U.S.

Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board ofImmigration Appeals

Office of the Clerk

5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000

Falls Church, Vtrgmia 22041

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Margaret W. Wong, Esq. OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel CLE
3150 Chester Avenue 925 Keynote Circle, Room 201
Cleveland, OH 44114 Brooklyn Heights, OH 44131

Name: S , D A -230

Date of this notice: 4/26/2017

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.

Sincerely,

Cynthia L. Crosby
Acting Chief Clerk

Enclosure

Panel Members:
Creppy, Michael J.
Liebowitz, Ellen C
Mullane, Hugh G.

Userteam: Docket

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

www.irac.net/unpublished/index/

Cite as: S-D-, AXXX XXX 230 (BIA April 26, 2017)
 ' '
..

l'.J.S. Department of Justice Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: 230 - Cleveland, OH Date:

APR 2 6 2017
In re: S D a.k.a.

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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Margaret W. Wong, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF OHS: Kaitlin A. DeStigter

Assistant Legal Advisor

CHARGE:

Notice: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)] -

Convicted of aggravated felony

APPLICATION: Termination; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture

The respondent, a native and citizen of India, who was admitted to the United States as an
immigrant in 1976, appeals from an Immigration Judge's decision dated June 26, 2015, denying
his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture ("CAT''). See section 24l(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("Act"),
8 U.S.C. 123l(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c). The respondent also argues that he is no
longer removable as charged. The appeal will be sustained and the proceedings will be
terminated.

We review findings of fact determined by an Immigration Judge, including credibility

findings, under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i). We review questio
of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals from decisions of Immigration
Judges de novo. 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).

On appeal, the respondent argues that, based on recent case law, his 1999 conviction for
grand theft by embezzlement in violation of Cal. Penal Code 487 is not for an aggravated
felony and he is no longer removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). He further argues that he has demonstrated his eligibility for withholding of
removal and protection under the CAT. The respondent was first found removable for having
been convicted of an aggravated felony in an Immigration Judge's decision dated March l, 2001.
This Board summarily affirmed this decision on June 22, 2001, and denied the respondent's
motion to reconsider whether his crime was an aggravated felony in a decision dated

1 The respondent's name appears throughout the record with Srinivasan as his family name. Our
heading reflects the name as it appears on the Notice to Appear (Exh. 1).

Cite as: S-D-, AXXX XXX 230 (BIA April 26, 2017)
 230

September 19, 2001. A California Federal District Court granted the respondent's habeas
petition to allow him to apply for relief, but on December 12, 2004, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision. Srinivasan v. Fasano, 68 F. App'x. 127 (9th
Cir. 2003). On June 2, 2005, we remanded the record to the Immigration Judge for further fact
finding and for the respondent to apply for relief. At the remanded hearing, the respondent
indicated that the only relief for which he was applying was withholding of removal and

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protection under the CAT (Tr. at 8-9). He conceded that he had been convicted of an aggravated
felony at hearings held in both 2011 and 2015 (Tr. at 22, 29, 107). In her June 26, 2015, decision
the Immigration Judge found the respondent removable as charged and ineligible for relief from
removal.

We first address the status of the respondent's conviction for grand theft by embezzlement
under Cal. Penal Code 487, as an aggravated felony. 2 Although the respondent conceded his
conviction was for an aggravated felony theft crime under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, there
has significant intervening precedent. In particular, in Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863
(9th Cir. 2015), the court found that Cal. Penal Code 484, which defines theft for purposes of
Cal. Penal Code 487, is overbroad as it includes crimes that are and are not theft crimes for
aggravated felony purposes. Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, supra, at 868-70. The court further found
that the statute is not divisible, as it lists various means of committing the crime, but not different
elements. Id. Also, since the time of the respondent's concessions and earlier decisions in this
case, the Supreme Court has provided additional guidance on what constitutes a divisible statute.
See Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). Based on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit,
we agree the statute is overbroad and not divisible. Therefore the crime cannot be found to be an
aggravated felony and the proceedings will be terminated.

The respondent was convicted of grand theft by embezzlement under Cal. Penal Code 487,
which provides:

Grand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases:(a) When the money,
labor, or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding nine hundred fifty
dollars ($950), except as provided in subdivision (b).

Cal. Penal Code 487 (1999).

Cal. Penal Code 484, defining theft provides:

(a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the
personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property
which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly,
by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of
money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to

2 On November 22, 2016, we requested supplemental briefing on this issue and both parties have
responded.

2
Cite as: S-D-, AXXX XXX 230 (BIA April 26, 2017)
 230

report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing
upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains
possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is
guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes
of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in
determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If

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there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered
shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent
representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any
money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint,
information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date
during the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee or
employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due and unpaid
and every judgment that the employer has been unable to meet shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to defraud

Cal. Penal Code 484 (1999).

In Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that Cal. Penal Code 484
includes both crimes that are aggravated felony theft crimes under a generic definition of
theft and those that are not. For example, the court noted the California statute criminalizes
theft of labor and services, as well as theft by false pretenses, which do not meet the generic
definition. Id at 868. Generic theft is generally considered to require: 1) a taking of property
or an exercise of control over property; 2) without consent; and 3) with the criminal intent
to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if less than total or permanent.
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815, 820 (2007); Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N
Dec. 436, 438 (BIA 2008). The Ninth Circuit further observed that although the statute
provides various means of committing theft, it is not divisible into various elements. Lopez
Valencia v. Lynch, supra, at 869. The respondent argues that this assessment should control the
outcome of his case.

While the Department of Homeland Security ("OHS") does not argue the statute is not
divisible, it notes that this case arises within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
and we are not bound by the precedent decision Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, supra, concerning the
breadth of the statute. It further argues that the Board has been using too broad a definition of
"consent" in our interpretation of theft and that under a more modem and appropriate definition
of theft all of the acts listed in Cal. Penal Code 484 are theft crimes.

The Board has held that a fraud crime is distinguishable from a theft crime. Matter of
Garcia-Madgruda, supra. We found that, while both crimes require the taking of property with
the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, theft requires the lack of
consent on the part of the victim. Id at 438. The OHS argues that we should define consent
more narrowly to include only "knowing and voluntary consent" (OHS Supp. Br. at 15), as,
under this definition, fraud crimes would be considered theft. In support of its argument, the
OHS discusses the history of theft at common law and, in particular, notes that, in 1927,
California joined other states in combining crimes such as larceny, false pretenses and

Cite as: S-D-, AXXX XXX 230 (BIA April 26, 2017)
 230

embezzlement into the theft definition (DHS Supp. Br. at 11-12). The OHS notes that these
changes are also part of the Model Penal Code (Id. at 12-13) and that without limiting the
definition of consent to include only knowing and voluntary consent, many state theft crimes
would not be considered aggravated felonies under section l0l(a)(43)(G) of the Act.

While we share the DHS's concerns regarding the possible limiting of the application of the

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aggravated felony definition after Mathis, supra, this and the other arguments raised do not
provide a sufficient basis to follow or otherwise withdraw from our previous holdings both
requiring consent and defining it within the generic definition of theft used for section
10l(a)(43)(G) of the Act. In Matter of Garcia-Madruga, supra, we listed cases from
almost every circuit that finding a lack of consent as a requirement for a theft crime, as did the
Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, supra, at 189. Matter of Garcia-Madruga,
supra, at 438-39. We further reiterated that the difference between fraud and theft crimes is that
theft crimes involve a lack of consent and fraud crimes do not. Id. at 439-40 (holding section
10l(a)(43)(G) (theft) and 10l(a)(43)(M)(i) (fraud) of the Act are distinct crimes). In Matter of
Cardiel, 25 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 2009), we did hold that consent under extreme duress, as in cases
of extortion, does not constitute consent as considered under the definition of theft. Id at 20-21;
see also Matter of Ibarra, 26 I&N Dec. 809 (BIA 2016) (a theft offense, which requires the
taking of property "without consent" includes extortionate takings, in which consent is coerced
by the wrongful use of force, fear or threats). However, we noted that, due to this duress, the use
of the term consent in the laws of extortion "does not connote voluntary or elective conferral of
property." Id. at 20. In cases of fraud or embezzlement, the transfer of the property is with
consent. Matter ofGarcia-Madgruda, supra. With the exception of the need for a lack of duress
discussed in Matter of Cardiel, supra, we decline narrowing the definition of consent any
further.

As we continue to apply these precedent decisions and, in line with their interpretation of
theft, we agree with the Ninth Circuit, that Cal. Penal Code 484 is overbroad, such that it can
be violated both by crimes that are considered theft and those that are not.3 Furthermore, the
statute is not divisible as it defines various means by which theft can be committed, but does not
provide separate elements that must be found by a jury. See Mathis, supra; Descamps, supra;
Lopez-Valencia, supra, at 869, citing, inter a/ia, People v. Nor Woods, 223 P.2d 897, 898
(Ca. 1951) (determination of which "pidgeonhole" the theft crime fell into is not material to
jury). Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

3 The OHS further argues that the taking of intangible items, like labor or services, included
under the California law, should also be considered theft under the generic definition. See
Lopez-Valencia, supra, at 868. As we find Cal Penal Code 484 overbroad concerning the
consent issue discussed above, we need not address this issue at this time. See INS
v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1976) (as a general rule, courts and agencies are not
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the result they reach).

Cite as: S-D-, AXXX XXX 230 (BIA April 26, 2017)
 230

0RDER: The appeal is sustained and the proceedings are tenninated.

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Board Member Hugh G. Mullane dissents without opinion.

Cite as: S-D-, AXXX XXX 230 (BIA April 26, 2017)
 (

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
IMMIGRATION COURT
801 W. SUPERIOR AVE, STE13-100
CLEVELAND, OH 44113

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BRATTON, SCOTT E.
3150 CHESTER AVE.
CLEVELAND, OH 44114

IN THE MATTER OF FILE A -230 DATE: Jun 26, 2015

S , D
P77663

UNABLE TO FORWARD - NO ADDRESS PROVIDED

{ .ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE. THIS DECISION

"\"rs FINAL UNLESS AN APPEAL IS FILED WITH THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE MAILING OF THIS WRITTEN DECISION.
SEE THE ENCLOSED FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPERLY PREPARING YOUR APPEAL.
YOUR NOTICE OF APPEAL, ATTACHED DOCUMENTS, AND FEE OR FEE WAIVER REQUEST
MUST BE MAILED TO: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
FALLS CHURCH, VA 20530

ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE AS THE RESULT

OF YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT YOUR SCHEDULED DEPORTATION OR REMOVAL HEARING.
THIS DECISION IS FINAL UNLESS A MOTION TO REOPEN IS FILED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 24 2B( c)(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 8 U'. S. C.
SECTION 1452B(c)(3) IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS OR SECTION 240(c)(6),
8 U.S.C. SECTION 1229a(c)(6) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS. IF YOU FILE A MOTION
TO REOPEN, YOUR MOTION MUST BE FILED WITH THIS COURT:

IMMIGRATION COURT
801 W. SUPERIOR AVE, STE13-100
CLEVELAND, OH 44113

OTHER:

IMMIGRATION COURT FF
CC: Tripi, Esq., Michael
1240 East Ninth St., Ste 519
Cleveland, OH, 44199
 -.

IMMIGRATION COJR
801 W. SUPERIOR AVE, STE13-100
CLEVELA...D, OH 44113
In the Matte of

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J
' Case No.: A -230
S , D
Respondent IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

,,
_,
ORDER OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

This is a summary of the (Z:CZr'l decision entered on & ?i- (-

This memorandum is solely for the convenience of the pa ties. If the
proceedings should be appealed or reopened, the oral decision will become
the official opinion in the case.
['ill The respondent was ordered removed from the United States to
I' INDIA or in the alternative to .
Respondent's application for volutary departure was denied and
resp9ndent was ordered removed to INDIA or in the
alternative to .
Respondent's application for voluntary departure was granted until
upon posting a bond in the amount of $
with an alternate order of removal to INDIA.
Respondent's.application for:
[ ] Asylum was ( )granted )denied( )withdlawn.
[)<l Withholding of removal was ( )granted ( )()denied ( )withdrawn.
[ J A Waivr under Section was ( )granted ( )denied ( )withdrawn.
( ) Cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) was ( )granted ( )denied
( )withdrawn.
Respondentsiapplication for ;
[ J Cancellation under section 240A(b) (1) was ( ) granted ) denied
( ) w1thdrawn. If granted, it is ordered that: the respo11dent be issued
all appropriate documents necessary ta give effect to this order.
Cancellation under section 240A(b) (2) was ( )granted ( )denied
( )withdrawn. If granted it is ordered that the respondent be issued
all apropriated documents necessary to give effect to this order.
Adjustment of Status under Section was ( )granted ( )denied
( )withdrawn. If granted it is ordered that the respondent be issued
all appropriated documents necessary to give effect to this order.
C'f. l Respondent's application of (Y ) withho:ding of removal ( ) deferral of
removal under Article III of the Convention Against Torture was
( ) granted (\/) denied ( : withdrawn.
l Respondent's st ltus was rescinded uder section 246.
1 Respondent is admited to the United States as a until
1 As a condition of admission, respondenl is to pos ---i;ond,
J Respondent knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application after proper
notice.
Respondent was advised of the limitation on discretionary relief for
failure to appear as ordered in the Ir:unigration Judge's oral decision.
Proceedings were terminated.
Other:
Date: !Ap l11 Qi --- - -- '

--,
L!SON M. BROWN
Inunigratio Judge
Appea (
Waive peal Duo By:

t/77f<i