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Brian Chambers
August 6, 2014
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Failure History
1. Washington Combined Cycle June 29, 2011
2. Murray Combined Cycle July 19, 2011
3. GE Safety Bulletin
4. Cliffside Steam Station, Unit 6 April 1, 2013
5. Hanging Rock Combined Cycle September 4, 2013
Hanging Rock Piping Modifications
6. GE Bulletin TIL 1927
7. Conclusions
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Washington Combined Cycle
Pipe Failure
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Washington Combined Cycle
Failed: June 29, 2011
Steam Turbine: GE Model D11 (2002)
Operating Conditions: 1055F & 1865 psig
Piping: 2 Schedule XXS, SA335 Grade P22 (2.375 O.D. x 0.436 NM)
Fitting: 2 90 SW Elbow, 9000#, SA182 Grade F22
The failure occurred on the drain from the left side Stop/Control Valve. The right side drain had
no evidence of overheating.
The ID magnetite in the pipe was shiny and polished, with obvious axial splits. The pipe OD was
heavily scaled with magnetite.
The root cause of the failure appeared to be severe overheating of the drain line.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Murray Combined Cycle
Failed Piping
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Murray Combined Cycle
Failed: July 19, 2011
Equipment & Operating Conditions similar to Washington
Piping: 1.5 Schedule XXS, SA335 Grade P22
Failure occurred during start-up at a valve socket weld connection.
Again, the ID magnetite in the pipe was shiny and polished and the OD was heavily scaled
with magnetite.
The root cause of the failure appeared to be severe overheating of the drain line. Flow
induced frictional heat generation from droplets or solids entrapped in the elbow may be
responsible.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
GE Safety Bulletin
GE issued a Safety Bulletin in 2012 concerning a
localized overheating phenomenon in steam lead
drain piping and valves. The drain leg piping and
open manual isolation valve, just upstream of the
closed drain MOV were significantly hotter than
the steam temperature. Burning of insulation
was observed and further interrogation found
that the valve and piping were glowing red.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Failed: April 1, 2013
Operating Conditions: 1050F & 3500 psig
Piping: 1.5 Schedule XXS, SA335 Grade P91 (1.900 O.D. x
0.400 NM)
The Unit was operating at full load, 905 MWs, at the time of
the failure with the motor operated isolation drain valve
closed.
The failure occurred on the upper right (C) Control Valve after
seat drain.
The OEM had notified the Station of failures of the drain piping
on a similar plant in India.
Areas around the Stop/Control Valves were roped off at the
time of failure.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures Cliffside
Steam Station Unit 6
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Metallurgical Evaluation
The failed C drain and the A drain (Upper Left CV) piping were shipped to the McGuire
Metallurgy Lab for analysis.
Diametrical and thickness measurements were performed on the failed drain piping. Both of
the horizontal runs of the drain piping showed significant swelling, typically uniform, with the
pipe remaining circular in cross-section.
Hardness of the unaffected material was typically 220 Brinell (HB 200 250 Desired Range).
From the Control Valve to the burst, the hardness decreased to 183 Brinell; beyond the burst,
the hardness increased significantly to as high as 388 Brinell.
This hardness increase implied that the material must have surpassed its critical temperature
and that a martensitic phase-transformation occurred on sudden cooling.
A cross section through the burst showed significant plastic deformation along with minor
voiding from stress rupture. There were no martensitic transformation products at the burst,
although some spheroidization of carbides was observed.
The ID scale had a matte appearance in all locations and did not show signs of internal
polishing.
The A drain pipe showed no notable swelling along its length; microstructure and hardness
were normal for P91 material.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Metallurgical Evaluation
241
212 388
187 183 302
255
217
The failed C drain line was found to be significantly overheated, in excess of its
critical temperature, above which a transformation from ferrite to austenite will
occur. The typical lower critical temperature for the P91 material is 1500F.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
The OEM has had 6 drain pipe failures on similar Units since
November 2012, thus root cause investigations were underway
at the time of the Cliffside failure.
The similar Units where the failures occurred were all super-
critical, 4 Control Valve Units.
The failures occurred on drains from the upper Control Valves
that have 90 elbows on the Main Steam piping exiting the
valves.
The OEM correlates that the failures are due to thermo-
acoustic overheating.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Thermo-Acoustic Resonance
Similar to a pipe organ
The sound wave from flow across the Control Valve
can excite the natural frequency of the steam in the
drain line.
If the steam is excited at the natural frequency it can
become superheated.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
The A and C Control Valve Drain lines were replaced with like
kind materials, 1.5 Schedule XXS, SA335 Grade P91.
The C drain line was re-routed to mirror the A drain line,
eliminating a horizontal 90 bend.
Hardness testing was performed on the B & D, lower Control
Valves, drain lines. One location had low hardness, most likely
from original installation.
The 4 drain lines were instrumented with thermocouples and
alarms set in the Control Room for 1100F.
A hi-hi alarm is set for 1150F that will open the MOV to allow
flow to cool the line.
The Station will manage MWs and CV opening to stay away
from high temperatures, potentially requiring derates.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
C CV After Seat Drain Temps
921 G
L 117
1206 F
D
1262 E
D
Failure Location
D
1282
M
D 91
1174 C
D
1058 B
A
D
Turbine
1050 F Main Steam
Operational data of drain line temps
4-16-13 at 09:00 905 MWs CV 39% open
On April 16th, the load was reduced to drop the drain line
temperatures. During the reductions, a change in pitch of the
Unit was noted.
When the valve goes over 37% open the unit started making
a high pitch noise and the temperature on the CV C drain pipe
after the seat started raising above 1100F.
The following noise measurements were taken about 150 feet
away from the turbine.
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Estimated Mechanism:
Overheating effect is observed when the high frequency
oscillation (cavity tone) generated at the downstream end
of the Control Valve is amplified by Main Steam pipe system
(resonance with membrane oscillation of piping).
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Turbine Valve Drain Piping Overheating Failures
Cliffside Steam Station Unit 6
Summary of OEM Research