Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chiongson
301 SCRA 614
Facts: A is a policeman charged with murder. During the trial, J ordered that
he be represented by counsel de officio because As attorney was ill. A then
charged J with ignorance of the law & oppression because the fact that the
counsel de officio did not know the particulars of the case meant that A
would be denied due process.
People vs Linsangan
Facts: Ambrosio Linsangan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or
poll tax under section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised
Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs. The case was tried and
decided before the Constitution of the Philippines took effect but while the
appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective, and, section
1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall be
imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsangan appealed,
alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections of the Revised
Administrative Code unconstitutional and void.
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and
all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution.
It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of
the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for
nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon
the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section
2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no
judgment of conviction can be based thereon.
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie
Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand.
The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed.
Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from
Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the
police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's
green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO.
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review
for the imposition of death penalty.
Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information
against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown
whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what
dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own
dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant
his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted.
When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There
could be no presumption. The court must be sure.
Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or
information is filed against him.
Held: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that "before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute." Upon the other
hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right." The clear implication,
therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer
such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not
have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would
have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of
his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the Supreme Court, in
the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez,
ruled that "Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall
no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case
to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt
of the offense charged is strong." Herein, the rape for which the accused was
indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced
to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied
his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but
the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year
after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirementsof
due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special
InvestigatingCommittee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation
only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted
men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under
article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of
the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
FACTS:
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court
deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to
guide lower court.
ISSUES:
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an
arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
FACTS
-On September 15, on petitioners motion that original bond previously given
be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real
property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the
province of Marinduque actually staying, therein" with properties which
"must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years."
-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for prelim injunction to SC, seeking to
set aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, and to
reinstate the bail bond approved on May 29 (original bond), charging the
respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and
w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in
issuing the disputed orders
-Oct 3: the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond.
WON THE P60K bond fixed by respondent judge transgress the constitutional
injunction that "(e)xcessive bail shall not be required?
HELD: NO
Reasoning Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2)) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases.
FACTS:
On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that
their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for
an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police
knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides
was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie,
who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested
him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was
filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
(Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus
Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the
Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn
Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was
alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had
sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution
and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail
was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail
in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving
Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is
probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been
made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under
detention until further order of the Court; and that the accused is entitled to
bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount
of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under
certain conditions. On 20 May 1997, Lavides filed a motion to quash the
informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or
Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to
suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997,
he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied
Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to
suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the
conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10
April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997,
Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the
trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May
1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth
in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case was pending in the Court of
Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides, bringing the total
number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. On 30 June
1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two
conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be
entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall
and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the
event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued
and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders
in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure
his presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.
RULING:
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed
before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to
leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9
and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and ExchangeCommission, denying
his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief
of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the
necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business
transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
Parada v. Veneracion
Facts: Danilo Parada was charged with 4 counts of Estafa. He was duly
bonded with an accredited bonding company. In October of 1993,
Paradas counsel formally notified the court and the manager of the
bonding company of change of address. Apparently, the notice of
hearing was sent to complainants former address. For failure to
appear on the date of hearing, respondent judge ordered the arrest of
the accused, confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was
conducted. No bail was recommended for Paradas arrest.
The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued
by respondent Judge is a downright violation of Paradas constitutional
right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong,
all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the
law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be noted that the
crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a
bailable offense. This circumstance could not have escaped the
attention of the respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the
order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so
doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross
which the Court can not countenance.