1. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs.

Court of Industrial Relations manifested that he was admitting the signature of witness
Topic: ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL Kaplin on the said documents
c. CIR erred granted the relief on unions counter-petition
1. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc (company) operated the Rural without receiving evidence.
Transit. The Rural Transit Employees Association
(association) went on strike. The dispute reached the Court ISSUE: Was it right for the court to order the testimony of witness
of Industrial Relations (CIR) for compulsory arbitration. CIR Kaplin be stricken off? YES.
ordered the strikers to return to work & for the company to
take them back.
2. While the labor dispute was pending w/ the CIR, the
company filed a Petition for Authority to discharge
driver Maximo Jacob from the service on the ground of
alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Jacob w/c
resulted to damage to property & injuries to 3rd parties, the
latest resulted to a total destruction of 1 bus owned by the
company.
3. An Answer & Counter-Petition was filed by the association in
behalf the employee Jabcob denying the charges & alleged
that the accident was due to mechanical defect w/c was
beyond Jacobs control, hence, the suspension of Jacob was
unjustified.
4. The petition by the company was heard. The
petitioner presented its only witness Mr. Kaplin,
general manager of Rural Transit, and certain documents
(Exh. 1-8F). After witness Kaplin was done with his
direct testimony, as agreed upon by the parties, the
hearing for the purposes of cross-examination of the
witness Kaplin was scheduled for another date.
However, the case was reset on different dates
because Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he left
for abroad.
5. The association filed a motion praying that the
testimony of witness Kaplin be stricken from the
records. CIR Judge Martinez dismissed the companys
petition, lifted the suspicion of employee Jacob + ordered his
reinstatement + back wages. MR of company was denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by the company.

Company contends:
a. CIR erred in ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be
stricken off the record & in dismissing the petition of the
company
b. It was ready to present another witness Ms. Silva to identify
the documents Exh. 1 - 8F but didnt proceed since during
the hearing, the counsel of the union Atty Santiago,
HELD:
As to the 1st contention of the company:
Petitioner company presented only 1 witness. But the witness failed
to appear at the scheduled hearings for its cross-examination since
he left for abroad. The respondent association, without fault
on its part, was deprived of its right to cross-examine
witness Kaplin. Due to this, the association was entitled to have
the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.
Rulings on diff. jurisprudence cited in the case:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal
or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi- judicial powers, is
fundamental right which is part of due process.
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when
it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly
cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to
cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault
of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not
and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable
to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted
testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
The express recognition of such right of the accused in the
Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in
civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Until such cross-examination has
been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot
be considered as complete and may not, therefore,
be allowed to form part of the evidence to be
considered by the court in deciding the case.
In the case of Savoyr Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, the witness in there already
finished his direct testimony & was even ready & available
for cross-examination. But the adverse counsel (respondent)
made motions for postponement of the cross-examination
until 1 day, the witness died due to heart attack w/out the
cross-examination being conducted. CIR ordered the direct
testimony of the witness be stricken off. However, the SC in
that case, set aside the order of the CIR & held that by their
own actuations, respondents were considered to have
impliedly waived & lost their right to cross-examine the
witness, since that right may be forfeited by a party
litigation thru his own conduct.
As to the 2nd contention of the company:
What Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the
signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the
contents of the documents. The opposing party was
still entitled to cross-examine the witness on the
matters written on Exhibits 1 to 8-F especially if
they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party
against whom they were being presented, namely, driver
Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the
signature appearing in Exhibits 1 to 8-F was that
of witness Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then,
Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party
was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of
the documents; not having done so, petitioner must
now suffer the consequences.
Even if the exhibits were admitted by CIR only for whatever
they may be worth. Evaluating them, it didnt consider the
documents as competent proof of the truthfulness of their
contents WITHOUT the supporting testimony of witness
Kaplin. CIR even stated in its order that no other witness
was presented by the company to testify on the intrinsic
value of the exhibits, hence, they are hearsay.
Since the testimony of witness Kaplin was stricken off
the record & the contents of the exhibits are hearsay,
there is NO EVIDENCE to substantiate the charges against
employee Jacob.
As to the 3rd contention of the company:
Lifting of Jacobs suspension & his reinstatement are
necessary consequences of the dismissal of the companys
petition. The relief can be granted without the need of
evidence. The onus probandi was on the company to justify
Jacob suspension which it failed to do. Hence, there were no
valid ground for the company to prevent the employee from
working.