o
perio r
dic
re
po t
rt o
s
on t
th h
e e
ex
ec p
ut r
io o
n t
of e
th c
e t
fi i
na o
l n
ju ,
d
g p
m r
en e
t; s
an e
d r
x (e) Such other v
reliefs which relate a
to t
the i
 on,
rehab Guardian from the coral reef. However, we
ilitati are mindful of the fact that the US and
on or Philippine governments both expressed
resto readiness to
ratio negotiate and discuss the matter of
n of compensation for the damage
the caused by the USS Guardian. The US
envir Embassy has also declared it is
onme closely coordinating with local scientists
nt, and experts in assessing the extent of the
exce damage and appropriate methods of
pt rehabilitation.
the x Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental
awar cases is not
d of proscribed by the Rules. As can be gleaned
dama from the following provisions, mediation and
ges settlement are available for the
to consideration of the parties, and which
indivi dispute resolution methods are encouraged
dual by the court, to wit:
petiti o RULE3
oners SEC. 3. Referral to
. mediation.-At the start of the
(Emp pre-trial conference,
hasis the court shall inquire
suppl from the parties if
ied.) they have settled the
x We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in dispute; otherwise,
asserting that this petition the court shall
has become moot in the sense that the immediately refer the
salvage operation sought to be enjoined parties or their
or restrained had already been counsel, if authorized
accomplished when by their clients, to the
petitioners sought recourse from this Philippine Mediation
Court. But insofar as the Center (PMC) unit for
directives to Philippine respondents purposes of
to protect and rehabilitate the mediation. If not
coral reef stn icture and marine available, the court
habitat adversely affected by the shall refer the
grounding incident are concerned, case to the clerk of
petitioners are entitled to these court or legal
reliefs notwithstanding the researcher for
completion of the removal of the USS mediation.
Mediation must be conducted
within a non-extendible
period of thirty
(30) days from
receipt of notice of
referral to
mediation.
The mediation report must be
submitted within ten
(10) days from the expiration
of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary
conference.-If mediation fails,
the court will
schedule the
continuance of the
pre-
trial. Before the
scheduled date of
continuance, the
court may refer the
case to the branch
clerk of court
for a preliminary
conference for the
following
purposes:
x (a) To assist the
parties in reaching a
settlement;
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference;
consent decree.-
The judge shall put
the parties and
their counsels
under oath, and
they shall remain
under oath in all
pre-trial
conferences.
The judge shall exert best
efforts to persuade the
parties to arrive at
a settlement of the
dispute. The
 judge may issue a consent
decree approving the
agreement between the
parties in accordance with
law, morals, public order and
public policy to protect
the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful
ecology.
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court
shall
endeavor to make the parties
to agree to compromise or
settle in accordance with law
at any stage of the
proceedings before rendition
of judgment.
(Underscoring supplied.)
x The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009
when a guided-
missile cruiser, the USS Port Royal, ran aground
about half a mile off the
Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck
for four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring
the coral reef, the US government was reported to
have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in
settlement over coral reef damage
caused by the grounding.38
x To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay
appropriate
compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding,
the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the
formation of a US
interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate
discussions with
the Government of the Philippines to review coral
reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on
assessments by Philippine-based
marine scientists." The US team intends to "help
assess damage and remediation options, in
coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office,
appropriate Philippine government entities, non-
governmental organizations, and scientific experts
from Philippine universities."39
x A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at
the cost
of the violator is also a major relief that may be
obtained under a judgment rendered in a
citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
o RULES
o SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted,
the court
may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs
which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation
of the environment and
the payment of attorney's fees, costs of
suit and other litigation
expenses. It may also require the
violator to submit a program of
rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which
shall be borne by the violator, or to
contribute to a special trust
fund for that purpose subject to the
control of the court.1wphi1

ISSUE # 7: Whether the SC may properly declare the amount of

compensation that should be imposed upon the US.

HELD # 7: NO. (this is a political question that should be addressed by the

Executive branch)
x In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive
Branch
on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution
of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of
common security
interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he
conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive
and legislative-"the political" --departments of the
government, and the propriety
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ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth
of what may be done in the respecting a matter of fact.
exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or Section 2. Scope. The rules
decision."40 of evidence shall be the same in
x On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional all courts and in all trials and
reliefs prayed for in hearings, except as otherwise
the petition to order a review provided by law or these rules.
of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions Evidence mode
thereof. and manner of proving
competent facts in
_________________________________________
judicial
proceedings (Bustos
EVIDENCE vs. Lucero)
Not every
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION [RULE 128] circumstance which
affords an inference as
1. Definition/ Meaning and Scope of Evidence to the truth or
falsity of a matter
Section 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the alleged is considered as
means, sanctioned by these rules, of evidence.
 o To be considered as such
it must be sanctioned by o HOWEVER, in criminal cases,
the if the alteration of rules of
Rules evidence would permit in
Hence, the ff DO NOT fall the reception of a lesser
within the definition in Sec 1 Rule quantum of evidence than
128: what the law required at the
o Hearsay evidence time of the commission of
o Coerced extrajudicial confession of crime, the retroactive
an accused application of the
o Evidence obtained in violation of the new rule of
constitutional rights evidence will be
even if ultimately unconstitutional for
shown to correspond to the truth being ex post facto
Proof the result or effect GR: rules of evidence are found in the RoC
of evidence o XPNs:
RA 4200 rules on
Evidence Proof evidence obtained
the probative effect of through wire-tapping
medium or means by evidence; the conviction or Code of Commerce
which a fact is proved persuasion of the mind rules on evidentiary
or disproved resulting from a consideration weight of
of evidence
conflicting
entries in
Evidence signifies a relationship merchants
between the factum probandum and books
the facum probans CC and RPC both
provide for certain
Factum Probandum Factum probans presumptions of law and
the evidentiary fact/s
fact
Consti fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine
GR: rules of evidence are applicable only in
judicial proceeding
o XPN: if a particular law
specifically on a particular judicial
proceedings adopts the rules
of evidence under the RoC
APPLICABILITY Judicial proceedings only
o Rule 1 Sec 4 RoC
Section 4. In what case not
applicable. These Rules
shall not apply to election
cases, land registration,
cadastral,
naturalization and
insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not
herein provided for, except
by analogy or in a
suppletory
character and whenever practicable
and convenient.
o INAPPLICABLE IN:
Administrative
proceedings
x Administrative
bodies are not
bound by
the
technical
niceties
of law
and
procedur
e and
the rules
obtaining
in courts
of law.
(Samalio vs CA)
Application of the Rules on Electronic Evidence:
o A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC (2001)
Section 2. Cases covered. -
These Rules shall
apply to all civil
actions and
proceedings, as
 well as quasi-judicial and Besides, the rules he
administrative cases. cites do not apply to the
o A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC (2003 amendment) present criminal action.
The Rules on Electronic
Included criminal proceedings in said Evidence applies only
scope) to civil actions, quasi-
o But see ruling in the case of Rustan Ang vs. judicial proceedings, and
CA (2010): administrative
the ultimate b proceedings. (Authors note:
fact or the y
fact sought relate this ruling to the 2003
to be amendment on The Rules on
established w Electronic
h Evidence, which added
i criminal proceedings to the
refers to the c
cases where said Rules are
preposition h
to be made applicable.)
t MMC vs. Ssangyong (2007) The
h ruling of the Appellate
e Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic
f Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
a electronic data message or an
c electronic document as the functional
t equivalent of a written
u
m

p
r
o
b
a
n
d
u
m

i
s

t
o

b
e

e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d

refers to the materials

which establish that
o
preposition
Evidence means of notice of the
ascertaining the truth specifically in official acts of the
judicial
proceeding legislature
o PURPOSE of evidence: to know
o When the
the truth
pleadings in a civil
REASON why evidence is required:
case do not tender
because of the presumption
an
that the court is not aware of the
issue of fact
veracity of the facts involved in the
there is no trial
case
needed, hence no
WHEN NOT REQUIRED:
presentation of
o When there is no factual
evidence required,
issue in the case there is
and the case is
no need to present
ripe of
evidence because the case
adjudication by
presents a
judgment on the
question of law, hence,
pleadings
may be resolved by the
o When there is an
mere
agreement between
application of the
the parties to
relevant rules or statutes
since there is dispense with
a mandatory judicial certain evidence
must be in writing
 o When the question involves document for evidentiary
matters of judicial notice purposes. The Rules on Electronic
an Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in
d those judicially evidence
admitted if it complies with the rules on
Rules on evidence admissibility prescribed by the
procedural law Rules
o Hence, new rules on of Court and related laws, and is
evidence are applicable to authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the said Rules. An
pending electronic document is also the
cases at the time of the equivalent of an original
change in the rule document under the Best
Because parties to an Evidence Rule, if
action have no vested it is a printout or output readable
right in the rules of by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately. A
evidence
facsimile is not a genuine and
authentic pleading. It is, at best,
an exact copy preserving
all the marks of an original.
Without the original, there is
no way of determining on its face
whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic
and was originally
signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham
pleading

2. Kinds and Classifications of Evidence

Kinds of evidence according to form:

o Object/ real evidence directly
addressed to the
senses of the court and
consists of tangible things

exhibited or demonstrated
in open court, in an ocular

inspection, or at a place
designated by the court
for its
view and observation of
an exhibition, experiment
or
demonstration.
Ascertainment of
controverted fact is made
through the use
of different
senses of the
presiding
magistrate
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from conventionaldeposition of
symbols, sucha witness.
Evidence by autoptic as letters, by which
preference by ideas are represented
proferring on material substances
or Oth

presenting er Definition
Sec 2, Rule 130:
Clas
in open x
sific
Section 2. Documentary evidence.
court the
atio
evidentiary
ns
writing or any material containing
articles for of
letters, words, numbers, figures,
the symbols or Evid
other modes of written
observation expression offered as
enc Weight proof of their
or contents. (n) e: given
inspection o
of the evidence Relevant
tribunal which is
Material
o Documentary evidence submitted to Competent
the
supplied by written
instruments or derived
court through the
testimony RIANO
or
 now
the
occu
rren
Po Negativ ce
siti e of a
ve fact
w
h
when the
e
witness
n entitl
affirms
ed to
that a
t lesse
fact did
h r
or did not weig
e
occur ht
w beca
i use
t there
n
entitled is a
e
to total
s
greater discl
s
weight aime
because r of
the pers
s
witness onal
represen t
a know
ts of his ledge
personal t
e ,
knowledg henc
e of the s
e,
presence witho
or t
h ut
absence any
of a fact a
t repre
senta
h tion
e or
disav
d owal
i that
d the
fact
n in
o quest
t ion
could

s or
e could
e not
have
o exist
r ed or
happ
k ened

evide evidence directed GR: Sec 2 Rule 128

nce to prove a fact in one that is not o XPN: Evidence in Civil Cases vs
havin issue as excluded by the Evidence in Criminal
g any determined by the Rules, a statute or Cases
rules of substantive
value
in Civil Cases Criminal Cases
reaso the Constitution law
n as and pleadings
Definition

tending to prove any

mat
ter
pro
vab
le
in
acti
on

fact in issue; whether whether the fact

the former tends to Quantum of
logic Test that the evidence
establish the Evidence intends to prove is
al probability or m
relati improbability of the at
on of latter er
the
ial
evide
or
ntiary
n
fact
ot
to the
;
as

to
w s E
h i vidence of Guilt
e o Preponderance of
n b
t eyond Reasonable
s
h Evidence
e Doubt
r o g
r e
a n
c e
f o
n r
a f a
c e l
t s l
s y
i i ,
s o
n
s a
n
i o
n n o
f
i f
s f e
s i
l r
u
e
e o
f
o
r
c
n o
o m
t p
r
-
o
-
m
i
i
s
t
e
is determined by
m
Effect of a
the substantive law, y

b
Compromise
t e
h offer of compromise is received as evidence
e not an admission of as an implied
liability and is not admission of guilt,
p admissible in evidence except in criminal
l against the offeror cases involving
e c
a
d r
i i
n m
g i
s n
, a
l
t
h
n
e
e
g
p l
r i
e g
- e
t n
r c
i
a e
l /

o q
r u
d a
e s
r i
a -
n o
d f
f
e
b n
y s
e
t
h s
e

a does not apply

d (
m g
i e
s n
e m
r i p
a s t
l i
l n o
y o n
,
f
t p o
h r r
e e
r s o
e u r
Dir Circumstantial y
ect t
t h o
h e r
e

p e p
proves r
r x
the fact o
o i
in b
o s
dispute a
f t
without b
e
the l
o n
aid in e
f c
interferen
e consequence
ce or
presumpti a
o
on
f f
a
c t
t h
e

o
r p
a
f r
a t
c i
t c
u
f l
r a
o r
m
f
w a
h c
i t
c
h i
, n

t d
a i
k s
e p
n u
t
e e
i
t m
h a
e y
r
b
s e
i
n
g i
l n
y f
e
r
o r
r e
d
c
o a
l s
l
e a
c n
t e
i c
v e
e s
l s
y a
, r
Applicability against any party; t t
of except when provided accused enjoys the h a
Presumption for by law; example - constitutional right of e t
of common carrier is presumption of i
Innocence presumed c o
to be at o n
fault u
r b
s y
innocence e
when a s
passenge o a
r is f i
i d
n
j t
u r c
r a a
e n r
d s r
p i
i o e
n r r

Doctrine of
falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus

Cumulati Corroborative c
ve l
a a
d s
evidence of
d s
the same
i
kind and to
t o
the same
i f
state of facts
o
n e
a v
Prima l i
Facie
d
e e
that which, v
standing n
i c
alone, d
unexplained e
e
or n
uncontradicte c
d, is w
e
sufficient to h
maintain i
o
the c
f
Defi proposition h
nitio affirmed a
n t
h
d
e
Primary i
f
l
f
Ter a
that which the e
m w
law r
use e
regards as d
d n
affording o
in t
the greatest e
the c
certainty s
Rul h
of the fact in
es a
question
r
a n
c o
t t
Best Evidence
e
r a
l
t l
o o
w
t
h t
e o

s b
a e
m contradicted
e

p
o Secondary
i
n t
t h
a
t
Conclusive
w e o False in one thing, false in everything
h o If the testimony of a witness on a
i i material issue is
c s wilfully false and given with an
h
n intention to deceive,
i o the jury may disregard all the
s t witness testimony
available (Hargrave vs. Stockloss)
i
S o Applied when the testimony of a witness
n
u may be
f
e b considered unworthy of belief as
r s to all the rest of his evidence if
i t he is shown to have testified
o i
falsely in one detail
r t
u o NOT an absolute rule
t t o Rarely applied in modern jurisprudence
o i o Modern trend in jurisprudence favors
o more flexibility
t n
when the testimony of a witness
h a
e r may be partly
y believed and partly disbelieved
p depending on the
r corroborative evidence
i E
v
presented at the trial.
m
a i (People vs Negosa)
r d o It is not a positive rule of law or
y e of universal
e n application. It should not be
v c
i e applied to portions of
d the testimony corroborated
e by other evidence,
n particularly where the false
c
portions could be
e
innocent mistakes. Moreover,
a the rule is not
n mandatory but merely sanctions
d a disregard of the testimony of a
i witness if the circumstances so
s warrant. To completely disregard
all the testimony
of a witness on this ground, his
p
e
testimony must
r have been false as to a material
m point, and the
i witness must have a conscious and
t deliberate
t
e 2
d 0
0
b
y

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a
w

o
n
l
y

w
h
e
n

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e

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t

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offered at the
intention to time
falsify a when it is
offered at the time offered
material presented for
immediately
point. its view or
when the witness is by proponent
evaluation
(People vs OR when the
before
Pacapac) called to the stand he rests his
party
case
rests his case
andoffered
When real
evidence
consists of
objects
exhibited in
court

objectio
n to the
Al i ently weak; negative evidence in nature; for anoth
ibi n crumbles in the light this er
h of positive defense to prosper, it must be place
e identification by a established that (1) accused is at the
r truthful witness; in time
of the Frame- Self-Defense q es became
commiss Up u apparent by reason
ion of al of such answer
the ifi
offense c
and (2) at
there is io
physical n
impossibili of a.
ty for him inherently weak th Relevan
to be at becau e
se it cy
the scene commonly w
of can it
used as
the crime easily n
defense in
at the time be e
violations fabric s
of the ated;
of its Dangerous s
commissi elem ->
Drugs Act;
on; ents m
evidence are
must be u
(1) st
shown by unlaw
the defense to b
ful e
overcom aggre
e the m
ssion, a
presumpt (2) reasonable
ion of d
nece e
regularity ssity
of at
of th
performa the
nce of e
mea ti
official ns
duties; m
empl e
oyed h
to e
prev is
ent c
or al
repel le
it, d
and to
(3) th
lack e
of st
suffici a
ent n
provo d;
cation must be made either at if
on the witness is qualified,
part of When the time it is presented
the other objections ->
pe objection in an ocular inspection
rs must be raised when
on should be or demonstration OR
de the objectionable
fe
made when it is formally
nd
question is asked or
in
offered
g
hi
m after the answer is
se g
lf i
v
e
n

i
f

t
h
e

o
b
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
b
l
e
f
e
a
t
u
r
 must be made at the formally offered
time it is
b e
u s
t
a
t t
h
i t
s h
e
d
e s
f a
e m
n e
s
e t
i
i m
s e
)

N
O
T Effect of Delay/ Initial
Reluctance in Reporting a
A Crime
L by the witness on their
W
A testimony
Y o Does NOT
S render the
testimony of
f
a
such witness
l false or
s incredible
e REASONS:
x
a
n
Peopl
d
e
w have
i a
t natur
h al
o
u r
t e
t
m i
e
c
r
i e
t n
c
e
(
r
e a
a n
s d
o
n
: a
b
n h
o o
p
r
e r
r e
s n
o c
n
c e
a
n o
f
b
e

i g
n e
t
2
t
p i
l n
a g
c
 i
n to the court (Section
v 35, Rule 132)
o o Objection
l thereto must
v be made at the
e time the
d evidence is
offered OR as
i soon thereafter as
n the
objection
a to its
admissibi
c lity shall
r have
i become
m apparent
e (otherwis
x Their e,
fear of waived)
reprisal
from
the Object/ Real
accuse
d
Testimonial
3. Axioms of Admissibility
Documentary
Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. Evidence is Eviden
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not ce
excluded by the law of these rules.
Eviden
2 requisites for the admissibility of ce
evidence under
Section 3:
o Relevancy under
Section 4, evidence is
relevant
if it has a relation
to the fact in issue as to
induce
belief in its existence or
non-existence
o Competency determined
by the prevailing
exclusionary rules of
evidence
2 axioms of admissibility according to
Prof. Wigmore:
o None but facts
having rational
probative value are
admissible
Hence, relevant
evidence is any class
of
evidenc
e which
has
rational
probativ
e value
to
establis
h the
issue in
controversy
o All facts having
rational probative value
are
admissible UNLESSS
some specific rule forbids
their
admission
Admissibility of evidence
determined at the time it is offered
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have which it was
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall offered provided it
not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to satisfies all
establish the requirements of
probability or improbability of the fact in issue law for its
admissibility
b. Competency
therefor
c. Authenticity
E.g. when,
d. Offer
immediately after a fight and
conscious of his
4. Kinds of Admissibility
impending death,
the
a. Conditional
declarant said
b. Multiple that it was he
c. Curative who provoked
the other and
x Doctrines/ Rules of Admissibility seriously
o Conditional Admissibility wounded his
when the evidence appears to opponent, such
be immaterial
declaration may
or irrelevant at the be admitted as
time of its offer, such part of his res
evidence MAY be gestae (dying
received if:
declaration) and
x Other facts may be
declaration
proved
against interest
thereafter AND
o Curative Admissibility
o
This doctrine treats upon
Otherwi the right of a party
se, the
to introduce
incompetent
evidenc evidence in his
e given behalf where the
may court has admitted
already be the same
stricken out kind of evidence
x There is no bad faith adduced by the
on the part adverse
of the proponent party
o Multiple Admissibility 3 theories/rules
When the evidence presented is obtaining:
relevant AND x American Rule
competent for 2 or more the admission of
purposes, then it such
should be admitted for incompetent
any or all purposes for evidence,
Evidence

without the objection by the

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Henedino M. Brondial)
s
i
opp m
one i
nt, l
doe a
s r
NO
T i
justi n
fy c
suc o
h m
opp p
one e
nt t
in e
reb n
utti t
ng
by e
 vide x
nce
x English Rule
Whether
if a party has
the
pres incompete
ent nt
ed e
inad v
mis i
sibl d
e e
evid n
enc c
e, e
the
adv w
erse a
part s
y
may s
resu e
lt to a
s
simi o
lar n
inad a
mis b
sibl l
e y
evid
enc o
e b
x j
e
Massachusetts c
Rule the t
adverse e
party d
may
be
permi t
tted o
to
introd A
uce N
simila D
r x
inco
mpet Whether
ent regardless
evide of the
nce o
in b
order j
to e
avoid c
a t
plain i
and o
unfair n
preju s
dice
cause v
d by e
the l
admis
sion n
of the o
other n
party
s [
evide o
nce r
Test in determining
the application of n
curative admissibility: o
 t], Can sustain a
the judgment if
admi sufficient
ssion o In sum:
of Admissibility
such LOGIC + LAW, and
evid determined by:
ence x
will
caus Relevance
ea x
plain
and
unfai Competen
r ce
preju Weight
dice determined by:
to x
the
part Judicial
y evaluation
agai within the
nst guid
who eline
m it s
is unde
admi r
tted Rule
o Evidence illegally obtained is not 133
admissible (Stonehill vs. and
Diokno) x
How objected:
x Timely Decisional
motion OR rules set
x Action to forth by
suppress the
o Collateral Matters matters SC
other than the facts in issue o Part IV of the Rules of
and offered as a basis for Court provides for rules of
inference as to the evidence, viz:
existence or non- Rule 128
existence of the facts in general provisions
issue Rule 130
GR: Collateral matters admissibility of
are inadmissible evidence
XPN: Collateral Rules 131 and
matters which are relevant 129 burden of
to proof and
the fact in what need not
issue, or those be proved
which tend in Rule 132
any reasonable presentation of
degree to evidence
establish the Rule 133
probability or weight and
improbability sufficiency of
of the fact in evidence
issue, are o Electronic Evidence
admissible Nuez vs Apao
x Hence, only (2005) The text
irrelevant messages
collateral were
matters are prope
inadmissible rly
o Circumstantial evidence the admit
evidence of collateral facts ted by
or circumstances from the
which an inference may Com
be drawn as to the mitte
probability or e
improbability of the facts since
in the
dispute same
In other words, are
circumstantial evidence is now
evidence of relevant cover
collateral facts ed by
Section 1(k),
Rule 2 of the xxx Under
Rules on Section 2, Rule
Electronic 11 of the Rules
Evidence which on Electronic
provides: Evidence,
"Ephemeral "Ephemeral
electronic electronic
communication communications
" refers to shall be proven
telephone by the
conversations, testimony of a
text messages . person who was a
. . and other party to the
electronic same or who has
forms of personal
communication knowledge
the thereof
evidence of . . . ." xxx In this
which is not case, complainant
recorded or who was
retained. the recipient of
said messages
and therefore
had personal
knowledge
thereof testified
on
their contents and
import.
Respondent
herself admitted
that the
cellphone
number
reflected in
complainants
cellphone from
which the
messages
originated was
hers.
MMC vs. Ssangyong
(2007) See page 1

CASES
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No.
127240

March 27,
2000
SECOND
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Ong Chia was born in China, arrived in PH when he
was 9 years old, stayed in
PH, married and started his own business herein.
x Ong Chia (On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66) filed a
verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under the
Revised Naturalization Law before RTC
Koronadal, South Cotabato
o He then testified as to his qualifications
and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony
x RTC granted Petitioners application for
naturalization
x SolGen appealed to CA
o on appeal, contended that petition must
fail because (1) petitioner
failed to state all the names by
which he is or had been known,
(2) failed to support his petition
with the appropriate
documentary
evidence, among others
 o in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had
likewise been known
since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong."
o annexed income tax returns allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973
to 1977 to show that his net income
could hardly support himself and his
family
x CA reversed
o It ruled that due to the importance naturalization
cases, the State
is not precluded from raising questions
not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal.
x Ong Chia filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on
the basis of which, justified the reversal of
the trial court's decision.
o Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of
any evidentiary value," so it
was argued, because under Rule 132,
34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been
formally offered.

ISSUE: Whether the rules of evidence are applicable in a petition

for naturalization in that the
evidence presented by the SolGen before the CA should no
longer be admissible, the same
being presented for the first time on appeal.

HELD: NO.
x The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now
being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present
case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable
and
convenient." That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on
appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the
rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
of the same documents.
x Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present and
formally offer its documentary evidence before the
trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due process. We are
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by
the State
x Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents
namely, the petition in
SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract,
the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed
under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity
of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
x CA decision was affirmed.
202
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separation and for
disqualification from
the practice of
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF medicine which she had filed
APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, against PR
respondents. x Alfredo then instituted an action
G.R. No. against Cecilia for specific performance
107383 before RTC Manila
o seeking to recover the said
documents and to make the latter
February pay
20, 1996 damages
SECOND x RTC in favor of Alfredo
DIVISION o declared that the documents
were properties of the PR and
FACTS: ordered
x Cecilia, wife of PR Alfredo Martin, forcibly took Petitioner to return the same
from the latters office certain and to pay damages
documents in the presence of his mother, driver x Cecilia appealed to CA
and secretary x CA affirmed
o Said documents were allegedly x Cecilia filed a Rule 45 before the SC
communications between PR and o Cited Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
his paramours which Felix, Jr. where the Court held that
Petitioner may use as the documents and
evidence in a case for legal papers (which were
 also forcibly taken from the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
owner) were admitted in v. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", Appellant.
evidence, hence, the use of G.R. NO. 150224 May 19, 2004
the same did not constitute EN BANC
malpractice or gross
misconduct on the part of the FACTS:
lawyer who used the same x Yatar was convicted by RTC Bulanao,
Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 with rape with
ISSUE: Whether the subject documents, which were homicide and sentenced him to death
forcibly taken from their owner, herein PR, may be x RTCs findings:
admitted in evidence against the latter in a case for o Judilyn Pas-a (prosecution
legal separation and witness) that at 8:30AM on the
disqualification from the practice of medicine filed by his wife. day
when the incident
HELD: NO. occurred she was
x Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case with the victim,
against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for her cousin
disbarment. Among other things, private seventeen year
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as old Kathylyn Uba
complainant in that case, charged that in at the house of
using the documents in evidence, Atty. their
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross grandmother, Isabel;
misconduct because of the injunctive that at 9AM, she left
order of the trial court. the said house;
x Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the Kathylyn
administrative case amounts to no told her that she may
more than a declaration that his use of the be going to
documents and papers for the Tuguegarao or staying
purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission at home
as to their genuiness and authenticity and washing the
did not constitute a violation of the clothes instead; that
injunctive order of the trial court. By no at 12:30PM, she saw
means does the decision in that case the
establish the admissibility of the appellant, wearing a
documents white shirt with
and papers in question. collar and black
x Indeed the documents and papers in question are pants, descending
inadmissible in from the 2nd floor to
evidence. The constitutional the back of the
injunction declaring "the privacy of house of Isabel; that
communication and at 1:30PM, she saw
correspondence [to be] inviolable" the appellant again,
is no less wearing a black shirt
applicable simply because it is the wife without collar and
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her blue pants, near her
husband's infidelity) who is the party house and told her
against whom the that he will no longer
constitutional provision is to be enforced. be getting the
The only exception to the lumber that he had
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is stacked
a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in
any
proceeding."
x The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
x The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in
confidence by one from the other
during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.
But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
x Petition was denied.
 same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
o Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
(prosecution mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
witnesses) that at 10AM, they stopped rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
by the house of Isabel, polymorphisms in human genetic structure,
the grandmother of the victim; that they no two individuals have the same DNA, with
saw the appellant at the the notable exception of identical twins.
back of the said house; that, upon inquiry, x DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a
appellant told them that suspect to a crime or
he was there to get lumber to bring to the eliminate one from suspicion in the same
house of his mother principle as fingerprints are used.
o Isabel Dawang (prosecution witness) that she Incidents involving sexual assault would
arrived home in leave biological evidence such as hair,
the same evening and saw the skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can
lifeless body of Kathylyn at the be left on the victims body or at
second floor, with multiple stab the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
wounds carpets, bedding, or furniture
o Semen was later on found inside the genitals of could also be transferred to the victims body
Kathylyn and that, during the assault. Forensic DNA
through Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence is helpful in proving that there was
test, the same was identical the semen physical contact between an
to be that of appellants gene type. assailant and a victim. If properly collected
x An automatic review by the SC pursuant to Article 47 of the from the victim, crime scene or
Revised Penal Code, assailant, DNA can be compared with known
as amended, ensued samples to place the suspect at the
o Yatar maintained used the defense of denial and scene of the crime.
alibi. x In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
o Yatar contended, among others, that the courts should consider,
witnesses credibility was inter alia, the following factors: how the
questionable and that the taking of his samples were collected, how they were
semen for the purpose of handled, the possibility of contamination of
subjecting the same to DNA test and the samples, the procedure followed in
presenting the result before analyzing the samples, whether the proper
the court was violative of his standards and procedures were followed in
constitutional right against self- conducting the tests, and the qualification
incrimination and that the resort of the analyst who conducted the tests.
thereto is tantamount to an ex post x In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de
facto aw. Ungria was duly qualified by
the prosecution as an expert witness on
ISSUE # 1: Whether the credibility of the witnesses may be ruled upon by DNA print or identification techniques.
the Supreme Court. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA
HELD # 1: NO. profile of appellant are identical to that of
x The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution the extracts subject of
witnesses should be examination. The blood sample taken from
resolved against appellant. This Court will not the appellant showed that he was of the
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of 10/11, which are identical with semen taken
weight and influence which has been from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA
overlooked or the significance of which has been match exists between the semen found in the
misinterpreted. Well- victim and the blood sample given by the
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial appellant in open court during the course of
court on credibility of the trial.
witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal x Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these
unless cogent reasons advances in science and
are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the technology in the Philippine criminal justice
disturbance of system, so we must be cautious as we
the same; the reason being that the former is in a traverse these relatively uncharted waters.
better and unique position of Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth
hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their of persuasive jurisprudence that has
deportment, conduct and developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically,
attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
overlooked, misunderstood, or instructive.
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight x In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent
which would affect the result evidence based on
of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility scientifically valid principles could be used
deserves the appellate as long as it was relevant
courts highest respect. Where there is nothing to show and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
that the witnesses for the allowed greater discretion over
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their which testimony they would allow at trial,
testimonies are entitled to including the introduction of new kinds of
full faith and credit. scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such
novel procedure.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the circumstance of the DNA test result x Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it
has probative value as to the guilt of the appellant. relates directly to a fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
HELD # 2: YES. non-existence. Applying the
x DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
living organisms. A evidence obtained through PCR
persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not 203
change throughout a
persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the
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admission of guilt. It
does not apply
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and where the evidence
which was appreciated by the sought to be
court a quo is relevant and reliable excluded is not an
since it is reasonably based on incrimination but as
scientifically valid principles of human genetics part of object
and molecular biology. evidence.
x In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the x Appellant further argues that the DNA
appellant contends that the tests conducted by the prosecution
blood sample taken from him as well as against him are unconstitutional
the DNA tests were conducted in violation on the ground that resort thereto
of his right to remain silent as well as his is tantamount to the application
right against self-incrimination under of an ex-post facto law.
Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the o This argument is specious. No
Constitution. ex-post facto law is involved in the
o This contention is untenable. The case at bar. The
kernel of the right is not science of DNA
against all compulsion, but typing involves the
against testimonial admissibility,
compulsion. The right against relevance and
self- incrimination is simply reliability of the
against the legal evidence obtained
process of extracting from under the Rules of
the lips of the accused an Court. Whereas an
 ex-post facto law refers his wife in the Ilocano dialect
primarily to a was, "If
question of law, DNA you leave me, I will kill all your
profiling requires a factual family and your relatives x x x.";
determination of the that these
probative weight of the statements were not contradicted by
evidence presented. appellant
x Thus, appellants motive to sexually
ISSUE # 3: Whether appellants defense of denial and alibi assault and kill the victim was evident in the
may be sustained. instant case. It is a rule in
criminal law that motive,
HELD # 3: NO. being a state of
x Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot mind, is established by the
be sustained. The forensic testimony of witnesses on
DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, the acts or
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts statements of the accused before
of his presence at Isabel Dawangs house or immediately after the
during the time when the crime was commission of the offense, deeds
committed, undeniably link him to the or words that may express it or
June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not from which his motive or reason
demonstrate with clear and convincing for committing it may be
evidence an impossibility to be in two inferred.
places at the same time, especially in this x The following are the elements
case where the two places are located in constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the
the same barangay.40 He lives within a appellant had carnal knowledge
one hundred (100) meter radius from the of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge
scene of the crime, and requires a mere of a woman
five minute walk to reach one house from was achieved by means of force,
the other. This fact severely weakens his threat or intimidation; and (3) by
alibi reason or on
x Generally, courts should only consider and rely the occasion of such carnal
upon duly established evidence knowledge by means of force,
and never on mere conjectures or threat or intimidation,
suppositions. The legal relevancy of appellant killed the woman.
evidence However, in rape committed by
denotes "something more than a minimum close kin, such
of probative value," suggesting that as the victims father, step-father,
such evidentiary relevance must contain a uncle, or the common-law spouse
"plus value." This may be necessary to of
preclude the trial court from being her mother, it is not necessary
satisfied by matters of slight value, that actual force or intimidation
capable of be
being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty employed. Moral influence or
conclusions. Evidence without "plus ascendancy takes the place of
value" may be logically relevant but not violence
legally sufficient to convict. It is and intimidation. The fact that
incumbent upon the trial court to the victims hymen is intact
balance the probative value of such does not
evidence against the likely harm that negate a finding that rape was
would result from its admission. committed as mere entry by
x The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld the penis
only when there is into the lips of the female
relevant evidence from which the court genital organ, even without
can properly find or infer that rupture or
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable laceration of the hymen,
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable suffices for conviction of rape.
doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in The strength and dilatability of
order to sustain a conviction. the hymen are invariable; it
Moral certainty is that degree of certainty may be so elastic as to stretch
that convinces and directs without laceration during
the understanding and satisfies the intercourse. Absence of
reason and judgment of those who hymenal
are bound to act conscientiously upon it. lacerations does not
It is certainty beyond reasonable disprove sexual abuse
doubt. This requires that the especially when the victim
circumstances, taken together, should be is of tender age.
of a x Being a relative by affinity within the third
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, civil degree, appellant is deemed in
on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion legal contemplation to have moral
that the accused, and no one else, ascendancy over the victim.
committed the offense charged. In view of
the totality of evidence appreciated thus
far, we rule that the present case passes
the test of moral certainty.
x However, as a matter of procedure, and for the
purpose of meeting the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, motive is essential for conviction
when there is doubt as to the identity of
the culprit
x Judilyn Pas-a testified that a few days before
the victim was raped and killed,
the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar
attempted to rape her after she came
from the school."; that her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant,
separated from her husband, "this Joel
Yatar threatened to kill our family."; that
the exact words uttered by appellant to

x RTC decision was affirmed (with modification as to civil
liability)
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING
MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS
TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
THIRD DIVISION
FACTS:
x A parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan
Psd-31182, located at
Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, was
owned by one Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating
(Daniela)
o Daniela sold the property to granddaughter, Nena
Registered under the name of Nena
and declared by
her for tax purposes
o However, the land remained in possession of
Daniela.
o Daniela then executed a sworn statement
claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the
property; the true agreement
between her and Nena was simply to
transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable
her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later
discovered that Nena did
not secure any loan nor mortgage the
property; she wants the title
in the name of Nena cancelled and the
subject property reconveyed
to her
x Daniela died
o leaving her children as her heirs, namely:
Ricardo,
Felicidad,
Julio,
Carlos and
Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and
was represented
by Nena (Cirilos daughter)
x Carlos demanded the return of the land (on the basis of the
executed sworn
statement of Daniela)
x Carlos and Felicidad (represented by her son Salvador)
filed a complaint with
the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena
o praying for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed
by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of
the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and
issuance of a new title and tax
declaration in favor of the heirs of
Daniela
x Nena filed an Answer
o denied that any fraud or misrepresentation
attended the execution
of the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale. She also denied having
received the letter of her uncle,
Carlos. She prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint, and in her
counterclaim, she asked the trial court
for the award of actual, exemplary and
moral damages as well as
attorneys fees and litigation
expenses
x RTC in favor of Carlos and Felicidad
o Declared that the deed of sale between
Daniela and Nena was
NULL and VOID
x Nena appealed to CA
x CA affirmed in toto
x Nena filed an MR
x CA denied
x Nena filed a Rule 65 before the SC
o the CA "has decided the instant case
without due regard to and in
violation of the applicable laws
and Decisions of this Honorable
Court and also because the
Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, which it has affirmed, is
not supported by and is even
against the evidence on record."
ISSUE # 1: Whether Rule 65 was correctly resorted to.
HELD # 1: NO.
x At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate. Considering that the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CA finally disposed of the case, the
proper remedy is a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
x The Court notes that while the instant petition is
denominated as a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, there is no allegation that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. On the
other hand, the petition actually avers errors
of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction,
which are the proper
subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
Hence, in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice, the Court
decided to treat the present petition for
certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45, especially considering that it was filed
within the reglementary period for
filing the same.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the subject sworn statement made
by Daniela deserves probative weight in that it
sufficiently proved that the prior deed of sale was void.
HELD # 2: NO.
x The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of
sale between petitioner and
Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated
if the parties do not intend to be
bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated).19 The primary
consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract is the intention of
the parties.20 Such intention is
determined from the express terms of
their agreement as well as from their
contemporaneous and subsequent
acts.21
204
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persuade.23 Thus, a particular
item of evidence may be
x In the present case, the main evidence presented admissible, but its
by private respondents in evidentiary weight depends on
proving their allegation that the judicial evaluation within the
subject deed of sale did not reflect guidelines provided
the true intention of the parties by the rules of evidence.24 It is
thereto is the sworn statement of settled that affidavits are
Daniela dated classified as
December 28, 1977. The trial court hearsay evidence since they are
admitted the said sworn statement as not generally prepared by the
part of private respondents evidence and affiant
gave credence to it. The CA also accorded but by another who uses his own
great probative weight to this document. language in writing the affiants
x There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject statements, which may thus be
sworn statement. either omitted or misunderstood
However, the admissibility of evidence by the
should not be equated with weight of one writing them.25 Moreover,
evidence.22 The admissibility of the adverse party is deprived of
evidence depends on its relevance the
and competence while the weight of opportunity to cross-examine the
evidence pertains to evidence already affiant.26 For this reason,
admitted and its tendency to convince affidavits are
and generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants
 themselves are placed
on the witness stand to testify thereon.27
The Court finds that both the trial
court and the CA committed error in
giving the sworn statement probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer
available to take the witness stand as she
is
already dead, the RTC and the CA should
not have given probative value on
Danielas sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale
between her and petitioner was simulated
and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them.
x Private respondents should have presented other
evidence to
sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of
disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of
sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil
cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the
strength
of his evidence and not on the weakness
of the evidence of the defendant.28
Aside from Danielas sworn statement,
private respondents failed to present any
other documentary evidence to prove
their claim. Even the testimonies of their
witnesses failed to establish that Daniela
had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
x In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled
that the most protuberant index
of simulation is the complete absence, on
the part of the vendee, of any attempt
in any manner to assert his rights of
ownership over the disputed property.30
In
the present case, however, the evidence
clearly shows that petitioner declared
the property for taxation and paid realty
taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has
shown that from 1972 to 1988 she
religiously paid the real estate taxes due
on
the said lot and that it was only in 1974
and 1987 that she failed to pay the
taxes thereon. While tax receipts and
declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property.31 The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only
ones sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues
to
the Government.32 Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition
of ownership.33 On the other hand,
private respondents failed to present
even a respondents were not able to
single tax receipt or declaration showing
that Daniela paid taxes due on the
disputed lot as proof that she claims
ownership thereof. The only Tax
Declaration in the name of Daniela, which
private respondents presented in
evidence, refers only to the house
standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even
the said Tax
Declaration contains a notation that
herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56)
upon which said house was built.
x Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if
the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale did not really reflect the real
intention of Daniela, why is it that she
remained silent until her death;
she never told any of her
relatives regarding her actual
purpose in executing the subject
deed; she simply chose to make
known her true intentions
through the sworn statement she
executed on December 28, 1977,
the existence of which she kept
secret from her relatives; and
despite her declaration therein
that she is appealing for help in
order to get back the subject lot,
she never took any concrete step
to recover the subject property
from
petitioner until her death more
than ten years later.
x It is true that Daniela retained physical
possession of the property even after she
executed the subject Absolute
Deed of Sale and even after title
to the property
was transferred in petitioners
favor. In fact, Daniela continued
to occupy the
property in dispute until her
death in 1988 while, in the
meantime, petitioner
continued to reside in Manila.
However, it is well-established
that ownership and possession
are two entirely different legal
concepts.35 Just as possession is
not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non-possession
inconsistent with
ownership. The first paragraph of
Article 1498 of the Civil Code
states that when the sale is made
through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the
contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not
appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Possession,
along with ownership, is
transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized
deed of conveyance.36 Thus, in
light of the circumstances of the
present case, it is of no legal
consequence that petitioner did
not take actual possession or
occupation of the disputed
property after the execution of
the deed of sale in her
favor because she was already
able to perfect and complete her
ownership of
and title over the subject property.
x As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9,
1983, submitted by petitioner, which
confirmed the validity of the
sale of the disputed lot in her
favor, the same has no
probative value, as the sworn
statement earlier adverted to,
for being
hearsay. Naturally, private
cross-examine the deceased-
affiant on her declarations
contained in the said
affidavit.
 testimonies, as well as the fact
x However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is that he had fled from his
disregarded, the fact residence the day after the
remains that private respondents failed to prove by incident and had stayed away in
clear, strong and convincing Bataan for eight years until his
evidence beyond mere preponderance of evidence37 arrest.
that the contract of sale o The RTC opined that had he not been
between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The hiding, there would be no
legal presumption is in favor reason for him to
of the validity of contracts and the party who immediately leave his
impugns its regularity has the residence, especially
burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private because he was also
respondents failed to discharge working near the area.
the burden of proving their allegation that the x Salafranca appealed to CA
contract of sale between petitioner x CA affirmed
and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of o citing the dying declaration made to his
regularity and validity of the uncle pointing to
October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands. Salafranca as his assailant,8 and
x Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale Salafrancas positive
between petitioner identification
and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It
there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to stressed that Salafrancas denial
whether or not a trust relationship was created and
between them. his alibi of being in his home
during the incident did not
overcome
the positive identification,
especially as his unexplained
flight after
the stabbing, leaving his home
and employment, constituted a
circumstance highly indicative of his guilt
x Salafranca appealed to SC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RODRIGO
SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant. ISSUE # 1: Whether Salafrancas denial and alibi
G.R. No. 173476 should be sustained over the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, Mendoza and Estao.

February 22, 2012 HELD # 1: NO.

FIRST DIVISION x Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses
against Salafranca would be
FACTS: unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly
x Salafranca was convicted of murder for the fatal stabbing of concluded that Mendoza and Estao were
Johnny Bolanon by credible and reliable. The determination of
the RTC Manila the competence and
x RTCs findings: credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily
o The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo with the RTC as the trial court due to its
Salafranca who delivered unique and unequalled position of observing
two (2) stabbing blows to the victim their
while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left deportment during testimony, and of
arm encircled around Bolanons neck assessing their credibility and
stabbing the appreciating their truthfulness, honesty
latter with the use of his right hand at the and candor. Absent a
right sub costal area substantial reason to justify the reversal of
which caused Bolanons death. Not only the assessment made and
because it was testified to conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as
by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by the reviewing court was
Rodolfo Estao, the bound by such assessment and
victims uncle who brought Bolanon to the conclusions,11 considering that the CA as
hospital and who relayed the appellate court could neither substitute
to the court that when he aided Bolanon its assessment nor draw different
and even on their way to conclusions without a persuasive showing
the hospital while the latter was suffering that the RTC misappreciated the
from hard breathing, circumstances or omitted significant
victim Bolanon was able to say that it was evidentiary matters that would alter the
Rodrigo Salafranca who result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively
stabbed him. show a misappreciation or omission by
o Appreciated treachery based on the testimony of the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is
Prosecution in no position to undo or to
witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had contradict the findings of the RTC and the
effected his attack against CA, which were entitled to great
Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his weight and respect.13
(accused) left arm, while x Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the
behind the victim on the latters neck and face of his positive
stabbing the victim with identification by Mendoza as the assailant
the use of his right hand," Salafranca did of Bolanon. The lower courts
not give Bolanon "any properly accorded full faith to such
opportunity to defend himself."4 incrimination by Mendoza considering that
o The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and
his witness 205
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alibi.
The method and means
Salafranca did not even project any ill Salafranca employed
motive that could have impelled constituted a surprise
Mendoza to testify against him unless it deadly attack
was upon the truth.14 against Bolanon from
x Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked behind and included an
Bolanon from behind and aggressive physical
had "encircled his left arm over the neck control of the
(of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing latters movements that
blow using the right(hand) and coming ensured the success of
from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and the attack without any
another one encircling the blow retaliation
towards below the left nipple."15 or defense on the part
Relying on of Bolanon. According to
Mendozas recollection of how the Revised Penal
Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the Code,16
RTC found treachery is present
treachery to be attendant in the killing. when the offender
This finding the CA concurred with. We commits any of the
join the CAs concurrence because crimes against the
Mendozas eyewitness account of the person, employing
manner means, methods or
of attack remained uncontested by forms in the execution
Salafranca who merely insisted on his thereof which tend
 directly and specially to insure its about ten minutes after
execution, without risk to himself arising his admission at the
from the defense which the offended emergency ward of the
party might make. hospital,
Bolanon had expired
and had been
pronounced dead.
Such circumstances
qualified the utterance
of Bolanon as both a
ISSUE # 2: Whether Bolanons statements in dying declaration and
identifying Salafranca may be given credence by as part of the res
the court. gestae, considering
that the Court has
HELD # 2: YES. recognized that the
x The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the statement of the victim
utterance by Bolanon of an hour before his
statements identifying Salafranca death and right after
as his assailant right after the the hacking incident
stabbing incident. The testimony bore all the earmarks
follows: either of a dying
o Q Can you tell what happened on the said declaration or part of
date? the res gestae either of
o A My nephew arrived in our house with a which was an
stab wound on his left exception to the
chest. hearsay rule.18
o Q What time was that? x A dying declaration, although
o A 12:50 a.m. generally inadmissible as evidence due to
o Q When you saw your nephew with a stab its hearsay character,
wound, what did he may nonetheless be
say? admitted when the
o A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak following requisites
ako." concur, namely:
o Q What did you do? o (a) that the declaration
o A I immediately dressed up and brought must concern the cause and
him to PGH. surrounding
o Q On the way to the PGH what transpired? circumstances of the
o A While traveling toward PGH I asked my declarants death;
nephew who o (b) that at the time the
stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod declaration is made, the
Salafranca. declarant is
o Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca? u
o A Yes, Sir. nder
o Q How long have you known him? a
o A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor cons
kami." cious
o Q If you see him inside the courtroom will ness
you be able to identify of an
him? impe
o A Yes, Sir. ndin
o Q Will you look around and point him to g
us? deat
o A (Witness pointing to a man who h;
answered by the name of Rod o
Salafranca.) (c) that the declarant is
o COURT When he told you the name of his competent as a witness;
and
assailant what was his
condition?
o A He was suffering from hard breathing so
I told him not to
talk anymore because he will just suffer
more.
o Q What happened when you told him that?
o A He kept silent.
o Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
o A I cannot remember the time because I
was already confused at
that time.
o Q When you arrived at the PGH what
happened?
o A He was brought to Emergency Room.
o Q When he was brought to the emergency
room what happened?
o A He was pronounced dead.17
x It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon
had gone to the residence
of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right
after being stabbed by Salafranca; that
Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring
his nephew to the Philippine General
Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to
the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon
who had stabbed him, and the latter had
told Estao that his assailant had been
Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance Bolanon had seemed to be
having a
hard time breathing, causing Estao to
advise him not to talk anymore; and
that
 x We modify the limiting of civil damages by the
o (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for CA and the RTC to only the death
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that
declarant is a victim.19 the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled
x All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante- by law to more than such indemnity,
mortem because the damages to be
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who awarded when death occurs due to a crime
had stabbed him. may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for
At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his the death of the victim (which was granted
impending death, herein); (b) actual or compensatory
having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary
Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. damages; and (e) temperate damages.26
Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few x We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further
minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours granted moral damages
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that which were different from the death
the indemnity.27 The death indemnity
declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown compensated the loss of life due to crime, but
by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial appropriate and reasonable moral
evidence, such as the nature of his damages would justly assuage the mental
wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of anguish and emotional sufferings of
his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify the surviving family of the victim.28 Although
on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the mental anguish and emotional
dying declaration was offered in this criminal sufferings of the surviving heirs were not
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. quantifiable with mathematical
x A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to
thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay set an amount that would restore
rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo
o (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling ante. Given the circumstances, the
occurrence; amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral
o (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time damages, which, pursuant to
to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to
contrive or devise; and award despite the absence of any
o (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question allegation and proof of the heirs mental
and its immediately attending circumstances.21 anguish and emotional suffering. The
x The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae rationale for doing so rested on human nature
concur and experience having shown
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to that:
Estao, Bolanon was o xxx a violent death invariably and
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by necessarily brings about
Salafranca. Bolanon was emotional pain and anguish on
then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, the part of the victims
and thus had no family.1wphi1 It is inherently
time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. human to suffer sorrow, torment,
His utterance pain and anger when a loved one
about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in becomes the victim of a violent
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling or brutal killing. Such violent
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it death or brutal killing not only
identified Salafranca as the perpetrator. steals
x The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which from the family of the deceased
are his precious life, deprives them
the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and forever of his love, affection and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act."22 In a support, but often leaves them
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, with the gnawing feeling that an
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to injustice has been done to
illustrate its character and are so them.30
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to x The CA and the RTC committed another omission
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule consisting in their non-
on res gestae recognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by to temperate damages. It is already settled that
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime when actual damages for burial and related
immediately before, during, or immediately after the expenses are not substantiated by receipts,
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are
that the statements were made as a warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement surviving heirs of the victim to deny them
of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant compensation by way of actual damages.31
to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.24 The test of x Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary
admissibility of damages may be imposed in
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the criminal cases as part of the civil liability
act, "when the crime was committed with one or
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or more aggravating circumstances."32 The
connected Civil Code permits such
with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be damages to be awarded "by way of example or
regarded correction for the public good, in
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly 206
negatives
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
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effect, one on the
public as it breaches
addition to the moral, temperate, the social order and
liquidated or compensatory the
damages."33 other upon the
Conformably with such legal private victim as it
provisions, the CA and the RTC causes personal
should have sufferings, each of
recognized the entitlement of the which is addressed
heirs of the victim to exemplary by, respectively, the
damages prescription of
because of the attendance of treachery. It heavier punishment
was of no moment that treachery was an for the accused and
attendant circumstance in murder, and, as by an award of
such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. additional
The Court explained so in People v. damages to the
Catubig:34 victim. The increase
o The term "aggravating circumstances" of the penalty or a
used by the Civil Code, the shift to a
law not having specified graver felony
otherwise, is to be understood underscores the
in its broad exacerbation of the
or generic sense. The offense by the
commission of an offense has attendance of
a two-pronged aggravating
 circumstances, whether x SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a
ordinary or sum of money with a prayer for
qualifying, in its preliminary attachment against SCC,
commission. Unlike the Arrieta, and Halili before RTC Manila
criminal liability which is x SCC filed its answer
basically a State concern, o Affirmative defense: lack of
the award of damages, COA
however, is SIHI anchored its
likewise, if not primarily, cause of action was
intended for the null, void, and
offended party who o
suffers thereby. It would f
make little sense for an
award of n
exemplary damages to be due o
the private offended party
when the aggravating b
circumstance is ordinary but i
to be withheld when it is n
qualifying. Withal, the d
ordinary or qualifying nature i
of an n
aggravating circumstance is g
a distinction that should only
be of e
consequence to the criminal, f
rather than to the civil, f
liability of the e
offender. In fine, relative to c
the civil aspect of the case, t
an
aggravating circumstance, f
whether ordinary or o
qualifying, should r
entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary l
damages a
within the unbridled meaning c
of Article 2230 of the Civil k
Code.
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. o
THE HONORABLE COURT OF r
APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, f
respondent. a
G.R. i
No. l
12853 u
8 r
e

Febru o
ary f
28,
2001 c
SECO o
ND n
DIVISI s
ON i
d
FACTS: e
x SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) r
through its chairman, private a
respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice t
president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, i
obtained a loan from State Investment o
House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the n
amount of .
P129,824.48 x During trial:
o The loan carried an annual interest o SIHI presented one witness to
rate of 30% plus penalty prove its claim. The cross-
charges of 2% per month on examination of said
the remaining balance of the witness was
principal upon non-payment postponed several
on the due date-January 12, times due to
1984 one reason or another
o To secure the payment of the loan, at the instance of
Danilo Arrieta and private either party. The case
respondent Leopoldo was
Halili executed a calendared several
Comprehensive Surety times for hearing but
Agreement binding each time, SCC or its
themselves jointly and counsel failed to
severally to pay the appear despite notice.
obligation on the maturity SCC was finally
date. declared by
x SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. the trial court to have
x SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta waived its right to
and Halili, but notwithstanding cross-examine the
receipt thereof, no payment was made. witness
 of SIHI and the case was
deemed submitted for
decision.
x RTC in favor of SIHI
x SCC appealed to CA
o On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI
had failed to show, by a
preponderance of evidence,
that the latter had a case
against it.
SCC argued that the lone
witness presented by SIHI
to prove its
claim was insufficient as
the competency of the
witness was not
established and there was
no showing that he had
personal
knowledge of the transaction.
SCC further maintained that
no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures
in the
documentary exhibits
presented as evidence and
that these signatures were
neither marked nor offered
in evidence by SIHI. Finally,
SCC pointed out that the
original copies of the
documents were not
presented in court.
x CA affirmed RTC; denied ensuing MR
x SCC filed a Rule 45 before SC
ISSUE # 1: Whether the subject documents presented
by SIHI were correctly admitted by the RTC,
considering that SCC was unable to cross-examine
SIHIs witness relative to the said
documents.
HELD # 1: YES.
x Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI
introduced documentary
evidence through the testimony of a
witness whose competence was not
established and whose personal
knowledge of the truthfulness of the
facts
testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that
the same was in violation of
Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court and it was manifest error
for the Court of Appeals to have ruled
otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that
the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to
have seen the document presented in
evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus,
no proof of its genuineness was
adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2,5
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which requires proof of due execution and
authenticity of private documents
before the same can be received as
evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that
none of the signatures affixed in the
documentary evidence presented by SIHI
were offered in evidence. It vehemently
argues that such was in violation of the
requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. It was thus an error
of law on the part of the appellate court to
consider the same. Finally, petitioner
posits that the non-production of the
originals of the documents presented in
evidence allows the presumption of
suppression of evidence provided for in
Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to
come into play.
o Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they
fail to persuade us
x We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC
failed to appear several times
on scheduled hearing dates despite due
notice to it and counsel. On all those
scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was
supposed to cross-examine
the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its
case. Petitioner now
charges the appellate court with committing
an error of law when it
failed to disallow the admission in evidence
of said testimony pursuant
to the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
x Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
o SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to
personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. - A witness
can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are
derived
from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided
in these
rules.
x Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court is misplaced.
As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and
carries no probative value.8
However, the rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object
to hearsay evidence, then the same is
admissible.9 The rationale for this
exception is to be found in the right of a
litigant to cross-examine. It is settled
that it is the opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim
that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay.10 However, the
right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party
to cross-examine the witness is an implied
waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities
by the trial court to
cross-examine the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error
was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial
court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the
opposing party's witness. It is now too late
for petitioner to be raising this matter of
hearsay evidence.
ISSUE # 2: Whether SIHIs other pieces of evidence were correctly
admitted.

HELD # 2: YES.
x Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals
correctly found
that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as
he testified to facts, which
he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of
his testimony were satisfied.
x Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot
and academic. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's
admission as to
the execution of the promissory note by it through
private respondent
Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle
the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission having
been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission. Under
Section, 411 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof.
x Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12
advance its cause.
Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original
of the documents as there
was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-
trial of the execution of the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is
now too late for petitioner
to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of
the existence of these
documents was sufficient to establish its obligation.
Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the
contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation.
x No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate
court when it held
petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant to Article
1159 of the Civil Code which
reads:
o ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts
have the force of law
between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith.
x On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals
with reversible
error for having sustained the trial court'' award of
attorney'' fees. Petitioner
relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v.
Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,
909 (1990), where we held that when attorney's
fees are awarded, the reason
for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the
text of the court's decision. Petitioner submits that
since the trial court did not state any reason for
awarding the same, the award of attorney's fees
should have been disallowed by the
appellate court.1wphi1.nt
o We find for petitioner in this regard.
x It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception
rather than the
rule, hence it is necessary for the trial court to
make findings of fact and law,
which would bring the case within the exception
and justify the grant of the
award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the
trial court to explicitly state
the rationale for the award of attorney's fees, the
same shall be disallowed. In
the present case, a perusal of the records shows
that the trial court failed to

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)

Factual matters in
explain the award of attorney's fees. controversy
We hold that the same should thereby Rental value of the
be
premises in question
deleted.
(Herrera vs. Bollos)
Valuation of the property
B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED [RULE 129] subject of
expropriation
1. Judicial Notice proceedings
(Landbank vs.
a. Mandatory and Discretionary Wycoco)
b. When to take Judicial Notice? Judicial Notice vs. Knowledge of a Judge

Judicial Notice Knowledge of a Judge

may be taken of a fact which
Judicial notice based on the maxim what judges ought to know mere
is known need not be because of their personal
knowledg
judicial functions e of
proved. the judge
o Hence, when the rule is invoked,
the court may dispense
 with the presentation of of another
evidence on judicially country re project
cognizable between the 2
facts countries
o To say that the curt will Under the rules,
take judicial notice of a fact it is mandatory
and the Court
merely saying that the has no
usual orm of evidence will alternative but
be to take judicial
dispensed with if notice of the
the knowledge of official acts of
the fact can be the President of
otherwise acquired the Philippines,
Functions of Judicial Notice: who heads the
o To abbreviate litigation executive
by the admission of matters branch of our
that government. It
need evidence because is further
judicial notice is a substitute provided in the
for above-quoted
formal proof of a matter by rule that the
evidence court shall take
o To take the place of proof judicial notice
o To displace evidence and of the foregoing
fulfill the purpose for which facts without
the introduction of
evidence is designed to evidence.
fulfill Since we
The ff are NOT functions of Judicial Notice: consider the act
o To be used to fill in the gaps in the of cancellation
partys evidence by President
o To deprive an adverse party of the Macapagal-
opportunity to prove a Arroyo of the
disputed fact proposed ZTE-
Mandatory Judicial Notice (Section 1, Rule NBN Project
129) no motion or during the
hearing necessary: meeting of
o Includes the ff October 2, 2007
matters (exhaustive with the
enumeration): Chinese
existence President in
and territorial extent of China as an
states, official act of
their political history, the executive
forms of government department, the
and symbols of Court must take
nationality, judicial notice of
the law of nations, such
the admiralty and official act
maritime courts of the without need of
world and their seals, evidence.
the political (Suplico vs.
constitution and history of NEDA)
the
Discretionary Judicial Notice
Philippines, (Section 2, Rule 129)
the official acts of o Requisites:
legislative, executive and
The matter
judicial departments of must be one of
the Philippines, common
the laws of nature,
knowledge
the measure of time, The matter
and must be settled
the geographical beyond
divisions.
reasonable
o No need for any party to doubt
raise or allege any The
amendment knowledge must
of any law or exist within the
administrative order, among jurisdiction of
others the court
o As to affidavits attached to o Hence,
pleadings See Candido vs. judicial notice
CA at page 15. is limited to
o As to declaration of the
President informing the
President
 facts Hence, judicial notice is NOT
judicial knowledge. The mere
evidenced by public personal knowledge of a judge is
records and NOT judicial knowledge of the
court. The judge is NOT
facts of general authorized to make his individual
notoriety knowledge of the fact as basis of
o The ff may NOT be taken judicial his action, if such fact is NOT
notice of: generally or professionally known

Corollarily, judicial notice is NOT

limited to judicial knowledge,
such that a judge is required to take
judicial notice of certain facts,
even though such facts are NOT within his personal knowledge

Stage when Judicial Notice may be taken:

o During trial the court
may announce its intention to
take judicial notice of any
matter
o After trial and before judgment
o On appeal
Either motu proprio OR
on the request of an
party
Hearing necessary only
for the purpose of
determining the
propriety of
taking judicial
notice of a
certain matter
and NOT for the
purpose of
proving issues
in the case
Doctrine of Processual Presumption
o GR: Our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws
Foreign laws must
be alleged and proved as
facts
In the absence of proof,
the foreign law will
be presumed to
be the same as
the laws of the
jurisdiction
hearing the case
under the
doctrine of
processual
presumption
Hence, PH laws should be
applied under this
doctrine
o XPNs: the court may take
judicial notice of a foreign law
in the ff instance:
When the foreign law is
within the actual
knowledge of the
court, such as
when the law is
generally well-
known
When it had ruled upon in
previous cases
before it
and none of
the parties
claim
otherwise
When the foreign law is
part of a published
 treatise, periodical or
pamphlet and the writer is
recognized in his profession
or calling as
expert in the subject
When foreign law refers to the law
of nations
(judicial notice is mandatory
PH adopts the generally
accepted principles of
international law as part of
the law of the land)
Judicial notice of certain matters
o Of Municipal Ordinances
MTCs should take judicial notice of
municipal
ordinances in the municipality
where they sit
RTCs should also take judicial
notice of
municipal ordinances in the
municipality
where they sit BUT ONLY
when so required by
law and should take judicial
notice of the
municipal ordinance on
appeal to it from an
inferior court which the
latter took judicial
notice of
x E.g. The Charter of
Manila
expressly
requires that all
courts
sitting therein
take judicial
notice

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
ces
passe
o d by
f its
city
t counc
h il
e o Of courts own
acts and records
c AR:
i Courts
t may take
y judicial
notice of
o its own
r
d
i
n
a
n
 acts and records in the SAME nowledge of the
case
GR: BUT courts are NOT opposing party,
authorized to take the
judicial contents of said
notice of other
the case are clearly
contents referred to by
of the title and
records number in a
of other pending
cases, action and
even adopted or
when read in the
such record of
cases the latter OR
have o When
been the
tried or original
are
pending
record of
in the
the other
same
case or any part
court
of it is actually
x XPNs:
withdrawn
o
from the
archives at
W
the courts
h
discretion
e
upon the
n
request, or
with the
i
consent, of
n
the parties, and
admitted as
t
part of the
h
record of the
e
pending
case
a
o Of Post Office
b practices
s Not
e a proper
n subject of
c judicial
e notice
Not
covered
by any of
the
o
instances
f under the
Rule
a s
n Not
y of
unquestio
o nable
b demonstr
j ation
e o Of Banking
c practices
t
i
o
Banks
n practice
, of
conductin
w g
i backgrou
t nd
h c
t h
h e
e c
k
k
 s on May
borrow be
ers and subject of
suretie judicial
s may notice
be BUT
subject the
of reasonabl
e amount
discreti
of rent
onary
may NOT
judicial
b
notice
e
This may fall under matters
which are of
d
public
e
knowledg
t
e or
e
ought to
r
be known
m
to
i
judges
n
because
e
of their
d
judicial
functions
b

y
o Of financial condition of the government
The fact that the government is
j
and has been
u
for many
d
years
i
been
c
financiall
i
y
a
strapped,
l
to the
point that
n
even the
o
most t
essential i
services c
have e
suffered
serious B
curtailm U
ent, T
may be
taken b
judicial y
notice of
(La s
Bugal- u
Blaan p
Tribal p
Associati o
on vs. r
Ramos) t
o Of Presidential powers under the law i
Should be taken judicial notice of, n
as it falls g
within the
contempla e
tion of the v
phrase i
official d
acts of e
the n
legislative c
, e
executive
and s
judicial
departme
nts
o Of the general increase in rentals in real
estate
 uch
as: Hence, such MTC and MCTC
x Realty assessment of judges, upon
the land taking judicial notice
x Increase in realty taxes of such fact, may
x Prevailing rate of perform any act within the
rentals in the competency of a
vicinity regular notary public, subject to
o Of an administrative regulation or statute provisions of
that is the Notarial Law (Lapena Jr. vs.
NOT yet effective Marcos)
May NOT be subject of judicial o Of the age of a victim in a
notice criminal case
REASON: a law which is May NOT be subject of
inexistent cannot be judicial notice
of The court must require
common competent evidence to
knowledg prove such age (People vs.
e capable Mitin)
of ready o That business transactions may be
and made through
unquestio teleconferencing
nable May be subject of judicial
demonstr notice
ation BUT although judicial notice
(State may be taken of
Prosecuto teleconferencing
rs vs. as a means of
Judge making
Muro see business
digest at transactions, there
page 16) is no judicial
o That there are municipalities that neither notice that one was
have conducted in a
lawyers nor notaries public particular case
May be subject of judicial notice (Expertravel and
Tours vs. CA)
o That the scene of rape is NOT always
secluded or
isolated and of a Filipinas
inbred modesty and shyness
and her antipathy in publicly
airing acts which blemish her
honor and virtue
May be subject of judicial
notice
Rape may be and has been
committed in
places where people
congregate (People vs.
Tundang)
o That a certain barangay in an urban
municipality is
likewise an urban area
May be subject of judicial
notice
A municipal jurisdiction,
whether designated
as a chartered city or
provincial capital, is
considered as urban
in its entirety if it has
a
population of at least
1,000 persons per
square kilometer.
Hence, when a
municipality is urban,
all its barangays are
considered
urban. (Chiongbian-
Oliva vs. Republic) o That the
judiciary is beset with the task of
unclogging dockets
May be subject of judicial
notice
 Hence, judges are required to resolve cases
within the prescribed period mandated by law
(GSIS vs. Vallar)
o Of the fact that testimonies during trial are much
more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn
statements
May be subject of judicial notice
Sworn statements are usually incomplete and
inaccurate (Estioca vs. People)
Such sworn statements are generally inferior
to the testimony of a witness in open court
(People vs. Sorilla)
o That drug abuse can damage the mental faculties
of a user
May be subject of judicial notice
Hence, it its beyond question that an
employee under the influence of drugs cannot
possibly continue doing his duties without
posing a serious threat to the lives and
property of his co-workers and employer
(Bughaw vs. Treasure Island Industrial)
o That persons may kill and have killed for no reason
at all
May be subject of judicial notice (People vs.
Zeta)
o That the counsel has moved to another address
May NOT be subject of judicial notice
Thus, the said counsel must inform the court
of such change, otherwise such omission or
neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the
finality of the decision (Karen and Khristy
Fishing vs. CA)
o Of a persons home address or office
May NOT be subject of judicial notice
This may not be taken judicial notice of,
notwithstanding the standing of such person
in the business community (Garrucho vs.
CA)

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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
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o Of matters which are within the locality where the

genuineness and due execution of

court sits

the same)
May be subject of judicial notice
x
BUT such party is NOT precluded
Thus, a court may take judicial notice of the
from arguing against the
fact that a person is the congressman or

document by evidence of fraud,

representative of the district where the court

mistake, compromise, payment,

sits (Saludo Jr vs. American Express)
SoL, estoppel, and want of
c
onsideration
2. Judicial Admissions

XPNs: failure to deny the genuineness and

d
ue execution of an actionable document is
a. When is there a Judicial Admission?

NOT a judicial admission in the ff cases:

x

When the party who fails to deny

Elements of a judicial admission under Section 4, Rule 129:
is NOT a party to the said
o Made by a party to the case

document OR
o Made in the course of the proceedings in the same case

When compliance with an order

hence, when an admission is made in another case, it

for an inspection of the original

is to be considered as an extrajudicial admission for

instrument is refused
purposes of the other proceedings where such admission o
Stipulations of
facts in pre-trial briefs in civil cases are
is being offered judicial
admissions
o No requirement as to the form of admission form is

REASON: pre-trial in civil cases is mandatory,

immaterial because the rule allows either a verbal or a

hence, the submission of pre-trial briefs is

written admission

part of the judicial proceedings (Heirs of

When/where/how judicial admissions may be made
Conahap vs. Heirs of Ragana
o During pre-trial through the stipulation of facts (Cuenco o
Stipulations of
facts made by the accused during the pre-
vs. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex) trial in a
criminal case may only considered judicial
o In the pleadings or

admissions if (1) reduced into writing AND (2) signed by

o During trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or both the
accused and his counsel (Section 2, Rule 118)
stipulations or
BUT
the requirements under Section 2 Rule
o Other stages of the judicial proceeding (Spouses

118 DO NOT apply to stipulations of facts

Binarao vs. Plus Builders)

made by during the trial itself because such

Rules governing admissions, set forth by jurisprudence:
stipulations of facts are automatically reduced
o An admission made in a drafted document for the
in writing and are contained in the TSN
 purpose of filing as a pleading but was NEVER filed is o
Admissions
obtained through depositions, written
NOT a judicial admission. When it is signed by the party,

interrogatories or requests for admission are also

it may be considered as an extrajudicial admission. If

considered as judicial admissions (Programme Inc vs.

signed by the counsel, it NOT an admission because the Province
of Bataan)
authority of the counsel to make statements for the client
BUT
a request for admission is considered as
only extends to statements made in open court or in

for the purpose of the pending action ONLY.

pleadings filed with the court. (Jackson vs. Schine

Hence, since under the Rules, the person to

Lexington [US Jurisprudence])

whom the request is directed must specifically

o GR: Admissions made in pleadings and motions are
deny by sworn statement the matters of
judicial admissions and are binding upon the person

which an admission is requested, failure to do

making them

so will be tantamount to a judicial admission

XPN: When there is a showing that such
but only as regards the pending action which
admission was made through palpable

the admission is being requested.

mistake (Martinez vs. CA, Herrera-Felix o
Admissions in
an amended pleading are judicial
vs. CA)

admissions
o GR: An admission may likewise be inferred from failure to
HOWEVER, the amended/superseded pleading
specifically deny the material allegations in the other

may STILL be used against the pleader BUT

partys pleadings

only as an extrajudicial admission hence,

XPNs: There is NO inferred admission in cases
must be formally offered and proven (Torres
where the ff matters are not specifically

vs. CA, Ching vs. CA)

denied: o
Admissions in
dismissed pleadings may likewise be
x Immaterial allegations
considered only as extrajudicial admissions
x Conclusions
(Servicewide Specialists Inc vs. CA)
x Non-ultimate facts in the pleading o A motion
to dismiss is considered as a judicial admission
x Amount of unliquidated damages BUT ONLY
insofar as material allegations which are
o In other words, when

sufficiently pleaded are concerned (Magno vs. CA, De

a party fails to Dios vs.
Bristol Laboratories, Dalandan vs. Julio)
 specifically deny the

REASON: a motion to dismiss partakes the

foregoing, such failure

nature of a demurrer which hypothetically

would NOT be

admits the truth of the factual allegations

tantamount to a

made in the complaint

judicial admission o GR:
Admissions made by a counsel is conclusive upon the
o There is likewise an implied admission of allegations of client,
hence, constitute judicial admission
usury for failure to specifically deny under oath

XPNs:
o As to implied admissions of actionable documents:
x
Where the reckless or gross
GR: Failure to deny the genuineness and due
negligence of the counsel deprives
execution of an actionable document at to set

the client of due process of law or

forth the facts so claimed is an implied

When its application will result in

admission of such actionable document (PNB

outright deprivation of the clients

vs. Refrigeration Industries)

liberty or property or
x Thus, the party who fails to deny
x
When the interests of justice so
such is PRECLUDED from arguing

require (Salazar vs. CA)

that the subject document is a
forgery (because he has already Consequences of
judicial admissions:
admitted impliedly the
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o The matter judicially admitted CANNOT be later on

challenged as a fact b
REASON: judicial e
admissions are a waiver of c
proof, a
hence, u
productio s
n of e
evidence
is t
dispense h
d with e
GR: Hence, in sum, the y
ff are EFFECTS of
judicial admissions: a
x They do not r
require proof e
x They cannot
be contradicted c
 oncl t
usiv h
e as a
to t
the
part i
y s
maki
ng it c
XPNs: The foregoing l
DO NOT apply in the ff e
cases: a
x Upon r
showing that the
admission t
w o
a
s t
h
m e
a mind
d or
e plain
to
t see
h x
r
o
When it is
u shown
g that no
h such
a
p d
a m
l i
p s
a s
b i
l o
e n

w
m a
i s
s
t m
a a
k d
e e
o

P
a t
l h
p i
a s
b
l m
e a
y
m
i
s b
t e
a
k i
e n
v
o
k
e
d
o
n w
e h
e
 na without the knowledge or
state consent of the parties
ment
ISSUE: Whether the RTC judge was
of a correct in taking judicial notice of the
party figures in the Rodriguez case, which
is was pending before it, for the purpose
take of determining the just compensation
n out applicable in the instant case.
of
HELD: NO.
cont x Well-settled is the rule that courts are not
ext authorized to take judicial
or notice of the contents of the
that records of other cases even
his when said
cases have been tried or are
state
pending in the same court or
ment before the
was same judge. They may only do
mad so "in the absence of objection"
e not and
"with the knowledge of the
opposing party," which are not
in
obtaining
the here.
sens x Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules
e it is of Court shall apply to all proceedings
mad before the Special Agrarian
e to Courts. In this regard, Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
appe Evidence is explicit on the
ar necessity of a hearing before a
by court takes judicial notice of a
the certain matter, thus:
other o "SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when
hearing necessary. - During the
party
trial,
the court, on its own
CASES initiative, or on
request of a party,
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. may announce its
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS intention to take
ARENAS-BANAL, respondents. judicial notice of any
G.R. matter and allow the
No. parties to be heard
1432 thereon.
76 o "After the trial, and before
judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own
July initiative or on request of a party, may
20, take
2004 judicial notice of any matter and
THIR allow the parties to be heard
D thereon if such matter is decisive
DIVIS of a material issue in the case."
ION x The RTC failed to observe the
above provisions.
FACTS: x While the determination of just
x Spouses Banal were the owners of an agricultural compensation involves the exercise of judicial
land, a portion thereof having discretion, however, such
been appropriated by the government discretion must be discharged
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian within the bounds of the law.
Reform Law Here, the RTC wantonly
x Landbank provided a valuation of Php disregarded R.A. 6657, as
173,918.55 amended, and its
x Spouses Banal rejected the said valuation implementing rules and
x A summary administrative proceeding was regulations. (DAR
conducted before the Provincial Administrative Order No.
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to 6, as amended by DAR
determine the valuation of the land
Administrative Order
x PARAD affirmed valuation by Landbank
No.11).
x Spouses Banal filed a petition for determination
x Petition was granted.
of just compensation before
the RTC
x RTC computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00
and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a
total of P703,137.00, which is beyond
respondents' valuation of P623,000.00.
The court further awarded compounded
interest at P79,732.00 in cash
x CA affirmed in toto
x Landbank contended that the RTC, in
determining the just compensation
merely took judicial notice of the
average production figures in the
Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. o As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS Hussin and Norma
FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON Sahiddan had withdrawn their
KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander appeal, and as such, the third
Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA and fourth assigned errors,
AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, which pertain to them only, will
NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, no longer be dealt with. Only
HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, the following issues pertaining
JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be
HASSAN DE KAMMING, discussed:
FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and JANE DOES, (1) judicial notice of other
accused, JAILON KULAIS, pending cases,
appellant. (2) sufficiency of the
G.R. No. 100901 prosecution evidence, and
(3) denial as a defense.
July 16, 1998 ISSUE # 1: Whether the taking of judicial notice by the
FIRST DIVISION trial court judge of a material testimony of Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano in another case resulted in the
FACTS: denial of the appellants constitutional right to cross-
x RTC convicted Appellant Kulais with 5 counts of kidnapping examine the witnesses against him.
for ransom, 1 count
of kidnapping a woman and public officer, and 2 HELD # 1: NO.
counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of x Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco process when the trial court took
o RTC likewise found Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador judicial notice of the testimony given in
Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin guilty as another case by one Lt. Melquiades
Feliciano, who was the team leader of the
conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping government troops that captured him and
x During trial: his purported cohorts. Because he was
o Prosecution (which presented 15 witnesses allegedly deprived of his right to cross-
including some of the
examine a material witness in the person of
vctims themselves) that a group of
Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the
public officials, which were
latter's testimony should not be used against
organized as a monitoring team to
him.
inspect government projects in x True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial
Zamboanga City, was heaed to Lincomo notice of the
Elementary School to evidence presented in other proceedings,
check its classrooms; that the said groupd even if these have been tried
was composed as or are pending in the same court, or have
Virginia Gara, as the head, Armando been heard and are actually
Bacarro, representing COA, pending before the same judge. This is
Felix del Rosario, representing an NGO, especially true in criminal cases,
Edilberto Perez, where the accused has the constitutional
representing the City Assessors Office, right to confront and cross-examine the
Jessica Calunod and Allan witnesses against him.
Basa, representing the City Budget Office,
x Having said that, we note, however, that even if the
and Monico Saavedra, court a quo did take
the driver from the City Engineer's Office; judicial notice of the testimony of
that the said group was Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use
not able to reach the said school because such testimony in deciding the cases
they were stopped by 9 against the appellant. Hence,
men who pointed guns at them; that the Appellant Kulais was not denied due
armed men took their
process. His conviction was based
belongings; that their leader introduced
mainly on the positive identification made by
himself as Commander
some of the kidnap victims, namely,
Falcasantos; that while they were walking
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
towards the mountains,
Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were
they encountered government troops;
subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
that said encounter cause
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best,
the group to be divided into 2, the others
then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant
joining a certain
Feliciano's testimony is a
Commander Kamlon; that they were held
decisional surplusage which neither
in captivity for 54 days in
affected the outcome of the case nor
the forests; that they were released after
substantially prejudiced Appellant
a ransom amounting to
Kulais.
P122,000 was paid
x RTC decision was affirmed (with modification as to
o Defense that accused-appellant Jumatiya
the penalty)
Amlani was picked up
by soldiers while she was weeding their
farm; that when she was
picked up by the military, she has just
escaped captivity of Carlos 211
Falcasantos and company, where she
was made to sleep with
Falcasantos and aide his wives; that
accused-appellant Jaliha
Hussin was likewise a kidnap victim who
escaped the captivity of
Daing Kamming; that accused appellant
Norma Sahiddan was
likewise arrested by soldiers without
telling her the reason behind
her arrest
x RTC acquitted Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk
Alaas they were
not positively identified and convicted the rest who were
positively identified
x Kulais et al appealed to SC
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x The contract was then extended to 5
years (Jan 21, 1979 - Jan 20 1984)
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. x Menandro, while in the employ of PR
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES committed the ff infractions:
LIMITED, respondents. o August 24, 1980 noise
G.R. violation offense; apologized
No. o Sometime in 1980 tail
114776 scraping incident wherein the tail of
the
aircraft scraped or
Februar touched the runway
y 2, during landing;
2000 suspended for a few
SECON days until
D investigation;
DIVISIO reprimanded
N x After attending a training, Menandro was
confirmed for his solo duty as captain
FACTS: of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently
x Menandro was hired by private respondent appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL) as x Recession came and SAL had to resort to
an expatriate B-707 captain for an cost-cutting measures
original period of 2 years, which x Menandro was advised by SAL to take
appointment was affirmed after he advanced leaves but, thinking that
passed the probation period of 6 months
 recession would only be for a short time, the Philippine Courts
did not immediately terminate its A-300 do not take
pilots judicial notice of the
x SAL then reviewed the qualifications of the laws of Singapore.
expatriate pilots and subsequently The defendant that
promoted 12 out of the 17 to the B-747 fleet, claims the
where Menandro was not included applicability of the
x On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff Singapore Laws to
of his termination effective this case has the
November 1, 1982 and that he will be burden of proof. The
paid three (3) months salary in lieu of defendant has failed
three-month notice to do so. Therefore,
o Menandro requested for the 3-month the Philippine law
notice instead should be applied.
o SAL granted him a 2-month notice and x However, the CA was correct in ruling that
a 1-month salary the action has already prescribed
x Menandro then instituted a case against PR before x In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the
the LA but subsequently ten-year prescriptive period fixed in
withdrew the same Article 1144 of the Civil Code
x Menandro thereafter filed a case for damages may not be invoked by
due to illegal termination of petitioners, for the Civil Code is a
contract of services before the RTC Manila law of general application, while
x SAL raised the issue of jurisdiction, among the prescriptive period fixed in
others Article 292 of the Labor Code
x RTC applying PH law, ruled in favor of Menandro [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL
x SAL appealed to CA LAW applicable to claims arising
x CA reversed and set aside RTCs decision from employee-employer
o the action for damages due to illegal relations.
termination was filed by x De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals:
plaintiff-appellee only on o The language of Art. 291 of
January 8, 1987 or more the Labor Code does not limit its
than four (4) years after application only to
the effectivity date of his "money claims
dismissal on November 1, specifically
1982, hence, has recoverable under
prescribed said Code" but
x Menandro filed a Rule 45 before SC covers all money
o Petitioner now raises the issue of claims arising from
whether his action is one based an employee-
on Article 1144 or on Article employer relations"
1146 of the Civil Code. o It should be noted further that
According to Article 291 of the Labor Code is a
him, his termination of special law applicable
employment effective to money claims
November 1, 1982, arising from
was based on an employment employer-
contract which is under Article employee relations;
1144, thus, it necessarily
so his action should prescribe prevails over Article
in 10 years as provided for in 1144 of
said the Civil Code, a
article. general law. Basic is
o Thus he claims the ruling of the the rule in statutory
appellate court based on Article construction that
1146 where prescription "where two statutes
is only four (4) years, is are of equal
an error. The theoretical
appellate court concluded application to a
that the action for illegal particular case, the
dismissal one designed
originally filed before the therefore should
Labor Arbiter on June 29, prevail."
1983, but which was x In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we
withdrawn, then filed again in agree with the appellate court's
1987 before the Regional Trial conclusion that petitioner's action for
Court, had already prescribed. damages due to illegal termination filed

ISSUE: Whether the trial court is correct in applying

PH laws, notwithstanding that the other party to the
case is a foreign entity.

HELD: YES.
x At the outset, we find it necessary to state our
concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly
ruled on the application of Philippine law,
thus:
o Neither can the Court determine
whether the termination
of the plaintiff is legal under
the Singapore Laws because

of the defendant's failure to

show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this
case. As substantially
discussed
in the preceding paragraphs,

again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effective date of his dismissal on November
1, 1982 has already prescribed.
x We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code
but on which sets
the prescription period at three (3) years and
which governs under this jurisdiction.
x Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period
was tolled when he
filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In
Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of
Appeals, we held that "although the commencement
of a civil action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the
same position as though no action had been
commenced at all."
x Petition was dismissed; CA decision was affirmed.
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO,
AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
EN BANC
FACTS:
x This an MR of the decision of the SC dated April 16, 2013:
o Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from
running for any local elective position.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.
x Arnado has already successfully ended his term
o While the relief sought can no longer be granted,
ruling on the
motion for reconsideration is important as
it will either affirm the validity of Arnados
election or affirm that Arnado never
qualified to run for public office.
x Arnado raises the ff points in this MR:
o Respondent failed to advance any argument to
support his plea for
the reversal of this Courts Decision
dated April 16, 2013. Instead,
he presented his accomplishments as
the Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he
has taken the Oath of
Allegiance not only twice but six times
o cites Section 349 of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of the
United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of
American Citizenship on
April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was
divested of his American
citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether SC may take judicial notice of Section 349
of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of the United States thereby warranting a
decision in favor of Arnado.
HELD: NO.
x If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an
American citizen, the
fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation
repudiates this claim.
x The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1
which must be presented
as public documents2 of a foreign
country and must be "evidenced by an
official publication thereof."3 Mere
reference to a foreign law in a
pleading does not suffice for it to be
considered in deciding a case.
x American law does not govern in this jurisdiction.
Instead, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code calls for application
in the case before us, given the fact that at
the time Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was not only a
Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is
the application of this law and not of any
foreign law that serves as the basis for
Arnados disqualification to run for any
local elective position.
x With all due respect to the dissent, the declared
policy of Republic Act No. (RA)
9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of
this Act."5 This policy pertains to the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Section 5(2)6 requires those who have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek
elective public office, to renounce any and all
foreign citizenship.
x This requirement of renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code7 which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any
elective local position, indicates a policy that
anyone who seeks to run for public office
must be solely and
exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a
former Filipino who reacquires Philippine
citizenship to continue using a foreign
passport - which indicates the recognition
of a foreign state of the individual as its
national - even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a
complete disregard of this policy.
x Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority
decision rules on a situation of
doubt.
x Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running
for local elective positions.
x There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport
is a positive declaration that
one is a citizen of the country which issued
the passport, or that a passport
proves that the country which issued it
recognizes the person named therein as
its national.
x It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born
Filipino citizen, or that he
acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that
he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his
American citizenship. It is also indubitable
that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at
least six times.
212
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does it say that Arnado is not a
Filipino citizen. What the
x If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the decision merely points out is that
efficacy of Arnados he also possessed another
renunciation of his American citizenship at the time he filed
citizenship when he subsequently his certificate of candidacy.
used his U.S. passport. The x Well-settled is the rule that findings of
renunciation of foreign citizenship fact of administrative bodies will not be
must be complete and interfered with by the courts in
unequivocal. The requirement that the the absence of grave abuse of
renunciation must be made through an discretion on the part of said
oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the agencies, or unless the
one making the oath of renunciation to aforementioned findings are not
remain true to what he has sworn to. supported by substantial
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign evidence.8 They are accorded
passport because it is convenient for the not only great respect but even
person to do so is rendering the oath a finality, and are binding upon
hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of this Court, unless it is shown
an oath, reducing it to a mere that the
ceremonial formality. administrative body had
x The dissent states that the Court has effectively arbitrarily disregarded or
left Arnado "a man without a misapprehended evidence before
country".1wphi1 On the contrary, this it to such an extent as to compel
Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have
more than one. Nowhere in the decision
 a contrary conclusion had such evidence to these crimes,
been properly appreciated. because they were
guilt-stricken after
seeing a man
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. carrying a child in
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. the first bus that
Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL they had entered.
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI o 9.) Accused Asali likewise
a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. admitted that in the middle of
Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, March
Accused, 2005 he gave a
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO television news
TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT interview in which he
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, admitted that he
Accused-Appellants. supplied the explosive
G.R. No. devices which
188314 resulted in this
explosion inside the
RRCG bus and which
January resulted in the filing
10, 2011 of these
THIRD charges.
DIVISION o 10.) Finally, accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali admitted that
FACTS: they are members of the Abu
x Upon filing of the information: Sayyaf.
o Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group - x During trial:
namely Khaddafy Janjalani, o The herein appellants were
Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo among the men who boarded a bus
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah along EDSA
Asali, Jainal o They alighted near Ayala
Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim Avenue
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, o Moments after, Andales (the
and other bus conductor) felt an explosion. He
"John" and "Jane Does" - were then saw fire
then charged with multiple quickly engulfing
murder and multiple the bus. He ran out
frustrated murder. of the bus
o Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and towards a nearby
Rohmat were arrested, while the mall. After a while,
other accused remain at-large. he went back to
x During arraignment: where the
o On their arraignment for the multiple bus was. He saw their
murder charge (Crim. Case bus passengers either
No. 05-476), Baharan, lying on the ground or
Trinidad, and Asali all looking traumatized. A
entered a plea of few hours after, he
guilty. made a statement
o On the other hand, upon arraignment before the Makati Police
for the multiple frustrated Station narrating the whole
murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05- incident.
477), accused Asali pled guilty. o The spokesperson of the Abu
o Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman -
not guilty. announced over radio
o Rohmat pled not guilty to both station DZBB that the
charges. group had a
x During pre-trial: Valentines Day "gift"
o 3.) All the same three accused for former President
likewise admitted that a bomb Gloria Macapagal-
exploded in the RRCG bus Arroyo
while the bus was plying the x Alleged confessions:
EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of
the Makati
Commercial Center.
o 4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing
the other accused alias Rohmat
whom he claims taught him how to
make explosive devices.
o 5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted
knowing Rohmat before the
February 14 bombing incident.
o 6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali all admitted to
causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG
bus which left four people
dead and more or less forty
persons injured.
o 7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed
to stipulate that within the
period March 20-24 each gave
separate interviews to the
ABS-CBN news network
admitting their participation in
the commission of the said
crimes, subject of these cases.
o 8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also
admitted to pleading guilty
 moments before the bomb exploded. On
o As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad the other hand, Asali testified that he
gave ABS-CBN News had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the
Network an exclusive interview TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati
some time after the incident, City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and
confessing his participation in the Trinidad was
Valentines Day bombing sufficiently established by these
incident. corroborating testimonies, coupled
o In another exclusive interview on the network, with their respective judicial admissions
accused Baharan (pretrial stipulations) and
likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television
o Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, interviews, as they both
confessing that he stipulated during pretrial) that they were
had supplied the explosive devices indeed the perpetrators of
for the 14 February 2005 the Valentines Day bombing.15 Accordingly,
bombing. the Court upholds the
x RTC asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were findings of guilt made by the trial court
amenable to as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge of x Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the
multiple frustrated murder, considering that they prosecution consisted of
pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple the testimony of accused-turned-state-
murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of
their pleas. the transcript of stenographic notes on
o Defense counsel conferred with the two the state prosecutors direct examination
accused and explained of state-witness Asali during the 26 May
to them the consequences of the pleas. 2005 trial:
o Baharan and Trinidad acknowledged the o Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and
inconsistencies and Trinidad. Under what
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. circumstances did he train
THEN pled guilty to the charge of you, Mr. Witness, to assemble
multiple frustrated those explosives, you and
murder Trinidad?
x Asali was then discharged as state witness o A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy
x RTC Makati CONVICTED and imposed DEATH upon Gamal Janjalani, the three of them,
B. Baharan a.k.a. that Angelo Trinidad and myself
Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and be the one to be trained to
Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky make an explosive, sir.
o For the complex crime of multiple murder and o Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or
multiple frustrated how long did it take that
murder training?
x Automatic review before the SC ensued o A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought
to make bomb about
ISSUE: Whether the herein appellants were correctly convicted one month and two weeks.
by the RTC, considering the testimony of the state witness and o Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr.
the confessions made by said appellants. witness, while you were still
in training at Mr. Cararao, is there
HELD: YES. any mission that you undertook,
x In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the if any, with respect to that
requirement of conducting mission?
a searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he o A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb
manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses in the malls, LRT, and
much of great significance where the conviction can other parts of Metro Manila, sir.16
be based on independent evidence proving the o The witness then testified that he kept
commission by the person accused of the offense eight kilos of TNT for
charged."13 Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court accused Baharan and Trinidad.
stated: o Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr.
o Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt witness, did you know what
are set aside only happened to the 2 kilos of bomb
if such plea is the sole basis of the that Trinidad and Tapay took from
judgment. If the trial court you sometime in November
relied on sufficient and credible 2004?
evidence to convict the accused, o A : That was the explosive that he
the conviction must be sustained, planted in the G-liner, which did
because then it is predicated not not explode.
merely on the guilty plea of the accused o Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
but on evidence proving 213
his commission of the offense charged.14
(Emphasis supplied.)
x In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants
assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out
that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of
Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
x Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are
concerned, the evidence
for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be
drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor,
Elmer
Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-
witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the
two men who had acted
suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted
on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had
scampered away from the bus
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o Q : What did Abu Zaky tell
you when he called you up?
o A : He was the one who told me, Mr. o A : He told me that "this is
Angelo Trinidad, sir. your first mission."
o Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, o Q : Please enlighten the
when the bomb did not Honorable Court. What is that
explode, as told to you by Trinidad? mission you
o A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad are referring to?
got 2 more kilos of TNT o A : That is the first mission
bombs. where we can show our anger
o Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he towards
needed another amount of the Christians.
explosive on that date, o Q : The second time that he
December 29, 2004? Will you got a bomb from you, Mr. witness,
kindly tell us the reason do
why? you know if the bomb
explode?
o A : He told me that Abu Solaiman
instructed me to get the TNT so o A : I did not know what
happened to the next 2 kilos taken
that he could detonate a bomb
by
o Q : Were there any other person,
besides Abu Solaiman, who called Angelo Trinidad from
me until after I was
you up, with respect to the taking of
the explosives from you? caught, because I was
o A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called told by the policeman
up also. that interviewed me
 after I was arrested that the 2 o Q : Connected in what sense,
kilos were planted in a bus, Mr. witness?
which also did not explode. o A : Because when we were
o Q : So besides these two incidents, undergoing training, we were told
were there any other incidents that
that Angelo Trinidad and the Abu Sayyaf
Tapay get an explosive should not wage
for you, Mr. war to the forest,
witness? but also wage our
o A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on battles in the city.
February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m. o Q : Wage the battle against
o Q : Who got from you the explosive who, Mr. witness?
Mr. witness? o A : The government, sir.17
o A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir. x What can be culled from the testimony of
o Q : How many explosives did they get Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was
from you, Mr. witness, at determined to sow terror in
that time? Metro Manila, so that they could
o A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir. show their "anger towards the
o Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, Christians."18 It can also be
where are they going to use that seen that Rohmat, together
explosive? with
o A : No, sir. Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had
o Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what carefully planned the Valentines
happened to the third batch of Day bombing
explosives, which were taken from incident, months before it
you by Trinidad and Tapay? happened. Rohmat had trained
o A : That is the bomb that exploded in Asali and Trinidad to
Makati, sir. make bombs and explosives.
o Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness? While in training, Asali and
o A : Because I was called in the others were told that
evening of February 14 by Abu their mission was to plant bombs
Solaiman. He told me not to in malls, the LRT, and other
leave the house because the parts of Metro
explosive that were taken by Manila. According to Asali,
Tapay and Angelo Trinidad Rohmat called him on 29
exploded. December 2004 to confirm that
o Q : Was there any other call during Trinidad would get two kilos of
that time, Mr. Witness? TNT from Asali, as they were
o A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to "about to
leave the house because commence" their "first
the explosive that he took exploded mission."19 They made two
already, sir. separate attempts to bomb a bus
o Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at in Metro Manila, but to no avail.
that time, that indeed, the The day before the Valentines
bomb exploded at Makati, Day
beside the call of Abu bombing, Trinidad got another
Solaiman and two kilos of TNT from Asali. On
Trinidad? Valentines Day,
o A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the Abu Sayyaf Group
the bombing in Makati should announced that they had a gift
coincide with the bombing in General for the former President,
Santos. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On
o A : He told it to me, sir I cannot their third try, their plan finally
remember the date anymore, but succeeded. Right
I know it was sometime in February
2005.
o Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from
Abu Solaiman and Trinidad
after the bombing exploded in Makati,
any other call?
o A : There is, sir The call came from
Abu Zaky.
o Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr.
witness?
o A : He just greeted us congratulations,
because we have a
successful mission.
o A : He told me that "sa wakas, nag
success din yung tinuro ko
sayo."
o Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would
just like to clarify this. You
stated that Abu Zaky called
you up the following day, that
was
February 15, and
congratulating you for the
success of the mission.
My question to you, Mr.
witness, if you know what is
the relation of
that mission, wherein you
were congratulated by Abu
Zaky, to the
mission, which have been
indoctrinated to you, while
you were in
Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
o A : They are connected, sir.
 indispensable participation of accused
after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group Rohmat in seeing to it that the
declared that there would be more bombings in the conspirators criminal design would be
future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat, realized.
praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din x It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred
yung tinuro ko sayo."20 from the acts of the
x In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the accused, which clearly manifests a
finding of guilt concurrence of wills, a common intent or
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads: design to commit a crime (People v.
o Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where
principals: acts of the accused collectively and
1. Those who take a direct part in the individually demonstrate the existence of a
execution of common design towards the
the act accomplishment of the same unlawful
2. Those who directly force or induce purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the
others to perpetrators will be held liable as principals
commit it (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).25
3. Those who cooperate in the x In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it
commission of the would be justified in
offense by another act concluding that the defendants therein were
without which it would not engaged in a conspiracy "when the
have been accomplished defendants by their acts aimed at the same
x Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second object, one performing one part and the
paragraph, or the other performing another part so as to
provision on "principal by inducement." The complete it, with a view to the
instructions and training he had attainment of the same object; and their
given Asali on how to make bombs - coupled with acts, though apparently independent, were
their careful planning and in fact concerted and cooperative,
persistent attempts to bomb different areas in indicating closeness of personal
Metro Manila and Rohmats association, concerted action and concurrence of
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT sentiments."26
from Asali as part of their x Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is
mission - prove the finding that Rohmats co- inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30,
inducement was the determining cause of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true
commission of the crime.21 Such "command or advice that under the rule, statements
[was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would made by a conspirator against a co-
not have materialized."22lawphi1 conspirator are admissible only
x Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the when made during the existence of the
criminal act that conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in
without it, the act would not have been performed."23 People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the
In People v. Sanchez, et statement in court, his extrajudicial
al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that confession becomes a judicial admission,
Mayor Sanchez was not at making the testimony admissible as to both
the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the conspirators.27 Thus, in People v. Palijon, the
mastermind of the criminal act Court held the following:
or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor o [W]e must make a distinction between
Sanchez was a co-principal extrajudicial and judicial
and co-conspirator, and because the act of one confessions. An extrajudicial
conspirator is the act of all, the confession may be given in
mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting evidence against the
crimes.24 The same finding must confessant but not against his
be applied to the case at bar. co-
accused as they are deprived of
ISSUE # 2: Whether conspiracy was sufficiently established, the opportunity to cross-
considering that Asalis testimony implicating the herein examine him. A judicial
appellants were made AFTER the termination of their conspiracy. confession is admissible
against
HELD # 2: YES. the declarants co-accused
x The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of since the latter are afforded
conspiracy opportunity to cross-examine the
involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. former. Section 30, Rule
Conspiracy was clearly established from the 130 of the Rules of Court applies
"collective acts of the accused-appellants before, only to extrajudicial acts
during and after the commission of the crime." As or admissions and not to
correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus testimony at trial where the party
Decision:
o Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which adversely affected has the
remains unrebutted opportunity to cross-examine
on its major points, coupled with the the declarant. Mercenes
judicial admissions freely and admission implicating his co-
voluntarily given by the two other accused
accused, are sufficient to prove was given on the witness stand. It
the existence of a conspiracy hatched is admissible in evidence against
between and among the four appellant Palijon. Moreover,
accused, all members of the terrorist where several accused are tried
group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak
chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by
214
indiscriminately killing and
injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs
and other similar
destructive explosive devices.
x While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not
been expressly
admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and
Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the
latters participation in the commission of the
crimes,
nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the
aforementioned evidence, which established the
existence of the conspiracy itself and the
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos,
Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
together for the same offense, Potenciano Ilusorio
the testimony of a co-accused (collectively, the respondents)
for reconveyance, reversion,
implicating his co-accused is accounting,
competent evidence against restitution, and damages before the
the latter. Sandiganbayan
o alleged, inter alia, that the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. respondents illegally manipulated
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH the
DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), purchase of the
MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND major shareholdings
E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. of Cable and Wireless
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE Limited in Eastern
ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by Telecommunications
his heirs), Respondents. G.R. No. 152375 Philippines, Inc.
December 16, 2011 (ETPI), which
EN BANC shareholdings
respondents Jose
FACTS: Africa and Manuel
x Republic (through PCGG) filed complaint Nieto, Jr. held for
(docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) themselves and,
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, through their
Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. holdings and the
 corporations they x Republic filed an Urgent Motion and/or
organized, beneficially for Request for Judicial Notice
respondents Ferdinand E. o SB denied
Marcos and Imelda R. Judicial notice is
Marcos found under Rule 129
x Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental which is titled
cases,6 among them, Civil "W
Case No. 0130 hat
x Civil Case No. 0130 Nee
o During the pendency of PCGGs d
petition (G.R. No. 107789), the Not
PCGG filed with this Court a Be
"Very Urgent Petition for Pro
Authority to Hold Special ved
Stockholders Meeting for ."
[the] Sole Purpose of App
Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized are
Capital Stock" (Urgent ntly
Petition). In our May 7, 1996 ,
Resolution, we referred this this
Urgent Petition to the
Sandiganbayan for reception pro
of evidence and immediate visi
resolution.16 The on
Sandiganbayan included refe
the Urgent Petition in Civil rs
Case No. 0130. to
o In the proceedings to resolve the the
Urgent Petition, the testimony of Cou
Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former rts
director and treasurer-in-trust dut
of ETPI) was taken- at the y to
petitioners instance and after con
serving notice of the sid
deposition-taking on the er
respondents18 - on October admission
23 and 24, 1996 by way of s made by
deposition upon oral the
examination (Bane parties in
deposition) before Consul the
General Ernesto Castro of pleadings,
the Philippine Embassy in or in the
London, England. course of
o Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old the trial or
Rules of Court), purportedly other
allowing the petitioner to proceedin
depose Bane without leave of gs in
court, i.e., resolv
as a matter of right after the ing
defendants have filed their cases
answer, before
the notice stated that "[t]he it. The
purpose of the deposition is duty
for [Bane] of the
to identify and testify on the Court
facts set forth in his is
affidavit19 x x x mand
so as to prove the ownership atory
issue in favor of [the and in
petitioner] those
and/or establish the prima cases
facie factual foundation for where
sequestration of [ETPIs] Class it is
A stock in support of the discreti
[Urgent Petition]."20 The onary,
notice also states that the the
petitioner shall use the Bane initiativ
deposition "in evidence in e is
the main case of Civil Case No. upon
0009."21 On the scheduled the
deposition date, only Africa Court.
was present and he cross- Such
examined Bane. being
x Republic filed a motion to admit Banes the
deposition in Civil Case No. 0009 case,
o [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in the
[Civil Case No. 0009] their Court
testimonies and the finds
documentary exhibits the
presented and identified Urgent
by them, since their Motion
testimonies and the said and/or
documentary exhibits Request
are very relevant to prove the for Judicial
case of the [petitioner] in Notice as
[Civil Case something
No. 0009]. which
x SB promulgated the 1998 resolution DENYING need not
the motion to admit be acted
 upon as the same
is considered Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial
redundant. notice of the Bane deposition as part of its
On the matter of the evidence.
[Bane deposition], [its] x Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that
admission is done judges may
through the properly take and act on without proof
ordinary formal because these facts are already known to
offer of exhibits them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption
wherein the by a court of a fact without need of further
defendant is given traditional evidentiary support. The
ample principle is based on convenience and
opportunity to expediency in securing and introducing
raise objection on evidence on matters which are not
grounds provided ordinarily capable of dispute and are not
by law. Definitely, bona fide disputed.153
it is not under x The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to
Article (sic) 129 the civil and canon law
on maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent
judicial notice. [Emphasis probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice
ours] means that the court will dispense with the
traditional form of presentation of evidence.
In so doing, the court assumes that the
ISSUE # 1: Whether the Bane deposition, which had matter is so notorious that it would not be
already been previously introduced and admitted in disputed.
Civil Case No. 0130, should have been taken judicial x The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule
notice of by the 129 of the Revised Rules on
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0009. Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to take
judicial notice, inter alia, of
HELD # 1: NO. "the official acts of the x x x judicial
x The petitioner also claims that since the Bane departments of the
deposition had already been Philippines,"155 or gives the court the
previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case discretion to take judicial notice of
No. 0130, then the matters "ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions."156 On the
other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court
to take judicial notice of any matter and the
court may allow the parties to be heard on
the propriety of taking judicial notice of the
matter involved.157 In the present case, after
the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or
Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents
were also heard through their corresponding
oppositions.
x In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are
not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court,
and
notwithstanding that both cases may have
been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge.158 This
rule though admits of exceptions.
o As a matter of convenience to all the
parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in
its
archives as read into the record
of a case pending before it,
when,
with the knowledge of, and
absent an objection from, the
adverse
party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and
number or in some other manner
by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any
part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court's
direction, at the request or with
the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending.159
x Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of
another case or cases,
where sufficient basis exists in the records
of the case before it, warranting the
dismissal of the latter case.160
x The issue before us does not involve the applicability
of the rule on mandatory
taking of judicial notice; neither is the
applicability of the rule on discretionary taking
of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather,
the petitioner approaches the concept of
judicial notice from a genealogical perspective
of
treating whatever evidence offered in any of the
"children" cases -
Civil Case 0130 - as evidence in the "parent" case -
Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161
To the petitioner, the supposed
relationship of these cases warrants the taking of
judicial notice.
o We strongly disagree.
First, the supporting cases162 the
petitioner cited
are inapplicable either
because these cases
involve only a single
proceeding or an
exception to the rule,
which proscribes the
courts from taking judicial
notice of the
contents of the records of
other cases.163 Second,
the petitioners proposition is
obviously
obnoxious to a system of
orderly procedure.
The petitioner itself admits
that the present case has
generated a lot of cases,
which, in all likelihood,
involve issues of varying
complexity. If we follow the
logic of the petitioners
argument, we would be
espousing judicial confusion
by indiscriminately
allowing the admission of
evidence in one case, which
was presumably found
competent and relevant in
another case, simply based on
the supposed lineage
of the cases. It is the duty of
the petitioner, as a
party-litigant, to properly lay
before the court the
evidence it relies
upon in support of the
relief it
seeks, instead of
imposing that same
duty on the
court.
x We invite the petitioners attention to our prefatory
pronouncement in Lopez v.
Sandiganbayan:164
o Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial
system, by common
sense, tradition and the law,
the Judge in trying a case sees
only
with judicial eyes as he ought
to know nothing about the facts
of
the case, except those which
have been adduced judicially in
evidence. Thus, when the case is
up for trial, the judicial head is
empty as to facts involved and it
is incumbent upon the litigants
to
the action to establish by
evidence the facts upon which
they rely.
(emphasis ours)
x We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to
entertain the petitioners
argument that we should take
judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
____________________________________
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY [RULE 130]
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
When an object is relevant to a
fact in issue, the court may acquire
1. Object/ Real Evidence knowledge thereof by:
o Actually
Section 1. Object as evidence. Objects as viewing the
evidence are those addressed to the senses of the object in
court. When an object is relevant to the fact in
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed
this caser, it
by the court. (1a) becomes an
object
ANNOTATION evidence
o
Object evidence evidence that is addressed Receiving
to the senses of the testimonial
court thereon
o Refers to the actual thing itself the
o NOT the perception of a witness of testimony of
what the thing is a
o NOT a replica of such thing person
o Has persuasive effect on the part of DOES NOT
the court
 preclude the offering of an considered as an object
object as evidence:
object evidence OR o Existence or condition
the inspection of the document
thereof through an o Nature of the
ocular handwritings thereon
Ocular inspection lies o Age of the paper used
within the discretion o
of the court; Blemishes or
conducted by alterations
a judge; with thereon, as
notice OR in when
the presence falsification is
of the parties
to the alleged
case Persons may also be considered
When the court may refuse the introduction of as object documents, as when
object evidence and any of the ff are sought to be
rely on testimonial evidence alone: proven:
o When the exhibition o Nature, extent or
of the object is contrary location of his injuries
to public o His physique
policy, morals or o His
decency facial
XPN: but when the features
viewing is necessary in the to
interest of determine
justice, the his
object may resemblan
be viewed, ce and
even if
repulsive, to possible
the exclusion relationshi
of the p to
public another or
o When to require its his racial
being viewed would result origin or
in delays, probable age
inconvenience, or o In case
unnecessary expenses out of a
of woman, to
proportion to the evidentiary value determine
of such object the fact
o When such object evidence would that she is
be confusing or
misleading example:
when the purpose is to pregnant
prove the Testimonial vs. Object
former condition of the o Physical
object and there is no evidence is a
preliminary mute but
showing that there has eloquent
been no substantial manifestation
change in the of
said condition truth, and
o When the testimonial or it ranks high in
documentary evidence our hierarchy
already of trustworthy
presented renders the evidence
viewing of the object . We
unnecessary have, on
Real evidence is NOT limited to the viewing of many
an object occasion
o It also includes s, relied
objects which may be principall
known by other y upon
senses, viz: physical
Hearing auditory evidence
Taste gustatory in
Touch tactile ascertain
Smell olfactory ing the
Documents may also be considered as object truth.
documents, when Where
what is sought to be proven is NOT the
the contents of the same. Hence, physical
when any of the ff are sought to evidence
be proven, a document is only
on record runs counter
to the consistently rule that the physical
testimonial evidence of the evidence should prevail.
prosecution witnesses, we (BPI vs. Reyes)
o An object evidence when
offered in accordance with the
requisites of its admissibility
becomes evidence of the
highest order and speaks
more eloquently than
witnesses put together
(People vs. Larranaga)
Requisites for Admissibility
o Relevant
o Authenticated to be considered as
competent
o Passed the test of authentication by a
competent witness
Both object and
documentary evidence cannot
stand alone
There must be someone
who should identify
the object to be
the actual thing
involved in the
litigation
This is done to comply
with the element of
competence as
an essential
ingredient of
admissibility
o Formally offered in evidence
A vital act after
authentication because the
court shall
consider no
evidence which
has not been
formally offered
Laying the foundation
common problem in
offering an object
in evidence,
particularly in
convincing the
court that the
object being
presented is the
actual thing
involved in the
litigation and not a
mere substitute or
representation thereof
Competent Witness one who:
o Has the capacity to identify the
object
o Has actual and personal
knowledge of the exhibit he is
presenting for admission
AFTER authentication the object NEEDS to
be formally offered in
evidence at the appropriate time (that
is, when the offeror has rested his case)
Laying the Foundation common problem in
authenticating an
object evidence
o DEFINITION: proving that the
object being presented is
the real thing and not
merely a substitute or
representation thereof
Once all requisites of admissibility are present,
an object evidence
 becomes evidence of HIGHEST ORDER and speaks
more eloquently than all witnesses put together
o BUT it must be remembered that object
evidence
CANNOT STAND ALONE and requires
testimonial evidence
for authentication
Object Evidence vis--vis Right Against Self-Incrimination
o Right against self-incrimination cannot be
invoked against
object evidence
o If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability
not only
for his [physical control of his] own vocal
utterances, but
also for his physical control in whatever
form exercise,
then, it would be possible for a guilty
person to shut
himself up in his house, with all the tools
and indicia of
his crime, and defy the authority of the law
to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained
by forcibly
overthrowing his possession and compelling
the surrender of the evidential articles a
clear reduction ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
compulsion
that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but
testimonial
compulsion. (Justice Holmes in Holt vs. US,
cited in People vs. Malimit)
Demonstrative Evidence representation or demonstration
of a
thing
o NOT strictly an object evidence
o TEST OF ADMISSIBILITY: Whether the
evidence
sufficiently or accurately represents the
object it seeks to
demonstrate or represent.
o Under the Electronic Rules on Evidence, a
photographic
evidence of events is admissible when:
It is presented, displayed and shown to
the
court AND
It is identified, explained or
authenticated by
EITHER:
x The person who made the
recording OR

216
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)

x Other person who is competent to

to the next link in the chain.
testify to the accuracy thereof

These witnesses would then

Same rule applies in motion pictures and
describe the precautions taken to
recordings

ensure that there had been no

View the process of going out of the courtroom to observe places
change in the condition of the
and objects

item and no opportunity for

o Authorized under Section 1 Rule 130 BUT, even without

someone not in the chain to have

 this provision, the court is recognized to have the

possession of the same. (Lopez

inherent power to order a view when there is a need to

vs. People)
do so, pursuant to Section 5 of s he
Rule 135 made
o Must be made in the on the
presence of the parties OR at object
least o Non-unique Objects
with previous notice to those with no identifying
them marks
Categories of Object Evidence for purposes and cannot be marked
of authentication of Those which
the object and of laying the foundation of are not readily
the exhibit: identifiable, were
o Unique Objects those that not
have readily identifiable mad
marks e
If a thing has a unique iden
characteristic, like a tifia
serial number, it is ble
readily identifiable. or
When the witness can
testifies that such object not
has a unique be
characteristic, mad
that he saw e
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remembers its like
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condition s,
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o Objects made unique those and
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like a kitchen situation, the
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no identifying evidence must
marks establish a
Authentication chain of
requirement is satisfied custody
when x
the witness
testifies that
he made the PURPOSE:
to
thing
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testi e
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uate s
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f an r
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evide e
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rt a h
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on is w
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that w
every i
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the s
exhibi
t
would p
descri o
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how s
and e
from s
whom s
it was i
o
n, x The
the investigator need
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tion that
in the
whic proce
h it ss of
was sealin
recei g the
ved evide
and nce
the and
condi the
tion submi
in ssion
whic to
h it the
was chemi
deliv st
ered were
done
in the

prese
nce of
the
accus
ed or
his
repre
senta
tive,
pursu
ant to
the
doctri
ne of
presu
mptio
n of
regularity
BUT non-compliance with
the procedure in
the chain of
custody of
drugs DOES
NOT
automatically
result in the
acquittal of the

accused if the
prosecution is
able to show
that:
x Such non-
compliance is
justified
AND
x The integrity of
the evidence is
preserved
DNA Evidence totality of the DNA profiles,
results, other genetic
information directly generated
from the DNA testing of biological
samples
o FACTORS to be considered in
assessing probative value of
DNA:
How the samples were
collected
How they were handled
Possibility of
contamination
Procedure followed in
analyzing
 Whether proper standards and
procedure
were followed in conducting the
tests
Qualifications of the analyst
o The ff must be shown as
CONDITIONS prior to the
issuance of an order for DNA
testing:
A biological sample exists that
has relevance
to the case
Such biological sample
x Was not previously
subjected to
DNA testing OR
x If previously
subjected, results
require
confirmatio
n for good
reasons
DNA testing uses a scientifically
valid
technique
Has scientific potential to
produce new
information that is
relevant to the
proper resolution of
the case
Existence of other factors which
may
potentially affect the accuracy of
DNA testing
o BUT DNA testing may be done
WITHOUT court order if
conducted PRIOR to a suit or
proceeding
Paraffin Test inconclusive because unreliable in
use
o Can only establish the presence or
absence of nitrites or
nitrates on the hand
These substances are also found
in tobacco
o Considered as merely a corroborative
evidence
Polygraph Test/ Lie Detector Test operates on the
principle
that stress causes physiological changes in
the body which can be measured to
indicate whether a person is telling the
truth
o Uniformly rejected when
offered for the purpose of
establishing guilt or
innocence

CASES

JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
x RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52 issued a warrant of search
and seizure
x 5 police officers then raided the house of Malillin in his
presence, and in the
presence of his wife, and barangay kagawad Delfin Licup

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allowed entry into
the house by
o The team was headed by P/Insp. petitioner after the
Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with latter was shown the
PO3 Roberto Esternon search warrant; that
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro upon entering the
Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala premises, he ordered
and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera Esternon and
(Gallinera) as members. barangay kagawad
x The raid yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu Licup, whose
and five (5) empty plastic assistance had
sachets containing residual morsels of the said previously been
substance requested in
x Mallillin was then charged with violation of Section executing the
11,7 Article II of Republic Act warrant, to conduct
No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive the search; that the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 rest of the
x Mallillin pleaded not guilty police team
x Prosecution evidence: positioned
o Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the themselves outside
leader of the raiding team, the house to make
testified on the sure
circumstances surrounding that nobody flees;
the search as follows: that that he was observing
he and his men were the conduct of the
 search petitioner himself
from about a meter away; inside. However, it
that the search conducted was momentarily
inside the interrupted when one
bedroom of petitioner yielded of the police officers
five empty plastic sachets declared to Bolanos
with that petitioner's wife,
suspected shabu residue Sheila, was tucking
contained in a denim bag and something inside her
kept in one underwear. Forthwith,
of the cabinets, and two a lady officer arrived
plastic sachets containing to conduct the search
shabu which fell of Sheila's body inside
off from one of the pillows the same bedroom. At
searched by Esternona that point, everyone
discovery that except Esternon was
was made in the presence of asked to step out of
petitioner.10 On cross the room. So, it was in
examination,
Bolanos admitted that during his presence that
the search, he was explaining Sheila was searched
its by the lady officer.
progress to petitioner's Petitioner
mother, Norma, but that at was then asked by a
the same time police officer to buy
his eyes were fixed on the cigarettes at a nearby
search being conducted by store and when
Esternon.11 he returned from
o Esternon testified that the denim bag the errand, he
containing the empty plastic was told that
sachets was found "behind" nothing was
the door of the bedroom and found on Sheila's
not inside the cabinet; that he body.18 Sheila
then found the two filled was ordered to
sachets under a transfer to the
pillow on the bed and other bedroom
forthwith called on Gallinera to together with her
have the children.19
items recorded and marked.12 o Petitioner asserted that on his
On cross, he admitted that it return from the errand, he was
was he summoned by
alone who conducted the Esternon to the
search because Bolanos was bedroom and once
standing inside, the officer
behind him in the living room closed the door and
portion of the house and that asked him to lift the
petitioner handed to him the mattress on the bed.
things to be searched, which And
included as he was doing as
the pillow in which the two told, Esternon
sachets of shabu were kept;13 stopped him and
that he ordered him to
brought the seized items to lift the portion of the
the Balogo Police Station for a headboard. In that
"true instant, Esternon
inventory," then to the trial showed
court14 and thereafter to the him "sachet of shabu"
laboratory.15 which according to
o Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the him came from a
forensic chemist who administered pillow
the examination on the on the bed.20
seized items, was presented Petitioner's account in
as an expert witness to its entirety was
identify the items submitted corroborated
to the laboratory. She in its material
revealed that the two filled respects by Norma,
sachets were positive of barangay kagawad
shabu and that of the five Licup and
empty sachets, four were Sheila in their
positive of containing residue testimonies. Norma
of the same substance.16 She and Sheila positively
further admitted that all declared
seven that petitioner was
sachets were delivered to not in the house for
the laboratory by Esternon the entire duration
in the afternoon of the same of the
day that the warrant was search because at
executed except that it was one point he was
not she but rather a certain sent by Esternon to
Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who the store
received the items from to buy cigarettes
Esternon at the laboratory. while Sheila was
x Defense evidence: being searched by
o The evidence for the defense focused the lady
on the irregularity of the officer.21 Licup for his
search and seizure conducted part testified on the
by the police operatives. circumstances
Petitioner testified that surrounding the
Esternon began the search of discovery of the
the bedroom with Licup and
 plastic sachets. He recounted
that
after the five empty sachets
were found, he went out of
the
bedroom and into the living
room and after about three
minutes,
Esternon, who was left inside
the bedroom, exclaimed that
he had
just found two filled sachets
x RTC found Mallillin guilty
o The trial court reasoned that the fact
that shabu was found in the
house of petitioner was prima
facie evidence of petitioner's
animus possidendi sufficient
to convict him of the charge
inasmuch as
things which a person
possesses or over which he
exercises acts of ownership
are presumptively owned by
him. It also noted
petitioner's failure to
ascribe ill motives to the
police officers to fabricate
charges against him
x Mallillin appealed to CA
x CA affirmed RTC; denied ensuing MR
x Mallillin filed a Rule 45 before the SC
x OSG filed its Comment
o OSG bids to establish that the raiding
team had regularly
performed its duties in the conduct of the
search.31
o It points to petitioner's incredulous claim
that he was framed up by
Esternon on the ground that the
discovery of the two filled
sachets was made in his and
Licup's presence.
o It likewise notes that petitioner's bare
denial cannot defeat the
positive assertions of the
prosecution and that the same
does not
suffice to overcome the prima
facie existence of animus
possidendi.
ISSUE: Whether it was sufficiently shown that the
sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were the
same ones obtained from Mallillin.
HELD: NO.
x Prefatorily, although the trial court's findings of fact
are entitled to great weight
and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule
does not apply where facts of weight and
substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied in a case
under appeal.32 In the case at bar, several
circumstances obtain which, if properly
appreciated, would warrant a conclusion
different from that arrived at by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
x Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.33 Essential therefore in
these cases is that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond
doubt.34 Be that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not
suffice to create in a reasonable mind the
moral certainty required to sustain a
finding of guilt. More than just the fact of
possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as
exhibit must also be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt. The
chain of custody requirement performs
this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.35
x As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent
claims it to be.36 It would include testimony
about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item
 and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.37
x While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness.38 The same standard
likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to
alteration, tampering, contamination39 and even
substitution and exchange.40 In other words, the
exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering
without regard to whether the same is advertent or
otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.
x Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is
greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that
has physical characteristics
fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their
daily lives.41 Graham vs. State42 positively
acknowledged this danger. In that
case where a substance later analyzed as heroin
was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the
condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time
it was in their possession was excluded from the
prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the
white powder seized could have been indeed heroin
or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It
ruled that unless the state can show by records or
testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit
at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of
the state as to the laboratory's
findings is inadmissible.43
x A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are
not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific
analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of
the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been
tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other casesby
accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was
seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same,
a standard more stringent
than that applied to cases involving objects which are
readily identifiable must be
applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain
of custody of the item with
sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable
that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
x A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant
doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized
from petitioner. Of the people
who came into direct contact with the seized
objects, only Esternon and Arroyo
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testified for the specific purpose of
establishing the identity of the evidence.
Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly
handed over the confiscated sachets for
recording and marking, as well as Garcia,
the person to whom Esternon directly
handed over the seized items for chemical
analysis at the crime laboratory, were not
presented in court to establish the
circumstances under which they handled
the subject items. Any reasonable mind
might then ask the question: Are the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from
petitioner the very same objects
laboratory tested and offered in court as
evidence?
x The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to
provide an affirmative
answer. Considering that it was Gallinera
who recorded and marked
the seized items, his testimony in court is
crucial to affirm whether the
exhibits were the same items handed
over to him by Esternon at the
place of seizure and acknowledge
the initials marked thereon as his
own. The same is true of
Garcia who could have, but
nevertheless
failed, to testify on the
circumstances under which
she received the
items from Esternon, what she
did with them during the time
they
were in her possession until
before she delivered the same
to Arroyo for analysis.
x The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in
discharging its burden of establishing
the identity of the seized items
because it failed to offer not
only the testimony of Gallinera
and Garcia but also any
sufficient explanation for such
failure. In effect, there is no
reasonable guaranty as to the
integrity of the exhibits
 inasmuch as it failed to rule out the alleged purpose of making a "true
possibility of substitution of the inventory" thereof, but there
exhibits, appears to be no reason why a
which cannot but inure to its own true inventory could
detriment. This holds true not only not be made in petitioner's house
with when in fact the apprehending
respect to the two filled sachets but also team was able
to the five sachets allegedly containing to record and mark the seized
morsels of shabu. items and there and then prepare
x Also, contrary to what has been consistently a seizure receipt
claimed by the prosecution that the therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the
search and seizure was conducted in a raiding team has had enough
regular manner and must be presumed to opportunity to
be so, the records disclose a series of cause the issuance of the warrant
irregularities committed by the police which means that it has had as
officers from the commencement of the much time to
search of petitioner's house until the prepare for its implementation.
submission of the seized items to the While the final proviso in Section
laboratory for analysis. The Court takes 21 of the rules
note of the unrebutted testimony of would appear to excuse non-
petitioner, corroborated by that of his compliance therewith, the same
wife, cannot benefit the
that prior to the discovery of the two prosecution as it failed to offer
filled sachets petitioner was sent out of any acceptable justification for
his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby Esternon's course
store. Equally telling is the testimony of of action.
Bolanos that he posted some of the x Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the
members of the raiding team at the door seized items to the court demonstrates
of petitioner's house in order to forestall a departure from the directive in
the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the the search warrant that the
scene. By no stretch of logic can it be items seized be
conclusively explained why petitioner was immediately delivered to the
sent out of his house on an errand when in trial court with a true and
the first place the police officers were verified inventory of the
in fact apprehensive that he would flee to same,45 as required by Rule
evade arrest. This fact assumes prime 126, Section 1246 of the Rules
importance because the two filled sachets of Court. People v.
were allegedly discovered by Esternon Go47 characterized this
immediately after petitioner returned to requirement as mandatory in
his house from the errand, such that he order to preclude the
was not able to witness the conduct of the substitution of or tampering with
search during the brief but crucial said items by interested
interlude that he was away. parties.48 Thus, as a
x It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it reasonable safeguard, People vs.
was petitioner himself who Del Castillo49 declared that the
handed to him the items to be searched approval by the
including the pillow from which the two court which issued the search
filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is warrant is necessary before police
contrary to ordinary human behavior that officers can
petitioner would hand over the said pillow retain the property seized and
to Esternon knowing fully well that without it, they would have no
illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the authority to retain
same breath, the manner by which the possession thereof and more so
search of Sheila's body was brought up by to deliver the same to another
a member of the raiding team also agency.50 Mere
raises serious doubts as to the necessity tolerance by the trial court of a
thereof. The declaration of one of the contrary practice does not make
police officers that he saw Sheila tuck the practice
something in her underwear certainly right because it is violative of
diverted the attention of the members the mandatory requirements
of petitioner's household away from the of the law and it thereby
search being conducted by Esternon defeats the very purpose for
prior to the discovery of the two filled the enactment.51
sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court x Given the foregoing deviations of police
likewise takes note of Esternon's officer Esternon from the standard and
suspicious presence in the bedroom while normal procedure in the implementation
Sheila was being searched by a lady of the warrant and in taking post-
officer. The confluence of these
circumstances by any objective standard
of behavior
contradicts the prosecution's claim of regularity in
the exercise of duty.
x Moreover, Section 2144 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-
seizure procedure in taking
custody of seized drugs. In a language too
plain to require a different
construction, it mandates that the officer
acquiring initial custody of
drugs under a search warrant must
conduct the photographing and the
physical inventory of the item at the place
where the warrant has been
served. Esternon deviated from this
procedure. It was elicited from him that at
the close of the search of petitioner's
house, he brought the seized items
immediately to the police station for the
 inducement or instigation, an
seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by innocent person is lured by a
the trial court and the public officer or private detective
Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in to commit a crime. In the case at
the conduct of police duty is bar, the buy-bust operation was
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is planned only after the police had
merely just thata mere received
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which information that the appellant
when challenged by the was selling shabu.
evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.52 o The CA also held that the failure of the
Suffice it to say that this police to conduct a prior
presumption cannot preponderate over the surveillance on the appellant
presumption of innocence that was not fatal to the
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable prosecutions case. It reasoned
doubt.53 In the present out that the police are given
case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal wide discretion to select
drugs allegedly seized from effective means to apprehend
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner drug dealers. A prior
by which the same were surveillance is, therefore, not
placed under police custody before offered in court, necessary, especially when the
strongly militates a finding of police are already accompanied
guilt. by their informant.
x In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the o The CA further ruled that the prosecution
presupposition that the was able to sufficiently
burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prove an unbroken chain of
prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own custody of the shabu. It
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. explained that
The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation PO3 Almarez sealed the plastic
of the accused, for the law sachet seized from the appellant,
presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary
is shown.54 In dubio pro marked it with his initials, and
reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in transmitted it to the PNP Crime
the balance, acquittal on Laboratory for examination. PSI
reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. Quintero conducted a qualitative
examination and found the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. FELIMON specimen positive for the
PAGADUAN y TAMAYO, Appellant. presence of
G.R. No. 179029 shabu. According to the CA, the
prosecution was able to prove
that
August 12, 2010 the substance seized was the
THIRD DIVISION same specimen submitted to the
laboratory and presented in
FACTS: court, notwithstanding that this
x Capt De Vera received information that Pagaduan was selling
drugs specimen was turned over to
x Captain Jaime de Vera called PO3 Peter Almarez and SPO1 the crime laboratory only after
Domingo Balido - two
who were both in Santiago City and informed days.
them re planned buy-bust operation x Pagaduan filed a Rule 45 before the SC
x Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO3 o appellant claims that the lower courts
Almarez as the poseur erred in convicting him of the
buyer crime charged despite the
x Buy bust ensued prosecutions failure to prove
o The informant approached Pagaduan and his guilt beyond reasonable
introduced Almarez to doubt.
him o He harps on the fact that the police did
o Almarez informed Pagaduan that he is interested not conduct a prior
in buying shabu surveillance on him before conducting the
o Pagaduan then handed one heat-sealed buy-bust operation.
transparent plastic sachet x OSG filed its comment
containing white crystalline substance to PO3 o counters with the argument that the
Almarez. chain of custody of the shabu
o PO3 Almarez, in turn, gave the two pre-marked was sufficiently established.
P100 bills to the o It explained that the shabu was turned
appellant over by the police officers
x Information was then filed against Pagaduan before the to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Regional Trial Court where it was found by the
(RTC), Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for forensic chemist to be positive
violation of Section 5, Article II for the presence of shabu.
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive o The OSG likewise claimed that the
Dangerous Drugs Act of appellant failed to rebut the
2002. presumption of regularity in
x RTC convicted Pagaduan the performance of official
x Pagaduan appealed to CA duties by the police.
o Raised instigation as defense o The OSG further added that a prior
x CA affirmed RTC surveillance is not indispensable
o The CA found unmeritorious the appellants to a prosecution for illegal sale of drugs.
defense of instigation,
and held that the appellant was
apprehended as a result of a legitimate
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entrapment operation. It explained that in
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drugs. We have
repeatedly declared
that the deviation from
the
standard procedure
dismally compromises
the integrity of the
ISSUE: Whether it was sufficiently shown that the presentation in court of
sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were the corpus
the same ones obtained from Pagaduan. delicti, i.e., the body
or substance of the
HELD: NO. crime that establishes
x In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug that a crime has
under Section 5 of R.A. No. actually been
9165, the prosecution must prove the committed, as shown
following elements: (1) the identity of by presenting the
the object of the illegal
buyer and the seller, the object, and the transaction.26 To
consideration; and (2) the delivery of remove any doubt or
the thing sold and the payment uncertainty on the
therefor. All these require evidence that identity and integrity
the sale of the seized drug,
transaction transpired, coupled with the evidence must
 definitely show that the illegal drug open to
presented tampering,
in court is the same illegal drug actually alteration or
recovered from the appellant; otherwise, substitution either
by accident or
the prosecution for possession or for otherwise.28 The
drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 records of the
fails.27 present case are
x The required procedure on the seizure and custody of bereft of evidence
drugs is embodied in showing that the
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, buy-bust team
which states: followed the
o (1) The apprehending team having initial outlined procedure
custody and despite its
control of the drugs shall, mandatory terms.
immediately after seizure The deficiency is
and confiscation, physically patent from the
inventory and photograph following exchanges
the same in the presence of at the trial:
the accused or the person/s o PROSECUTOR [EMERSON
from whom such items were TURINGAN]:
confiscated and/or seized, or o Q: After you handed this
his/her buy-bust money to the
representative or counsel, a accused, what
representative from the happened next?
media and the Department o [PO3 ALMAREZ:]
of Justice (DOJ), and any o A: When the shabu was
elected already with me and I gave him
public official who shall be the
required to sign the copies of money
the inventory and be given a [,] I
copy thereof[.] signale
x This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the d the
Implementing Rules and two,
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads: Captai
o (a) The apprehending officer/team having n Jaime
initial custody and de
control of the drugs shall, Vera
immediately after seizure and
and SPO1
confiscation, physically Balido,
inventory and photograph sir.
the same in the o Q: After you gave that
presence of the accused or signal, what happened?
the person/s from whom o A: Then they approached
such items us and helped me in arresting
were confiscated and/or Felimon
seized, or his/her Pagaduan, sir.
representative or o Q: After Pagaduan was
counsel, a representative arrested, what happened next?
from the media and the o A: After arresting
Department of Pagaduan[,] we brought him
Justice (DOJ), and any directly in Diadi
elected public official who Police Station, sir.
shall be required o Q: What happened when
to sign the copies of the you brought the accused to the
inventory and be given a Police
copy thereof: Station in Diadi?
Provided, that the physical o A: When we were already
inventory and photograph in Diadi Police Station, we first
shall be put him in
conducted at the place jail in the Municipal Jail of
where the search warrant is Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
served; or at o Q: What did you do with
the nearest police station or the shabu?
at the nearest office of the o A: The request for
laboratory examination was
apprehending officer/team,
prepared and was
whichever is practicable, in
brought to the Crime Lab.
case of
of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya,
warrantless seizures;
sir.
Provided, further, that non-
o Q: After making the
compliance with request, what did you do
these requirements under next[,] if any[,] Mr.
justifiable grounds, as long Witness?
as the o A: After submission of the
integrity and the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we
evidentiary value of the prepared
seized items are properly our joint affidavit for
preserved by the submission of the case to
apprehending officer/team, the Court, sir.29
shall not render void x From the foregoing exchanges during
and invalid such seizures of trial, it is evident that the apprehending
and custody over said team, upon
items[.] confiscation of the
x Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is drug, immediately
required because of brought the appellant
the illegal drug's unique and the seized items
characteristic rendering it
indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily
 to the police station, and, once there,
made the request for
laboratory examination. No physical
inventory and photograph of the seized
items were taken in the presence of the
accused or his counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of
Justice, and an elective official. PO3
Almarez, on cross-examination, was
unsure and could not give a categorical
answer when asked whether he issued a
receipt for the shabu confiscated from
the appellant.30 At any rate, no such
receipt or certificate of inventory
appears
in the records.
x In several cases, we have emphasized the importance
of compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the custody and
disposition of the seized
evidence. In People v. Morales,31 we acquitted
the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to
photograph and inventory the seized items,
without giving any justifiable ground for the
non-observance of the required procedures.
People v. Garcia32 likewise resulted in an
acquittal because no physical inventory was
ever made, and no photograph of the seized
items was taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and
its implementing rules. In Bondad, Jr. v.
People,33 we also acquitted the accused for
the failure of the police to
conduct an inventory and to photograph
the seized items, without justifiable
grounds.
x We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,34
People v. Denoman,35 People
v. Partoza,36 People v. Robles,37 and
People v. dela Cruz,38 where we
emphasized the importance of
complying with the required
mandatory procedures under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165.
x We recognize that the strict compliance with the
requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be
possible under field
conditions; the police operates under varied
conditions, and cannot at all times
attend to all the niceties of the procedures in
the handling of confiscated
evidence. For this reason, the last sentence of
the implementing rules
provides that "non-compliance with these
requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and
custody over said items[.]" Thus,
noncompliance with the strict
directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not
necessarily fatal to the
prosecutions case; police procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence
may still have some lapses, as in the present
case. These lapses, however, must
be recognized and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized must be shown to have
been preserved.39
x In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to
offer any
explanation to justify the failure of the police to
conduct the required
physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs. The apprehending
team failed to show why an inventory and
photograph of the seized evidence
had not been made either in the place of
seizure and arrest or at the nearest
police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless
arrests). We emphasize that for the saving
clause to apply, it is important that
the prosecution explain the reasons behind
the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and value of the seized evidence had
been preserved.40 In other words, the
justifiable ground for noncompliance must be
proven as a fact. The court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they
even exist.41
x The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
x Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that
unwavering exactitude be
observed in establishing the corpus delicti -
the body of the crime whose core is
the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact
necessary to constitute the crime
must be established. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts
concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.42
x Blacks Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
o In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the
narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for
the custody of the evidence from the moment in
which it reaches his custody until the moment in
which it is offered in evidence, and such evidence
goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence.
Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.
x Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
Series of
2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as
follows:
o "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such
record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of
the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as
evidence, and the final disposition[.]
x In Malillin v. People,43 the Court explained that the chain of custody
rule
requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment
the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched it would describe how and
from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain.
x In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the
chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court
was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.
x The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heat-
sealed plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez
mentioned on cross-
examination that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet
"after
apprehending" the appellant. Notably, this testimony
constituted the totality of
the prosecutions evidence on the marking of the seized
evidence. PO3 Almarezs
testimony, however, lacked specifics on how he marked the
sachet and who
witnessed the marking. In People v. Sanchez, we ruled that the
"marking" of the
seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain
and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be
done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. In the present case, nothing in the records gives
us an insight on the manner and
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
the seized sachet - to
the exclusion of others
circumstances that attended the - during its transfer
marking of the confiscated sachet. from the place
Whether the marking had been done in of arrest and
the presence of the appellant is not at confiscation to the
all clear from the evidence that merely police station. The
mentioned that the evidence had been prosecution likewise
marked after the appellants failed to
apprehension. present evidence
x The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover pertaining to the
from the identity of the duty
apprehending team to the police desk officer who
station. PO3 Almarez testified that the received
appellant was brought to the Diadi the plastic sachet
Police Station after his arrest. containing shabu from
However, he the buy-bust team.
failed to identify the person who had This is particularly
control and possession of the seized significant since the
drug seized specimen was
at the time of its transportation to the turned over to the PNP
police station. In the absence of clear Crime
evidence, we cannot presume that Laboratory only after
PO3 Almarez, as the poseur buyer, two days. It was not,
handled therefore, clear who
 had temporary custody before offered in court,
custody of the seized items during this strongly militates a finding of guilt.
significant intervening period of time. x We are not unmindful of the
Although the records show that the pernicious effects of drugs in our society;
request for laboratory examination of they are
the lingering maladies that
seized plastic sachet was prepared by destroy families and
Captain de Vera, the evidence does relationships, and
not engender crimes.
show that he was the official who The Court is one with
received the marked plastic sachet all the agencies
from the concerned in pursuing
buy-bust team. an intensive and
x As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, unrelenting campaign
the records show that against this social
the seized specimen was forwarded by dilemma. Regardless of
PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime how much we
Laboratory on December 29, 2003, want to curb this
where it was received by PO2 menace, we cannot
Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI disregard the
Quintero. However, the person from protection provided by
whom PO3 Almarez received the seized the
illegal drug for transfer to the crime Constitution, most
laboratory was not identified. As earlier particularly the
discussed, the presumption of
identity of the duty desk officer who innocence bestowed on
received the shabu, as well as the the
person who had temporary custody of appellant. Proof
the seized items for two days, had not beyond reasonable
been established. doubt, or that quantum
x The procedural lapses mentioned above show the of proof sufficient to
glaring gaps in the produce moral
chain of custody, creating a reasonable certainty that would
doubt whether the drugs convince and satisfy
confiscated from the appellant were the the conscience of those
same drugs that were brought
to the crime laboratory for chemical who act in judgment, is
analysis, and eventually offered in indispensable to
court as evidence. In the absence of overcome this
concrete evidence on the illegal drugs constitutional
bought and sold, the body of the crime - presumption. If the
the corpus delicti - has not been prosecution has not
adequately proven.44 In effect, the proved, in the first
prosecution failed to fully prove the place, all the
elements elements of the crime
of the crime charged, creating charged, which in this
reasonable doubt on the appellants case is the corpus
criminal delicti, then the
liability. appellant deserves no
x Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of less than an acquittal.
Official Duties
x In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied NARCISO SALAS,
on the evidentiary Petitioners, v.
presumption that official duties have ANNABELLE
been regularly performed. This MATUSALEM,
presumption, it must be emphasized, is Respondent. G.R.
not conclusive.45 It cannot, by itself, No. 180284,
overcome the constitutional September 11,
presumption of innocence. Any taint of 2013
irregularity FIRST DIVISION
affects the whole performance and
should make the presumption FACTS:
unavailable. In x Matusalem claims that Salas is the
the present case, the failure of the father of her child
apprehending team to comply with o That he was 56 and she
paragraph was 24 and he made her
1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, believe that he
and with the chain of custody was a widower
requirement of this Act effectively o That Salas once rented an
negates this presumption. As we apartment where she stayed
explained in o That Salas likewise paid
for all the hospital bills when
Malillin v. People:46
she gave
x The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a
mere presumption birth
o BUT when Matusalem
disputable by contrary proof and which
refused Salas offer that the
when challenged by the evidence
latters family
cannot be regarded as binding truth.
will take care of the child,
Suffice it to say that this presumption
Salas left her and refused
cannot
to give support
preponderate over the presumption of
x Matusalem filed a petition for
innocence that prevails if not support with prayer for SPL before RTC
overthrown Cabanatuan City against Salas
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In x Salas filed his answer
the present case the lack of conclusive o He described respondent
identification of the illegal drugs as a woman of loose morals,
allegedly seized from petitioner, having
coupled with borne her
the irregularity in the manner by which first child
the same were placed under police also out of
wedlock when she went to
work in a female real estate agent named
Italy. Jobless upon her Felicisima de Guzman.
return to the country, Respondent had seduced a senior
respondent spent police officer in San Isidro and
time riding on petitioners jeepney which her charge of sexual abuse against
was then being utilized by said police officer was later
withdrawn in exchange for the
quashing of drug charges against
respondents brother-in-law who
was then detained at the
municipal jail. It was at that time
respondent introduced herself to
petitioner whom she pleaded for
charity as she was pregnant with
another child. Petitioner denied
paternity of the child Christian
Paulo; he was motivated by no
other reason except genuine
altruism when he agreed to
shoulder the expenses for the
delivery
of said child, unaware of
respondents chicanery and deceit

designed to scandalize him in

exchange for financial favor.
x Matusalems evidence:
o Respondent testified that she first met
petitioner at the house of
his kumadre Felicisima de
Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San
Isidro,
Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner
told her
he is already a widower and he
has no more companion in life
because his children are all
grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a
construction business and a
housing
subdivision (petitioner offered her
a job at their family-owned Ma.
Cristina Village). Petitioner at the
time already knows that she is a
single mother as she had a child
by her former boyfriend in Italy.
He then brought her to a motel,
promising that he will take care of
her and marry her. She believed
him and yielded to his advances,
with the thought that she and her
child will have a better life.
Thereafter, they saw each other
weekly and petitioner gave her
money for her child. When she
became pregnant with petitioners
child, it was only then she learned
that he is in fact not a widower.
She wanted to abort the baby but
petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.5
o On the fourth month of her pregnancy,
petitioner rented an
apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided
for all their expenses. She gave
birth to their child on December 28,

1994 at the Good Samaritan

Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before
delivery, petitioner even walked
her at the hospital room and
massaged her stomach, saying
he had not done this to his wife.
She filled out the form for the
childs birth certificate and wrote all
the information supplied by
petitioner himself. It was also
petitioner who paid the hospital
bills and drove her baby home. He
was
excited and happy to have a son at
his advanced age who is his
look-alike, and this was
witnessed by other boarders,
visitors and
 Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit father of Christian Paulo and ordering him
petitioner rented. to give monthly support.
However, on the 18th day after the babys birth, x CA affirmed RTC
petitioner went to o Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not
Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to enjoy the benefit of a
her daughter record of birth in the civil
and eventually his wife was also informed about his registry which bears
having sired an illegitimate child. His family then acknowledgment signed by
decided to adopt the baby and Narciso Salas. He cannot claim
just give respondent money so she can go open and continuous possession
abroad. When she of the status of an illegitimate
refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her child.
and sending o It had been established by plaintiffs
money to her. She and her baby survived evidence, however, that
through the help of during her pregnancy, Annabelle
relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to was provided by Narciso Salas
commit suicide by with an apartment at a rental of
drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN,
Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso
the Cabanatuan City Police provided her with a household
Station which set their meeting with petitioner. help with a salary of P1,500.00 a
However, it was only petitioners wife who month (TSN, October 6, 1995,
showed up and she was very mad, uttering ibid). He also provided her a
unsavory words against respondent.6 monthly food allowance of
o Matusalems witness, Grace Murillo, corroborated P1,500.00
respondents (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with
testimony as to the payment by petitioner of Annabelle at the hospital while the
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent latter was in labor, walking her
and financial support to her, his around and massaging her belly
presence during and after delivery of respondents (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home
baby, Christian Paulo to the rented
respondents attempted suicide through sleeping apartment after Annabelles
pills overdose and discharge from the hospital. People
hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her
complaint before the living in the same apartment units
police authorities and meeting with petitioners wife were witnesses to Narcisos
at the delight to father a son at his age
headquarters. which was his look alike. It was
x Salas waived presentation of evidence only after the 18th day when
x RTC in favor of MATUSALEM Annabelle refused to give him
x Salas appealed to CA Christian Paulo that Narciso
o (1) the trial court decided the case without affording him withdrew his support to him and
the right his
to introduce evidence on his defense; and mother.
o (2) the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the 221
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x Salas filed a Rule 45 before the SC

o Said testimony of Annabelle aside

from having been corroborated
by Grace Murillo, the owner of
the apartment which Narciso
rented, was never rebutted on
record. Narciso did not present
any
evidence, verbal or documentary, to
repudiate plaintiffs evidence.
o In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA
1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245
SCRA 150), the Supreme
Court made it clear that
Article 172 of the Family Code
is an adaptation of Article 283
of the Civil Code. Said legal
provision provides that the
father is obliged to recognize
the child as his natural child x
x 3) when the child has in his
favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his
father.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the RTC correctly
ruled that Salas has waived his right
to present evidence.
HELD # 1: YES.
x As to the denial of the motion for
postponement filed by his counsel for the
resetting of the initial
presentation of defense
evidence on April 17, 1998, we
find that it was not the first
time petitioners motion for
postponement was denied by
the trial court.
x Records disclosed that after the
termination of the testimony of respondents
last
witness on November 29, 1996,
the trial court as prayed for by
the parties, set the continuation
of hearing for the reception of
evidence for the defendant
 (petitioner) on January 27, February 3,
and February 10, 1997. In the Order
dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was
advised to be ready with his evidence
at those hearing dates earlier scheduled.
At the hearing on January 27, 1997,
petitioners former counsel, Atty. Rolando
S. Bala, requested for the cancellation
of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings
in order to give him time to prepare for
his defense, which request was granted
by the trial court which thus reset the
hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17,
1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral
manifestation by Atty. Bala and without
objection from respondents counsel,
Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court
again reset the hearing to March 14 and
17, 1997. With the non-appearance of
both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March
14, 1997, the trial court upon oral
manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared
their
absence as a waiver of their right to
present evidence and accordingly
deemed
the case submitted for decision.16
x On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for
petitioner and Atty. Rafael E.
Villarosa filed his appearance as his new
counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same
date he filed entry of appearance, Atty.
Villarosa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 14, 1997
Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimity of the trial court, without
offering any explanation for Atty. Balas
failure to appear for the initial
presentation of their evidence. The trial
court
thereupon reconsidered its March 14,
1997 Order, finding it better to give
petitioner a chance to present his
evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty.
Villarosa
received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled
on
September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997,
the trial court received his motion
requesting that the said hearing be re-set
to October 10, 1997 for the reason
that he had requested the postponement
of a hearing in another case which was
incidentally scheduled on September 22,
23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial
court reset the hearing to October 10,
1997. On said date, however, the hearing
was again moved to December 15, 1997.
On February 16, 1998, the trial court
itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998
since it was unclear whether Atty.
Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
x On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel
failed to appear but the trial court
received on April 16, 1998 an urgent
motion to cancel hearing filed by
Atty.
Villarosa. The reason given by the
latter was the scheduled hearing on
the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
in another case under the April 8, 1998
Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No.
1946. But as clearly stated in the said
order, it was the plaintiffs therein who
requested the postponement of the
hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to
inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a
previous commitment considering that
the April 17, 1998 hearing was
scheduled as early as February 16, 1998.
Acting
on the motion for postponement, the
trial court denied for the second time
petitioners motion for postponement.
Even at the hearing of their motion for
reconsideration of the April 17, 1998
Order on September 21, 1998,
Atty.
Villarosa failed to appear and
instead filed another motion for
postponement. The trial court
thus ordered that the case be
submitted for decision stressing
that the case had long been
pending and that petitioner and
his counsel have been given
opportunities to present their
evidence. It likewise denied a
second motion for reconsideration
filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived
late during the hearing thereof on
December 4, 1998.18
x A motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right, but
a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Parties
asking for postponement have
absolutely no right to assume that
their
motions would be granted. Thus,
they must be prepared on the
day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an
order declaring a party to have
waived the right to present
evidence for performing dilatory
actions upholds the trial courts
duty to ensure that trial
proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed on
the part of one party.20
x Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was
correctly rejected by the trial court in view
of his own negligence in
failing to ensure there will be
no conflict in his trial
schedules. As we held in
Tiomico v. Court of
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
o Motions for postponement are
generally frowned upon by
Courts if there is
evidence of bad
faith, malice or
inexcusable
negligence on the
part of the movant.
The
inadvertence of the
defense counsel in
failing to take note
of the
trial dates and in
belatedly informing
the trial court of any
conflict
in his schedules of
trial or court
appearances,
constitutes
 indicating petitioner as the father, we have
inexcusable negligence. It should be ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
borne in mind that a client is bound by considered public documents, they can only
his counsels conduct, negligence and serve as evidence of the
mistakes in administration of the sacraments on the
handling the case.22 dates so specified. They are not
x With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the necessarily competent evidence of the
trial courts denial veracity of entries therein with respect to the
of the motion for postponement filed by childs paternity.30
petitioners counsel, petitioners x The rest of respondents documentary evidence
contention that he was deprived of his day in consists of handwritten
court must likewise fail. The notes and letters, hospital bill and
essence of due process is that a party is given a photographs taken of petitioner and
reasonable opportunity to be respondent inside their rented apartment
heard and submit any evidence one may have in unit.
support of ones defense. o Pictures taken of the mother and her
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to child together with
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he the alleged father are
cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the inconclusive evidence to
opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or prove paternity.31
forfeited without violating the constitutional o Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner
guarantee. and respondent inside
the rented apartment unit thus have
ISSUE # 2: Whether Matusalem was able to sufficiently prove scant evidentiary value.
that Salas is indeed the father of her child. o The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C)
from the Good
HELD # 2: NO. Samaritan General Hospital
x We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and where respondent herself was
appellate courts indicated as the payee is likewise
erred in ruling that respondents evidence incompetent to prove that
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo petitioner is the father of her
is the illegitimate child of petitioner. child notwithstanding petitioners
x Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, admission in his answer that
illegitimate he shouldered the expenses in
filiation may be established in the same way and on the delivery of respondents
the same evidence as legitimate children. child as an act of charity.
x Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: o As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits
o The filiation of legitimate children is established D to D-13) of
by any of the petitioner and respondent
following: showing their exchange of
(1) The record of birth appearing in affectionate words and romantic
the civil register trysts, these, too, are not
or a final judgment; or sufficient to establish Christian
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation Paulos filiation to
in a public petitioner as they were not signed
document or a private by petitioner and
handwritten instrument contained no statement of
and signed by the parent admission by petitioner that he
concerned. is the father of said child. Thus,
o In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the even if these notes were
legitimate filiation authentic, they do not qualify
shall be proved by: under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis
(1) The open and continuous Article
possession of the status 175 of the Family Code which
of a legitimate child; or admits as competent evidence of
(2) Any other means allowed by the illegitimate filiation an admission
Rules of Court of filiation in a private
and special laws. (Underscoring handwritten
supplied.) instrument signed by the parent
x Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit concerned.35
A-1) of x Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner Appeals36 is misplaced. In
appears as his father but which is not signed by him. the said case, the handwritten letters of
Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the petitioner contained a clear
entries and signed the said document though she admission that he is the father of private
claims it was petitioner who supplied the information respondents daughter and
she wrote therein. were signed by him. The Court therein
x We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly considered the totality of
identifying the putative evidence which established beyond
father is not competent evidence of paternity when reasonable doubt that petitioner
there is no showing that the putative father had a was indeed the father of private
hand in the preparation of the respondents daughter. On the other
certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the
birth certificate, the placing of his name by the Court sustained the appellate courts
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is finding that private respondents evidence
incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can to establish her filiation with and
such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a paternity of petitioner was overwhelming,
public instrument27 and it has no particularly the latters public
probative value to establish filiation to the 222
alleged father.28 x As to the Baptismal Certificate29
(Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also
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admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been
acknowledgment of his amorous entered, common reputation
relationship with private respondents respecting his pedigree,
mother, and private respondent as his own admission by silence, the
child through acts and words, her testimonies of witnesses, and
testimonial evidence to that effect was other kinds of proof admissible
fully supported by documentary evidence. under Rule 130 of
The Court thus ruled that respondent had the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing
adduced sufficient proof of continuous the records, we find the totality
possession of status of a spurious child. of respondents
x Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas evidence insufficient to establish
could not claim open and that petitioner is the father of
continuous possession of status of an Christian Paulo.
illegitimate child, it nevertheless x The testimonies of respondent and Murillo
considered the testimonial evidence as to the circumstances of the birth of
sufficient proof to establish his filiation Christian Paulo, petitioners
to financial support while
petitioner. respondent lived in Murillos
x An illegitimate child is now also allowed to apartment and his regular visits
establish his claimed filiation by any to her at the said apartment,
other means allowed by the Rules of though replete
Court and special laws, like his with details, do not approximate
baptismal certificate, a judicial the overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial
presented in Ilano. In that case, we o During the time that Artemio
sustained the appellate courts ruling and Leoncia were living as husband
anchored on the following factual findings and wife, Artemio
by the appellate court which was quoted has shown concern
at length in the as the father of
ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Merceditas (sic).
o It was Artemio who made When Merceditas
arrangement for the delivery of (sic) was in Grade 1
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila at the St. Joseph
Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior Parochial School,
to the Artemio signed the
delivery, Leoncia underwent Report Card of
prenatal examination Merceditas
accompanied by (sic) (Exh. H) for
Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). the fourth and fifth
After delivery, they went grading period(s)
home to (Exh. H-
their residence at EDSA in a 1 and H-2) as the
car owned and driven by parent of Merceditas
Artemio (sic). Those signatures
himself (id. p. 36). of Artemio [were]
o Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of both identified by
Ilano since birth without any Leoncia and
objection on the part of Merceditas (sic)
Artemio, the fact that because Artemio
since Merceditas signed Exh. H-1 and
(sic) had her discernment H-2 at their
she had always known residence in the
and called presence of Leoncia,
Artemio as her Daddy Merceditas (sic) and
(TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); of Elynia (TSN, p. 57,
the fact that 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28,
each time Artemio was at 10/1/73). x x x.
home, he would play with o When Artemio run as a
Merceditas candidate in the Provincial Board of
(sic), take her for a ride or Cavite[,] Artemio
restaurants to eat, and gave Leoncia his
sometimes picture with the
sleeping with Merceditas (sic) following dedication:
(id. p. 34) and does all what a To Nene, with best
father regards, Temiong.
should do for his child (Exh. I). (pp. 19-20,
bringing home goodies, Appellants Brief)
candies, toys and o The mere denial by defendant
whatever he can bring her of his signature is not sufficient to
which a child enjoys which offset the totality
Artemio of the evidence
gives to Merceditas (sic) indubitably
(TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) showing that the
are positive evidence that signature thereon
Merceditas (sic) is the belongs to him.
child of Artemio and The entry in the
recognized by Artemio as Certificate of
such. Special attention is Live Birth that
called to Exh. E-7 where Leoncia and
Artemio was telling Leoncia Artemio was falsely
the need for a frog test to stated therein as
know the status of Leoncia. married does not
o Plaintiff pointed out that the support mean that Leoncia
by Artemio for Leoncia and is not appellees
Merceditas (sic) was daughter.
sometimes in the form of cash This particular entry
personally was caused to be
delivered to her by Artemio, made by Artemio
thru Melencio, thru Elynia himself in order to
(Exhs. E-2 avoid
and E-3, and D-6), or thru embarrassment.39
Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, o In sum, we hold that the
p. 40, testimonies of respondent and
5/17/74) and sometimes in the Murillo, by
form of a check as the Manila themselves are not
Banking Corporation Check competent proof of
No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the paternity and the
signature totality of
appearing therein which was respondents
identified by Leoncia as that of evidence failed to
establish Christian
Artemio because Artemio Paulos filiation
often gives her checks and to petitioner.
Artemio would x Time and again, this Court has ruled that
write the check at home and a high standard of proof is
saw Artemio sign the check required to establish paternity
(TSN, p. and filiation. An order for
49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio recognition and support may
and Nilda admitted that the create an unwholesome
check and situation or may be an
signature were those of irritant to the family or the lives
Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; of the parties so that it must be
TSN, p. 19,
10/9/78).
 issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing also held that the death of the putative father
evidence.40 is not a bar to the action
x Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 commenced during his lifetime by one
filed by petitioners counsel claiming to be his illegitimate child.43 The
informing this Court that petitioner had died on rule on substitution of parties provided in
May 6, 2010. Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
x The action for support having been filed in the Procedure, thus applies.
trial court when petitioner was o SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.
still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 - Whenever a party to a
of the Family Code. We have pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby
extinguished, it
shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of
the fact thereof, and to give
the
name and address of his legal
representative or
representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply
with his duty shall be a ground
for
disciplinary action.
o The action must be brought within the
same period specified in
Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
o The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an
executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
o The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or
representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period
of thirty (30) days from
notice.
o If no legal representative is named by the
counsel for the deceased
party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the
specified period, the court may
order the opposing party, within a
specified time to procure the
appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on
behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered
as costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. RUPER POSING y ALAYON, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No.
196973

July 31,
2013
SECOND
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Posing was charged before the RTC for violation of
Sections 53 and 114
respectively, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
x Prosecution evidence:
o Chief P/Inspector Arturo Caballes (Chief
Caballes) formed a team to
conduct a buy bust operation
after being informed of the
illegal selling of drugs of
Posing
o SPO1 Angeles together with PO1 Jesus
Cortez (PO1 Cortez),
 PO1Ralph Nicart (PO1 Nicart) and the
informant were dispatched to
Makabayan St., Brgy. Obrero, Kamuning,
Quezon City, and upon
arrival, the informant and SPO1
Angeles proceeded to the
squatters area
o SPO1 Angeles met Posing beside the basketball
court, where he
was introduced by the informant as a
buyer of shabu. The former asked if he
could buy one hundred peso (P100.00)
worth of shabu for personal use.
o Posing then pulled out one (1) transparent plastic
sachet from his
pocket and gave it to SPO1 Angeles in
exchange for the buy-bust
money.
o Afterwards, SPO1 Angeles took out his cap to
alert his companions
that the deal was already concluded.
o PO1 Cortez and PO1 Nicart rushed to the scene
and introduced
themselves as police officers. Posing was
frisked, and the buy-bust
money and another transparent plastic
sachet were recovered from
him.
o Prior to the turnover of the evidence to the desk
officer, SPO1
Angeles placed his marking on the two (2)
small heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets.9 The same
were then turned over to
PO2 John Sales (PO2 Sales), who prepared
a request for laboratory
examination.10
o On the same day, the specimens were delivered
by PO1 Nicart to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for
quantitative and qualitative examination,
wherein each sachet was
found to contain 0.03 gram and tested
positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug
x Defense evidence:
o On the contrary, Posing testified that on 13
August 2004, between
4:00 to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, he
was walking along a
basketball court at Makabayan St.,
Kamuning, Quezon City, when
he was arrested by PO1 Cortez and PO1
Nicart, who he came to
know based on their name plates.14
When he asked the officers
what his violation was, they replied:
"Nag-mamaang-maangan ka
pa."15 He was then led to their vehicle
and was brought to Station
10 wherein he was asked to point to a
certain "Nene" whom he did not know. He
refused, which was why he was detained
and
charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165
x RTC convicted Posing
x Posing appealed to CA
o contended that the trial court gravely erred when
it failed to
consider the police officers failure to
comply with the proper
procedure in the handling and
custody of the seized drugs, as
provided under Section 21 of R. A.
No. 9165, which ultimately
affected the chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs.21
223
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o In addition, it was averred
that the police officers are entitled
o Further, it was posited that there was to
no prior surveillance the presumption of
conducted to verify the regularity in the
informants tip and that there performance of
was no official duties.
coordination made with the Finally, the accused-
Philippine Drug Enforcement appellant did not
Agency interpose any
(PDEA).22 Furthermore, the evidence in support
accused-appellant invoked his of his defense aside
right to from his bare denial
be presumed innocent until x CA affirmed RTC
proven guilty beyond o ruled that the requisites laid
reasonable doubt down under Section 21 of R. A. No.
x OSG filed its brief 9165 were complied
o countered that although the with, more
requirements under Section 21 of R. A. particularly, through
No. 9165 has been held to be the
mandatory, non-compliance testimonies of the
with the same, does not police officers which
necessarily warrant an sufficiently
acquittal.24 established that
the integrity and the
 evidentiary value of the Justice or any elected
seized items were public official.35
preserved.27 x Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
o As to the alleged non-coordination Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which
with the PDEA, it was held that implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "Chain
although the PDEA is the lead of Custody" as follows:
agency, it is not to be o "Chain of Custody" means the
considered as the exclusive duly recorded authorized
agency, in enforcing drug- movements
related matters. and custody of seized
o Lastly, the evidence presented by the drugs or controlled
prosecution clearly showed chemicals or plant
that the elements of illegal sources of dangerous
sale and possession of drugs or laboratory
dangerous drugs were proven equipment of each
by competent evidence, as stage,
compared to the bare from the time of
denial interposed by the accused- seizure/confiscation to
appellant receipt in the forensic
x Posing filed a Rule 45 before the SC laboratory to
safekeeping to
ISSUE: Whether it was sufficiently shown that the presentation in court
sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were the for destruction.
same ones obtained from Posing. Such record of
movements and
HELD: YES. custody of seized item
x In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs shall include
Act, credence should be given the identity and
to the narration of the incident by the signature of the
prosecution witnesses especially when person who held
they are police officers who are temporary
presumed to have performed their custody of the seized
duties in a item, the date and
regular manner, unless there is time when such
evidence to the contrary. In this regard, transfer of
the custody were made in
defense failed to show any ill motive or the course of
odious intent on the part of the police safekeeping and use
operatives to impute such a serious crime in court
that would put in jeopardy the life and as evidence, and the
liberty of an innocent person, such as in final disposition.
the case of appellant. Incidentally, if x In Malillin v. People,36 we laid down the
these were simply trumped-up charges chain of custody requirements that
against him, it remains a question why no must be met in proving that
administrative charges were brought the seized drugs are the same
against the police operatives. Moreover, ones presented in
in weighing the testimonies of the court:
prosecution witnesses vis--vis those of o (1) testimony about every link
the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the chain, from the moment
in the absence of palpable error or grave the item was picked up to the
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial time it is offered into
judge, the trial courts evaluation of the evidence; and
credibility of witnesses will not be o (2) witnesses should describe
disturbed on appeal.34 the precautions taken to
x With the illegal sale of dangerous drugs ensure that there had
established beyond reasonable doubt, been no change in
the handling of the evidence, or the the condition of the
observance of the proper chain of item and no
custody, which is also an indispensable opportunity for
factor in prosecution for illegal sale of someone not in the
dangerous drugs, is the next matter to chain to have
be resolved. possession of the
x The accused-appellant, argued that the following item.
instances would constitute a x In this case, the prosecution was able to
break in the chain of custody of the seized plastic prove, through the testimonies of its
sachets of shabu: witnesses that the integrity of the
o (1) SPO1 Angeles failed to identify the seized item was preserved every
duty officer to whom step of the
he turned over the alleged process. After the sale of shabu
confiscated shabu; and another sachet was
o (2) SPO1 Angeles was not able to discovered in the person
recall who brought the drug of accused-appellant, SPO1
specimens to the crime laboratory; Angeles, who was the poseur-
o (3) SPO1 Angeles failed to mark the buyer in the buy-bust
confiscated sachets at operation, marked the drug
the crime scene specimens, and then turned over
immediately after the the same to the
accused-appellant was desk officer, who in turn handed it to PO1
arrested; and Sales. The latter then prepared a
o (4) the police officers failed to prepare
an inventory report of
the confiscated drugs, no
photographs of the same
were
taken in the presence of
the accused-appellant
and that of a
representative from the
media or the Department of

Request for Laboratory Examination, and on the
same day, the specimens were delivered by PO1
Nicart to the PNP Crime Laboratory for quantitative
and
qualitative examination, conducted by Engr. Jabonillo.37
x The same was corroborated by PO1 Sales and Engr. Jabonillo,
whose testimonies
were dispensed with, and formed part of the
stipulations of facts agreed upon by both the
prosecution and defense.38
x The defense kept on harping on alleged lapses in the
procedure observed by the
apprehending officers, like SPO1 Angeles failure to
recall the duty officer to whom he turned over the
specimens, and the officer who brought the
specimens to the crime laboratory. Also, they
questioned the absence of an inventory report of the
confiscated drugs and that there were no photographs
taken in the presence of the accused-appellant and
that of a representative from the media or the
Department of Justice or any elected public officer.
x Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
o Section 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having
initial custody and
control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the
accused or the
person/s from whom such
items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a
representative from the media
and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall
be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; x x x
x But time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that
less than
strict compliance with the procedural aspect of the
chain of custody
rule does not necessarily render the seized drug
items inadmissible.39
x As held in People v. Llanita40 as cited in People v.
Ara:41
o RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules
and Regulations
(IRR) do not require strict compliance
as to the chain of custody
rule. x x x We have emphasized that
what is essential is "the
preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused."
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the
procedural requirements under RA 9165
and its IRR
relative to the custody, photographing,
and drugtesting of the apprehended
persons, is not a serious flaw that can
render void the seizures and custody of
drugs in a buy-bust operation.
x As to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must
establish the following elements:
o (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is
identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug;
o (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and
o (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.42
x In the case at hand, the prosecution was able to
prove that the accused-
appellant was in possession of one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu, when he was frisked on the
occasion of his arrest. There was also no
showing that he had the authority to possess
the drugs that was in his person.
x This Court held in a catena of cases that mere
possession of a regulated drug
per se constitutes prima facie evidence
of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused absent
a satisfactory explanation of such
possession - the onus probandi is
shifted to the accused, to explain the
absenceofknowledge or animus possidendi.43
x In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution, the
denial of the accused-appellant fails.1wphi1
Courts generally view the defense of denial
with disfavor due to the facility with which an
accused can concoct it to suit his or her
defense. As evidence that is both negative
and self-serving, this defense cannot attain
more credibility than the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who testify clearly,
providing thereby positive evidence on the
various aspects of the crime committed.44
x Also, it is a well-entrenched principle that findings of
fact of the trial court as to
the credibility of witnesses are accorded
great weight and respect when no
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts, and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The rationale
behind this rule is that the trial court is in
a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during trial. This
rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.45 This
Court does not find any convincing reason
to depart from the ruling of the trial court,
which was affirmed by the appellate court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ASIR
GANI y ALIH and NORMINA GANI y GALOS, Accused-
Appellants.
G.R. No.
198318
November 27,
2013 FIRST
DIVISION
FACTS:
x Asir and Normina were charged before the RTC Pasig
with conspiracy for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under
Article II, Section 5 of
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testimony
of NBI
Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known Forensic
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in Chemist II
relation to Paragraph 2, Article 62 of Rommel G.
the Revised Penal Code. Patingo,
x Prosecution evidence: who
o The prosecution presented the testimonies conducted
of Special Investigator the
(SI) Elson Saul (Saul),6 SI chemical
Joel Otic (Otic),7 SI analysis of
Salvador Arteche, Jr. the
(Arteche),8 SI Melvin specimens
Escurel (Escurel),9 and submitted
Atty. Ross for his
Jonathan Galicia (Galicia),10 examinatio
all of the National Bureau of n, since the
Investigation (NBI) assigned subject
to the Special Enforcement matter of
Services of his
the Philippine Drug testimony
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). had already
The prosecution been
dispensed with the stipulated
presentation of the
 during appellants
the pre-trial conference. denial and
o The documentary evidence for the alibi fail in
prosecution consisted of the the
NBI-PDEA Pre-Operation absence of
Report11 dated May 6, 2004; clear and
Coordination convincing
Letter12 dated May 6, 2004 evidence
of NBI-PDEA to the Chief of of ill motive
Police of or bad faith
Taguig, City; Joint Affidavit of on the part
Arrest13 dated May 7, 2004 of the buy-
signed bust team.
by several members of the The
buy-bust team, namely, SI appellate
Saul, SI Otic, court also
SI Arteche, Atty. Galicia, SI declared
Antonio Erum, SI Garry I. that there
Meez, SI was
Bertrand Gamaliel A. substantial
Mendoza, and SI Junnel compliance
Malaluan; Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report14 with the
of each accused-appellant; rule on the
Inventory of chain of
Seized Properties15 signed custody of
by SI Saul and two the seized
witnesses; buy-bust drugs, thus,
money consisting of two
P1,000.00 bills and several preserving
pieces of the
P20.00 bills;16 request integrity
dated May 7, 2004 for and
the laboratory evidentiary
examination of "two (2) value of the
transparent heat-sealed same
plastic sachets x Asir and Normina filed Rule 45
containing undetermined before the SC
amount of white
crystalline substance" ISSUE: Whether it was sufficiently
recovered from accused- shown that the sachets of shabu
appellants and marked presented before the RTC were the
"ES-1 05-06-04" same ones obtained from Asir and
and "ES-2 05-06-04";17 Normina.
Dangerous Drugs Report No.
DD-04-16118 dated May 13, HELD: YES.
2004 prepared by NBI x In their Brief, accused-appellants
Forensic Chemist II Patingo assert that the prosecution failed to comply
and Forensic Chemist III Aida with the rules on the
R. Viloria-Magsipoc (Viloria- custody of seized drugs
Magsipoc); a brown provided under Section
envelope and four plastic 21 of
sachets of shabu, Republic Act No. 9165.
including the two sachets According to accused-
marked "ES-1 05-06-04" appellants, there is no
and "ES-2 05- showing that
06-04";19 and the the inventory and
Toxicology Report Nos. TDD- picture-taking of the
04-1788 and TDD- shabu were conducted
04-178920 prepared by NBI in their presence,
Forensic Chemist II Patingo as well as in the
and presence of a
Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc. representative from the
x Defense evidence: media, the Department
o The evidence for the defense consisted of of
accused-appellants Justice (DOJ), and any
testimonies.21 Both denied elected public official,
the crime charged against immediately after
them and accused-
claimed that they were the appellants arrest and
victims of extortion. They seizure of the shabu
were charged purportedly sold by
only because they failed to them. When
produce the money accused-appellants
demanded from were brought by the
them. buy-bust team to the
x RTC convicted both Asir and Normina barangay hall
x Asir and Normina appealed to CA following their arrest,
x CA affirmed there was already a
o The appellate court accorded weight to typewritten inventory
the assessment by the RTC report for
of the veracity of the signature by the
witnesses testimonies. barangay officials,
The prosecution which, accused-
witnesses gave a clear appellants surmise, was
and candid narration of
the buy-bust already prepared at the
operation against accused- NBI Office. It is likewise
appellants; while accused- not clearly established
where
 and when the markings on the plastic
sachets of shabu were made. Accused-
appellants reason that the suspicions
regarding the actual conduct of an
inventory of the shabu allegedly sold by
them could have been avoided had the
prosecution presented the testimonies of
the barangay officials who signed the
inventory report.
x Accused-appellants further point out that the
prosecutions evidence conflicted as
to the number of sachets of shabu
seized from them. It was stipulated
during the pre-trial that there were
four plastic sachets of shabu but
prosecution
witness SI Saul testified that as poseur-
buyer, he bought and received only
two sachets of shabu from accused-
appellants. No details were provided
about the seizure of the other two
sachets of shabu.
x Plaintiff-appellee, in its Brief, maintains that the rule
on the chain of custody of
the seized shabu had been
substantially complied with and the
issues raised by accused-appellants
are trivial and unfounded.
o The Court finds the appeal bereft of merit.
x The combined testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence of the
prosecution produced a detailed account
of the buy-bust operation against
accused-appellants and proved all the
essential elements of the crime charged
against them.
x In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, the following
elements must concur:
o (1) the identities of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration;
and
o (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment thereof.
x What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs
is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
occurred, coupled with the presentation in
court of the substance seized as evidence.27
x It has been clearly established herein that a buy-bust
operation took place on
May 6, 2004 conducted by a team of NBI
agents. SI Saul, as the poseur-buyer,
and accused-appellants, as the sellers, agreed
on the price of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) for One
Hundred (100) grams of shabu. After SI
Saul handed over the buy-bust money to
accused-appellants, the latter gave
him, in exchange, two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance.
Thereafter, accused-appellants were
immediately arrested by the buy-bust team.
During the search incidental to accused-
appellants arrest, a .45 caliber handgun,
the buy-bust money, and two more sachets of
suspected shabu were recovered
from their possession. Chemical examination
confirmed that the contents of the
two plastic sachets sold to SI Saul were indeed
shabu. These two sachets of
shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-
06-04" and with a total weight of
98.7249 grams, together with two other
sachets, were duly presented as
evidence by the prosecution before the
RTC.
x Contrary to accused-appellants averment, prosecution
witness, SI Saul, was
able to explain why there were a total of four
sachets of shabu
presented during trial, when SI Saul only
bought two sachets during the buy- bust
operation. SI Saul testified that in addition to
the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by
accused-appellants, there were two more
sachets of shabu recovered from accused-
appellants
possession by the buy-bust team during the
body search conducted incidental to accused-
appellants lawful arrest.28
x The Court further finds that the arresting officers had
substantially
complied with the rule on the chain of custody
of the dangerous drugs
as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. Jurisprudence
has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases,
the failure of the police
officers to make a physical inventory and to
photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to
mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not
render the seized drugs inadmissible in
evidence or automatically
impair the integrity of the chain of custody of
the said drugs.29 What is
of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these
would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.30
x In this case, testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution proved
that immediately after accused-appellants
arrest, they were brought to the FTI
Barangay Hall. It was there, in the presence of
two barangay officials, that SI
Saul conducted an inventory of the two
plastic sachets of shabu subject of the
buy-bust operation, plus the other items
seized from accused-appellants
 possession during the search conducted incidental to accused- witnesses before
appellants arrest. the RTC the two barangay officials who
It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul marked the two witnessed the conduct of the inventory.
plastic sachets of At best, the testimonies of these two barangay
shabu sold to him by accused-appellants as "ES-1 05-06-04" officials will only be
and "ES-2 05-06- corroborative, and would have no significant
04," representing SI Sauls initials and the date of the buy-bust impact on the identity and integrity
operation. of the seized drugs.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team, with accused-appellants, x Moreover, accused-appellants uncorroborated
proceeded to the NBI defenses of denial and frame-up
Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul made a request cannot prevail over the prosecution witnesses
for examination positive testimonies, coupled with
of the two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" the presentation in court by the prosecution of
and "ES-2 05-06- the corpus delicti. Prosecutions
04," and personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II involving illegal drugs depend largely on the
Patingo. NBI credibility of the police officers who
Forensic Chemist II Patingo, together with NBI Forensic Chemist conducted the buy-bust operation. Oft-repeated
III Viloria- is the rule that in cases involving
Magsipoc, conducted the laboratory examination of the violations of Republic Act No. 9165, credence is
contents of the two given to prosecution witnesses
sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and who are police officers (or in this case, NBI
kept said sachets in agents) for they are presumed to
his custody until the same were submitted to the RTC as have performed their duties in a regular
evidence during trial. manner, unless there is evidence to the
x Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure contrary. Absent any indication that the NBI
of the buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs agents herein were ill motivated in
immediately testifying against accused-appellants, their
upon seizure and at the site of accused-appellants testimonies deserve full credence.31
apprehension, and In contrast, the defenses of denial and frame-
to mark and make an inventory of the same in the presence of up have been invariably viewed by
all the this Court with disfavor for it can easily be
persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not concocted and is a common and
fatal standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
and did not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence violation of Republic Act No. 9165. In order to
given that prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up
the prosecution was able to trace and establish each and every must be proved with
link in strong and convincing evidence.32
the chain of custody of the seized drugs and, hence, the identity Accused-appellants presented no such
and evidence in this case.
integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved. For the
same 225
reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to present as
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)

ANNOTATION
x The penalty for illegal sale of shabu, regardless of
the quantity and purity
involved, under Article II, Section 5 of
x Document a deed, instrument or
Republic Act No. 9165, shall be life other duly authorized paper by
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging which something is proved,
from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos evidenced or set forth
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos o Hence,
(P10,000,000.00). Hence, the imposition document do NOT
of
exclusively refer to
the penalty of life imprisonment upon
accused-appellants and an order for each writings
of them to pay a fine of Five Hundred x Documentary evidence that
Thousand Pesos PS00,000.00) are correct. which is furnished by written
instruments,
inscriptions and
2. Documentary Evidence documents of all kinds

Section 2. Documentary evidence. Documents o To be

as evidence consist of writing or any material
containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols
considered as
or other modes of written DOCUMENTARY
expression offered as proof of their contents. (n) EVIDENCE, a
 writing/material by other
must be offered evidence showing its
as proof of its integrity and
contents reliability to the
Otherwise the same satisfaction of
may be considered as the judge.
object evidence o The manner
x 2 categories of documents: above ONLY applies
o Writings where the electronic
Those instantly document being
recognizable as documents offered is private and
Example contract is offered as an
and wills authentic document
o Any other o When such
material containing electronic document
modes of written is NOTARIZED, there
expressions is
Those not traditionally no need to
considered as writings authenticate it as
BUT are prescribed above
actually objects x When a document is offered as a
which contain documentary evidence the
modes of hearsay rule, parol
written evidence rule and best
expression evidence rule may come
x Electronic Evidence information or the into play
representation of x Requisites for Admissibility of
information, data, figures, symbols Documentary Evidence:
or other modes of written o Relevant
expression, described or however o Authenticated
represented, by which a right is o By a competent witness
established or an obligation o Formally offered in
extinguished, or by which a fact evidence
may be prove and affirmed, which
is receive, recorded, transmitted, a. The Best Evidence Rule
stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. Section 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. When the subject of
o Also referred to as electronic inquiry is the contents of a document, no
data message evidence shall be admissible other than the
o DOES NOT only refer to original document itself, except in the
information itself following cases:
o Functional equivalents of paper-
based documents
o May be used for any of the ff
purposes:
To establish a right
To extinguish an
obligation OR
To prove or affirm a
fact
o Burden of proving the one
seeking to introduce it
o Manner of authenticating:
by evidence that it
had been digitally signed
by the
person
purported to
have signed
the
same;
by evidence that other
appropriate security
procedures or
devices as
may be
authorized by
the Supreme
Court or by
law for
authentication
of electronic
documents
were applied
to the
document;
 BASIC: the need to
present to the court the
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or exact words of a
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of writing where a
the offeror;
slight
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the variation may
control of the party against mean great
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce difference in
it after reasonable notice; rights
ANCILLARY: to prevent
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
fraud or mistake in
other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from the proof of the contents
them is only the general result of the whole; and of a writing
o Requisites for Applicability:
(d) When the original is a public record in the Subject matter must
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. involve a document
(2a) Subject of inquiry is the
contents of such
Section 4. Original of document.
document
(a) The original of the document is one the contents x GR: documents, when presented as evidence,
of which are the subject of should be in their
inquiry. original
o XPNs: Section 3, viz:
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed
Lost, destroyed or cannot
at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.
be produced See
Section 5
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of In the custody or under
business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the control of the
the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally adverse party
regarded as originals. (3a) who fails to
produce it See
Secondary Evidence
Section 6 and 8
Section 5. When original document is unavailable. When the Records are voluminous
original document has and the factum
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the probandum is the
offeror, upon proof of its execution general result of
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
the whole
on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some and not the
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the detailed contents
order stated. (4a) of the results
x REQUISITES:
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody o
or control. If
Vo
the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse
party, he must have reasonable lu
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory mi
proof of its existence, he fails to no
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as us
in the case of its loss. (5a) ch
Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
ar
public record. When ac
the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is te
recorded in a public office, its r
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. (2a)
m
Section 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. us
A party who calls t
for the production of a document and inspects the same is not
be
obliged to offer it as evidence.
(6a) es
ta
ANNOTATION bli
sh
x Best Evidence Rule applies as rule of exclusion ed
o Best has NOTHING to do with the o
hierarchy of Su
evidence nor with the probative ch
value in relation to other types of rec
evidentiary rules ord
o RATIONALE: s
Hazard of inaccuracy in the mu
human process of st
making a copy by handwriting or be
typewriting
Special risk of error as regards
acc
oral testimony
ess
o PURPOSE:
ibl
e
to the 226
other
party so
that their
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Personal Notes on Remedial Law 2 Review (based on the syllabus of Prof.
Henedino M. Brondial)
teste
d on
c cross
o exa
r mina
r tion
e In the custody
c of a public officer or
t recorded
n in public office
e See Section
s 7
s x APPLICABILITY of the Best Evidence
Rule:
m o When the
a contents of the
y document is the
subject of
b inquiry
e o In criminal cases
when the issue is not
 only with respect ff:
to the contents of the x
document but also as to
whether
Person/s
such document who
actually existed with executed
the participation it
imputed to the x
accused
x NON-APPLICABILITY of the Best Evidence
Rule: Person
o When the document is before
presented to prove its whom the
existence or execution
condition was
In such cases, parol ackn
evidence is admissible owle
o When what is sought to be dged
proven is a collateral or x Any
person
concominant fact that
who was
took place while the
present
document was being
and
prepared
s
o When the document is
a
merely collateral in issue
w
(meaning, it is being
presented NOT for the
i
purpose of t
proving its contents but for
some other purpose)
e
x Depositions and affidavits NOT the best
x
evidence
e
x Section 4 documents which are
c
considered as originals , viz:
u
o Regular entries in journals and
t
ledgers
e
o Signed carbon copy or duplicate
of the document d
executed at the
a
same time as the
n
original (duplicate
d
original)
o Carbon copy if the same
d
includes the signature of the
e
party sought to be
l
charged thereby and which
i
signature
v
being thus reproduced by the
e
same stroke of pen
r
o Telegrams and cables best
evidence depends on what e
the issue is, viz: d
If the issue is the
contents of the telegram a
received by the n
addressee d
original
dispatch w
received h
If the issue is the o
telegram sent by the
sender t
message h
delivered for e
transmission r
Inaccuracy of e
transmission both a
telegrams f
as sent and received t
x Section 5 governs cases where the e
original is lost, destroyed or r
cannot be produced
x For secondary evidence to be admissible, s
the ff must be proven: a
o Due execution of the original w
Proven through the
testimony of any of the
 it m
and e
recognized n
the t
signatures
x Any person w
to whom the a
parties s
ther
eto a
had n
prev d
ious
ly h
conf a
ess s
ed
the b
exe e
cuti e
on n
ther
eof u
o Lost, destruction or n
unavailability of such a
original/s b
Proven by l
the testimony of any of e
the ff:
x Any person t
who knew of o
such fact
x Anyone f
who, in the i
judgment of n
the d
court,
had i
made t
a x
suffici
ent
exami Anyone
natio who has
n in made any
the other
place i
s n
where v
e
the s
docu t
ment i
s or g
paper a
s of t
simila i
r o
chara n
cter
are w
usuall h
y i
kept c
by h
the
perso i
n in s
whos
e s
custo u
dy f
the f
d i
o c
c i
u e
 nt to
satis o Copy
fy o Recital of the contents in some
the authentic document
cour o Testimony of witness
t x GR: The foregoing order shall be followed in
that presenting secondary
the evidence
o XPN: When the law
document is
specifically provides for the class
indeed lost
This also includes and
when the document is quantum of secondary
OUTSIDE the evidence, viz:
JURISDICTION Notarial will testimony
of the court, of at least 2 credible
as when it is witnesses
in a foreign who can
country clearly and
o Reasonable diligence distinctly
and good faith in the search establish its
for or contents
attempt to produce the Holographic will no
original/s testimonial evidence
x Order on which the contents of the allowed BUT
document shall be proven: MAY BE proven
by photostatic
copies thereof

x Sections 6 and 8 govern cases where the

original is in the custody
or under the control of the adverse party who
fails to produce it
x CONDITION PRECEDENT: notice to the party
having custody or
con
trol
of
the
ori
gin
al

o
No
for
m
req
uir
ed
o May be an oral demand in open
court
o XPN: Notice is NOT
required where the nature of
the
action is in itself a
notice
Example action for
recovery or annulment
of documents
wrongfully
obtained or
withheld by the
other party
x JUSTIFIED refusal to produce original DOES
NOT give rise to the
presumption of suppression of evidence
o It only authorizes the
introduction of secondary evidence x
Secondary evidence NOT
automatically admissible UNTIL the
requirements for admissibility are present
x Section 7 governs cases where the original
document is a public
record
x When a document is a public record, there is
no need to present the
 original thereof
o REASON: Under Rule 132,
such document may be
evidenced:
by an official publication thereof
OR
by a copy attested by the officer
having legal
custody of the record OR
in the case of a private writing,
may be
proved by a copy thereof
attested by the legal
keeper of the record

CASES

CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S.

TEODORO, respondent. G.R. No. 150905. September 23,
2003
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS:
x Teodoro was one of the credit card holders of Citibank
o Under the terms and conditions governing the
use of the Citibank
credit card, the cardholder undertakes
to pay all the purchases
made using the card within the period
indicated on the statement
of account or within thirty (30) days
from the date or dates of its
use. Charges that remain unpaid within
the period fixed in the
monthly statement of account shall earn
interest at the rate of 3.5
percent per month plus a penalty fee
equivalent to 5 percent of the
amount due for every month or even a
fraction of a months delay.
x Teodoro made certain purchases for which he tendered
various payments.
x Citi claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of
respondent stood at
P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges
x Citi claimed to have made several demands from Teodoro
o Teodoro was still unable to pay
x Citi filed an action for sum of money against Teodoro
before RTC Makati
x RTC Makati dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
x Case was transferred to MeTC Makati
x Citis evidence:
o During the trial, petitioner presented several
sales invoices or
charge slips, which added up to only
P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies
of the originals, the invoices were
marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4.
Because all these copies appeared to
bear the signatures of respondent, the
trial court deemed them sufficient proof
of his purchases with the use of the
credit card.
x MeTC in favor of CITI
o Ordered Teodoro to pay Citi the amount of
P24,388.36 plus
interest and penalty fee
x Teodoro appealed to RTC
x RTC affirmed MeTC in toto
x Teodoro appealed to CA
x CA reversed RTC

227
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whenever the subject
of inquiry is the
o The focal issue of the case according content of a
to the CA was whether the document, its
photocopies of the sales original must be
invoices or charge slips, produced, as it is the
marked as best evidence to
Exhibits F to F-4, were prove such content.
competent proofs of the Secondary evidence,
obligations of like the subject
respondent. These were the photocopies, is
only evidence presented by inadmissible. It will be
petitioner admissible only if the
that could prove the actual offeror proves (a) any
amount of obligation he had of the exceptions
incurred in enumerated in
favor of the former. In Section 3 and (b) the
reversing the trial courts, the conditions
CA ruled that for its admissibility set
this evidence was insufficient forth in Section 5 of
to prove any liability on Rule 130. For
respondents secondary
part. evidence to be
o According to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule admissible, there
130 of the Rules of Court, must be satisfactory
 proof of (1) p
the due execution of the p
original; (2) the originals loss, l
destruction i
or unavailability that is not c
due to the offerors bad faith; a
and (3) t
reasonable diligence and good i
faith in the search for or o
attempt to n
produce the original.
o Although petitioner was able to prove f
the existence of the original o
sales invoices, it failed to r
prove their due execution or m
to account for their loss or .
unavailability. x Teodoro filed his comment
x Citi filed a Rule 45 before the SC o On the other hand,
o Petitioner contends that the respondent maintains that
testimony[10] of its principal witness - petitioner failed to
Mark Hernando, assistant prove the due
manager of Citibank, N.A. execution of the
Mastercard -- sales invoices.
proves the following: According to him,
a) the existence or due Hernando was not
execution of the original sales privy to such
invoices which execution and
sufficiently proved could not have
respondents properly or
liability of competently
P24,388.36; declared that the
b) the loss or signatures on the
unavailability of the original invoices and on the
sales application form
invoices; and belonged to the
c) petitioners reasonable former. The
diligence and good faith in latter was not the
the search for or attempt person before whom
to produce the originals. the application form
x It further was
argues that signed, executed or
Hernando acknowledged; he
compe was not even present
tently then.
identifi As to the sales
ed the invoices and
signat respondents alleged
ures of signatures
thereon, he saw
respon them only after the
dent Complaint had
on the been filed in court
sales or long after those
invoice invoices had been
s, executed. He was
having therefore not
competent to
recogn identify the
ized signatures.
them o Because Hernandez had not
as actually witnessed the execution of
identic the
al to sales invoices and
the the application form,
si respondent
g concludes that
n petitioner failed to
a observe Section 5 of
t Rule 130 of the Rules
u of
r Court, which
e provides that the
o contents of the
n original may be
t proven by the testimony of
h witnesses.
e o Finally, respondent contends
la that the alleged loss or
tt unavailability
e of the original sales
rs invoices was not
cr sufficiently
e established.
di Allegedly, Hernandez
t had requested the
c originals from
a Equitable
r Credit Card Network,
d Inc., but failed to show
a in court that he had
 followed up his request as
advised by another witness,
Zen
Hipolito. Therefore, the
requirement of reasonable
diligence and
good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the
originals was
not satisfied, because he had
shown no proof of having
followed up
the request.
ISSUE: Whether the photocopies of the subject
invoices were sufficient in proving the liabilities of
Teodoro.
HELD: NO
x The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as
plaintiff, to establish its case based
on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-
settled that in civil cases, the party that
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
[11] Petitioner failed to prove that
respondent had an obligation in the
principal amount of P24,388.36, because
the photocopies of the original sales
invoices it had presented in court were
inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had
they been admissible, they would still
have had little probative value.[12]
x The original copies of the sales invoices are the
best evidence to prove
the alleged obligation. Photocopies
thereof are mere secondary
evidence. As such, they are inadmissible
because petitioner, as the
offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section
3[13] of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as
well s the conditions of their
admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the
absence of the originals, respondents
obligation was not established.
x Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
o SEC. 5. When original document is
unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be
produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence
and the
cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part,
may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the
order
stated.
x Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a
party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original sales invoices,
the offeror must prove the following:
o (1) the existence or due execution of the
original;
o (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and
o (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence
of bad faith to which
the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.[14]
x The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and
contents. At the sound discretion of the
court, this order may be changed if
necessary.[15]
x In the present case, the existence of the original
sales invoices was established
by the photocopies and the testimony of
Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to
prove that the originals had been lost or
could not be
produced in court after reasonable
diligence and good faith in
searching for them.
x Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable
diligence in the search for them
were conditions that were not met, because
the sales invoices might have been found by
Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had
requested the originals from Equitable,
failed to show that he had subsequently
followed up the
request.[16]
x Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it
must appear that all
of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court
before secondary evidence can be given of
any one. A photocopy may
not be used without accounting for the
other originals.[17]
x In Santos v. Santos[18] the Court upheld
the pronouncement of the CA that
before the appellees therein could be
allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original, they had
to prove -- with the requisite
quantum of evidence -- the loss, the
destruction or the unavailability of all
original copies of the document.
x In the present case, triplicates were produced,
although the cardholder signed
the sales invoice only once.[19] During the
trial, Hernandez explained that an original
copy had gone to respondent, another to the
merchant, and still another to petitioner.[20]
x Each of these three copies is regarded as an original
in accordance with Section
4 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[21]
Petitioner failed to show that all three original
copies were unavailable, and that due
diligence had been exercised in the search for
them.

WILGEN LOON, JERRY ARCILLA, ALBERTPEREYE,

ARNOLD PEREYE, EDGARDO OBOSE,
ARNEL MALARAS, PATROCINO TOETIN, EVELYN
LEONARDO, ELMER GLOCENDA, RUFO
CUNAMAY, ROLANDOSAJOL, ROLANDO ABUCAYON,
JENNIFER NATIVIDAD, MARITESS
TORION, ARMANDO LONZAGA, RIZAL GELLIDO, EVIRDE
HAQUE,1 MYRNA VINAS, RODELITO AYALA, WINELITO
OJEL, RENATO RODREGO, NENA ABINA, EMALYN
OLIVEROS, LOUIE
ILAGAN, JOEL ENTIG, ARNEL ARANETA, BENJAMIN COSE, WELITO x LA ruled PARTIALLY in favor of petitioners
LOON and WILLIAM ALIPAO, Petitioners, vs. POWER MASTER, o awarded the petitioners salary
INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, and SPOUSES HOMER and differential, service incentive leave,
CARINA ALUMISIN, Respondents. and thirteenth month pays. In
G.R. No. 189404 awarding these claims, the LA
stated that the burden of proving
the payment of these money
December 11, 2013 claims
SECOND DIVISION rests with the employer. The LA
also awarded attorneys fees in
FACTS: favor of the petitioners, pursuant
x Herein petitioners were employed by Power Master (PM) as to Article 111 of the Labor Code.
janitors and o denied the petitioners claims for
leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance backwages, overtime, holiday,
Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila and premium pays. The LA
area observed that the petitioners
x Petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for money failed to
claims against Power show that they rendered
Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their overtime work and worked on
officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin holidays
(collectively, the respondents) and rest days without
o alleged in their complaint that they were not paid compensation. The LA further
minimum wages, concluded that the petitioners
overtime, holiday, premium, service cannot be declared to have been
incentive leave, and thirteenth month dismissed from
pays employment because they did
o averred that the respondents made them sign not show any notice of
blank payroll sheets. termination of employment.
x Petitioners then amended their complaint and included They were also not barred from
illegal dismissal in their entering the
COA respondents premises.
o They claimed that the respondents relieved them x BOTH parties appealed to NLRC
from service in o PM et al filed an unverified
retaliation for the filing of their original complaint. supplemental appeal.
x PM et al did NOT file any position paper nor proffered
pieces of evidence in
their defense despite their knowledge of the pendency of the 228
case.
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Henedino M. Brondial)
been
accorded
They attached due
photocopied and computerized process.
copies o Petitioners filed an Urgent
of list of Manifestation and Motion12 where
employees with they asked for the
automated teller deletion of the
machine supplemental
(ATM) cards to the appeal from the
supplemental records because it
appeal. This list allegedly suffered
also from infirmities.
showed the First, the
amounts allegedly supplemental appeal
deposited in the was not verified.
employees ATM Second, it was
cards.11 They belatedly filed six
also attached months from the
documentary filing of
evidence showing the
that the responde
petitioners nts
were dismissed notice of
for cause and had appeal
 with o NLRC denied
memorandum on x Petitioners filed a Rule 65 before the
appeal. The CA
petitioners x CA affirmed NLRC
pointed out o The CA held that the
that they only petitioners were afforded
agreed to the substantive and
respondents procedural due
filing of a process. Accordingly,
responsive the petitioners
pleading until deliberately did not
December 18, explain their side.
2002.13 Instead, they
Third the attached continuously resisted
documentary evidence on the their
supplemental transfer to other
appeal bore PLDT offices and
the violated company
petitioners rules and
forged regulations. It also
signatures. upheld the NLRCs
x NLRC ruled PARTIALLY in favor of Power Master findings on the
o The NLRC affirmed the LAs awards of petitioners
holiday pay and attorneys monetary claims.
fees. It also maintained that x Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SC
the LA acquired jurisdiction
over the ISSUE # 1: Whether NLRC correctly
persons of the respondents admitted the pieces of evidence which
through their voluntary Power Master presented for the first time
appearance. on appeal.
o However, it allowed the respondents
to submit pieces of evidence HELD # 1: NO.
for the first time on x A party may only adduce evidence for the
appeal on the ground that first time on appeal if he adequately
they had been deprived of explains his delay in the
due process. It found that submission of evidence and he
the respondents did not sufficiently proves the
actually receive the LAs allegations sought to be
processes. It also proven
admitted the x In labor cases, strict adherence to the
respondents unverified technical rules of procedure is not
supplemental appeal on the required. Time and again, we
ground that technicalities have allowed evidence to be
may be disregarded to submitted for the first
serve the greater interest of time on appeal with the NLRC in
substantial due process. the interest of substantial
Furthermore, the Rules of justice.28 Thus, we
Court do not require the have consistently supported the
verification of a rule that labor officials should use
supplemental pleading. all reasonable
o NLRC also vacated the LAs awards of means to ascertain the facts in
salary differential, thirteenth each case speedily and
month and service incentive objectively, without
leave pays. In so ruling, it regard to technicalities of law or
gave weight procedure, in the interest of due
to the pieces of evidence process.29
attached to the memorandum x However, this liberal policy should still be
on appeal subject to rules of reason and fairplay.
and the supplemental appeal. The liberality of procedural rules is
It maintained that the absence qualified by two requirements:
of the o (1) a party should adequately
petitioners signatures in the explain any delay in the submission
payrolls was not an of evidence; and
indispensable o (2) a party should sufficiently
factor for their authenticity. It prove the allegations sought to be
pointed out that the payment proven.30
of money claims was further x The reason for these requirements is that
evidenced by the list of the liberal application of the rules
employees with ATM cards. It before quasi-judicial agencies
also found that the cannot be used to perpetuate
petitioners signatures were injustice and hamper the just
not forged. It took judicial resolution of the case. Neither is
notice that many people use the rule on liberal construction a
at least two or more different license to disregard the rules of
signatures. procedure.31
o The NLRC further ruled that the x Guided by these principles, the CA grossly
petitioners were lawfully dismissed erred in ruling that the NLRC did not
on grounds of serious commit grave abuse of discretion
misconduct and willful in arbitrarily admitting and giving
disobedience. It found that the weight to the respondents pieces
petitioners failed to comply of evidence for the first time on
with various memoranda appeal.
directing them to transfer to x A. The respondents failed to adequately
other workplaces and to explain their delay in the submission of
attend evidence
training seminars for the x We cannot accept the respondents
intended reorganization and cavalier attitude in blatantly
reshuffling. disregarding the NLRC Rules of
x Petitioners filed an MR Procedure. The CA gravely erred
when it overlooked that the
NLRC blindly admitted and arbitrarily
gave probative value to the respondents
evidence despite their failure to
adequately explain their delay in the
submission of evidence. Notably,
the respondents delay was anchored on
their assertion that they were
oblivious of the proceedings before the LA.
However, the respondents did
not dispute the LAs finding that Mr. Romulo
Pacia, Jr. appeared on their behalf
on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001.32 The
respondents also failed to contest
the petitioners assertion that the
respondents counsel appeared in a
preliminary mandatory conference on July 5,
2001.33
x Indeed, the NLRC capriciously and whimsically
admitted and gave weight to the
respondents evidence despite its finding that
they voluntarily appeared in the
compulsory arbitration proceedings. The
NLRC blatantly disregarded the fact that
the respondents voluntarily opted not to
participate, to adduce evidence in their
defense and to file a position paper despite
their knowledge of the pendency of
the proceedings before the LA. The
respondents were also grossly negligent in
not informing the LA of the specific building
unit where the respondents were
conducting their business and their counsels
address despite their knowledge of
their non-receipt of the processes.34

ISSUE # 2: Whether the photocopies of the subject documents

deserve credence.

HELD # 2: NO.
x Furthermore, the respondents failed to sufficiently
prove the allegations sought
to be proven. Why the respondents
photocopied and computerized
copies of documentary evidence were
not presented at the earliest
opportunity is a serious question that lends
credence to the petitioners claim that the
respondents fabricated the evidence for
purposes of
appeal. While we generally admit in evidence
and give probative value to photocopied
documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should
prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection.35 It was
incumbent upon the
respondents to present the originals,
especially in this case where the petitioners
had submitted their specimen signatures.
Instead, the
respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to
examine and controvert the alleged spurious
evidence by not adducing
the originals. This Court is thus left with no
option but to rule that the
respondents failure to present the originals
raises the presumption
that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.36 x It was also gross error for
the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that "[i]t is
of
common knowledge that there are many
people who use at least two or more
different signatures."37 The NLRC cannot
take judicial notice that many people use at
least two signatures, especially in this case
where the petitioners
themselves disown the signatures in the
respondents assailed documentary
evidence.38 The NLRCs position is
unwarranted and is patently unsupported by
the law and jurisprudence.
x Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt
in favor of the employees.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule
that the employers cause can only
succeed on the strength of its own
 evidence and not on the weakness of the
employees evidence.

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and

GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA, Petitioners, vs. JOSE and
SONIA A. MONTEIRO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS:
x Monteiros filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages
before the RTC Sta.
Cruz, Laguna against the Dumaguilas
o They were co-owners and prayed for the partition
of a residential
house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St.,
Liliw, Laguna, with an area
of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1453.
o Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed
of sale executed
in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila
(Pedro).
x Dumaguilas filed their answer
o there was no co-ownership to speak of in the first
place.
o They alleged that the subject property, then
owned by Maria
Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been
partitioned equally between her two sons,
Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through
a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, with its
southern-half portion assigned to
Perfecto and the northern-half portion
to Vitaliano.
o They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano
and that Spouses
Monteiro had nothing to do with the
property as they were not heirs of
either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
x Monteiros filed a motion for leave to amend complaint
o The amended complaint abandoned the original
claim for partition
and instead sought the recovery of
possession of a portion of the
subject property occupied by the Dimagui
as and other defendants,
specifically, the potiion sold to the couple
by the heirs of Pedro.
Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas
as defendants.
x RTC granted the motion
x Dimaguilas filed an answer
o admitted that the subject property was inherited
by, and divided
equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano,
but denied the admission in their original
answer that it had been actually divided
into southern and nmihern portions.
Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial
Partition mentioned only the division of
the subject property "into two and share
and share alike." In effect, they argued the
existence of a co-owenrship, contrary to
their original position. The Dimaguilas
further argued that the Bilihan did not
specify the
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which went to his
children, Esperanza,
metes and bounds of the Leonardo and Pedro.
property sold, in violation of Pedro was survived by
Article 1458 his children Pedrito,
of the Civil Code. Even Theresita, Francisco,
assuming that such had been and Luis, who, in turn,
specified, they sold their rights over
averred that the sale of a the subject property
definite portion of a property to Sonia.
owned in o Sonia testified that she was
common was void since a co- approached by Pedro's son,
owner could only sell his Francisco,
undivided and was asked if
share in the property. she was interested
x Monteiros evidence: in purchasing
o Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Pedro's 1/3
Adrieta, brother of Sonia share of the
Monteiro (Sonia), who testified southern portion of
that Perfecto was his the Bahay na Sato,
grandfather and that at the and that he
time of Perfecto's death, he showed her a deed
had two properties, one of of extrajudicial
which was the subject partition executed
property in Liliw, Laguna, by and
 between Perfecto and affix the stamp and
Vitaliano, as well as the tax merely reminded the
declaration of the property presiding judge to be
to prove that the property more vigilant on
had already been similar situations in
partitioned between the two brothers. the future.
o Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified Nonetheless, it held
that he was the geodetic that the petitioners
engineer hired by Spouses did not possess the
Monteiro to survey the necessary personality
property in Liliw, and to
recounted that he checked assail the sale
the boundary of the subject between Spouses
property, subdivided the lot Monteiro and the heirs
into two and came up with of Pedro
a survey because it pe1iained
plan. to the southern-half of
o Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the property to which
the Office of the Municipal they had no claim.
Assessor, presented a x Dimaguilas filed a Rule 45 before the
certified true copy of the SC
cadastral map of Liliw and a
list of claimants/owners. ISSUE # 1: Whether the Dimagauilas have
o Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of judicially admitted the partition of the land so
the Department of as to estop them from denying the same in
Environment and Natural their appeal.
Resources (DENR), testified
that as part of her duties, HELD # 1: YES.
she certifies and safekeeps x Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the
the records of surveyed original case, had the burden of proof to
land, including cadastral establish their case by a
maps from the region. preponderance of evidence, which
x Dimaguilas evidence: is the weight, credit,
o One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was and value of the aggregate
the sole witness for the evidence on either side,
defendants. She testified synonymous with the term
that their first counsel "greater weight of the evidence."
made a mistake Preponderance of evidence is
when he alleged in their evidence which is
original answer that the more convincing to the court as
property had worthy of belief than that which is
already been partitioned offered in
into n01ihern and southern opposition thereto.14
portions x To prove their claim of partition, the
between the two brothers, as respondent spouses presented the
the original answer had been following:
rushed and they were never o (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial
given a copy of it. Partition, dated October 5, 1945,
o She claimed that the mistake was only executed by and between the
pointed out to her by their brothers Perfecto and
new counsel after their former counsel Vitaliano;
withdrew due to cancer. o (2) the cadastral map of Liliw
o She further testified that there was no Cadm-484,15 dated August 6,
intention to partition the 1976,
"bahay na bato" which showing that the
stood on the subject subject property had
property, in order to been divided into
preserve its historical and southern
sentimental value. and northern
x RTC in favor of the MONTEIROS; ordered the portions, registered
Dimaguilas to turn over the as Lot Nos. 876 and
possession of the subject 1/3 portion of the 877; and
southern-half of the property o (3) the Municipal Assessor's
x Dimaguilas appealed to CA records16 showing that the said lots
o The Dimaguilas also insisted on their were respectively claimed by
argument, which was raised Buenaventura and Perfecto.
before the RTC, but not x It is undisputed that the Deed of
addressed, that the Bilihan Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and
should not have Vitaliano agreed "to divide
been admitted as evidence for between them into two and share
lack of a documentary stamp and share alike" the subject
tax, in property, including the house
accordance with Section 201 situated thereon. It appears,
of the National Internal however, that the property was
Revenue Code actually partitioned into definite
(N!RC). Citing Gabucan v. portions, namely, southern and
Manta10 and Del Rosario v. northern halves, as reflected in
Hamoy,11 the cadastral map of Liliw, which
the CA, however, ruled that if were
a document which did not bear respectively claimed by an heir of
the Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus,
required documentary stamp
was presented in evidence,
the court
should require the proponent
to affix the requisite stamp.
x CA affirmed RTC
o The CA noted that the RTC had failed
to direct Spouses Monteiro to
 clearly relied on the petitioners' admission
appears that the subject property had already been and so amended their
partitioned into definite original complaint for partition to one for
portions more than 20 years prior to the original recovery of possession of a
complaint for partition filed in portion of the subject property. Thus, the
1993, and that such division had been observed by petitioners are now estopped from
the brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the denying or attempting to prove that there was
petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact in no partition of the property.
their original answer, to wit:
o (b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO x Considering that an admission does not require proof,
and VITALIANO the admission of the
DIMAGUILA executed a deed of EXTRA petitioners would actually be sufficient to
JUDICIAL PARTITION of the prove the partition even without the
aforedescribed property dividing the documents presented by the respondent
same into two (2) equal parts as spouses. If anything, the additional
indicated in the aforesaid deed as evidence they presented only served to
follows, to wit: corroborate the petitioners' admission.
(c) As a result of the foregoing
partition and as ISSUE # 2: Whether the copies of the subject
known by all the parties in cadastral map and the list of claimants
this case from the presented by the Monteiros are admissible in
beginning or as soon as they evidence.
reached the age of
discernment PERFECTO HELD # 2: YES.
DIMAGUILA became the sole x The petitioners argue that they timely objected to
and exclusive owner of the the cadastral map and the list
southern half of the of claimants presented by the
aforedescribed property and respondent spouses, on the ground that
VITALIANO DIMAGUILA they violated the rule on hearsay and
became the sole owner of the the best evidence rule.
northern half of the x Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule
same property; the house 130 of the Rules of Court
that was built thereon and provides that when the subject of inquiry is
still existing up to this time the contents of a document,
was likewise equally no evidence shall be admissible other than
divided between the two (2) the original document itself,
DIMAGUILA brothers in except when the original is a public record in
accordance with the the custody of a public
extrajudicial partition of half officer or is recorded in a public office.22
equal shares; Section 7 of the same Rule
o 2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO provides that when the original of a
DIMAGUILA in the document is in the custody of a
above described property has already public officer or is recorded in a public
been long segregated and had passed office, its contents may be
on to his heirs as is very well known by proved by a certified copy issued by the
all the parties in this case;17 public officer in custody
x Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an thereof.23 Section 24 of Rule 132
admission provides that the record of public
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in documents may be evidenced by a copy
the same case does not require proof, and may be attested by the officer having the legal
contradicted only by showing that it was made custody or the record.24
through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that x Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and
such admission was the palpable mistake of their the corresponding list of
former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of claimants of the area covered by the map
which was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion were presented by two public officers.
testified: The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of
o Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the the Municipal Assessor's Office, a
Answer? repository of such documents. The second
o A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee,
Paredes filed the who, as a record officer, certifies and
same without giving us a copy ...19 safekeeps records of surveyed land
x This contention is unacceptable. involving cadastral maps. The cadastral
x It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of maps and the list of
evidence. Bare claimants, as certified true copies of original
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not public records, fall under the exception to
equivalent to proof.20 the best evidence rule.
Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was x As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the
adopted by the petitioners Rules of Court similarly
only almost eight (8) years after their original answer provides that entries in official records are an
was filed, in response to exception to the rule.25 The rule
the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. provides that entries in official records made
In their original answer in the performance of the duty of a
to the complaint for partition, their claim that there public officer of the Philippines, or by a
was already a person in the performance of a duty
partition into northern-half and southern-half specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
portions, was the very the facts therein stated.
essence of their defense. It was precisely this 230
admission which moved
the respondent spouses to amend their complaint.
The petitioners
cannot now insist that the very foundation of their
original defense
was a palpable mistake.
x Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel,
an admission is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
respondent spouses had
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presented no evidence to
contradict the evidence of the
The necessity of this rule consists in the respondent
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring spouses. Thus, even without
the official's attendance as a witness to the admission of the
testify to the innumerable transactions in petitioners, the
the course of his duty. The document's respondent spouses proved by a
trustworthiness consists in the preponderance of evidence that
presumption of regularity of performance of there had indeed been a partition
official duty.26 of the subject property.
x Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral
surveys. The DENR is the ISSUE # 3: Whether the RTC correctly
department tasked to execute, admitted the subject Bilihan ng Lahat
supervise and manage the conduct of Naming
cadastral surveys.27 It is, therefore, Karapatan, considering the contention of
clear that the cadastral map and the the Dimaguilas that the DST of the same
corresponding list of claimants qualify as has not
entries in official records as they were been paid.
prepared by the DENR, as mandated by
law. As such, they are exceptions to the HELD # 3: YES.
hearsay rule and are primafacie evidence x To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half
of the facts stated therein. portion of the subject property was sold
x Even granting that the petitioners had not to them, Spouses Monteiro
admitted the partition, they presented a deed of sale
entitled Bilihan ng Lahat
 Naming Karapatan,28 dated September January 2, 2001, the date the
29, 1992, wherein Pedro's share was Spouses Monteiro filed their
sold by his heirs to them, with the Amended Complaint
acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza seeking recovery of the subject
and Leandro in an Affidavit of portion. Interest at the rate of
Conformity and Waiver.29 The 6% per annum
petitioners argue that the Bilihan should shall also be imposed on the
not have been admitted into evidence total amount of rent due from
because it lacked the documentary finality of this
stamp tax required by Section 201 of Decision until fully paid.
the NIRC.
x On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion b. Parol Evidence
for the production and/or
inspection of documents,30 praying that
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.
Spouses Monteiro be ordered to
When the terms of an agreement have
produce the deed of sale, which they
been reduced to writing, it is considered as
cited as the source of their rights as co-
containing all the terms agreed upon and
owners. On November 20, 1995, Spouses
there can be, between the parties and their
Monteiro submitted their
successors in interest, no evidence of such
compliance,31 furnishing the RTC and the
terms other than the contents of the written
petitioners with a copy32 of the
agreement.
Bilihan. On January 3, 1996, the
petitioners filed a notice of
However, a party may present evidence
consignation,33 manifesting that they
to modify, explain or add to the terms of
had attempted to exercise their right of
written agreement if he puts in issue in
redemption as co-
his pleading:
owners of the 1/3 portion of the southern
half of the property under Article
162334 of the Civil Code by sending and (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement;
tendering payment of redemption to
Spouses Monteiro, which was, however,
(b) The failure of the written
returned.
agreement to express the true intent and
x By filing the notice of consignation and tendering
their payment for the agreement of the parties thereto;
redemption of the 1/3 portion of the
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
southern-half of the property, the
petitioners, in effect, admitted the
existence, due execution and validity of
the
Bilihan. Consequently, they are now
estopped from questioning its admissiblity
in
evidence for relying on such for their right
of redemption. Additionally, the
Court notes that the copy35 of the Bilihan
which was originally
submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its
compliance filed on November
20, 1995, does in fact bear a documentary
stamp tax. It could only
mean that the documentary stamp tax on
the sale was properly paid.
The Bilihan was, therefore, properly
admitted into evidence and
considered by the RTC.
x In any case, as correctly held by the lower cou1is,
the petitioners, as heirs of
Vitaliano, who inherited the northern-half
po1iion of the subject property, do not
possess the necessary personality to
assail the sale of the southern-half portion

between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs

of Pedro.1wphi1 They are not real
parties-in-interest who stand to be
benefited or injured by the sale of the
1/3 portion of the southern-half over
which they have absolutely no right.
As
correctly ruled by the courts below, only
fellow co-owners have the personality to
assail the sale, namely, the heirs of
Pedro's siblings, Esperanza and Leandro.
They have, however, expressly
aquiesced to the sale and waived their
right to the property in the affidavit
presented by Spouses Monteiro.36 As
such, the petitioners have no right to
their counterclaims of demolition of
improvements and payment of
damages.
x With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved
their claim over the subject I
/3 portion of the southern-half of the
prope1iy through the Bilihan, the lower
courts did not err in awarding
possession, rentals, attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses to them.
x The Court, however, finds that the award of
rentals should be reckoned from
 o No distinction between a
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the public and private document x GR:
parties or their successors in interest after the execution of parol evidence rule only applies to
the written agreement.
written contracts
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a) o XPN: it is likewise applicable
to wills, though the latter is
Interpretation of Documents not a contract
x Contract meeting of the minds between 2
Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal or more persons
meaning. The language of a writing is to be interpreted o It is the meeting of
according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its
execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
the minds that
constitutes a
Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all contract and NOT the
provisions. In the construction of an instrument, where document evidencing it
there are several provisions or particulars, such a o Such document is merely the
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to instrument, that is, the
all. (9)
tangible evidence of the contract
Section 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and x As a rule, a contract need not be in any form
particular o Hence, an oral contract is generally
provisions. In the construction of an instrument, the intention VALID
of the parties is to be o However, for legal convenience,
pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are most persons choose to
inconsistent, the latter is
reduce into writing their agreement
paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a
general one that is inconsistent x Once such parties reduce such agreement
with it. (10) into writing, the parol
evidence rule comes into play
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the o When the terms of an agreement
proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under have been reduced to
which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof writing it is considered
and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be
as containing all the terms
placed in the position of those who language he is to interpret.
(11) agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties
Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a and their successors in
writing are presumed to interest
have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but
evidence is admissible to show
that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar
signification, and were so used and 231
understood in the particular instance, in which case the
agreement must be construed
accordingly. (12)

Section 15. Written words control printed. When an

instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a
printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls
the latter. (13)

Section 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining

certain writings. When the characters in which an
instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the court, the evidence of
persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who
understand the language, is admissible to declare the
characters or the meaning of the language. (14)

Section 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred. When the

terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense
by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either
party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when
different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is
to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose
favor the provision was made. (15)

Section 18. Construction in favor of natural right. When an

instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in
favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to
be adopted. (16)

Section 19. Interpretation according to usage. An

instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to
determine its true character. (17)

ANNOTATION

x ONLY rule that has direct application to written

contracts
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EFFECT: Generally, no evidence of such terms

incompleteness in the writing, or the presence
other than the contents of the written

of inconsistent provisions therein

agreement. o Failure of
the written agreement to express the true
Hence, generally, no extraneous evidence intent
and agreement of the parties thereto
may be presented for any of the ff purposes:

Aside from mistake and imperfection, the ff

x Modify contract
may be causes of failure to express the true
x Explain it
intent and agreement of the parties to the
x Add to it
contract (Arts 1359 and 1364 CC):
 TOTAL INTEGRATION of the agreement in
x
Fraud
PH, the American jurisprudence on partial and

Inequitable conduct
total integration of agreements is irrelevant

Accident
since Section 9 provides that once the

Ignorance
agreement is reduced into writing, it is

Lack of skill
considered as containing ALL terms agreed

Negligence
upon by the parties

Bad faith
o Whatever is NOT found in the writing is understood to

Action for reformation of the instrument

have been waived and abandoned

proper remedy of the aggrieved party where

x Parol literally means oral or verbal
parol evidence may be presented by the latter
o BUT if used with reference to contracts it means

to prove the real intention of the parties

extraneous or evidence aliunde

In such action, it is the

x PURPOSE of the parol evidence rule: to give certainty to written
INSTRUMENT and NOT the
transactions; to preserve the reliability thereof; to protect the sanctity

contract that is being sought to be

of written agreements

reformed
x DOES NOT apply to oral agreements
x
Hence, an action for the
x Applies only to the parties to the written contract AND their
reformation of the instrument
successors-in-interest

PRESUPPOSES that there is a

o Hence, although parol evidence is generally inadmissible,
 contract, that is, that there is a
this rule does not apply to a stranger to the contract or

meeting of the minds

one who is not privy of the terms thereof

In other words, when it is shown

x In case of WILLS:
that there was NO meeting of the
o General, a will may not be probated except upon

minds between the parties

evidence of the contents thereof by presenting before the

because consent was vitiated by

court the actual will itself

fraud etc., the proper remedy is

XPNs:
NOT an action for reformation
x Notarial will may be
BUT one for the annulment of the
reconstituted by parol evidence

contract
when lost or destroyed o Validity of
the written agreement
x Holographic will may be proven o Existence
of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
by a mere photostatic copy

successors in interest after the execution of the written

x HOW to introduce parol evidence put in issue any of the
agreement
circumstances set forth in Section 9 and prove the same
o Putting in issue to allege in the pleadings Best
Evidence Rule Parol Evidence Rule
o Hence, the mere existence of a circumstance that may Province/ establishes
preference for the not concerned with the primacy of
justify the presentation of parol evidence DOES NOT ipso Office of the original document
over a evidence but presupposes that the
facto result in the allowance of the same rule secondary evidence
thereof original is available
x It is NOT the province of the court to amend precludes the
a contract by admission of other
What is precludes the
evidence to prove the
construction admission of
terms of a
o Contract is precluded by secondary
document other than
evidence if the original
considered as a law the contents
the rule document is
between the parties of the document itself
available
for the
thereto
purpose of varying the
x As to PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS and terms of the
SUBSEQUENT agreements writing
no distinction under the new Rules, hence,
should still be put in issue

so that parol evidence may be admitted any litigant to an

Who only by the parties to
x XPNs to the parol evidence rule under may
action whether said
the document
Section 9: litigant is a party to
invoke and their successors-
the
o An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or the rule in-interest
document involved
imperfection in
the written agreement applies to all forms
applies to written
of writing
agreements and
Intrinsic/ Latent Application where the contents
wills
thereof are
sought to be
Extrinsic/ Patent proven
one which is not apparent on
the face of the language is
one which appears on the
document but clear and intelligible and
very face of the instrument
which lies in the suggests a single meaning but
Defini and arises from the defective, obscure or
person or some matters to the writing
tion insensible
thing; when the creates ambiguity
language used o rule may be o The fact that the court has admitted
Par WAIVED by parol evidence does not ipso
ol failure to nvoke facto result in great probative weight
evi the which is a matter of judicial
de benefits of discretion
nce the said rule

parol
CASES
evidence shall
never be
When parol when such intrinsic ambiguity is admitted RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
because to do so APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES
evidence may put in issue, parol evidence would be INOCENTES, respondents.
tantamount to the G.R.
be admitted may be admitted creation of a No.
new contract by 1073
the court 72.
Janua
ry
Mistake and 23,
imperfection may result 1997
in THIR
failure of the D
DIVIS
instrument to
ION
capture the
true intent FACTS:
and x Inocentes sold 2 parcels of land in QC to Ortanez
agreement of for a consideration of
the parties P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively
x Inocentes received the sums of money BUT failed to
Mistake refers to a deliver the Ortanez the TCT
mistake of fact and one x Inocentes refused
which is mutual to the o on the ground that the title of the first lot
parties is in the possession of
Imperfection refers another person,[4] and
to an inaccurate petitioner's acquisition of the
statement in the title of the other lot is subject
to certain conditions.
agreement, or
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Henedino M. Brondial)
complaint as well
as the
x Ortanez filed an action for specific performance counterclaim
before the RTC x Ortanez appealed to CA
x Inocentes evidence: x CA affirmed RTC
o private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a x Ortanez filed a Rule 45 before the SC
former judge, orally testified
that the sale was subject to ISSUE: Whether the subject parol evidence
the above conditions,[7] was correctly admitted to establish the
although such conditions were alleged oral conditions-precedent to a
not incorporated in the deeds contract of sale, considering that the deeds of
of sale. sale are silent on
x Ortanez timely objected to the oral testimony such conditions
of Oscar
x RTC overruled the objection HELD: NO.
x RTC dismissed Ortanezs complaint x The parol evidence herein introduced is
o Despite petitioner's timely objections inadmissible.
on the ground that the o First, private respondents'
introduction of said oral oral testimony on the alleged
conditions was barred by conditions,
the parol coming from a party
evidence rule, the lower who has an interest in
court nonetheless, the outcome of the
admitted them and case, depending
eventually dismissed the exclusively on human
 memory, is not as reliable as the
written or documentary contract
evidence.[8] Spoken words additional
could be contempo
notoriously unreliable unlike a raneous
written contract which conditions
speaks of a uniform language. which are
[9] Thus, under the general not
rule in Section 9 of Rule mentioned
130[10] of the Rules of Court, at all in
when the writing
the terms of an agreement unless
were reduced to writing, as in there has
this case, it is deemed to been
contain all the terms agreed fraud or
upon mistake."
and no evidence of such terms [18] No
can be admitted other than such
the contents thereof.[11] fraud or
Considering that the written mistake
deeds of exists in
sale were the only repository this
of the truth, whatever is not case.
found in o Fourth, we disagree with
said instruments must have private respondents' argument that
been waived and abandoned their
by the parol evidence is
parties.[12] Examining the admissible under the
deeds of sale, we cannot even exceptions provided
make an by the
inference that the sale was Rules, specifically,
subject to any condition. As a the alleged failure of
contract, the agreement to
it is the law between the express
parties.[13] the true intent of the
o Secondly, to buttress their argument, parties. Such
private respondents rely on exception obtains
the case of Land Settlement only in the
Development, Co. vs. Garcia following instance:
Plantation[14] where the "[W]here the
Court ruled that a condition written contract is so
precedent to ambiguous
a contract may be or
established by parol evidence. obscure in
However, the terms that
material facts of that case are the
different from this case. In the contractu
former, the contract sought al
to be enforced[15] expressly intention
stated that it is subject to an of the
agreement containing the parties
conditions-precedent which cannot be
were proven through parol understoo
evidence. Whereas, the d
deeds of sale in this case, made no from a
reference to any pre- mere
conditions or other agreement. In reading of
fact, the sale is denominated the
as absolute in its own terms. instrumen
o Third, the parol evidence t. In such
herein sought to be introduced a case,
would vary, contradict or extrinsic
defeat the operation of a evidence
valid instrument,[16] of the
hence, contrary to the rule subject
that: matter of
The parol evidence rule the
forbids any addition to contract,
x x x the terms of of the
a written relations
instrument by of the
testimony parties to
purporting to each
show that, at or other,
before and of the
the signing of the facts and
document, other circumsta
or different nces
terms were orally surroundi
agreed upon by ng them
the when they
parties.[17] entered
Although parol evidence is into the
admissible to explain the contract
meaning of a may be
contract, "it received
cannot serve the to enable
purpose of the court
incorporating into to make a
 proper
interpretation of intention[21] of the buyer
the instrument." (petitioner) and the seller (private
[19]
x In this case, respondents). Such issue must be
the deeds of sale "squarely presented."[22] Private
are respondents merely alleged that
clear, the sale was subject to four (4)
witho conditions which they tried to
ut any prove during trial by parol
ambig evidence.[23] Obviously, this
uity, cannot be done, because they
mista did not plead any of the
ke or exceptions mentioned in the parol
imper
fectio evidence rule.[24] Their case is
n, covered by the general rule that
much the contents of the writing are the
less only repository of the terms of
obscu the agreement. Considering that
rity or private respondent Oscar
doubt Inocentes is a lawyer (and former
in the judge) he was "supposed to be
terms steeped in legal knowledge and
there practices" and was "expected to
of. know the consequences"[25] of
o Fifth, we are not persuaded by private his signing a deed of absolute
respondents contention that sale.
they "put in issue by the Had he given an iota's attention
pleadings" the failure of to scrutinize the deeds, he would
the written have incorporated important
agreement to express stipulations that the transfer of
the true intent of the title to
parties. Record said lots were conditional.[26
shows[20] that private x One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol
respondents did not expressly evidence is admissible,
plead that the deeds of sale it should nonetheless be disbelieved as no
were incomplete or that it did other evidence appears from
not reflect the the record to sustain the existence of the
alleged conditions. Not even
the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was
presented to testify on such conditions.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN,

Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventeenth
Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP., Respondents.
G.R. No.
126006

January 29,
2004
SECOND
DIVISION

FACTS:
x Elias Q. Tan (then President of the co-petitioner
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc.)
obtained four loans from the respondent
Allied Banking Corporation covered by four
promissory notes in the amounts of
P100,000 each.
x Allied Bank demanded payment
x Lapu Lapu and Tan failed to pay
x Allied Bank filed an action for sum of money before
RTC Cebu
o seeking payment by the petitioners,
jointly and solidarily, of the
sum of P493,566.61 representing
their loan obligation, exclusive of
interests, penalty charges,
attorneys fees and costs.
x Lapu lapu filed answer
o denied incurring indebtedness from the
respondent Bank alleging
that the loans were obtained
by petitioner Tan in his
personal capacity, for his own
use and benefit and on the
strength of the personal
information he furnished the
respondent Bank.
o The petitioner Foundation maintained
that it never authorized
petitioner Tan to co-sign in his
capacity as its President any
promissory note and that the
respondent Bank fully knew that
the loans contracted were made
 in petitioner Tans personal capacity and
for his own use and that the petitioner
Foundation never benefited, directly or
indirectly, therefrom.
o The petitioner Foundation then interposed a
cross-claim against
petitioner Tan alleging that he, having
exceeded his authority, should be
solely liable for said loans, and a
counterclaim against the respondent
Bank for damages and attorneys fees.
x Tan filed his answer
o admitted that he contracted the loans from the
respondent Bank in
his personal capacity.
o The parties, however, agreed that the loans were
to be paid from
the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares
of common stocks in the Lapulapu
Industries Corporation, a real estate
firm.
o The loans were covered by promissory notes
which were
automatically renewable ("rolled-over")
every year at an amount
including unpaid interests, until such
time as petitioner Tan was
able to pay the same from the
proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
o According to petitioner Tan, the respondent
Banks employee
required him to affix two signatures
on every promissory note, assuring
him that the loan documents would
be filled out in accordance with their
agreement.
o However, after he signed and delivered the loan
documents to the
respondent Bank, these were filled out
in a manner not in accord with their
agreement, such that the petitioner
Foundation was included as party
thereto.
o Further, prior to its filing of the complaint, the
respondent Bank
made no demand on him.
x RTC in favor of ALLIED BANK; ordered both Lapu Lapu and
Tan to pay
x Lapu Lapu and Tan appealed to CA
x CA affirmed RTC
o disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the loans
were his personal
loans as the promissory notes evidencing
them showed upon their
faces that these were obligations of the
petitioner Foundation, as
contracted by petitioner Tan himself in
his "official and personal
character." Applying the parol evidence
rule, the CA likewise
rejected petitioner Tans assertion that
there was an unwritten agreement
between him and the respondent Bank
that he would pay the loans from the
proceeds of his shares of stocks in the
Lapulapu Industries Corp.
x Lapu Lapu and Tan filed a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE: Whether Tans assertion as regards the unwritten

agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would
pay the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the
Lapulapu Industries Corp. may be given credence by the court.

HELD: NO.
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x The Court particularly finds as incredulous
petitioner Tans allegation that he was
made to sign blank loan documents and
that the phrase "IN MY
OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY" was
superimposed by the respondent
Banks employee despite petitioner
Tans protestation. The Court is hard
pressed to believe that a businessman
of petitioner Tans stature could have
been so careless as to sign blank loan
documents.
x In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory
notes11 clearly showed upon
their faces that they are the obligation of
the petitioner Foundation, as
contracted by petitioner Tan "in his
official and personal capacity."12
Moreover,
the application for credit
accommodation,13 the signature cards
of the two
accounts in the name of petitioner
Foundation,14 as well as New
Current
Account Record,15 all
accompanying the promissory
notes, were signed by
petitioner Tan for and in the
name of the petitioner
Foundation.16 These
documentary evidence
unequivocally and categorically
establish that the loans
were solidarily contracted by the
petitioner Foundation and
petitioner Tan.
x As a corollary, the parol evidence rule
likewise constrains this Court to
reject petitioner Tans claim
regarding the purported
unwritten
agreement between him and the
respondent Bank on the payment
of the obligation. Section 9, Rule
130 of the of the Revised Rules
of Court provides that "[w]hen
the terms of an agreement have
 been reduced to writing, it is to be covering an area of
considered as containing all the terms 1,004 square meters
agreed upon and there can be, between (or a total of 4,024
the parties and their successors-in- square
interest, no evidence of such terms other meters).
than the contents of the written x Valdez filed an action for Annulment of
agreement."17 Title, Reconveyance and Damages
x In this case, the promissory notes are the law against Leoveras
between the petitioners and the o seeking the reconveyance of
respondent Bank. These promissory notes the 1,004-square meter portion
contained maturity dates as follows: (disputed property)
o February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, covered by TCT No.
April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, 195813, on the
respectively. That these notes ground that Leoveras
were to be paid on these dates is entitled only to the
is 3,020 square meters
clear and explicit. Nowhere identified in the
was it stated therein that they parties Agreement.
would be o The respondent sought the
renewed on a year-to-year nullification of the petitioners titles
basis or "rolled-over" annually by
until paid contesting
from the proceeds of the
petitioner Tans shares in the authenticity
Lapulapu of the
Industries Corp. Accordingly, petitioners
this purported unwritten documents.
agreement Particularly,
could not be made to vary or the
contradict the terms and respondent
conditions in assailed the
the promissory notes. Benigna
x Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal Deed by
agreement is generally presenting Benignas
not admissible to vary, contradict or death certificate. The
defeat the operation of a valid respondent argued
contract.18 While parol evidence is that
admissible to explain the meaning Benigna could not
of written contracts, it cannot serve the have executed a
purpose of incorporating into deed, which purports
the contract additional to convey
contemporaneous conditions which are 4,024 square meters
not to the petitioner, in
mentioned at all in writing, unless there 1969 because
has been fraud or mistake.19 No such Benigna
allegation had been made by the already died in 1944.
petitioners in this case. The respondent
added that neither
could Sta. Maria have
MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. sold to the parties her
CASIMERO VALDEZ, Respondent. G.R. three-fourths ()
No. 169985 June 15, 2011 share in 1969
THIRD DIVISION because she had
already sold her share
FACTS: to Benigna in 1932.
x Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the x Leoveras filed his answer
registered owners - three- o claimed that the parties
fourths () and one-fourth () pro- already had
indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of (i) delineated
land located in Pangasinan their respective
x Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to portions of the subject
Benigna Llamas property even
o When Benigna died in 1944,7 she before they
willed her three-fourths () acquired it in
share equally to her sisters Alejandra 1969 and
Llamas and Josefa Llamas (ii) agreed that
o THUS, Alejandra and Josefa each upon acquisition, each
owned one-half () of Benignas would own the
three-fourths () share. portion as
x Alejandras heirs sold their predecessors one-half delineated;
() share (roughly equivalent x that
to 10,564 square meters) to Valdez, as evidenced the area he
by a Deed of Absolute Sale actually
x Josefa sold her own one-half () share (subject possessed
property) to Valdez and the and
petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of subse
Absolute Sale quentl
x Valdez then asked the Register of Deeds of y
Lingayen, Pangasinan on the acquir
requirements for the transfer of title ed
over the portion allotted to him on has a
the subject property total
o He learned that Leoveras had already area
obtained in his name two
transfer certificates of title
(TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812 -
covering an area of 3,020
square meters; and two, TCT
No. 195813 -

of 4,024 square
meters, which he
subdivided into
two portions and
caused
to be covered by
the two TCTs in
question.
o The petitioner claimed that in signing the
Agreement, he was led to
believe, based on the parties rough
estimation, that the area he
actually possessed is only 3,020 square
meters contrary to the
parties real intention - i.e., the extent of
their ownership would be based on their
actual possession
o further claimed that the respondent voluntarily
participated in
executing the Affidavit, which corrected
the mistake in the
previously executed Agreement26 and
confirmed the petitioners ownership over
the disputed property. The petitioner
asked for the dismissal of the complaint
and for a declaration that he is the lawful
owner of the parcels of land covered by
his titles.
x RTC DISMISSED the action
o Valdez failed to preponderantly prove that the
Benigna Deed and
the Affidavit are fabricated and,
consequently, no ground exists to nullify
the petitioners titles.
o The court observed that the respondent did not
even compare his
genuine signature with the
signatures appearing in these
documents.
x Valdez appealed to CA
x CA reversed RTC
o ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna
Deed and the
Affidavit.
o The CA gave weight to Benignas death certificate
which shows the
impossibility of Benignas execution of the deed in
1969.
o The CA also noted the discrepancy between the
respondents
signatures as appearing in the
Affidavit, on one hand, and the
documents on record, on the other.27
o The CA added that the respondents failure to
compare his genuine
signature from his purported signatures
appearing in the
petitioners documents is not fatal,
since Section 22, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court allows the court to
make its own comparison.
x Leoveras filed a Rule 45 before the SC
o he claims that since the Agreement does not
reflect the true
intention of the parties, the Affidavit was
subsequently executed in order to reflect
the parties true intention
ISSUE: Whether the subject affidavit was sufficiently proved that
the prior agreement did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto.
HELD: NO.
x The petitioners argument calls to fore the application of the
parol evidence
rule,35 i.e., when the terms of an agreement are
reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed
to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence
of these terms can be admitted other than what is
contained in the written
agreement.36 Whatever is not found in the writing
is understood to have been waived and
abandoned.37
x To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of
Court
allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in
this case, the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties. The failure of the
written
agreement to express the true intention
of the parties is either by
reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of
the minds of the parties.38 x At the trial, the
petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence,
the
alleged true intention of the parties by
presenting the Affidavit, which
allegedly corrected the mistake in the
previously executed Agreement
and confirmed his ownership of the parcels
of land covered by his
titles. It was the petitioners staunch
assertion that the respondent co-executed
this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the
parties true intention.
x In the present petition, however, the petitioner made
a damaging
admission that the Benigna Deed is
fabricated, thereby completely
bolstering the respondents cause of
action for reconveyance of the
disputed property on the ground of fraudulent
registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely
reflects what is embodied in the Benigna
Deed, the
petitioners admission, coupled with the
respondents denial of his purported
signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious
doubt the reliability of this document,
supposedly the bedrock of the petitioners
defense.
x Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in
the petitioners share
the disputed property, the petitioner
obviously need not go at length of
fabricating a deed of sale to support his
application for the transfer of
title of his rightful portion of the subject
property. Notably, there is
nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly
corrected the mistake in the earlier
Agreement) that supports the petitioners
claim that the
partition of the subject property is
based on the parties actual
possession.
x Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based on
the respondents alleged
failure to prove the spuriousness of the
documents submitted by the petitioner to
the Register of Deeds. However, by admitting
the presentation of a false deed in
securing his title, the petitioner rendered
moot the issue of authenticity of the
Benigna Deed and relieved the respondent of
the burden of proving its falsity as a ground
to nullify the petitioners titles.
x By fraudulently causing the transfer of the
registration of title over the
disputed property in his name, the petitioner
holds the title to this
disputed property in trust for the benefit of
the respondent as the true
owner;39 registration does not vest title but
merely confirms or records
234
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title already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration

cannot be used to protect a usurper from o A: 4[0]20 square meters and
the true owner, nor can it be my brother-in-law 6,000 plus square
used as a shield for the commission of meters.
fraud, or to permit one to enrich o Q: Was there a boundary
oneself at the expense of others.40 between the 4,020 square meters
Hence, the CA correctly ordered the and
reconveyance of the disputed property, the rest of the
covered by TCT No. 195813, to property which (sic)
the respondent. designated by your
x The parties Agreement effectively partitioned the brother-in-
subject property law?
x The petitioner also relies on his alleged actual o A: There is sir, and the
possession of the disputed boundary is the fence.
property to support his claim of o Q: When did you put up that
ownership. Notably, both parties make fence which is the boundary?
conflicting assertions of possession of o A: After the deed of sale was
the disputed property.41 The petitioner made.
testified on his possession as follows: o Q: And that boundary fence
o Q: How many square meters did you which you put according to you
get from the land and how since
many square meters was the share of the execution of
[respondent]? the Deed of
 Absolute Sale in 1969 claims in December 1987.50 The
up to the present does it total area (7,544 square meters)
still exist? of the properties declared is
o A: Yes, sir. equivalent to the area allotted to
o Q: Since the time you purchased the the respondent under the
property according to you you Agreement. On the other hand,
already divided the property, is that the petitioner declared the 1,004-
correct? square meter portion only in
o A: Yes, sir. September 1994, under Tax
o Q: And that as of today who is in Declaration No. 9393,51 despite
possession of that 4,020 square his claim of exclusive and adverse
meters? possession since 1969.
o A: I, sir.42 x Nullification of the petitioners title over
x The petitioner and the respondent were originally the 3,020 square meter portion
co-owners of the subject x While the petitioner admitted using a
property when they jointly bought it spurious document in securing his titles,
from the same vendor in 1969. nonetheless, he questions the
However, the parties immediately CAs nullification of TCT No.
terminated this state of indivision by 195812 on the ground that, per
executing an the respondents own admission
Agreement, which is in the nature of a partition and the parties Agreement, he is
agreement. the rightful owner of the land
x The Civil Code of the Philippines defines partition covered by this title.
as the separation, division and o We disagree.
assignment of a thing held in common x The petitioners argument confuses
among those to whom it may belong.43 registration of title with ownership.52 While
Partition is the division between two or the petitioners ownership
more persons of real or personal over the land covered by
property, owned in common, by setting TCT No. 195812 is
apart their respective interests so that undisputed, his ownership
they may enjoy and possess these in only gave him the right to
severalty,44 resulting in the partial or apply for the proper
total extinguishment of co-ownership.45 transfer of title to the property in
x In the present case, the parties agreed to divide his name. Obviously, the
the subject property by giving petitioner, even as a rightful
the petitioner the 3,020 square meters owner, must comply with the
"residential portion on the northern part statutory provisions on the
near the Municipal road."46 There is no transfer of
dispute that this 3,020- square meter registered title to lands.53
portion is the same parcel of land Section 53 of Presidential Decree
identified as Lot No. 2 (which is not the No. 1529 provides
subject of the respondents action for that the subsequent registration
reconveyance) in the Affidavit and the of title procured by the
Subdivision Plan presented by the presentation of a forged
petitioner before the Register of Deeds. deed or other instrument is null
The and void. Thus, the subsequent
fact that the Agreement lacks technical issuance of TCT
description of the parties respective No. 195812 gave the petitioner
portions or that the subject property no better right than the tainted
was then still embraced by a single registration
certificate of title could not legally which was the basis for the
prevent a partition, where the different issuance of the same title. The
portions allotted to each were determined Court simply cannot allow the
and became separately identifiable, as in petitioners attempt to get
this case.47 around the proper procedure for
x What is strikingly significant is that even the registering the transfer of title in
petitioners own testimony merely his name by using spurious
attempted to confirm his actual documents.
possession of the disputed property,
without,
however, supporting his claim -
contrary to the written Agreement -
that the
parties ownership of the subject
property would be co-extensive with
their
possession. This is the core of the
petitioners defense. At any rate, just as
non-
possession does not negate ownership,
neither does possession automatically
prove ownership,48 especially in the face
of an unambiguous document executed by
the parties themselves.1avvphi1
x Contrary to the petitioners claim that his actual
possession determines the
extent of his ownership, it is the
parties Agreement that defines the
extent of
their ownership in the subject property.
One of the legal effects of partition,
whether by agreement among the co-
owners or by judicial proceeding, is to
terminate the co-ownership and,
consequently, to make the previous co-
owners the absolute and exclusive owner
of the share allotted to him.49
x Parenthetically, the respondent declared for
taxation purposes the portion he
 ii. whether the initial electronic document had been
c. Electronic altered after the transformation was
made.
Evidence
Rules on (f) "Digitally signed" refers to an electronic document
or electronic data message bearing a digital signature
Electronic verified by the public key listed in a certificate.

Evidence (g) "Electronic data message" refers to information

generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC optical or similar means.

(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the

July 17, 2001 RULES ON
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Acting on the Memorandum dated 18 June 2001 of the Committee
on the Revision of the
Rules of Court to Draft the Rules on E-Commerce Law [R.A. No.
8792] submitting the Rules on Electronic Evidence for this Court's
consideration and approval, the Court Resolved to
APPROVED the same.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending
after their effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on the first
day of August 2001 following thier publication before the 20th
of July in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines
17th July 2001.
RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any print-out or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message".
(i) "Electronic key" refers to a secret code which secures
and defends sensitive information
that crosses over public channels into a form
decipherable only with a matching electronic key.

Rule 1
COVERAGE
235
Section 1. Scope. - Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules
shall apply whenever an
electronic document or electronic data message, as defined in
Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used
in evidence.

Section 2. Cases covered. - These Rules shall apply to all civil

actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and
administrative cases.

Section 3. Application of other rules on evidence. - In all

matters not specifically covered by these Rules, the Rules of
Court and pertinent provisions of statutes containing rules on
evidence shall apply.

Rule 2
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. Definition of terms. - For purposes of these Rules,

the following terms are defined, as follows:

(a) "Asymmetric or public cryptosystem" means a system

capable of generating a secure key pair, consisting of a private
key for creating a digital signature, and a public key for verifying
the digital signature.

(b) "Business records" include records of any business,

institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate
or illegitimate purposes.

(c) "Certificate" means an electronic document issued to

support a digital signature which purports to confirm the
identity or other significant characteristics of the person who
holds a particular key pair.

(d) "Computer" refers to any single or interconnected device or

apparatus, which, by electronic, electro-mechanical or magnetic
impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive,
record, transmit, store, process, correlate, analyze, project,
retrieve and/or produce information, data, text, graphics, figures,
voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform
any one or more of these functions.

(e) "Digital signature" refers to an electronic signature

consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an
electronic data message using an asymmetric or public
cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed
electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately
determine:

i. whether the transformation was created using the private

key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and
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(j) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in
electronic form, representing the identity of a person and includes the computer system or other
and attached to or logically associated similar devices by or in which data are
with the electronic data message or electronic recorded or
document or any methodology or procedure stored and any procedure related to the
employed or adopted by a person and executed or recording or storage of electronic data
adopted by such person with the intention messages or
of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic electronic documents.
data message or electronic document. For purposes of
these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital (m) "Key pair" in an asymmetric
signatures. cryptosystem refers to the private key and its
mathematically
(k) "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to related public key such that the latter can
telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom verify the digital signature that the former
sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and creates.
other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or (n) "Private key" refers to the key of a key pair used
retained. to create a digital signature.

(l) "Information and communication system" refers to (o) "Public key" refers to the key of a key pair used to
a system for generating, sending, verify a digital signature.
receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic
data messages or electronic documents
Section 2. Construction. - These Rules shall be
liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining
a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination
of cases.
The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into
consideration the international origin of Republic
Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act.
Rule 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized
document. - A document electronically
notarized in accordance with the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be
considered as a public document and proved
as a notarial document under the Rules of
Court.

Section 1. Electronic documents as functional

equivalent of paper-based documents. -
Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term
writing, document, record, instrument,
memorandum or any other form of writing, such term
shall be deemed to include an electronic document as
defined in these Rules.

Section 2. Admissibility. - An electronic document is

admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules
on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court
and related laws and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.

Section 3. Privileged communication. - The

confidential character of a privileged
communication is not lost solely on the ground that it
is in the form of an electronic document.

Rule 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Section 1. Original of an electronic document. -

An electronic document shall be
regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.

Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. -

When a document is in two or more copies executed
at or about the same time with identical contents,
or is a counterpart
produced by the same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by mechanical
or electronic re-recording, or by chemical
reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduces the original, such
copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the
equivalent of the original.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates

shall not be admissible to the same extent as the
original if:

(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the

original; or

(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or

inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the
original.

Rule 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. - The

person seeking to introduce an electronic document
in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving
its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any

private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved
by any of the following
means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by

the person purported to have signed the
same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security

procedures or devices as may be authorized by
the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
Rule 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Section 1. Electronic signature. - An electronic signature or a
digital signature authenticated in the manner prescribed
hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent
of the signature of a person on a written document.
Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. - An
electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the
following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish
a digital signature and verify the same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as
establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.
Section 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic
signatures. - Upon the authentication of an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:
document or electronic data message is recorded or
stored, the court may consider, among others, the
following factors:
(a) Whether the information and communication system
or other similar device was operated in a manner that did
not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and
there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the
integrity of the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or
stored by a party to the proceedings with interest
adverse to that of the party using it; or
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or
stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a
person who is not a party to the proceedings and who
did not act under the control of the party using it.
Rule 8
236

(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;

(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the
intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document
to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the
transaction embodied therein; and

(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the

electronic signature operated without error or fault.

Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital

signatures. - Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it
shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the
immediately preceding section, that:

(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a
certificate;

(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;

(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been
altered from the time it was signed; and,

(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated

therein.

Rule 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. - In

assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document,
the following factors may be considered:

(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was

generated, stored or communicated, including but not limited to
input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for
accuracy and reliability of the electronic data message or
document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any
relevant agreement;

(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;

(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in

which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to the
hardware and computer programs or software used as well as
programming errors;

(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the
entry with the communication and information system;

(e) The nature and quality of the information which went

into the communication and
information system upon which the electronic data message
or electronic document was
based; or

(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or electronic
data message.

Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication

system. - In any dispute involving the integrity of the
information and communication system in which an electronic
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Rule 9
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE METHOD OF PROOF

Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. - A
memorandum, report, record or data
compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or
other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a
person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the
regular course or conduct of a business
activity, and such was the regular practice to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation by electronic, optical or similar means,
all of which are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. - The
presumption provided for in Section 1 of this Rule
may be overcome by evidence of the
untrustworthiness of the source of information or the
method or circumstances of the preparation,
transmission or storage thereof.
Section 1. Affidavit evidence. - All matters
relating to the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of an electronic
document may be established by an
affidavit stating facts of direct personal
knowledge of the affiant or based on
authentic records. The affidavit must
affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to
testify on the matters contained therein.
Section 2. Cross-examination of deponent. -
The affiant shall be made to affirm the
contents of the affidavit in open court and
may be cross-examined as a matter of right
by the adverse party.
Rule 10
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1. Electronic testimony. - After
summarily hearing the parties pursuant to
Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may authorize the
presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic
means. Before so authorizing, the court shall
determine the necessity for such presentation and
prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary
under the circumstances, including the protection of
the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
Section 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. - When
examination of a witness is done electronically, the
entire proceedings, including the questions and
answers, shall be
transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypist or other
recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall
certify as correct the transcript done by him. The
transcript should reflect the fact that the
proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been
electronically recorded.
Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. - The
electronic evidence and recording
thereof as well as the stenographic notes shall
form part of the record of the case. Such
transcript and recording shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of such proceedings.
Rule 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE
Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. - Audio,
photographic and video evidence
of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible
provided it shall be shown, presented or
displayed to the court and shall be identified,
explained or authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.
Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. -
Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of
a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or
unavailability of such witnesses, other competent
evidence may be admitted.
A recording of the telephone conversation or
ephemeral electronic communication shall be
covered by the immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or
embodied in an electronic document, then the
provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
Rule 12
EFFECTIVITY
Section 1. Applicability to pending cases. - These
Rules shall apply to cases pending after their
effectivity.
Section 2. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take
effect on the first day of August 2001 following
their publication before the 20th of July 2001 in
two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
E-COMMERCE LAW
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8792 June 14, 2000
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE RECOGNITION
AND USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS AND DOCUMENTS,
PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL USE THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
PART I
SHORT TITLE AND DECLARATION OF POLICY
Section 1. Short Title - This Act shall be known as the
"Electronic Commerce Act of 2000."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - The State recognizes
the vital role of information and
communications technology (ICT) in nation-building;
the need to create an information-
friendly environment which supports and ensures the
availability, diversity and affordability of ICT products
and services; the primary responsibility of the private
sector in contributing
investments and services in telecommunications and
information technology; the need to
develop, with appropriate training programs and
institutional policy changes, human resources
for the information technology age, a labor force skilled
in the use of ICT and a population
capable of operating and utilizing electronic appliances
and computers; its obligation to
facilitate the transfer and promotion of technology; to
ensure network security, connectivity
and neutrality of technology for the national benefit; and
the need to marshal, organize and
deploy national information infrastructures, comprising in
both telecommunications network
and strategic information services, including their
interconnection to the global information
networks, with the necessary and appropriate legal,
financial, diplomatic and technical
framework, systems and facilities.
PART II
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IN GENERAL
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 3. Objective - This Act aims to facilitate domestic
and international dealings,
transactions, arrangements agreements, contracts and
exchanges and storage of information
through the utilization of electronic, optical and similar
medium, mode, instrumentality and
technology to recognize the authenticity and reliability of
electronic documents related to such
activities and to promote the universal use of electronic
transaction in the government and
general public.
Section 4. Sphere of Application - This Act shall apply
to any kind of data message and
electronic document used in the context of
commercial and non-commercial activities to
include domestic and international dealings, transactions,
arrangements, agreements contracts and exchanges and
storage of information.
Section 5. Definition of Terms - For the purposes of
this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
(a) "Addressee" refers to a person who is intended by
the originator to receive the electronic data message or
electronic document. The term does not include a
person acting as an
intermediary with respect to that electronic data message or
electronic data document.
(b) "Computer" refers to any device or apparatus which,
by electronic, electro-mechanical, or
magnetic impulse, or by other means, is capable of
receiving, recording, transmitting, storing,
processing, retrieving, or producing information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of
written expression according to mathematical and
logical rules or of performing any one or more of
these functions.
(c) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.
(d) "Information and Communications System" refers to a
system intended for and capable of generating, sending,
receiving, storing, or otherwise processing electronic
data messages or electronic documents and includes the
computer system or other similar device by or in which
data is recorded or stored and any procedures related to
the recording or storage of electronic data message or
electronic document.
(e) "Electronic Signature" refers to any distinctive mark,
characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the
identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with
the electronic data message or electronic document or any
methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person
and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of
authenticating or approving an electronic data message or
electronic document.
(f) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described
or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be prove and
affirmed, which is receive, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
(g) "Electronic Key" refers to a secret code which secures and
defends sensitive information
that cross over public channels into a form decipherable only
with a matching electronic key.
(h) "Intermediary" refers to a person who in behalf of another
person and with respect to a particular electronic document
sends, receives and/or stores provides other services in respect
of that electronic data message or electronic document.
(i) "Originator" refers to a person by whom, or on
whose behalf, the electronic document purports to
have been created, generated and/or sent. The term
does not include a person acting as an intermediary
with respect to that electronic document.
(j) "Service provider" refers to a provider of -
i. On-line services or network access or the operator
of facilities therefor, including entities
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for online communications,
digital or otherwise, between or among points specified
by a user, of electronic documents of the user's
choosing; or
ii. The necessary technical means by which
electronic documents of an originator may be stored
and made accessible to designated or undesignated
third party.
Such service providers shall have no authority to modify
or alter the content of the electronic
data message or electronic document received or to
make any entry therein on behalf of the
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Section 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic
Documents - Electronic documents shall have
originator, addressee or any third party unless the legal effect, validity or enforceability as
specifically authorized to do so, and who shall retain any other document or legal writing, and -
the electronic document in accordance with the
specific request or as necessary for the purpose of (a) Where the law requires a document to
performing the services it was engaged to perform. be in writing, that requirement is met by an
electronic document if the said electronic
CHAPTER II document maintains its integrity and
LEGAL reliability and can be authenticated so as to
RECOGNITION OF be usable for subsequent reference, in that
ELECTRONIC -
WRITING OR
DOCUMENT AND i. The electronic document has remained
DATA MESSAGES complete and unaltered, apart from the
addition of any endorsement and any
Section 6. Legal Recognition of Electronic Data authorized change, or any change which
Messages - Information shall not be denied legal arises in the normal course of communication,
effect, validity or enforceability solely on the storage and display; and
grounds that it is in the data
message purporting to give rise to such legal ii. The electronic document is reliable in
effect, or that it is merely referred to in that the light of the purpose for which it was
electronic data message. generated and in the light of all relevant
circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement
therein is in the form of an obligation or whether
the law simply provides consequences for the
document not being presented or retained in its
original from.
(b) where it is required that information be
resented, that the information is capable of
being displayed to the person to whom it is
to be presented.

(c) Where the law requires that a document be

presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if -

i. There exists a reliable assurance as to the

integrity of the document from the time when it was
first generated in its final form; and

ii. That document is capable of being displayed to the

person to whom it is to be presented: Provided, That
no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all
requirements of existing laws on formalities required
in the execution of documents for their validity.

For evidentiary purposes, an electronic

document shall be the functional equivalent of a
written document under existing laws.

This Act does not modify any statutory rule

relating to admissibility of electronic data
massages or electronic documents, except the
rules relating to authentication and best
evidence.

Section 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures.

- An electronic signature on the electronic document
shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a
written document if that signature is proved by
showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable
by the parties interested in the electronic document,
existed under which -

(a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be

bound and to indicate said party's
access to the electronic document necessary for his
consent or approval through the electronic
signature;

(b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the

purpose for which the electronic document was
generated or communicated, in the light of all
circumstances, including any relevant
agreement;

(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound,

in or order to proceed further with the transaction,
to have executed or provided the electronic
signature; and

(d) The other party is authorized and enabled to

verify the electronic signature and to make the
decision to proceed with the transaction
authenticated by the same.

Section 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic

Signatures - In any proceedings involving an
electronic signature, it shall be presumed that
-

(a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to

whom it correlates; and

(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that

person with the intention of signing or approving
the electronic document unless the person
relying on the electronically signed electronic
document knows or has noticed of defects in or
unreliability of the signature or reliance on the
electronic signature is not reasonable under the
circumstances.

Section 10. Original Documents. -

(1) Where the law requires information to be

presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic data message
or electronic document if;

(a) the integrity of the information from the time

when it was first generated in its final form, as an
electronic data message or electronic document is
shown by evidence aliunde or
otherwise; and

(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in
the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides
consequences for the information not being presented or
retained in its original form.
Electronic Document. - In any legal proceedings, nothing
in the application of the rules on
evidence shall deny the admissibility of an electronic
data message or electronic document in
evidence -

(3) For the purpose of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1): (a) On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or

(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the (b) On the ground that it is not in the standard written
information has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the form, and the electronic data message or electronic
addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the document meeting, and complying with the
normal course of communication, storage and display ; and requirements under Sections 6 or 7 hereof shall be the
best evidence of the agreement and transaction
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the contained therein.
light of purposed for which the information was generated and in
the light of all the relevant circumstances. In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data
message or electronic document, the
Section 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic reliability of the manner in which it was generated,
Documents. stored or communicated, the reliability of
- Until the Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so the manner in which its originator was identified, and
provided, electronic documents, other relevant factors shall be given due
electronic data messages and electronic signatures, shall be regard.
authenticated by demonstrating,
substantiating and validating a claimed identity of a user, Section 13. Retention of Electronic Data Message
device, or another entity is an or Electronic Document. -
information or communication system, among other ways, as follows; Notwithstanding any provision of law, rule or
regulation to the contrary -
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof than
a letter , character, number or other symbol in electronic form (a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain
representing the persons named in and attached to or documents be retained in their original form is satisfied
logically associated with an electronic data message, electronic by retaining them in the form of an electronic data
document, or that the message or electronic
appropriate methodology or security procedures, when document which -
applicable, were employed or adopted by such person, with the
intention of authenticating or approving in an electronic data (i) Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent
message or electronic document; reference;

(b) The electronic data message or electronic document shall
be authenticated by proof that an appropriate security
procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for the
purpose of verifying the originator of an electronic data message
and/or electronic document, or detecting error or alteration in
the communication, content or storage of an electronic
document or electronic data message from a specific point,
which, using algorithm or codes, identifying words or numbers,
encryptions, answers back or acknowledgement procedures, or
similar security devices.
(ii) Is retained in the format in which it was generated,
sent or received, or in a format which can be
demonstrated to accurately represent the electronic
data message or electronic
document generated, sent or received;
238

The supreme court may adopt such other authentication

procedures, including the use of
electronic notarization systems as necessary and advisable,
as well as the certificate of
authentication on printed or hard copies of the electronic
document or electronic data
messages by electronic notaries, service providers and other
duly recognized or appointed certification authorities.

The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message or

electronic document in any
legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by
evidence capable of supporting
a finding that the electronic data message or electronic
document is what the person claims it
be.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the

information and communication system in which an electronic
data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may
be established in any legal proceeding -

a.) By evidence that at all material times the information and

communication system or other similar device was operating in a
manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic data
message and/or electronic document, and there are no other
reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and
communication system,

b.) By showing that the electronic data message and/or

electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the
proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party using it; or

c.) By showing that the electronic data message and/or

electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and
ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the
proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using the
record.

Section 12. Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Electronic

Data Message or
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(iii) Enables the identification of its originator and
addressee, as well as the determination of the date
and the time it was sent or received.
(b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is
satisfied by using the services of a third
party, provided that the conditions set fourth in
subparagraph s (i), (ii) and (iii) of paragraph
(a) are met.
Section 14. Proof by Affidavit. - The matters referred
to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section 9, on
the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to
have been established by an affidavit given to the
best of the deponent's knowledge subject to the
rights of parties in
interest as defined in the following section.
Section 15. Cross - Examination.
(1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section
14 that has been introduced in evidence may be
cross-examined as of right by a party to the
proceedings who is adverse in interest to the
party who has introduced the affidavit or has
caused the affidavit to be introduced.
(2) Any party to the proceedings has the right
to cross-examine a person referred to in
section 11, paragraph 4, sub paragraph c.
CHAPTER III.
COMMUNICATION OF ELECTRONIC DATA
MESSAGES OR ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
Section 16. Formation of Validity of Electronic
Contracts.
(1) Except as otherwise agreed by the
parties, an offer, the acceptance of an offer
and such other elements required under
existing laws for the formation of contracts
may be expressed in, demonstrated and
proved by means of electronic data
messages or electronic documents and no
contract shall be denied validity or
enforceability on the sole ground that it is in
the form of an electronic data message or electronic electronic data message or electronic
document, or that any or all of the elements required document as received as being what the
under existing laws for the formation of contracts is originator
expressed, demonstrated and proved by means of intended to send, and to act on that
electronic data messages or electronic documents. assumption. The addressee is not so
entitled when it
(2) Electronic transactions made through
networking among banks, or linkages thereof with
other entities or networks, and vice versa, shall be
deemed consummated upon the actual
dispensing of cash or the debit of one account and
the corresponding credit to another,
whether such transaction is initiated by the depositor
or by an authorized collecting party:
Provided, that the obligation of one bank, entity, or
person similarly situated to another arising
therefrom shall be considered absolute and shall not
be subjected to the process of preference
of credits.

Section 17. Recognition by Parties of Electronic Data

Message or Electronic
Document. - As between the originator and the
addressee of an electronic data message or
electronic document, a declaration of will or other
statement shall not be denied legal effect,
validity or enforceability solely on the ground that it
is in the form of an electronic data
message.

Section 18. Attribution of Electronic Data Message. -

(1) An electronic data message or electronic document

is that of the originator if it was sent by the originator
himself.

(2) As between the originator and the addressee,

an electronic data message or electronic
document is deemed to be that of the originator if
it was sent:

(a) by a person who had the authority to act on

behalf of the originator with respect to that
electronic data message or electronic document; or

(b) by an information system programmed by,

or on behalf of the originator to operate
automatically.

(3) As between the originator and the addressee, an

addressee is entitled to regard an
electronic data message or electronic document as
being that of the originator, and to act on that
assumption, if:

(a) in order to ascertain whether the electronic data

message or electronic document was that of the
originator, the addressee properly applied a
procedure previously agreed to by the
originator for that purpose; or

(b) the electronic data message or electronic

document as received by the addressee resulted
from the actions of a person whose relationship with
the originator or with any agent of the originator
enabled that person to gain access to a method used
by the originator to identify electronic data messages
as his own.

(4) Paragraph (3) does not apply:

(a) as of the time when the addressee has both

received notice from the originator that the
electronic data message or electronic document is
not that of the originator, and has
reasonable time to act accordingly; or

(b) in a case within paragraph (3) sub-paragraph (b),

at any time when the addressee knew or should have
known, had it exercised reasonable care of used any
agreed procedure, that the electronic data message or
electronic document was not that of the originator.

(5) Where an electronic data message or electronic

document is that of the originator or is
deemed to be that of the originator, or the
addressee is entitled to act on that assumption,
then, as between the originator and the addressee,
the addressee is entitled to regard the

knew or should have known, had it exercised treasonable care or
used any agreed procedure, that the transmission resulted in any
error in the electronic data message or electronic
document as received.
(6) The addressee is entitled to regard each electronic data
message or electronic document received as a separate
electronic data message or electronic document and to act on
that assumption, except to the extent that it duplicates another
electronic data message or
electronic document and the addressee knew or should have
known, had it exercised
reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, that the
electronic data message or electronic document was a duplicate.
Section 19. Error on Electronic Data Message or Electronic
Document. - The
addressee is entitled to regard the electronic data message or
electronic document received as that which the originator
intended to send, and to act on that assumption, unless the
addressee knew or should have known, had the addressee
exercised reasonable care or used the appropriate procedure -
(a) That the transmission resulted in any error therein or in the
electronic document when the
electronic data message or electronic document enters the
designated information system, or
(b) That electronic data message or electronic document is
sent to an information system which is not so designated by
the addressee for the purposes.
Section 20. Agreement on Acknowledgement of Receipt of
Electronic Data
Messages or Electronic Documents. - The following rules shall
apply where, on or before
sending an electronic data message or electronic document, the
originator and the addressee
have agreed, or in that electronic document or electronic data
message, the originator has
requested, that receipt of the electronic document or electronic
data message be
acknowledged:
a.) Where the originator has not agreed with the addressee that
the acknowledgement be given in a particular form or by a
particular method, an acknowledgement may be given by or
through any communication by the addressee, automated or
otherwise, or any conduct of the addressee, sufficient to indicate
to the originator that the electronic data message or electronic
document has been received.
b.) Where the originator has stated that the effect or significance
of the electronic data message or electronic document is
conditional on receipt of the acknowledgement thereof, the
electronic data message or electronic document is treated as
though it has never been sent, until the acknowledgement is
received.
c.) Where the originator has not stated that the effect or
significance of the electronic data
message or electronic document is conditional on receipt of the
acknowledgement, and the
acknowledgement has not been received by the originator within
the time specified or agreed
or, if no time has been specified or agreed, within the reasonable
time, the originator may give notice to the addressee stating that
no acknowledgement has been received and specifying a
reasonable time by which the acknowledgement must be
received; and if the
acknowledgement is not received within the time
specified in subparagraph (c), the originator may, upon
notice to the addressee, treat the electronic document or
electronic data as though it had never been sent, or
exercise any other rights it may have.
Section 21. Time of Dispatch of Electronic Data Messages or
Electronic Documents.
- Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and
the addressee, the dispatch of an electronic data
message or electronic document occurs when it enters
an information system outside the control of the
originator or of the person who sent the electronic data
message or electronic document on behalf of the
originator.
Section 22. Time of Receipt of Electronic Data Messages
or Electronic Documents. -
Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the
addressee, the time of receipt of an electronic data
message or electronic document is as follows:
a.) If the addressee has designated an information
system for the purpose of receiving
electronic data message or electronic document, receipt
occurs at the time when the electronic data message or
electronic document enters the designated information
system: Provide, however, that if the originator and the
addressee are both participants in the designated
information system, receipt occurs at the time when the
electronic data message or electronic document is
retrieved by the addressee;
b.) If the electronic data message or electronic
document is sent to an information system of the
addressee that is not the designated information
system, receipt occurs at the time when the electronic
data message or electronic document is retrieved by
the addressee;
c.) If the addressee has not designated an
information system, receipt occurs when the
electronic data message or electronic document
enters an information system of the
addressee.
These rules apply notwithstanding that the place where
the information system is located may be different from
the place where the electronic data message or
electronic document is
deemed to be received.
Section 23. Place of Dispatch and Receipt of Electronic
Data Messages or Electronic Documents. - Unless
otherwise agreed between the originator and the
addressee, an
electronic data message or electronic document is
deemed to be dispatched at the place where the
originator has its place of business and received at the
place where the addressee has its place of business.
This rule shall apply even if the originator or addressee
had used a laptop other portable device to transmit or
received his electronic data message or electronic
document. This rule shall also apply to determine the
tax situs of such transaction.
For the purpose hereof -
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appropriate technological methods that suit
their need.
a. If the originator or addressee has more than one
place of business, the place of business is that which PART III
has the closest relationship to the underlying ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IN SPECIFIC AREAS
transaction or, where there is no
underlying transaction, the principal place of business. CHAPTER I.
CARRIAGE OF GOODS
b. If the originator or the addressee does not
have a place of business, reference is to be made Section 25. Actions Related to Contracts of
to its habitual residence; or Carriage of Goods. - Without derogating
from the provisions of part two of this law,
c. The "usual place of residence" in relation to a this chapter applies to any action in
body corporate, means the place where it is connection with, or in pursuance of, a
incorporated or otherwise legally constituted. contract of carriage of goods, including but
not limited to:
Section 24. Choice of Security Methods. - Subject
to applicable laws and /or rules and (a) (i) furnishing the marks, number, quantity or
guidelines promulgated by the Department of weight of goods;
Trade and Industry with other appropriate
government agencies, parties to any electronic (ii)
transaction shall be free to determine the type of level
of electronic data message and electronic document stating
security needed, and to select and use or implement
or
 PART IV
declaring the ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS IN GOVERNMENT

nature or value of Section 27. Government Use of Electronic

Data Messages, Electronic Documents
goods; (iii) and Electronic Signatures. - Notwithstanding
any law to the contrary, within two (2) years
issuing a receipt from the date of the effectivity of this Act, all
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies
for goods; of

(iv) confirming that goods have been loaded;

(b) (i) notifying a person of terms and conditions of the

contract;

(ii) giving instructions to a carrier;

(c) (i) claiming delivery of goods;

(ii) authorizing release of goods;

(iii) giving notice of loss of, or damage to goods;

(d) giving any other notice or statement in connection with

the performance of the contract;

(e) undertaking to deliver goods to a named person or a

person authorized to claim delivery;

(f) granting, acquiring, renouncing, surrendering, transferring

or negotiating rights in goods;

(g) acquiring or transferring rights and obligations under the

contract.

Section 26. Transport Documents. - (1) Where the law

requires that any action referred to contract of
carriage of goods be carried out in writing or by using
a paper document, that
requirement is met if the action is carried out
by using one or more data messages or
electronic documents.

(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement

there in is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for
failing either to carry out the action in
writing or to use a paper document.

(3) If a right is to be granted to, or an obligation is

to be acquired by, one person and no
person, and if the law requires that, in order to
effect this, the right or obligation must be
conveyed to that person by the transfer, or use of, a
paper document, that requirement is met if the right
or obligation is conveyed by using one or more
electronic data messages or
electronic documents unique;

(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3), the standard

of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of
the purpose for which the right or obligation was
conveyed and in the light of all the circumstances,
including any relevant agreement.

(5) Where one or more data messages are used to effect any
action in subparagraphs (f) and
(g) of Section 25, no paper document used to effect
any such action is valid unless the use of electronic
data message or electronic document has been
terminated and replaced by the used of paper
documents. A paper document issued in these
circumstances shall contain a
statement of such termination. The replacement of
the electronic data messages or electronic
documents by paper documents shall not affect the
rights or obligation of the parties involved.

(6) If a rule of laws is compulsorily applicable to a

contract of carriage of goods which is in, or
is evidenced by, a paper document, that rule shall not
be inapplicable to such a contract of
carriage of goods which is evidenced by one or
more electronic data messages or electronic
documents by reason of the fact that the contract is
evidenced by such electronic data
messages or electronic documents instead of by a paper
document.
 amongst all government departments, agencies,
the government, as well as all government-owned and bureaus, offices down to the division level
-controlled corporations, that pursuant to law require or accept and to the regional and provincial offices as practicable
the filling of documents, require that documents be created, or as possible, government owned and controlled
retained and/or submitted, issue permits, licenses or certificates corporations, local government units, other public
of registration or approval, or provide for the method and manner instrumentalities, universities, colleges and other
of payment or settlement of fees and other obligations to the schools, and universal access to the general public.
government, shall -
The RPWEB network shall serve as initial platform of the
(a) accept the creation, filing or retention of such documents government information
in the form of electronic data messages or electronic infrastructure (GII) to facilitate the electronic online
documents; transmission and conveyance of government services to
evolve and improve by better technologies or kinds and
(b) issue permits, licenses, or approval in the form of electronic electronic online wide area networks utilizing, but not
data messages or electronic documents; limited to, fiber optic, satellite, wireless and other
broadband telecommunication mediums or modes.
(c) require and/or accept payments, and issue receipts
acknowledging such payments, through systems using To facilitate the rapid development of the GII, the
electronic data messages or electronic documents; or Department of Transportation and
Communications, National Telecommunications
(d) transact the government business and/or perform Commission and the National Computer Center
governmental functions using electronic data messages or are hereby directed to aggressively promote and
electronic documents, and for the purpose, are authorized to implement a policy environment and
adopt and regulatory framework that shall lead to the substantial
promulgate, after appropriate public hearing and with due reduction of costs of including, but not
publication in newspapers of limited to, lease lines, land, satellite and dial-up
general circulation, the appropriate rules, regulations, or telephone access, cheap broadband and
guidelines, to, among others, specify wireless accessibility by government departments,
- agencies, bureaus, offices, government
owned and controlled corporations, local government
1) the manner and format in which such electronic data units, other public instrumentalities and
messages or electronic documents shall be filed, created, the general public, to include the establishment of a
retained or issued; government website portal and a
domestic internal exchange system to facilitate strategic
2) where and when such electronic data messages or access to government and amongst
electronic documents have to signed, the use of an electronic agencies thereof and the general public and for the
signature, the type of electronic signature required; speedier flow of locally generated internal
traffic within the Philippines.
3) the format of an electronic data message or electronic
document and the manner the The physical infrastructure of cable and wireless system
electronic signature shall be affixed to the electronic data for cable TV and broadcast excluding programming
message or electronic document; content and the management thereof shall be
considered as within the activity of telecommunications
4) the control processes and procedures as appropriate to for the purpose of electronic commerce and to maximize
ensure adequate integrity, security and confidentiality of the
electronic data messages or electronic documents or records of convergence of ICT in the installation of the GII.
payments;
Section 29. Authority of the Department of Trade and
5) other attributes required to electronic data messages or Industry and Participating
electronic documents or payments; Entities. - The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
and shall direct supervise the promotion
and development of electronic commerce in the country
6) the full or limited use of the documents and papers for with relevant government agencies,
compliance with the government requirements: Provided, that without prejudice to the provisions of Republic Act 7653
this Act shall be itself mandate any department of the (Charter of Bangko Sentral ng
government, organ of state or statutory corporation to accept Pilipinas) and Republic Act No. 337, (General Banking Act) as
or issue any document in the form of electronic data messages amended.
or electronic documents upon the adoption, promulgation and
publication of the appropriate rules, regulations or guidelines. Among others, the DTI is empowered to promulgate rules
and regulations, as well as provide
Section 28. RPWEB To Promote the Use of Electronic Documents quality standards or issue certifications, as the case may
or Electronic Data be, and perform such other functions
Messages In Government and to the General Public. - Within two as may be necessary for the implementation of this Act
(2) years from the in the area of electronic commerce to
effectivity of this Act, there shall be installed an electronic online include, but shall not limited to, the installation of an
network in accordance with online public information and quality and
Administrative Order 332 and House of Representatives price monitoring system for goods and services aimed in
Resolution 890, otherwise known as protecting the interests of the
RPWEB, to implement Part IV of this Act to facilitate the open, consuming public availing of the advantages of this Act.
speedy and efficient electronic
online transmission, conveyance and use of electronic data 240
messages or electronic documents
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Commission, National Computer

Center, National Information
Technology Council, Commission
on Audit, other concerned agencies
and the private sector, to
implement this Act within sixty
(60) days after its approval.
PART V
FINAL PROVISIONS (b) The making, publication, dissemination
or distribution of such material or any
Section 30. Extent of Liability of a Service Provider. - statement made in such material, including
Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no possible infringement of any right subsisting
person or party shall be subject to any civil or criminal in or in relation to such material. Provided,
liability in respect of the electronic data message or That:
electronic document for which the person or party
acting as a i. The service provider does not have
service provider as defined in Section 5 merely provides actual knowledge, or is not aware of
access if such liability is founded on - the facts or
circumstances from which it is
(a) The obligations and liabilities of the parties under apparent, that the making, publication,
the electronic data message or electronic document; dissemination or
distribution of such material is unlawful or infringes
any rights subsisting in or in relation to such
material;
ii The service provider does not knowingly receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the unlawful or
infringing activity; and
iii. The service provider does not directly commit
any infringement or other unlawful act and does not
induce or cause another person or party to commit
any infringement or other
unlawful act and/or does not benefit financially from
the infringing activity or unlawful act or another
person or party; Provider, further, That nothing in
this Section shall affect -
limited to, the internet, in a manner that
infringes intellectual property rights shall
be punished by a minimum fine of one
hundred
thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) and a
maximum commensurate to the damage
incurred and a mandatory imprisonment of
six (6) months to three (3) years;
(c) Violations of the Consumer Act of
Republic Act No. 7394 and other relevant
to pertinent laws through transaction
covered by or using electronic data
messages or electronic
documents, shall be penalized with the same
penalties as provided in those laws;

(a) Any obligation founded on contract; (d) Other violations of the provisions of this
Act, shall be penalized with a maximum
(b) The obligation of a service provider as such penalty of one million pesos (P 1,000,000.00)
under a licensing or other regulatory regime or six (6) years imprisonment.
established under written law; or
Section 34. Implementing Rules and
(c) Any obligation imposed under any written law; Regulations. - The DTI, Department of Budget
and Management and the Bangko Sentral ng
(d) The civil liability of any party to the extent that Pilipinas are hereby empowered to enforced
such liability forms the basis for injunctive the
relief issued by a court under any law requiring that provisions of this Act and issue
the service provider take or refrain from implementing rules and regulations
actions necessary to remove, block or deny access to necessary, in coordination
any material, or to preserve evidence of with the Department of Transportation and
a violation of law. Communications, National
Telecommunications
Section 31. Lawful Access. - Access to an electronic
file, or an electronic signature of an electronic data
message or electronic document shall only be
authorized and enforced in favor of the individual or
entity having a legal right to the possession or the
use of plaintext,
electronic signature or file or solely for the authorized
purposes. The electronic key for identity or integrity
shall not be made available to any person or party
without the consent of the
individual or entity in lawful possession of that electronic key;

Section 32. Obligation of Confidentiality. - Except for

the purposes authorized under this Act, any person
who obtained access to any electronic key, electronic
data message or
electronic document, book, register, correspondence,
information, or other material pursuant
to any powers conferred under this Act, shall not
convey to or share the same with any other
person.

Section 33. Penalties. - The following Acts, shall be

penalized by fine and/or imprisonment, as follows:

(a) Hacking or crackling with refers to unauthorized

access into or interference in a computer
system/server or information and communication
system; or any access in order to corrupt,
alter, steal, or destroy using a computer or other
similar information and communication
devices, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner of the computer or information and
communications system, including the introduction of
computer viruses and the like, resulting in the
corruption, destruction, alteration, theft or loss of
electronic data messages or electronic documents
shall be punished by a minimum fine of One Hundred
Thousand pesos (P
100,000.00) and a maximum commensurate
to the damage incurred and a mandatory
imprisonment of six (6) months to three (3)
years;

(b) Piracy or the unauthorized copying,

reproduction, dissemination, or distribution,
importation, use, removal, alteration,
substitution, modification, storage,
uploading,
downloading, communication, making available to
the public, or broadcasting of protected material,
electronic signature or copyrighted works
including legally protected sound
recordings or phonograms or information material
on protected works, through the use of
telecommunication networks, such as, but not
Failure to Issue rules and regulations shall not in any manner
affect the executory nature of the provisions of this Act.
C
Section 35. Oversight Committee. - There shall be
Congressional Oversight Committee A
composed of the Committees and Trade and
Industry/Commerce, Science and Technology, S
Finance and Appropriations of both the Senate and House of
Representatives, which shall E
meet at least every quarter of the first two years and every
S
semester for the third year after
the approval of this Act to oversee its implementation. The DTI,
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S.
DBM, Bangko Sentral ng
SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN,
Pilipinas, and other government agencies as may be
DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU; HEIRS OF
determined by the Congressional Committee shall provide
a quarterly performance report of their actions taking in ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ
TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ
the implementation of this Act for the first three (3) years.
and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ
GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR.,
Section 36. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the
provisions of Sections petitioners, vs.
27 and 28 of this Act shall be charged against any available ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA,
funds and/or savings under the OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1 REMEDIOS
General Appropriations Act of 2000 in the first year of COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,1a BELINDA M.
effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, the COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H.
funds needed for the continued implementation shall be COMORPOSA, respondents.
included in the annual General G.R. No.
Appropriations Act. 152807

Section 37. Statutory Interpretation. - Unless otherwise August 12,

expressly provided for, the 2003
interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its THIRD
international origin and the need to DIVISION
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade relations. The generally FACTS:
accepted principles of international law and convention on x Sabanpans filed an unlawful detainer case against
electronic commerce shall likewise be considered. the Comoporsas before the
MTC Davao Del Sur
Section 38. Variation by Agreement. - As between parties involved o alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful
in generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing and actual possessor of
electronic data message or electronic document, any provision of Lot No. 845, Land 275 located at
this Act may be varied by agreement between and among them. Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur
with an area of 1.2 hectares. In
Section 39. Reciprocity. - All benefits, privileges, advantages or 1960, he died leaving all his
statutory rules established heirs, his children and
under this Act, including those involving practice of profession, grandchildren.
shall be enjoyed only by parties o Francisco Comorposa who was working in
whose country origin grants the same benefits and privileges or the land of Oboza was
advantages to Filipino citizens. terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment
Section 40. Separability Clause. - The provisions of this Act are caused a problem in relocating his
hereby declared separable and in the event of any such provision house. Being a close family friend
is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions, which are not of
affected, shall remain in force and effect. [Marcos] Saez, Francisco
Comorposa approached the late
Section 41. Repealing Clause. - All other laws, decrees, rules and Marcos
regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified husband of Gloria Leano Saez,
accordingly. about
his problem. Out of pity and for
Section 42. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect immediately humanitarian consideration,
after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) Adolfo
national newspapers of general circulation. allowed Francisco Comorposa to
occupy the land of Marcos Saez.
Approved: Hence, his nipa hut was carried
by his neighbors and transferred
J
to
u a portion of the land subject
matter of this case. Such transfer
n was
witnessed by several people,
e among them, Gloria Leano and
Noel
Oboza. Francisco Comorposa
1 occupied a portion of Marcos
Saez'
4 property without paying any
rental.
, o Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii,
U.S.A. He was succeeded in
his possession by the
respondents who likewise did
2
not pay any rental and are
0 occupying the premises
through petitioners'
0 tolerance.
o a formal demand was made upon the
0 respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to
vacate the same and claimed
that they [were] the legitimate claimants
and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises. A
[C]omplaint was filed with the

241
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acquired just and
valid ownership and
barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] possession of the
Davao del Sur, but the parties premises by
failed to arrive at an amicable ordinary or
settlement. Thus, the extraordinary
corresponding prescription, and
Certificate to File Action that the Regional
was issued by the said Director of the
barangay and an action for DENR, Region XI has
unlawful detainer was filed already upheld their
by petitioners against possession over the
respondents. land in question when
x Comorposas filed their answer it ruled that they
o denied the material allegations of the [were] the rightful
[C]omplaint and alleged that claimants and
they entered and occupied possessors and
the premises in their own [were], therefore,
right as true, entitled to the issuance of a
valid and lawful claimants, title.
possessors and owners of the x MTC in favor of the SABANPANS;
said lot ordered the Comorposas to vacate
way back in 1960 and up to x Comorposas appealed to RTC