MANAGEMENT CASE

HONDA MOTORCYCLES AND SCOOTERS

INDIA LIMITED (HMSI)*

Debi S. Saini

T
he president of Honda Motorcycles and Scooters
India Limited (HMSI), who was also its CEO, had
recently chalked out an aggressive expansion plan,
which involved making the production capacity of the
company’s plant (at Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana, India)
triple by the end of 2007-08. Post-expansion, the
company would produce 0.6 million motorcycles
compared to 0.2 million in 2005; and its total two-wheeler
capacity would increase to 1.2 million units from 0.8
million in 2005. He was exploring the options towards
building a strategy for a long-term cooperation with the
employees. But he had bitter memories of the recent past.
He looked back at the happenings in the company in the
last twelve months. Neither he nor perhaps any of the
members in his managerial team could have imagined
that workers’ seemingly not-so-major grievances could
actually lead to a war-like situation. It was not just any
ordinary unionization struggle that HMSI workers had
recently fought for. The company could not prevent the
Union formation, which took place in May, 2005; that
too with affiliation to All India Trade Union Congress
(AITUC), which was the trade union wing of the
Communist Party of India. What was more worrying to
him was the damage to the company’s image due to the
large-scale violence that took place at the Gurgaon Civil
Lines area involving its workers and the police on 25th
July, 2005. The workers had gone there to seek a more
proactive intervention of the state machinery towards
reinstatement of their colleagues who had been dismissed
or suspended by the HMSI management for acts related
with union formation. This incident was reminiscent of a
police state reflecting barbarism of the type practiced in
the feudal era. The CEO would surely not have liked that
to happen even to his supposedly “indisciplined” workers.
Many happenings of that day were telecast almost live by
multiple news channels in India. They were perceived by
the management to have done perhaps an irreparable harm
to the social existence of the company.
The drop in the company’s sales was also worrying
him. The company had suffered a production decline
resulting in monetary loss of Rs. 1300 million as a
consequence of the strike and go-slow tactics by the
workers, especially during the months of May and June,
2005. But there was much more to it than just the
monetary loss. He wanted to focus the attention of his
whole workforce and the managerial team on the
ambitious goals that the company had set before itself
when it decided to extend its manufacturing operations
to India. While choosing the company’s logo of the wing,
the company aimed to fly high by taking a dominant role
in the Indian two-wheeler industry, simultaneously
taking advantage of the rapidly growing Indian economy.
He was looking at the possible ways in which he could
increase the pace of the company’s march towards
realization of its vision.
HMSI: Products and Workforce
Honda was the largest manufacturer of two-wheelers at
the global level. HMSI was a wholly owned subsidiary
of Honda Motor Company Limited (HMCL), Japan. The
Tokyo-headquartered HMCL was one of the leading
manufacturers of automobiles and power products and
the largest manufacturer of two-wheelers in the world,

*Many people helped in constructing this case. I thank the three office bearers of the HMSI Union who visited Management Development Institute
(MDI), Gurgaon at my request twice to give interviews. Mr. Palan, the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Gurgaon, and his staff, were very kind to share
information and provide other help to reconstruct some of the nuances of the case. Some anonymous persons shared useful information that facilitated
cross-checking of the claims of the HMSI union and in building several new formulations. I also thank Rakhi Sehgal, a doctoral scholar of sociology,
in helping me to make contacts with many respondents.
72 Saini
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with more than 120 manufacturing facilities in 30
countries worldwide. HMCL was known to have
excelled in the adoption of the post-Fordist production
system (also called Toyota Production System). HMSI
was established on 20th October 1999. Its aim was to
achieve this dream through production of world-class
scooters and motorcycles manufactured at its state-of-
the-art plant The HMSI factory was spread over 52 acres.
The initial installed capacity was 100,000 scooters per
year, which was scheduled to reach 6,00,000 scooters
by the end of 2005.
HMSI operated on principles, which were followed
worldwide by all Honda companies. Maintaining a global
viewpoint, HMSI was dedicated to supplying products
of the highest quality, yet at a reasonable price for
complete customer satisfaction. It aimed to produce
technologically superior, efficient and reasonably priced
two-wheelers, with Honda-tested technology, backed up
with after-sales service to match Honda’s global
standards. Instead of being just vehicles of transportation,
its products were intended to become vehicles of change:
change in the way people work, the way they travel, and
in the way they live.
The company had about 3000 employees in all; of
these, 2000 were in the worker category––1300 were
confirmed workers, and 700 were contract workers.
About 1000 employees belonged to the supervisory and
managerial staff. Besides, 700 persons were working as
trainees and 300 were apprentices under the Apprentices
Act, 1960. Almost every worker or trainee held a
certificate from one or the other Industrial Training
Institute (ITI) in India. All trainees normally got absorbed
in the regular workforce after the training; whereas only
about 15 per cent of the apprentices were able to get a
job with the company after the apprenticeship was over.
Going by region-cum-industry considerations,
HMSI had the reputation of being a comparatively good
paymaster. During the time when workers waged their
recent agitation, the company had increased the wages
of each worker by Rs. 3000 per month. Thus, in October
2005, salaries for workers ranged from Rs. 8,150 for an
unskilled worker to Rs. 11,200 for a skilled worker,
which included Rs. 2,000 towards house rent allowance.
Employee Welfare
HMSI had taken several initiatives in the area of
employee welfare, which ranged from subsidized canteen
facilities to attractive hospitalization reimbursement for
all employees. Some of the key initiatives in this regard
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were as follows: Besides canteen, transport facilities to
and from workers’ residences were provided at
subsidized rates. The company had a sports club for
employees’ use at Sukhrali village in Gurgaon, which
had facilities for indoor games. Workers had been
organizing matches with employees of other companies
in different games including football, volleyball, table
tennis, chess, carnom board, badminton, tug-of-war and
high/long jump. Two sets of uniforms, one company cap
and one pair of shoes were provided to each employee
every year; all employees including the managers wore
similar uniforms.
Most of the HMSI workers were not covered by the
Employees State Insurance (ESI) scheme under the ESI
Act, 1948 as their salaries had crossed the maximum
salary limit for coverage. The company covered such
employees under Paramount Health Care facility.
Besides OPD (out patient department) facility, this
scheme envisaged reimbursement for hospitalization
expenses. Till very recently, the coverage of the workers
and their family for hospitalization insurance was as
follows: A workman and his/her spouse and up to two
children were covered for Rs. 75,000 each, while parents
were covered for Rs. 1,50,000 each. On the intervention
of the Union, these rates were enhanced later on in
September, 2005. The company also met its liabilities
under various labour laws. Earlier, it used to invite
workers’ families for celebrating the foundation day, but
as the size of the workforce increased, that practice was
stopped. To provide support to an associate (HMSI’s
nomenclature for employee) on happy and on sad
occasions, the company had a policy of paying cash as
under: Rs. 2100 on the birth of a child (limited to
maximum number of two children); Rs. 3100 on his/her
marriage; Rs. 5000 given to the family of an employee
on his/her death; and Rs. 3000 on death of an associate’s
spouse or child or parent.
Human Resource Policies
The human resource policies of HMSI were in alignment
with the philosophy of its parent company, HMCL. The
latter considered itself as a unique organization as it
claimed to have adopted some distinctive employment
and production practices. It also had certain fundamental
beliefs, which among others, included appreciating the
value of each individual. HMSI’s philosophy advocated
two fundamental beliefs: 1) Respect for Individual
differences; and 2) the Three Joys that it wanted to
promote for all organizational members. Respect for the
individual stemmed from initiative, equality, and trust.

The company believed that it was the contribution from
each individual in the company that was responsible for
company’s success, and which would take the company
into the future. With its focus on The Three Joys, in line
with its parent Honda’s Philosophy, HMSI conducted
all its daily activities in pursuit of: the Joy of Buying,
i.e., the joy of using world-class products; the Joy of
selling, i.e., the joy of selling world-class products; and
the Joy of Manufacturing, i.e., the joy of producing high-
quality products. Based on its philosophy, the respect
for the individual got translated into independent spirit
and freedom, equality and mutual trust of human beings
who worked for or came in contact with the company.
The company claimed that its policies focused on
developing each individual’s capacity to think; reason;
and most importantly, the ability to dream.
The company believed that what thrilled its
employees––its ‘associates’––most was the “Joy of
Creating,” which was a key mission at Honda, which
aimed to promote working for the company’s own
happiness. The company promoted “association” among
different categories of employees through provision of
similar uniforms and same canteen facilities for all. The
induction programme of HMSI involved, among others,
acclimatizing the employees to the Honda philosophy,
which was a clear written statement. The company also
talked of a “Honda way” which was not a written
statement but was an unspoken but readily intuited
philosophy expected to run through the company. For
example, one of the prominent Honda ways was
perseverance to ensure safety and quality in all aspects.
The Honda way meant “human behaviour or way of
thinking based on Honda’s philosophy.” The HR
department was expected to organize training
programmes and facilitate internalization of culture-
building so as to promote the Honda way among the
employees. Apart from training in Honda philosophy,
the company organized the following types of training
for its employees: TQM (total quality management)
training; training for building team leaders; ISO 9000
training; and 5S training. The training department, which
was a part of its Human Resource department, was
supposed to be headed by an assistant manager; but this
position had long been lying vacant.
HMSI had a performance appraisal (PA) system for
all its employees including those in the worker category.
It involved interviewing of the person concerned by the
section head and the shift incharge, on the basis of which
PA was done on a rating scale. For the purpose of
increment, workers were divided into five categories;
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Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India Limited 73 ●
increments ranged from Rs. 400 to 1400 per month
depending upon the PA grade of an employee. The
company announced all PA results and salary-hikes
immediately at the end of the financial year. Thus, on
April 1 of each year, one would get his/her pay-hike/
promotion letter. The promotion chances for workers
ranged from worker to sub-leader to assistant executive
to executive. Since almost nobody was covered by the
Payment of Bonus Act, 1961, as they got higher salary,
the company had the policy of giving an ex gratia of
one month’s gross pay to every employee as incentive
pay around the Diwali festival.
Since April 1, 2004 the company had constituted a
Works Committee (WC) under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (IDA) consisting of 15 workers and 5
management representatives. However, after the union
came up, the Works Committee had become merely
symbolic. The management had also constituted some
other committees consisting of workers and management
representatives. Some of these were the canteen
committee, transport committee, health committee, and
sports committee. The nomination to these committees
were done by the management on the basis of the
perceived interest of different persons.
The company’s six-page, three-monthly quarterly
newsletter was titled “Dream Team.” Its focus, among
others, was on covering the company’s achievement in
terms of awards, contracts, recognitions, quality
certification, list of new dealers, and kaizen activity. A
perusal of the past issues of the newsletter revealed that
its focus was on targets, safety, exhortations related to–
and announcement of–achievements concerning quality,
safety and training programmes on defensive and safe
driving of two-wheelers. Very few employee-related
matters were covered. Nor was there any scope for
workers’ expression through any letter to the editor
related to issues that concerned them. Employee-related
matters covered included: sports competition results;
news about marriage; and child birth in case of employees
or their spouses.
Seeds of Unionization and After
Things were going smoothly for nearly two years after
production started, but for a series of unpleasant events.
Perhaps, the major resentment of the workers was
expressed when the company decided to give to each
employee a Diwali gift of Rs. 600 in November, 2004.
Union leaders said, “In the past years also, the value of
the Diwali gift was of about 400 to 500 rupees. Looking
74 Saini
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at the stature that our company enjoys in the global
market, we all felt belittled at this small gift.” A manager
added that the perception of unfairness among workers
was enhanced when some rumour also spread that Hero-
Honda had given a refrigerator each to its workers as
Diwali gift. Ninety-nine per cent of the workers refused
to accept this Diwali gift, and the company took it back.
Alternatively, it offered a coupon of Rs. 600, which
too was refused by the workers. After 10 days of
Diwali, this money was transferred to the bank accounts
of all workers.
Workers also encountered certain other problems.
They were made to sign a ‘movement sheet’ whenever
they went to toilet or drink water. One day, a worker
was denied permission to go to the toilet unable to ensure
continence any longer he pulled the line chain and rushed
to relieve himself. When he returned some minutes later,
he was dismissed. Often workers had to attend to more
than one machine simultaneously, as in the post-Fordist
production system; this was a source of stress for them.
The company was also very strict in granting leave. Even
when a worker’s close relative was seriously ill or
circumstances were otherwise serious, leave would not
be granted. While denying the leave, sermons were given
to them, which they did not like. Sometimes they would
be told to leave the company permanently if they could
not perform up to its expectations. If a worker wanted to
change a shift temporarily for some compelling reason,
it was almost never granted. Memos were issued for
different reasons; almost every day, one or the other
worker would get a threat of termination. There was
considerable fear of management’s authority amongst
the workers; nobody could dare raise his voice or think
of seeking a grievance redressal.
Workers perceived that many managers had been
showing partiality in matters related to posting. Their
blue-eyed boys were posted in jobs outside the
production-line work. Production-line jobs were far more
demanding than others. The problem had assumed
apparently a serious proportion, and led to considerable
bickering among workers. The managers relished this,
as it prevented the workers from uniting. The practice
was going on since beginning. The Japanese top
management knew little about it. The Indian managers
would not let the workers meet the top management to
share their problems. Union leaders claimed that this was
done mainly with a view to creating friction amongst
the ranks of common workers. They wanted these
postings to be done on the basis of seniority, and not on
an ad hoc basis.
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Workers were also unhappy with the idiosyncratic
attitude of the Vice-President (VP)–Manufacturing (a
Japanese national), a free-style person, who was a strict
Honda disciplinarian; they were afraid of him as he could
say anything to anybody any time. He was often seen
moving on the shop-floor with a 14-foot-long stick that
was used for measuring the standard height of a trolley.
Most workers did not like his carrying a stick; they would
crack jokes about him behind his back. One day, a worker
was 2 minutes late after tea time. He kicked this worker
on his leg to show his anger; but it was partly a friendly
kick. This worker somehow did not react at all, nor did
the other workers do so. As the news spread amongst
others by the evening, workers raised slogans against
the VP. The next day, he apologized in front of the
workers’ gathering. The Indian managers asked some
15 workers to have a meeting with them on this issue.
Production grounded to a halt for one and a half days.
Another somewhat similar incident occurred on a day
when a Sikh officer of the company was wearing a
different-coloured cap and not the usual company cap.
The VP gave a push to his cap from one edge; it toppled
off and fell to the ground. The official concerned felt
insulted but kept quiet. The errant VP was later sent back
to Japan; no other action was taken against him.
The workers were not satisfied with a mere apology
from the VP. In the next 15 days, they came out with a
charter consisting of more than 50 demands which
included: an increase of Rs. 2500 per month in wages;
20 per cent annual increment in wages; house rent
allowance to be pegged at 70 per cent of wage;
conveyance allowance at Rs. 1500 per month; 20 per
cent bonus on wage + dearness allowance; provision for
free distribution of one kilogram of milk and ½ kilogram
of gur (jaggery) per worker every day; provision for a
Union Office within the company premises along with
all incidental facilities like telephone; a loan of Rs. 2
lakh for marriage of sibling/child; provision of a library
within company premises; abolition of the policy of
overstay (if the production target for the day was not
achieved, workers were required to compulsorily stay
back until the target was achieved).
With considerable heartburn and opposition, on
April 1, 2005 the management offered to workers a
compensation package comprising of an increment of
Rs. 3000 per month. This was on the condition that the
workers would not form a Union. They refused to accept
the management’s offer.
When the management did not yield, the workers
started collecting money for funding of union activities.

HMSI management suggested to the workers, “Why don’t
you form an internal committee instead?” The workers
declined this suggestion. Many workers were individually
called to a manager’s room and were exhorted not to join
the Union. Letters were sent to certain workers’ homes
that they were indulging in undesirable activities. The
management allegedly hired some outside toughs to
frighten the workers if they formed a Union; but their
resolve was too strong. With the help of local Union
leaders (affiliated to political parties), they began making
efforts to form a Union, and subsequently moved an
application for registration of the Union to the Registrar
of Trade Unions at Chandigarh. The management, not
wanting the formation of a Union in the organization, tried
its level best to stop Union registration. It resorted to
various means like lobbying with the Haryana Government
to help prevent Union formation and its registration. The
registrar allegedly denied registration of the Union on the
ground that the proposed workers’ action was initiated in
bad taste. It also apprehended that it would result in
disharmony of relations between the industry and workers
in the region at large, and would also prove detrimental to
the growth and development of the industrial belt in and
around Manesar.
Consequent to this, the workers resorted to a
slowdown of work (go slow) and refused to put in
overtime to complete the production targets. The
management viewed the new stand of the workers as a
serious case of breach of discipline and suspended four
workers on charges of insubordination, tampering with
the quality of output, adopting a go-slow policy,
indiscipline and unrest. During the same period, the
management also refused to absorb some trainees who
had completed their two years of internship.
The aforementioned actions of the management led
to widespread discontent among the workers. Most
workers, whether permanent or trainees, gathered
together under the leadership of the suspended workers,
and started raising slogans. They also “gheraoed” the
management within the offices located at the factory
premises. During this “gherao”, one person from senior
management was manhandled and beaten up. The entire
incident of “gherao” and violence resulted in the
production being shut down for 30 minutes. The
management saw this as a grave and acute case of breach
of discipline. It retorted by suspending 50 workers and
dismissing the previously suspended four workers
without any enquiry. This made the situation in the
company more explosive. Interestingly, so far as the
importance of local laws was concerned, the global
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Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India Limited 75 ●
philosophy of Honda stated as follows:
Honda is committed to providing a work
environment that is free from unlawful
discrimination, including harassment that is based
on any legally protected status. Honda will not
tolerate any form of harassment that violates this
policy. This policy forbids any unwelcome conduct
that is based on an individual’s age, race, colour,
religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, marital status,
sexual-orientation…or any other basis protected by
state, federal or local law.
In view of the resistance from the management, the
registration of the proposed HMSI Union was further
delayed by more than a month. The cause of the workers
and their application for registration was then supported
by a letter of Mr. Gurudas Dasgupta, General Secretary
AITUC and, a member of Indian Parliament. This letter
dated May 20, 2005 was addressed to Shri Bhupinder
Singh Hooda, Chief Minister, Haryana requesting him
to look into the matter to secure early registration of the
proposed Union. Subsequently, the HMSI labour Union
was registered by the Registrar. The newly-formed Union
raised further demands while adopting the demands
raised earlier.
Conciliation Failure and the Intesity of Workers’
Action
Eventually, the dispute snowballed till it reached the
stage of Conciliation proceedings, which were initiated
on May 26, 2005 by the Deputy Labour Commissioner
(DLC), Gurgaon, who was the conciliation officer of the
Gurgaon region for all general-demands disputes. For
conciliating matters related to individual disputes, the
Gurgaon area was divided into four regions, each headed
by a labour-cum-conciliation officer. Six conciliation
meetings were held on June 3, 17, 28, and July 8, 14,
and 19. The HMSI management was represented by two
managers belonging to the company’s human resources
department. They remained almost silent during the
proceedings. The only contention of the management was
that the company was not required, on any ground––
whether legal or equitable––to raise the wages of the
workers since it was already paying more than the region-
cum-industry standards. The representatives of the
Union, however, chose to stick to their demands. The
DLC thought that the conciliation proceedings failed due
to “the uncompromising stand adopted by both the Union
as well as the management representatives.” He
submitted a confidential failure report to the Haryana
76 Saini
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Government under section 12 (4) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA) on July 19, 2005.
In the meanwhile, during the pendency of the
conciliation proceedings, the management asked the
workers to sign a statement of good conduct. This
statement provided that workers would remain disciplined
while in the factory premises and that they were returning
to work unconditionally. The statement also contained a
clause envisaging non-pursuance of Union activities by
the workers while on work. It was this clause that became
contentious, due to which the workers refused to sign the
statement. The management, in retaliation, refused to let
the workers enter into the factory premises unless they
signed the good-conduct bond.
The management hired some temporary workers
from its vendor companies in order to maintain
production schedules. These temporary workers were
asked to stay in the factory premises and requisite
facilities were provided to them within the factory.
Eventually, the management and the Union reached an
agreement in June, 2005 whereby the management
agreed to allow the workers to enter the premises of the
company and work only under the condition that the
terminated staff would not be taken back/reinstated.
Furthermore, it was decided that the workers would be
allowed entry into the factory premises in batches of 400,
that too if they signed good-conduct bonds. Workers
agreed to do so.
However, an apprehension continued to bother the
management as a few years ago at Hero-Honda
Motorcycles Limited, Dharuhera (a joint venture
between the Hero Group of Companies and Honda
Motors) a similar situation had arisen, and temporary
workers from vendor companies were used to continue
the production. The management of Hero-Honda
Motorcycles Limited, under circumstances similar to
those in the present case, entered into an agreement with
the workers and allowed batches of 400 workers to enter
the premises and resume work. However, after entering
the premises, these workers disrupted the work done by
the temporary workers from the vendor companies and
brought production to a halt. The Honda management
feared a similar incident being repeated at HMSI.
On the following day, the workers put up the Union
flag at the factory gate. The HMSI management got
apprehensive and decided to allow only batches of 100
workers to enter the factory premises; but later the
management further retracted and announced that it would
take back workers in batches of 50 only. Anguished
workers agreed yet again but the management eventually
decided not to allow any worker to enter the factory. The
management also requested and got a good degree of
police protection. The persistently explosive situation in
the factory resulted in fear being instilled in the minds of
the temporary workmen who had come from the vendor
companies. Many of these workers fled from the factory
premises. At the end, only 38 workers reported to work
on June 18, 2005. At 1:30 p.m., the management was
forced to declare that the production would be shut down
for the day. After obtaining registration for their Union,
the workers had been resorting to “go slow” as a result of
which during the month of May, June and July, 2005 the
production was reduced to just 10 per cent of the normal–
–from 2000 scooters per day to around 200 scooters per
day. Later, it was discovered that the management had
placed an advertisement in a newspaper for recruitment
of new workers.
The Dance of Naked Violence and its Aftermath
On July 25, 2005 workers from HMSI and those from
the neighbouring industries staged a rally at offices of
the district authorities to press their demand for
reinstatement of their dismissed and suspended
colleagues. The police prohibited the workers from
entering the Civil Lines area which housed the offices
of all major government functionaries of the district,
including the District Collector. At this point several
masked men began throwing stones. The protesters
attacked the Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), who
was beaten mercilessly—an incident covered by the
television media that invited public sympathy for the
police. They also set fire to the vehicle belonging to the
sub-divisional magistrate (SDM). The police, however,
succeeded in controlling the mob. The identity of these
masked men had not been confirmed, and workers denied
that anyone from their ranks was amongst them. After
this clash, a message was sent to the workers that the
administration would meet them and accept their
memorandum; they were asked to assemble at the lawns
of the secretariat. When within the enclosure, in order to
avenge the earlier attack on them the police reacted to
slight provocation by resorting to the use of brute force
against the unarmed workers. The media reported the
use of the worst possible police brutality on the workers.
While the initial claim of workers’ injured was 700, most
workers were discharged after first-aid. But 70 of them
suffered severe injuries. Later on the police arrested a
number of workers and booked them under different
sections of the Indian Penal Code. The legal counsel of

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the HMSI Union was also booked by the Haryana Police
on charges of attempt to murder. The media reported
that the police brutality, though inexcusable, was not
exactly unprovoked. The television images of the
savagery brutality exhibited by the police in their attack
on the workers reminded many of the savagery seen at
Jalianwala Bagh, which General Dyer’s armed force
perpetrated in the interest of their British masters. A
journalist of The Hindu, an English daily, wrote:
The scenes from Gurgaon gave us more than just a
picture of labour protest, police brutality or corporate
tyranny…The streets of Gurgaon gave us a glimpse
of something larger than a single protest. Bigger than
a portrait of the Haryana police. Greater than Honda.
Far more complex than the “image of India” as an
investment destination. It presented us a microcosm
of the new and old Indias. Of private cities and gated
communities. Of different realities for different
classes of society. Of ever-growing inequality.
Of course, it was admitted that some policemen were
beaten by the mob before the police responded with its
brutality. The HMSI Union maintained that it was so
done by the outsiders. The constabulary forced workers
indiscriminately to kneel holding their ears while they
were being thrashed. The second day’s violence was
reportedly sparked off when enraged members of the
public who turned up at the civil hospital could not find
their relatives. Some of these were whisked away by the
police and were charged with the previous day’s
violence. That inflamed matters further.
The police action on workers was severely protested
by the print and the television media and the politicians
in and outside Parliament. As a result, the Inspector-
General of Police conceded that the incident was an act
of gross negligence on part of the police. The DSP and
the SDM concerned claimed that out of the 375 odd
persons arrested after the incident, 79 had nothing to do
with the strike at HMSI; this was later on also verified
with the records of the HMSI.
On July 26, 2005, the day after the unprecedented
violence, HMSI had closed operations for half a day;
but it did not declare a lockout. Consequent to severe
protests in different circles, on 27 July, the Haryana Chief
Minister ordered a court of enquiry to investigate the
violent incident to be conducted by a retired Judge of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The terms of
reference, among others, provided for: completing the
inquiry within a period of 3 months; examining the role
of outsiders in the incident; and examining whether the
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Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India Limited 77 ●
force used by the Police was justified or excessive; and
whether the means available with the police were
adequate to control the crowd. The Haryana Chief
Minister was also directed by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi,
President, Indian National Congress to hold discussions
with the HMSI management and its workers. Sixty-one
workers remained in jail for more than two weeks; they
were released on 11 August, 2005.
The Truce and Role of the State
On July 30, 2005 an agreement, arbitrated by the Haryana
Chief Minister, was arrived at between the workers and
the management of HMSI. Of course, technically this
was a conciliated settlement and not a case of arbitration
under the IDA. The agreement stated that the striking
workers would resume duty from 1st August, 2005 and
that they would not raise any new demands during the
next one year. The trade union, which was the bone of
contention between the workers and management would,
however, continue to operate. The agreement also stated
that the 50 suspended workers would be reinstated as
also the four Union leaders whose services had been
terminated. However, the terminated employees would
be reinstated only after they had submitted an
unconditional letter of apology. The four terminated
workers were also required to submit a separate assurance
letter to the top management. The undertaking contained
a clause that the workers promised not to engage in any
act of indiscipline and assure normal production.
However, the management retained the right to conduct
an enquiry into the reasons for termination of the
aforementioned four terminated employees and if after
such enquiry the employees were found guilty, the
management had the right to transfer them to any other
department other than the manufacturing department.
The agreement also provided for termination of any
employee of HMSI who would get convicted in any of
the court cases that had been initiated against them by
the city administration in connection with the July 25,
2005 incident. And, the workers would get full salary
for the months of May and June, 2005. However, from
June 27 onwards, the principle of “no work, no pay” (as
per an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court of India) would
be implemented. It was also provided that the injured
workers who were not able to work immediately would
be given paid leave.
About the workers’ demand to absorb the trainees
as permanent employees after the completion of their
internship as per the prevalent practice, it was decided
that a proper test and a detailed appraisal form would
78 Saini
●
be administered for evaluating their performance before
inducting them as permanent staff. Finally, it was
agreed that the agreement would be considered as final
conciliation in respect of all demands raised by the
workers and in future both the parties would maintain
cordial relations.
Union–Management Dynamics in the Post-violence
Scenario
The Union office-bearers felt that a good degree of
change could be seen in the attitude of the managers in
the post-July 25 scenario. The management allowed
concessions on several fronts. On the day of the tripartite
agreement, the management wanted to terminate the
services of some 200 contract workers even though the
tripartite agreement provided for reinstatement of all
workers. But the Union could convince the management
that the company should stick to the agreement. There
was also an informal understanding that the Union
leaders would have the freedom of not working on the
shop floor since several Industrial Relations (IR) issues
were pending that required their persistent attention. No
domestic enquiry proceedings were started against the
four dismissed workers who had been taken back; nor
were they transferred to other departments as envisaged
in the tripartite agreement.
Police had registered cases against 63 workers,
including all the seven union office-bearers for the July
25-violence. This necessitated running around to contact
different people for making their defence sound. The
injured workers had their problems, which needed
intervention of the Union: out of 50 workers who had
suffered major injuries, 15 cases were far more serious
which included head injuries, multiple fractures, damage
to knee caps, etc. The company showed all these injured
as absent, and was hesitant to pay them their salaries.
Union leaders said, “We had to struggle to ensure that
their salaries are paid regularly.” They had to monitor
the worker–supervisor relations closely to see that
workers were treated better. The management had also
informally allotted a room to the Union leaders, though
it was not sufficiently big. But it had promised them a
proper union office after some time.
Another area of the Union leaders’ involvement was
the issue of absorption of trainees in regular jobs. Even
as the absorption of all persons who had completed their
training into regular service formed part of the tripartite
settlement, the management was initially refusing to take
most of them on different pretexts; they had supported
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the workers’ struggle. The Union got all of them absorbed
in regular jobs. Speaking of the change, a union leader
observed:
Now, when a worker asks for leave, managers
speak with much restraint; their response being far
more positive. Workers are able to adjust half-day
shift within the next day with negligible hassles.
The number of memos that workers get is
negligible. The workers wanted four days’ leave
on Diwali in November 2005, and consequently
closure of the factory for four days. This meant
three days’ compensatory working on Sunday and/
or holidays; the management has hesitantly agreed
to this proposal. Further, most factories in Gurgaon
were working on 29th September, 2005 when some
of the major Indian trade Union federations gave a
call for industrial strike all over the country in
protest against the Central Government’s economic
policies. Our Union, however, observed the day as
strike. Though the management took the decision
with ill grace, the Union compensated the loss by
working on a Sunday.
One of the major recent achievements of the Union
was the hike in the coverage of the workers and their
family members under the medical insurance scheme.
In September 2005, the hospitalization expense of a
worker’s wife went up to Rs. 1,35,000. The management
refused to pay the excess over the coverage limit. The
worker was already in distress as his wife had
subsequently died. Earlier, nobody could dare to talk
these things over with the management. The Union
negotiated this issue and made the management agree
for a family floater coverage scheme of Rs. 1,75,000;
this overall limit could be utilized by one or more or all
the family members. If the expenses still exceeded this
amount, the company agreed to pay up to Rs. 1,00,000.
This agreement was reached not through any written
settlement with the Union but by way of a change in
management policy at the instance of the Union, and
came into effect from October 1, 2005.
Another new development was that whenever there
was a workers-related problem or issue, the management
invited all the seven Union office-bearers for discussion;
this was never so earlier. The management was facing the
problem of increasingly stressed workers who had to work
overtime to meet the production targets. Overtime was
being paid at the rate double of the basic wage rate.
Workers found it somewhat attractive to work overtime
and make extra money. But this had led to, among others,

medical problems. Workers never felt fresh while on work.
Union’s help was sought, and a decision was taken to scrap
the overtime working completely in most cases.
Despite these developments, Union leaders still did
not feel happy at the worker–manager relations. One
incident took place on 2nd September, 2005, when two
supervisors in the aluminium machine shop behaved
with workers authoritatively and in a provocative
manner as they used to do so earlier. The workers of
this department reacted; some 150 of them came to the
Union leaders seeking their intervention. When the
Union leaders went to settle the issue with the Senior
Manager concerned, he spoke angrily with the Union
leaders. Workers of the whole shift stopped the work
for some 15 minutes. A Union leader said, “We went
to all the departments to exhort the workers to start the
work; we did not want work to be interrupted. That
day, most senior managers had gone to Chandigarh for
some work. After they came back, the next day they all
felt sorry for the incident and appreciated our
intervention in the matter.”
Another incident occurred on 9th September, 2005.
The ‘A shift’ in assembly achieved its target of 1000
scooters for the first time after the Union formation.
Earlier, the target used to be achieved in almost every
shift. Union leaders said that the targets could not be
achieved for various interruptions. However, they could
not satisfactorily explain why these interruptions did
not affect the target achievement earlier. On hearing
the target achievement that day, Vice-President –
Manufacturing, along with General Manager (GM) –
Production came to the shop floor during the lunch time
and commended the achievement of the workers; the
next day, sweets were distributed to all workers.
The scheme of inviting workers’ family on the
founders’ day had been stopped as the number of
employees had increased, and this was becoming
unmanageable in view of the fact that Honda workers
were from more than 20 different states of India. This
practice had been revived since late September, 2005.
Now the family members were invited to the factory at
the company’s expense in batches. They were shown
the conditions under which their near ones worked in
the factory. The Diwali gift for the year 2005 became a
matter of negotiation. Each employee was given a gift
of Rs. 2000 and a credit in their bank account of Rs.
4,000 in the form of incentive bonus including the
managerial staff. So unlike one month’s gross pay for
the year 2004, the bonus money for the year 2005 was
smaller. But the management could convince the Union
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Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India Limited 79 ●
that the factory had suffered huge losses and hence the
ex gratia bonus had to be cut down. The biggest sufferers
were the managerial employees, as they had got a bonus
of one month’s salary in 2004.
Expatiating on the issues involved, a Union office
bearer observed as follows:
We are committed to the company. We consider it as
ours, and always want to do our best for it. The respect
for the individual and the Joys that the company claims
to be practicing are merely in the book. Some of the
senior managers want to see a big distance between
the top management and the workers. The HR
manager never wants that we meet the Japanese top
management, as he feels that a transparent working
may expose his ulterior designs and motives. Only
some 20 per cent of the managers treat us with the
dignity that we expect as members of the company;
most others have big egos. The managers as well as
the workers need to change. You know, the problems
always emanate at the shop floor, but nobody bothers
about analyzing their causes and possible solutions
in a more practical and acceptable manner. The
worker always wants fair and just working of the
company. When this does not happen, he reacts.
Looking Back and the Future Plans
The company had been performing extremely well since
the beginning, and had shown promising results on
several fronts. As shown in Figure 1, as per a research
conducted on two-wheeler dealers by TNS Automotive
Dealers Satisfaction Study in 2004, HMSI led the two-
wheeler category in India. It got 108 points, leaving
behind Hero-Honda, which got second place with 96
points. It had got several other recognitions in other
spheres. But in the post-July 25 scenario, the company
took quite some time to absorb the shock of what had
happened. It wanted to know what had gone wrong and
where, and how could things be made to improve.
Recently, it revamped and intensified its training
function. Managers were being sent out to attend
management development programmes (MDPs)
organized by, among others, Confederation of Indian
Industry (CII), and All India Management Association
(AIMA) in areas such as inter-personal skills;
negotiation skills; team-building and conflict
management; and leadership building. The HR
department had been actively informing the line
managers to volunteer for the MDPs that were being
organized by some of the leading organizations.
80 Saini
●
Interestingly, however, the solitary vacancy of an
Assistant Manager–Training was lying vacant since
long. Some of the issues at hand that needed attention
were identified by a manager of HMSI as follows:
The company had a total lack of direction on the
people front, which to a great extent is still persisting.
Management does not know what to do to overcome
the shock of July 25 and its aftermath. Japanese were
conversant with dealing with the Japanese Unions,
that were known to be much more tolerant. The
company also has a lot of problems of hierarchy
consciousness. The present General Manager (GM)–
Operations came from Maruti (a Suzuki-controlled
automobile company), where he could successfully
tackle somewhat similar discontent among workers.
The Japanese also do not understand the workers’
language. The Director––General Affairs, who is also
responsible for overall HR management, came with
a lot of ideas, but he could not understand the
organizational working from the employees’ point of
view. When workers had resorted to go-slow,
Japanese managers did not know what to do. On the
other hand, Indian managers were specialists in
production; they did not understand how to handle
industrial relations (IR) issues. If D.P. Singh [who
was HR chief till some time ago, and had left HMSI,
Figure 1: 2004 DSS Ranking: Two-Wheeler
Source: Dream Team: HMSI Newsletter, April-June, 2005
VISION—The Journal of Business Perspective ● Vol. 9 ● No. 4 ● October-December 2005
commanded respect among most workers] had not
left, perhaps the problems may never have arisen. He
had a good rapport with the workers. Another problem
was that the Japanese had not given Indian managers
much power to take major initiatives in different
dimensions. Things have, however, somewhat
improved in this regard now after 25/7.
In view of the damage done to the company’s
reputation, HSMI was busy in an image-building
exercise. Earlier, the managers seemed to remain under
the impression that Honda products would sell due to its
world-wide image. But it realized that in the post-July
25 scene, its advertisements were not being perceived
as effective; so newer ways were being thought of to
cope with those problems. It recently organized a one-
week drive in this regard, whereby the HMSI logo was
applied in henna on ladies’ hands. In its endeavour to
reach the far-flung masses across the country, HMSI was
running road shows of two of its popular two-wheeler
models, Eterno and Unicorn. A meeting of the top
management and the department heads took place at an
outside resort to decide the future course of action. They
were aware that two posts of Senior Manager–IR and
Senior Manager–Administration were lying vacant since
long. These officials decided that a new person should
be appointed as Senior Manager–IR and Administration.
 Honda Motorcycles and Scooters India Limited 81 ●

Also, in September, 2005 all Union office-bearers were
taken to an outside resort, and were given training by
the HR department on building cooperative industrial
relations. Independent trainers were also invited in this
programme. The company also nominated a committee
consisting of seven worker representatives who would
bring the workers’ grievances to the notice of the
management and the Union leaders.
The CEO was asking himself whether these
measures were sufficient to move in the right direction,
given the substantial damage the company had recently
suffered. He was perhaps haunted by the ghost of July
25 more than anything else. He was considering
alternatives for bringing about change in the situation
fast; he was also wondering if some radical decisions
were required and on what fronts.

Debi S. Saini, Ph.D. (debisaini@mdi.ac.in), is Professor of Human Resource Management (HRM) at Management Development
Institute (MDI), Mehrauli Road, Gurgaon-1220 001, Haryana. Besides authoring four dozen research papers, articles and management
cases in journals and edited volumes published from India and abroad, he has authored or edited seven books in the area of HRM,
industrial relations, and labour law. He has also authored a 275-page volume on “Social Security Law in India” which forms part of the
International Encyclopaedia of Laws published by Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands. Among others, he has done assignments
for ILO and GTZ (Germany). Dr. Saini is the editor of Vision––The Journal of Business Perspective, the journal of MDI. He was the
first editor of Management and Change; and, has been on the editorial board of Industrial Relations Journal (Blackwell, Oxford).
Among others, he is on the Board of the Best Practice Institute, Boston, USA, and the Advisory Board of the Society for Leadership of
Change, Huntersville, USA.

VISION—The Journal of Business Perspective ● Vol. 9 ● No. 4 ● October-December 2005