DE LA SALLE LIPA COLLEGE OF LAW

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

CASE DIGESTS

Ezekiel T. Mostiero
JD 1

Atty. Mary Alice Abratigue

 Professor, Legal and Judicial Ethics
Marita Tolentino and Fely San Andres Vs. Sheriff IV Glenn A. Umali
A.M. No. P-16-3615.
January 24, 2017

Facts:

Judge Corazon A. Domingo-Raola (Judge Raola), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 10, received separate letter-complaints from Marita Tolentino
(Tolentino) and Fely San Andres (San Andres), respectively. The letter-complaints alleged that
defendant Sheriff IV Glenn Umali received the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(l00,000.00) from San Andres representing payment of the judgment debt awarded in Tolentino's
favor in a criminal case then pending before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan. It
appears, however, that such amount was neither delivered to Tolentino or the clerk of court, nor
was it deposited to the MTC's bank account. Thus, the letter-complaints requested a conference
before Judge Raola to resolve the issue.

Subsequently, Judge Raola held the requested conference, during which Umali agreed to
pay the unremitted judgment debt on or before March 13, 2015. Thereafter, Judge Raola reported
the matter to Executive Judge Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Judge Arcega) of the RTC of
Bulacan who then referred the Memorandum to the OCA for appropriate action.

OCA:

Respondent Sheriff Umali failed to comply with the rule that if the judgment obligee is not
present to receive the payment, the judgment obligor shall give the payment to the sheriff.
Thereafter, the sheriff shall turn over the amount paid to the clerk of court within the same day, or if
the same is not possible, the sheriff shall deposit the said amount to the depository bank of the
court. A misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule are present.

Respondent Sheriff Umali may therefore be dismissed from the service.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation. Under Section 46 (A)(3), Rule 10 on the
Schedule of Penalties of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from service in the first instance. The
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
perpetual disqualification from holding public office and being barred from taking civil service
examinations.

Umali's bare assertion that his failure to turn over the judgment debt m accordance with Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court resulted from a "misunderstanding" is specious, at best. The fact that Umali did
not offer any form of explanation as to the nature, cause and incidents of this so-called
misunderstanding shows that it was a mere afterthought and a lame excuse offered after his
misdeed had been discovered. Moreover, while the Court is aware that it may consider
circumstances to mitigate the imposable penalty prescribed under the RRACCS, no such
circumstance has been invoked, nor does any appear from the records of the case.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sheriff IV Glenn A. Umali GUILTY of grave misconduct,
meriting the penalty of DISMISSAL from service, with FORFEITURE of retirement and other
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION from re-employment
in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or financial institution.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Executive Judge Illuminada P. Cabato, et al.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2401.
January 25, 2017

Facts:

Sheriff IV Oliver N. Landingin of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City, complained
of bias and partiality against Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora. He submitted with the letter a video
compact disc (VCD) showing two persons purportedly punching in the Daily Time Record (DTR)
Bundy Cards of his other co-employees in the early hours of the morning. By doing so, Landingin
alleges that it was made to appear that his co-employees arrived on time when in fact, they usually
arrived late. Landingin, thus, concludes. that Judge Tabora acted with partiality by refusing to sign
his DTR Bundy Card while affixing her signature on the DTR Bundy Cards of his other co-
employees.

The investigating team, as directed by the Office of the Court Administrator, found that
instead of using the bundy clocks, the court personnel were manually entering their arrival times in
their bundy clock cards and office logbooks. The team also observed that numerous court
personnel were arriving after 8:00am and leaving the court premises before 5:00pm, and that
instances of loafing were prevalent. The team inspected the logbooks of each and every
branch/office of the Baguio courts to identify those making untruthful entries therein, thereby
committing acts of dishonesty and falsification.

OCA:

The OCA classified the above court personnel into four (4) groups and with their
corresponding penalty: 1) the personnel who have no entries in the attendance log books/sheets
are administratively liable, and guilty of simple negligence 2) the personnel who have no time-outs
in the attendance log books/sheets are also are administratively liable, and guilty of simple
negligence 3) the personnel who made untruthful time-outs in the attendance log books/sheets are
imposed with the fine of P10,000.00; 4) the Judges and the Clerks of Court who certified the DTRs
of the above court personnel with penalty of suspension subject to respective respondents.
Ruling:

The Court is disposed to modify the recommendations of the OCA.

First and Second Group:

Court Personnel who had no entries in the logbooks or did not enter their log-out.

The first two (2) groups delineated by the OCA as those who had no entries in the
attendance log books/sheets and those who left their offices without entering their time-outs are
correctly administratively liable.

They are, however, not liable for simple negligence but rather for Violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations. OCA Circular 7-2003 requires that: 4. Every Clerk of Court shall: 4.1.
Maintain a registry book (logbook) in which all officials and employees of that court shall indicate
their daily time of arrival in and departure from the office;

In Contreras v. Monge, the Court classified the failure of court personnel to enter their time-
in and time-out in the office logbook as a light offense, to wit:

Respondent was previously reprimanded in AM. No. P-05-2040. Her act of not logging in
and out of the attendance logbook was, without doubt, her second violation of civil service rules. A
light offense such as a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, if violated for the second
time, is punishable by suspension for one to 30 days.

Relevantly, Rule 10, Article 46 (F) (3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Case in the
Civil Service provides:

The following light offenses are punishable by reprimand for the first offense; suspension of
one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense; and dismissal from the service for the third
offense: 3. Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations;

Thus, considering that the above court personnel will only be administratively liable for the
first time with this case, the proper punishment for them would only be a Reprimand with a stern
warning that the repetition of the same or any similar act or omission shall be dealt with more
severely.

Third Group: Court Personnel who made untruthful time-outs

As such, the allegations of the court personnel on this matter are unmeritorious.

In Flores-Tumbaga v. Tumbaga, is that: the presumption is that witnesses are not actuated
by any improper motive absent any proof to the contrary and that their testimonies must
accordingly be met with considerable, if not conclusive, favor under the rules of evidence because
it is not expected that said witnesses would prevaricate and cause the damnation of one who
brought them no harm or injury. Thus, respondent's bare denial vis-a-vis the positive testimonies of
the witnesses, the latter should prevail.

Here, the OCA team reported that they conducted the roll call of the court personnel before
5:00pm and found that the above court personnel already logged their time-out as 5:00pm. There
was no reason for the OCA team to falsify its report. As such, petitioners' contention herein is
bereft of merit.

Specifically as to Derasmo, Pasag, and Mariano, it bears noting that, after examining the
Attendance - Log Sheet of RTC Branch 6 for May 5, 2011, they, along with Peralta, Ferrer, Sacpa,
Fagel, and Gonzales logged time-outs of 5:00pm or after. It is, therefore, unbelievable that the OCA
team would select the three court personnel at random and allege that they were no longer at the
court when, in fact, they were. Respondents have not given any reason why the OCA team would
do so.

The same principle applies to Manipon, Eserio and Romero who argue that they were also
present when the roll call was conducted by the OCA team. Again, it is illogical for the OCA team to
make false allegations against them and yet say that the other court personnel of Branch 7, namely
Fukai, Perez, Madayag and Pangan were present when the roll call was conducted.

In People v. Villajlores, Well-entrenched is the rule that evidence should first be believable
and logical before it can be accorded weight. To be given any credence, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself as a common experience and
observation that mankind can deem probable under the circumstances. Thus, unless the OCA
team was motivated by some reason to distinguish respondents from the other personnel, the
allegations cannot be given any credit.

With regard to the penalty, Office of the Court Administrator v. kasilag is relevant:

Jurisprudence on this matter is clear. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave

offense. The nature of this infraction is precisely what the OCA states: the act of falsifying an
official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government
service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of
public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official
document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as in this
case. In the instant case, however, the Court agrees with the penalty recommended by the OCA in
consonance with the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Hernandez.

In previous cases, the Court accorded some measure of compassion to erring employees.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Magbanua, the Court ratiocinated that the law is concerned
for the working man, and respondent's unemployment would bring untold hardships and sorrows
on his dependents. In addition, the Court regarded as mitigating circumstance, the fact that
Magbanua had been an employee of the court since 1985.
 The Court deems it proper to instead impose the fine of Five Thousand Pesos
(PhP5,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Fourth Group: Judges and Clerks of Court that certified the DTRs of the erring court personnel

As to the findings and penalties for the certifications made by the judges and clerks of court
of the Baguio courts, it would be in line with jurisprudence to admonish rather than reprimand
them. Verily, the abovementioned judges and clerks of court must be Admonished for their failure to
properly supervise their subordinates, particularly in the logging of their attendance.

Ruth B. Bawayan, Clerk of Court, Branch 4, RTC; Jerico G. Gay-Ya, Clerk of Court, Branch
61, RTC

With regard to Bawayan, as discussed above, she is likewise guilty of failing to log her time-
in and time-out on the day of the inspection and was penalized with Reprimand. The more serious
penalty shall, therefore, be imposed pursuant to Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, which states:

Section 50. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. - If the respondent is found guilty of two
(2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.

Thus, her previous penalty of being Admonished for certifying as correct the DTRs of the
erring court personnel will be absorbed by the penalty of Reprimand earlier imposed.

The same principle will apply to Gay-ya who was earlier found above to have entered an
untruthful time-out in the logbooks and fined the amount of PhP5,000.00. Such fine shall, therefore,
absorb the penalty herein imposed.

Utility Worker, Manolo V. Mariano III

As to the case of Utility Worker Manolo V. Mariano III, while it may seem that his situation is
similar to the OCA's second group of personnel who failed to log their time-in and time-out in the
log books, the extent of the proven failure of Mariano to perform his duty differentiates his case
from the others.

The OCA recommends the imposition of the penalty of Suspension for ten (10) months on
Mariano, following this Court ruling in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Cyril Jotic as
Mariano committed a Grave Offense punishable at the first instance with dismissal from the
service.

This would be the first time that Mariano will be held administratively liable. As such,
Mariano shall be imposed a Suspension from work of three (3) months and one (1) day with the
warning that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely.
 Mariano was earlier found liable for making an untruthful time-out on the date of the
inspection and was Fined the amount of PhP5,000.00. Such penalty is absorbed by the imposition
of the instant penalty of Suspension.
Dominador B. Remiendo, Clerk Ill, Branch 7, RTC

Finally, as to Clerk III Dominador B. Remiendo, he was the person identified in the
videotape punching in the DTRs of his officemates. This is clearly an act of Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Document, both of which are grave offenses punishable in the first instance
with dismissal from the service. The OCA recommends the imposition of such extreme penalty to
make him a strong example to all the court personnel in the country.

We disagree with this recommendation.

As aptly stated by the Court in Velasco v. Obispo, dismissal should not be imposed if a less
punitive penalty would suffice:

The Court also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps
may be committed by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not
only for the law's concern for .the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider.
Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.
Applying the rationale in the aforesaid judicial precedents and rules, the Court considers as
mitigating circumstances the fact that this is the first infraction of Obispo and more importantly, the
lack of bad faith on his part in committing the act complained of.

Here, this would be the first time that Remiendo would be held administratively liable.
Further, he admits his error and apologized for the same. Considering the above extenuating
circumstances and following the ruling in Velasco, Remiendo is hereby Suspended for a period of
six (6) months with a stern warning that a repetition of this offense shall be met with a harsher
penalty.

On a final note, court personnel are reminded of their sworn duty to always act with
honesty, as eloquently put by this Court. In Gubatanga v. Boday: this Court will not tolerate
dishonesty. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest
employee, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in
the public service It has been consistently stressed that even minor employees mirror the image
of the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciary's good name and standing
as a true temple of justice.
 Silvestra Medina and Santos Medina Loraya Vs. Atty. Rufino Lizardo
A.C. No. 10533.
January 31, 2017

Facts:

Complainant Silvestra, because of her advanced age, allegedly entrusted the owner's
duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) to respondent. However, since complainants are
not the only owners of the properties covered by said TCTs, and other heirs were asking for the
original duplicate copies, complainants went to the residence of Atty. Lizardo and requested the
return of said TCTs. However, respondent claimed that Silvestra entrusted the TCTs to him because
they sold their shares in in favor of a certain Renato Martinez (Martinez). He refused to return the
subject TCTs because complainants did not secure the written consent of Martinez.

Respondent notes that complainants only had a one-fourth share in the subject lots based
on a compromise agreement. Complainants allegedly sold this one-fourth share to Martinez, but
their co-owners resisted the transfer of the titles to said properties, forcing Silvestra and Alicia to
file a Complaint for Partition. Upon the death of Alicia, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale wherein said heirs appear to have agreed to convey in favor of Martinez and
his spouse all their shares.

Complainants averred that they did not notice that the subject lots were sold together with
another subject lots. Santos claims that they did not read the Extrajudicial Settlement since they
trusted Atty. Lizardo to sell only one parcel of land covering 1,000 square meters to Martinez.
Hence, complainant informed the Investigating Commissioner of their letter terminating the
services of Atty. Lizardo as counsel for total loss of trust and confidence and prayed for the latter's
disbarment.

IBP:

The Investigation Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the

practice of law for two years. The Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thereby
suspending Atty. Lizardo from the practice of law for two years.

Ruling:
This Court resolves to adopt with modification the Resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors. The main charge against Atty. Lizardo is his alleged violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

This Court has explained the test in determining whether conflicting interests are being
represented in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

In the case at bar, it is undeniable that complainants Silvestra and Santos, on one hand,
and Martinez, on the other, have conflicting interests with regard to the disputed property,
particularly lot which complainants assert they never sold to Martinez. Atty. Lizardo now finds
himself arguing against the ownership by Silvestra and Santos of their shares in the disputed
property, which is the very legal position he was bound to defend as their counsel in the partition
case.

The Court observes that the complaint for partition in the RTC of Makati is the only case
filed in court concerning the subject properties, and Atty. Lizardo is the counsel of record therein of
Silvestra and Alicia. There is no mention of Martinez in said Complaint. These inactions make it
hard for us to believe Atty. Lizardo's claim that Martinez engaged his services concurrently with
Silvestra and Alicia in the filing of the partition case. There is no credible proof on record that Atty.
Lizardo was from the beginning engaged to represent Silvestra, Alicia and Martinez as their
common counsel.

Respondent is required to deliver the property of his client when due or upon demand, and
mandated to always be loyal to them and vigilant to protect their interests, in accordance with the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent
on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

Atty. Lizardo's withholding of the TCTs entrusted to him by his clients to protect another
purported client who surreptitiously acquired his services despite a conflict of interest is therefore a
clear violation of several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For this reason, we
also uphold the grant of complainants' prayer for the return of the subject titles which they turned
over to Atty. Lizardo for safekeeping. In any event, the return of said TCTs will not unduly prejudice
Martinez who may cause his adverse claim to be duly annotated thereon.

However, we refrain from passing upon the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that
Atty. Lizardo was guilty of deceit. The matter of fraud in the execution of said agreement which will
have implications on its validity and legal effects must be first threshed out by the parties in the
appropriate proceedings.

We find insufficient basis to hold Atty. Lizardo liable for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 at this point in time, a lighter penalty is in order. Suspension from the practice
of law for one year is sufficient in the case at bar.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Rufino C. Lizardo GUILTY of violating Canons 16
and 17, and Rules 15.03 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision,
ORDERS him, under pain of contempt, to return TCTs No. 3900 and 13866 to complainant
Silvestra Medina within 15 days from notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Eufemia A. Camino Vs. Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui
A.C. No. 11095.
January 31, 2017

Facts:

In a Supreme Court decision in 2011, respondent was disbarred after he was found guilty of
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for converting the money of his client to his own personal
use without her consent.
 Complainant alleged that respondent violated their agreement for the latter to facilitate and
secure a loan in order to finance the payment of necessary expenses to transfer the title of a
certain property under her name. She claimed that respondent obtained a loan in her name and
that of her husband, using their property as collateral, but Atty. Pasagui arrogated the proceeds
thereof to himself.

The court ruled that by his failure to make good of their agreement to use the proceeds of
the loan for the transfer of the title in complainant's name, Atty. Pasagui not only betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed upon him by his client, but he is likewise guilty of engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct. For his acts, Atty. Pasagui degraded himself and besmirched the fair name
of an honorable profession.

Complainant now prays for the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the
said judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of writ of execution may be granted for enforcement of
judgment;

Ruling:

Yes. The issuance of writ of execution may be granted for enforcement of judgment.

Generally, once a judgment or order becomes final and executory, the judgment obligee
may file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided for under
Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:

SEC. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the
entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same
case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

Corollarily, judgments declared to be immediately executory, as in the present case, are

enforceable after their rendition. Similar to judgments or orders that become final and executory,
the execution of the decision in the case at bar is already a matter of right. 4 The judgment obligee
may, therefore, file a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in the court of origin as provided
for under Rule 39, Sec. 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 Judge Guillermo P. Agloro vs Court Interpreter Leslie J. Burgos, et al.
A.M. No. P-16-3550
January 31, 2017

Facts:

Judge Agloro reported to respondent Judge Renato C. Francisco (EJ Francisco) of RTC-
Malolos that based on his own investigation, the LRC case regarding certain irregularities relative
to the petition for reconstitution of four (4) transfer certificates of title, was raffled off to Branch 77
but for "unknown reason," the record of the case appeared in Branch 8. He also averred that he
came to know that the registration of the entry of judgment for the order was refused by the Office
of the Clerk of Court (OCC) because the LRC case was raffled off to Branch 77, and not to Branch
83; and that he was in a predicament because there was a pending motion for execution, yet the
decision was not yet final and executory.

On 2012, the new Executive Judge, Ma. Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega referred the matter to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) after she had conducted her own investigation on the
personnel of the OCC and Branch 83 regarding the apparent anomalies surrounding the LRC case.
She also forwarded the case folder of the LRC case from Branch 77 and the case folder from
Branch 83, together with the affidavits of the court personnel.

OCA:

The OCA recommended the following:

a) that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter against the
respondents;

b) the administrative complaint against respondent Court Interpreter Leslie Burgos, Branch 83,
RTC, Malolos City, Bulacan, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence;

c) in view of the death of respondent Clerk III Julieta Fajardo, same court, the administrative
complaint against her be DISMISSED;

d) respondent Clerk III Annaliza Santiago, same court, be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty
and be REPRIMANDED, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of such or any similar act shall
be dealt with more severely by the Court; and

e) respondent Court Stenographer Marissa M. Garcia, same court, be found GUILTY of grave
misconduct, serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and be meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits may be
forfeited except accrued leave credits, and be perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation
or government financial institution;

Ruling:
 The Court agrees that there is a dearth of evidence to hold Burgos administratively liable.
Indeed, no participation, whatsoever, relating to the subject scheme could be attributed to her. The
records would also show that Burgos came to know of the misdeed only after Fajardo had reported
the same to her. Thus, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the OCA that Burgos could not be
made administratively liable as she could not have prevented the devious scheme by any amount
of diligence.

Respondent Clerk III Julieta Fajardo

As regards Fajardo, jurisprudence is settled that the death of a respondent does not
preclude a finding of administrative liability, subject to certain exceptions. In the case of Gonzales
v. Escalona, the Court wrote:

While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that
the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the
respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case;
jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case.

The above rule, however, admits of exceptions. In Gonzales, citing the case of Limliman vs.
Judge Ulat-Marrero, the Court held that the death of the respondent necessitated the dismissal of
the administrative case upon a consideration of any of the following factors: first, if the
respondent's right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional
circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, the
kind of penalty imposed. In the case against Fajardo, none of the aforesaid exceptions exists.
Thus, the case against Fajardo could not be dismissed merely on account of her death.

Nevertheless, the Court is convinced that the case against Fajardo must be dismissed for
want of evidence against her.

Respondent Court Stenographer Marissa M. Garcia

The Court likewise concurs with the recommendation of the OCA with respect to Garcia, but
modifies its findings in the case of Santiago. The Court is convinced that Santiago is also
administratively liable for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

Garcia performed numerous acts which led to no other conclusion than that she was
instrumental and complicit in making sure that the petition would be granted. Garcia first
approached the OCC and tried to persuade them to have the LRC case assigned to Branch 83.
Her request was denied as there was a process of raffling off the cases. This, however, did not
stop Garcia from pursuing her objective. When the LRC case mysteriously appeared in Branch 83,
it was Garcia who practically prepared all the orders relating to the said case. More importantly, it
was Garcia who prepared the draft of the order which granted the petition.

Respondent Clerk III Annaliza Santiago

The Court disagrees with the OCA that her acts were done in accordance with her usual
daily routine. Contrary to the OCA findings, Santiago's acts, relating to the present anomaly, could
not be considered as constituting simple neglect of duty because they were not committed due to
carelessness and indifference, but as a result of a willful violation of the established rules. In fact,
her participation was an essential part of the scheme, without which, no semblance of legitimacy
could have attached to the proceedings before Branch 83 regarding the LRC case.

The totality of the evidence shows that Garcia and Santiago connived to guarantee that the
LRC petition would be acted on favorably.
 Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty are grave offenses which merit the penalty of
dismissal from service even for the first offense. Such penalty shall carry with it the cancellation of
civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the complaints against respondents Leslie J. Burgos, Court Interpreter, and Julieta
Fajardo, Clerk III, both of Branch 83, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan,
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Respondents Marissa M. Garcia, Court Stenographer, and Annaliza P. Santiago, Clerk III, both of
Branch 83, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, are found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and are,
thus, DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all their retirement and other benefits, except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.