Balkinization - Revisting Hart V

2017527 Balkinization:RevistingHartv.
Fuller:"NoVehiclesinthePark"
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Balkinization
Frontpage Wednesday,July23,2008
Balkin.com BooksbyBalkinization
RevistingHartv.Fuller:"NoVehiclesinthePark" Bloggers
Balkinization
anunanticipated
consequenceof
BrianTamanaha
JackM.Balkin
Inthesedogdaysofsummer,Ithoughtitmightbeentertaining(?)forreaders
oftheblogtorevisittheclassic1958HartFullerdebateovertheinterpretation
Archives ofrules.Hartassertedthatruleshaveacoreliteralmeaningthatisdetermined
withoutconsiderationofthepurposesbehindtherule.Fullercounteredthat
purposealwaysfactorsintotheinterpretationofrules(thoughoftenimplicitly).
Theyfoughtitoutusingthisexample:Novehiclesinthepark.Thisdebatehas
beenrehashedinnumerabletimesbylegaltheorists(mostrecentlybyFred
Email:
Schauerhere),withwhatlookslikeastrongconsensusonHartsside.
JackBalkin:
jackbalkinat
yahoo.com IhavealwaysthoughtthatHarthadthebetterofthedebate.Butafterreading
BruceAckerman SchauersdefenseofHartsposition,IbecameconvincedthatFullerwascorrect
bruce.ackermanat (yes,thatiswhatImeanttosay).AsimpleexampleoccurredtomethatIthink
yale.edu clinchesthepoint.Readtheargumentbelowit'sjustafewparagraphsandtell
IanAyres mewhatyouthink.
ian.ayresatyale.edu SanfordLevinson,
MaryDudziak NullificationandSecession
mary.l.dudziakat inModernConstitutional
emory.edu Torepeat:HartinsistedthatNovehiclesintheparkhasacoremeaning
Thought(UniversityPress
JoeyFishkin conveyedbytheconventionalmeaningofitsterms(automobilesprohibited), ofKansas2016)
joey.fishkinat althoughitsapplicationatthepenumbra(tobicyclesandrollerskates,he
gmail.com suggested)isambiguousandmustbedecidedbythejudge(oftenbyreference
HeatherGerken topurpose).Inresponse,Fullerarguedthattheinterpretationofrules
heather.gerkenat
unavoidablyinvolvesconsiderationofunderlyingpurposes,evenwithrespectto
yale.edu
AbbeGluck coremeaning.
abbe.gluckat
yale.edu Toillustratehispoint,FullerpostulatedtheplacementofaWorldWarIItruckin
MarkGraber theparkasawarmemorial.Heaskedwhetherthisiswithinthecoreorthe
mgraberat penumbraoftheNovehiclesintheparkrule,andwhatplacesitthere.The
law.umaryland.edu standardripostetoFullersargumentisthatafunctionaltruck,evenifintended
StephenGriffin
asamemorial,isclearlyprohibitedbytherulebecauseitisavehicle.
sgriffinattulane.edu
BernardHarcourt TheoristssaythatFullersexampledoenotrefuteHartsposition,butmerely
harcourtat servestoillustratethatrules,whenappliedliterally,canhaveunintendedor
uchicago.edu undesirableresults.ThatisSchauersviewofthedebateaswell.
ScottHorton
shortoat ButFullercannotbedismissedsoeasily.Toseewhyhemightberight,read
law.columbia.edu thesestandarddefinitionsofvehicle:1)anymeansinorbywhichsomeone
AndrewKoppelman SanfordLevinson,An
travelsorsomethingiscarriedorconveyed2)aconveyancemovingon ArgumentOpentoAll:
akoppelmanat
law.northwestern.edu wheels,runners,tracks,orthelike,asacart,sled,automobile,ortractor.Now ReadingTheFederalistin
MartyLederman ask:Whatintheliteral(conventional)meaningofNovehiclesinthepark the21stCentury(Yale
msl46at determinesthatautomobilesareintheobviouslyprohibitedcore,whilebicycles UniversityPress2015)
law.georgetown.edu androllerskates,asHartclaimed,areintheambiguouspenumbra?
SanfordLevinson
slevinsonat Alimitlessnumberofpossibleconveyancescomewiththedefinitionofvehicle
law.utexas.edu
(wheelchair,skateboard,childswagon),nonedistinguishedbytheliteralterms
DavidLuban
david.lubanat oftherule.Hartthoughtitobviousthatanautomobileisaparadigmexampleof
gmail.com avehicle,whichiscorrect,butnomoresothanabicycle.PerhapsHartthought
GerardMagliocca thatapplicationoftheruletobicycleswasambiguousbecausehehadinminda
gmagliocatiupui.edu sedatecityparkwherepeopleambledalonginconversation,anatmosphere
JasonMazzone thatbicycleswoulddisrupt.Butthatinvolvesconsiderationofpurposeto
mazzonejat determinewhatis(andisnot)inthecoremeaningoftherule,whichgoes
illinois.edu
againsthisownposition.
LindaMcClain
lmcclainatbu.edu
JohnMikhail Consideramoreevocativeexample.Onlybyknowingwhatparksareforandby
mikhailat havinginmindwhatthisruleaimsatachievingwouldonesaythatNovehicles
law.georgetown.edu intheparkprohibitsautomobilesbutnotbabystrollers,whicheasilyfallwithin
FrankPasquale thedefinitionofvehicle.(Coremeaningcoverswhatisincludedintherules
pasquale.frankat coverageaswellaswhatisexcluded.).Nomemberofthecommunity,nopark
gmail.com StephenM.Griffin,Broken
enforcementofficer,nojudge,wouldevenconceivethatthisruleprohibitsbaby Trust:Dysfunctional
NatePersily
npersilyatgmail.com strollers,whicharenormalinparks. Governmentand
MichaelStokes ConstitutionalReform
Paulsen Hartsargumentcanperhapsbesavedbyassertingthatallconveyancesare (UniversityPressofKansas,
michaelstokespaulsen withinthecoremeaningoftherule,soeveryapplicationthatmightbe 2015)
atgmail.com consideredproblematicincludingbabystrollersandwheelchairsisnotan
DeborahPearlstein ambiguitybutjustanotherundesirableresult.Butthatdoesnotseemaccurate.
dpearlstat
ItgoeswithoutsayingthatababystrollerisnotprohibitedbyNovehiclesin
princeton.edu
RickPildes theparknoambiguityaboutit.
rick.pildesatnyu.edu
RichardPrimus Assumptionsaboutunderlyingpurposesrestrict(constrain,shape)andrankthe
raprimusat possiblemeaningsthatoccurtointerpretersofarule.Itiswithinthecore
umich.edu meaningofthisrulethatautomobilesareincludedbutbabystrollersarenot
K.SabeelRahman becausetheimplicitlyunderstoodpurpose,notliteralmeaningoftheterms
sabeel.rahmanat
alone,makesitso.Purposeandliteralmeaningareintertwinedin
https://balkin.blogspot.in/2008/07/revistinghartvfullernovehiclesin.html 1/21
2017527 Balkinization:RevistingHartv.Fuller:"NoVehiclesinthePark"
alone,makesitso.Purposeandliteralmeaningareintertwinedin
brooklaw.edu
AliceRistroph interpretation,neitherdictatingbutbothinplay.
alice.ristrophat
shu.edu
Fullerwasright.
NeilSiegel
siegelat
law.duke.edu Posted12:06PMbyBrianTamanaha[link]
BrianTamanaha
btamanahaat
wulaw.wustl.edu
MarkTushnet
mtushnetat
law.harvard.edu
AdamWinkler Comments:
winkleratucla.edu
Compendiumofposts Forgivemefornotunderstandingtheprofundityofthedebate."Novehiclesinthepark"is
onHobbyLobbyand a*shorthand*.Theaudienceisexpectedtoknowwhichexceptionsareallowed.Those
relatedcases whowrotetherulesexpectthattheywon'thavetosay"Novehiclesinthepark...unless
FrankPasquale,TheBlack
thepark'smanagersdecidetoinstallbumpercarshere,inwhichcase*those*vehicleswill
BoxSociety:TheSecret
TheAntiTorture beallowed,butnoothers.Andifthereeverhappenstobeawarinhere,we'llallow
AlgorithmsThatControl
Memos:Balkinization militaryvehicles.Andplanescanlandhereinanemergency,*butonlyinanemergency*." MoneyandInformation
PostsonTorture,
(HarvardUniversityPress,
Interrogation, Thisseemslikeahighlyacademicdebate.Cansomeoneexplaintomewhyit'sinteresting? 2015)
Detention,War
#postedby SteveLaniel:12:49PM
Powers,andOLC

TheAntiTorture
Memos(arrangedby
topic)
IalwaysthoughtFullerwasright.Butthen,IliveinastatewherePacificGas&E.Co.v.
G.W.ThomasDrayageetc.Co.isthelaw.
RecentPosts #postedby MarkField:12:59PM
RevistingHartv.
Fuller:"NoVehiclesin
thePark" I'mreadingLewisA.Grossman's"Food,Drugs,andDroods:AHistoricalConsiderationof
DefinitionsandCategoriesinAmericanFoodandDrugLaw,"93CornellLawRevies1090,
linkedtoatMary'sLegalHistoryBlogandavailableviaSSRN.Thestatutorydefinitionsof
"food"and"drugs"inseveralstatutesarediscussedthatpresentquestionssimilarto
Hart'sarticle.(Bytheway,I'mlearningmuchmoreaboutfood,someappetizing,some
not.)Evenwhenastatutorydefinitionisprovided,issuescontinuetoberaisedasto
whethersomethingconstitutes"food"ora"drug"orboth.Perhapssomeonemightupdate
theproposedordinanceinHarttoincludeadefinitionof"vehicle"andthenconsider
JustAFewBlogs
whethercertainitemsnotclearlyinoroutofthedefinitionofvehiclemayormaynotbe BruceAckerman,Wethe
proscribed.Keepinmindtherearemanyofus(lawyers)outtherelookingforloopholesto People,Volume3:TheCivil
ACSWeblog
driveavehiclethrough. RightsRevolution(Harvard
Alas,aBlog
UniversityPress,2014)
Althouse #postedby ShagfromBrookline:1:22PM
ArtsandLettersDaily
BalkinizationSymposiumon
Atrios(Eschaton)
WethePeople,Volume3:
BadAttitudes
TheCivilRightsRevolution
BillofHealth Cansomeoneexplaintomewhyit'sinteresting?
Buzzflash.com
BuzzMachine Well,itisanacademicdebate(abitunusualforanacademicblog,surely),butitdoes
Cairns(BethNoveck) speaktothelargerdebateoforiginalismandlivingconstitutionalismadebatethatoften
CatoatLiberty framesthepoliticsofjudicialappointments.
JuanCole(Informed
Comment)
Whatstrikesmeasoddisthatthisdebateseemstohavebeenmadeintheabsenceof
ConcurringOpinions
basicsemiotics.Ofcoursethemeaningofsignsisarbitrary.Ofcoursethatmeaningis
TheConstitutionin
2020
dependentonthemeaningofothersigns.
Corrente #postedby PMS_Chicago:1:22PM
CrookedTimber
DailyHowler
DailyKos
DanaBoyd Steve,
BradDeLong
Digby(Hullabaloo) Thedebateconnectsupwithbroaderissuesabouttherelationshipbetweenrulesand
Discriminations purposes(ruleorientedreasoningversusendorientedreasoning),lawandmorality,andso
DanielDrezner on.Yourphrase"highlyacademicdebate"appliestoalloftheseissues(andlot'sofother
KevinDrum(Mother stuffIthinkabout).Manypeoplethinkthat"highlyacademicdebates"areawasteoftime.
Jones) JosephFishkin,Bottlenecks:
Electrolite ANewTheoryofEqual
Perhaps(thoughIdon'tagree). Opportunity(Oxford
EnBanc
Eunomia(Daniel UniversityPress,2014)
Larison) Butatleastit'sentertainingtothinkabout.(paceyourcomments).
Fafblog
MichaelFroomkin Brian
(Discourse.net) #postedby BrianTamanaha:1:24PM
RickHasen(Election
Law)
HistoryNewsNetwork
HowAppealing HiBrian,
Ignatz(Sam
Heldman) Thanksforresponding.Theendorientedv.ruleorientedstuffisinteresting.Istherean
TheImportanceof
endorientedwaytoframethisregulationthatwouldmakeitlesssubjecttoloophole
(ErnieMiller)
gaming?
Infolaw
Instapundit
International By"highlyacademic,"bytheway,Ididn'tmean"writtenbypeopleinacademia"as
EconomicLawand pms_chicagonotes,thisisanacademicblog,soofcourseIknowwhatI'mgettinginto.
PolicyBlog "Highlyacademic"inthesenseinwhichIuseditissupposedtomean"notparticularly
IntLawGrrls interestingforrealworldpolicymaking."Inmyoriginalquestion,Iwaslookingforsomeone
JacobLevy toexplaintomewhyit*is*interestinginthatsense.
Jesus'General #postedby SteveLaniel:1:29PM MarkA.Graber,ANew
Jurisdynamics IntroductiontoAmerican
TheKitchenCabinet Constitutionalism(Oxford
MarkKleiman UniversityPress,2013)
LawBlogCentral
LarryLessig YoumakeFuller'spositionsoundmorereasonablethanitisbyconflatingdefinitionswith
Lawyers,Gunsand meanings.Dictionarydefinitionsareanattempttoexpress,inwords,thesetofthings(or
Money actions,qualities,etc)thatarereferredtobyaword.Assuch,theyarenecessarily
LiberalOasis approximationsofactualmeaning.
BrianLeiter'sLaw
SchoolReports
Toseewhythismakesadifference,imagineaddressingawomanstandinginthepark,and
TheLeiterReports
MarginalRevolution
tellingherthatyoulikedhervehicle.Shewouldthinkyouweretalkingabouthercar
MeganMcArdle (evenifitwasfaraway)andnotherstroller.Why?Becauseweneverusetheword
Memeorandum "vehicle"torefertostrollers,eveniftheyareincludedwithinthesetofthingsreferredto
Metafilter bysomelexicographer'sattempttodefinewhat"vehicles"are.
MirrorofJustice
TheNewRepublic Inotherwords,vehicledoesn'tmeanstrollersanymorethanitmeansrollerskatesor
Newseum pineapples.Onceyoulimityourattentiontocasesinvolvingthingsthatordinarypeople
NoMoreMisterNice wouldactuallycall"vehicles,"Hart'spositionsoundsmuchstronger,andFuller'smuch
Blog weaker.Afterall,HartwasnotsayingthatjudgescouldnotinterpretthelawasFuller
BrendanNyhan suggested,butonlythatitwaspossibleforthemtoapplythelaw(inatleastsomecases)
OpinioJuris byrelyingonmeaningalone,withoutresorttopurposiveconsiderations.Andwhenwerely
Orcinus onactualmeaninginthesenseofpatternsofusagetherule"novehiclesinthepark"
TheOriginalismBlog JohnMikhail,Elementsof
wouldprohibitcarswhilepermittingstrollers.
Pandagon MoralCognition:Rawls'
Passport(Foreign #postedby Mark:1:47PM LinguisticAnalogyandthe
Policy) CognitiveScienceofMoral
OvercomingBias andLegalJudgment
PoliticalAnimal (CambridgeUniversity
(WashingtonMonthly) ThepointFullerwasmaking,Ithink,andtheoneBrianunderlines,isthatthemeaningof Press,2013)
PoliticalTheoryDaily thelegalcategoryrestsonimplicitassumptionsthatstarttoberevealedonlyoncewe
Review begintoposethequestion:why?Whenthisquestionisnotposedexpressly(i.e.whena
PoliticalWire(Taegan purposiveinquiryiseschewedforthesakeofpracticality,commonsenseetc.)thequestion
Goddard) isnonethelessbeingansweredtacitly.Let'ssay,then,thatitisthe"ordinary"meaning
ThePoorMan thatisadopted.Butwhatarethecriteriafordeterminingwhatthatis?Ifdictionary
VirginiaPostrel definitionsdonotsuffice,doeshavingmechanismsofstateviolenceatone'sdisposaldo
Prawfsblawg thetrick?Askingsuchquestionsareindeedrelevanttotherealmofpolicyandindeeddaily
PublicReason
life(notjustblogospheres)becausepeoplewhotendtoliveinwhatthosewithmore
JonathanRauch
ordinaryexperiencestendtoconsiderthepenumbra,deservejusticeasmuchasanyone
RawStory
Redstate
else.Forexample,whenahomelessmancyclingintoaparkwithallhispersonal
ReligiousLeftLaw.com belongings,includinghisshelter,hitcheduptohisbike,thelaw"Novehiclesinthepark"
ReportersCommittee takesonaveryparticularsignificance."Sorry,buddy,novehicles"mayindeedbea
ForFreedomofthe shorthand.Forwhat,though?ThatisthequestionFullerandTamanahareminduswe
Press cannotaffordnottopose.RoderickMacdonaldandJasonMaclean'sarticle,"NoToiletsin
ReproductiveRights Park"providesaratherthoughtfulreflectiononthe"novehiclesinthepark"debate.
Blog Here'sthelink:http://francais.mcgill.ca/files/crdpcq/Macdonald_Maclean_park_toilets.pdf
Rothman'sRoadmap #postedby Thomas:2:23PM
totheRightof
Publicity GerardN.Magliocca,
SCOTUSBlog AmericanFoundingSon:
SeeingtheForest
I'mpicturingaParkServicestruckthatenterstheparkonamaintenancemission&is JohnBinghamandthe
ClayShirky InventionoftheFourteenth
dulyticketed.
TheShiftedLibrarian Amendment(NewYork
TheSituationist UniversityPress,2013)
LarrySolum(Legal ButasPMSnotedabove,theargumentseemsabitjejeunetoanyonewho'ssampledabit
Theory) ofsemiotics.Wordsdonot"mean"allbythemselvestheyhavemeaninginacontext.
AndrewSullivan
TalkingPointsMemo IOW,whatSteveLanielsaid,butmoreacademiclike.
TalkLeft #postedby Anderson:2:30PM
Tapped
Tbogg
TechPresident
ThePaperChase Thereasonthisalwaysgotayawnfromme(includingmyagonizinglyworthless1LLegal
(Jurist) ProcessclasswhereIfirstencounteredit)wasthatittotallyignoresthedynamicnatureof
TomPaine
thelawandthepoliticalinadequaciesthatcreateitinthefirstplace.
TomTomorrow(This
ModernWorld)
EveTushnet
Someauthority,somewhere,enactedthe"novehiclesinthepark"rule.Thatauthority
Uggabugga can,andshould,reviseit("promulgaterulesandregulationssubsequenttothestatute,"
UniversityofChicago etc.)toclarifytheextentofthelawasbicycles,mopeds,warmemorials,etc.,are
LawSchoolFaculty encountered.
Blog
UnqualifiedOfferings Topassasloppylawandthenexpressfrustrationthatreasonablejudgesdisagreeonwhat
TheVolokh tomakeofitsaysmoreaboutthesloppypoliticiansthanaboutthereasonablejudges.The
Conspiracy conundrumderivesnotfromanyinherentcontradictioninlegaltheoryitself,butsimply StephenM.Griffin,Long
WarandPiece(Laura fromdumblegislators. WarsandtheConstitution
Rozen) (HarvardUniversityPress,
Wampum 2013)
LikeIsaid:yawn.
OliverWillis
Wonkette
Mostrecently,thesethoughtscrossedmymindintheLedbetterdecision.Whocares
WrittenDescription
whethertheSupremeCourt"gotitright"or"gotitwrong."Itwasabadlywrittenstatute
MatthewYglesias
Yin
which,ifit'ssoimportant,Congresscouldreviseeasily.Nodeepconstitutional
contemplationorlegaltheorizingrequired.
Laythis"conundrum"atthelegislativedoorstep,notthejudicial.
#postedby KipEsquire:2:51PM
YourChoiceofFeeds
1.XMLpoweredby
2RSS.com
::RSS I'drephrasethisintermsofobviousness.Does"vehicle"include"automobile?"Well,
2.AtomFeed obviously.Does"vehicle"include"rollerskates?"Well...uh...I'mnotsosure.Alljudges
couldeasilysaythatsomeonedrivingacarintotheparkviolatestherule,butdifferasto
3. other"vehicles,"andstillneednotlooktothepurposeoftheruletocometoadecision.
Subscribewith #postedby l2p:3:24PM
Bloglines
AndrewKoppelman,The
4.RSS2.0 ToughLuckConstitutionand
Thiscommenthasbeenremovedbytheauthor. theAssaultonHealthCare
#postedby CharlesGittings:4:06PM Reform(OxfordUniversity
#postedby CharlesGittings:4:06PM
Press,2013)

Wellgee,whenIconsiderthatthecurrentPresident,VicePresident,andAttorneyGeneral
oftheUnitedStatesarewarcriminalswhoclaimtosincerelybelievethereisavalid
distinctionbetweenhumaneandinhumanemethodsoftorture,thistopicdoesn'tseem
theleastbitacademic.
#postedby CharlesGittings:4:11PM
Thanks,everyone,forthethoughtfulresponses.
KipesquireIdon'tthinkyoursuggestionthatthisispoordraftinggetsusveryfarsimply
becauseunanticipatedsituationswillalwaysarise.Butyouarecorrectthatbetterdrafting
canavoidobviousproblemsofthissort.
Markyoumakeaverygoodpointaboutmeaninganddefinitions,andthedivergence
betweenthetwo.Butit'strickierthanyousuggestfortworeasons.First,withrespectto
conventionalmeaning,everyoneinthecommunitywillnotalwaysagreeaboutmeaning JamesE.FlemingandLinda
C.McClain,Ordered
asyousuggest.Bicyclesstrikemeasa"vehicle"(anyoneaskedifbicyclesarevehicles
Liberty:Rights,
wouldanswerintheaffirmative)sowhydidHartsaythiswasinthepenumbra?Second,
Responsibilities,andVirtues
becausesuchdisagreementsaboutmeaningariseandbecausesanctionsareattached (HarvardUniversityPress,
andpeoplemusthavenoticejudgesdoconsultdictionariestofigureoutmeaning. 2013)
Mypoint,whichThomasstateswell,isthatagreatdealofconfusionthatmightarise BalkinizationSymposiumon
owingtopotentialambiguitiesaboutconventionalmeaningareavoidedbeforehand(they OrderedLiberty:Rights,
don'tevenarise)becausereadersoftheruleimplicitlyrelyuponpurposetoreadtherule Responsibilities,andVirtues
inasensiblewayconnectedtothepointoftheruleandthecontextathand.
Brian
#postedby BrianTamanaha:4:46PM
becausereadersoftheruleimplicitlyrelyuponpurposetoreadtheruleinasensibleway
But"purpose"doesn'treallygetoneveryfar,doesit?
Isthe"purpose"toprotecttheparkfromvehicleemissions?
Isittoprotectpedestriansfromcollisions?
Isittoprotectthegrassfrombeingtornupbytires?
Allofthesepurposesexcludedifferenttypesofvehicles.
AndrewKoppelman,
That'swhycontextisatleastasimportantaspurpose.Andeventhen,youget DefendingAmerican
uncertainties,becauselanguagedoesnotmap1:1ontotheworld. ReligiousNeutrality
(HarvardUniversityPress,
#postedby Anderson:5:03PM
2013)

First,withrespecttoconventionalmeaning,everyoneinthecommunitywillnotalways
agreeaboutmeaningasyousuggest.Bicyclesstrikemeasa"vehicle"(anyoneaskedif
bicyclesarevehicleswouldanswerintheaffirmative)sowhydidHartsaythiswasinthe
penumbra?
IagreethatthiswasaquestionablecallonHart'spart,asamatteroflexicography.But
howdoesthatweakentheforceofhisargument?Hispointwasjustthatthereisa
penumbra(wherethereissomeagreementonmeaningbutnotuniversalagreement),at
whichpointothercriteriathanmeaningwillhavetodeterminetheoutcomeofcases.In
otherwords,heclaimsthatformalismcanresolvesomecases,butnotall.
Second,becausesuchdisagreementsaboutmeaningariseandbecausesanctionsare
attachedandpeoplemusthavenoticejudgesdoconsultdictionariestofigureout
meaning.
Ofcoursedictionarydefinitionsprovideevidenceofmeaning.AllIwasarguingwasthat
BrianZ.Tamanaha,Failing
theydonotconstitutemeaning,andcansometimesleadusastray.Idoubtthatanyjudge LawSchools(Universityof
wouldsaythatastrollerwasavehicle,evenifalitigantprofferedtheabovedefinition. ChicagoPress,2012)
Whynot?Youcanofferpurposeasonereason,butIthinkthatjudgesarelikelytobe
relyingontheirlinguisticcommonsense.Afterall,ifyouchangedtheproscriptionto"No
wheeledcontraptionsareallowedinthepark,"Ithinkmanyjudgeswouldsaystrollersare
nowbanned,eventhoughthepurposeofthenewrulewouldbearguablythesameasthe
old.
#postedby Mark:5:13PM
Cansomeoneexplaintomewhyit'sinteresting?
Itisinterestingtomeforwhatitsaysabouttheimperfectionsoflanguageandthe
difficultyofmakingrulesfunctioninadesirableway.
Iagreethattherule"novehiclesinthepark"isfaultyonaccountofvagueness.Butthe
testIwouldapplyis"well,whattheymeantwasthis..."Thatseemstobeallabout
purpose.
#postedby mattski:6:50PM
SanfordLevinson,Framed:
America's51Constitutions
andtheCrisisof
Governance(Oxford
IagreethatthiswasaquestionablecallonHart'spart,asamatteroflexicography.But UniversityPress,2012)
howdoesthatweakentheforceofhisargument?Hispointwasjustthatthereisa
penumbra(wherethereissomeagreementonmeaningbutnotuniversalagreement),at
whichpointothercriteriathanmeaningwillhavetodeterminetheoutcomeofcases.In
otherwords,heclaimsthatformalismcanresolvesomecases,butnotall.
JMHO,butIthinkHartischeating.Whenheclaimsthatpeopleagreeonmeaning,what
hereallymeans*isthatpeopleshareassumptionsaboutpurposeandcontextdueto
culturalsimilarity.Ifformalismwereallit'scrackeduptobe,itwouldn'tbesohardto
programmeaningintocomputersortoteachaforeignlanguage.
*Ironydulynoted.
#postedby MarkField:7:23PM
Butdoesn'ttheconcept"agree"alsohaveameaning?
Ifnot,onwhatbasisdoyouclaimtobediscussinglaworthatsuchathingaslaweven LindaC.McClainand
exists? JoannaL.Grossman,
GenderEquality:
#postedby CharlesGittings:7:49PM DimensionsofWomen's
EqualCitizenship
(CambridgeUniversity
Press,2012)
MarkField:
Yousaid:"Ifformalismwereallit'scrackeduptobe,itwouldn'tbesohardtoprogram
meaningintocomputersortoteachaforeignlanguage."
Ummmm...ahhhh...tellmemoreaboutyourmother.
Cheers,
#postedby ArneLangsetmo:7:57PM
Afterthisisover,maybeyoucouldtakeon"onecarryonbagandonepersonalitem"
#postedby r.friedman:8:43PM

MaryDudziak,WarTime:
InterestingthatBartDePalmahasn'tshownuphere.He,afterall,istotallyconvincedof AnIdea,ItsHistory,Its
hismethodsofinterpretation,andisverydismissiveoftheideathatmeaningisinformed Consequences(Oxford
bypurposeorcontext. UniversityPress,2012)
Doesheknowthatthisisa50yearoldjurisprudentialdebate?Doeshecare?
(Ofcourse,thediscussionofpurposeclausesinHellershowsthatScaliadoesn'tknowvery
muchaboutthiseither.)
#postedby Dilan:9:20PM
InterestingthatBartDePalmahasn'tshownuphere.
Bart:"Vehicle"meanswhatthePresidentsaysitmeans.
Otherwise,Islamofascistterroristswilldestroythepark.
Wasn'tthateasy?
#postedby Anderson:12:33AM
JackM.Balkin,Living
Originalism(Harvard
Thisisn'taterriblyinsightfulcontribution,butmygutreactiontothevehiclesinthepark
debatehasalwaysbeenthat,whilestrollersandbicyclesarevehiclesunderatleastone
dictionarydefinitionof'vehicle,'there'samorecolloquialdefinitionofvehiclethatonly
includesmotorizedconveyances.Peopleknowthatstrollersarevehicles,technically
speaking,buttheycertainlydon'tthinkofstrollersasvehiclesorrefertothemasvehicles.
Carsandvehicles,ontheotherhand,arepracticallysynonymsineverydayusage.When
youseethesign,younaturallyassumethatthecolloquialdefinition,ratherthanthe
dictionarydefinition,isbeingused,becausesurelytheparkwouldn'tbanstrollers,bikes,
motorizedwheelchairs,etc.Whatreallyhappens,inmyopinion,whenajudgeorpasserby
interpretstheruleisthathereadsitwiththedefinitionthatseemstofittheregulator's
likelypurposethecolloquialone.Iwouldnote,though,thatonthisviewthereisacore
meaningnamely,thatcarsareprohibited,becausebothdefinitionsofvehicle,the
dictionaryandthecolloquial,includethem.AndIdon'tseehowonyourargumentyou
reachtheconclusionthatyouneedpurposetoknowthatdrivinginyourcarviolatesthe
rule.AllIseethatyou'veshownisthatyouneedpurposetoknowthatalltheseother
sortsofvehiclesmaynotvioldoesnotallowit.
#postedby tray:12:54AM

JasonMazzone,Copyfraud
andOtherAbusesof
Thelastsentenceshouldread"...alltheseothersortsofvehiclesmaynotviolateit[it
IntellectualPropertyLaw
beingtherule]."
(StanfordUniversityPress,
#postedby tray:1:02AM 2011)
Howaboutaseguefrom"vehicle"tothe...drumroll....Segue!Consideroriginalintentat
thetimeofHart'snovehiclesrulewhentheSeguedidnotexist.Sothetextualistrules,or
doeshe?ThelivingConstitutionconceptcancomeintoplayeventhoughHart(no,not
Bart)goesbackonlyagenerationortwo.Butwhataboutakid'sscooterconsistingofan
orangebox(wooden)nailedontopofatwobyfourwithrollerskatesectionsateachend
thatIandmyfriendsusedtoconstructbackinthelate1930s,early1940s?
#postedby ShagfromBrookline:6:08AM
Onceyoulimityourattentiontocasesinvolvingthingsthatordinarypeoplewouldactually
call"vehicles,"Hart'spositionsoundsmuchstronger,andFuller'smuchweaker.Afterall,
HartwasnotsayingthatjudgescouldnotinterpretthelawasFullersuggested,butonly
thatitwaspossibleforthemtoapplythelaw(inatleastsomecases)byrelyingon
meaningalone,withoutresorttopurposiveconsiderations. RichardW.Garnettand
AndrewKoppelman,First
I'minFuller'scampaswellasWittgenstein's.'Meaning'isitselfvagueandsuspectasa AmendmentStories,
concept.Ifyouthinkabouthowwecomeupwithideasof'meaning'itisforthemostpart (FoundationPress2011)
aprocessofcataloguingandgeneralizingfromuse.Andthereisnouse(atall)apartfrom
purpose.
Adictionaryisaposthoccatalogueofusage.Languagechangesandevolvesanda
dictionaryismoreorlessjustasnapshotofcurrentusageseasonedwiththe'penumbra'
ofhistoricalusage.
Ithasbeensaid(eventhoughWittgenstein,akaik,nevercameoutandsaidit)thatthe
essenceofhiscontributiontophilosophywastheinsightthatmeaningismerelyuse.
#postedby mattski:7:17AM
Let'ssee,inthislittleworldtherearecitizens,parks,vehicles,andcodethatspecifieslegal
andillegalmanipulationsofvehicles.Vehiclesaremanipulatedexclusivelybycitizens
vehiclesdonotdrivethemselvestothepark.Citizensandparksarefairlystraightforward
objects.Thetarpitseemstobethecode,whichdefinesvehiclesinwaysthatleadto
unsatisfactoryresults.Cursoryanalysisshowstheresultsareunsatisfactorybecausethe
code'sdefinitionofvehicleimplicitlyreferstootherobjectssuchasquietenjoyment, JackM.Balkin,
safety,custom,andsoon.Unlesstheyaremadeexplicit,itwillalwaysbepossibletofind ConstitutionalRedemption:
edgecasesthatbehaveinunexpected,evenundefined,ways.Probablysomeofthese PoliticalFaithinanUnjust
World(HarvardUniversity
otherobjectscomeundertheheadingof"purpose"suchasthepurposeofthepark.The
Press,2011)
purposeofthecodemightbebestsubsumedunderthepurposeofthepark.Acodethat
preservesthepurposeoftheparkprobablyproducessatisfactoryresults.
TheTragedyofWilliam
JenningsBryan
Inshort,itseemsthatacademiclegaldebatescouldlearnsomethingfromsoftware
modeling.
Myview,informedbysoftwaremodeling,isthatHartandFullerarebothwrong,butHart
isfurtheroff.Hartmissesobjectsandrelationshipsbetweenobjectsintheworld,sohis
modelisbroken.Fullerseesthembutinvokespurposeasyetanotherobject,whenit
shouldbeasetofconstraintsthecodeisrequiredtosatisfy,sohismodelisoverly
complicated.InFuller'sdefense,however,hismodeldoesgainsomethingattheexpense
ofthatcomplexity,e.g.it'sadaptableovertimepurposeschangethepurposeofthepark
todaymaynotbeexactlywhatitwasahundredyearsago.
#postedby jpk:12:48PM GerardMagliocca,The
TragedyofWilliamJennings
Bryan:ConstitutionalLaw
andthePoliticsofBacklash
(YaleUniversityPress,
ShagfromBrookline:
2011)
Howaboutaseguefrom"vehicle"tothe...drumroll....Segue!
Intheinterestofaccuracy,thatvehicleiscalledthe"Segway".I'msurethepunwas
intended,though.IdidsomeworkforDeanKamentheinventorawhileback(butnot
onthat'thatwasaftermystintupthere).He'sacharacterandquiteabrilliantand
creativeperson....
Cheers,
#postedby ArneLangsetmo:1:13PM
Istand(asthatishowoneridestheSegway)corrected.LikeFrankSinatra(akaPaul
Anka),Ispelleditmyway.
Bythesegue,analternativetotheorangeboxscooterwastouseanothertwobyfour
perpendiculartothebasetwobyfour(with45degreeangleslatsupportsoneachside),
thuseliminatingtheorangebox(whichwasusefulforstoragebutlousyforspeedand BernardHarcourt,The
manueverability).Idon'tseeorangeboxesaroundanymore.ThisishowSunkistoranges IllusionofFreeMarkets:
wereshippedbackthen,eachorangewrappedinorangetissuepaperwithSunkist PunishmentandtheMythof
markings.Irecallinthelate1930sthatatailorinourneighborhoodwouldcollectthe NaturalOrder(Harvard
tissuesfromalocalfruitandvegetablestoreandkeeptheminhistoiletforusewherethe UniversityPress,2010)
sundon'tshine.
DeanKamenisindeedquiteaguy.ASixtyMinutesfeaturedemonstratedthis.Butthe
Segwayhasnotcaughton,atleasthereintheBostonareaandmopedshavedroppedoff
aswell.Perhapsbecauseofgasprices,wedon'thavetoworryaboutvehiclescominginto
thepark,somewhatmootingthisrevisitwithHart(notBart).
#postedby ShagfromBrookline:1:36PM
WhileBrianiscorrectthatwhenaskedonwouldadmitthatabicyclefitswithinthe
definitionofavehicle(almostanyonewoulditisamechanicalmodeoftransport),heis
wrongthatnativespeakersofEnglishcommonlyrefertobicyclesasvehicles(noone
wouldsaythatwithoutprompting).Bycontrast,peoplecommonlyrefertoautomobilesas
vehicles,especiallyinlegalcontexts("Pleasestepawayfromthevehicle.").Thatdifference
inusageiswhatplacesautomobileswithinthecoremeaningandbicyclesandrollerskates
without.Itisnotunderlyingpurpose,butrathersimplyhownativespeakersofEnglish
ordinarilyuselanguagethatsetstheboundariesofmeaning.IwouldsaythatHart,like
manyphilosophersofthistime,issimplyassumingthatweacceptordinarylanguage
philosophy,andoperatinginaworldthatisnotasobsessedwiththehyperliteralismof
analyticphilsophyasoursistoday.
#postedby JohnTaylor88:8:57AM BruceAckerman,The
DeclineandFallofthe
AmericanRepublic(Harvard
IwouldsaythatHart,likemanyphilosophersofthistime,issimplyassumingthatwe
acceptordinarylanguagephilosophy,andoperatinginaworldthatisnotasobsessedwith BalkinizationSymposiumon
thehyperliteralismofanalyticphilsophyasoursistoday. TheDeclineandFallofthe
AmericanRepublic
Ifformalistswouldagreethatlanguageisacomplexinteractionofcustom,word,andreal
worldreferenceasyoudidinyourexample,there'dbenoproblem.Theywon't(atleast
notasIunderstandthem).
Fromastrictlylogicalperspective,yourexamplewon'tworktojustifytheformalists.All
carsmaybe"vehicles",butthatdoesn'tmeanallvehiclesare"cars".Wecanonlygetto
thelatterconclusionbyusingexternalreferences,whichformalistsdenytheneedfor.
#postedby MarkField:10:27AM
Fromastrictlylogicalperspective,yourexamplewon'tworktojustifytheformalists.All
carsmaybe"vehicles",butthatdoesn'tmeanallvehiclesare"cars".Wecanonlygetto
thelatterconclusionbyusingexternalreferences,whichformalistsdenytheneedfor.
Idon'tthinkHartsuggestedthatallvehiclesarecars.Infact,Ithinkheexplicitlystated
thatthiswasnotthecase.Hearguedthatsomejudgesmightplausiblyinterpretthe
statuteliterally,sothatvehicles(includingcars,buses,semis,motorcycles,tanks,
hovercraft,etc.)wereprohibited,andthingsthatarenotvehicleswerenot.Heconceded IanAyres.Carrotsand
thattherewouldbeaspaceofvaguenesswheremeaningcouldnotdecidecases,but Sticks:UnlockthePowerof
arguedthatmanydisputescouldbesettledbasedonmeaningalone. IncentivestoGetThings
Done(BantamBooks,
2010)
Moreover,Idon'tthinkmostformalistswoulddenytheneedtolooktoexternalsourcesto
determinemeaningwhenmeaningisunclear.Indeed,Ican'tthinkofanyonewhohas
madethatclaim.
#postedby Mark:11:15AM
Here'saperfectexampleoftheformalistproblem.It'saquotefromBradSetser'sblog:
"Theresultingoverallexternaldeficitwasfinanced,atleastinpart,bythebuildupofdollar
reservesbytheworldscentralbanksnotbyabuildupofdollardenominatedfinancial
assetsamongprivateinvestorsabroad.SomeoneinLondonwasbuyingUScorporate
bondsacategorythatincludesawiderangeofassetbackedsecurities.Butthecrisis
hasrevealed(Ithink)thatmuchofthatdemandcamefromvehiclessponsoredbyUS
andEuropeanfinancialinstitutionsthatfundedthemselvesbyborrowingdollars.Theytook
oncreditrisk,notcurrencyrisk."
Iassumethatthesigndoesnotbangovernmentbonds,butI'dlovetohearaformalist
explainwhy. MarkTushnet,Whythe
#postedby MarkField:11:15AM ConstitutionMatters(Yale
UniversityPress2010)

Idon'tthinkHartsuggestedthatallvehiclesarecars.
Idon'tthinkhedideither.IthoughtJohnTaylor'spostmightbe.
Idon'tthinkmostformalistswoulddenytheneedtolooktoexternalsourcestodetermine
meaningwhenmeaningisunclear.
Theproblemis,atleastfromtheperspectiveofthenonformalist,thatmeaningisNEVER
"clear".Meaningalwaysdependsonexternalsources.That'swhatweseeastheflawin
formalism.
#postedby MarkField:11:18AM
MarkField:IthinkaformalistcouldplausiblyreplythatmostEnglishspeakersdonotthink
ofinvestmentstrategieswhentheyheartheword"vehicle,"absentcontextualindications
IanAyresandBarry
thatvehicleisbeingusedinthatmetaphoricway,andnotinitsprimaryusage.Somerules
Nalebuff:Lifecycle
mightpresentthisasaplausibleamibiguityforinstance,ifacommoditiesexchange
Investing:ANew,Safe,and
prohibitedthe"transferofanyvehicleintheparkinggarage."ButIdon'tthinkordinary AudaciousWaytoImprove
speakersofEnglishfind"novehiclesinthepark"tobeambiguousinthisway. thePerformanceofYour
RetirementPortfolio(Basic
Tobesure,yourexamplepointsoutthatourbrainsprobablyengageinsomeautomatic Books,2010)
rejectionofpossiblemeanings,basedonthehypotheticalintentofalikelyspeaker,as
inferredfromcontext.Thatdoesn'tmean,however,thatweneedtoknowtheactual
purposeofalegislaturetoknowthattheordinarymeaningofthephrase"novehiclesin
TheLawsofChange
thepark"relatestomodesoftransportandnottomodesofinvestment.Especiallywhen
onesenseofawordisstronglydominantinusageoveranalternativesense.
Theproblemis,atleastfromtheperspectiveofthenonformalist,thatmeaningisNEVER
"clear".Meaningalwaysdependsonexternalsources.That'swhatweseeastheflawin
formalism.
Ifyouthinkformalistsareclaimingthatweeverknowmeaningseparatelyfromour JackM.Balkin,TheLawsof
knowledgeoftheconventionsoftheEnglishlanguage,youarepickingonastrawman. Change:IChingandthe
Anythoughtfulformalistwillreadilyconcedethattheyknowthemeaningofwordsbased PhilosophyofLife(2d
onalargevolumeofextratextualinformation.Theywillalsoconcedethatmeaningsare Edition,SybilCreekPress
oftenvagueorambiguous.Theformalistclaimissimplythat,whenameaningapplies(or 2009)
doesnotapply)toaneventwithoutvaguenessorambiguity,adecisionmakercandecide
cases(iftheywishto)basedonthemeaningfactsalone.
So,taketherule:
NomembersofthespeciesCanislupusfamiliarisareallowedwithinthecitylimitsofLos
Angeles.
Sure,therewillbeedgecases(whatifIownahalfdog,halfwolf?).Butcanyoureally
disagreethatmostquestionsastowhetherthisruleappliescanbedeterminedby
referencetomeaningfactsthatis,factsaboutwhatthingsarereferredtoasmembers
ofthedogspecies,andwhatthingsarenot(combinedofcoursewithamapconsultation
todeterminethecitylimitsofLA)?
Seemsobvioustomethattheproblemisnotwhetherwordsareselfdefiningorwhether
theyhavetobeunderstoodfromcontext,butthatthisisabadlydraftedrule.Ifthe BrianZ.Tamanaha,Beyond
assumedpurposewastobancarsandthelike,exceptwhennecessary,theruleshouldsay theFormalistRealistDivide:
so:"Nounauthorizedmotorvehiclesinthepark." TheRoleofPoliticsin
Judging(Princeton
#postedby Theophylact:11:46AM UniversityPress2009)

ARighttoDiscriminate?
Doestheintroductionof"Canislupusfamiliaris"suggestMarkingthetrailofmeaningand
howmeaningistobesniffedoutinthesedogdaysofJuly?
"Fromastrictlylogicalperspective,yourexamplewon'tworktojustifytheformalists.All
carsmaybe"vehicles",butthatdoesn'tmeanallvehiclesare"cars."
ButJohn'snotarguingthat,norwasHart.Hispoint,andmypoint,issimplythatallcars
arevehicles,thatthere'snoonewhohasanydoubtaboutwhethercarsarevehicles. AndrewKoppelmanand
Hence,carsareinthecoreoftherule.Bikes,scooters,wheelchairs,strollers,however,all TobiasBarringtonWolff,A
aren'tcommonlydescribedorthoughtofasvehiclesthoughtheyaretechnicallysuch RighttoDiscriminate?:How
sothey'reinthepenumbra.Orputitthiswayif'vehicles'appliestoanything,ithasto theCaseofBoyScoutsof
Americav.JamesDale
applytocars.There'snoonewhoseusageof'vehicle'issoidiosyncraticthattheycall
WarpedtheLawofFree
scootersvehiclesbutdon'tcallcarsvehicles.That'sjustafact.
Association(YaleUniversity
#postedby tray:1:16PM Press2009)
TheTheConstitutionin
2020
Theformalistclaimissimplythat,whenameaningapplies(ordoesnotapply)toanevent
withoutvaguenessorambiguity,adecisionmakercandecidecases(iftheywishto)based
onthemeaningfactsalone.
TheproblemIhavewiththisisthatyourprevioussentenceagreedthat"Anythoughtful
formalistwillreadilyconcedethattheyknowthemeaningofwordsbasedonalarge
volumeofextratextualinformation."
Wecan'tjuststophalfwaythroughtheprocess(at"extratextualinformation=>
meaning).Goingthroughthatprocessdoesn'tthengiveusatangiblething("meaning").
Itgivesusaconcept.Inordertodetermine"meaning",weneedtotakethespecificcase, JackM.BalkinandRevaB.
comparethattotheexperienceofpreviouscases,andmakejudgmentsaboutprobability, Siegel,TheConstitutionin
2020(OxfordUniversity
socialcontext,andotherfactors.AsIunderstandthem,formalistsdenythatsubsequent
Press2009)
process.
IthinkaformalistcouldplausiblyreplythatmostEnglishspeakersdonotthinkof
investmentstrategieswhentheyheartheword"vehicle,"absentcontextualindications
thatvehicleisbeingusedinthatmetaphoricway,andnotinitsprimaryusage.
Ofcoursetheycan,butthenthey'reappealingtoexternalfactors,whichisexactlywhat
formalismtriestoavoid.
Theproblemisthat"vehicles"hasmultiplemeanings.Inordertodecidewhichones
do/shouldapplyinagivencase,wecan'tjustlookatthedictionary.Wecanonlyreacha
conclusionbasedonexternalconsiderations.
Thatdoesn'tmean,however,thatweneedtoknowtheactualpurposeofalegislatureto
knowthattheordinarymeaningofthephrase"novehiclesinthepark"relatestomodes
oftransportandnottomodesofinvestment.
Surewedo,sinceotherwisewehavenowayofresolvingtheproblem.Weactuallyinfer
intentofthelegislaturefromourordinaryexpectations.That'sperfectlyok,butweneedto
intentofthelegislaturefromourordinaryexpectations.That'sperfectlyok,butweneedto
recognizethatwe'redoingso. HeatherK.Gerken,The
DemocracyIndex:WhyOur
NomembersofthespeciesCanislupusfamiliarisareallowedwithinthecitylimitsofLos ElectionSystemIsFailing
Angeles. andHowtoFixIt(Princeton
UniversityPress2009)
Theterm"species"isactuallyaverycontestedonewithinbiology.Agoodbiologistwould
recognizerealproblemswiththisstatute.
Butthereareproblemswithitanyway.Examples:canawolfstickonepaw(a"member")
overthecityline?Cananairplaneflyoverthecitywithawolfinit?
ButJohn'snotarguingthat
Hemaynothavebeen.Itstruckmethathispostcouldreadthatwayifnot,thenno
problem.
Hispoint,andmypoint,issimplythatallcarsarevehicles,thatthere'snoonewhohas
anydoubtaboutwhethercarsarevehicles.Hence,carsareinthecoreoftherule.
Yes,andforthisdiscussionwe'veallagreedtothat.Butthisdoesn'tresolvetheissue,
whichis"whatotherthings,besidescars,areexcludedbythetermsofthestatute?".
Limitingtheexclusiontocarssolelybecauseallcarsarevehiclesrunsafoulofthelogical MaryDudziak,Exporting
errorInotedabove.Thereneedstobeanotherreasongiventoaddresstheissueofother AmericanDreams:
thingsincludedbytheword"vehicle". ThurgoodMarshall'sAfrican
Journey(OxfordUniversity
Press2008)

Theterm"species"isactuallyaverycontestedonewithinbiology.Agoodbiologistwould
recognizerealproblemswiththisstatute.
Butthereareproblemswithitanyway.Examples:canawolfstickonepaw(a"member")
overthecityline?Cananairplaneflyoverthecitywithawolfinit?
ButneitherHart,norI,normostformalists,claimthatallcasescanberesolvedbasedon
meaningfactsalone.Onlythatsomecasescanbe.Andseriously:canyoupossiblycontest
thatitisperfectlyclear,fromtheplainmeaningofthelanguagealone,thattheruleI
provided:
(1)forbidshavingaschnauzerindowntownLA
(2)doesnotforbidhavingaschnauzerinSanFranciscoand
(3)doesnotforbidhavingahousecatanywhere?
DavidLuban,LegalEthics
andHumanDignity
Ifyouagreethattheruleisneithervaguenorambiguousasappliedtotheseexamples, (CambridgeUniv.Press
thenyoueffectivelyconcedeHart'spoint:somelegalquestions(butnotall)arecapableof 2007)
beingresolvedbasedonthemeaningofrules,withoutresorttopurposiveconsiderations.
Inordertodetermine"meaning",weneedtotakethespecificcase,comparethattothe
experienceofpreviouscases,andmakejudgmentsaboutprobability,socialcontext,and
otherfactors.AsIunderstandthem,formalistsdenythatsubsequentprocess.
Andtheydenyitcorrectly.Themeaningofaruledoesnotchangeacrossdifferentcases,
becausemeaningisnotdeterminedbyreferencetosituationalfactors,butbyreferenceto
theconventionsoflinguisticcommunication.Casespecificfactorsmightprovidereasonsto
declinetoapplyawrittenrule,andtheymightgiveusreasonstodecideacaseoneway
ratherthananotherwhentherule'smeaningcannotprovideananswer.Buttheydon't
changewhattherulesays.
Bicyclesarevehiclesundertheuniformtrafficcodemybicycleismysolevehicle.Signs
nowoftenread:nomotorizedvehiclestodifferentiatedbetweenwhichcategoryofvehicles
is,infact,prohibited. IanAyres,Super
#postedby tpbach:2:29PM Crunchers:WhyThinking
ByNumbersistheNew
WaytobeSmart(Bantam
2007)
Themeaningofaruledoesnotchangeacrossdifferentcases,becausemeaningisnot
determinedbyreferencetosituationalfactors,butbyreferencetotheconventionsof
linguisticcommunication.Casespecificfactorsmightprovidereasonstodeclinetoapplya
writtenrule,andtheymightgiveusreasonstodecideacaseonewayratherthananother
whentherule'smeaningcannotprovideananswer.Buttheydon'tchangewhattherule
says.
Yourpostcontainsotherpassages,butItakethistobethecruxofit,soI'llrespondto
this.
Thebasicproblemisthatthisviewtreatsmeaningasfrozenataparticularpointintime.
AsIunderstandyou,theformalistagreesthatwederive"meaning"fromcontextand
history,butthatoncewe'vedoneso,we'veachievedMeaning.Thisachievement
Meaningisnowathinginitselfwhichwecanuseasatool.
That'snothowitworks,inmyview.Iagreethatweachieve"meaning"byadialectical
processofhistoryandcontext.Thatprocess,though,neverends.Thereisnopointat
whichweachieveMeaning.Everyadditionaluseofatermconstitutesnewevidenceof
JackM.Balkin,James
usage(includingcontext,purpose,semantics,etc.)whichwethenusetoaddto
Grimmelmann,EddanKatz,
"meaning".
NimrodKozlovski,Shlomit
IfIcanuseanexample,I'lltakeonewhichIbelieveDavidHumewasthefirsttouse.We WagmanandTalZarsky,
maysaythatallswansarewhiteonlybecauseeveryswanwe'veeverseenis,infact, eds.,Cybercrime:Digital
white.Butwecan'teverprovethatallswansarewhitebecauseitremainspossiblethat CopsinaNetworked
somewhere,sometime,we'llseeablackswan(justaskNicholasTaib:)). Environment(N.Y.U.Press
2007)
Whatthismeansisthatthecategory"swan"alwaysremainscontingent.Wenevercan
say,definitively,thatitincludestheconcept"white".The"meaning"ofswanisnotsettled
and,logically,nevercanbe.
Soitiswithallwords,allthetime.Theyareneverfixed.Inordertodetermine"meaning",
weneedtoknowcontext(including,inthespecificcaseofthepark,purpose).
Readerswhocanrememberwhenthisblogwasthegotosourceforlegalnewsontheuse
oftorturebytheU.S.government,maywishtoexamineSpencerAckerman'sarticleon
thelatesttorturememo.
#postedby Anderson:4:06PM
MarkField:doyouadmitthatthethreeexamplesIprovidedabovecouldberesolvedby JackM.BalkinandBeth
referencetothemeaningoftherulealone?Ifnot,I'dliketoknowwhereyouthinkthe SimoneNoveck,TheState
vaguenessorambiguitylies. ofPlay:Law,Games,and
VirtualWorlds(N.Y.U.Press
Thebasicproblemisthatthisviewtreatsmeaningasfrozenataparticularpointintime. 2006)
AsIunderstandyou,theformalistagreesthatwederive"meaning"fromcontextand
history,butthatoncewe'vedoneso,we'veachievedMeaning.Thisachievement SameSex,Different
Meaningisnowathinginitselfwhichwecanuseasatool. States
Actually,Idon'tclaimthis.Idon'tblameyouforthinkingIdo,giventhatsomelegal
formalistsmakeclaimsthatcouldbedescribedthisway(LarrySolum'sfixationthesis
soundssomethinglikethis,forinstance).Butoneneedn'tthinkthatmeaningisfixedin
timetothinkitisafact.Letmeexplain.
Meaningisafactabouthowpeopleuselanguage.Youarerighttopointoutthatpeople's
useoflanguagechangesovertime.Furthermore,differentgroupsofpeoplemayuse
languageindifferentways.So,really,meaningcanonlybedefinedbyreferencetoatime
andagroupoflanguageusers.Ifwewantedtoformalizealittlebit,wecouldsaythatthe AndrewKoppelman,Same
meaning,M,ofaword(w)isconditionalonbothtime(t)andgroup(g).SoMisafunction Sex,DifferentStates:When
ofthreevariables,w,t,andg. SameSexMarriagesCross
StateLines(YaleUniversity
(I'musingindividualwordmeaningtokeepthingssimple.Sentencemeaninginvolves Press2006)
morerules,ofcourse,andspecificutterancesrequireattentiontocontextfactsaswell.)
Youarecorrecttonotethatmeaningcanchangeovertime.Thus,peopleattimeT1
(whenthenovehiclesintheparkrulewasadopted)mightincludeadifferentgroupof
thingsintheset[vehicles]thanpeopleattimeT2.Inotherwords,bicyclesmightbe
withinthesetM(vehicle,T1,G1)butnotwithinthesetM(vehicle,T2,G2).
DoesthisproveHartwrong?No,forthefollowingreason.Hearguedthatitispossible,in
somecases,forjudgestodeterminethecontentoflegaldoctrinebyreferencetomeaning
factsalone.Judgescandothisbyspecifyingatimesliceatwhichtheywillexamine
meaning,andbyidentifyingtherelevantgrouptowhomtheywilllooktodetermine
patternsofusage.OriginalismisonevariantjustalwayslookatratifiersatT1.Present
meaningtextualismcouldbeanotheralternativejustlookatTpresent.Butwhichever
timesliceonepicksdoesnotchangethebasicmethodologymeaningsarestill
determiningtheoutcomesofsomecases,just(potentially)differentmeanings.
Youarguedthattheindividualfactsofacasewillalwaysberelevanttodeterminingword
meaning.Ithinkthisiswrong,becausechanginganoutlierusuallydoesn'tchangethe
valueofamedianverymuch.So,ifIstartusingtheword"kumquat"toreferto BrianTamanaha,Lawasa
basketballs,usuallythisdoesnotbecomeaconventionoftheEnglishlanguage.Ihaveto MeanstoanEnd
getalotofotherpeopletoagreewithmeaboutthisusagebeforethemeaningoftheword (CambridgeUniversity
"kumquat"actuallyshifts(atleastifweareusingthesetofAmericanenglishspeakersas Press2006)
ourG...ifthesetissmallersayG=myfriendsthanlesseffortmybeinvolvedin
changingM).
Similarly,legislaturescan'talwayschangethemeaningsofwordsjustbecausetheywant
to.Sosomecaseswillberesolveablewithoutlookingatthelegislature'spurpose,because
meaningwon'talwaysdependonthatpurpose.
Maybeitwouldhelp,however,ifyoucouldprovidesomecounterexamples.WhywouldI
needtolookatthefactsofaspecificcaseinordertodeterminewhethermyexamplerule
(dogsinLA)wasbeingbroken,inthethreeexamplesIgave?
So,ifIstartusingtheword"kumquat"torefertobasketballs,usuallythisdoesnot
becomeaconventionoftheEnglishlanguage.
Agreed.
SanfordLevinson,Our
UndemocraticConstitution
Furthermore,differentgroupsofpeoplemayuselanguageindifferentways.So,really, (OxfordUniversityPress
meaningcanonlybedefinedbyreferencetoatimeandagroupoflanguageusers. 2006)
Here'stheproblem:the"differentgroups"towhichyoureferincludesdifferentgroups
withinthesetofpeopletowhomaruleissupposedtoapply.That'swhywecansee
disagreementamongpeopleastowhatarule"means".
Iassumeyou'dagreethisistrue.Butifyoudo,thenIdon'tunderstandwhyyouwould
continuetorelyonformalism.
Thus,peopleattimeT1(whenthenovehiclesintheparkrulewasadopted)mightinclude
adifferentgroupofthingsintheset[vehicles]thanpeopleattimeT2.
Theproblemisthattherulemightincludeadifferentsetforpeopleingroup1thanitdoes
ingroup2.
Timeandgroupareproblems(and"group"canbeverysmallindeedtwopeople,
perhaps,especiallyiftheybothsitontheCourt).Andtimecanbeveryshortatthe
margins.AsShag'sexampleoftheSegwayshows,therulecanbecomeambiguous
becauseofexternaleventsintheworld,notbecauseofinternalchangesin"meaning".
DoesthisproveHartwrong?No,forthefollowingreason.Hearguedthatitispossible,in
somecases,forjudgestodeterminethecontentoflegaldoctrinebyreferencetomeaning
factsalone.Judgescandothisbyspecifyingatimesliceatwhichtheywillexamine MarkGraber,DredScott
meaning,andbyidentifyingtherelevantgrouptowhomtheywilllooktodetermine andtheProblemof
patternsofusage.OriginalismisonevariantjustalwayslookatratifiersatT1. ConstitutionalEvil
(CambridgeUniversity
Thisassumesthatagroupaslargeas"ratifiers"actuallyhadasharedmeaning.Idoubt Press2006)
theydid,butit'sunprovableeitherway.Inanycase,theonlywaywecoulddeterminethe
meaningtotheratifierswouldbetoconsultnotMeaning,butthecontextofthetimes.
That'swhyoriginalistargumentsendupashistorydebates(badones,mostly).Every
participantrecognizesthatwithoutthehistory,theycan'tshowthemeaning.
Maybeitwouldhelp,however,ifyoucouldprovidesomecounterexamples.WhywouldI
needtolookatthefactsofaspecificcaseinordertodeterminewhethermyexamplerule
(dogsinLA)wasbeingbroken,inthethreeexamplesIgave?
Ididgiveonecounterexample.Here'sanotherone:theschnauzerisdead.Violationor
not?
MarkField:thepointoflistingthreeexampleswastoshowthatHartiscorrect,because
meaningcanresolvesomecases.Inordertoshowthathewaswrong,youhavetobeable
toshowthatmeaningcannotresolveanycases.AsIsaid,he(andI)concedethatthere
JackM.Balkin,ed.,What
willbecasesofdeaddogsandhalfwolves.Thepointisthatmanycaseswon'tbe
Roev.WadeShouldHave
ambiguous.Ergo,Iaskedyou:WhywouldIneedtolookatthefactsofaspecificcasein
Said(N.Y.U.Press2005)
ordertodeterminewhethermyexamplerule(dogsinLA)wasbeingbroken,inthethree
examplesIgave?SopleaseaddresstheexamplesIgave(ifyoudon'twishtotacitly
concedethemainpoint).
Here'stheproblem:the"differentgroups"towhichyoureferincludesdifferentgroups
withinthesetofpeopletowhomaruleissupposedtoapply.That'swhywecansee
disagreementamongpeopleastowhatarule"means".
Iassumeyou'dagreethisistrue.Butifyoudo,thenIdon'tunderstandwhyyouwould
continuetorelyonformalism.
Meaningcanbedefinedsolongasthegroupisdefined.Sothefactthatothergroups
mightdisagreedoesn'tshowthatformalismcannotsucceeditjustshowsthataformalist
judgewillneedtodecidewhatTandGhewantstoworkwithinidentifyingM.
AndnotethatnotallmembersofGhavetoagreeinorderforMtobedefinedtherejust
hastobeamedianrule.SoifGistakentobetheAmericancitizenry,itdoesn'tmatter
thatthetwolitigantsdisagreeaboutmeaning,becauseoneofthemcanbewrong.See,
e.g.,thesuccessoftaxprotesterswhoclaimthatwagesarenotincome. SanfordLevinson,ed.,
Torture:ACollection
Overall,youseemtobeconfusingHart(andme)withsomesortoforiginalistbogeyman. (OxfordUniversityPress
NotethatIhaven'targuedANYWHEREinthisthreadthattheoriginalmeaningshould 2004)
controlcaseoutcomes.I'mjustsayingthatnonpurposive,meaningbasedadjudicationis
possibleinsomecases(thethesisthatHartwasdefending,andthatFullerwas Archives
contesting).Sopleasesavethefusilladesagainstoriginalismforanothercommentthread.
#postedby Mark:5:08PM Balkin.comhomepage
Bibliography
Conlaw.net
CulturalSoftware
Readerswhocanrememberwhenthisblogwasthegotosourceforlegalnewsontheuse Writings
oftorturebytheU.S.government,maywishtoexamineSpencerAckerman'sarticleon Opeds
TheInformationSociety
thelatesttorturememo.
Project
BrownvBoard.com
IassumeProf.Ledermanisonvacation.Inthemeantime,philosophyisthelastrefugeof
UsefulLinks
theunproductive. SyllabiandExams
Overall,youseemtobeconfusingHart(andme)withsomesortoforiginalistbogeyman.
NotethatIhaven'targuedANYWHEREinthisthreadthattheoriginalmeaningshould
controlcaseoutcomes.
Fairenough.Thoughmyissueismorewithtextualismthanoriginalism.
thepointoflistingthreeexampleswastoshowthatHartiscorrect,becausemeaningcan
resolvesomecases.
I'mnotatallsureyou'veshownthat.Let'staketheSchnauzercase.Supposetwopossible
debatesintheCityCouncilpriortotheordinance:
1.TheCouncilexpressedconcernaboutdogwastepollutingthegroundandwatersupply.
2.TheCouncilcannolongerbeartheexpenseofdisposingofcaninecarcasses.
2.TheCouncilcannolongerbeartheexpenseofdisposingofcaninecarcasses.
Inthiscase,atleast,purposeisnecessarytoresolvetheissueIposedaboutthe
interpretationofthestatute.
Now,you'llrespondthatyouagree,butwedon'tneedtoknowpurposeinordertoknow
thatliveschnauzersarebanned.Thus,formalistrulescansolvesomecases,justnotall
cases.
Ihavetworesponsestothis.First,it'shardtoknowinadvanceofaparticularsituation
whetherformalismwillresolveadisputeornot.It'sonlyinthecontextofaparticular
disputethatwecanteststatutory"meaning"againsttherealworld.Thatconsiderationof
contextseemstomesomethingwhichformalistsclaimisnotnecessary.
Second,let'sgobacktotheoriginalexampleandconsiderhowpeopleinterprettheword
"vehicle".Suppose100%ofAmericanstodayinterpretthewordtoinclude"cars".Only
50%interpretittoinclude"bicycles".Intheabsenceofknowingtherealworldsituation
wasitacarorbicycleinthepark?wecan'tdecidewhatthestatute"means".
Butit'sactuallyworsethanthat.Thestatuteisdesignedtoapplyuniversally.Butonly
50%ofthegrouptowhichit'ssupposedtoapplyinterpretsitasprecludingbicycles.In
whatsense,then,can"formalism"resolvethisissue.Andifformalismisonlyeffective
whenessentially100%oftherelevantgroupagrees,whatgoodisit?
Isupposethatinreplyyou'dsaythatwecanstilldecidetheissueofbicycles,butIdon't
thinkweuseformalismwhenwedo.Instead,weconsidercontext,purpose,majorityrule,
andotherfactors.Sometimesthedecisionismoreorlessarbitraryandthusanexerciseof
powerratherthanformalism.
IfindI'mrunningoutofthingstosayhere,soImayjustletyouhavethelastword.Iwill
saythis:thepositionI'vetakenhereissomewhatstrongerthanmyactualviews,though
notmuch.Idoagreethatformalismcanresolveafewdisputesitconstrainstheuniverse
ofpossibilities(inthewaythat,forexample,nobodythinks"vehicle"includes
"kumquats").Thatconstraintishelpfulinthatitallowsustohavethisdebate.Butit'snot
veryusefulinresolvinganymeaningful(punintended)disputeintherealworld.
Idoagreethatformalismcanresolveafewdisputesitconstrainstheuniverseof
possibilities(inthewaythat,forexample,nobodythinks"vehicle"includes"kumquats").
...Butit'snotveryusefulinresolvinganymeaningful(punintended)disputeinthereal
world.
Iactuallyagreewiththis,toapoint.Formalism,properlyunderstood,shouldn'tresolve
manyseriousdisputesaboutlegalmeaning,becauserulesoflawaremostlydisputed
preciselywhentherulesaren'tclear.ButHartwasn'targuingwithFulleraboutwhat
judgesshoulddowhenthelawwasunclearhewasdevelopingatheoryofhowlaw
functions,andthatinvolvesexplaininghowitworkswhenitisclearaswellaswhenitis
unclear.Itsoundslike,attheendoftheday,youdon'treallycontestthebasicclaimhe
wasmakingagainstFuller:thatthelawcansometimesfunctionlinguistically,without
attendingtopurposeorequities.Whetherthatisabugorafeature,inyourview,islikely
tocomedowntotherelativeweightsyougivetoruleoflawvaluesascomparedwiththe
valuesofequity.
Ican'tresistonepartingshot,however:yourintuitionthatargumentsarerarelyresolved
byformalismmaybeshapedbyfocusingtoomuchonSupremeCourtcases(atiny
fractionoflegaldisputes),ratherthanlookingatargumentsmadeattheretaillevel(e.g.,
stateandfederaltrialcourts).(I'mnotsayingthatthisisnecessarilytrueinyourspecific
case,justthatsuchafocusoftenmotivatespeopletodenythatthelawisever
determinate.)Downinthetrenches,lawyersthrowalotmoreargumentsintothemix,
includinglotsofargumentsaskingjudgestoactagainsttheplainmeaningofstatutesor
bindingprecedents.Iftheycouldn'trelyonformalism,trialjudgeswouldhavetospenda
lotmoreoftheirtimereinventingthewheel.
Anyway,funtalkingtoyou.Haveagreatweekend!
IfinishedreadingLewisA.Grossman'slawreviewarticletitled"Food,Drugs,andDroods:A
HistoricalConsiderationofDefinitionsandCategoriesinAmericanFoodandDrugLaw"that
Ireferencedinamuchearliercomment.Thevariousfoodanddrugactsovertheyears
soughttoprovide"correct"definitionsfor"food"and"drugs"butdefinitionalissues
continuedtoberaised.Thisarticledemonstratestherelativelyminor"vehicles"issuein
Hart'sarticlewithmoreserioushealthissues.Backin1906,peoplehadanunderstanding
ofwhatconstituted"food."Yetproperlydefining"food"legislativelywasdifficult,as
demonstratedbythelitigationthatfollowed,andcontinues.Foodforthoughtcanbecome
adrugonthemarket.
Andspeakingofformalism(ortextualism?),IhopetocompleteovertheweekendMitchell
N.Berman's"OriginalismisBunk(Draft7/10/08)"thatisavailableonSSRNlinkedtoat
LarrySolum'sLegalTheory.Asequelmightbetitled"FormalismisBunk."
ButFullercannotbedismissedsoeasily.Toseewhyhemightberight,readthese
standarddefinitionsofvehicle:1)anymeansinorbywhichsomeonetravelsor
somethingiscarriedorconveyed2)aconveyancemovingonwheels,runners,tracks,or
thelike,asacart,sled,automobile,ortractor.Nowask:Whatintheliteral(conventional)
meaningofNovehiclesintheparkdeterminesthatautomobilesareintheobviously
prohibitedcore,whilebicyclesandrollerskates,asHartclaimed,areintheambiguous
prohibitedcore,whilebicyclesandrollerskates,asHartclaimed,areintheambiguous
penumbra?
Theproblemhereisthatadictionarydefinitionisnotaparticularlygoodwayof
determiningthemeaningofaword.Nodictionaryprovidesatruedefinitioninthesenseof
providingthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforappropriateuseofthewordin
ordinarylanguage.Rather,linguists[1]recognizethatdictionariesprovide"moreorless
randomlistsofquasisynonyms,"notlistsofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.Anna
Wierzkika,Semantics:PrimesandUniversals240(1996).Noscholaroflinguisticsor
semantics(orliterature)willtellyouotherwise.
Judgesandlegalscholarshavelongpersistedinpurportingtotreatdictionariesasproviding
truedefinitions(necessaryandsufficientconditions)butthispracticeisaseriouserror.A
dictionarybasedargumentissimplyirrelevant.
Thisdoesn'tmeanthatFulleriswrong,butitdoesmeanthatyourargumentisnogood.
Incidentally,whydoesn'tthisblogallowblockquotetags?
[1]i.e.,academicexpertsonlanguage.Youcanfindtheminyourschool'sDepartmentof
Linguistics,theexistenceofwhichlegalscholarsseemtobeshockinglyunaware.
#postedby Elliot:10:56AM
Itiswithinthecoremeaningofthisrulethatautomobilesareincludedbutbabystrollers
arenotbecausetheimplicitlyunderstoodpurpose,notliteralmeaningofthetermsalone,
makesitso.Purposeandliteralmeaningareintertwinedininterpretation,neitherdictating
butbothinplay.
Thisisactuallyanexcellentexampleoftheproblemwithyourerroneousrelianceon
dictionaries.Itcaneasilybedismissedbysayingthereasonababystrollerisnota
"vehicle"undertheruleisthatinordinarylanguagepeopledonotrefertobabystrollersas
"vehicles."Thebulkofthehitsfor<"babystroller"vehicle>concernbabystrollersthat
doubleascarseatsandhowthey'llfitintoyourvehicle,meetfederalmotorvehiclesafety
standards,etc.Icouldfindtwoorthreeexamplesofsomeonecallingababystrollera
"vehicle"butthisisclearlyanextremelyrareuseofthetermandIdoubtmostpeople
wouldacceptitasacorrectuseoftheterm.Iseenoreasontothinkababystrollerfalls
withinthe"coreliteralmeaning"of"vehicle."
#postedby Elliot:11:13AM
"Hispoint,andmypoint,issimplythatallcarsarevehicles,thatthere'snoonewhohas
anydoubtaboutwhethercarsarevehicles.Hence,carsareinthecoreoftherule."
Yes,andforthisdiscussionwe'veallagreedtothat.Butthisdoesn'tresolvetheissue,
whichis"whatotherthings,besidescars,areexcludedbythetermsofthestatute?".
No,theissue,atleastasframedbyTamanaha,isifthereisanycoremeaningtothe
statuteatall.Hartgrantsthatthere'sapenumbrawherewehavetolooktopurpose
Fullersaysweneedpurposetoevenknowthatcarsviolatetherule.Tamanahaagrees
withFullerbecausehecan'tseewhycarsareanymorecorethanstrollers,andI'msimply
sayingthatinnormalusage,everyonecallscarsvehiclesandnoonecallsstrollersvehicles.
#postedby tray:1:15PM
TamanahaagreeswithFullerbecausehecan'tseewhycarsareanymorecorethan
strollers,andI'msimplysayingthatinnormalusage,everyonecallscarsvehiclesandno
onecallsstrollersvehicles.
Whataword'means'isdependentonwhatthediscussionisabout.Orinthiscase,what
theruleisabout.Thisruleisaboutparks.Thatcausesanimmediateassumptionabout
howtheword'vehicle'isbeingused.
Tosaythatthecolloquialusageofvehicleasmotorvehicleisthe'coremeaning'ofthe
wordisreallyjusttosay"well,it'sthemostcommonusage."Thatmightbetrue,butitis
stillthecontextwhichtellsushowtointerprettheword.
"Thevehicleforthetransmissionofthisvirusisbodilyfluid,notair."
"Filmisamorepowerfulvehicleforhisartisticvisionthanthewrittenword."
"Coremeaning"isacontrivance,inthiscaseitappears,forcolloquialuse.Butthekey
hereisthatonceweknowwhatthediscussionisabout(parks)thatdeterminespurpose
andpurposedirectsourassumptionsaboutmeaning/usage.
#postedby mattski:6:25PM
Then,ofcourse,therearemattersofstrictlylogicalstructure.FromthewonderfulThe
ReaderOverYourShoulder,byRobertGravesandAlanHodge,IcitetheDogWalking
Ordinance:
FromtheMinutesofaBoroughCouncilMeeting:
CouncillorTraffordtookexceptiontotheproposednoticeattheentranceofSouthPark:
"NodogsmustbebroughttothisParkexceptonalead."Hepointedoutthatthisorder
wouldnotpreventanownerfromreleasinghispets,orpet,fromaleadwhenoncesafely
insidethePark.
TheChairman(ColonelVine):Whatalternativewordingwouldyoupropose,Councillor?
TheChairman(ColonelVine):Whatalternativewordingwouldyoupropose,Councillor?
CouncillorTrafford:"DogsarenotallowedinthisParkwithoutleads."
CouncillorHogg:MrChairman,Iobject.Theordershouldbeaddressedtotheowners,not
tothedogs.
CouncillorTrafford:Thatisanicepoint.Verywellthen:"Ownersofdogsarenotallowedin
thisParkunlesstheykeepthemonleads."
CouncillorHogg:MrChairman,Iobject.Strictlyspeaking,=thiswouldkeepmeasadog
ownerfromleavingmydoginthebackgardenathomeandwalkingwithMrsHoggacross
thePark.
CouncillorTrafford:MrChairman,Isuggestthatourlegalisticfriendbeaskedtoredraftthe
noticehimself.
CouncillorHogg:MrChairman,sinceCouncillorTraffordfindsitsodifficulttoimproveon
myoriginalwording,Iaccept:"NobodywithouthisdogonaleadisallowedinthisPark."
CouncillorTrafford:MrChairman,Iobject.Strictlyspeaking,thisnoticewouldpreventme,
asacitizen,whoownsnodog,fromwalkingintheParkwithoutfirstacquiringone.
CouncillorHogg(withsomewarmth):Verysimply,then:"DogsmustbeledinthisPark."
CouncillorTrafford:MrChairman,Iobject:Thisreadsasifitwereageneralinjunctionto
theBoroughtoleadtheirdogsintothePark.
CouncillorHogginterposedaremarkforwhichhewascalledtoorderuponhis
withdrawingit,itwasdirectedtobeexpungedfromtheMinutes.
TheChairman:CouncillorTrafford,CouncillorHogghashadthreetriesyouhavehadonly
two.
CouncillorTrafford:"AlldogsmustbekeptonleadsinthisPark."
TheChairman:IseeCouncillorHoggrisingquiterightlytoraiseanotherobjection.MayI
anticipatehimwithanotheramendment:"AlldogsinthisParkmustbekeptonthelead."
Thisdraftwasputtothevoteandcarriedunanimously,withtwoabstentions.
#postedby Theophylact:8:25PM
Betweenvehiclesanddogs,thatparkisn'tsafeforhumansorcats.Even(orespecially)
the"standards"ofOriginalismfailtoprovideguidance.
#postedby ShagfromBrookline:10:45PM
Inanearliercomment,Iclosedwith:
"Andspeakingofformalism(ortextualism?),IhopetocompleteovertheweekendMitchell
N.Berman's'OriginalismisBunk(Draft7/10/08)'thatisavailableonSSRNlinkedtoat
LarrySolum'sLegalTheory.Asequelmightbetitled'FormalismisBunk.'"
Ijustfinishedreadingthe92pagesofthisexcellentarticle,aquitetimeconsumingread
sinceitsextensivefootnotescouldnotbeignored.Bermandoesn'tcomeoutandsaythat
"OriginalismisBunk'butraisesseriousquestionsastowhetheritshouldbeoriginalism
(howeverdefined)orthehighwayininterpretingtheConstitution.Perhapsthosereluctant
toallotthetimetoreadthisarticlemightfirstreaditswellconsideredconclusion
(somethingIdonotnormallyrecommend)perhapstoencourageafullread.Theterm
originalismistooreadilybandiedaboutwithoutdefinition.Bermantriestoaddressthis.(I
comparethiswithreferencesto"freetrade"and"freemarkets"butwithoutdefinitions.)
Bermanneedstodoabookonthissubject.
YoumightreadGrahamHughes'commentsonHartv.Fuller:
FromGrahamHughes,"Rules,PolicyandDecisionMaking,"77YaleLawJournal411439
(1968)[footnotesomitted].
"ProfessorFuller,repudiatingHart'swayoftalkingaboutstatutoryinterpretation,begins
bymakingthepointthatHartmisleadinglyseemstoimplythatinterpretationiscommonly
amatterofthevaguenessorambiguityofsinglewords.Itisrather,Fullersuggests,more
oftenabusinessofassigningmeaningstosentences,paragraphsorevenpagesoftext.
Butevenifthequestionshouldpresentitselfasturningontheinterpretationofasingle
word,thecertaintythatwemayfeelabouttheproprietyofagiveninterpretationis,in
Fuller'sview,derivednotfromlinguisticusagebutratherfromtheclearnessofthe
purposeoftherule,orperhapsfromthecircumstancethattheanswerwouldbethesame
nomatterwhichofseveralpossiblepurposesunderliestherule.So,onthelatter
hypothesis,nomatterwhetherthepurposeofHart'sruleprohibitingvehiclesisto
suppressnoiseortopreventairpollution,itwouldclearlyapplytodrivingaCadillac
throughthepark.Ifatankweredrivenintotheparkinordertobemountedonapedestal
asawarmemorial,thedecisionmightbeindoubt,notbecauseofanydoubtconcerning
theusageof'vehicle,'butratherbecauseofourdoubtwhetheranyconceivablepurpose
fortherulewouldrequireorrecommenditsapplicationtothiscase.
"TheprincipaltaskofstatutoryinterpretationforProfessorFulleristhusalwaysasearch
forpurpose.Howthesearchistobeconductedandwhatrelationshipthereisbetweenthe
conceptsoflawandpolicyhedoesnotdiscussatanylength,thoughhereferstoaseries
ofquestionsthatcouldbeasked,questionswhichareveryreminiscentoftheoldcommon
lawprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretationasenunciatedinHeydon'scase:'Whatcanthis
rulebefor?Whatevildoesitseektoavert?Whatgoodisitintendedtopromote?'Hedoes
notconsiderthepossibilityofdetectingplausiblebutdivergentpurposes.
"Inthefirstplacelegalrulesdifferenormouslyintheirconcretenessandparticularity.We
maytalkaboutarulethat'Awillmusthavetwowitnesses'andagainaboutarulethat
'Contributorynegligencewilldefeattheclaimofaplaintiffinanegligencesuit.'Butthese
rulesclearlydifferintheirgeneralityandintheamountofcreativediscretionary
adjudicationthatmustgointotheirapplication.Andtheymaybothbecontrastedinthese
samerespectswithaprinciplelike'Acontractmaybeillegalifitoffendsagainstpublic
policy'oramaximthat'Hewhocomestoequitymustcomewithcleanhands.'Noprecise
distinctionscanbemadebetweenrules,principlesandmaxims,butthetermsserveto
markdifferencesofdegreeintheprecisionofguidestodecisionmaking.Rulesarefairly
concreteguidesfordecisiongearedtonarrowcategoriesofbehaviorandprescribingnarrow
patternsofconduct.Principlesarevaguersignalswhichalertustogeneralconsiderations
thatshouldbekeptinmindindecidingdisputesunderrules.Sowedecideunderrulesbut
inthelightofprinciples.Amaximisaprinciplethathasbeendistilledinatraditional,
aphoristicform.Inmarginalcasesrulesmaybeappliedinthelightofprinciples,but
sometimes,whennoconcreteruleispresentandrelevant,acasemustbedecidedbya
directapplicationofprincipleormaximtothefactswithouttheinterpositionofamore
concreterule.
"Thefirststepinanydiscussionofhowissuesofpolicyenterintodecisionmakingshould
beanexaminationofhowtheseissuesareoftenveryembeddedinthesedifferentlayers
ofmaterialusedinlegalreasoning.Whenisarecoursetoconsiderationsofpolicyin
applyingaruleareferencetoextralegalmaterialsandwhenisit,atleastinpart,a
referencetoamorecentrallegalnotionintheformofanotherruleorprincipleormaxim?
Istheresomecriterionbywhichwemustsaythatrulesarelawandprinciplesormaxims
arenotlaw,ifthis,indeed,iswhatProfessorHartmightbetakentoimply?(418420)
"These[omitted]examplesrevealthatintheedificeofargumentationinwhichalegal
problemisdebatedandinthestructureofreasoningbywhichajudicialopinionsupportsa
judgment,thereisconstantmovementbetweendifferentlayersofmaterial.Someofthis
materialisconcreteandparticular,thoughstillperhapsvagueorambiguousatitsedges,
aswithourruleaboutthesignatureatthefootorendofthewill.Someismuchmore
general,supervisoryandpolicycharged,aswiththenotionthatwhereverpossiblethe
wishesofthetestatorshouldbeeffected.Someisformallylegalinthestrongestsenseas
withtheinterpretivedirectionsintheWillsActAmendmentAct.Someislessformally
stampedwithauthoritybutyetremainsinanimportantsensedoctrinal,aswiththe
principlethatgenerallyrespectshouldbeaccordedtoprecedent.Somehasonlyfaint
marksoflegalformality,aswiththenotionthathardcasesmakebadlaw.Butweare
dealingineveryinstancewiththemoreorlessconcrete,themoreorlessformallylegal.To
attempt[asHartdoes]todrawsharplinesbetweenlawandpolicyorbetweenlegaland
nonlegalmaterialinthiscontextsadlyoversimplifiesacomplicatedproblem.
"Butwhatifourexperiencewiththeparticularjudgeinquestionaffordsusknowledge
thatheisinthehabitoftakingbribes?Wehavereferredearlierto'thestockofideas
whichbyobservationweknowinfluencejudgesindecidingcases.'Howthencanwe
discriminatebetweentheimpactonajudgeoftheinterpretivedirectionsintheWillsAct
AmendmentActand,ontheotherhand,theinfluenceofabribe?Itisimportanttostress
thattheanalysisofferedheredoesinsistontheneedfordrawingadistinctionbetween
thesetwophenomena.Otherwisestatementsaboutthenatureoflawandinquiriesinto
legalreasoningwould,indeed,becomemattersonlyofwhatjudgesdoandwewouldbe
backwiththeexcessesofearlyAmericanrealism.Whatweareconcernedwithinour
analysisofthedecisionmakingprocessisthestructureofargumentation,whichis
intimatelyconnectedwithwhatjudgesdobutiscertainlynotthesameaswhattheydo.
Thephilosophicalinquiryaboutlegalreasoningismarkedlydifferentfromapsychological
investigationintowhichinfluencesinfactdeterminedecisionsorevenintowhich
argumentsareinfactmostlikelytobeacceptableorconvincing.Themostobviouspointto
makeinthisconnectionisthatthejudge'stakingabribeisnotanargumentatall.Itisan
explanationforhisjudgmentinthesensethatthebribeisamotivation,butitisnota
reasoninthesenseofajustificationthatcouldbeopenlystatedinhisopinion.Itisnot
thereforeaninstanceoflegalreasoning:itdoesnotfindanyplaceamongthose
argumentsthat,byconsensusoftheparticipantsinthesystem,areregardedaslegitimate
materialsforbuildingastructureofpersuasion.(425426)
"OnecanagreewithProfessorHartthatitislessmysterioustospeakofrulesbeing
interpretedinthelightofpurposes.Butatthispointitisnecessarytoinsistthatthe
purposesofwhichwespeakaresometimespartlyentwinedintheruleitself,forpolicy
notionsmaybemoreorlessrevealedandmoreorlessembeddedinprescriptivelanguage,
maybesometimesdiscoverableinotherrulesofthesystemandsometimesinprinciples,
maximsanddoctrines,sothatpurposesareoftenatleasthalfmanifestinlegalmaterial
itself.
"Theprocessoflegalreasoningisthusoneofdeployingawiderangeofacceptable
argumentsthescopeofwhichblursanyanswertothequestionofwhatisandwhatisnot
law.Ifcourtsaregenerallyverywillingtolistento(thoughnotnecessarilytobeconvinced
by)theargumentthatacertaininterpretationofastatutewouldleadtoagraveinjustice,
whyshouldwenotregardtheargumentfrominjusticeasalegalone?Certainlyithasa
differentstatusfromtheargumentthatthecourtshoulddecideagainsttheplaintiff
becauseheisugly.Doesit,ontheotherhand,standonanydifferentfootingfromthe
argumentthatacourtshouldadoptacertaininterpretationbecausethereareearlier
authoritativedecisionswhichholdthatway?Itwouldnotsufficetosaythatthelatterisa
legalargumentbecausecourtsmustbepersuadedbyitwhiletheargumentfrominjustice
isonlyonethattheymaylistento,forcourtshavefrequentlybrushedasideprecedentand
declaredopenlythatforreasonsofjusticetheywillcreateanewrule.Norcanwesaythat
oneargumentistobeclassifiedaslegalandtheothernotbecauseobservationleadsusto
believethattheoneisasamatteroffactmorelikelytosucceedthantheother.Thisis
oftennotadeterminationthatcanbemadeand,inanycase,thediscussionisnotabout
whatargumentsareinfactmostlikelytosucceedbutaboutwhichonesareacceptablein
thesensethattheywillbelistenedtoandthatanobligationwillusuallybefelttorebut
themiftheyaretoberejected.Theideaofacceptableargumenthereisthuslinked
intimatelywiththeideasofaudienceanddialogue.Inthiswaylegalargumentisverylike
moralargumentandtheeverydaybusinessofprudentdecisionmakinginpersonalaffairs.
Butinthelegalcontexttheaudienceisaspecializedonewithparticularcrafttechniques
andtraditionswhichimposeamoreobvioushierarchyofcogencyonargumentsthanis
thecasewitheverydaypracticalreasoning.Argumentsaboutinjustice,hardshipandthe
likearequiteacceptableinthelegalsphere,butaslegalargumentstheymayhavetoyield
totheplainmeaningofastatuteortotheweightofavenerableprecedentincaseswhere
theywouldhavecarriedthedayinamoralargument.Wherethemeaningofastatuteis
notplain,orwhereprecedentisnotmassed,suchargumentsaremorelikelytosucceed.
Buttheargumentsused,listenedtoandsometimesacceptedaspersuasiveinlegal
reasoningcertainlyembraceawidefieldofargumentsalsoemployedinmoraldiscussion
andpracticalreasoning.
"Theupshotisthatthewholedistinctionbetweenwhichrulescanbeidentifiedas'valid'
andwhichcannot,towhichthepositivistsattachsomuchimportance,isoflittlehelpinan
analysisoflegalargumentanddecisionmaking.Itisoflittlehelpbecauselegalargument
hastodowithmanyconceptsotherthanrules,andtosaythatapropositioncannotbe
formallyidentifiedasavalidruleofthesystemisthereforenottosayanythingabout
whetheritisappropriateandusableinlegaldebate.Hart'sstigmatizingofviewswhich
confusewhatthelawisandwhatthelawoughttobeisnotinpointhere,forwhatis
beingassertedisthatthecharacteroflegalreasoninginthedecisionmakingprocessis
suchthat,thoughindeedtheremaybeadifferencebetweenwhatthelawisandwhatthe
lawoughttobe,thelawitselfisacollectionofinterwovenprescriptiveandpurposive
statementswhichwemarshallanddeployintheadjudicationofdisputesandalsointhe
tenderingofadvice.Doesthisinvolverevisingourconceptofaruleina'mysterious'
fashion,whichwasthetendencythatProfessorHartjustifiablycastigatedinProfessor
Fuller'sviews?Itcertainlyinvolvesassertingthatrulesoftencombinewiththeir
prescriptiveelementsmoreorlessincompletepurposiverevelationswhichareusedin
conjunctionwithothermaterialintheinterpretationoftherule,butitisdifficulttosee
whatismysteriousaboutthisorwhatgenerallyacceptedconceptofaruleitistakentobe
revising.(430431)
"Inourinvestigationoftheconceptoflawwearelikewiseinterestedinarulesystem
primarilybecauseithasasignificanteffectonbehaviorandnotmerelybecauseitisa
collectionofprescriptivesoundingutterances.Itistruethat,asProfessorHarthaspointed
out,rulegovernedorruleorientedbehaviorhasitsowndistinctivecharacterinthatit
presupposesanideologyorattitudeofacceptance,sothattounderstanditfullywemust
refertophenomenamorecomplexthanstatementsofwhatpeoplehabituallydoor
predictionsofwhatwillprobablybedone.Wemusttakeaccountofattitudesandpractices
inreferringtorulesasstandardsforjustification,forcriticismandcondemnation.Butitis
preciselythissocialphenomenonofacceptanceandapplicationthatliftsasystemofrules
outoftheprintedpageandmakesitasystemoflaw.
"Buttheconceptofavalidlawdoesnotappeartobeatallthesameasthatofagood
reasonforadecision.Decisionsbyacourtarenotcharacteristicallybasedonareasonbut
ratheronanedificeofreasoningtheyarenotsupportedbyseparatingvalidfrominvalid
rules(whichwouldbesosimpleataskthatdisputesneedneverarise),butbyarrivingat
aninterpretationofmaterialsgenerallyacknowledgedtoberelevantinafashiongenerally
acknowledgedtobeacceptable.Nojudgewaseverputinmuchofaquandarybythe
difficultyofdecidingwhetherastatuteemanatesfromhisownjurisdictionoranother.
Certainlytheidentificationofrulesasbelongingtothesystemisasubjectworthyof
philosophicalanalysis,butasapracticalmatteritoccasiionsnodifficultywhateverandis
scarcelyworththeattentionthathasbeenpaidtoitbytheanalyticaljurists.(4324)
"Thetasksoflawteachingaretoimpartsophisticationintechniquesofargumentand
reasoning.Forthispurpose,andfortheelucidationofalegalsystem,wemustaddtothe
conceptsofdutyimposingandpowerconferringrulesthenotionofcanonsorstandardsof
interpretationwhichservemorethanonepurpose.
"Sometimes,especiallywhencontainedinastatute,theyfunctionpartlyasapublic
justificationoftheenactmentorasadeclamatorystatementoflegislativepolicy.More
oftentheyaredirectivestoofficials,particularlyjudges,astohowtheyshouldworkwith
theprescriptiverulesofthesystem.Whendevelopedbythejudgesthemselvesinthe
formofprinciples,maximsandaphorismstheyareadeclarationoftheshared
understandingofcraftsmenabouthowtheyshouldshapethematerialsonwhichthey
work.But,bytheirverynature,theseinterpretivedirectivesareoftencapableof
expressionwithinthescopeofadutyimposingorpowercreatingrule,andforthisreason
itisnotprofitabletoattempttosplitthemoffandreservethetitle'law'forstatementsof
pureprescription.Suchanattemptwouldservenousefulpurposefor,bothbythecriteria
offormalvalidityandfunctionalimportance,suchjudgmentstandardsmeetthesame
testsaspurelyprescriptivestatements.
"Theconceptofaruleisthustoonarrowtoexplainthevarietyofmaterialcontained
withinalegalsystem.
"ForthesereasonstheAmericanrealistmovementisinsomewaysamorefruitfuland
hopefuljurisprudentialschoolthanthatofthemodernanalyticalpositivists.Onecareful
reservationmustbemadeonthiscomment.Itisnotmeantasadenigrationofthe
techniqueofsophisticatedlinguisticanalysis,whichisaninvaluableweaponforattacking
allproblemsoflawandallquestionsoflegalphilosophy.Thecriticismisnotdirectedatthat
techniquebutratherattheemphasisinsuchwritersasKelsenandProfessorHartonthe
centralityoftheconceptsofnormorrule.Suchamonocularconcentrationhasinevitably
ledtoalackoffocusonthedecisionmakingprocess.TheAmericanrealists,although
guiltyofsomecrudeanalyticalblunders,didperceivethattheimportanceoftheprocessof
decisionmakingandalsothattheconceptofarulewasoflittlehelpinitselucidation.The
realistfallacylayinthepreoccupationwithexplainingthecausesofdecisionsina
sociologicalorpsychologicalcontextandintheinabilitytodistinguishbetweenmotivation
andargument.Theneednowistoreturntoaconcentrationondecisionmakingwithan
awarenessofthisdistinction.(436437)"
#postedby W.Boardman:10:30AM
YoumightreadGrahamHughesonHartv.Fuller.Herearesomeexcerpts:
"ProfessorFuller,repudiatingHart'swayoftalkingaboutstatutoryinterpretation,begins
amatterofthevaguenessorambiguityofsinglewords.Itisrather,Fullersuggests,more
oftenabusinessofassigningmeaningstosentences,paragraphsorevenpagesoftext.
Butevenifthequestionshouldpresentitselfasturningontheinterpretationofasingle
word,thecertaintythatwemayfeelabouttheproprietyofagiveninterpretationis,in
Fuller'sview,derivednotfromlinguisticusagebutratherfromtheclearnessofthe
purposeoftherule,orperhapsfromthecircumstancethattheanswerwouldbethesame
nomatterwhichofseveralpossiblepurposesunderliestherule.So,onthelatter
hypothesis,nomatterwhetherthepurposeofHart'sruleprohibitingvehiclesisto
suppressnoiseortopreventairpollution,itwouldclearlyapplytodrivingaCadillac
throughthepark.Ifatankweredrivenintotheparkinordertobemountedonapedestal
asawarmemorial,thedecisionmightbeindoubt,notbecauseofanydoubtconcerning
theusageof'vehicle,'butratherbecauseofourdoubtwhetheranyconceivablepurpose
fortherulewouldrequireorrecommenditsapplicationtothiscase.
"TheprincipaltaskofstatutoryinterpretationforProfessorFulleristhusalwaysasearch
forpurpose.Howthesearchistobeconductedandwhatrelationshipthereisbetweenthe
conceptsoflawandpolicyhedoesnotdiscussatanylength,thoughhereferstoaseries
ofquestionsthatcouldbeasked,questionswhichareveryreminiscentoftheoldcommon
rulebefor?Whatevildoesitseektoavert?Whatgoodisitintendedtopromote?'Hedoes
notconsiderthepossibilityofdetectingplausiblebutdivergentpurposes.
"Inthefirstplacelegalrulesdifferenormouslyintheirconcretenessandparticularity.We
maytalkaboutarulethat'Awillmusthavetwowitnesses'andagainaboutarulethat
'Contributorynegligencewilldefeattheclaimofaplaintiffinanegligencesuit.'Butthese
rulesclearlydifferintheirgeneralityandintheamountofcreativediscretionary
adjudicationthatmustgointotheirapplication.Andtheymaybothbecontrastedinthese
samerespectswithaprinciplelike'Acontractmaybeillegalifitoffendsagainstpublic
policy'oramaximthat'Hewhocomestoequitymustcomewithcleanhands.'Noprecise
distinctionscanbemadebetweenrules,principlesandmaxims,butthetermsserveto
markdifferencesofdegreeintheprecisionofguidestodecisionmaking.Rulesarefairly
concreteguidesfordecisiongearedtonarrowcategoriesofbehaviorandprescribingnarrow
patternsofconduct.Principlesarevaguersignalswhichalertustogeneralconsiderations
thatshouldbekeptinmindindecidingdisputesunderrules.Sowedecideunderrulesbut
inthelightofprinciples.Amaximisaprinciplethathasbeendistilledinatraditional,
aphoristicform.Inmarginalcasesrulesmaybeappliedinthelightofprinciples,but
sometimes,whennoconcreteruleispresentandrelevant,acasemustbedecidedbya
directapplicationofprincipleormaximtothefactswithouttheinterpositionofamore
concreterule.
"Thefirststepinanydiscussionofhowissuesofpolicyenterintodecisionmakingshould
beanexaminationofhowtheseissuesareoftenveryembeddedinthesedifferentlayers
ofmaterialusedinlegalreasoning.Whenisarecoursetoconsiderationsofpolicyin
applyingaruleareferencetoextralegalmaterialsandwhenisit,atleastinpart,a
referencetoamorecentrallegalnotionintheformofanotherruleorprincipleormaxim?
Istheresomecriterionbywhichwemustsaythatrulesarelawandprinciplesormaxims
arenotlaw,ifthis,indeed,iswhatProfessorHartmightbetakentoimply?(418420)
"These[omitted]examplesrevealthatintheedificeofargumentationinwhichalegal
problemisdebatedandinthestructureofreasoningbywhichajudicialopinionsupportsa
judgment,thereisconstantmovementbetweendifferentlayersofmaterial.Someofthis
materialisconcreteandparticular,thoughstillperhapsvagueorambiguousatitsedges,
aswithourruleaboutthesignatureatthefootorendofthewill.Someismuchmore
general,supervisoryandpolicycharged,aswiththenotionthatwhereverpossiblethe
wishesofthetestatorshouldbeeffected.Someisformallylegalinthestrongestsenseas
withtheinterpretivedirectionsintheWillsActAmendmentAct.Someislessformally
stampedwithauthoritybutyetremainsinanimportantsensedoctrinal,aswiththe
principlethatgenerallyrespectshouldbeaccordedtoprecedent.Somehasonlyfaint
marksoflegalformality,aswiththenotionthathardcasesmakebadlaw.Butweare
dealingineveryinstancewiththemoreorlessconcrete,themoreorlessformallylegal.To
attempt[asHartdoes]todrawsharplinesbetweenlawandpolicyorbetweenlegaland
nonlegalmaterialinthiscontextsadlyoversimplifiesacomplicatedproblem.
"Butwhatifourexperiencewiththeparticularjudgeinquestionaffordsusknowledge
thatheisinthehabitoftakingbribes?Wehavereferredearlierto'thestockofideas
whichbyobservationweknowinfluencejudgesindecidingcases.'Howthencanwe
discriminatebetweentheimpactonajudgeoftheinterpretivedirectionsintheWillsAct
AmendmentActand,ontheotherhand,theinfluenceofabribe?Itisimportanttostress
thattheanalysisofferedheredoesinsistontheneedfordrawingadistinctionbetween
thesetwophenomena.Otherwisestatementsaboutthenatureoflawandinquiriesinto
legalreasoningwould,indeed,becomemattersonlyofwhatjudgesdoandwewouldbe
backwiththeexcessesofearlyAmericanrealism.Whatweareconcernedwithinour
analysisofthedecisionmakingprocessisthestructureofargumentation,whichis
intimatelyconnectedwithwhatjudgesdobutiscertainlynotthesameaswhattheydo.
Thephilosophicalinquiryaboutlegalreasoningismarkedlydifferentfromapsychological
investigationintowhichinfluencesinfactdeterminedecisionsorevenintowhich
argumentsareinfactmostlikelytobeacceptableorconvincing.Themostobviouspointto
makeinthisconnectionisthatthejudge'stakingabribeisnotanargumentatall.Itisan
explanationforhisjudgmentinthesensethatthebribeisamotivation,butitisnota
reasoninthesenseofajustificationthatcouldbeopenlystatedinhisopinion.Itisnot
thereforeaninstanceoflegalreasoning:itdoesnotfindanyplaceamongthose
argumentsthat,byconsensusoftheparticipantsinthesystem,areregardedaslegitimate
materialsforbuildingastructureofpersuasion.(425426)
"OnecanagreewithProfessorHartthatitislessmysterioustospeakofrulesbeing
interpretedinthelightofpurposes.Butatthispointitisnecessarytoinsistthatthe
purposesofwhichwespeakaresometimespartlyentwinedintheruleitself,forpolicy
notionsmaybemoreorlessrevealedandmoreorlessembeddedinprescriptivelanguage,
maybesometimesdiscoverableinotherrulesofthesystemandsometimesinprinciples,
maximsanddoctrines,sothatpurposesareoftenatleasthalfmanifestinlegalmaterial
itself.
"Theprocessoflegalreasoningisthusoneofdeployingawiderangeofacceptable
argumentsthescopeofwhichblursanyanswertothequestionofwhatisandwhatisnot
law.Ifcourtsaregenerallyverywillingtolistento(thoughnotnecessarilytobeconvinced
by)theargumentthatacertaininterpretationofastatutewouldleadtoagraveinjustice,
differentstatusfromtheargumentthatthecourtshoulddecideagainsttheplaintiff
becauseheisugly.Doesit,ontheotherhand,standonanydifferentfootingfromthe
argumentthatacourtshouldadoptacertaininterpretationbecausethereareearlier
authoritativedecisionswhichholdthatway?Itwouldnotsufficetosaythatthelatterisa
legalargumentbecausecourtsmustbepersuadedbyitwhiletheargumentfrominjustice
isonlyonethattheymaylistento,forcourtshavefrequentlybrushedasideprecedentand
declaredopenlythatforreasonsofjusticetheywillcreateanewrule.Norcanwesaythat
oneargumentistobeclassifiedaslegalandtheothernotbecauseobservationleadsusto
believethattheoneisasamatteroffactmorelikelytosucceedthantheother.Thisis
oftennotadeterminationthatcanbemadeand,inanycase,thediscussionisnotabout
whatargumentsareinfactmostlikelytosucceedbutaboutwhichonesareacceptablein
thesensethattheywillbelistenedtoandthatanobligationwillusuallybefelttorebut
themiftheyaretoberejected.Theideaofacceptableargumenthereisthuslinked
intimatelywiththeideasofaudienceanddialogue.Inthiswaylegalargumentisverylike
moralargumentandtheeverydaybusinessofprudentdecisionmakinginpersonalaffairs.
Butinthelegalcontexttheaudienceisaspecializedonewithparticularcrafttechniques
andtraditionswhichimposeamoreobvioushierarchyofcogencyonargumentsthanis
likearequiteacceptableinthelegalsphere,butaslegalargumentstheymayhavetoyield
totheplainmeaningofastatuteortotheweightofavenerableprecedentincaseswhere
theywouldhavecarriedthedayinamoralargument.Wherethemeaningofastatuteis
notplain,orwhereprecedentisnotmassed,suchargumentsaremorelikelytosucceed.
Buttheargumentsused,listenedtoandsometimesacceptedaspersuasiveinlegal
reasoningcertainlyembraceawidefieldofargumentsalsoemployedinmoraldiscussion
andpracticalreasoning.
"Theupshotisthatthewholedistinctionbetweenwhichrulescanbeidentifiedas'valid'
andwhichcannot,towhichthepositivistsattachsomuchimportance,isoflittlehelpinan
analysisoflegalargumentanddecisionmaking.Itisoflittlehelpbecauselegalargument
hastodowithmanyconceptsotherthanrules,andtosaythatapropositioncannotbe
formallyidentifiedasavalidruleofthesystemisthereforenottosayanythingabout
whetheritisappropriateandusableinlegaldebate.Hart'sstigmatizingofviewswhich
confusewhatthelawisandwhatthelawoughttobeisnotinpointhere,forwhatis
beingassertedisthatthecharacteroflegalreasoninginthedecisionmakingprocessis
suchthat,thoughindeedtheremaybeadifferencebetweenwhatthelawisandwhatthe
lawoughttobe,thelawitselfisacollectionofinterwovenprescriptiveandpurposive
statementswhichwemarshallanddeployintheadjudicationofdisputesandalsointhe
tenderingofadvice.Doesthisinvolverevisingourconceptofaruleina'mysterious'
fashion,whichwasthetendencythatProfessorHartjustifiablycastigatedinProfessor
Fuller'sviews?Itcertainlyinvolvesassertingthatrulesoftencombinewiththeir
prescriptiveelementsmoreorlessincompletepurposiverevelationswhichareusedin
conjunctionwithothermaterialintheinterpretationoftherule,butitisdifficulttosee
whatismysteriousaboutthisorwhatgenerallyacceptedconceptofaruleitistakentobe
revising.(430431)
"Inourinvestigationoftheconceptoflawwearelikewiseinterestedinarulesystem
primarilybecauseithasasignificanteffectonbehaviorandnotmerelybecauseitisa
collectionofprescriptivesoundingutterances.Itistruethat,asProfessorHarthaspointed
out,rulegovernedorruleorientedbehaviorhasitsowndistinctivecharacterinthatit
presupposesanideologyorattitudeofacceptance,sothattounderstanditfullywemust
refertophenomenamorecomplexthanstatementsofwhatpeoplehabituallydoor
predictionsofwhatwillprobablybedone.Wemusttakeaccountofattitudesandpractices
inreferringtorulesasstandardsforjustification,forcriticismandcondemnation.Butitis
preciselythissocialphenomenonofacceptanceandapplicationthatliftsasystemofrules
outoftheprintedpageandmakesitasystemoflaw.
"Buttheconceptofavalidlawdoesnotappeartobeatallthesameasthatofagood
reasonforadecision.Decisionsbyacourtarenotcharacteristicallybasedonareasonbut
ratheronanedificeofreasoningtheyarenotsupportedbyseparatingvalidfrominvalid
rules(whichwouldbesosimpleataskthatdisputesneedneverarise),butbyarrivingat
aninterpretationofmaterialsgenerallyacknowledgedtoberelevantinafashiongenerally
acknowledgedtobeacceptable.Nojudgewaseverputinmuchofaquandarybythe
difficultyofdecidingwhetherastatuteemanatesfromhisownjurisdictionoranother.
Certainlytheidentificationofrulesasbelongingtothesystemisasubjectworthyof
philosophicalanalysis,butasapracticalmatteritoccasiionsnodifficultywhateverandis
scarcelyworththeattentionthathasbeenpaidtoitbytheanalyticaljurists.(4324)
"Thetasksoflawteachingaretoimpartsophisticationintechniquesofargumentand
reasoning.Forthispurpose,andfortheelucidationofalegalsystem,wemustaddtothe
conceptsofdutyimposingandpowerconferringrulesthenotionofcanonsorstandardsof
interpretationwhichservemorethanonepurpose.
"Sometimes,especiallywhencontainedinastatute,theyfunctionpartlyasapublic
justificationoftheenactmentorasadeclamatorystatementoflegislativepolicy.More
oftentheyaredirectivestoofficials,particularlyjudges,astohowtheyshouldworkwith
theprescriptiverulesofthesystem.Whendevelopedbythejudgesthemselvesinthe
formofprinciples,maximsandaphorismstheyareadeclarationoftheshared
understandingofcraftsmenabouthowtheyshouldshapethematerialsonwhichthey
work.But,bytheirverynature,theseinterpretivedirectivesareoftencapableof
expressionwithinthescopeofadutyimposingorpowercreatingrule,andforthisreason
itisnotprofitabletoattempttosplitthemoffandreservethetitle'law'forstatementsof
pureprescription.Suchanattemptwouldservenousefulpurposefor,bothbythecriteria
offormalvalidityandfunctionalimportance,suchjudgmentstandardsmeetthesame
testsaspurelyprescriptivestatements.
"Theconceptofaruleisthustoonarrowtoexplainthevarietyofmaterialcontained
withinalegalsystem.
"ForthesereasonstheAmericanrealistmovementisinsomewaysamorefruitfuland
hopefuljurisprudentialschoolthanthatofthemodernanalyticalpositivists.Onecareful
reservationmustbemadeonthiscomment.Itisnotmeantasadenigrationofthe
techniqueofsophisticatedlinguisticanalysis,whichisaninvaluableweaponforattacking
allproblemsoflawandallquestionsoflegalphilosophy.Thecriticismisnotdirectedatthat
techniquebutratherattheemphasisinsuchwritersasKelsenandProfessorHartonthe
centralityoftheconceptsofnormorrule.Suchamonocularconcentrationhasinevitably
ledtoalackoffocusonthedecisionmakingprocess.TheAmericanrealists,although
decisionmakingandalsothattheconceptofarulewasoflittlehelpinitselucidation.The
realistfallacylayinthepreoccupationwithexplainingthecausesofdecisionsina
sociologicalorpsychologicalcontextandintheinabilitytodistinguishbetweenmotivation
andargument.Theneednowistoreturntoaconcentrationondecisionmakingwithan
awarenessofthisdistinction.(436437)"
#postedby W.Boardman:10:33AM
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