Level III - Ata 27 Flight Controls

A380
TECHNICAL TRAINING MANUAL

MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric)
LEVEL III - ATA 27 Flight Controls
This document must be used for training purposes only
Under no circumstances should this document be used as a reference
It will not be updated.
All rights reserved

No part of this manual may be reproduced in any form,
by photostat, microfilm, retrieval system, or any other means,
without the prior written permission of AIRBUS S.A.S.
A380 TECHNICAL TRAINING MANUAL
LEVEL III - ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS

Theory System
Primary Flight Controls
Primary Flight Controls: Controls Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
PRIM FLT CTLs: Computation & Indicating Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . .20
PRIM FLT CTLs: Conventional Servocontrols Des (3) . . . . . . . . . . .26
PRIM FLT CTLs: Electro-Hydrostatic ACTR Desc (3) . . . . . . . . . . .48
PRIM FLT CTLs: Elec. Backup Hyd. ACTR Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . . .58
Primary Flight Controls: THS Actuator Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
Primary Flight Controls: Fly By Wire Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
PRIM FLT CTLs: Electrical Backup System Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . .132
Primary Flight Controls Maintenance (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152
PRIM FLT CTLs Operation, Control & Indicating (3) . . . . . . . . . .168
Secondary Flight Controls
SEC FLT CTLs: Controls, Computation, Ind Desc (3) . . . . . . . . . .290
Secondary Flight Controls: System Description (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . .300
SEC FLT CTLs: Slat & Droop Nose Act & TX Desc (3) . . . . . . . .320
SEC FLT CTLs: Flap Actuation & TX Desc. (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .338
Secondary Flight Controls Maintenance (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358
SEC FLT CTLs Operation, Control & Indicating (3) . . . . . . . . . . . .370
Flight Controls Component Location (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406
AIRBUS Documentation-Complementary Info.
Documentation-Complementary Information (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .408
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) TABLE OF CONTENTS Apr 21, 2006
LEVEL III - ATA 27 Flight Controls Page 1
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

General
This module shows the various controls located inside the cockpit. Also,
it shows the other inputs belonging to the primary flight controls.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
GENERAL

Side Sticks
The main functions of the side sticks are to:
- transmit to the flight control computers and to the backup control module
the lateral and longitudinal manual control orders,
- generate spring loads to neutral position and artificial feel in function
of the handgrip position,
- hold the handgrip in neutral position when the auto-pilot (AP) mode is
engaged,
- generate resisting torque according to hand grip movement speed,
- do the AP instinctive disconnects and priority take-over via the
pushbutton dedicated to it,
- do the connection for radio transmissions (ATA 23, not describe).
The Line and Replaceable Units (LRUs) of the side sticks are:
- the side stick assembly,
- the side stick handgrip,
- the side stick bellows,
- the roll Side Stick Transducer and Damper Unit (SSTDU),
- the pitch SSTDU and,
- the solenoid.
The roll and pitch SSTDUs send to the computers the positions of the
side stick given by the pilots.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
Each SSTDU has 14 potentiometers. They transmit analogical signals to

all computers and the backup control module as well.
On the top of the side stick handgrip, there is the AP disconnect and
takeover priority pushbutton switch.
The pilot presses this button when he wants to disconnect the AP or when
he wants to take the priority.
Solenoid on each side stick locks side stick in AP mode.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
SIDE STICKS

Rudder Pedals
The main function of the rudder pedals is to give to the computers pure
yaw order given by the pilots in manual mode.
The two rudder pedal assemblies are interconnected by mechanical
components (arms, bell cranks, interconnection rod...).
The rudder pedals are connected to:
- the pedal feel and trim unit,
- the pedal damper and friction unit,
- 2 pedal transducer units,
The LRUs of the rudder pedals are:
- the rudder pedals assembly,
- the pedal sets,
- the pedal feel and trim unit,
- the pedal damper and friction unit and,
- the 2 transducer units,
The pedal feel and trim unit has three functions:
- the pedal artificial feel in manual or AP modes,
- the pedal trim and,
- the pedal position transmission used for rudder control.
The three functions are going to be detailed in another module.
The pedal feel and trim unit are connected to the computers by means of
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
analogical signals.
The PRIMs controlled the solenoid to create forces in the AP mode. These
forces generated are higher to avoid spurious commands at the rudder
pedals. If necessary, autopilot disengagement is allowed by the flight
crew.
The pedal feel and damper unit generates a constant friction torque to
prevent unwanted rudder pedal movement due to unbalanced weight
which can occur in case of disconnection between the pedals and the
pedal feel and trim unit.
Also, it generates a resisting torque, function of the pedal input speed, to
improve pilots feel.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
RUDDER PEDALS

Speedbrake/Ground Spoiler Lever
The speedbrake/ground spoiler lever has two functions.
The first function is the speedbrake function. According to the lever
position, the potentiometers send analogical signals to the PRIMs
according to the lever position. The deflection of the spoilers is not
proportional to the lever position.
The second function is the ground spoiler function. When the pilot pulls
up the lever, the potentiometers measure a negative lever movement,
which is sent to the PRIMs.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
SPEEDBRAKE/GROUND SPOILER LEVER

Pitch Trim Control Switches/Rudder Trim Control Panel
The pitch trim control switches and the rudder trim control panel are
belonging to the same panel. This panel is an Integrated Control Panel
(ICP) called 1115 VU.
Pitch Trim Control Switches
The function of the pitch trim control switches is to send to the
computers the pilot commands in manual mode.
When the AUTOMATIC MODE is available, these switches are
inhibited.
Note that, the backup control module is connected to the pitch trim
control switches.
Rudder Trim Control Panel
The rudder trim control panel is connected to the SEC 1 and 3.
It has the following functions:
- send trim motor control orders given by the rudder trim control
switch,
- send trim reset orders given by the reset pushbutton switch and,
- indicate the pedal trim position by means of the digital indicator.
The rudder trim function will be explained in another module.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
PITCH TRIM CONTROL SWITCHES/RUDDER TRIM CONTROL PANEL - PITCH TRIM CONTROL SWITCHES & RUDDER TRIM CONTROL
PANEL

FAULT/RESET Pushbutton Switches
The fault/reset pushbutton switches are installed on two ICPs.
The push buttons related to PRIM 1, 2, 3 and SEC 1, 2, 3 are two position
switches. These pushbutton switches are guarded to prevent spurious
action.
They are used for:
- computer engagement (push-button switches pushed, OFF and FAULT
legends off),
- failure indication (push-button switch pushed, FAULT legend on),
- computer reset,
- computer neutralization (pushbutton switch released, OFF legend on).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
FAULT/RESET PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES

Other Inputs
In addition to the controls located inside the cockpit, the primary flight
controls need other inputs.
Accelerometer Units
The accelerometer units measure acceleration rates and give analogical
signals to the PRIMs.
This information is used for the computation of the flight control laws.
There are 14 accelerometer units installed on the aircraft.
There are 4 accelerometer units to give vertical acceleration rates (NZ)
to the PRIMs for the NZ law computation.
4 others give lateral acceleration rates (NY) to the PRIMs for the
lateral law computation.
These 8 accelerometer units are installed in the center fuselage, in the
forward cargo, in pressurized area.
There are 6 accelerometer units installed in the outboard pylons, and
in unpressurized area. They give to the PRIMs vertical acceleration
rates (NZ LAF) for the Load Alleviation Function.
Rate Gyrometer Units
The 6 rate gyrometer units measure angular speeds and give digital
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
signals to the PRIMs by ARINC 429.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
OTHER INPUTS - ACCELEROMETER UNITS & RATE GYROMETER UNITS

Other Inputs (continued)
Elevator and Rudder Transducer Units
The transducer units are installed on each elevator and each rudder
surfaces.
They give an analogical signal, function of the surfaces deflection, to
all flight control computers, excepted to the backup control module.
This information is used for the computation of the flight control laws.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
OTHER INPUTS - ELEVATOR AND RUDDER TRANSDUCER UNITS

Other Inputs (continued)
Hydraulic Pressure Switches and Transmitters
Three hydraulic pressure switches and one hydraulic pressure
transmitter are installed on each manifold HP of each hydraulic circuit.
The hydraulic pressure switches send to the computers the status of
the hydraulic circuit by discrete signals.
The hydraulic pressure transmitters send hydraulic pressure values
by analogical signals to the computers.
The data are used in the reconfiguration on different surfaces if there
is a loss of one or two hydraulic circuits.
Note that, the backup control module does not receive the hydraulic
pressure by the switches or transmitters.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D1CTL000001
OTHER INPUTS - HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SWITCHES AND TRANSMITTERS
PRIM FLT CTLS: COMPUTATION & INDICATING DESC. (3)

General
This module shows the computer design of the primary flight controls
(excepted the backup control module), and the interface with the
indicating systems.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D2CPTIND001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIM FLT CTLS: COMPUTATION & INDICATING DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
GENERAL

Computer Design
This topic shows the computer design for the PRIMs and SECs.
A PRIM is made of two Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) called Flight
Control and Guidance Units (FCGUs).
So, PRIM 1 consists of FCGU 1A + 1B.
Each SEC is a LRU.
PRIMs and SECs have two channels "A" and "B".
Each channel can be:
- COMmand (COM) or,
- MONitoring (MON).
For example, for a servocontrol "X", the COM is done by the channel
"A" while the MON is done by the channel "B".
For a servocontrol "Y", the COM is done by the channel "B" and the
MON is done by the channel "A".
The COM channel generates the signal (OUTPUT) and valid the data by
a switching device. This signal goes through the MON channel.
If the MON channel agrees with the computed data, the MON closed the
switching device, then the servocontrol receives the signal.
The two channels receive the feedback signal (INPUT).
The COM channel mainly calculates the deflection orders from the orders
it receives and does the servoing of the servocontrols.
The MON channel mainly checks that the orders are correctly executed.
The COM/MON architecture avoids erroneous data generation. When a
discrepancy is detected between COM and MON, the computer is
deactivated.
COMPUTER DESIGN

These data are used to:
Indicating Interfaces - generate alert annunciation of the flight control failures (aural and
visual warnings) and,
- the CDS.
- define the flight control status.
- the side sticks priority lights and,
The warning messages of the flight control system are displayed on
- the fault/reset pushbutton switches.
the EWD.
FAULT/RESET Pushbutton Switches
Each PRIM and each SEC when faulty sends to its related pushbuttons
a fault signal, the legend in amber "FAULT" is displayed on the
pushbutton.
Side Stick Priority Lights
One side stick priority light is installed in front of each crewmember
on the glare shield.
Each FCDC sends two discrete signals to control the priority lights.
CDS Interfaces
Each PRIM and each SEC is connected to the two FCDCs through
the ADCN network.
The PRIMs communicate directly with the CDS.
The FCDCs communicate with the CDS as well.
The SEC does not communicate with the CDS.
The PRIMs and SECs send to the FCDCs the F/CTL data.
With these data, the FCDC communicate with the CDS for F/CTL
page elaboration of the SD.
The interfaces from the FCDCs to the PFDs lets to:
- display the side stick position,
- display the THS and spoiler position on the lower part,
- display the F/CTL messages and warning,
The PRIMs send directly data to the CDS. They send the estimated
and target sideslips, displayed on PFDs.
The FCDCs send data to the Flight Warning System Application. This
application is hosted in the CPIOM-C1 and C2.
The communication between them is done via ADCN network.
INDICATING INTERFACES - FAULT/RESET PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES ... CDS INTERFACES
PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

General
The conventional servocontrols are installed on the ailerons, the elevators
and on some spoilers (1,2,3,4,7,8).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
GENERAL

Aileron And Elevator Conventional Servocontrols: LRUs and
Main Components
The conventional servocontrols of the ailerons and elevators have the
same main components.
These main components are:
- HP inlet and LP outlet ports,
- electrical connectors,
- an accumulator,
- a mode LVT and,
- a servovalve spool LVT (only for the elevator servocontrols).
- a HP filter
- a mode solenoid valve
- a ServoValve (SV).
These components are Line Replaceable Units (LRUs):
- the HP filter,
- the mode solenoid valve and,
- the servovalve.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Aileron and Elevator Conventional Servocontrols: Mode and
Operation
The aim of this topic is to show the impact of a LRU replacement inside
the servocontrol.
Here, you can see the LRUs location and the LRUs function linked to
the various modes.
Each conventional servocontrol of the ailerons and elevators has two
main operating modes. There are:
- the ACTIVE MODE, which actuates the surface according to the
electrical orders sent by the flight control computers,
- the DAMPING MODE, which prevents the appearance of fluttering on
the surface.
The HP filter is connected after the HP port to avoid fluid pollution inside
the servocontrol.
The mode solenoid valve lets select the ACTIVE MODE or the
DAMPING MODE.
The servovalve is used for the control of the hydraulic flow inside the
chambers for a rod retraction or extension.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS: MODE AND OPERATION

Operation (continued)
ACTIVE MODE
The HP hydraulic circuit supplies the servocontrol through the HP
filter and maintains the HP maintaining valve opened.
The LP maintaining valve keeps a pressure inside the servocontrol
return line higher than inside the LP hydraulic circuit; the accumulator
is permanently connected to SV return port (R), thus, it enables the
accumulator filling.
The flight control computer sends a discrete signal to the mode
solenoid valve, then, the mode valve is positioned in the ACTIVE
MODE. The mode LVT provides to the computer an electrical signal
representative of the mode valve position.
Proportionally to an electrical order from the computer (rate
command), the SV controls the hydraulic flow (so the rod speed of
the actuator), connecting either the pressure port (P) with U2 and the
return port (R) with U1 for a rod extension (or either P with U1 and
R with U2 for a rod retraction).
The feedback LVDT gives to the computer a feedback of the rod
position for the "inner" control loop.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
For the elevator conventional servocontrols, the flight control

computers receive two more data than for the aileron conventional
servocontrols.
There are:
- the spool servovalve position and,
- the surface position.
The spool servovalve position is sent by the servovalve LVT.
The surface position is sent by the surface RVDT installed on the
aircraft structure.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS: MODE AND OPERATION - ACTIVE MODE

DAMPING MODE (Hydraulic Circuit Loss)
In case of a hydraulic loss, the servocontrol switches from the ACTIVE
MODE to the DAMPING MODE.
The computer no longer controls and monitors the servocontrol.
The HP maintaining valve is closed under its spring load effect, and
so isolates the servocontrol from the HP hydraulic circuit.
return line higher than inside the LP hydraulic circuit.
The computer no longer sends an electrical order to the mode solenoid
valve, so the mode valve is positioned in the DAMPING MODE under
its spring load effect.
The chamber CA and CB are connected through mode valve and
through the damping restrictor.
The accumulator compensates fluid volume variations inside the
chambers due to the temperature variation. The anti-cavitation valves
operate to enable the fluid transfer between the accumulator and the
chambers when the fluid volume inside them decreases.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS: MODE AND OPERATION - DAMPING MODE (HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT
LOSS)

Spoiler Conventional Servocontrol: LRUs and Main
Components
The main components of the spoiler conventional servocontrol are:
- Electrical connectors,
- Maintenance device,
- HP filter,
- Servovalve.
The only LRUs of this servocontrol are the HP filter and the servovalve.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Spoiler Conventional Servocontrol: Mode and Operation
the servocontrol.
Here, you can see the LRU location and the LRU function linked to the
various modes.
Each conventional servocontrol of the spoilers has four main operating
modes. There are:
- the HYDRAULIC MODE,
- the RETRACTED MODE,
- the BLOCKING MODE and,
- the MAINTENANCE MODE.
The HYDRAULIC MODE enables the spoiler to be actuated according
to the electrical orders sent by the flight control computers.
The RETRACTED MODE enables the spoiler to be retracted
automatically to its zero position in case of rate command failure.
The BLOCKING MODE avoids the spoiler to be extended.
The MAINTENANCE MODE, the unit includes a manually mechanical
device to enable the surfaces to be manually moved on ground for
maintenance purposes, with no danger for the ground staff.
the servocontrol.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
The Servovalve enables to control the hydraulic flow inside the chambers
for a rod retraction or extension.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION

(continued)
HYDRAULIC MODE
filter and maintains the HP maintaining valve and the blocking valve
opened.
Proportionally to an electrical order from the computer, the SV controls
the hydraulic flow connecting either the P port with U2 and the R port
with U1 for a rod extension (or either P with U1 and R with U2 for a
rod retraction).
position for the inner loop function.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - HYDRAULIC MODE

(continued)
RETRACTED MODE (Rate Command Failure)
opened.
The flight control computers no longer controls the servocontrol. The
SV is in biased position connecting the P port with U1 and the R port
with U2.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - RETRACTED MODE (RATE COMMAND FAILURE)

(continued)
BLOCKING MODE
In case of a hydraulic loss, the servocontrol switches to the
BLOCKING MODE.
The HP maintaining valve is closed under its spring load effect, and
so isolates the servocontrol from the HP hydraulic circuit.
The blocking valve is in the closed position (yellow ring).
The SV is in biased position connecting the P port with U1 and the R
port with U2.
Under the air load, the fluid is expelled from the chamber CA and
goes to the chamber CB through the SV and through the check valve.
The surface extension blocking mode is achieved by the check valve
belonging to the blocking valve (yellow ring).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - BLOCKING MODE

(continued)
MAINTENANCE MODE
The maintenance device is in the maintenance position.
The result is:
- the blocking valve enables the servocontrol to be disconnected from
the HP circuit,
- the LP maintaining valve is opened, there is no residual pressure
inside the servocontrol,
The fluid can flow freely inside the servocontrol. Thus, the mechanic
can move the spoiler.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D3CONV00001
SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - MAINTENANCE MODE
PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3)

General
The Electro-Hydrostatic Actuators (EHAs) are installed on:
- the INDB ailerons,
- the OUTB ailerons and,
- the elevators.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
GENERAL

Aileron and Elevator EHAs: LRUs and Main Components
The EHAs of the ailerons and the elevators have the same main
components:
These components are:
- electrical connectors
- the mode solenoid valve,
- the mode LVT,
- the accumulator,
- the hydraulic pump,
- the AC electrical motor and,
- the electronic module.
The electronic module is a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Aileron and Elevator EHAs: Mode and Operation
the EHA.
the various modes.
Each EHA of the ailerons and elevators has two main operating modes.
There are:
the surface,
- the ACTIVE MODE, which actuates the surface according to the
electrical orders sent by the flight control computers.
The electronic module controls and monitors the EHA.
There is no surface RVDT installed on the ailerons for the monitoring of
the surface position.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: MODE AND OPERATION

Aileron and Elevator EHAs: Mode and Operation (continued)
Damping Mode
During a normal operation, the EHAs are in DAMPING MODE, the
adjacent servocontrols (conventional) are in ACTIVE MODE.
The 28 VDC electrical network supplies the electronic module of
EHA through the relay controlled by the flight control computer.
This enables the computer to monitor the EHA through the ARINC.
The computer does not send an electrical order to the mode solenoid
valve, so the mode valve is in the DAMPING MODE under its spring
effect load.
The mode valve position is monitored and sent to the electronic
module. This one sent to the computer the mode valve position through
the ARINC.
The chambers CA and CB are connected through the mode valve and
through the damping restrictor.
operate to enable the fluid transfer between the accumulator and the
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - DAMPING MODE

Aileron and Elevator EHAs: Mode and Operation (continued)
Active Mode
If the conventional servocontrol is loss, it switches to the DAMPING
MODE, then, the EHA switches to the ACTIVE MODE.
The 115 VAC network supplies the electronic module through the
Remote Control Circuit Breaker (RCCB) controlled by the computer
to supply the electrical motor.
The 28 VDC network still supplies the electronic module.
The computer sends an "electronic module enable" signal to switch
on the electronic module.
The computer sends a "mode valve command" to select the mode
solenoid valve in the ACTIVE MODE via the electronic module.
The mode valve position is monitored by the mode LVT.
The chambers CA and CB are now connected to the hydraulic pump
ports.
command), the electronic module controls the voltage sent to the
electrical motor (so the rod speed of the actuator).
position for the "inner" control loop. Also, for the elevators only, a
surface RVDT sends the surface position to the computer for
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
monitoring.
To avoid cavitation inside the circuit, an accumulator compensates
fluid variation through pump anti cavitation valves for the hydraulic
pump and, through the piston anti cavitation valves for the chambers.
Furthermore, load limiting valves avoid a too high pressure inside the
circuit and, let the fluid to be expelled.
Note that the ACTIVE MODE engagement is inhibited on ground.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D4EHA000001
AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - ACTIVE MODE
PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)

General
The Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuators (EBHAs) are installed on the
rudders and on spoilers 5 and 6.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
GENERAL

Rudder EBHA: LRUs and Main Components
The main components of the rudder EBHAs are:
- an accumulator,
- a hydraulic pump,
- an AC electrical motor,
- a electrical mode solenoid valve,
- a hydraulic mode LVT
- a electrical mode LVT,
- a servovalve spool LVT,
- the HP filter,
- the hydraulic mode solenoid valve,
- the ServoValve (SV) and,
These main components are Line Replaceable Units (LRUs):
- the HP filter,
- the hydraulic mode solenoid valve,
- the ServoValve (SV) and,
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
RUDDER EBHA: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Rudder EBHAs: Mode and Operation
the servocontrol.
the various modes.
Each rudder EBHA has three main operating modes. There are
the surface.
- the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE, which actuates the surface
according to the electrical orders sent by the flight control computers,
the EBHA is hydraulically powered.
- the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE, which actuates the surface
according to the electrical orders sent by the flight control computers too,
the EBHA is electrically powered. The deflection speed is less high than
in the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
the EBHA.
The hydraulic mode solenoid valve enables to select the HYDRAULIC
ACTIVE MODE or the DAMPING MODE.
The servovalve is used for the control of the hydraulic flow inside the
chambers for a rod retraction or a rod extension.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
The electronic module controls and monitors the EBHA when this one
is in the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION

Rudder EBHAs: Mode and Operation (continued)
Damping Mode
The 115 VAC and 28 VDC network do not supply the EBHA.
The flight control computer does not send a discrete signal to the
hydraulic mode solenoid valve. Also, it does not send a discrete signal
to the electrical mode solenoid valve too.
The mode valves (hydraulic and electrical) are in the DAMPING
MODE under their spring load effect.
The computer monitors through the mode LVTs the position of the
hydraulic and electrical mode valves.
The chamber CA and CB are connected through the two mode valves
and through the damping restrictor.
operate to let the fluid transfer between the accumulator and the
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - DAMPING MODE

Rudder EBHAs: Mode and Operation (continued)
Hydraulic Active Mode
During a normal operation, the EBHA is in the HYDRAULIC
ACTIVE MODE.
filter and maintains the HP maintaining valve opened.
is permanently connected to SV return port (R), thus, it enables the
The flight control computer sends an electrical order to the hydraulic
mode solenoid valve, then, the mode valve is positioned in the
ACTIVE MODE. The mode LVT gives to the computer an electrical
signal representative of the mode valve position.
The position of the other mode valve is sent to the computer for
monitoring.
Proportionally to an electrical order from the computer (rate command)
to the SV through the electronic module (no 115 VAC network), the
SV controls the hydraulic flow (so the rod speed of the actuator),
connecting either the pressure port (P) with U2 and the return port
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
(R) with U1 for a rod extension (or either P with U1 and R with U2
for a rod retraction). The SV position is always monitored by the
computer.
Also, a surface RVDT sends the surface position to the computer for
monitoring.
To avoid force fighting during double pressurization of both EBHAs
on a same surface, the computer receives a delta pressure data given
by the differential pressure LVDT.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE

Rudder EBHAs: Mode and Operation (continued) fluid variation through pump anti cavitation valves for the hydraulic
pump and, through the piston anti cavitation valves for the chambers.
Electrical Active Mode
Furthermore, load limiting valves avoid a too high pressure inside the
If no EBHA can be switched to the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE circuit and, let the fluid to be expelled.
on a same rudder (hydraulic supplies lost), the EBHA is switched to To avoid force fighting during double pressurization of both EBHAs
the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE. Note that, the deflection speed on a same surface, the computer receives a delta pressure data given
in this mode is less high than the deflection speed in the HYDRAULIC by the differential pressure LVDT.
ACTIVE MODE. Note that the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE engagement is inhibited
The 115 VAC network supplies the electronic module through the on ground.
Remote Control Circuit Breaker (RCCB) controlled by the computer
to supply the electrical motor.
So it disables the computer to control the servovalve.
The 28 VDC electrical network supplies the electronic module of the
EBHA through the relay controlled by the flight control computer.
This enables the computer to control and monitor the EBHA.
The computer sends an "electronic module enable" signal to switch
on the electronic module.
The computer sends a "mode valve command" to select the mode
solenoid valve in the ACTIVE MODE via the electronic module.
The mode LVT sends an electrical signal to the computer to give the
position of the mode valve.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
The position of the other mode valve (hydraulic) is sent to the

computer for monitoring.
The chambers CA and CB are now connected to the hydraulic pump
ports.
electrical motor (so the rod speed of the actuator).
Also, a surface RVDT sends the surface position to the computer for
monitoring.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE

Spoiler EBHA: LRUs and Main Components
The main components of the spoiler EBHA are:
- an accumulator,
- a hydraulic pump,
- an AC electrical motor,
- a mode LVT,
- a maintenance device,
- the HP filter,
- the solenoid valve,
- the servovalve,
- the electronic module and,
- the motor drain filter.
These main components are LRUs:
- the HP filter,
- the solenoid valve,
- the servovalve,
- the electronic module and,
- the motor drain filter.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

The servovalve enables to control the hydraulic flow inside the chambers
Spoiler EBHA: Mode and Operation for a rod retraction or a rod extension.
The electronic module controls and monitors the EBHA when this one
is in the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE.
the servocontrol.
The motor drain filter avoids the electrical motor to be polluted by the
hydraulic fluid.
the various modes.
Each spoiler EBHA has five main operating modes. There are:
- the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE,
- the RETRACTED MODE,
- the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE,
- the BLOCKING MODE and,
- the MAINTENANCE MODE.
The HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE enables the spoiler to be actuated
according to the electrical orders sent by the flight control computers,
the EBHA is hydraulically powered.
The RETRACTED MODE enables the spoiler to be retracted
automatically to its zero position in case of rate command failure.
The ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE enables the spoiler to be actuated
according to the electrical orders sent by the flight control computers too,
the EBHA is electrically powered. The deflection speed is less high than
in the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
The BLOCKING MODE avoids the spoiler to be extended under the
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
airload.
The MAINTENANCE MODE, the unit includes a manual mechanical
device to enable the surfaces to be manually moved on ground for
maintenance purposes, with no danger for the ground staff.
the EBHA.
The solenoid valve is opened during the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE,
and closed during the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE. It enables to
connect or not the EBHA return line to the LP return line through the
accumulator.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: MODE AND OPERATION

Spoiler EBHA: Mode and Operation (continued)
Hydraulic Active Mode
"A" opened.
The mode valve is hydraulically opened, that allow the spoiler EBHA
to be switched in the HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
The solenoid valve is not energized connecting the accumulator with
the LP return line through the restrictor. Then, a permanent leakage
is established between the EBHA return line and the LP return line
through the accumulator.
Proportionally to an electrical order from the computer (rate command)
to the SV through the electronic module, the SV controls the hydraulic
flow (so the rod speed of the actuator), connecting either the pressure
port (P) with U2 and the return port (R) with U1 for a rod extension
(or either P with U1 and R with U2 for a rod retraction).
When an antagonist load is applied to the surface, the blocking valve
"B" is more or less opened under the CA pressure and the spring effect.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
It leaves a flow more or less important from CB.

position for the "inner" loop function.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: MODE AND OPERATION - HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE

Retracted Mode (Rate Command Failure)
The HP hydraulic circuit still supplies the servocontrol through the
HP filter and maintains the HP maintaining valve and the blocking
valve "A" opened.
The mode valve is still hydraulically opened.
The solenoid valve is not energized connecting the accumulator with
the LP return line through the restrictor.
The flight control computer no longer controls the servocontrol. The
SV is in biased position connecting the P port with U1 and the R port
with U2. The blocking valve "B" is closed. Then, it enables a surface
retraction.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: MODE AND OPERATION - RETRACTED MODE (RATE COMMAND FAILURE)

Electrical Active Mode
If the hydraulic circuit is lost, the spoiler EBHA switches to the
ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE.
The HP and the LP maintaining valves are closed, the solenoid valve
is closed too. The EBHA spoiler is isolated from the hydraulic circuit.
The computer sends an "electronic module enable" signal to the
electronic module to switch on the electronic module.
RCCB controlled by the computer to supply the electrical motor.
So it disables the computer to control the servovalve.
The 28 VDC electrical network supplies the electronic module of
EBHA through the relay controlled by the flight control computer.
This enables the computer to control and monitor the EBHA.
The mode valve is in the electrical position under its spring load effect
(no hydraulic pressure command) connecting the chambers CA and
CB to the hydraulic pump ports.
The mode LVT sends an electrical signal to the computer through the
electronic module to give the position of the mode valve.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001

electrical motor (so the rod speed of the actuator). The blocking valve
"B" lets the fluid be expelled from the chamber CB to the pump return
port.
fluid variation through the shuttle valves.
Furthermore, relief valves avoid a too high pressure inside the circuit
and, let the fluid be expelled.
Note that the ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE engagement is inhibited
on ground.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: MODE AND OPERATION - ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE

Blocking Mode
If both power supplies (hydraulic and electrical) of the spoiler EBHA
are lost, this one switches in the BLOCKING MODE.
This mode enables the surface retraction but avoid the surface
extension.
The mode valve is in the electrical position under its spring load effect
(no hydraulic pressure command) connecting the chambers CA and
CB to the hydraulic pump ports.
The blocking valve "A " and "B" are closed under their spring effect.
The blocking valve "A" avoids the fluid transfer from CB due to the
check valve inside the blocking valve "A" (yellow ring).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: MODE AND OPERATION - BLOCKING MODE

Maintenance Mode
The maintenance device is in the maintenance position.
The result is:
- the blocking valve enables the servocontrol to be disconnected from
the HP circuit,
- the LP maintaining valve is opened, there isno residual pressure
inside the servocontrol,
- the mode valve is in the hydraulic position.
The fluid can flow freely inside the spoiler EBHA. Thus, the mechanic
can move the spoiler.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D5EBHA00001
SPOILER EBHA: MODE AND OPERATION - MAINTENANCE MODE
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: THS ACTUATOR DESC. (3)

General
The Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator (THSA) links structurally
the THS to the aircraft structure.
Three motors, two hydraulics, and one electrical actuate the THS through
a gearbox.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: THS ACTUATOR DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
GENERAL

The electrical channel has the following components:
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator: LRUs and Main - the electrical control motor unit and,
Components - the DC brush less electrical motor and its dual DC electric brakes.
The SLLDD is divided into two units:
- the Secondary Upper Load path Loading Detection Device (SULLDD)
the THSA.
and,
- Two Secondary Lower Load path Loading Detection Device
the various modes.
(SLLLDDs).
The THSA has the main following components:
The basic purpose consists to give a cockpit alert of Secondary Load path
- the ball screw assembly,
(either upper or lower) loading.
- the gearbox,
The SULLDD is designed to detect upper secondary load path loading,
- the green Hydraulic Control Module (HCM),
while the other called SLLLDDs are dedicated to detect lower secondary
- the yellow HCM,
load path loading. They are connected in series, if detection appears, THS
- the electrical channel,
immobilization is commanded by the PRIM computers.
- the position sensor units (resolvers pack "A" and "B"),
These components are Line Replaceable Units (LRUs):
- the Secondary Load path Loading Detection Devices (SLLDDs).
- the HCMs,
The components of the green and yellow HCM are identical.
- the HVBs,
These components are:
- the hydraulic screen filters,
- the hydraulic motor/brake assembly,
- the hydraulic motor resolvers,
- the Hydraulic Valve Block (HVB),
- the hydraulic pressure switches,
- the ServoValve (SV) and its LVT,
- the servovalves and their LVDTs,
- the brake Solenoid Operated Valve "A" (SOV "A"),
- the SOVs "A",
- the enable Solenoid Operated Valve "B" (SOV "B") and,
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
- the SOVs "B",

- the pressure switch.
- the electronic motor and dual electric brakes,
The components of the hydraulic motor/brake assembly are:
- the electrical motor control unit,
- the hydraulic motor and its position sensors (resolvers) and,
- the position sensor units pack "A" and "B",
- the Power Off Brake (POB) including its brake LVT.
- the secondary upper load path loading detection device,
The HVB components are:
- the two secondary lower load path loading detection devices.
- the main shuttle valve
- the hydraulic screen filter,
- the flow limiter (not shown),
- the inlet check valve (not shown),
- the anticavitation valves (not shown) and,
- the relief valves (not shown).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator: Mode and
Operation
The first slide only shows the operation of the green HCM, but the yellow
operation HCM is the same.
In normal operation, the green hydraulic motor is active, the other one
(the yellow) is in standby, and the electrical motor is not electrically
supplied. Both hydraulic motors can be simultaneously activated when
a high rate is requested.
In case of failure on the hydraulic motors, the electrical motor is activated.
HYDRAULIC MODE
The HP hydraulic circuit supplies the green HCM through the HP
filter and maintains the inlet check valve opened.
The hydraulic pressure switch sends to the computer a data "pressure
enable".
The computer send to the servovalve a "null" position, this position
is monitored by the LVDT servovalve.
The computer sends a discrete signal to the brake SOV "A", the brake
POB is not opened because there is no pressure at its port.
Then, the computer sends a discrete signal to the enable SOV "B",
the main shuttle valve opens supply pressure to the SOV "A" to release
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
the POB. The POB position is monitored by the POB LVT.

The main shuttle valve continues to move and connects the hydraulic
motor ports to the servovalve ports.
command), the SV controls the hydraulic flow. The flow limiter
prevents motor over speed.
The HYD motor speed is monitored by the resolvers.
The resolvers pack "A" and pack "B" gives to the computer a feedback
of the ballscrew for the "inner" control loop.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR: MODE AND OPERATION - HYDRAULIC MODE

Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator: Mode and
ELECTRICAL MODE
If the two hydraulic circuits are lost for example, the electrical channel
is switched on.
The 115 VAC network supplies the electrical motor control unit
through the Remote Control Circuit Breaker (RCCB) controlled by
the computer.
The computer sends a "motor enable" signal to switch on the control
unit.
For brakes releasing, two discrete orders (brakes 1 and 2 enable) are
sent by the computer to the control unit. Then, the control unit sends
two 270 VDC voltages to the two brakes.
To control the electrical motor through a voltage sent by the control
unit, the computer sends discrete signals called "motor control UP"
or "DOWN".
The resolvers pack "A" and pack "B" still gives to the computer a
feedback of the ballscrew for the "inner" control loop.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D6THSA00001
TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR: MODE AND OPERATION - ELECTRICAL MODE
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: FLY BY WIRE DESC. (3)

General
This module shows what is called the "fly by wire philosophy" for the
A380.
It shows the links between the inputs, the computers and, the surface
servocontrols.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: FLY BY WIRE DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
GENERAL

Computation Philosophy
The PRIMARY flight controls have three PRIMs and three SECs.
Each of them perform two functions:
- the COMPUTATION function, which elaborates the aircraft objective,
and also the surface deflection orders,
- the EXECUTION function, which fulfils the servoing control of the
surfaces.
Only one PRIM at a time is the "MASTER".
The COMPUTATION function of the "MASTER" receives the orders
from the pilot in manual mode or, from the Flight Guidance (FG) in
autopilot mode.
The "MASTER" PRIM generates the surface deflection orders and sends
them to the two other PRIMary systems and to the three SEcondary
Computers.
So, each PRIM, and each SEC signal their associated surfaces and do the
"inner" control loop in their EXECUTION function.
Also, in its COMPUTATION function, the "MASTER" does the "outer"
control loop. This one compares the aircraft response with the aircraft
objective to check if the demand has been reached.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
COMPUTATION PHILOSOPHY

Flight Control Laws: General Protections
In the NORMAL laws, the protections are:
The flight control laws can be divided into three main levels of laws. - Load Factor protection
The NORMAL and ALTERNATE laws are only implemented into the - Pitch attitude protection
PRIMs, while the DIRECT law is implemented into the PRIMs and into - Angle Of Attack (AOA) protection
the SECs. - High speed protection
The flight control laws are automatically switched from NORMAL to - Bank Angle protection
ALTERNATE and then to DIRECT according to the nature and the It secures the flight envelope, the load factor is limited to -1g to 2.5g
number of failures. in clean configuration while it is limited to 0 to 2g in high lift
Inside the NORMAL, ALTERNATE and, DIRECT laws, there are: configuration.
- the pitch control laws, The protection limits the pitch attitude to -15 to +30 or -15 to +25
- the lateral control laws and, at low speed.
- the protections. It gives positive static stability at low speed and protects the aircraft
against stall during maneuvering and wind gusts.
Pitch Control Laws: NORMAL Laws
The AOA protection is engaged during the flight phase and flare phase.
The NORMAL law is composed of the pitch control laws, the lateral The objective of the high speed protection is to limit the speed
control laws and the protections. excursions beyond the maximum operating speed (VMO) whatever
The Nz law is the normal law engaged during the flight phase. the side stick input. The high speed protection is engaged from lift
The objective of this law is to control the flight path of the aircraft, off to touch down.
through a load factor demand. The Nz law changes a load factor demand Bank angle protection allows a bank angle until 66 in clean
(from pilots or autopilot) into a pitch order. The pitch control law does configuration and 60 in high lift configuration.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
the automatic trim function. The pitch moment linked to roll surface
deflection is compensated. Flight Control Laws: ALTERNATE Laws
Lateral Normal Law (Y*) If the NORMAL law is lost, the computers switch to ALTERNATE law.
The pitch laws are still available but are less efficient than in NORMAL
The objective of the lateral normal law (Y*) is to control the roll and
law.
yaw axes of the aircraft, through roll rate and sideslip demand.
The lateral laws are still available but are less efficient than in NORMAL
Also, the objectives of this law are to:
law.
- do Dutch roll damping and,
The lateral alternate law does the Dutch roll damping and turn
- do yaw damping on ground.
coordination.
The Y* law is used for both manual and AP controls.
The protections are overrideable by pilot inputs except load factor
protection.
Flight Control Laws: DIRECT Laws

In the DIRECT law, the pitch control law has a "stabilized" pitch direct
law.
The "stabilized' pitch direct law controls the axis though elevator
deflection proportionally to side stick input. Also, there is some
attenuation according to the aircraft speed, configuration.
The THS is controlled manually via the pitch trim control switches.
The lateral law consists of Roll Direct Laws and Yaw Alternate Law with
Yaw Damping.
In the DIRECT law, the protections are totally lost.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: GENERAL ... FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: DIRECT LAWS
This Page Intentionally Left Blank

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001

Three failure examples have been taken. They are:
Servocontrol Servoing And Reconfiguration - a power supply failure (green),
- a computer failure (P1) and,
This topic shows the servocontrol servoing operation.
- a control loop failure (wiring).
It shows the normal engagement of the computer on the ACTIVE
On the INBD aileron, the conventional servocontrol is connected to
servocontrol and, the switching reconfiguration philosophy after failures.
PRIM 1 (P1), SEC 1 (S1) and to the backup control module (B).
The servocontrol servoing done by the backup control module (all
The EHA is connected to P2 and S2.
computers lost) will be treated in the next module.
The ServoValve (SV) receives from the computer an electrical signal
Ailerons representative of a surface deflection order. The SV controls the
The OUTBD ailerons are driven by two conventional servocontrols. hydraulic flow inside the servocontrol actuator, so the piston rod
The INBD and MID ailerons are driven by one conventional direction and speed.
servocontrol and one EHA. The Motor Drive Electronics (MDE) controls the voltage sent to the
There are two computers (one PRIM and one SEC) connected to each electrical motor, in fact, it has the "same role" as a SV for a
servocontrol for each aileron (INBD and MID), excepted for the servocontrol.
OUTBD ailerons where there is only one computer connected to each The feedback LVDTs give the piston rod position for the "inner"
servocontrol. control loop.
Furthermore, the conventional servocontrols of the INBD ailerons are During normal operation, the conventional servocontrol is in ACTIVE
connected to the backup control module. MODE, the EHA is in DAMPING MODE.
During normal operation, there is one engaged computer at a time on P1 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
one aileron surface, which fulfils the "inner" control loop. the piston rod position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
The other computers are not engaged. If the green hydraulic circuit is lost (arrow 1), the conventional
Note that the computer engagement priority of the actuator servoing servocontrol switches to DAMPING MODE, the EHA switches to
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
is totally independent from the computer engagement priority in law ACTIVE MODE.
computation. P2 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
The arrows show the reconfiguration logics in case of computer, the piston rod position and P2 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
control loop failures or power supplies (hydraulic or electrical) failures. The EHA remains the only servocontrol that can actuate the surface
In case of one left or right OUTBD servocontrol failure, the because the conventional servocontrol has no longer its hydraulic
symmetrical one on the opposite wing is inhibited. power supply available.
Nevertheless, it is possible to control the INBD or MID aileron with If P1 is lost (arrow 2), the conventional servocontrol switches to
one conventional servocontrol on one side and one EHA on the other DAMPING MODE, the EHA switches to ACTIVE MODE.
side. P2 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
The INBD aileron has been taken as an example to show how the the piston rod position and P2 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
reconfigurations are made after failures.
Furthermore, the conventional servocontrol is not lost, it can be
controlled by S1 if there is a failure on the EHA.
If the control loop is lost, for example a SV failure, a LVDT failure,
or a wiring failure (arrow 3), the EHA switches to ACTIVE MODE,
the conventional servocontrol switches to DAMPING MODE.
In this case, the conventional servocontrol cannot be longer controlled
by the computers (P1 and S1), the EHA remains the only servocontrol
available to actuate the surface.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001
SERVOCONTROL SERVOING AND RECONFIGURATION - AILERONS

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D7FBW000001

The feedback LVDTs give the piston rod position for the "inner"
Servocontrol Servoing And Reconfiguration (continued) control loop.
During normal operation, the upper EBHA is in HYDRAULIC
Rudders
ACTIVE MODE, the lower EBHA is in DAMPING MODE.
Each rudder is driven by two Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuators P1 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
(EBHAs). the piston rod position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
There are two computers (one PRIM and one SEC) connected to each If the yellow hydraulic circuit is lost (arrow 1), the upper EBHA
EBHA. The upper EBHAs of each rudder are connected to the backup switches to DAMPING MODE, the lower EBHA switches to
control module. HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
During normal operation, there is one engaged computer at a time on P2 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
one rudder surface, which fulfils the "inner" control loop. the piston rod position and P2 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
The other computers are not engaged. Now, if the green hydraulic is lost too (arrow 2), the lower EBHA
The computer engagement priority of the actuator servoing is totally switches to DAMPING MODE, the upper EBHA switches to
independent from the computer engagement priority in law ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE.
computation. P1 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
The arrows show the reconfiguration logics in case of computer, the piston rod position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
control loop failures or power supplies (hydraulic or electrical) failures. If P1 is lost (arrow 3), the upper EBHA switches to DAMPING
The two rudder operations are independent, an EBHA failure on one MODE, the lower EBHA switches to HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
rudder has no consequences on the operation on the other rudder. P2 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
The UPPER rudder has been taken as an example to show how the the piston rod position and P2 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
reconfigurations are made after failures. Furthermore, the upper EBHA is not lost, it can be controlled by S1
Three failure examples have been taken. They are: if there is a failure on the lower EBHA.
- power supply failures (green and after yellow),
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If the control loop is lost, for example a SV failure, a LVDT failure,

- a computer failure (P1) and, or a wiring failure (arrow 4), the upper EBHA switches to DAMPING
- a control loop failure (wiring). MODE, the lower EBHA switches to HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
On the UPPER rudder, the upper EBHA is connected to P1, S1 and In this case, the upper EBHA can be no longer controlled by the
to the backup control module (B). computers (P1 and S1), the lower EBHA remains the only servocontrol
The lower EBHA is connected to P2 and S2. available to actuate the surface.
When the EBHAs are in HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE, the SV When high rate or large deflection demands are requested, both
receives from the computer an electrical signal representative of a EBHAs can be switched to ACTIVE MODE in all cases, excepted
surface when one EBHA cannot be engaged.
When the EBHAs are in ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE (dual
hydraulic circuit loss), the MDE controls the voltage sent to the
electrical motor.
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SERVOCONTROL SERVOING AND RECONFIGURATION - RUDDERS

The MDE controls the voltage sent to the electrical motor.
Servocontrol Servoing And Reconfiguration (continued) The feedback LVDTs give the piston rod position for the "inner"
control loop.
Elevators
During normal operation, the conventional servocontrol is in ACTIVE
Each elevator is driven by one conventional servocontrol and one MODE, the EHA is in DAMPING MODE.
EHA. P3 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
There are two computers (one PRIM and one SEC) connected to each the piston rod position and P3 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
servocontrol for each elevator. If the green hydraulic circuit is lost (arrow 1), the conventional
Furthermore, the conventional servocontrols of the INBD elevators servocontrol switches to DAMPING MODE, the EHA switches to
are connected to the backup control module. ACTIVE MODE.
During normal operation, the elevator servocontrol operation is the P1 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
same as the aileron servocontrol operation. the piston rod position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
There is one engaged computer at a time on one elevator surface, The EHA remains the only servocontrol that can actuate the surface
which fulfils the "inner" control loop. because the conventional servocontrol has no longer its hydraulic
Note that the computer engagement priority of the actuator servoing power supply.
is totally independent from the computer engagement priority in law If P3 is lost (arrow 2), the conventional servocontrol switches to
computation. DAMPING MODE, the EHA switches to ACTIVE MODE.
The arrows show the reconfiguration logics in case of computer, P1 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
control loop failures or power supplies (hydraulic or electrical) failures. the piston rod position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
After a servocontrol failure on the OUTBD or INBD elevator, the Furthermore, the conventional servocontrol is not lost, it can be
symmetrical one is not inhibited. controlled by S3 if there is a failure on the EHA.
So, it is possible to control the OUTBD or INBD elevator with one If the control loop is lost, for example a SV failure, a LVDT failure,
conventional servocontrol on one side and one EHA on the other side.
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or a wiring failure (arrow 3), the EHA switches to DAMPING MODE,

The INBD elevator has been taken as an example to show how the the conventional servocontrol switches to ACTIVE MODE.
reconfigurations are made after failures. In this case, the conventional servocontrol cannot be longer controlled
Three failure examples have been taken. They are: by the computers (P3 and S3), the EHA remains the only servocontrol
- a power supply failure (green), available to actuate the surface.
- a computer failure (P3) and, In case of high rate or large deflection demands, both servocontrols
- a control loop failure (wiring). can be switched to ACTIVE MODE in all cases, excepted when one
On the INBD elevator, the conventional servocontrol is connected to EBHA cannot be engaged.
P3, S3 and to the backup control module (B).
The EHA is connected to P1 and S1.
The SV receives from the computer an electrical signal representative
of a surface deflection order.
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SERVOCONTROL SERVOING AND RECONFIGURATION - ELEVATORS

The resolvers give the screw jack position for the "inner" control loop.
Servocontrol Servoing And Reconfiguration (continued) During normal operation, the green hydraulic motor is in ACTIVE
MODE, the yellow hydraulic motor is in STAND BY MODE and,
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer
the electrical motor is not electrically supplied (OFF MODE).
Three motors, two hydraulics, and one electrical actuate the THS P3 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The resolvers give the screw
through a gearbox and a screw jack. jack position and P3 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
There are two computers (one PRIM and one SEC) connected to each If the green hydraulic circuit is lost (arrow 1), the green hydraulic
hydraulic motor. Only one computer is connected to the electrical motor is LOST, the yellow hydraulic motor switches to ACTIVE
motor. MODE, the electrical motor still in OFF MODE.
Furthermore, the yellow hydraulic motor is connected to the backup P1 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The resolvers give the screw
control module. jack position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
During normal operation, there is one engaged computer at a time, Now, if the yellow hydraulic is lost too (arrow 2), the yellow hydraulic
which fulfils the "inner" control loop. motor is LOST, the electrical motor switches to ACTIVE MODE.
The computer engagement priority of the actuator servoing is totally P2 sends to the electrical motor control unit an electrical signal. The
independent from the computer engagement priority in law resolvers give the screw jack position and P2 fulfils the "inner" control
computation. loop.
The arrows show the reconfiguration logics in case of computer, If P3 is lost (arrow 3), the green hydraulic motor switches to STAND
control loop failures or power supplies (hydraulic or electrical) failures. BY MODE, the yellow hydraulic motor switches to ACTIVE MODE
After a motor failure, the hydraulic or electrical motors still allow the and, the electrical motor still in OFF MODE.
THS actuation. P1 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The resolvers give the screw
Failure examples have been taken to show how the reconfigurations jack position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
are made after failures. Furthermore, the green hydraulic motor is not lost, it can be controlled
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by S3 if there is a failure on the yellow hydraulic motor.

- power supply failures (green and after yellow), If the control loop is lost, for example a SV failure, a LVDT failure,
- a computer failure (P3) and, or a wiring failure (arrow 4), the green hydraulic motor is LOST, the
- a control loop failure (wiring). yellow hydraulic motor switches to ACTIVE MODE and, the electrical
On the THS Actuator (THSA), the green hydraulic motor is connected motor is still in OFF MODE.
to P3 and S3. The yellow hydraulic motor is connected to P1, S1 and P1 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The resolvers give the screw
to the backup control module (B). The electrical motor is connected jack position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
to P2. In this case, the green hydraulic motor cannot be longer controlled by
The SV receives from the computer an electrical signal representative the computers (P3 and S3), the yellow hydraulic and the electrical
of a THS deflection order. motor remain the only motors available to actuate the surface.
The Electrical Motor Control Unit (EMCU) controls the voltage sent
to the electrical motor.
In case of high rate or large deflection demands, the hydraulic motors
can be switched to ACTIVE MODE in all cases, excepted when one
hydraulic motor cannot be engaged.
Do not forget that the electrical motor is activated after failures on
the hydraulic motors and it can only be used in AUTOMATIC MODE.
If the AUTOMATIC MODE is lost, the pilots can control the THS
via the pitch trim control switches but in such a case using the
hydraulic motors. This mode is called MANUAL MODE.
When the AUTOMATIC MODE is available, this mode has the
priority over the MANUAL MODE, and the pitch trim control switches
are inhibited.
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SERVOCONTROL SERVOING AND RECONFIGURATION - TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER

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In fact, spoiler 7 is retracted to its zero position under airloads.
Servocontrol Servoing And Reconfiguration (continued) If S2 is lost (arrow 2), the conventional servocontrol switches to
BLOCKING MODE (CONTROL FAILURE MODE).
Spoilers
The consequence is the same as a hydraulic power supply loss, spoiler
The spoilers are driven by only one servocontrol. 7 is retracted to its zero position (SV in biased position) and the spoiler
Spoilers 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 are driven by a conventional servocontrol, is lost.
whereas spoilers 5 and 6 are each driven by one EBHA. If the control loop is lost, for example a SV failure, a LVDT failure,
There is only one computer per servocontrol and per EBHA. or a wiring failure (arrow 3), the conventional servocontrol switches
The backup control module is not connected to the spoiler to BLOCKING MODE (CONTROL FAILURE MODE).
servocontrols. Spoiler 7 is retracted to its zero position (SV in biased position) and
During normal operation, the computer controls its spoiler servocontrol the spoiler is lost.
and fulfils the "inner" control loop. On the EBHA, if there is a computer failure (P1) or a control loop
After a servocontrol failure, the spoiler is retracted to its zero position failure, the consequences are the same as conventional servocontrol
and the spoiler is lost. failures. The spoiler is retracted to its zero position and the spoiler is
For the conventional servocontrol, the symmetrical spoiler operation lost.
on the opposite wing is inhibited. If the green hydraulic circuit is lost (arrow 4), the EBHA is not lost,
But for an EBHA failure, the symmetrical EBHA still operates this one switches to ELECTRICAL ACTIVE MODE, and still allows
normally. the spoiler operation.
Spoilers 6 and 7 have been taken as an example to show how the
- a power supply failure (yellow for spoiler 7 and, green for spoiler
6),
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- a computer failure (S2 for spoiler 7 and, P1 for spoiler 6),

- a control loop failure (wiring).
During normal operation, the conventional servocontrol of spoiler 7
is in ACTIVE MODE, S2 sends to the SV a surface deflection order.
The EBHA of spoiler 6 is in HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE, P1
sends to the SV a surface deflection order.
The feedback LVDTs give the positions of the piston rod and, S2 and
P1 fulfil their "inner" control loop.
If the yellow hydraulic circuit is lost (arrow 1), the conventional
servocontrol switches to BLOCKING MODE (SUPPLY FAILURE
MODE).
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SERVOCONTROL SERVOING AND RECONFIGURATION - SPOILERS

Main Functions: Lateral Function: Roll
The ailerons and spoilers 3 to 8 are used for the roll function. Associated
with the rudder used for the yaw function, these surfaces automatically
do the lateral function. It does roll/yaw coordination during turns.
In manual mode, the PRIMs and SECs receive roll orders coming from
the roll Side Stick Transducer and Damper Unit (SSTDU) of the side
sticks.
In Autopilot (AP) mode, it is the Flight Guidance (FG) that sends the roll
orders to the F/CTL part of the PRIMs.
After computation of the roll surface deflection, the "MASTER" sends
it to the other flight control computers. They fulfill the servoing of the
ailerons and the roll spoilers.
For computation of the flight control laws, aircraft response is needed
("outer loop"), for this the computers receive additional data.
These data are coming from:
- dedicated roll rate gyrometer units,
- the Air Data/Inertial Reference Units (AIDRUs).
The dedicated roll rate gyrometer units send only to the PRIMs roll
angular speeds so roll rates.
The ADIRUs compute air data (speed, altitude, side slip...) with the ADR
part but also aircraft attitude (roll rates and accelerations) with the IR
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part.
These data are sent to the PRIMs and to the SECs.
Note for flight control law computation, the angular speeds given by the
rate gyrometer units are used as "primary" source for PRIMs and SECs
instead of IR angular speeds.
When the AP mode is engaged, the side sticks are locked by a solenoid,
energized by the PRIMs. If the pilots give an effort on the side stick over
than the solenoid load, the AP mode is disengaged.
The F/CTL parameters are sent by the computers to the FCDCs. The roll
indications are displayed on the CDS.
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MAIN FUNCTIONS: LATERAL FUNCTION: ROLL

The accelerometer units measure yaw acceleration rates and are connected
Main Functions: Lateral Function: Yaw to the PRIMs as well.
The ADIRUs send to the computers air data and aircraft attitude.
The upper and lower rudders give the yaw control of the aircraft.
Note for flight control law computation, the angular speeds (yaw rates)
Associated with the ailerons and spoilers 3 to 8 used for the roll function,
given by the rate gyrometer units are used as "primary" source for PRIMs
the rudders automatically do the lateral function.
and SECs instead of IR angular speeds.
It does roll/yaw coordination during turns.
The pedal feel and trim unit gives artificial feel and rudder trim.
On ground, the rudders enable the aircraft to be controlled during taxiing.
The unit includes springs to do artificial feel.
In manual mode, the rudders do the yaw control from the rudder pedals,
Also, the unit includes two trim motors (active/standby configuration)
the rudder trim control panel or, the side sticks.
and four trim RVDTs for the rudder trim function.
For that, the "MASTER" computes yaw surface deflection order taking
During manual trim operation, the pilot operates the rudder trim control
into account:
switch. The orders are sent to the SECs.
- "pure" yaw orders from the rudder pedals,
The SECs send signals to the electronic module of the pedal feel and trim
- manual trim orders from the rudder trim control switch,
unit. The active motor operates and moves the rudder pedals.
- roll orders from the side sticks (turn coordination),
The position of the trim motors given by the trim RVDTs are used for
- Dutch roll damping according to the control law.
trim motor servoing but also the positions are used to be displayed on
After computation of the yaw surface deflection, the "MASTER" sends
the digital indicator of the panel.
The lever RVDTs send rudder pedals position to the PRIMs and SECs.
rudders.
Then, the computers control their associated EBHAs and trim the rudders.
Depending of the aircraft speed, the travels of the rudders and pedals are
In AP mode, the FG sends guidance orders to the F/CTL part.
limited in order to avoid excessive loads on the aircraft structure.
The "MASTER" computer sends AP trim order to the SECs to control
This function called rudder trim limitation is only implemented in the
the pedal feel and trim unit. The unit moves the rudder pedals, then, the
PRIMary systems.
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rudders move.
In addition to the feedback LVDTs (located on the Electrical Backup
When the autopilot is engaged, a solenoid controlled by the PRIMs
Hydraulic Actuators), RVDTs send positions of the rudders for
produces higher forces on the rudder pedals.
monitoring. These positions are used for monitoring but also used for the
If necessary, AP disengagement is allowed by the pilots by detection of
display on the CDS.
rudder pedals movement given by the RVDTs.
For the computation of the flight control laws, the computers receive
The F/CTL parameters are sent by the computers to the FCDCs. The yaw
additional data.
indications are displayed on the CDS.
A CAM device is installed between the aircraft structure and the upper
- dedicated yaw rate gyrometer units,
rudder.
- dedicated yaw accelerometer units,
It avoids free play in the control of the surface and thus passenger comfort.
- the ADIRUs.
The yaw rate gyrometer units send only to the PRIMs yaw rates.
The CAM device applies pre-loaded force, which creates a hinge moment
around 0 of the rudder deflection.
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MAIN FUNCTIONS: LATERAL FUNCTION: YAW

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As for the other axes, for flight control law computation, the data coming
Main Functions: Pitch Function from the pitch rate gyrometer units are used as "primary" sources for
PRIMs and SECs instead or IR angular speeds.
The elevators and the THS are used for the pitch function.
The FQMS receives, from PRIMs, the THS position for fuel quantity
The elevators are used for short-term actions while the THS is used for
computation. This function is hosted in the CPIOM-F.
long-term actions.
In addition, the Landing Gear Control and Indication System (LGCIS),
During normal operation, the AUTOMATIC MODE has priority over
gives to the computers for law switching the data such as flight/ground
the MANUAL MODE.
condition.
Indeed, when the AUTOMATIC MODE is available, the computers
When the AUTOMATIC MODE is not available, the pilot selects the
actuate and trim automatically the THS. No pilot actions are possible via
wished trim position (pitch up/down) of the THS through the pitch trim
the pitch trim control switches because the switches operation is inhibited.
control switches.
The computers receive pitch orders coming from the pitch SSTDU of the
The orders are sent to the computers. The "MASTER" sends pitch
side sticks.
deflection orders to the other computers, and they fulfil the servoing of
After computation of the pitch order deflections, the "MASTER" sends
the THS.
Do not forget that when the AUTOMATIC MODE is lost the electrical
elevators and the THS.
motor cannot be engaged in servoing.
In addition to the feedback LVDTs (located on the elevator servocontrols),
During the AP mode, the FG sends guidance to the F/CTL part.
RVDTs send positions of the elevators for monitoring. These positions
The side sticks are locked by a solenoid energized by the PRIMs. As for
are used for monitoring but also used for the display on the CDS.
the roll function, the pilots can disengaged the AP by moving the side
The THS resolvers are used for servoing but also used for the display on
sticks.
the CDS.
Also, when the AP is engaged, the "MASTER" computer sends AP trim
For the computation of the flight control laws, the computers receive
order to the computer to control the THS.
additional data.
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The F/CTL parameters are sent by the computers to the FCDCs. The
pitch indications are displayed on the CDS.
- dedicated pitch gyrometer units,
- dedicated pitch accelerometer units,
- the ADIRUs and,
- the Radio Altimeters (RAs).
The pitch rate gyrometer units send yaw rates only to the PRIMs
The pitch accelerometer units measure pitch acceleration rates and are
connected to the PRIMs as well.
The ADIRUs send to the computers air data and aircraft attitude.
The RAs send to the PRIMs aircraft height. These data are used for the
computation of specific flight control law (flare law engagement).
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MAIN FUNCTIONS: PITCH FUNCTION

Auxiliary Functions
More than the main flight control functions, the PRIMs compute auxiliary
functions.
Speedbrake Function
The speedbrake function operates in the flight phase further to a pilot
input through the speebrake/ground spoiler lever.
The function decreases the aircraft speed with an acceptable buffet
with the passengers.
Spoilers 1 to 8 are used for the function.
Spoiler kinematics is a function of the lever. When full lever is applied,
full speedbrake deflections are commanded. When half lever is applied,
of speedbrake deflections are commanded.
Spoiler 1 and 2 do not have the same kinematics than spoilers 3 to 8.
In addition, according to the aircraft configuration (slat/flap positions),
the surface deflections are not the same.
Pitch compensation occurs when speedbakes are out. However, to
limit loads on the THS in some conditions (high weight/low altitude),
the deflections can be limited.
The roll function has priority over speedbrake function.
Automatic retraction occurs when:
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- AOA protection is phased on,

- a Go-around is initiated.
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AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS - SPEEDBRAKE FUNCTION

Auxiliary Functions (continued)
Lift Dumping and Phased Lift Dumping Functions
The lift dumping and phased lift dumping functions are used to:
- stick the aircraft on ground by suppressing the lift,
- reduce bound risks,
- decelerate the aircraft and,
- give acceptable level of passenger comfort at touch down.
All available spoilers are used for these functions.
Moreover, ailerons contribute to the lift dumping function. The ailerons
move upward.
In case of impact on one main landing gear, the phased lift dumping
function partially deploys spoilers at low rate to force the impact on
the second leg, which activates the lift dumping function for full
deflection at high rates.
Spoiler 1 and 2 don't have the same kinematics than spoilers 3 to 8.
The spoilers are extended if two conditions are fulfilled. The first one
is the "preselection" and the second one is the "aircraft on ground".
The "preselection" condition is achieved when the lever is armed AND
all throttle levers are at idle OR 1 throttle lever is in reverse AND all
other 3 are at idle.
"Aircraft on ground" is based on the Wing Landing Gear (WLG)
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compression, but also on wheel speeds and RA information.
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AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS - LIFT DUMPING AND PHASED LIFT DUMPING FUNCTIONS

Aileron Droop Function
The aileron droop function is computed by the lateral law.
When the pilot puts the slat/flap control lever in the position "1" or
more, the Slat Flap control computers send to the PRIMs a "flap out"
signal through ARINC 429.
The PRIMs send deflection orders to the ailerons.
The ailerons droop downward to increase the wing curve.
The ailerons continue to fulfill the roll function.
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AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS - AILERON DROOP FUNCTION

Load Alleviation Function
The aim of the Load Alleviation Function (LAF) is to alleviate the
fatigue and static loads on the wings by reduction of the wing bending
moment.
The LAF is composed of:
- the passive turbulence alleviation and,
- the active turbulence alleviation.
The passive turbulence alleviation alleviates the static loads in
turbulence and during maneuvers. The activation is based on the
vertical load factor given by normal law. The computed orders are
sent to the ailerons and spoilers 6 to 8.
The pitch compensation linked to the deflections is sent to the inner
elevators.
The active turbulence alleviation alleviates the fatigue and static loads.
The activation is based on the measurement of the vertical load factor
on the wings given by the accelerometer units installed on the pylons.
The computed orders are superimposed (added) to the computed orders
of the passive turbulence alleviation. They are sent to the ailerons.
Compensation orders are sent to the inner elevators.
The LAF is activated above a given speed and, vertical acceleration
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thresholds but are inhibited when slats and flaps are in full
configuration.
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AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS - LOAD ALLEVIATION FUNCTION

Reminder
This topic is a reminder.
It shows the synthesis slide for the primary flight controls.
The various servocontrols that actuate the surfaces are conventional
servocontrols, EHAs, EBHAs, or THSA.
The power supplies:
- the green hydraulic circuit,
- the yellow hydraulic circuit,
- the E1 electrical circuit,
- the E2 electrical circuit and,
- the E3 electrical circuit.
A servocontrol is connected to one or two flight control computers.
Some of these servocontrols are connected to the backup control module
if these computers are lost.
There are reconfigurations if failure happens.
Double pressurization on some surfaces is possible if high rates are
requested by the computers.
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REMINDER
PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM DESC. (3)

General
In case of temporary loss of the all three PRIMary computers, and the
all three SEcondary Computers, or their power supplies, the electrical
backup system becomes active and does the stabilization and
manoeuvrability of the aircraft.
The electrical backup system is composed of three components:
- two backup power supply units and,
- one backup control module.
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MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
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GENERAL

- the roll SSTDUs,
Electrical Backup System Activation and Operation - the pedal feel and trim unit, a RVDT sends the position of the rudder
pedals,
During the normal operation, the electrical backup system is off.
- the Pitch trim control switches.
PRIM 2 and SEC 2 send inhibition signals to the two backup power
The backup control module ensures the servoing of these surfaces:
supplies.
- the left INBD aileron, through the green conventional servocontrol,
If the backup power supplies do not receive the two inhibition signals,
- the right INBD aileron, through the green conventional servocontrol,
they generate electrical power to the backup control module.
- the lower rudder, through the upper Electrical Backup Hydraulic
Then, the backup control module is ENERGIZED.
Actuator (EBHA) supplied by the green hydraulic system,
Note that one backup power supply is enough to supply the backup control
- the upper rudder, through the upper EBHA supplied by the yellow
module.
hydraulic system,
PRIM 1, PRIM 3, SEC 1 and, SEC 3 send inhibition signals to the backup
- the left INBD elevator, though the green conventional servocontrol,
control module.
- the right INBD elevator, through the green conventional servocontrol
The backup control module switches automatically on if it does not
and,
receive all the inhibition signals coming from the computers. Then, the
- the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS), through the yellow hydraulic
backup control module is ACTIVATED.
motor.
If the backup control module is ENERGIZED and ACTIVATED, it is
Furthermore, the backup control module elaborates flight control laws.
OPERATIVE.
The flight control laws generates the orders using:
Furthermore, the backup control module sends two output signals to the
- the pitch and yaw rates information,
Flight Control Data Concentrator (FCDCs) hosted into the CPIOM C1
- the side sticks position information,
and C2.
- the rudder pedals position information.
When the backup control module operates, it acquires pilot orders and
For the THS control, the rate command to the yellow hydraulic motor is
controls the surfaces.
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directly connected to the pitch trim control switches.

The backup control module uses two internal rate gyrometer units, one
for the yaw and, one for the pitch rates.
This yaw rate gyrometer unit is used for the Dutch roll damping and the
pitch rate gyrometer unit is used for stabilization on the pitch axis.
Note that there is no roll rate gyrometer unit.
Furthermore, the backup control module does the turn coordination
function.
The backup control module does the acquisition of pilot orders coming
from specific transducers.
They are located inside:
- the pitch Side Stick Unit and Transducer Units (SSTDUs),
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ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND OPERATION

Electrical Backup System: Servoing Engagement and
Reconfiguration
Theses slides show the reconfiguration after the electrical backup system
activation.
It is a reminder of the normal operation and of the backup control module
servocontrol servoing.
Ailerons
The INBD aileron has been taken as an example to show how the
If P1 is lost (arrow 1), the conventional servocontrol switches to
DAMPING MODE, the EHA switches to ACTIVE MODE.
P2 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
the piston rod position and P2 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
If all the computers are lost (arrow 2), the conventional servocontrol
switches to ACTIVE MODE.
The backup control module sends an electrical order to a specific coil
of the SV.
For the "inner" control loop, the dual electrically segregated feedback
LVDT sends the piston rod position.
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING ENGAGEMENT AND RECONFIGURATION - AILERONS

Reconfiguration (continued)
Rudders
The UPPER rudder has been taken as an example to show how the
If P1 is lost (arrow 1), the upper EBHA switches to DAMPING
MODE, the lower EBHA switches to HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
P2 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
If all the computers are lost (arrow 2), the upper EBHA switches to
HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
of the SV.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING ENGAGEMENT AND RECONFIGURATION - RUDDERS

Elevators
The INBD aileron has been taken as an example to show how the
If P3 is lost (arrow 1), the conventional servocontrol switches to
DAMPING MODE, the EHA switches to ACTIVE MODE.
P1 sends to the MDE an electrical signal. The feedback LVDT gives
If all the computers are lost (arrow 2), the conventional servocontrol
of the SV.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING ENGAGEMENT AND RECONFIGURATION - ELEVATORS

THS
If P3 is lost (arrow 1), the green hydraulic motor switches to STAND
BY MODE, the yellow hydraulic motor switches to ACTIVE MODE
and, the electrical motor still in OFF MODE.
P1 sends to the SV an electrical signal. The resolvers give the screw
jack position and P1 fulfils the "inner" control loop.
If all the computers are lost (arrow 2), the yellow hydraulic motor
of the SV.
There is no "inner" control loop for the THS.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING ENGAGEMENT AND RECONFIGURATION - THS

Electrical Backup System: Servoing
This topic shows the servocontrol servoing done by the backup control
module.
Aileron and Elevator Conventional Servocontrols
filter and maintains the HP maintening valve opened.
The LP maintening valve keeps a pressure inside the servocontrol
is permanently connected to SV return port (R), then it enables the
The flight control computer sends a discrete signal to the mode
solenoid valve, then, the mode valve is positioned in the ACTIVE
MODE. The mode LVT does not provide to the computer an electrical
signal representative of the mode valve position.
Proportionally to an electrical order from the backup control module
(rate command), the SV controls the hydraulic flow (so the rod speed
of the actuator), connecting either the pressure port (P) with U2 and
the return port (R) with U1 for a rod extension (or either P with U1
and R with U2 for a rod retraction).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING - AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS

Electrical Backup System: Servoing (continued)
Rudder EBHA
During the electrical backup system operation, the EBHA is in the
HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE.
filter and maintains the HP maintening valve opened.
The LP maintening valve keeps a pressure inside the servocontrol
is permanently connected to SV return port (R), then it enables the
The backup control module sends an electrical order to the hydraulic
mode solenoid valve, then, the mode valve is positioned in the
ACTIVE MODE. The mode LVT does not provide to the backup
control module an electrical signal representative of the hydraulic
mode valve position.
The position of the electrical mode valve is not sent too.
Proportionally to an electrical order from the module (rate command)
to the SV, this one controls the hydraulic flow, connecting either the
pressure port (P) with U2 and the return port (R) with U1 for a rod
extension (or either P with U1 and R with U2 for a rod retraction).
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
The feedback LVDT gives to the module a feedback of the rod position
for the "inner" control loop.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING - RUDDER EBHA

Electrical Backup System: Servoing (continued)
Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
The HP hydraulic circuit supplies the yellow HCM through the HP
filter and maintains the inlet check valve opened.
The computer sends discrete signals to the brake SOV "A" and to the
SOV "B",
Proportionally to an electrical order from the module (rate command),
the SV controls the hydraulic flow. The flow limiter prevents motor
over speed.
There is no position monitoring given to the backup control module.
Only, orders are sent by the module.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
ELECTRICAL BACKUP SYSTEM: SERVOING - TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR

Reminder
The A380 can be controlled by the electrical backup system even if all
the flight control computers are lost.
The aircraft is controlled on the three axes by some servocontrols that
actuate some surfaces.
The backup control module fulfills the servoing of these surfaces:
hydraulic system,
and,
- the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS), through the yellow hydraulic
motor.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D8BCM000001
REMINDER
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS MAINTENANCE (3)

Damping test is also divided in 3 tests:
EFCS tests - Damping test of the ailerons
For each aileron actuator, the Aileron Damping Test
The Flight Control System provides the following interactive BITE/system
- launch damping coefficient measurement via CMS interface
tests via CMS application:
- check damping value on CMS and make sure that no warning is
- Safety test
emitted
- System test
- Damping test of the elevators
- Confirmation test
For each elevator actuator, the Elevators Damping Test:
- EFCS specific tests and functions
- launch damping coefficient measurement via CMS interface
EFCS tests are launched from OMS HMI (using OMT, OIT, PMAT).
- check damping value on CMS and make sure that no warning is
Safety test emitted
Safety tests are integrated tests of the computers related to the EFCS. - Damping test of the rudder
These tests cover only the monitoring activated with hydraulic off. For each rudder actuator, the Rudder Damping Test
This test is also automatically started at power-up of flight control - launch damping coefficient measurement via CMS interface
computer and at the end of the flight. (last shutdown engine) - check damping value on CMS and make sure that no warning is
emitted
System test The damping test checks the damping coefficient using the differential
This test is used to do a check of the integrity of all EFCS (FCU, pressure transducer that measures the pressure differential between
PRIM1, PRIM2, PRIM3, SEC1, SEC2, SEC3). the two chambers. The goal of the Damping Test is to ensure actuator
This test starts the safety tests of all EFCS computers. . damping function availability.
THSA test is also divided in 3 tests:
Confirmation test
-Yellow hydraulic THSA test
Confirmation test is used to do a check if the faults related to the EFCS -Green hydraulic THSA test
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
are present at the time of request. The confirmation test can be started The goal of Yellow and Green Hydraulic THSA Test is to verify green
without any specific initial conditions. For each new fault, the screen and yellow hydraulic channel operation incl. hydraulic valve block,
is updated. motor and pressure-off brake. This Test performs the test procedure
NOTE: During the test, obey the instructions shown on the terminal. via CMS to check operation of the green hydraulic valves, motor and
EFCS tests pressure-off brake and of the yellow hydraulic valves, motor and
pressure-off brake.
CAUTION: SURFACES WILL MOVE DURING TEST
-Electrical motor THSA test
EFCS specific tests functions is divided in 3 tests:
The goal of Electrical Motor THSA Test is to verify operation of the
-Damping test
stand-by electrical channel include motor, control and power-off brake.
-THSA tests
-BCM test
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS MAINTENANCE (3) Apr 18, 2006
This Test performs test procedure via CMS to check operation of the - IF YOU MOVE THEM QUICKLY, THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
electrical channel include Electrical motor, electrical motor control CAN DECREASE WITH THE RESULT THAT THERE WILL BE
unit and power-off brake 1 and 2. NO SURFACE ACTUATION.
The test of BCM operation is controlled by FCDC1 hosted in
EFCS functions
CPIOM-C1 through dialog with Centralised Maintenance System and
Flight After a component change, it's necessary to refill the EHA. Via the
Warning System. OMS, you can refill this EHA.
When the BCM is active (powered, inhibition discrete signals reset) Connected to the aircraft 5080-PSI (350 bar) HP hydraulic system
and when the test input discrete signal is set from FCDC application through the HP port, the commanded fluid-filling device includes a
Test logic, a specific test sequence is generated. This test sequence solenoid valve, called filling solenoid valve, an HP filter and a filling
allows the verification of: non-return valve. According to the accumulator pressure and
- The rate gyro sensors operation by generation of a predefined test temperature, reflecting the accumulator level, the electronic module
pattern on the rate measured, controls the opening of the filling solenoid valve via flight control
- The control laws operation by generation of a predefined test pattern computer when the aircraft is on ground and hydraulic system is
on the input position measured (side sticks position and pedal available. The complete filling is achieved around 20 seconds.
position). After replacement on aircraft, the actuator length must be adjusted to
- The test sequence is engaged when the test input discrete signal is be consistent with the surface position commanded by the flight control
applied during 6+/-2 seconds only on ground (test inhibited in flight). computers. This function is used to place the spoiler in 1 position in
- To avoid spurious test engagement, a test input discrete signal applied order to allow adjustment of spoiler with AMM procedure. The
for less than 4 seconds doesn't activate a test sequence. actuator length, for a 0 position order is adjusted through the rigging
- To avoid permanent test activation, the test sequence is stopped if of the feedback transducer with the related mechanical adjustment
a test input discrete signal is applied for more than 8 seconds. device.
- The proposed test function performs as follows:
. 6 seconds after test engagement, the rate gyros sensors generate
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
predefined rate gyros patterns, the analog electronics then simulate a

predefined pedals and side sticks position pattern,
WARNING:
- MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF THE FLIGHT
CONTROL SURFACES ARE CLEAR.
- MOVEMENT OF THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES CAN
CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONS AND DAMAGE TO THE
AIRCRAFT OR EQUIPMENT.
CAUTION:
- MOVE THE SIDE STICKS AND/OR THE RUDDER CONTROL
PEDALS SLOWLY WHEN YOU DO THIS TEST.
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EFCS TESTS - SAFETY TEST ... EFCS FUNCTIONS
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EFCS TESTS - SAFETY TEST ... EFCS FUNCTIONS

Specific maintenance item
Specific maintenance item:
- EBHA / EHA Manual Bleeding Device
- EHA Filling
- Spoiler Deactivation
- Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
- Lubrication of THSA ball screw nut
- Visual Check of THSA Hydraulic Motor Drain Bottle Device Including
Hoses
- Visual Check of THSA Gearbox Oil Level
- Detailed Inspection of THSA Gear Box Magnetic Chip Detectors
WARNING: MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF THE
FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES ARE CLEAR. MOVEMENT OF
THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES CAN CAUSE INJURY TO
PERSONS AND DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT OR EQUIPMENT.
EBHA / EHA Manual Bleeding Device
Before operating a maintenance task the hydraulic systems must be
put in the depressurized-for-maintenance configuration. In that case
the operator will be protected from any hydraulic pressurization.
However the EHA/EBHA accumulator maintains a pressure inside
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
the unit that could be dangerous. The accumulator is emptied acting

on the manual bleeding device with a hexagonal wrench. By this way
the internal pressure maintained by the accumulator will be released
and the maintenance operation could be done safely.
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SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - EBHA / EHA MANUAL BLEEDING DEVICE

Specific maintenance item (continued)
EHA Filling
The EHA Filling is only possible on ground.
To fill an EHA, there are 2 modes:
- Automatic filling
-"Manual" filling via OMS
If the level of oil is below normal level, the Flight Control Computer
sends an electrical order to energize the filling solenoid in order to
refill the EHA.
If the level drops below minimum level, an ECAM Message appears,
no auto-refilling is commanded to avoid supplying leak.
After a component change, it's possible to refill the EBHA via the
OMS.
WARNING: MAKE SURE THAT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND
THE WARNING NOTICES ARE IN POSITION BEFORE YOU
START A TASK ON OR NEAR:
-THE FLIGHT CONTROLS
-THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES
-THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS
-COMPONENTS THAT MOVE.
-OVEMEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR INJURE
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PERSONS.
CAUTION:
-DO NOT OPERATE THE FLAPS AND SLATS WHEN ONE OR
MORE "ACCUMULATOR TEST" ARE PERFORMED.
- SURFACES WILL MOVE DURING TEST
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - EHA FILLING

Spoiler Deactivation / Reactivation
The goal is to allow extension of spoilers for maintenance.
Safety precaution must be taken.
A specific tool is installed on maintenance device, then turn to "M"
position in order to deactivate and move spoiler to the extended
position.
A safety collar must be installed.
For reactivation, use the specific tool to turn maintenance device to
"O" position.
- THE FLIGHT CONTROLS
- THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES
- THE LANDING GEAR AND RELATED DOORS
- COMPONENTS THAT MOVE.
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR CAUSE INJURY
TO PERSONS AND CAN CAUSE DAMAGE.
WARNING: MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF
THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES ARE
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
CLEAR. MOVEMENT OF THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES

CAN CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONS AND DAMAGE TO THE
AIRCRAFT OR EQUIPMENT.
The Specific Tools are:
1 SPOILER MAINTENANCE KEY
1 COLLAR, SPOILER ACTUATOR
1 LOCKING TOOL - FLAP/SLAT CONTROL LEVER
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - SPOILER DEACTIVATION / REACTIVATION

Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
Safety Precautions:
-Use the safety Belts
- THE LANDING GEAR AND RELATED DOORS
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR CAUSE INJURY
TO PERSONS AND CAN CAUSE DAMAGE.
- BE CAREFUL WHEN YOU USE OILS AND GREASES.
- OBEY THE MATERIAL MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS
AND THE LOCAL REGULATIONS.
- USE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, GOGGLES AND GLOVES.
- IF YOU GET OIL OR GREASE:
ON YOUR SKIN, REMOVE IT WITH SOAP AND CLEAN WATER
IN YOUR EYES OR IN YOUR MOUTH, FLUSH IT AWAY WITH
CLEAN WATER AND GET MEDICAL AID.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
IN GENERAL, OILS AND GREASES ARE POISONOUS AND

SKIN IRRITANTS.
Three maintenance tasks can be carried out:
Lubrication of THSA ball screw nut
Visual Check of THSA Hydraulic Motor Drain Bottle Device
Including Hoses
Visual Check of THSA Gearbox Oil Level
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - TRIMMABLE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATOR

Specific maintenance item (continued) Visual Check of THSA Gearbox Oil Level
The procedure is:
Lubrication of THSA ball screw nut: - Make sure that the oil is in middle range of the minimum and
The procedure is: maximum on the sight glass (Top up of oil is provided on the top level
-Open the access door of the gearbox).
-Make sure that grease nipples are clean. - Close the access door.
-Lubricate the ballnut assy (fwd and rear grease nipples) with standard
Detailed Inspection of THSA Gear Box Magnetic Chip
grease gun until fresh grease is visible on vent holes only.
-Operate THSA from 0 to -6 position and back to 0 position. Detectors
-Lubricate the ballnut assy again (fwd and rear grease nipples) until The Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) shows the Detailed
fresh grease is visible on vent holes only. Inspection of THSA Gear Box Magnetic Chip Detectors in order to
-Wipe off surplus grease from grease nipples and vent holes. ensure that the power differential gears are safe.
-Close the access door. The procedure is:
Tool: Lock Tool Pitch Trim Switches - Open the access door.
- Remove magnetic chip detectors from the gearbox housing.
Visual Check of THSA Hydraulic Motor Drain Bottle Device - Inspect magnetic chip detectors for metal particles (fragments and/or
Including Hoses chips).
The Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) shows the visual check Note: If metal particles are present in fragments/chips, then carry out
of THSA hydraulic motors drain bottle device including hoses in order a borescope inspection of the power differential.
to ensure that the drain bottle device is serviceable. - Clean and install magnetic chip detectors on the gearbox housing.
Actuator hydraulic motors. The introduction of the drain system shall - Close the access door
prevent contamination of the airframe structure by hydraulic fluid. An oil-draining device with magnetic plugs and non-return valves are
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
The drain bottle device consist of: provided on the lower half of the gearbox.
- Drain hoses (connected to THSA hydraulic motors seepage drain
Visual Check of THSA no-back wear indicator
fitting and drain bottle).
- Drain bottle (attached to THSA Gearbox). The Maintenance Planning Document (MPD) shows the Visual Check
The procedure is: of THSA no-back wear indicator.
- Open the access door The procedure is:
- Check drain bottle device for damage and hydraulic oil fill level -Open the access door.
(Empty bottle if more half filled) -Check that no-back wear detection device has not caused a scratch
- Close the access door mark on the no-back red area.
Note: in case of scratch marks, remove THSA from A/C for work
shop investigation.
-Close the access door
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - LUBRICATION OF THSA BALL SCREW NUT: ... VISUAL CHECK OF THSA NO-BACK WEAR
INDICATOR

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y1000000001
PRIM FLT CTLS OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING (3)

General
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) PRIM FLT CTLS OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
GENERAL

Primary Flight Controls Surface Operation, Control &
Indicating
NOTE: Note: Already seen in the level 2 ATA 29 (monitoring through

Hydraulic page)
Human factor point:
WARNING: Flight control surface movement

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301

Indicating (continued)
Ailerons & Elevators Operation, Control & Indicating
The position of the three ailerons of each half wing in the range [-30;
+20] is represented by the vertical size of a rectangle in an analog
way superimposed to the grey area of permanent part indicating the
total deviation available.
The position of each elevator on each tail plan in the range [-35;
+20] is represented by a green ribbon in an analog way superimposed
to the Grey area of permanent part indicating the total deviation
available.
When indicating zero deviation, the indicator remains present by mean
of a small Green rectangle.
When ailerons are used in high lift configuration, a droop position
index appears on the scale as a white round symbol.
The actuator status is displayed with an Amber box if the actuator is
failed.
Human factor point:
WARNING: ON GROUND, THE EHA AND EBHA (ELECTRICAL

MODE) OPERATION IS INHIBITED.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
SHOULD ANY HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT BE

POWERED, THE INHIBITION IS CANCELLED.
A letter indicating which hydraulic circuit is monitored ('G' for Green
or 'Y' for Yellow) or an electrical symbol representing the status of
the power supply of the actuator changes to amber when the power
supply is failed or not available.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING - AILERONS & ELEVATORS OPERATION, CONTROL
& INDICATING
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
& INDICATING
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& INDICATING
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
& INDICATING
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& INDICATING

Pitch Trim Operation, Control & Indicating
The function of the pitch trim control switches is to send to the
computers the pilot commands in manual mode.
When the AUTOMATIC MODE is available, these switches are
inhibited.
The manual trim control of the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS)
is based on activation of two trim switches A and B. The two switches
A and B have to be pressed in the same direction to permit a nose-up
or nose-down control.
The pitch trim scale is constituted by:
- one white vertical line,
- 2 short horizontal white lines located at each extremity of the vertical
line.
The value of deviation is indicated in an analog way by mean of a
Green filled in black triangular index moving along the vertical line.
At the right of the vertical scale, the value of the pitch trim angle is
written.
Presents to pilots the value of current pitch trim angle and target angle
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
according to GWCG position and the THS angle.

The whole pitch trim symbology (trim wheel and numerical
indications) are displayed at take-off, touch and go and landing.
The motor status is displayed with an Amber box if the motor is failed.
One A letter indicating which hydraulic circuit is monitored ('G' for
Green or 'Y' for Yellow) or an electrical symbol representing the status
of the power supply of the motor changes to amber when the power
supply is failed or not available.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING - PITCH TRIM OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING
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the power supply of the actuator changes to amber when the power
Primary Flight Controls Surface Operation, Control & supply is failed or not available
Rudders Operation, Controls & Indicating
The position of each mobile surface of the rudder is represented in
the range [-30; +30] by a green horizontal ribbon in an analog way
superimposed to the Grey area of permanent part indicating the total
deviation available.
When indicating zero deviation, the indicator remains present by mean
of a small Green rectangle.
The scale for the index position is constituted by 2 green vertical lines
at the extremities indicating the max deviation if aircraft is on ground
removed as soon as aircraft is in flight and replaced by the SRTL
limitation represented by 4 L indexes showing the limit of moving
for the rudder control surfaces in the range [-30, +30].
The rudder trim control panel has the following functions:
- trim motor control,
- trim reset by the reset pushbutton,
- indicates the pedal trim position by means of the digital indicator.
The rudder trim indication is displayed in the range [-30, 30] by
mean of one cyan moving index located between the two surfaces.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
The rudder trim indication is also displayed on Rudder trim panel.

The actuator status is displayed with an Amber box if the actuator is
failed
Human factor point:
WARNING: ON GROUND, THE EHA AND EBHA (ELECTRICAL

MODE) OPERATION IS INHIBITED.
SHOULD ANY HYDRAULIC CIRCUIT BE
POWERED, THE INHIBITION IS CANCELLED.
A letter indicating which hydraulic circuit is monitored ('G' for Green
or 'Y' for Yellow) or an electrical symbol representing the status of
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PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING - RUDDERS OPERATION, CONTROLS & INDICATING
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301

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Spoilers Operation, Controls & Indicating
If spoiler state is valid and deployed, its analog position shall be
included in the range [-35;0] (for spoiler 1 and 2) or [-50;0] (for
spoilers 3 to 8).
In order to indicate the maximum Roll control deviation, a green line
is drawn over the spoiler deviation symbols from 3 to 8 if A/C is on
ground (removed as soon as aircraft is in flight).
The spoiler state is displayed with a Green growing rectangle if spoiler
is available and deployed
The spoilers state are displayed with an Amber rectangle if spoiler is
deployed (and faulty = not available) or an Amber number (1 to 8
counted from inner to outer part of each wing) that means the spoiler
is retracted and faulty.
If a conventional actuator is lost on one side, it is lost symmetrically
on the other side; this is not applicable on EBHA.
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PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING - SPOILERS OPERATION, CONTROLS & INDICATING
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PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS SURFACE OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING - SPOILERS OPERATION, CONTROLS & INDICATING

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Electrical Back Up System Operation, Control & Indicating
WARNING: BCM activated if all computers OFF + one hydraulic circuit

pressurized
The actuators statuses are displayed with an Amber box excepted the
actuators controlled by Backup Control Module (BCM).
The backup control module ensures the servoing of these surfaces:
hydraulic system,
and,
- the THS, through the yellow hydraulic motor.
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ELECTRICAL BACK UP SYSTEM OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING
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ELECTRICAL BACK UP SYSTEM OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING

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Sidestick Priority Operation, Control & Indicating
The priority lights are used to indicate the priority between the two side
sticks and to indicate a dual pilot input on the side sticks.
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SIDESTICK PRIORITY OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING
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Test Capabilities / Specific Tests and Functions
THSA Test
THSA test is also divided in 3 tests:
- Yellow hydraulic THSA test,
- Green hydraulic THSA test,
- Electrical motor THSA test.
The goal of Yellow and Green Hydraulic THSA test is to verify green
and yellow hydraulic channel operation including hydraulic valve
block, motor and pressure-off brake. This test performs the test
procedure via Central Maintenance System (CMS) to check operation
of the green hydraulic valves, motor and pressure-off brake and of
the yellow hydraulic valves, motor and pressure-off brake.
Electrical motor THSA test
The goal of Electrical Motor THSA test is to verify operation of the
stand-by electrical channel include motor, control and power-off brake.
This Test performs test procedure via CMS to check operation of the
electrical channel include Electrical motor, electrical motor control
unit and power-off brake 1 and 2.

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TEST CAPABILITIES / SPECIFIC TESTS AND FUNCTIONS - THSA TEST
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Test Capabilities / Specific Tests and Functions (continued)
Damping Tests
Damping test is also divided in 3 tests:
- damping test of the ailerons,
- damping test of the elevators,
- damping test of the rudder.
Damping test of the ailerons
For each aileron actuator, the aileron damping test:
- launches damping coefficient measurement via CMS interface,
- checks damping value on CMS and make sure that no warning is
emitted.
Damping test of the elevators
For each elevator actuator, the elevators damping test:
- launches damping coefficient measurement via CMS interface
emitted
Damping test of the rudder
For each rudder actuator, the rudder damping test
- launches damping coefficient measurement via CMS interface
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301

emitted
The damping test checks the damping coefficient using the differential
pressure transducer that measures the pressure differential between
the two chambers.
CAUTION: Be careful the middle aileron EHA is now engaged
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
TEST CAPABILITIES / SPECIFIC TESTS AND FUNCTIONS - DAMPING TESTS
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Test Capabilities / Specific Tests and Functions (continued) CAUTION: - MOVE THE SIDE STICKS AND/OR THE RUDDER
CONTROL PEDALS SLOWLY WHEN YOU DO THIS
BCM Test TEST.
The test of Backup Control Module (BCM) operation is controlled - IF YOU MOVE THEM QUICKLY, THE
by FCDC1 hosted in CPIOM-C1 through dialog with Centralized HYDRAULIC PRESSURE CAN DECREASE WITH
Maintenance System (CMS) and Flight Warning System (FWS). THE RESULT THAT THERE WILL BE NO SURFACE
When the BCM is active (powered, inhibition discrete signals reset) ACTUATION.
and when the test input discrete signal is set from FCDC application
test logic, a specific test sequence is generated. WARNING: Flight control surface movement
This test sequence allows the verification of:
- the rate gyro sensors operation by generation of a predefined test
pattern on the rate measured,
- the control laws operation by generation of a predefined test pattern
on the input position measured (side sticks position and pedal position),
- the test sequence is engaged when the test input discrete signal is
applied during 6+/-2 seconds only on ground (test inhibited in flight).
To avoid spurious test engagement, a test input discrete signal applied
for less than 4 seconds does not activate a test sequence.
To avoid permanent test activation, the test sequence is stopped if a
test input discrete signal is applied for more than 8 seconds.
The proposed test function performs as follows:
- 6 seconds after test engagement, the rate gyros sensors generate
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
predefined rate gyros patterns,

- the analog electronics then simulate a predefined pedals and side
sticks position pattern.
Human factor points:
WARNING: - MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF

THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES ARE CLEAR.
- MOVEMENT OF THE FLIGHT CONTROL
SURFACES CAN CAUSE INJURY TO PERSONS
AND DAMAGE TO THE A/C OR EQUIPMENT.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O1LEVEL0301
TEST CAPABILITIES / SPECIFIC TESTS AND FUNCTIONS - BCM TEST
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EHA Filling
The Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator (EHA) filling is only possible on
ground.
After a component change, it is possible to refill the EBHA via the
Onboard Maintenance System (OMS).
WARNING: Flight control surface movement.

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TEST CAPABILITIES / SPECIFIC TESTS AND FUNCTIONS - EHA FILLING
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Spoilers Adjustment
After replacement on A/C, the actuator length must be adjusted to be
consistent with the surface position commanded by the flight control
computers. This function is used to place the spoiler in 1 position in
order to get adjustment of spoiler as per AMM procedure.
The actuator length, for a 0 position order is adjusted through the
rigging of the feedback transducer with the related mechanical
adjustment device.
CAUTION: In progress 8 min, you will be questioned to continue the

adjustment.
If no answer after 10 min, spoilers move back to neutral.
CAUTION: When you stop the operation, the spoilers retract to

neutral.
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TEST CAPABILITIES / SPECIFIC TESTS AND FUNCTIONS - SPOILERS ADJUSTMENT
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SEC FLT CTLS: CONTROLS, COMPUTATION, IND DESC (3)

General
This module shows the controls, the computation, and the indicating of
the secondary flight controls.
The orders coming form the slat/flap lever are sent to Slat Flap Control
Computers (SFCCs).
They also receive data from the Air Data and Reference System for the
automatic command of the SFCCs (flight control laws).
The orders are converted into surface positions, and sent to the surfaces
for deflection.
The computers monitor the position feedback of the surfaces and check
that the surfaces have reached the correct deflection orders.
The positions of the slats and flaps are displayed on the CDS.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27D9CTLIND001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) SEC FLT CTLS: CONTROLS, COMPUTATION, IND DESC (3) Apr 18, 2006
GENERAL

Slat/Flap Control Lever
The slat/flap control lever assembly is Line and Replaceable Unit (LRU).
It receives a command from the pilots.
The system is mainly composed of:
- a housing,
- a lever assembly and,
- two command sensor units (CSUs).
It has five gates position. From "0" to FULL position.
The mechanism has a lift-up locking which when lifted, releases the lever
from its gated position.
When lifted-up and moved, the pilot drives the lever. The two CSUs
measure a lever displacement.
Each CSU has a code wheel equipped with diodes emitting light and
phototransistors.
The phototransistors change the light energy into discrete signals.
The CSU 1 is connected to the SFCC1 and, the CSU2 is connected to
the SFCC2.
In case of jamming, an override mechanism lets pilots put the lever from
the position "0" to the position "1".
Indeed, the pilot can still move the lever by putting a higher force on the
lever than in normal operation.
This pilot given force pushes down the override mechanism by

compressing the spring.
SLAT/FLAP CONTROL LEVER

Slat/Flap Reset Switches
Each SFCC channel can be reset by the pilots via slat/flap reset switches.
Two pairs of reset switches are located in the overhead panel.
The reset switches of SFCC 1 are located on the Integrated Control Panel
(ICP) 1 (CAPT reset panel), while the reset switches of SFCC 2 are
located on the ICP 8 (F/O reset panel).
SLAT/FLAP RESET SWITCHES

Slat Flap Control Computers: Dual Control Concept
Each PCU is divided into two parts.
The slat PCU has an electrical part and a hydraulic part.
The flap PCU has two hydraulic parts.
Each SFCC has a slat channel and a flap channel.
The slat channel of each SFCC is connected to both parts of the slat PCU.
The flap channel of each SFCC is connected to both parts of the flap
PCU.
The motor control logic is following the "active/standby "concept.
Only one SFCC channel controls a PCU motor.
SFCC 1 slat channel is active on the electrical part of the slat PCU, and
SFCC 2 slat part is active on the hydraulic part of the slat PCU.
For example, if a failure occurs onto the SFCC 1 slat channel, the
electrical part control is done by the SFCC 2 slat channel.
Then, the SFCC 2 controls the slat PCU, so the PCU keeps full
performance (no PCU part lost) due to the dual concept control.
SLAT FLAP CONTROL COMPUTERS: DUAL CONTROL CONCEPT

Indicating and Interfaces with Primary Flight Controls
Each SFCC channel is connected to the CDS through ADCN network.
Moreover, there is a backup connection between SFCCs via the CDS
through ARINC 429.
The slat/flap and the lever positions are displayed on the lower part of
the PFD.
The SFCCs send data to the SD for the F/CTL page.
The SFCCs send also data to the Flight Warning System Application for
flight warning, displayed on EWD.
Each channel is connected to the PRIMs and to the SECs. These
communications are done via ARINC 429 and via AFDX.
The SFCCs send to the PRIMs and SECs the slat and flap positions, and
the lever position in order to compute the correct flight control laws.
INDICATING AND INTERFACES WITH PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS
SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (3)

General
This module shows the laws and protections computation of the secondary
flight controls done by the Secondary Flight Control Computers (SFCCs).
Moreover, it shows the controls and monitoring of the secondary flight
control system.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DCSFCC00001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DCSFCC00001
GENERAL

Secondary Flight Control Laws
There are two types of command:
- a manual command and,
- an automatic command.
A position of the slats and flaps is adapted to a manual command on the
slat/flap control lever position.
The SFCCs can modify the position of the slats and flaps for flight safety
reasons. It is the automatic command.
According to the five different protection functions, the SFCCs generate
the corrected commands to the surfaces in order to reach the necessary
and correct deployment angles given by the Air Data and Inertial
Reference System (ADIRS).
The five functions are:
- the slat baulk protection function,
- the slat alpha lock protection function,
- the flap load relief protection function,
- the flap auto command protection function and,
- the slat/flap cruise baulk protection function.
The engagement of the protections is displayed on the CDS.
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SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

Secondary Flight Control Laws: Manual Command
The slat/flap control lever has five positions from "0" to "FULL".
In "0" position, the surfaces are fully retracted, while in "FULL" position,
the surfaces are fully extended.
The relationship between the lever position, slat and flap angles and the
flight phases is shown in the table.
That means that each slat and flap position is adapted to each lever
position.
The slat/flap lever position and the position of the surfaces are displayed
onto the lower part of the PFDs.
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SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: MANUAL COMMAND

Secondary Flight Control Laws: Automatic Command
This topic shows the protections that can be engaged during the automatic
command done by the computers.
Slat Alpha-Lock + Slat Baulk Functions
The slat alpha-lock and the slat baulk functions are closely linked.
The slat channels of the SFCCs receive Corrected Angle Of Attack
(CAOA) and Calibrated Air Speed (CAS) given by the ADIRS for
the function computation.
When the angle of attack is high (alpha lock) or the speed is too low
(slat baulk), slat retraction from 20 (position 1) to fully retracted
position is inhibited to maintain aircraft lift.
An "A LOCK" indication is displayed onto the PFDs when the
alpha-lock or slat baulk function is engaged.
Slat retraction from position 20 to 0 is prevented if CAOA > 8.5
or CAS < 148 kt.
The alpha lock and baulk functions are reset if CAOA < 7.6 or CAS
> 154 kt.
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SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: AUTOMATIC COMMAND - SLAT ALPHA-LOCK + SLAT BAULK FUNCTIONS

(continued)
Flap Load Relief Function
This function retracts the flaps to the deflection related to the lever
position just below the current one if the CAS exceeds the maximum
speed allowed for the current configuration by more than 2.5 kt, that
means maximum Velocity Flap Extended speed + 2.5 kt.
The flap configuration is automatically restored to the original
configuration if the airspeed drops below the maximum airspeed
allowed for the currently configuration by more than - 2.5 kt, that
means maximum Velocity Flap Extended speed - 2.5 kt.
The function is available when the lever is in 2, 3 or FULL position.
There is no flap load relief function with the lever in position 1.
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SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: AUTOMATIC COMMAND - FLAP LOAD RELIEF FUNCTION

(continued)
Flap Auto Command Function (1+F)
This function gives two alternative flaps setting with the control lever
in position 1 according to the CAS.
The configuration 1+F is engaged when the current speed is lower
than 212 kt.
When the CAS reaches 212 kt, the flaps retract automatically to 0 and
the new slat flap configuration is 1, the slats remain in position 1.
If the lever is in position 1 during approach/holding, the flaps remain
at 0 until a higher position is selected or if CAS decreases below 212
kt.
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SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: AUTOMATIC COMMAND - FLAP AUTO COMMAND FUNCTION (1+F)

(continued)
Slat/Flap Cruise Baulk Function
This function keeps the slats and flaps fully retracted if the control
lever is accidentally moved in the position 1 during the cruise phase.
The Slat/Flap cruise baulk function is activated if the altitude is above
22 000 ft or CAS is above 265.5 kt.
The protection is only valid when the lever is put in the position 1.
A lever selection beyond the position 1 (2, 3, or FULL) gives to the
pilot the possibility to override this protection and then, allows the
slats and flap extension/retraction.
There are no indications on the PFDs but an aural warning is emitted
and a message on the EWD is displayed.
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SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS: AUTOMATIC COMMAND - SLAT/FLAP CRUISE BAULK FUNCTION

While, one energized flap WTB solenoid is enough to release the flap
System Overview and Normal System Operation WTB but with the associated hydraulic circuit available.
The position of the transmissions is monitored by the Asymmetry Pick-Off
This topic shows the overview of the secondary flight control system.
Position Units (APPUs) and by the Feedback Pick-Off Position Units
All the interfaces between the SFCCs and the slat and flap components
(FPPUs).
are shown.
Moreover, the SFCCs monitor the switches of the flap interconnection
The system is shown during an extension of slats and flaps.
strut.
During normal operation, both parts of the two PCU are energized.
Due to slat PCU and slat WTBs design, the slat operation still be done
The slat channel of the SFCC 1 controls and monitors the electrical side
without hydraulic circuits with RAT extended, which supplies these
of the slat PCU, while the slat channel of the SFCC 2 controls and
components with electrical power.
monitors the hydraulic side.
With no hydraulic power on ground, the activation of the SLAT E-motor
It is identical for the flap PCU but with the flap channels of the SFCCs.
is inhibited. The E-Motor can only be driven while the On Ground
The operation of the hydraulic parts of the slat and flap PCUs are identical.
E-Motor Function is activated via OMS.
The SFCC sends an electrical signal to the enable solenoid valve.
Then, the SFCC controls the brake solenoid valve. Once the POB is
released (transmission shaft free to rotate), the SFCC controls the
servovalve.
The hydraulic pressure is monitored by the SFCCs.
The electrical side operation of the slat PCU is as follows.
The motor control electronic receives the 115 VAC through the Remote
Control Circuit Breaker (RCCB) controlled by the SFCCs.
Then, the POB is released through a signal sent by the SFCC to the
electronic module.
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Once the transmission shaft is free, the electronic module controls and
monitors the electrical motor according to the signals sent by the SFCCs.
When the system is not failed, SFCC 1 controls and monitors the electrical
part. If SFCC 1 fails, SFCC 2 takes over (dual control concept).
At the same time of the PCUs start sequence, the WTBs are energized
(so released), and transmissions are free.
The slat WTBs are controlled and energized by the SFCCs themselves,
while the flap WTBs are controlled by the SFCCs and supplied by both
hydraulic circuits.
Note that, one energized slat WTB solenoid is enough to release the slat
WTB.
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SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION

Abnormal System Operation System Asymmetry Monitoring
The system asymmetry monitoring of each slat and flap channel of
System position and speed protection monitoring is fulfilled by both SFCCs checks for rupture of the left or right drive shafts using
comparison of APPUs and FPPUs position of a same system transmission. the FPPU and the APPUs.
Any discrepancy between the units is detected as an abnormal operation. There is asymmetry detection if a position discrepancy is greater than
The SFCCs monitor the transmissions. a given threshold between the left and right APPU of each slat and
The abnormal operations can results in: flap system.
- a system overspeed, The monitoring is done as long as the SFCCs are powered.
- a system asymmetry,
- a system runaway, System Runaway Monitoring
- an un-commanded movement and, The system runaway monitoring of each slat and flap channel of both
- a system jam, SFCCs checks for rupture of the central drive shaft using the FPPU
Other abnormal operation can be detected by the SFCCs such as a flap and the APPUs.
misalignment or a slat/flap control lever failure. There is a runaway detection if a position discrepancy is greater than
If any of the mentioned failures above is detected by one SFCC channel, a given threshold between the FPPU and the APPUs.
this channel powers off its associated PCU motor and POB and WTBs. The monitoring is done as long as the SFCCs are powered.
If the other channel does not detect and confirm this failure, the dual
control concept is activated, and this channel controls and monitors the System Uncommanded Movement Monitoring
system. The system un-commanded movement monitoring of each slat and
Nevertheless, if the failure is detected by both SFCC channels, they shut flap channel of both SFCCs checks for a slats or flaps movement that
down their associated PCU motor, and apply their POBs and WTBs, the is not commanded by the SFCCs.
transmission is locked. There is un-commanded movement detection if slats or flaps
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DCSFCC00001
movement is greater than a given threshold away from the commanded

System Overspeed Monitoring target position measured by FPPU.
The system is protected against torque shaft overspeed. The monitoring is done as long as the SFCCs are powered.
The system overspeed monitoring of each slat and flap channel of
both SFCCs checks for overspeed of the left and right transmissions. System Jam Monitoring
There is overspeed detection if left/right transmissions speed is greater The system jam monitoring of each slat and flap channel of both
than a given threshold measured by the left/right APPUs. SFCCs checks for systems speed (slat or flap) during movements
The monitoring is done as long as the SFCCs are powered. using the FPPUs.
There is a jam detection if transmission speed is below a given
threshold measured by the FPPU.
The monitoring is done as long as the SFCCs are powered.
Flaps Misalignment Monitoring
Flap misalignment monitoring of each flap channel of both SFCCs
checks for a misalignment of two adjacent flaps using the proximity
switches.
There is a misalignment detection when the SFCC flap channels detect
a target FAR given by the proximity switches. That means that there
is a position discrepancy between the adjacent pairs of flaps.
Slat/Flap Control Lever Monitoring
The slat/flap control lever monitoring of each slat and flap channel
of both SFCCs checks for valid detent, out of detent, and invalid
position of the lever.
The monitoring gives indication of valid position of the lever as well
as information of an out of detent position.
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DCSFCC00001
ABNORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION - SYSTEM OVERSPEED MONITORING ... SLAT/FLAP CONTROL LEVER MONITORING

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DCSFCC00001
SEC FLT CTLS: SLAT & DROOP NOSE ACT & TX DESC (3)
General
This module shows all the components involved in the slat system.
The slat system is divided into main parts. They are:
- the transmission components (gearboxes, transmission shafts...),
- the Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs),
- the Asymmetry and Feedback Position Pick-off Units (APPUs and
FPPU),
- the slat PCU,
- the slat actuators and the slat surface kinematics.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) SEC FLT CTLS: SLAT & DROOP NOSE ACT & TX DESC (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
GENERAL
Slat Transmission Architecture
Here is the slat system with the main components.
Only the left wing is shown, the right wing has the same symmetrical
components.
This slide shows an overview of the slat system architecture with the
main components.
The slat transmission is driven by the slat PCU via:
- transmissions shafts, and steady bearings,
- a slat T-gearbox,
- system torque limiters,
- bevel gearboxes,
- kink gearboxes,
The actuators transform the power given by the PCU into slat movements.
There are two actuators by surface so four droop nose actuators and
twelve geared rotary actuators.
Moreover, to monitor the slat transmission, APPUs and FPPU monitor
the slat transmission.
If a failure appears, WTBs are applied to hold the transmission in locked
position.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
SLAT TRANSMISSION ARCHITECTURE
Transmissions System Torque Limiter
One system torque limiter per wing is installed between the bevel
The aim of the transmission is to transmit the torque created by the slat gearbox and the T-gearbox.
PCU to the actuators. The function of the system torque limiter is to limit the maximum
Gearboxes transmitted torque to the slat transmission.
If the PCU output torque exceeds a value, the limiter locks
The gearboxes are used to accommodate a change in direction of the
automatically the PCU output torque and transmits it to the fuselage.
slat transmission.
This enables to protect the other components against overload.
For that, several gearboxes are installed all along the wing. There are:
When the output torque level has reduced below a setting value, the
- a slat T-gearbox,
system torque limiter unlocks the transmission automatically and the
- two bevel gearboxes, one has a shaft angle of 32, the other one has
system remains operative after system reverse operation.
a shaft angle of 36 and,
System torque limiter pop out is indicated by means of a mechanical
- two kink gearboxes, with shaft angle of 36.
indicator located on the limiter. Pop out indication still remains after
The slat T-gearbox is used to split the torque into the directions of the
limiter system reset. The mechanical indicator must be reset manually
wing.
on ground.
The T-gearbox is installed near the PCU between the two system
The system torque limiter is lubricated with mineral oil.
torque limiters.
This gearbox has a shaft angle of 90 and a gear ratio of 1.3:1. Transmission Shafts
The T-gearbox is lubricated with semi fluid. The transmission has of torque shafts, steady bearings and joints.
The bevel gearboxes (32 and 36) are used to accommodate a change Most of the transmission shafts are in Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic
of direction of the transmission. (CFRP).
The gearboxes have a ratio of 1:1. They are designed to transfer the torque from the PCU to the actuators
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
The angle shafts are different due to their location. The bevel gearbox through the gearboxes.
installed near the T-gearbox has a shaft angle of 32 while the bevel Moreover, they are designed to compensate wing flexion,
gearbox installed on the middle of the wing has a shaft angle of 36. manufacturing tolerances.
The bevel gearbox is lubricated by semi fluid.
The two kink gearboxes are used to inverse the rotation direction of
the transmission and to accommodate a change of direction.
The kink gearboxes have a ratio of 1.7:1 and a shaft angle of 36.
One is installed after the system torque limiter while the other one is
installed before the bevel gearbox in the middle of the wing (after the
droop nose actuators).
The kink gearboxes are lubricated with semi fluid.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
TRANSMISSIONS - GEARBOXES ... TRANSMISSION SHAFTS
Asymmetry and Feedbacks Position Pick-Off Units
The APPUs and FPPU measure the position of the slat transmission.
The APPUs are installed at the end of the transmission, while the FPPU
is installed on the PCU.
Each unit comprises a gear, which reduces the movement torque shaft to
the range of the redundant position sensors.
The gear ratio is 450:1.
Two zero indication windows are installed on each PPU to allow a 0
position adjustment for installation.
Two redundant resolvers measure the transmission position sent to the
SFCCs through analogical signals.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
ASYMMETRY AND FEEDBACKS POSITION PICK-OFF UNITS
The Wing Tip Brakes are lubricated with Skydrol.
Wing Tip Brakes
The slat WTBs are supplied by electrical power. There are no longer
hydraulically supplied.
They are power off brake type, which means that when they are not
supplied, the WTBs lock the transmission.
The WTBs are engaged and stopped the transmission during failure cases
(slat asymmetry...).
Each WTB has:
- two solenoids,
- a brake system mechanism
- a sensor and its target and,
- a manual release device.
Each solenoid is connected to one SFCC. They are supplied by direct
current.
One solenoid is sufficient to unlock the WTB brake mechanism.
Each solenoid is designed to provide an initial "pull in" current for WTB
releasing, which then is reduced to a "hold in" current to maintain the
brake released. This enables lets reduce electric consumption
(temperature), thus increase the WTB reliability, and decrease also the
solenoid size.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
Each WTB incorporates a proximity switch, which detects and signals

the operational state of the WTB to the SFCC1 only.
The proximity switch is used at each pre flight during a test.
The position of the switch is either target "FAR" or target "NEAR"
depending of the WTB status (released or applied).
When the WTB is not energized (OFF), the WTB is "ON, so the
transmission is locked, the switch target is "FAR".
If the WTB is energized (ON), the WTB is OFF, the transmission is
unlocked or the switch target is "NEAR".
For maintenance purposes, each WTB includes a manual release device.
This enables to release the brake manually during power off conditions.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
WING TIP BRAKES
- the electrical motor,
Slat Power Control Unit - the hydraulic valve block,
- the enable solenoid valve,
The slat PCU is installed in the center of the fuselage (Belly fairing).
- the brake solenoid valve and,
The PCU has an electrical part and a hydraulic part.
- the pressure transducer.
During a normal operation, both parts of the PCU are active (by summing
their speed). But, in the case of one part loss, the PCU is able to move
the surfaces by using the other part, with full torque but at half speed.
This topic shows description of the Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) and
the main components of the PCU.
It shows also, the LRUs operation and the impact of a LRU replacement
inside the PCU.
LRUs and Main Components
The slat PCU is composed of an electrical part, and a hydraulic part.
The main components of the electrical part are:
- the motor control electronic,
- two harnesses (one signal, and one supply) and,
- an electrical motor and its built in power off brake.
The main components of the hydraulic part are:
- the hydraulic valve block,
- the electrical connectors,
- the hydraulic connectors,
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
- the enable solenoid,

- the brake solenoid,
- the pressure transducer
- the swash plate position transducers and,
- the motor speed transducers.
The electrical motor and hydraulic valve block are installed onto a
gearbox and a differential.
The hydraulic power off brake is installed inside this unit.
The LRUs of the slat PCU are:
- the motor control electronic,
- the two harnesses,
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
SLAT POWER CONTROL UNIT - LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS
The motor includes resolvers, which are used to measure the plate
Slat Power Control Unit (continued) angle (two swash plate position resolvers) and the motor speed (two
motor speed resolvers).
Slat PCU Operation
The hydraulic valve block incorporates a pressure transducer to
During a normal operation, both parts of the slat PCU are energized. monitor pressure downstream of the shut off valve.
The SFCC 1 controls and monitors the electrical side, while the SFCC To reduce POB wear, the brake solenoid valve is not energized until
2 controls and monitors the hydraulic side. Note that if a failure occurs, there is sufficient supply pressure.
a SFCC can monitor both parts of the PCU. Moreover, the transducer is also used to limit swash plate position to
The 115 VAC network supplies the electronic module through the give priority to other more critical hydraulic consumer units.
Remote Control Circuit Breaker (RCCB) controlled by the SFCC to Due to slat PCU and slat WTBs design, the slat operation still be done
supply the electrical motor. Then, the electronic module sends to the without hydraulic circuits with RAT extended, which supplies these
SFCC a "115 VAC available" signal. components with electrical power.
The SFCC sends to the module a "MCE enable" signal and, receives With no hydraulic power on ground, the activation of the SLAT
from the module a "ready to drive" signal. E-motor is inhibited. The E-Motor can only be driven while the On
Before motor start, the POB has to be released. The SFCC sends a Ground E-Motor Function is activated via OMS.
"POB command" signal to the module, which transforms it into DC
current for brake releasing.
Once the output shaft is free to rotate, instruction command is sent to
the module by the SFCC.
The SFCC sends an analogical signal representing a speed command.
The module transmits to the motor a DC voltage proportional to the
signal sent by the SFCC.
The DC motor speed is monitored by the SFCC through analogical
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
signals sent by the electronic module.

Also, the module is connected to the SFCC via ARINC 429. The data
sent are mainly temperature data of the electrical motor.
At the same time as the control sequence of the electrical motor, the
pressure is provided to the hydraulic part through the shut off valve
controlled by an enable solenoid valve, signaled by the SFCC.
The SFCC sends to the brake solenoid valve a command signal to
release the POB.
When the output shaft is free, the SFCC controls the servovalve, which
controls the swash plate angle, so the hydraulic motor speed and
direction of rotation.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
SLAT POWER CONTROL UNIT - SLAT PCU OPERATION
The hinge arm is connected to the rib at one side and to the droop
Droop Nose Actuators and Surface Kinematics nose surface at the other side.
Stop points enable to the kinematics to not go over the limits.
The aim of the actuators and the surface kinematics are to transform a
rotation movement into deflection or retraction movements.
For that, there are four droop nose actuators installed, two per droop nose
surface.
Droop Nose Actuators
The droop nose actuators has an input shaft from the PCU transmission
side, a through shaft connecting the rest of the transmission. Moreover
the output shaft is connected to the transmission through reduction
gears.
Between the input shaft and the output shaft, the actuator has a torque
limiter to lock the torque if this one exceeds a maximum value.
If the load difference (between input and output) exceeds the
pre-loaded value, the torque limiter transfers the torque into the
actuator housing.
When the output torque level is reduced below a setting value, the
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001

on ground.
The actuator is filled with lubricant semi fluid.
Surface Kinematics
The surface kinematics components connect and transmit the actuators
movement to the droop nose surface.
The actuator is connected to the actuator lever.
The actuator lever is connected to the drive link, which moves the
hinge arm.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
DROOP NOSE ACTUATORS AND SURFACE KINEMATICS - DROOP NOSE ACTUATORS & SURFACE KINEMATICS
Geared Rotary Actuators and Surface Kinematics
As for the droop nose actuators, the aim of the geared rotary actuators
and the surface kinematics are to transform a rotation movement into
deflection or retraction movements.
For that, there are twelve geared rotary actuators installed, two per slat.
Geared Rotary Actuators
Each geared rotary actuator has an input shaft, an output shaft and a
through shaft.
When the input torque exceeds the maximum value, the limiter
transfers the torque to the actuator housing.
on ground.
The actuator is filled with semi fluid.
Surface Kinematics
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001

movement to the slat surface.
Each one is operated through a rack and pinion mechanism driven by
the actuator output shaft.
The track is attached to the slat surface and then allows the retraction
or extension of the slat.
The track is guided by the rollers installed all along the track.
Two stop points (extend and retract) enable to the kinematics to not
go over the limits.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DASLAT00001
GEARED ROTARY ACTUATORS AND SURFACE KINEMATICS - GEARED ROTARY ACTUATORS & SURFACE KINEMATICS
SEC FLT CTLS: FLAP ACTUATION & TX DESC. (3)

General
This module shows all the components involved in the flap system.
The flap system is divided into main parts. They are:
- the transmission components (gearboxes, transmission shafts...),
- the Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs),
- the Asymmetry and Feedback Position Pick-off Units (APPUs and
FPPU),
- the flap Power Control Unit (PCU),
- the flap actuators and the flap surface kinematics.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) SEC FLT CTLS: FLAP ACTUATION & TX DESC. (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
GENERAL

Flap Transmission Architecture
Here is the flap system with the main components.
Only the left wing is shown, the right wing has the same symmetrical
components.
This slide shows an overview of the flap system architecture with the
main components.
The flap transmission is driven by the flap PCU via:
- transmissions shafts, and steady bearings,
- a flap T-gearbox,
- system torque limiters,
- bevel gearboxes,
-T-bevel gearboxes,
- kink gearboxes,
The drive stations transform the power given by the PCU into flap
movements.
There are two drive stations by surface divided into one center hinge
actuator for flap track 1 and, geared rotary actuators for flap tracks 2 to
6.
Moreover, to monitor the flap transmission, APPUs and FPPU monitor
the flap transmission.
If a failure appears, WTBs are applied to hold the transmission in locked
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
position.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
FLAP TRANSMISSION ARCHITECTURE

The T-bevel gearbox is used to split the transmission in two
Transmissions transmissions.
One part is transferred to the center hinge actuator of the flap 1 with
The aim of the transmission is to transmit the torque created by the flap
a ratio of 2.3:1 and a shaft angle of 69.
PCU to the flap drive stations.
The second part is transferred to the rest of the downstream flap
Gearboxes transmission with a ratio of 1:1 and a shaft angle of 123.5.
The gearboxes are used to accommodate a change in direction of the The T-bevel gearbox is lubricated with semi fluid.
flap transmission. System Torque Limiter
For that, several gearboxes are installed all along the wing. There are:
One system torque limiter per wing is installed between the bevel
- a flap T-gearbox,
gearbox and the T-gearbox.
- two bevel gearboxes, one has a shaft angle of 27, the other one has
The function of the system torque limiter is to limit the maximum
a shaft angle of 67.5,
transmitted torque to the flap transmission.
- a kink gearbox and,
If the PCU output torque exceeds a value, the limiter locks
- a T-bevel gearbox.
automatically the PCU output torque and transmits it to the fuselage.
The flap T-gearbox is used to split the torque into the directions of
This enables to protect the other components against overload.
the wing.
The T-gearbox is installed near the PCU between the two system
torque limiters.
This gearbox has a shaft angle of 90 and a gear ratio of 1:1.
The T-gearbox is lubricated with semi fluid.
The bevel gearboxes (27 and 67.5) are used to accommodate a
change of direction of the transmission.
on ground.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
The gearboxes have a ratio of 1:1.

The system torque limiter is lubricated with mineral oil.
The angle shafts are different due to their location. The bevel gearbox
installed near the system torque limiter has a shaft angle of 27 while Transmission Shafts
the bevel gearbox installed after the T-bevel gearbox has a shaft angle The transmission has of torque shafts, steady bearings and joints.
of 67.5. Most of the transmission shafts are in Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic
The bevel gearbox is lubricated by semi fluid. (CFRP), some are in titanium, other are in steel.
The kink gearbox is used to inverse the rotation direction of the They are designed to transfer the torque from the PCU to the actuators
transmission and to accommodate a change of direction. through the gearboxes.
The kink gearbox has a ratio of 1:1 and a shaft angle of 12. Moreover, they are designed to compensate wing flexion,
It is installed between the flap 1 and the flap 2. manufacturing tolerances.
The kink gearbox is lubricated with semi fluid.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
TRANSMISSIONS - GEARBOXES ... TRANSMISSION SHAFTS

Asymmetry and Feedbacks Position Pick-Off Units
The APPUs and FPPU measure the position of the flap transmission.
The APPUs are installed at the end of the transmission, while the FPPU
is installed on the PCU.
Each unit comprises a gear, which reduce the movement torque shaft to
the range of the redundant position sensors.
The gear ratio is 900:1.
Two zero indication windows are installed on each PPU to allow a 0
position adjustment for installation.
Two redundant resolvers measure the transmission position sent to the
SFCCs through analogical signals.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
ASYMMETRY AND FEEDBACKS POSITION PICK-OFF UNITS

Flap Interconnection strut
There are two flap interconnection struts.
They are installed between each flap.
Each interconnection strut has, two proximity sensors and a target.
The sensors are LRUs but not the interconnection strut.
One sensor is connected to the SFCC 1 flap channel while the other sensor
is connected to the SFCC 2 flap channel.
During a correct alignment of the flaps, the sensors measure a target
"NEAR".
If a flap misalignment occurs due to free wheel on rotary actuators for
example, the interconnection strut gives to the flap an alternative load
path.
Also, it results in a target "FAR" measured by the proximity sensors and
sent to the SFCCs.
Then, the SFCCs signal a flap PCU shut down.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
FLAP INTERCONNECTION STRUT

The Wing Tip Brakes are lubricated with Skydrol.
Wing Tip Brakes
The flap WTBs are supplied by the two hydraulic circuits of the aircraft.
They are power off brake type, which means that when they are not
supplied, the WTBs lock the transmission.
The WTBs are engaged and stopped the transmission during failure cases
(flap asymmetry...).
Each WTB has:
- two solenoid valves,
- two valve blocks,
- a brake system mechanism
- a sensor and its target and,
- a manual release device.
Each solenoid valve is connected to one SFCC.
One hydraulic circuit available is sufficient to unlock the WTB brake
mechanism.
The solenoid valves are normally closed.
When the solenoid valves are supplied, they connect the hydraulic
pressure to the brake system mechanism that releases the WTB.
Otherwise, they are not supplied and so, the WTB is applied and locks
the transmission.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
Each WTB incorporate a proximity switch, which detects and signals the
operational state of the WTB to the SFCC1 only.
The proximity switch is used at each pre flight during a test.
The position of the switch is either target "FAR" or target "NEAR"
depending of the WTB status (released or applied).
When the WTB is not energized (OFF), the WTB is "ON, so the
transmission is locked, the switch target is "FAR".
If the WTB is energized (ON), the WTB is OFF, the transmission is
unlocked or the switch target is "NEAR".
For maintenance purposes, each WTB includes a manual release device.
This enables to release the brake manually during power off conditions.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
WING TIP BRAKES

- swash plates angular position sensors and,
Flap Power Control Unit - motor angular position sensors
The LRUs of the flap PCU are:
The flap PCU is installed in the center of the fuselage (belly fairing).
- the power off brakes,
The PCU has two hydraulic parts, one is supplied by the green circuit,
- the manifold assemblies,
the other one is supplied by the yellow circuit.
- the variable displacement hydraulic assemblies,
During a normal operation, both parts of the PCU are active (by summing
- the enables solenoid valves,
their speed). But, in the case of one part loss, the PCU is able to move
- the brake solenoid valves,
the surfaces by using the other part, with full torque but at half speed.
- the pressure transducers and,
This topic shows description of the Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) and
- the servovalve.
the main components of the PCU.
It shows also, the LRUs operation and the impact of a LRU replacement
inside the PCU.
LRUs and Main Components
The flap PCU is composed of a green hydraulic part, and a yellow
hydraulic part.
The PCU has these components:
- a gearbox and a differential,
- two hydraulic power off brakes,
- two manifold assemblies,
- two variable displacement hydraulic motor assemblies and,
- two protective covers.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
Each manifold assembly has of:

- a valve block,
- hydraulic ports,
- a enable solenoid valve,
- a isolation valve,
- a brake solenoid valve and,
- a pressure transducer.
The variable displacement hydraulic motor assembly has the following
components:
- a hydraulic motor,
- a servovalve,
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
FLAP POWER CONTROL UNIT - LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Flap Power Control Unit (continued)
Flap PCU Operation
During a normal operation, both parts of the flap PCU are energized.
The SFCC 1 controls and monitors the green hydraulic part, while the
SFCC 2 controls and monitors the yellow hydraulic side. Note that if
a failure occurs, a SFCC is able to control and monitor both parts of
the PCU.
The operation of the both parts is identical. Only the green hydraulic
part operation is shown.
The pressure is given to the green hydraulic part through the isolation
valve controlled by an enable solenoid valve, signaled by the SFCC.
release the POB.
angle (two swash plate angular position sensors called SAPS) and the
motor speed (two motor angular position sensors called MAPS).
The hydraulic valve block incorporates a pressure transducer to
monitor pressure downstream of the isolation valve.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
To reduce POB wear, the brake solenoid valve is not energized until
there is sufficient supply pressure.
Moreover, the transducer is also used to limit swash plate position to
give priority to other more critical hydraulic consumer units.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
FLAP POWER CONTROL UNIT - FLAP PCU OPERATION

Center Hinge Geared Rotary Actuator (Flap Track 1) And
Surface Kinematics
The aim of the actuators and the surface kinematics are to transform a
For that, there are six actuators installed, two per flap surface.
The flap actuator of the flap track 1 is different than the other flap
actuators.
Center Hinge Geared Rotary Actuator (Flap Track 1)
The center hinge geared rotary actuator receives the torque coming
from the flap transmission (bevel gearbox, T-bevel gearbox, down
drive shaft).
The input gearbox installed onto the center hinge arm geared rotary
actuator transmits the torque to the actuator.
The actuator has an input stage, and a planetary output stage.
The torque is transmitted to the output lever, which is connected to
the flap drive strut.
Surface Kinematics
movement to the flap surface.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
The flap track beam is attached to the aircraft structure via the aft and
forward attachments and via the Y struts.
The flap drive strut connects the output lever and the carriage.
The carriage rolls onto the flap track beam via the carriage rollers.
The flap is attached to the carriage via the attachment point and via
the torque strut.
By a rotating movement, the output lever, the flap drive strut and, the
carriage transform the torque into a flap movement.
There is an end stop to avoid the carriage to go over the limit.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
CENTER HINGE GEARED ROTARY ACTUATOR (FLAP TRACK 1) AND SURFACE KINEMATICS - CENTER HINGE GEARED ROTARY
ACTUATOR (FLAP TRACK 1) & SURFACE KINEMATICS

Side Attached Geared Rotary Actuators (Flap Track 2 to 6)
and Surface Kinematics
As for the center hinge geared rotary actuator, the aim of the side attached
geared rotary actuators and the surface kinematics are to transform a
Side Attached Geared Rotary Actuators (Flap Track 2 to 6)
The side attached geared rotary actuators receive the torque coming
from the flap transmission (down drive gearbox, down drive shaft).
The input gearbox installed onto the beam transmits the torque to the
geared actuator via the cross shaft.
The actuator, connected to the cross shaft, has an input stage, and a
planetary output stage.
The torque is transmitted to the output lever, which is connected to
the flap drive strut.
Surface Kinematics
movement to the flap surface.
The flap is attached to the flap drive strut, the carriage and, the rear
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
link.
The carriage rolls out onto the track beam via rollers.
By a rotating movement, the output lever, the flap drive strut, the
carriage and, the rear link transform the torque into a flap movement.
The actuator has end-stops to limit the movement of the output lever
to a defined angle.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27DBFLAP00001
SIDE ATTACHED GEARED ROTARY ACTUATORS (FLAP TRACK 2 TO 6) AND SURFACE KINEMATICS - SIDE ATTACHED GEARED
ROTARY ACTUATORS (FLAP TRACK 2 TO 6) & SURFACE KINEMATICS
SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS MAINTENANCE (3)

Test Capabilities Flap/Slat System Test
The objective of the System Test is to check the integrity of the SFCC
The secondary flight control system provides the following interactive and all peripheral LRUs including the detection of failures, which are
tests: not covered by the continuous monitoring.
- Automatic Safety Test: Only for Display Purpose The test is performed manually in interactive mode via the CMS.
- Safety Test The first phase of this test checks the internal integrity of the SFCCs
- System Test (equal to Safety Test).
- WTB Engagement Test The second part of the test rechecks the continuous monitoring
- WTB / POB Performance Test covering also interfaces to external LRUs as WTBs, PCU, FPPU,
- Flap PCU Motor 1 (2) Test / Salt PCU Motor 2 Test APPU, ADIRU.
- Standby Motor Test This test does not detect failures only detectable during system
- RCCB Control Test movement (system movement is no precondition for the test).
Test capabilities are launch by CMS. This test can be used for troubleshooting procedures to check whether
Safety test a fault has been successfully repaired.
The objective of the safety test is to check the integrity of the SFCC WTB Engagement test
hardware and all peripheral hardware (LRUs) which are relevant for The Flap (Slat) WTB engagement test includes the testing of hardware
the safety objectives and which are not covered by the continuous and software parts of the WTB function responsible for opening and
monitoring. closing the WTB which are relevant for the safety objectives and
Activation of the safety test can be done via 3 different means: which are not covered by the operational safety monitors. For that
- During power up (POST) reason, this test is a cyclic test and has to be executed at least once in
- Automatically triggered by CMS 10 days.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
- Manually in interactive mode via the CMS. The SFCCs automatically start daily the flap (slat) WTB engagement
The test is performed test during flight phase 11 (after landing).
- without any movement of the system The test can also be performed manually in interactive mode via the
- independent from the other channel (system) CMS.
- without interaction with other A/C systems The WTB engagement test applies the WTBs for a short period of
For the CMS to know when to trigger the automatic safety test, a timer time. The Proximity Switches report to SFCC 1 whether the WTBs
value is sent continuously from the SFCC to the CMS. are engaged or released as commanded.
It is possible to launch the safety test (SFCC self test) manually. If the engagement test was successful; the counters of the respective
Make sure that flaps are in retracted position SFCCs are set to zero.
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS MAINTENANCE (3) Apr 18, 2006
The main timer used for monitoring of the WTB engagement is a day The test is performed manually in interactive mode via the CMS.
counter based on a date received from the clock. As a backup, an This test checks the function of the following PCU components (LRIs):
SFCC operational counter is used. - Valve Block
If the engagement test was unsuccessful for 10 consecutive days (9 - Servo Valve
consecutive days plus one flight) or not performed then the F/CTL - Enable Valve
FLAP (SLAT) FAULT - TIP BRK TEST REQUIRED warnings are - PCU Motor
displayed on the Engine Warning Display (EWD). - Pressure Switch
It will be requested to perform a WTB engagement test manually via This test is available only for the Hydraulic Motors (Flap Motor 1 and
the CMS. 2, Slat Motor 2). The E-Motor does not contain any LRIs. Therefore
isolation of the failure found by continuous monitoring is not
WTB / POB Performance Test
necessary.
The purpose of the WTB/POB performance test is to check the correct
application, torque resistance and release of the WTBs and POBs by Standby Motor Test
driving the system against the closed WTB (closed POB) on single The objective of the standby motor test is to confirm failures within
channel control (controlling single motor). the standby motor path while the SFCC channel is in dual control
The test is performed manually in interactive mode via the CMS. mode.
The performance of the WTB is tested by driving the PCU Motor The test is performed manually in interactive mode via the CMS.
against the closed WTB for approximately 4 seconds. By that time, During the test, the SFCC only activates the standby motor. The default
the System Torque Limiter has tripped. motor is not activated.
The correct test torque value is achieved if the required twist angle During the test, the system does not move, as the POBs are kept
of the transmission shaft between the PCU and the WTB is achieved. deenergized.
This angle is measured by comparing the FPPU and APPU angles. This test checks for standby motor failures also checked by continuous
The performance of the POB is tested by driving the PCU Motor monitoring.
against the closed POB until the motor stalls.
RCCB Control Test
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
The test is OK:

- if the APPU angle does not change while the system drives against The objective of the RCCB control test is to check for the correct
the closed WTB, function of the slat E-motor RCCBs.
- if the FPPU angle does not change while the system drives against The test is performed manually in interactive mode via the CMS.
the closed POB The test is triggered by slat channel 1 / 2.
- if the required twist angle is achieved The test checks for 'jammed open' or 'jammed closed' condition of the
RCCBs.
Flap PCU Motor 1 (2) Test / Slat PCU Motor 2 Test
The objective of the PCU flap motor 1(2)/slat motor 2 test is to confirm
failures found by continuous monitoring and to further isolate the
failures.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
TEST CAPABILITIES - SAFETY TEST ... RCCB CONTROL TEST

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001

Specific Functions Specific Data Readout Function
The purpose of the Specific Data Readout Function is to transmit
NVM Reset Function dynamically actual input data from the SFCC to the maintenance
The NVM Reset Function release WTB Software operator for troubleshooting purposes.
The purpose of the NVM Reset Function is to reset NVM latched This function is performed manually interactive mode via the CMS.
monitors of the Flap (Slat) SFCC channel. The specific data readout function transmit following information:
The specific function is performed manually in interactive mode via - Actual synchro angle values of the FPPU and APPUs
the CMS. - Discrete inputs from hydraulic system pressures switches, PCU
pressure transducers and flaps lever
BITE Memory Dump Function
- States of the ARINS 429 inputs from the ADIRU and the x-channels
The purpose of the BITE memory dump function is to readout via - Received ARINC 429 cross-communication labels of the SFFCs
maintenance terminal all failure data stored in the BITE NVM. - Sate of the interconnection strut and wing tip brake proximity sensors
The specific function is performed manually in interactive mode via
the CMS.
Pin Programming Readout Function
The purpose of the pin programming readout function is to transmit
the actual SFCC status of discrete signals used for pin programming
(SFCC installation mode and operation mode) to the maintenance
operator.
The specific function is performed manually in interactive mode via
the CMS.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
When this function is activated, the actual status of the discrete inputs
used for pin programming will be displayed.
On Ground E-Motor Drive Function
The purpose of the on ground E-motor drive function is to be able to
drive the slat E-motor in the absence of hydraulic power.
With no hydraulic power on ground, the activation of the slat E-motor
is inhibited. The E-motor can only be driven while this function is
activated.
This function is performed manually in interactive mode via the CMS.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS - NVM RESET FUNCTION ... SPECIFIC DATA READOUT FUNCTION

Specific Maintenance Item
WTB Manually Release on Ground
For maintenance purposes, each WTB includes a manual release
device. This enables to release the brake manually during power off
conditions.
Safety Precaution:
- MAKE SURE THAT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND THE
WARNING NOTICES ARE IN POSITION BEFORE YOU START
A TASK ON OR NEAR:
- THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR INJURE
PERSONS.
MAKE SURE THAT THE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM IS CLEAR
OF PERSONS AND/ OR EQUIPMENT.
MOVEMENT OF THE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM CAN CAUSE
INJURY AND/OR DAMAGE.
Get access to the WTB Maintenance Device
Remove the locking pin
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
Turn the maintenance device from the 'O' to the 'M' position with
appropriate tool
WTB released
After Maintenance Operation, Return Maintenance Device to "O"
position
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - WTB MANUALLY RELEASE ON GROUND

Specific Maintenance Item (continued)
Flap Geared Rotary Actuator (GRA) Actuator Unscheduled
replenishment of semi fluid
Lessons learnt have been incorporated in the A380 Flap Geared Rotary
Actuator, a new sealing was designed to take the experience.
Despite new design, if water ingress occurs, 20% volume of water
can be absorbed in the semifluid without leading to ice formation.
Partial Semifluid change without fairing removal can be carried out
in 32 flap position (flaps full).
For unscheduled trouble shooting, drain and refill of GRA semifluid
is realizable in extended full flap position but semi fluid can not be
replaced and drained completely.
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - FLAP GEARED ROTARY ACTUATOR (GRA) ACTUATOR UNSCHEDULED REPLENISHMENT OF
SEMI FLUID

Specific Maintenance Item (continued)
Position Pick off Unit (PPU) Adjustment
The Position Pickoff Unit (PPU) measure the position of the torque
shafts of the slat / flap system. The PPUs comprise a gear, which
reduces the movement of the torque shaft to the range of two redundant
position sensors.
The first stage is a marking on the input shaft and the housing which
match at 0 position. A medium indication is attached to the gearbox
and can be observed through a window in the housing. A triangle
exactly points to a line at zero.
On the back side of the PPU there is the final stage, where also two
lines shall fit with each other at 0.
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27Y2000000001
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE ITEM - POSITION PICK OFF UNIT (PPU) ADJUSTMENT
SEC FLT CTLS OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING (3)

General
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) SEC FLT CTLS OPERATION, CONTROL & INDICATING (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
GENERAL

A white shape represents the wing fixed part as a permanent part.
Slat and Flap Control & Indicating The S/F current positions are symbolized by indexes moving in either
direction (extension or retraction) according to slat and flap positions.
Human factor point:
Four filled white triangles located at the rear of the wing fixed part symbol
WARNING: Flight control surface movement. indicate the theoretical positions for flap extension (configuration not
Flight control surface movement risk of interference between clean).
slat or droop nose and engine cowling. Two white dots located at the front of the wing fixed part symbol indicate
The Slat/Flap positions for indication on the PFDs are signaled to the the theoretical positions for slat extension (configuration not clean).
Control and Display System (CDS) from each SFCC channel via Avionics Under the fixed wing part symbol, the indication of lever position is
Full Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX) (and ARINC429) based on the displayed if current configuration is not clean.
Feedback Position Pick-off Units (FPPUs) installed on the power control The lever position indication is:
units. - in green if current slat/flap position matches the lever position,
The Slats and Flaps actual positions are symbolized by indexes moving - in cyan otherwise (Slat/Flap are in transit).
in either direction (extension or retraction) according to the movement A cyan triangle on the flap side is displayed upon the white triangle
of the surfaces. related to the lever position chosen by pilots if flaps are in transit.
A symbol represents the wing fixed part - in clean configuration (S/F A cyan dot on the slat side shall be displayed upon the white dot related
retraced) both indexes for Slats and Flaps actual positions are located to the lever position chosen by pilots if slats are in transit.
side by side with this symbol. All these indications disappear when slat and flap are not in transit
White dots show the theoretical possible S/F positions - they are not anymore.
displayed in clean configuration. The actuator status is displayed with an Amber box if the actuator has
The letter S (respectively F) indicates the front (respectively rear) part failed.
of the wing - they are not displayed in clean configuration. A letter indicating which hydraulic circuit is monitored ('G' for Green or
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
When the flight crew selects a different S/F configuration from the present 'Y' for Yellow) or an electrical symbol representing the status of the
one (with the Flaps Lever), specific dots appear below the selected S/F power supply of the actuator changes to amber when the power supply
positions and disappear when these selected positions are reached by the is failed or not available.
surfaces - one considers that the selected position is reached at the
positioning threshold
Flaps Lever configuration is indicated - indication can be 0, 1, 1+F, 2, 3,
FULL - in clean configuration, the lever configuration indication is not
displayed.
The PFD slat flap indicator presents the position of the slat, flap and
spoiler surfaces, using symbols that represent a wing cross section.
It presents also the landing gear when they are locked down.
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SLAT AND FLAP CONTROL & INDICATING
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Slat & Flap PCU Operation
Slat & Flap PCU Operation
The pressure is given to the hydraulic part through the isolation valve
controlled by an enable solenoid valve, signaled by the SFCC.
release the POB.
angle (two Swash Plate Angular Position Sensors called SAPS) and
the motor speed (two Motor Angular Position Sensors called MAPS).
Slat PCU Electrical Part Operation
During a normal operation, both parts of the slat PCU are energized.
The SFCC 1 controls and monitors the electrical side, while the SFCC
2 controls and monitors the hydraulic side. Note that if a failure occurs,
a SFCC can monitor both parts of the PCU.
Remote Control Circuit Breaker (RCCB) controlled by the SFCC to
supply the electrical motor.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
Before motor start, the POB has to be released. The SFCC sends a
"POB command" signal to the module, which transforms it into DC
current for brake releasing.
Once the output shaft is free to rotate, instruction command is sent to
the module by the SFCC.
The SFCC sends an analogical signal representing a speed command.
The module transmits to the motor a DC voltage proportional to the
signal sent by the SFCC.
The DC motor speed is monitored by the SFCC through analogical
signals sent by the electronic module.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP PCU OPERATION - SLAT & FLAP PCU OPERATION & SLAT PCU ELECTRICAL PART OPERATION

Slat & Flap PCU Abnormal Operation
Dual Control Concept
Each PCU is divided into two parts.
The slat PCU has an electrical part and a hydraulic part.
The flap PCU has two hydraulic parts.
Each SFCC has a slat channel and a flap channel.
The slat channel of each SFCC is connected to both parts of the slat
PCU.
The flap channel of each SFCC is connected to both parts of the flap
PCU.
The motor control logic is following the "active/standby "concept.
Only one SFCC channel controls a PCU motor.
SFCC 1 slat channel is active on the electrical part of the slat PCU,
and SFCC 2 slat part is active on the hydraulic part of the slat PCU.
For example, if a failure occurs onto the SFCC 1 slat channel, the
electrical part control is done by the SFCC 2 slat channel.
Then, the SFCC 2 controls the slat PCU, so the PCU keeps full
performance (no PCU part lost) due to the dual concept control.
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP PCU ABNORMAL OPERATION - DUAL CONTROL CONCEPT

Slat & Flap PCU Abnormal Operation (continued)
Hydraulic or Electrical Power Failure
Transmission Failure (Asymmetry)
System position and speed protection monitoring is fulfilled by
comparison of APPUs and FPPUs position of a same system
transmission.
Any discrepancy between the units is detected as an abnormal
operation.
The SFCCs monitor the transmissions.
The abnormal operations can result of:
- a system overspeed,
- a system asymmetry,
- a system runaway,
- an uncommanded movement,
- a system jam,
If any of the mentioned failures above is detected by one SFCC
channel, this channel shuts down its related PCU motor and applies
its respective POB and WTBs.
If the other channel does not detect this failure, the dual control
concept is activated, and this channel controls and monitors the system.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
Nevertheless, if the failure is detected by both SFCC channels, they

shut down their related PCU motor, and apply their POBs and WTBs;
the system is locked.
An amber "S LOCKED" message and an amber slat index are
displayed if Slats are LOCKED
An amber "F LOCKED" message and an amber flap index are
displayed if Flaps are LOCKED
An amber "S", an amber slat index and line are displayed when slat
part is faulty.
An amber "F", an amber flap index and line are displayed when flap
part is faulty.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP PCU ABNORMAL OPERATION - HYDRAULIC OR ELECTRICAL POWER FAILURE & TRANSMISSION FAILURE
(ASYMMETRY)
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP PCU ABNORMAL OPERATION - HYDRAULIC OR ELECTRICAL POWER FAILURE & TRANSMISSION FAILURE
(ASYMMETRY)

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301

Slat & Flap Laws of Operation (Protections) & Indication
Slat Alpha Lock & Baulk Protection
Slat Alpha-lock Function
This automatic mode inhibits the retraction of the slats at high angles
of attack.
Slat retraction from 20 deg to fully retracted position is inhibited, if
Corrected Angle Of Attack (CAOA) exceeds 8,5 deg. of incidence.
The function is reset if CAOA falls below 7.6 deg.
With no data received from Air Data/Inertial Reference Units
(ADIRUs), the last received air data will be used for slat alpha-lock
function until new command is selected.
Slat Baulk Function
This automatic mode inhibits the retraction of the slats at low airspeed.
Slat retraction from 20 deg to fully retracted position is inhibited, if
Calibrated Air Speed (CAS) falls below148 kts.
The function is reset if CAS exceeds 154 kts.
With no data received from ADIRUs, the last received air data will
be used for slat baulk function until new command is selected.
A green " A LOCK" pulse, and a green slat index and line pulse when
slat alpha lock or baulk is engaged.
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP LAWS OF OPERATION (PROTECTIONS) & INDICATION - SLAT ALPHA LOCK & BAULK PROTECTION

(continued)
Flap Auto Command
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP LAWS OF OPERATION (PROTECTIONS) & INDICATION - FLAP AUTO COMMAND

(continued)
Flap Relief Load Protection
Flap Load Relief Function
This function commands a flap retraction to the next lower
configuration automatically if the airspeed exceeds the maximum
speed allowed for the currently selected configuration by more than
+2,5 kts.
The flaps are automatically restored to their original position if the
airspeed drops below the maximum speed allowed for the selected
configuration by more than -2,5 kts.
There is no flap load relief function with lever in position 0 or 1.
The activation of the flap load relief function is indicated to the flight
crew.
With no data received from ADIRUs the last received air data will be
used for flap load relief function until new command is selected.
Indications
A green "F RELIEF" pulse, and a green flap index and line pulse when
flap relief information is received.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
A green "S RELIEF" pulse, and a green slat index and line pulse when
slat load relief is engaged.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SLAT & FLAP LAWS OF OPERATION (PROTECTIONS) & INDICATION - FLAP RELIEF LOAD PROTECTION

- if the APPU angle does not change while the system drives against
Test Capabilities the closed WTB,
- if the FPPU angle does not change while the system drives against
WTB / POB Performance Test
the closed POB,
Human factor points: - if the required twist angle is achieved.

THE WARNING NOTICES ARE IN POSITION
BEFORE YOU START A TASK ON OR NEAR:
- THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED
DOORS
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR
INJURE PERSONS.
MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF THE
FLIGHT CONTROLS ARE CLEAR.
MOVEMENT OF FLIGHT CONTROLS CAN CAUSE
INJURY TO PERSONS AND/OR DAMAGE.
The purpose of the WTB/POB performance test is to check the correct
application, torque resistance and release of the WTBs and POBs by
driving the system against the closed WTB (closed POB) on single
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
channel control (controlling single motor).

The test is manually done in interactive mode via the CMS.
The performance of the WTB is tested by driving the PCU Motor
against the closed WTB for approximately 4 seconds.
By that time, the System Torque Limiter has tripped.
The correct test torque value is achieved if the required twist angle
of the transmission shaft between the PCU and the WTB is achieved.
This angle is measured by comparing the FPPU and APPU angles.
The performance of the POB is tested by driving the PCU Motor
against the closed POB until the motor stalls.
The test is successful:
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
TEST CAPABILITIES - WTB / POB PERFORMANCE TEST

Specific Functions
NVM Reset Function (WTB Reset)
The purpose of the NVM Reset Function is to reset NVM latched
monitors of the Flap (Slat) SFCC channel.
The specific function is manually done in interactive mode via the
CMS.
The specific function resets the NVMs related to monitors and does
a reset of all monitors.
WARNING: If torque applied on WTBs, when releasing the WTBs

the transmission might be moving.
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS - NVM RESET FUNCTION (WTB RESET)
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301

- Discrete inputs from hydraulic system pressures switches, PCU
Specific Functions (continued) pressure transducers and flaps lever
- States of the ARINS 429 inputs from the ADIRU and the x-channels
On Ground E-Motor Drive Function
- Received ARINC 429 cross-communication labels of the SFFCs
Human factor points - Sate of the interconnection strut and wing tip brake proximity sensors

THE WARNING NOTICES ARE IN POSITION
BEFORE YOU START A TASK ON OR NEAR:
- THE FLIGHT CONTROLS,
- THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES,
- THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED
DOORS,
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR
INJURE PERSONS.
MAKE SURE THAT THE TRAVEL RANGES OF THE
FLIGHT CONTROLS ARE CLEAR.
MOVEMENT OF FLIGHT CONTROLS CAN CAUSE
INJURY TO PERSONS AND/OR DAMAGE.
The purpose of the on ground E-motor drive function is to be able to
drive the SLAT E-motor in the absence of hydraulic power.
With no hydraulic power on ground, the activation of the SLAT
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
E-motor is inhibited. The E-motor can only be driven while this

function is activated.
This function is manually done in interactive mode via the CMS.
Specific Data Readout Function
The purpose of the Specific Data Readout Function is to transmit
dynamically actual input data from the SFCC to the maintenance
operator for troubleshooting purposes.
This function is performed manually interactive mode via the CMS.
The specific data readout function transmit following information:
- Actual synchro angle values of the FPPU and APPUs
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27O2LEVEL0301
SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS - ON GROUND E-MOTOR DRIVE FUNCTION & SPECIFIC DATA READOUT FUNCTION
FLIGHT CONTROLS COMPONENT LOCATION (3)

Cockpit
Emergency Avionic Bay
Main Avionics Bay
FWD Cargo Compartment
Wing
Ailerons
Spoilers
Flaps
Slats
Outboard Engine
Center Fuselage Belly Fairing

Flaps
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27C1LEVEL0301
Slats
Miscellaneous
Tail
Rudder
Elevator
THS
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) FLIGHT CONTROLS COMPONENT LOCATION (3) Apr 18, 2006

L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM27C1LEVEL0301
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) FLIGHT CONTROLS COMPONENT LOCATION (3) Apr 18, 2006
DOCUMENTATION-COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (3)

General
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
MAINTENANCE COURSE - T1 & T2 (RR / Metric) DOCUMENTATION-COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (3) Apr 18, 2006
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
GENERAL

Complementary Information Philosophy
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
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COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION PHILOSOPHY

Complementary Information Philosophy (continued)
TFU Purposes
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION PHILOSOPHY - TFU PURPOSES

Complementary Information Philosophy (continued)
SIL Purposes
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION PHILOSOPHY - SIL PURPOSES

Means For Technical and Operational Issues
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
MEANS FOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Means For Technical and Operational Issues (continued)
TFU through AIRNAV
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
MEANS FOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES - TFU THROUGH AIRNAV

TFU and SIL through AIRMAN
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
MEANS FOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES - TFU AND SIL THROUGH AIRMAN

EDCI Consultation Tool
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
MEANS FOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES - EDCI CONSULTATION TOOL

AOLS Consultation Tool
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
MEANS FOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES - AOLS CONSULTATION TOOL

Complementary Information Examples
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION EXAMPLES
L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
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L1W06161 - L0KT0T0 - LM00O2LEVEL0301
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AIRBUS S.A.S.
31707 BLAGNAC cedex, FRANCE
STM
REFERENCE L1W06161
APRIL 2006
PRINTED IN FRANCE
AIRBUS S.A.S. 2006
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
AN EADS JOINT COMPANY

WITH BAE SYSTEMS

Level III - Ata 27 Flight Controls

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Level III - Ata 27 Flight Controls

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A380

TECHNICAL TRAINING MANUAL

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LEVEL III - ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

Each SSTDU has 14 potentiometers. They transmit analogical signals to

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

SPEEDBRAKE/GROUND SPOILER LEVER

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

FAULT/RESET PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

signals to the PRIMs by ARINC 429.

OTHER INPUTS - ACCELEROMETER UNITS & RATE GYROMETER UNITS

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

OTHER INPUTS - ELEVATOR AND RUDDER TRANSDUCER UNITS

PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS: CONTROLS DESC. (3)

OTHER INPUTS - HYDRAULIC PRESSURE SWITCHES AND TRANSMITTERS

PRIM FLT CTLS: COMPUTATION & INDICATING DESC. (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: COMPUTATION & INDICATING DESC. (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: COMPUTATION & INDICATING DESC. (3)

INDICATING INTERFACES - FAULT/RESET PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES ... CDS INTERFACES

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

AILERON AND ELEVATOR CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS: MODE AND OPERATION

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

For the elevator conventional servocontrols, the flight control

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - HYDRAULIC MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - BLOCKING MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROLS DES (3)

SPOILER CONVENTIONAL SERVOCONTROL: MODE AND OPERATION - MAINTENANCE MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3)

AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3)

AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: MODE AND OPERATION

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3)

AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - DAMPING MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELECTRO-HYDROSTATIC ACTR DESC (3)

AILERON AND ELEVATOR EHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - ACTIVE MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)

RUDDER EBHA: LRUS AND MAIN COMPONENTS

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)

RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)

RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - DAMPING MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)

RUDDER EBHAS: MODE AND OPERATION - HYDRAULIC ACTIVE MODE

PRIM FLT CTLS: ELEC. BACKUP HYD. ACTR DESC. (3)