DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F.

MEDINA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine
of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Divisions finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its
discretion because the language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16,
2006,[1] whereby the CTA First Division disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas Law Offices guilty of
DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel is

hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.

SO ORDERED.[2]

and the resolution dated July 26, 2006,[3] whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.

Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty
taxes paid from 1995 until 2000.[4] After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund, [5] Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City,
and Hon. City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214.[6] Surfield later amended its petition to include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001
until 2003.[7]

On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus.[8]

Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer
and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong City).[9] The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista
and Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.

In its decision dated January 5, 2006,[10] the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section
253 [11]
and Section 226[12] of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, [13] insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282; [14] and
arguing that the CTA First Division manifested its lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No.
117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 7160.

On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by
Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did
not include the real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of
the CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.

In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the motion for reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt
why they should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are concerned let this
Resolution be considered as the final decision on the matter.

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction
over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful.
Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; they vow solemnly to conduct
themselves with all good fidelityto the courts. As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its superior importance. Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby
ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.[15]
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006, [16] in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless justified their language as, among others, necessary to
bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.[17]
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong,
which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion, to wit:

In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly
pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity. We
quote:

a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call
the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the
error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which the Decision was based (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket, p. 349);

b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of
the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned
counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it
was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank
articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in
ruling on its lack of jurisdiction (par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);[18]

Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect
due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,[19] the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal
sense to describe the error of judgment and was not directed to the character or competence of the decision makers; ( b) there was no unfounded accusation or allegation, or
scandalous, offensive or menacing, intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c)
there was no statement in their motion for reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into disrepute; and ( d) they had repeatedly
offered their apology in their compliance.[20]
 Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which declared through its second assailed resolution that:

The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors of judgment
almost always result to the destruction of the high esteem and regard towards the Court.[21]
and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and
to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.

SO, ORDERED.[22]

Issues

Arguing that they were merely prompted by their (z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error committed by the CTA First Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of
the law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:

I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;

II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE ARROGANT;

III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND

IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA
First Division; and that the statements described by the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and disrespectful should be viewed within the context of the
general tone and language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered, restrained and respectful and should not be construed as a display of
contumacious attitude or as a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate the
sincerity of their apology; and that they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and the character of the words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their
statements reflected no humility, nor were they expressive of a contrite heart; and that their submissions instead reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the
opportunity to again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision.[23]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section
1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[24]
Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct
contempt of court.
 Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on
similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:

Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate
channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:[25]

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns
a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)[26]

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) [i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no
jurisdiction over the instant petition; [27] (b) [t]he grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction;[28] and (c) the Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.[29]

The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting prompt penalty.

We agree.

By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An
imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, [30] and constitutes direct contempt of
court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.[31] This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court. [32] Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa,
[33]
where the petitioners motion for clarification stated that the respondent judges decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and
sophistry, the Court held that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements when submitted before a court or judge in which the proceedings are pending is
direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. [34]
 In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, [35] regards the statements not contemptuous, or not
necessarily assuming the level of contempt for being explanations of their position in a case under consideration and because an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter
feelings.[36]

Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful,
although obviously correct, provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless and hurtful statements were used to explain their
clients position in the case. [37] The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of
their strong, tactless and hurtful language minimized on the basis that snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered contemptuous considering that
unfavorable decision usually incite bitter feelings. [38] By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as totally unaware or ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No.
9282, and making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To hold such language as
reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the CTA and the members of its First Division is not altogether unwarranted.

The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their side found firm confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly
emphasized such disdain in the following telling words:

3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to
bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong
articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of
dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution , which requires that the Decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions
or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a
perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3) . Hence the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is
matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned
counsels perception that was influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction.
(emphasis supplied)[39]
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the statements had they convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding
itself bereft of jurisdiction over the appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA
First Division. This result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim
that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment
and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx

As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5)
grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment
and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals. In its resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division
forthrightly explained why, contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a real property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be
treated as a local tax.[40]

It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted their blatant error upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about
the untenability of their legal position on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their
perception about the CTA First Divisions being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3) due to the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, viz:

12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the
terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the undersigned counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section
7(a)(3). Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in the 05 January 2006 decision, there would have
been no basis for undersigned counsels to have formed the above-mentioned perception.[41] (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high
prestige, should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair
and temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal
Profession. Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins,
[42]
to wit:

The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in
speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the
persuasive force of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown not to be conducive to the
orderly and proper administration of justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their
opposing attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their contentions with that courtesy all have a
right to expect. (emphasis supplied)

We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. They threw out self-restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare
virtues that all members of the Legal Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the
highest degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not permit them to cross the line between liberty and license. [43] Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently
reminding the Bar that language, though forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the
Legal Profession.[44] It is always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not
derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive.[45] No attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls upon him to be
respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First Division was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over
the walls of propriety.

The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish
contempt of court in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. [46] We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited
upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect that attorneys and their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably feigned, for they did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous
language, they do not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court
for using contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.

The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has
not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction
has ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition of the misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and even
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February
2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[47] the errant lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law. Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and
did not apologize for his actions that resulted from cases that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,[48] the complaining
State Prosecutor, despite his strong statements to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was warned to be more circumspect in language. In
contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this Court, which declared such language to
be below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,[49] Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling
insulting language against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar,[50] the Court
prescribed a higher fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning against Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against the
NLRC First Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.

Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they should explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they)
should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action, [51] the CTA First Division was content with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1, [52] Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended courts treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt.
Thus, we impose on each of them a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of
the same level as the Court of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using
offensive or intemperate language towards a court or its judge in the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.

ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B.
Habawel and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them only to pay the fine of P2,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14,
2013 Resolution,2referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first
semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her
mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage
scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his
discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted addict.4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates
who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and
transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly
receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one
who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash
bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had
investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed
in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that
he never personally attacked Judge Tormis dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be
discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC
judges and in schools where remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there
was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her
ways, but she resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother;
that the matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named
Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme
Court who determines the persons to be appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on
March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act
on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge,
he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of
Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the
afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not
done in the performance of his judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in
Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes
frequent discussions in class of her mothers administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes
discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that
administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a drug addict.

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by
Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not
be resolved based on the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.11

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were
conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes act of discussing Judge Tormis cases in class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and
lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of
Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the
embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being
investigated; that the administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he
received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the
assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him
from committing the acts complained of.

In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became
public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy
of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis,
she should have filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of
the Judiciary.14

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class
discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive
and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression.
She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis
Section 6 which stated that Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.16

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes position that he could not be held administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while
he was not in the exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the
discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jills allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said
issue was still being investigated. She cited, as basis for Judge Paredes liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not
supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when
he approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense
under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge
Paredes be meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. 18

The Courts Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.19

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the
remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as misconduct. They are simply not related to the
discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. 23

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the
decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence
in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore,
correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out
insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to
criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people
expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to rub salt to the wound,25 as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly
found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit
the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a
judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words,
snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.26

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed,
Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic
that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without
limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves
in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge
Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have
been more circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this
standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class
discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and
private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:
CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized
that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also
to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge,
in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judges official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. 27

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the
position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to
the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which
authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that
should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge
Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail
bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or
the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental
to the performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an
Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the
judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes
was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not
backed up by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following:
(1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a
judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi (respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ
of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the case.
Factual Antecedents
On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision2 in a consolidated labor case3 against M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses
Mercado), the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, M.A. Mercado Construction and Maximo and Aida Mercado to reinstate the complainants to
their former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and to pay jointly and severally, their full backwages from October 28, 2000 up to the date of this decision plus ten (10%)
percent attorneys fees of the total monetary award. The Research and Information Unit of this Office is hereby directed to compute complainants[] monetary award which shall
form part of this decision. The complaint for damages is dismissed. The complaint against Shoemart, Inc., is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 4
The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was
dismissed for failure to post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision. Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte
Motion for Amendment of an Alias Writ of Execution.5 They claimed that they could hardly collect the judgment award from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly
transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators/stockholders6 as additional entity/personalities against which the writ of execution shall be enforced. In an Order 7 dated February 10, 2006, respondent granted the
motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to
P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its stockholders who are
the complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash8 the Amended Alias Writ of
Execution, contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In an Order9 dated March 13, 2006, however, respondent denied the
Urgent Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment, which we referred to the IBP on March 4, 2007 for investigation, report and
recommendation.10
IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation11 dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was adopted and approved with modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12, 2011 Resolution,
to wit:

RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres, et al. vs. Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, considering respondent[s] contumacious disregard of the lawful Order of Supreme Court and the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for his failure to appear
despite due notices, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.12(Emphasis in the original).

Issue

Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Our Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our discussion should be limited only on the issue of whether respondent acted in gross ignorance of
the law when he granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution; when he issued an Amended Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the monetary judgment against M.A.
Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators; and when he denied complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross
ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud,
and dishonesty. As such, our discussion should be focused primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as to amount to malice, bad faith, corruption,
fraud and dishonesty. On the other hand, we need not delve into the issue of whether there is an apparent misapplication of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
when respondent issued the Amended Alias Writ of Execution. For one, it is outside the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover, the issue of whether the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of an appeal brought by complainants before the National Labor Relations Commission and eventually to the Court
of Appeals.13 We perused the records of the case particularly respondents Order 14 dated March 13, 2006 denying complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that
respondents ruling was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based on his personal assessment of the facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are doing business under the name and style of M.A.
Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc. where individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to the argument of
the complainants that the incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The
incorporators listed have similar family names of the Mercados and the Andreses and common address at Gen. Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy St., Quezon City, and Maximo A.
Mercado is the biggest stockholder. Aside from the Articles of Incorporation, complainants also submitted a Letter of Intent/Notice To Proceed where respondents, despite their
representation that they have already ceased their business operation, are still continuing their business operation. The documents submitted by the complainants were
corroborated by certification issued by Maggie T. Jao, AVP-Assistant Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an amount of P3,291,300.00 representing a
sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that was garnished belong to M.A. Mercado Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works,
Inc. and/or Gertrudes Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore, enough reason to conclude that respondents
Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein are one and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud the complainants and to
consequently evade payment of judgment award. x x x As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution proceedings, the argument of denial of due process is
untenable.15
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondents conclusion had some bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act
whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above, we are
not here to judge in this present administrative proceeding whether respondents ratiocination on the application of the piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here
is to decide whether respondents error was so gross as to amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot be said, by any stretch of
imagination, that respondents error, if any, was so gross or that he was actuated by malice when he issued the above orders. His conclusion was reached after an examination of
the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted
efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the
appreciation of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the
possibility of being administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this would not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole.
Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada v. Judge Banzon,16viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge
may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases. Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make
his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the
administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment.17
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. However, we note that respondent had consistently and
obstinately disregarded the Courts and IBPs orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the Courts June 7, 2006 Resolution18 directing him to file his Comment. He also
failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. 19 Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter,
respondent should know that orders of the court are not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely. 20 He disregarded the
oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a
lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. 21 Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that this appears to be respondents first infraction, we find it proper to impose on him the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for obstinately and unjustifiably refusing to obey lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Nambis record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREO, ET AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAEZ AND HON. AMY
C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
We hereby resolve the administrative complaint1 brought against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez and Associate
Justice Amy C. Lazaro- Javier for their undue delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 entitled Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v. Wenefredo Parreo, Ronnie
Cuevas and Joseph Denamarca.

Antecedents

Complainants Wenefredo Parreno and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital
Region (DENR-NCR) against the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside
the Signal Village, Taguig.2 The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest,3 but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by the DENR. 4 Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the
Office of the President (OP), which denied their appeal. 5 With their motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied, 6 Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition
for review,7 and it is such appeal from which this administrative complaint arose.

It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision. 8 However, the complainants
lament that from the issuance of the resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not
rendered the decision, which the complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the respondents should decide under Section 15(1 ), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.9

The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the administrative complaint.

In her comment,10 Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the CA 16th Division effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA Office Order No. 220-12-
ABR, and she served as such until July 5, 2012 in accordance with the successive reorganizations implemented in the CA under CA Office Order No. 198-12-ABR 11 and CA Office
Order No. 220-12-ABR,12 respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA), 13 Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for incurring
any undue delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson of the 16th Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice Ybaez as the assigned
ponente in his transfer to the Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth (13th) Division, the Division that ultimately
promulgated the awaited decision on February 28, 2014.14

Justice Ybaez admitted in his comment 15 that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial caseload following his transfer to Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had
conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to the older cases assigned to him; that he
had already assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile fallen seriously ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload,
he had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon being offered a permanent position in another agency of the Government; that after disposing of the older cases
assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and that he had not been
remiss in his duty and responsibility to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing a monthly average of 15 cases. 16

Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the adoption and promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for
decision because only filled in the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the 16th Division. She pointed
out, however, that she had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be administratively liable for any delay in deciding the case. 17

Issue

Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?
Ruling

The administrative complaint is without merit.

The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself.
This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.

xxxx

Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay?

Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 after the parties did not file their memoranda, 18 it was the 13th Division
of the CA (composed of Justice Ybaez as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on
February 28, 2014, or nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of
cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who should be administratively accountable
must consider the specific role each of the respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for
undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of the 13th Division who actually promulgated the decision.

Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the
15th Division through CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, 19 terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her
participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division, and
conformed to the procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of the 2009 IRCA.20 The constitution of the Special 16th Division was by virtue of CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR.21

Justice Ybaez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively
liable for the delay of eight months should depend on the relevant circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from
disposing his cases within the reglementary period, 22 the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, 23 the Court relieved the
respondent judge from liability because the delay had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts.
In Santos v. Lorenzo,24 the Court held that a delay of seven months in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro, 25 the Court, in sparing the respondent from the sanctions earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge, the motivation of
the complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of 3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases
and the resolution of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of
the Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule."26
The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybaez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He
assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The
latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybaez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His
explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybaez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

SO ORDERED.

MARILOU T. RIVERA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is the administrative matter that stemmed from the complaint-affidavit 1 filed on July 16, 2008 by Marilou T. Rivera (Rivera) with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor [Judge Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna] with Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019].

The Antecedents

The facts as set out in the final report and recommendation 2 of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Justice Fernando) of the Court of Appeals are summarized
below.3

Rivera alleged that she had been engaged in assisting litigants to obtain judicial bonds since year 2000. Sometime in February 2008, she asked her daughter Shiela T. De Mata (De
Mata), who was also a bondsman, to help her secure a bail bond for accused Ricardo Catuday (Catuday). Catuday was charged of violating Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165 (the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Laguna.

On February 27, 2008, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dan B. Rodrigo (Prosecutor Rodrigo) recommended a bail of 200,000.00 for Catuday who moved to reduce his bail
to120,000.00 before the Office of the Executive Judge, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. De Mata brought a copy of the motion to Prosecutor Rodrigo who did not object to the motion and
who signified his conformity by writing "no objection" and affixing his signature and the date "4/14/08" on the face of the motion. 4

De Mata thereafter brought the document to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna for the approval of Judge Blancaflor who was then the Executive Judge.
De Mata failed to see Judge Blancaflor; she was told by Dennis Trinidad (Trinidad), a member of the OCC staff, that Judge Blancaflor was not in the court. Trinidad volunteered to
bring the motion to Judge Blancaflor at Tagpuan Restaurant(in Pila, Laguna that the judge allegedly owned) for the judges approval. Trinidad, however, returned without securing
the requested approval. De Mata was told to come back the next day.

De Mata went back to the OCC the following morning and was advised this time by Gemma Gallardo (Gemma), another OCC personnel, to personally approach Judge Blancaflor
about Catudays motion. De Mata acted as advised, but Judge Blancaflor simply told De Mata that it was not her job to ask for the motions approval and that she should return it
to the OCC. De Mata at that point approached a Kuya Moring, the process server of Branch 27, about her predicament. Kuya Moring introduced her to Judge Blancaflors driver who
tried to help, but the judge still refused to act on the motion. De Mata next approached Manuel Bugain (Bugain), a court employee at Branch 26. Bugain offered to bring the motion
to Judge Blancaflor who was then in Barangay Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna. When Bugain returned, he told De Mata that Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion because it did
not bear the signature of Prosecutor Rodrigo.

De Mata went back to Branch 26, together with Councilor Cecil Magana (Magana), whose assistance she sought upon Bugains advice, to secure the requested approval. Whilethe
motion was being handed to Judge Blancaflor, he blurted out: "Hindi granted yan! Magbayad siya ng P200,000.00. Ayaw ko ng drugs! Hindi granted yan!" Frustrated by the turn of
events, De Mata returned the unapproved motion to Rivera.

On May 27, 2008, Rivera brought the motion to Branch 91, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna as Judge Blancaflor was then out on a seminar. The following day, Judge Divinagracia Ongkeko
(Judge Ongkeko), the Presiding Judge of Branch 91 and Vice-Executive Judge of RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, issued an order granting Catudays motion to reduce bond. Rivera
immediately secured a bail bond for Catuday from the Industrial Insurance Company and presented it to Branch 26 for Catudays provisional release.

Still, Judge Blancaflor refused to issue a release order, saying that he never approved Catudays reduced bailbond of P120,000.00. Rivera then learned from one Teresa Mirasol
(Mirasol) that Judge Blancaflor refused to approve Catudays motion because it was Rivera who was working for it. According to Mirasol, the information was given to her over the
phone by Noralyn Villamar (Villamar), a.k.a.Macky, allegedly Judge Blancaflors live-in partner.

Rivera further alleged that she experienced the same treatment from Judge Blancaflor when she worked for the approval of the bail of Roel Namplata (Namplata) who was charged
with violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165, also by the OPP, Laguna. Namplatas recommended bail was P60,000.00. After securing Prosecutor Rodrigos consent and with the
help of Gemma, she succeeded in securing Judge Blancaflors approval with the handwritten notation: "Approved P40,000.00 for surety bond. 3-27-08 (SGD.) Judge Blancaflor."

After obtaining a bail bond for Namplata, Rivera tried to secure a release order from Judge Blancaflor who refused to honor the bond as it had been belatedly filed. He even brought
back the cost of the bond to P60,000.00. In the afternoon of June 12, 2008, Rivera learned that Judge Blancaflor declared that he would not release Namplata unless a criminal
case is filed against her by Rina Tranilla (Tranilla), a sister of Namplata. True enough, Tranilla filed a complaint for estafa 5 against Rivera at around 4:00 oclock that afternoon. The
following day, Judge Blancaflors order6 was issued, dated June 10, 2008, for Namplatas release.

Explaining her difficulties with Judge Blancaflor in relation with her work as a bondsman, Rivera claimed that the judge harbored ill will against her because of her involvement in
Special Proceeding No. 4605 entitled Arsenio S. Leron, et al. v. Benjamin S. Leron, et al.,then pending before Judge Blancaflors sala. Rivera alleged that she was the attorney-in-
fact of one of the defendants in the case, Dr. Emelita R. Leron (Dr. Leron) who filed on March 2, 2007 a motion for inhibition against Judge Blancaflor. 7 The motion allegedly recited
in detail Judge Blancaflors misdeeds and gross misconduct, manifest partiality and indiscretion in fraternizing with clients and litigants in connection with the case.

Rivera further alleged that Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the case after she executed an affidavit attesting to (1) the judges recommendation to the plaintiff, Normita
Leron, to secure the services of Atty. Ricardo Pilares, Jr. (Atty. Pilares); (2) the rigging of the raffle of the case to Judge Blancaflor; and (3) the irregular service of summons to the
defendants in the case. Moreover, her son Byron Torres (Byron) and son-inlaw Ricel De Mata (Ricel)) also executed a joint affidavit 8 stating that Judge Blancaflor "bribed" them not
to testify in connection with the motion for inhibition.

Lastly, Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with immorality for maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar, who is not his wife.

In a Supplemental Affidavit,9 dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated her charge that Judge Blancaflor committed gross misconduct in (1) fraternizing with litigants;(2) maintaining an
illicit affair with a woman not his wife; and (3) exhibiting personal bias and prejudice against her in her efforts to obtain bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.
Judge Blancaflors Comment

In his Comment10 dated August 26, 2008, Judge Blancaflor denied Riveras accusations and dismissed them as "mere concoctions" of her "fertile imagination."

Judge Blancaflor claimed that neither Rivera nor her daughter approached him regarding Catudays and Namplatas bail bonds. Even assuming that they did, he refused their
requests because they were not authorized bondsmen or agents of any duly accredited surety company. They were acting as fixers, he explained; thus, he was justified in denying
their requests. Further, Judge Blancaflor claimed that he strictly observes a policy of refusing to reduce the required bail in drug-related cases even if approval is recommended by
the investigating prosecutor. He could not also order Catudays release because it was Judge Ongkeko who granted his motion to reduce bail; in his view, Judge Ongkeko should
also order Catudays release.

Judge Blancaflor considered as "fantastic" Riveras account that she and De Mata brought the motions to reduce bail of Catuday and Namplata to Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila,
Laguna for his approval. He maintained that Riveras account was simply untrue because as a matter of policy, he does not allow court personnel orany other person for
thatmatter, to bring the case records or any part thereof outsidethe court premises. Moreover, he does not own a restaurant in Pila, Laguna, nor a house, chapel and resort in
Pagsanjan, Laguna.

In the Leron case, Judge Blancaflor recalled that Rivera asked him to extend assistance to her boss, Dr. Leron, a defendant in the case. He denied her request and since then, she
started harassing and blackmailing him and even filed an administrative case against him.

Shortly thereafter, the Lerons (defendants in Special Proceeding No. 4605), with Riveras active participation, started circulating stories against him, which culminated in the filing
ofa letter-complaint before Executive Judge Mary Ann E. Corpus-Maalac (Judge Corpus-Maalac) accusing him of bias, partiality and bribery. The Lerons however eventually
withdrew the complaint after being enlightened aboutthe raffle of cases. Also, he had absolutely no involvement in the engagement of Atty. Pilares as a lawyer in the case as he
does not entertain fixers.

Judge Blancaflor brushed off the immorality charge against him. He branded it as malicious and a mere fabrication of Rivera. He alleged that Rivera even hired a Solomon
Ondevilla (Ondevilla) to execute an affidavit against him,[11]] but Ondevilla subsequently denied that he executed and signed the affidavit.12

Judge Blancaflor questioned Riveras credibility, claiming that she is known for filing fabricated charges and malicious complaints against lawyers, judges and other public officials,
among them, an Atty. Cayetano Santos.13Further, she has also been charged with numerous criminal offenses, mostly swindling or estafa cases and violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and is known to have an illicit relationship withdifferent men.

In his Comment14 to Riveras supplemental affidavit,15 Judge Blancaflor reiterated his denial of Riveras charges against him. In particular, he took exception to Annex "B" 16 of the
supplemental affidavit, which referred to Namplatas motion to reduce bail bond and which allegedly carried his marginal note of approval. Judge Blancaflor claimed that the
document was manufactured and was not on file with the court. He added that the marginal note approving a reduced bail of P40,000.00 was forged; even assuming that it was
genuine, it was not a formal order and he still had the discretion on whether toreduce the P60,000.00 recommended bail. By way of a reply-affidavit, 17 Rivera countered that she is
a legitimate bondsman as she is an agent of Genric Insurance and that she is also a swimming instructor and in business through her "Rivera Swimming Lessons." With respect to
Tagpuan Restaurant, she clarified that the property is registered in the name of Villamar, Judge Blancaflors live-in partner, and that the two also purchased and co-owned several
parcels of land in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna.

Rivera also claimed that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit relating Judge Blancaflors illicit relationship with Villamar because the two of them threatened to file a case against him
and would have him imprisoned. She stressed that Judge Blancaflors attack on her person has nothing to do with the case she filed against him.
Justice Fernandos Investigation/Findings/Recommendation

In compliance with the Courts resolution of August 17, 2011, 18 Justice Fernando conducted a thorough investigation of the complaint, in the course of which, she conducted several
hearings, received affidavits and documentary evidence, heard testimonies of witnesses, and even conducted an ocular inspection.19

Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. 3019; and (2) immorality. She recommended that the judge be dismissed from
the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and likewise recommended the forfeiture of the judges retirement benefits, if any.

The OCA Report and Recommendation

On July 24, 2013, the Court referred Justice Fernandos final report to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. 20 In its memorandum21 of February 25, 2014, the OCA
submitted its report to the Court, adopting the findings and recommendations of Justice Fernando.

The Courts Ruling

After considering Justice Fernandos report and the records of the case, we note that she conducted a very thorough investigation. We uphold her findings and recommendation as
we find sufficient basis to dismiss respondent Judge Blancaflor from the service.

Re: charge of bribery, gross misconduct

and violation of R.A. No. 3019

The first count against Judge Blancaflor regarding this charge involved his alleged: (1) refusal to approve Catudays motion to reduce bail bond, despite a "no objection" from the
prosecutor; (2) refusal to order Catudays release, despite Judge Ongkekos grant of the motion; (3) refusal to order Namplatas release, despitehis own approval of the motion to
reduce bail bond; and (4) offer of money to Byron and Ricel to prevent them from testifying in the motion for his inhibition in the Leron case.

While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce bail, it appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and
Namplata. Through Judge Blancaflors inaccessibility (he was usually not in the court in the afternoon) 22 and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and
Namplata and the people working for the approval of their motions (Rivera and De Mata) suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in securing the motions approval. In more ways
than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Riveraa run-around in Catudays and Namplatas cases for no plausible reason other than the judges strong antipathy towards
Rivera.

This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 23 which mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties without
favor, bias or prejudice,"24 and that they "shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."25

For instance, when De Mata learned that Judge Blancaflor said that he did not approve Catudays motion for reduction of his bail because Prosecutor Rodrigo was against the
motion, she went to see the prosecutor about it. Prosecutor Rodrigo told her that there was no problem with the motion, so he signed it, but he did not know why Judge Blancaflor
would not approve the motion. De Mata then asked the help of Magana, yet even with Maganas intercession, Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion, saying that he did not
like drugs. Magana wondered why Catudays motion was not approved when all the other surety bonds were approved. The following testimony of De Mata confirmed the
difficulties De Mata and her mother experienced in their work as bondsmen in Judge Blancaflors sala:
 xxxx

Q: After Mr. Bugain told you that Judge Blancaflor refuses to sign for the reason that Fiscal Rodrigo also does not approve of the said motion, what did you do?

A. I went to Fiscal Rodrigo and asked him what was the problem with the motion?

Q: What did Fiscal Rodrigo [tell] you?

A: He said there was really no problem with the motion so he signed it. He did not know why the motion of Catuday was left pending.

xxxx

Q: During this time, this Mayora was also in branch 26?

A: Yes, mam, and she was also wondering why our application cannot be approved while all the other surety bonds were approved.

Q: Can you tell us who this Mayora is, what is her occupation?

A: She was a councilor, the wife of the previous mayor. If there are people who cannot afford to pay bail, they ask her for help and she helps people. 26

xxxx

Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catudays motion was not filed with the OCC and never reached him. 27 Justice Fernando found otherwise, citing the
Order28 dated May 28, 2008 of Judge Ongkeko, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, granting the motion when Judge Blancaflor was attending a seminar in Tagaytay
City. Judge Ongkeko could not have issued the order had it not been filed with the OCC. But what was more surprising was Judge Blancaflors refusal to acknowledge and to act on
the order of approval. This belies Judge Blancaflors excuses for not acting on Catudays motion and lends credence to Riveras submission that the judges refusal was to spite her.

The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplatas bail bond. As the records show, Judge Blancaflor approved Namplatas motion for reduction of bail. The judge
admitted his approval during the investigation. When he was asked: "Do you clearly remember Judge that you reduced it as shown by your signature from P60,000,00
to P40,000.00 bail?," he answered: "That is correct sir, that day," referring to March 27, 2008. 29 Yet, he refused to approve Namplatas temporary release. In fact, in his Comment
to Riveras supplemental complaint,30 he disowned the marginal note he made on a copy of Namplatas motion reducing his bail bond to P40,000.00.

The following exchanges during the investigation further indicate that Judge Blancaflor overstepped and abused his authority as a judge when he took time to release Namplata,
despite his approval of Namplatas bail bond at its original amount which he earlier reduced to P40.000.00:

J. Fernando:

But you admit you issued a March 27 Order reducing it to P40,000.00?

Judge Blancaflor:
The marginal note I admit, Your Honor.

J. Fernando:

Yes, thats fine.

Atty. Aguirre (Riveras, counsel):

Q: The reason Judge Blancaflor why you did not anymore honor your marginal note reducing the amount from 60 to 40 is that you came to know that it was Waling, the
complainant, and her daughter Shiela who was (sic) following it up with you?

A: That is not correct, sir. What you claim that I did not honor the original marginal note is because I did not see it in the original file of the case.

Q: But the more important reason Judge is that you came to know that it was the complainant and her daughter who were following up this bail bond case and when you
came to know that follow up of the complainant and her daughter, you wanted it returned back to 60 because you said it was too long in coming, the P40,000.00 bond, is
that correct?

A: That is not correct sir:

Q: And another condition of yours before the bail could be approved by you is that the sister or Namplata must file a case of estafa against the complainant which she did
and one day after, the case against the complainant for estafa was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor, you issued the Order of Release, is that correct?

A: That is not correct. That is your own language, sir.

Q: That is the testimony of the witnesses.31

In an effort to justify his errors and omissions in relation to Catudays and Namplatas motions, Judge Blancaflor argued that he refused to act on the motions because he hates
drugs and,in the case of Namplata, there was a delay in the processing of the bail bond.

We are not at all convinced by Judge Blancaflors explanations. His excuses which were marked by inconsistencies and typified by his initial denial that he approved Namplatas
motion, only to admit the approval before Justice Fernando cannotjustify his failure to act. Action by the judge was clearly called for by the urgency of the matter before him the
plea for provisional liberty of Catuday and Namplata who enjoy the right to bail despite the serious offenses they were charged with. His unexplained refusal in these cases can
only support Riveras claim that his inaction was due to Riveras intervention in the approval of the motions, a clear sign of his personal bias and prejudice against her. This, in our
view, ispatently a gross misconduct on the part of Judge Blancaflor.

It appears from the records that Judge Blancaflors antipathy towards Rivera arose from her involvement in the Leron case when she testified against the judge in a motion for his
inhibition from the case. The motion must have caused considerable anxiety and concern for the judge so that he even exerted efforts to neutralize Rivera, to the extent of offering
cash to Byron (Riveras son) and Ricel (Riveras son-in-law) who executed a joint Affidavit 32 that Judge Blancaflor and Villamar offered them P10,000.00 each and even warned
them not to testify atthe hearing on the motion. The two showed the cash to Rivera and they had the incident entered in the police blotter. 33 In this regard, Torres and Ricel
deposed:
xxxx

1. x x x Kami ay namamasukan kay Armando Q. Torres ("ARMANDO") na tatay ni BYRON at biyenan na lalaki ni RICEL. Kami ay laging nagkakaroon ng komunikasyon kay
Noralyn M. Villamar a.k.a. Macky ("Macky") dahil may mga transaksiyon silang pinag-uusapan ng aming tatay na si Armando.

2. Noong ika-02 Marso 2007, araw ng Biyernes, mga 5:00 5:30 ng hapon, tumawag si Macky kay Byron at sinabi na gusto daw siya makausap nito tungkol sa pagtetestigo
nila laban kay Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor ("Judge Blancaflor"), at sinabihan na pumunta sa bahay nila.

3. Pagdating ni Byron sa bahay nila Macky at Judge Blancaflor sa Brgy. Layugan ng mga bandang 6:00 ng gabi, tinanong ni Macky si Byron "Bakit natin kailangang
maglaban?"Nagkunwari akong walang alam at tumahimik na lang ako.

4. Nilapitan ako (Byron) ni Judge Blancflor at sinabi na: "Byron, ayaw ko tayong mag-kabanggaan. Kung lilitaw kayo sa hearing sa petsa 6 ay ipapakulongko kayo. Ito ang
ten thousand (P10,000.00), ito ay hindi suhol. Wag ka lang tumistigo. Kung tetestigo ka, mapipilitan kaming lumaban. Kayang-kaya kitang gawan ng kaso tulad ng rape at
anumang kaso na puwedeng isaksak sa iyo.

5. Pinahabol pa ni Macky na: "Kahit patayan pwede kami."

6. Noong 03 ng Marso 2007, araw ng Sabado, bandang 5:10 ng hapon, pumunta si Macky at si Guillen Almonte sa bahay ng tatay namin na si Armando sa Brgy. Duhat kung
saan kami ay nagtratrabaho.

7. Galit na galit si Macky at sinabi nito kay Armando ngunit nakatingin sa amin: "Pare, bakit ganito? Ano ang ginawa ng mga bata? Kayong dalawa, tinanggap namin kayo
nang maayos sa Layugan."

8. Hindi na kami umimik at hinayaan naming magsalita na lamang si Macky.

9. Sinabi pa ni Macky na: "Huwag na nating patagalin ito. Ayaw kong tayo ang magkabanggaan. Kung lalaban kayo, lalaban kami hanggang patayan."

10. Nagtangkang umalis si Byron kaya sumigaw si Macky na: "Byron! Huwag kang umiwas. Problema natin to. Huwag kang umalis!"

11. Nag-isip si Byron ng dahilan upang maka-alis. Bago siya nakaalis, pahabol na sinabi ni Macky na: "Mag-aabot ako ng tulong, huwag lang kayong sumali."

12. Nang nakaalis na si Byron mga bandang 6:00 pm, naglabas ng pera si Macky at inaabot ito kay Ricel, ngunit hindi niya ito kinuha. Kaya ang ginawa ni Macky ay
kinausap si Armando at inilagay ang pera sa mesa at sinabi na: "Pare, kung ayaw magtiwala ng anak mo sa amin, ito ang P20,000.00 para kay Byron at para kay Ricel. Ikaw
na ang bahala. Meron pang kasunod yan kung pipirma sila ng Affidavit of Desistance."34

In his comment35 on Riveras complaint, Judge Blancaflor denied the alleged offer, claiming that the alleged sums did not come from him but from Armando Torres (Torres) and
were "given as support to his son Byron and son-in-law Ricel." When Rivera saw the P20,000.00, she grabbed it from Byron and proceeded to the police station and made a false
story of bribery against him.36 Judge Blancaflor offered in evidence two affidavits Armando executed37 dated March 6, 2007 and August 22, 2008.

Again, the explanation fails to persuade us. Armando is Riveras estranged husband. Their union produced Byron and De Mata, the wife of Ricel. Rivera and Armando separated in
1983. It was a case of a marriage turned sour where the spouses filed cases against one another, as Armando himself stated in his affidavit of August 22, 2008. 38 We should not be
too quick therefore to admit Armandos statements as unvarnished truth, especially when he did not even appear during the investigation to affirm the statements attributed to
him, despite several subpoenas for him to testify, the last one being on December 6, 2012.39

On the other hand, Rivera and Byron reported the bribery incident to the police. The following exchanges on what transpired in the police station significantly shed light on this
incident and bolstered Riveras claim that Judge Blancaflor committed a serious misconduct in relation with the Leron case, thus:

Q: Now, do you remember what thisis all about, the incident reported by Byron Torres?

A: It was a threat.

Q. Will you please read it again to refresh your memory?

(Witness reading the blotter)

Q: What you read, the entry in the blotter is in your handwriting?

A. Yes sir.

Q: What do you remember about this P10,000.00?

J. Fernando: 10 or 20?

A: P10,000.00

J. Fernando: 10 lang?

A: Yes, P10,000.00.

Wag siyang aatend sa hearing saa-sais kung hindi sila ang magkakabangga ni Judge Blancaflor. Q: What is that P10,000.00 there?

A: Ang akin pong pagkakaintindi ito ay suhol dahil nakalagay dito hindi ito suhol. Wag kang tumestigo dahil kung tetestigo ka ay mapipilitan lumaban gawan ka ng kaso.
Pag tumestigo siya gagawa siya ng kaso.

Translation:

If he testified, he would have a case filed against him.

xxxx

Q: But the signature here of Byron, did he sign it in your presence?

 A: Yes sir.

Q: And the witness also signed it in your presence?

A: Yes, sir, in my presence.40

The root cause of the Leron case, as Justice Fernando established and stressed, was the irregular assignment of the case which was directly brought to Judge Blancaflors sala
without going through a raffle. Atty. Arthur Trinidad, Jr. (Atty. Trinidad), then RTC Clerk of Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, testified that the case, Special Proceeding No. 4605, which was
filed on November 15, 2006 was not included in the schedule of raffle of cases for the period November 10 to 30, 2006 and was brought to the judges sala even before the case
was supposed tobe raffled on November 30, 2006 because he was made to understand, based on the judges letter to him, that the case a settlement of estate dispute
belonged to the Family Court then handled by Judge Blancaflor. 41 Due to the judges letter, he assumed that the case was within the jurisdiction of the Family Court so that it was
his ministerial duty to forward the case to Judge Blancaflors sala.42

Not only does it appear that Judge Blancaflor intervened in the assignment of the Leron case, he also had a hand in ensuring who would represent the disputants, by suggesting, in
the presence of and with the active participation of Villamar, that the lawyers for the parties would be Atty. Pilares for the plaintiffs 43 and Atty. Stephen David (Atty. David) for the
defendants.44 He even went to the extent of voicing out how the case should turn out.

Thus, Dr. Leron deposed: "Tinanong ko si Judge Blancaflor kung matatalo ako kahit sabihin ko na wala naman talaga ang lahat ng hinahanap nila. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor Pwede,
depende sa presentasyon ng abogado mo. Tinanong ko kung sino yong abogado na sinasabi ni Macky. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor[,] si [Atty. David] at dinagdag pa niya kumpare ko
yan,magaling yan, at taga-Tektite, madali nating maayos ang kaso. Nabanggit din niya na kumpare ni Atty. David si

Atty. Pilares. Sinabi niya pa mas lamang kayo kasi mas alam niyo nangyayari kaysa sa kabila."45

Also, Ricel, Riveras son-in-law, stated under oath that he saw Judge Blancaflor and plaintiff Gilbert Leron (Gilbert) during the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of the
judges house on January 16, 2007 and he overheard Judge Blancaflor assuring Gilbert not to worry about the case saying: "Pare wag na kayo mag-alala, ayos na ang kaso nyo nina
Dr. Leron," while they were drinking beer.46

Judge Blancaflor argued that he had no interest whatsoever in the Leron case as it was forwarded to Branch 26 in the ordinary course of business since cases falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court are directly forwarded to Branch26, his branch. His letter to Atty. Trinidad should not be considered against him because he was then a
new family court judge. He further argued that he did not refer Atty. Pilares to the plaintiffs; he even dismissed the case for prematurity and inhibited himself from the case after it
was re-raffled.47

We do not find Judge Blancaflors explanations convincing.The circumstances of the Leron case left Judge Blancaflor no other recourse but to inhibit. As Justice Fernando aptly
observed, it was more prudent for the judge to inhibit than to be placed under a cloud of distrust by the parties. On the matter of the parties legal representation alone, we find
credible the statements of Rivera, Dr. Leron and Ricel that not only did Judge Blancaflor refer lawyers to the parties but, more seriously, he gave them hints that they would prevail
in the case.

Judge Blancaflors interference in the case in the way just described is not only gross misconduct; it also constitutes a violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, particularly Section 3(e) which provides: "In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence x x x."

To be sure, even if Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the Leron case, he cannot extricate himself from the legal mess he brought upon himself. His interference in the case
caused an undue injury to the party who should have prevailed had the case pushed through; and an unwarranted benefit to the party who should have lost had the case been
decided on the merits. Worse, he exhibited evident bad faith when he gave both parties expectations of winning the case. Thus, there is every reason to find probable cause
against him for violation of R.A. No. 3019.

It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards demanded of the office of a judge in the Leroncase. Time and again, judges have been reminded thatas
magistrates, they must comport themselves in such a manner that their conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as
the epitome of integrity and justice.48 Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed to pass this "searching scrutiny."

Re: charge of immorality

On the charge of immorality for allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar who is nothis wife Justice Fernando aptly observed that Judge Blancaflor offered no
evidence, except general denials to disprove his moral indiscretion, which appeared to be widely known in the community at the time material to the case. As the records show,
statements made here and there by witnesses and personalities drawn into the case confirm the special relationship between Judge Blancaflor and Villamar such that Villamar had
no hesitation in speaking for the judge on matters concerning him and his work.

The community, it seemed, had accepted them as man and wife, given that they stayed in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna and owned Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna. This
restaurant, incidentally, even became Judge Blancaflors extension office, usually in the afternoons, as deposed by Rivera, De Mata, Byron, Ricel and Judge Blancaflors staff whose
assistance Rivera and De Mata sought in their effort to secure the provisional liberty for their clients Catuday and Namplata. The depositions were backed up by pictures of (1) the
places where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand and where the two were residing, and (2) the events in the life of the live-in partners. Notably, Exhs. "N," "N-1," and "N-2" 49 were
separate camera shots of the place where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand; Exh. "A-15-C" 50 was a picture of Gilbert, a party in the Leron case, attending the blessing of the
chapel inside the compound of Judge Blancaflors house; Exh. "E" 51 was a picture of Judge Blancaflor and Villamar together in a hut located inside the compound of their house in
Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, apparently relaxing; and Exhs. "F," "G," and "H" were pictures of Villamar picking up Judge Blancaflor from his office at the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
using her Pajero with plate no. XHF 887.52

Judge Blancaflor belittled the immorality charge, dismissing it as merely a fabrication and a product of Riveras fertile imagination. To substantiate his claim, he cited the
withdrawal of Ondevillas affidavit confirming Riveras charge that he was maintaining an illicit liaison with Villamar.53

Again, we are not persuaded by the judges response. Given the fact that Judge Blancaflor is a person of authority and his involvement in the "bribery" incident (as revealed by
Byron and Ricel whom the judge even threatened if they would testify against him), we find more credibility in Riveras submission that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit on the
immorality charge because the judge likewise threatened him.

The confluence of the statements of Rivera and the others (Byron, De Mata, Ricel and Mirasol), the information provided by Judge Blancaflors staff, and the exhibits described
above, constitute more than enough support for the immorality charge against Judge Blancaflor. These interwoven pieces of evidence pointing to the relationship between the
judge and Villamar, several of which materialized over a period of time, could not conceivably have been the result of Riveras fabrications. As De Mata testified during the
investigation:

ATTY. SHALIM:
Q: Ms. Witness, you mentioned that Noralyn Villamar is the live-in partner of Judge Blancaflor. How do you know this?

A: Because Tita Macky herself was the one who told me that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner.

xxxx

J. FERNANDO:

Q: If you know, how long have JudgeBlancaflor and Noralyn been living together as live-in partners?

A: 2006, your Honor.

Q: So they started as live-in partners since 2006?

A: June of 2006, Your Honor, because that was when I came back from Manila.

Q: As far as you are concerned, you only learned about it in 2006?

A. Yes , Your Honor.

Q: Have you seen them really living together as live-in partners?

A: No, Your Honor. It was my husband because they were still at Layugan because my husband was the driver of my father at that time.

xxxx

Q: Are you saying that Judge and Macky are living in Layugan?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: Are you sure that Macky told you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How did she tell you?

A: It was just in a casual way that she told me that Judge is her current live-in partner because previously it was a Colonel.
 Q: So despite the fact that you are not close to Macky, Macky intimidated (sic) to you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in-partner?

A: Yes, Your Honor.54

Justice Fernando stressed that Judge Blancaflor did not categorically deny the allegations of an illicit relationship with Villamar. While he stated that his marriage to his wife
NoraLopez was already annulled, the annulment became final only on July 18, 2012 by virtue of an entry of judgment from the RTC, Br. 199, Las Pias City. Thus, he was still a
married man at the time of his liaison with Villamar.55

For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line of a proper and acceptable conduct as a magistrate and a private person. In Re: Complaint of Mrs.
Rotilla A. Marcos and her children against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, 56 we said: "x x x The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. x x x."

In sum, we find substantial evidence to hold Judge Blancaflor guilty as charged. This conclusion, as correctly observed by Justice Fernando:

x x x jibes with the affidavits and testimonies of complainant Rivera and her witnesses. His acts of fraternizing with lawyers and litigants, his partiality in the performance of his
duties, his act of giving bribe money to two (2) witnesses to a case in order for them to withdraw, and maintaining an illicit affair with a woman not his wife tarnished the image of
the judiciary. Respondent judge demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity x x x He is therefore unfit to remain in office and discharge his functions and duties as
judge.57 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, as observed by the OCA, it has been established that "[t]he findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified."58

Gross misconduct, bribery, violation of R.A. No. 3019 and immorality, all of them constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 59 are serious charges under Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court punishable under Section 11 of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Considering the gravity of theoffenses committed by Judge Blancaflor, we approve and adopt the recommendations of Justice Fernando and the OCA for his dismissal from the
service, with the accessory penalties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Presiding Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Branch 26, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct, violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and immorality, constituting serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8,Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Judge Blancaflor is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other monetary benefits, except accrued leave credits. He is DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This ruling shall be without prejudiceto any disciplinary action that may be brought against Judge Blancaflor as a lawyer under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. 60 Accordingly, Judge Blancaflor
is directed to COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision and to show cause why heshould not alsobe suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned
as a member of the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints 1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant
was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCPs objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly
appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCPs creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as
legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order 2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction
(i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan
she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her
authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receivers exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
 6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionzas financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation
and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCPs expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIBs witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need
for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCPs requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCPs counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the courts power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIBs favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised
concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also
posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained
that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation
plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature
because judicial remedies were still available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of
the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules 6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors,
then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was
SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the
matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the complainants motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or
prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other
creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the
grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the complainants allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by
evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the
Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was
nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered
vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no
prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of
Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, 10 insisting that the respondents acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of
impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The CAs Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4,
2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these
involved the respondents appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCPs financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCPs interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting
judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCPs creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondents explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were
reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this
regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details
as a magistrate in the account) even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be
legally justified by the publics acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision 17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
 3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt
with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondents explanation in
the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary
action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the
OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sisons observations that the respondents act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth
by the Code.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We
sustain Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. 20 In the present case, the
allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant
failed to establish the respondents bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." 23Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the respondents alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply
relying on the complainants verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. 25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality
is not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The
complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondents predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The
bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainants failure to
establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. 27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous." 28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the
debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged
that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule]
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we
find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove
(or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-companys assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the
interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public. 33 The rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously
deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no
judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondents act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in
the performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. 36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondents act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee,
without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondents explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court
may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however,
shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether
the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able
to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondents approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. 40 He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should
always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, 43 the Court declared that "although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble
position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."

Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as
well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain
the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and
perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet a new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each
other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their
status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this
light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold
opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." 46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom of
expression. The respondent judges act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should
always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing
an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate regardless of whether it is a personal
matter or part of his or her judicial duties creates and contributes to the peoples opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is
especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public
consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the
visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves. 47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of
morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach. 48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of
conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A)
of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by
any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair
and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos ( P21,000,00). Judge Austria
is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.
He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the amount
of P1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages in her collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities. The Office of Administrative
Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall compute the
money value of the same, the amount to be deducted from the shortages to be restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the service. He is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount of P58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED P5,000, which should be deducted from her retirement benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.

SO ORDERED.

As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in both courts.

xxx xxx xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team found an unremitted amount of P18,702.oo representing the court's collection from
August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account. Furthermore,
31 booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) collection of P348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003. However, only P186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of P162,662.62; the total Clerk of
Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January 1996 to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of P30,411. 70; and as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary
Fund had a total cash shortage of P1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from 1995 to August 2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled P2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been getting money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge
Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over P240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his
monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip
evidencing the turnover of the P240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's
salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to the present.

In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting
to P59,545.oo. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF
Account No. 0591-0116-34.

A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of P106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and
JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that
Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut.
But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of borrowing money from the collections of the court.
In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities.
The team also found that the amount of P540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said amount was
remitted to the Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court
instead of maintaining an account with Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A
comparison of the court's CCGF collections and remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of P510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his
incumbency a cash shortage of P430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of P80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage
of P430.00. She deposited the amount of P400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates,
totalling P243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of
the amount refunded. The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to P2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however, the amount
of P846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as
the offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections. In these instances, she requested
Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement
receipt. Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the
back portion of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the
signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to P193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling P90,500.oo were also given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were
notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted
to .P207,774.42. However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts totalling P802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and
Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of P846, 710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of P58,100.oo
which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)

In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for
an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a
chance to present his side on the matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum, 2 sought reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally
required to comment on the findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in the court collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge Balut
was able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required
to comment on the findings of the financial audit.

In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and, upon the recommendation 5 of the OCA, referred the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.6
Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the
participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no
longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.7 The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if
such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.8

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe
categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been
borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips 9 where
the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of the court. These withdrawal
slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to
Judge Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification 10 stating that his cash accountability as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was P207,774.42 and there were
certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its
October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision
and for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.

Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. 11 Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all
times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. 12 He should adhere to the highest standards of public
accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.13

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the
proper administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense. 15 For said reason, the
respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and
diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.16

The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That, however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts
of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service for the same offense.
Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from the service. And it would send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different
standards - one for the magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.
The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves
administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts
is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business."17

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a
span of several years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. In
the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City,18 it was written:

For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the
latter recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed P130,ooo to be able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for reasons
ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents. That he intended to repay the amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used
outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law."

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their
will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow."

Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to present himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no
compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and
would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately served on the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated
prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the
money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest
actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee),
the names of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles
(Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among
whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-
dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach
out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:

32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other
special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family,
Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director
Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear
pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we
should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."

xxxx

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles).
Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera." 3(Emphasis
supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of
Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had
interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada
who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted
that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she
was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " 5 wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have
visited their office or attended their events, thus:

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa
inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang
iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa
conference room.

x x x x6

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised
questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He
explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party.
On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our
court, or while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs.
Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on
the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief
Justice such that even without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution
from unfair and malicious innuendos."

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the
malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the
intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam).9

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the
affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's Comment. 10 Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the
visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs.
Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the
consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and
others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs
on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to
convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."

As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent
said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous
healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish
priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his
prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of
cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such favor,
respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental
affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer
had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He
thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was
issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the
resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more
need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and
26769.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the following findings and conclusions:

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation
of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother
Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.

These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the
amount of P3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are
mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and
2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this
does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the
JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in charge
of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business activities.

In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that
court who would help her.

When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is
respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr.
Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam
kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur."
Do you remember that question being asked from you?

xxxx

A Yes po.

Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were
talking about, if you remember?

Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang
mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po
si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory
Ong.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung
decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."

On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million
pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only P3.8 million. She explained that she gave various
amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to
respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated
that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang
pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms.
Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice
Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.

xxx

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy

Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang P3.8 lang na PO
(purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"

Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?

A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May P5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito.
lba-iba kasi madam, eh.

Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.

Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the
first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of P25.5
million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's P25.5 million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to
respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's
suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?

Witness Luy

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms.
Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng
13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang
ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?

A Opo.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni
Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam
yung nakalagay sa ...

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung
check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in
madam, P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00 or P281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang
ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka
bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na
lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke
na P282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos
na.

Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay
Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the
Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his
lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for
business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?

xxx

Ms. Sula

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

The Chairman

Gregory Ong?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is
filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Witness Sula

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan
kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam,
paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong
mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit
ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her
acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is
shielded by law and he has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that
picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to
a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him.
Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman
in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest
would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.

xxxx

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar
case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists
who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the
fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles considering that her
mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what
prompted him to do so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked
him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence against her, she would
have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was
not interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of
the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer)
which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his
body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal
for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his first visit.

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang
kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to
her his BDO check of P25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not
have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced
interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The
limit or ceiling is P3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.

6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a
case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.

With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As
to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that
he never interceded on her behalf.

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the
Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions
propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is
telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did
not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy
witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's
belief that the two members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.

xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that
in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for
the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:

Justice Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ...
they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..

xxxx

Justice Gutierrez

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula.
Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding
their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx

Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross
misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

xxxx

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is
highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent P3,
102,000.00 as advanced interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true,
nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest
of P3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?

Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful
and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion
that he received money from Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her,
respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely
frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed"
the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only
while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of
inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.

xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx

This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This
exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the
same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have
waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez
v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the
members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division, respondent was ordered to
pay a fine of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

xxxx

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that
Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that
there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the
processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to P3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited
and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service
WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

xxxx

The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her
acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced
interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles.11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and
socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually
visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." 12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross
misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff,
they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed
to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed
and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with
respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount.
There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles'
information about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven
checks issued by Napoles in 2012.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them
by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it
could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at
the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees
to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. 14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-
litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. 15

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is
imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. 16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of
anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public
disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy
and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus,
even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and
how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.

The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with
government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate
hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear, unequivocal,
and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-
examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of
the witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases
applies a fortiori to administrative cases. 18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's
claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar
as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and
also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other
employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with
the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula

A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na
niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero
hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at
sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation
period.

xxxx

Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public
documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits
of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. 20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded
by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free
from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)

On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the
case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:

Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte,
Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their
cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house
on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating
and drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or
thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see
that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they
meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at
the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that
his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.'"

The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the
Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges,
in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his
Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony
expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety. 24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that
"[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is
not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work
commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of
the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion
that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such
manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the
termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with
Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted
"contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and
compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation
Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist
you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did you not do that?

Justice Ong

I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and
had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is
such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Gutierrez

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public,
you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so
grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her
office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public with her
considering that she was a former accused in that case.

Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former
respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before
you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada
who was accused before of plunder?

Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish
priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's
meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .5 million as claimed
by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by
him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00 supposed advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as
consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case. Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case.
Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her
office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest
for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar
case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts
of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he
vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain
omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the
"contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her
supplemental affidavit x x x."27).

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a
violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." 28 Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no
place in the Judiciary.29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and
dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, BIAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM :
Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to
exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending
cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding.1 Complainant filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was opposed
by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.2
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias.3 Evelyn Tanael, the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report that
included not only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of complainants late husband. 4
The third case is a civil action5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant,
among others.6
In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and part of the estate of complainants husband was involved. 7
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother,
Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaa, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna.8
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., 9 met with respondent Pecaa on February 20, 2010. 10 During this meeting, complainant informed
respondent Pecaa of the delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaa to check the status of the
publication of the notice.11 Respondent Pecaa asked for complainants number so that she could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case. 12 Enrique13 and
Perlito14executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaa asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Bian, Laguna. 15 Complainant went there with Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaa then informed complainant
that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael. 17
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-
Barias.18 She was only concerned with the administration of the properties of her late husband, to which respondent Pecaa replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."19
Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaa sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 20 asking complainant to call her. Complainant called respondent Pecaa who informed her
that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her. 21 Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaa would be
present as well.22
On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaa at 6750 Ayala Avenuein Makati City. They proceeded to Caf Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global
City. Respondent Pecaa said that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.24
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Caf Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge
Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. 25 Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew
of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias. 26 This disclosure surprised complainant,as she was under the impression that opposing counsel and
respondent JudgeRubia had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.27
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias. 28 She was
asked about the hospital where she brought her husband at the time of his cardiac arrest.29
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course of the trial. 30Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the
opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court proceedings. 31 The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in
favor of Atty. Zarate.32
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant was
appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un."33
After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that respondent Judge Rubia had made insinuations that she was awaiting the company
of another man.34
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom until August 8, 2010.
In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-
Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.35
On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for consolidation filed by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the
hearing on such motion being set on June 18, 2010. 36 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did not even consider the comment/opposition to the motion for
consolidation filed by her counsel, which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings, they could not be consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Respondent
Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the totality of the different issues involved in the three distinct cases under one court proceeding. 37 As such, complainant alleged that the main
issues of the special proceedings were consolidated with matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil action. 38 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia
refused to issue Orders39 that would have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special administrator of her late husbands estate. 40 This included the order to conduct an
inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of the administrator.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her request for subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to compel
Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late husband. 41 As such, complainant raised that respondent Judge
Rubias refusal emboldened Evelyn Tanael and oppositor Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management of the estate of complainants late husband. 42 Because of this
refusal, she asserted that respondent Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the duty of the court to ensure a proper inventory of the estate. 43
Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of respondent Judge Rubia. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing
of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael and
Almeda-Barias were not declared in default.44 She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove ownership of the property was on complainant, when in
fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her late husband. 45
Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she had with respondents. 46 It was Enrique who allegedly told complainants lawyers about it when
he went to the lawyers office to pay some bills. 47 Complainant said that her lawyer immediately admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia. Complainant
then texted respondent Pecaa on August 8, 2010 on her lawyers reaction concerning the March 3, 2010 meeting. The following exchanges took place via text message:
COMPLAINANT:
Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother went to hm today to pay som bills. Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge
rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat n I dnt
knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]:
Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)
COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to talk to hm n person para mas claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our meetng
nga, dats wat struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going to col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to buy foncard pa. (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8, 2010, 4:28 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)48(Emphasis supplied)
On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubias inhibition. This was denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration
denied in an order49 dated November 15, 2010.50
On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit 51 before the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaa for gross misconduct and respondent
Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct.52
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment.53
In her comment,54 respondent Pecaa did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010 through the introduction of Enrique Sison. 55 However, she claimed that the alleged
meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter.
Respondent Pecaa alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010," 56 when she was on her way to Makati City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant invited her
for dinner. Respondent Pecaa hesitantly agreed after complainant had insisted. 57 Complainant picked her up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they proceeded to Caf Juanita
in Burgos Circle for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle, respondent Pecaa saw respondent Judge Rubias car parked near Caf Juanita.58
At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaa said that she saw respondent Judge Rubia together with some companions walking toward his car. 59 She stepped out of the restaurant
and greeted him. Complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaa and so the latter was constrained to introduce complainant as an employee of Philippine Airlines to
respondent Judge Rubia.60 After the introduction, respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and left. Complainant and respondent Pecaa returned to the restaurant to finish their
food and pay the bill.61
Complainant drove respondent Pecaa back to Makati City. During the drive, complainant allegedly asked her help regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to what she
could give to respondent Judge Rubia because her lawyers instructed her to bribe him. Respondent Pecaa only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not accept money and that
he is financially stable.62
After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent Pecaa concerning her case filed in court. 63 Respondent Pecaa admitted to the exchanges
through text messages she had with complainant on August 8, 2010 regarding the filing of administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia. 64
Respondent Pecaa denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate. 65 She maintained the position that she should not be held administratively liable for what she construed to be
primarily judicial matters, such as the bases for respondent Judge Rubias decisions and orders in court.66
Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.
Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent Pecaa together with complainant was a mere chance encounter. 68 He denied any
pre-arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the brief encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing wife. 69 He stated that he was only introduced to
complainant because she was an employee of Philippine Airlines where he was a former executive. 70 Respondent Judge Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with complainant
did take place, it should have been mentioned in the first motion for inhibition. 71 Further, he emphasized that it took complainant eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting
to file a motion for inhibition and an administrative case.72
Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a favorable outcome of the cases filed, initiated contact with respondent Pecaa. The filing of the
administrative case against him was only to compel him to inhibit from the cases to seek a friendlier forum.73
Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged between complainant and respondent Pecaa as well as any active advocacy in favor of
opposing counsel, Atty. Zarate.74
As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed, respondent Judge Rubia argued that the best forum to ventilate complainants allegations was
not through an administrative proceeding but through judicial recourse.75
Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the administrative complaint
to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and recommendation.76
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.77 The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention78 allegedly due to the implication of his name in the administrative complaint.79
Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because the orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the complaint
were assailed in a petition for certiorari.80
Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he was not closely associated with them. 81 He asserted that the records were replete with incidents
where he and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in heated discussions on legal matters. 82 He maintained that he did not foster any closeness or personal affinity with respondent
Judge Rubia that would substantiate complainants allegations.83
In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents narration of the events on the alleged dinner meeting. 84 He argued that if the dinner meeting did take place,
this incident should have been the ground for the motion for inhibition filed.85
Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there was nothing "wrong, improper or illegal" 86 about it. It could have been reasonably interpreted
as an extrajudicial means initiated by respondent Judge Rubia to assuage the parties in the contentious litigation.87
The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.88
On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before Justice Gaerlan. It was agreed that respondents would file their respective supplemental
comments and complainant her reply to the comment. Complainant manifested that she would present three (3) witnesses: herself and her two brothers. Respondent Pecaa
would testify for herself and present Semenidad Pecaa, her aunt, as witness. Respondent Judge Rubia manifested that he would testify on his behalf and present respondent
Pecaa as witness.89
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa filed their respective supplemental comments dated December 15, 2011 90and December 16, 2011,91 respectively. Complainant filed her
consolidated reply on January 17, 2012.92
A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where complainant testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.
During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls showing that she called respondent Pecaa on March 2 and 3, 2010. 93 Counsel for
respondent Pecaa stipulated that these calls were made to her.94
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.
In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaa testified to the allegations in her comment and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with
complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter, was presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the
Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown
in the attendance sheet identified by Rodel.
Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked together toward the parking area. When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their
cars were parked, Rodel allegedly saw complainant and respondent Pecaa approaching them.95 He then saw respondent Pecaa introduce complainant to respondent Judge
Rubia.96 After the introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive away.97
Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial affidavit filed. 98 He alleged that the encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was on March
10, not March 3, 2010.99
Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012,100 the parties filed their respective memoranda.
Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012. 101 In his report, Justice Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents. 102 He was
"convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter" 103 and found that complainant failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence that would justify the
imposition of a penalty on respondents.104
Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated testimony of complainant.105
Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she filed the administrative complaint. 106 He stated that the deliberate concealment of
the meeting was inconsistent with her resolve to prove respondent Judge Rubias alleged partiality toward the counsel of the opposing party. 107
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the administrative case was not the proper recourse for complainant. 108 The proper action for
her was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to rectify the purported error"109 in the court proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should be held administratively liable.
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should be held administratively liable for their
actions. The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a trial court judges since an investigating justice
personally assessed the witnesses credibility.110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,111 this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated,
and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial
court or appellate courts findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding
of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.112 (Citations omitted)
These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainants testimony and relying on the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubias witness, Justice Gaerlan
said:
While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on all material points, complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating
Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondents witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright
narration of facts credible and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was
just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not
[take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.
Not only that. Cortez[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of evidence, such as the Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary Club of Makati
Southwest which tend to prove that at that particular date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaa. These evidence, when taken
together, debase the uncorroborated version of incident as narrated by Barias. Barias[] self-serving declarations have no evidentiary value when ranged against the testimony of a
credible witness on affirmative matters.113 (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlans assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their testimonies.
Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a
"disinterested" witness.
A disinterested witness testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the outcome of the case. This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness
testimony more believable. To actively take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings.
The disinterested witness candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and believability to the content of his or her testimony.
To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that surround his or her testimony.
The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel in 1989. 114 He was appointed Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was a former
President and remains an active member.115
The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of the organization that the witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would
be a definite blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty of the offenses that complainant imputed upon
respondent Judge Rubia. The possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his loyalty to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the
characterization that he is disinterested. The substance of Rodels narration of events should also be scrutinized.
Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecaa, and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation report
of Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was complainants judicial affidavit establishing the date of the
dinner as March 3, 2010 in Caf Juanita. 116 Complainant also alleged in her complaint that respondent Judge Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary Club of
Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.117
The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaa took
place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on
their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by
complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged chance meeting
between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity of complainants allegations. Both
the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed
respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet 118 and the program of meeting that Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance
sheet and on the program of meeting was March 10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither
was there an indication of the time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of
Rodels testimony, do not discount the distinct and tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the other hand, we find the allegation
that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March 2010. 119 She identified her cellular phone number 120 as well as respondent
Pecaas.121 Respondent Pecaa admitted that the number identified by complainant was her number. 122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaas
number.123 Respondent Pecaa admitted that she had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City. 124 However, no calls to respondent
Pecaa were recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document presented. 125 On the other hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaa as shown in the document coincided with
complainants allegations.
Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he would testify for himself and present respondent Pecaa as witness. 126 He did not
manifest that he would be presenting Rodel or any participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and Rodels narration of events.
The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that
respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to
respondents claims. They only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.
This court has held:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondents malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and respondent,
the Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating
Judge.127 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainants narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The
conversation alleged by complainant that took place with respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainants allegations was the exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent Pecaa regarding the dinner
meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaa. 128 However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not
included in his investigation report.129
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaa belied respondents claim that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kngmkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)130(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Pecaa used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a meeting." "Mkpg kta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecaas text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after
complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of the
possibility of administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting. However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant,
this would have logically led to a hostile reaction from respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.

In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaa gave the following testimony:
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you received a text coming from Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of
that meeting, isnt it?
EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March 2010, isnt it?
EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this is: ["]ha anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another message
says "bakit siya...another...did you do something to pacify her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]? EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?
EILEEN PECAA:
I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the context of these messages?
EILEEN PECAA:
Alin po doon?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"
EILEEN PECAA:
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"
EILEEN PECAA:
The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative case is filed against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and
promotion chances we will be disqualified.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative case because you simply thought that it was a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
Ano po sir?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to explain?
....
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
No more, sir.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad becauseit was only a chance meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131
Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent Pecaa, while having dinner with complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet
respondent Judge Rubia on the side street of Burgos Circle. Since complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaa out of the restaurant, the latter introduced complainant to
respondent Judge Rubia.
This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:
1. Respondent Pecaa described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman po masyado. My dealing with the Judge is only in relation with my work because during
flag ceremonies he always reminds us not to act as go between or not to be involved in the cases filed in the court." 132
2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaa as the latter is in the Office of the Clerk of Court.
3. Respondent Pecaa was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a pending case before respondent Judge Rubia.
4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with litigants.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaa to go out of her way to greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees
should not have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaa should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.
The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaa would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons
may take place, but a chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is
outside the realm of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer improbability of such an occurrence already puts into question
the truth of respondents allegations.
Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be afforded greater evidentiary weight.
Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month
delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think about before
filing an administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative complaint
has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late husbands estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the
proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the
interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that
could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and
court personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v.
Judge Santos,133 this court held that:
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed
only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard
the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the
bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath.134 (Emphasis supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot
prejudice the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of
complainants allegations. This courts mandate to discipline members of the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined
based on whether their actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. 135 Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel 136 and are appointed in
accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a period within
which a complaint must be filed after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of erring members of the judiciary and its
employees. The gravity of an administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed. The
commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to
the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.
Respondent Pecaas actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality." 137
The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent
Judge Rubia. Because of respondents actions, complainant and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For
this alone, respondents should be held administratively liable.
For respondent Pecaa, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaa should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in
the judiciary. Respondent Pecaa should have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of extended communication with
complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecaa makes her
culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaa admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the formers knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in
addition to the text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of
complainants attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaa failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising
complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaa violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
....
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their
official acts or duties.
....
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory
and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaas actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v.
Orpiano:138
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for and
trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness. 139
Respondent Pecaa should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaas actions
by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive
Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna. 140 As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct
supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaa even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his
jurisdiction as Executive Judge.141 However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaas interactions with a
litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable. Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with
complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubias mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative
liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion
and beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions
and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and
outside the courtroom is always under constant observation. 143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office.
By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaa for her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law,
free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become
aware.
In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,144 this court explained the necessity of a judges integrity:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived
by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior
both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin,
Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people
in the administration of justice.145
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr.,146 this court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judges official life can not
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should
be above suspicion.147 (Citations omitted)
In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:
. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a
partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct
contact with the litigating parties.
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.148 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated that even if respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting, it was merely
an attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an extrajudicial solution.149
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubias meeting an
opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubias actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.
As to complainants questioning of respondent Judge Rubias actions in the issuance of the orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that
complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not negate the administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure
complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 150 Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality:
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court held:
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice. Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes
upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at
all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of conduct of the saints and
martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Whether or not he purposely went to the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet complainant
or only had a chance meeting with him, his act of trying to convince complainant to agree to his proposal is an act of impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to
suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not
only must a judge render a just decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in
the instant case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal
virtue, it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of impartiality or the mere appearance of bias would cause resentment if the party who refused the judge's proposal subsequently
lost his case. It would give rise to suspicion that the judgment was "fixed" beforehand. Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public contempt,
disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent violated Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His misconduct is not excused but rather made more
glaring by the fact that the controversy involving complainant was pending in his own sala.152 (Citations omitted)
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and impartiality essential to a judge.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen 153 that: Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of
the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
....
A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching
public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system. 154
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have
relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.
Respondent Judge Rubias actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the
requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In
effect, both respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." 155 In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, 156 this court held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as wrong or
improper conduct and gross has been held to mean flagrant; shameful. . . . This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment."157
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the
proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents must be
sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the courts mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in society. WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a
regular administrative matter. Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned or -controlled corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaa is SUSPENDED
for one (1) year for gross misconduct. This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his
office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personal records of respondents.
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.1

Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision 3 and the August 8, 2007
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an Administrative Complaint 5 against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct.

Factual Antecedents

Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a 601-square meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion,
Maramag, Bukidnon.6 The said property, which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15,
1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of P2,355,000.00.7Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in PNBs name, which was
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999.8 The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.9

In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as counsel
de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property. 10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted to
reacquire11 the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it.12 Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell
him the 331-square meter portion of the property, where one of the buildings is located, for P5 million.13

On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to inquire about the status of the property. 14 They were informed by the bank that the property could
be purchased at the fair market value of P2,938,000.00.15 The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a down payment
of P587,600.0016 or 20% of the purchase price.17

On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. 18 The
bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the banks total claim19 to formalize their offer.20

On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB.21

On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of PNB.22

On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay23 since spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.24

G.R. No. 179914

On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession 25 before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No.
375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.

On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order26 granting the Petition and, on June27, 2005, he issued a Writ of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28

On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garays offer to purchase the property had been approved due to their failure to pay the full down payment. 29

On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration 30 of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, 31 who was the former counsel of Hilly, was
barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order33 holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, a portion of which reads:

Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a mandatory and ministerial duty under Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if
the implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession would work [great] injustice to the registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel
for the Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in manipulating that the property in question was finally bought by him from
the PNB not to mention the possible violation of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty.
Garay [the opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2, 2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be
accommodated in the morning[,] it will proceed in the afternoon.

Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.

In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C. Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of
Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of the property, if already implemented and enforced.

SO ORDERED.34

Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction 35 under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for Certiorari for several procedural defects.37However, on reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the Petition.39

On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution40 granting the PNB and Atty. Garays application for a TRO. Thus:

Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso ( P5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering,
[petitioners] to:

1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to, or alters the nature and condition of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;

3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have already received to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region,
Malaybalay City; and

Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the disputed property to the said Clerk of Court.

SO ORDERED.41

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision 42 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession.43 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.44

Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in its August 8, 2007 Resolution.46

Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that:

THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT. 47

Spouses Sombilons Arguments

Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Order.48

They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed a Motion to Recall Order with the RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier
filed with the CA.49

As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession
because PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply for a Writ of Possession considering that the subject property had already been sold to Atty. Garay, 50 who they claim is
also not entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph 5,

Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51

Atty. Garays and PNBs Arguments

Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the
Writ of Possession without notice to him and PNB. 52 He also emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has
lapsed.53

PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the Writ of Possession. 54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, which he had earlier issued.55

PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon. 56 In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the Civil Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon. 57

Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed
with as the issue involved is purely one of law, which is an exception under prevailing jurisprudence.58

Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time considering that Judge Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording PNB the opportunity to be heard.59

Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute another action simultaneously with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA. 60

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint 61 against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he
proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilons motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case No. 375-05.

Atty. Garays Arguments

Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier issued 62 and for ignoring Sections
4,63 5,64 and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.66

Judge Venadas, Sr.s Arguments

In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to
prevent any injustice.67 He insists there was no violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence.68

Report and Recommendation of the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure. 70 Although the OCA did not touch
on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending with
the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective
motion filed by spouses Sombilon.71 It also pointed out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no proper notice was sent to them. 72 Thus, the OCA
recommended that:

a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint;

b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure; and

c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ( P20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will be dealt
with more severely.73

On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.74

Issues

Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ
of Possession; and (2) whether he should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5,
and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

G.R. No. 179914

The issuance of a writ of possession is

ministerial upon the court.

A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property. 75 During the one-year redemption period,
the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond. 76 But after the one-year period, the
purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. 77 And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court. 78 Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment
of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.79 The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.80

In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property had already been
consolidated in PNBs name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.

Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, 81 we find none of these recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses
Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged invalidity of
the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNBs right to possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for
Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to the availment of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due process,82 such as in the instant case.

All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay
of their right to due process.

To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to
receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge
Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law, 83which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.84

Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge
Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is hereby fined the amount of P20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution
in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but withheld the amount of P100,000.00 pending the final resolution of
this case. In view thereof, the fine of P20,000.00 herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN
are hereby AFFIRMED.

In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS ( P20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld amount
of P100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.

SO ORDERED.