Sympathy Biography and Sympathy Margin

Author(s): Candace Clark

Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 93, No. 2 (Sep., 1987), pp. 290-321
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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SympathyBiographyand SympathyMargin'
Candace Clark
MontclairState College

Sympathyis an emotionguidedby cultural"feelingrules"and by

the structureof relationships.This articleexamineshow sympathy
flowsbetweensympathizer and sympathizeein our society's"emo-
tionaleconomy." Data fromfieldobservations,surveys,interviews,
and contentanalysesshowthatsympathy marginsexistas a rightof
groupmembership.The sizes ofone's sympathy marginsvarywith,
among a host of factors,one's sympathybiographyor past adher-
ence to sympathyetiquette.Rules of sympathyetiquetteforsym-
pathizeesare the following:(1) do not make unwarrantedclaims
to sympathy,(2) do not claim too much sympathy,(2a) do not
acceptsympathy too readily,(3) claimand acceptsomesympathy to
keep sympathyaccountsopen, and (4) repaysympathywithgrati-
tude, with sympathy,or withboth. Sympathizersare expectedto
enforcetheserules;people who under-or overinvestare considered
deviant sympathizers.Finally, sympathyprocessesmay be used,
consciouslyor unconsciously,formicropolitical ends.

Tony'sbeenwiththegroupfora longtime-he was oneof

thefounders-andsomeonediscovered thathe was cheating
onhisMedicarecases.Therewas a bigto-dowiththeIRS and
themedicalsocietyand so forth.Tonywas furious and kept
tryingtobuttonhole
us,youknow,todefend himself toevery-
one. Nobodyin thegroupwouldhave anything to do with
him....
Butthenthathurricane camealong,and,uh,Tony'shouse
wasrightintheareawheretheflooding . .. [Whenhe
occurred
was askedaboutdamages,]he said thegovernment people
estimatedaroundfortythou,and the insurancecompany
wouldn'tpay.Thestorywentthrough thegroupthatday,and

1 Anearlierversionofthispaperwas presented at theannualmeetingsoftheSouthern

SociologicalSociety,April,1985.I wouldliketo acknowledge thehelpfulsubstantive
comments ofLynnAtwater,CarolynEllis,David Franks,JudithGerson,JayLiving-
ston,JudithLong,BarbaraG. Salmore,Paul Williams,severalanonymous reviewers,
and, especially,HowardRobboy.To preservetheanonymity ofmysources,I have
alteredsomeofthedefining in twocasescitedhere.Requestsfor
statuscharacteristics
reprintsshouldbe sentto Candace Clark,Department ofSociology,MontclairState
College,UpperMontclair,New Jersey 07043.

? 1987by The University

ofChicago.All rightsreserved.
0002-9602/88/9302-0002$01
.50

290 AJS Volume 93 Number2 (September1987): 290-321

 Sympathy

by theafternoon everyonewas back to talkingto himand

himtheyweresorry.
telling I've neverseensucha turnaround!
... In theendeveryone helpedTonysalvagehimself fromthe
Medicaremess,too. It becamethethingto do to helppoor
Tony.[A physician describing
a caseofsympathy involving
a
partner in hisgrouppractice;
fieldnotes,Feb. 1984]

Sympathy,feelingsorryfor or with anotherperson(see Scheler 1954;

Stark 1978), is basic to human society(Smith[1759] 1853; Hume 1948;
Denzin 1984, p. 240). Like love, awe, and jealousy, sympathyis triply
social. First,itis a role-taking
emotion(Shott1979,p. 1324)thatrequires
anotherforwhom to feel. Second, a symbolicvocabularyand a gram-
mar-a setof"feelingrules"(Hochschild1979)-shape how, where,and
when sympathyroles are played. Third, its displayreflects,and feeds
back on, the power and intimacydimensionsof relationships(Kemper
1978).Tony'scase, givenabove, showsthatsympathy givingis guidedby
complicatedsocial normsthat, at times,run counterto commonsense
expectations.It also shows that givingsympathyhas importantconse-
quences,such as Tony's reinstatement in thegroup.Sympathyrulesand
processes,like the ones illustrated,are largelyignoredby laypersonand
social scientistalike.
In thecourseofeverydayencounters,peopleenterand enacttherecip-
rocal roles-within-roles of sympathydonorand recipient,"sympathizer"
and "sympathizee."In my research,I explorethe roles of sympathizer
and sympathizeein the United States today, followingthe methodsof
ErvingGoffman(1952, 1956, 1959, 1964),BarrySchwartz(1967, 1973),
and ArlieRussell Hochschild(1983). Since relevantdata existin profu-
sion and myfindingsare manyand complex,I can presentonlya partof
myanalysesand evidencein the space available.
I beginwiththe observationthatnot all claims to sympathyare hon-
ored. Sometimespeoplewithproblemsreceivesympathy; sometimesthey
do not. I will argue that,by lookingat theirpast sympathyclaims and
gifts-theirsympathybiographies-we can betterunderstandthe rea-
sonsfordifferential treatment.
Most ofthetime,peoplewitha historyof
followingsympathyrulescan expectto receivesympathy whenproblems
befallthem.Of course,factorssuch as age, social class, sex, and typeof
problemare also important,but mymain focusis on past involvements
withsympathyper se.
This focusallows us to see thatgroupmemberscreatesympathy"ac-
counts,"or "margins,"for each other. Sympathyis a type of "feeling
currency"(Hochschild1983, p. 18) thatpeople hold "on account,"ready
to giveto each otherin thefuture.Sympathymarginsare variablein size
and continuallynegotiated.How manycreditsone personholds foran-
otherdepends,in part, on that person'sperceptionsof the other'ssym-

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 AmericanJournalof Sociology

pathybiography;perceptionsof how well theotherhas adheredto rules

of sympathyetiquettein the past. Four sympathy-claiming rules I will
discuss are: (1) do not make fraudulentclaims to sympathy;(2) do not
claim too much sympathyor accept it too readily;(3) claim some sym-
pathyto keep accountsopen; and (4) reciprocateforgiftsof sympathy.
Finally,I will considerdeviantsympathizers, thosewho under-or over-
invest.

DATA SOURCES
Given the difficulties of observingthe interiorand ofteninaccessibleas-
pectsof thisemotionand theneed to validateconclusionsand searchfor
negativecases, I gathereddata eclectically.I wantedevidenceofpatterns
of givingarndtakingsympathyas well as people's perceptionsof such
patterns.First,I soughtexpressionsofsympathy in greetingcards,news-
paper and televisionreports,advice columns,etiquettebooks, songlyr-
ics, and literature.In thesesources,two typesofdata exist:viewsofhow
sympathyis given and received(which may be more or less accurate
reflections of real behavior),and the sympathyaroused by the author's
representations in the"dear reader's"mind(available throughintrospec-
tion).
A second source of data is the ethnographicmaterialsproducedby
generationsof sociologistsstudyingvictims,the downtrodden,the be-
reaved,the sick, and otherunderdogs(Becker 1967) and potentialsym-
pathizees.These materialsyieldinformation on how people make claims
to sympathyand how sympathygatekeepersrespond.
I also involved myselfas a participantobserver(sometimesmore as
participant,othersmoreas observer)of sympathy interactionsin natural
settings(e.g., hospitals,funeralhomes,offices,etc.) overa periodof two
years.Field notesfromtheseobservationswereespeciallyusefulin ana-
lyzingsympathymarginand etiquette.
A fourthsource of data is a surveyof northernNew Jerseyresidents
(hereafter designated"respondents").Studentinterviewers presentedvi-
gnettesdepictingthreeplightsto a crosssectionofadultnonstudents. The
877 respondentswerepredominantly whiteCatholics,rangedin age from
18 to 77, and came mostlyfromtheworkingand middleclasses.In one of
the vignettes,a hurricanehas damaged a family'shouse; in another,a
womanis brutallybeatenby a man she "metin passingin a bar"; in the
third,a youngcouple'smarriageis jeopardizedby one spouse'sproblems
withalcohol. Respondentswere asked to read one of thesevignettes,to
indicatethe degreeof sympathytheyfeltforthe character(s)(from"ex-
tremelysorry"to "somewhatsorry"to "notsorryat all"), and to describe
what aspects of the storyhad affectedtheirresponses.The vignettes

292
 Sympathy

elicitedthe highestsympathyscores when the cause of the plightwas

beyond human control(the hurricanestory)and the lowest when the
characterscould have influencedtheirsituation(the troubledmarriage
story).Answersto the open-endedquestionillustrateattitudestoward
sympathy-worthy plightsand individuals.
Finally, fourtrainedmale and femaleinterviewers and I conducted
intensiveinterviewswith12 menand 13 women(hereafter termed"inter-
viewees")betweenthe ages of 25 and 80 livingin northernNew Jersey.
Three intervieweeswere Jewish;the remainderwere almostevenlydi-
vided betweenProtestants and Catholics.Theiroccupationsrangedfrom
blue-collar(e.g., technician,waitress)to middle-class(secretary,
teacher,
radio announcer) to upper-middle-class(psychologist,stockbroker).
Three wereblack, two Hispanic, and 20 white.All maritalstatuseswere
represented.The interviewschedule asked people to describespecific
cases in whichtheyhad given,not given,received,rejected,expected,
feigned,and "workedon" (Hochschild1983,pp. 35-55) sympathy.They
werealso asked to describetheir"innerfeelings"about thesecases. Talk-
ing abstractlyabout sympathywas a novel experiencefor the inter-
viewees,one thatmanyfoundabsorbingand interesting. Several,in fact,
were moved to tears recallingtheirown or others'plightsor recalling
sympathy "due" thatwas notpaid. In general,as we mightexpect(David
and Brannon 1976, pp. 49-50; Cook 1985), women spoke morereadily
about sympathythan men and had moredefiniteopinionsabout how it
shouldbe givenand taken. But it is interesting to notethatthemajority
of both male and femaleintervieweessaw themselvesas more sympa-
theticthan mostpeople of theirsex.
Let us look briefly
at thegeneralconceptionsofsympathy myinvestiga-
tionsuncoveredbeforewe examinesympathymarginand etiquettemore
closely.

ConceptualizingSympathyProcesses
Afterquestioning,listening,observing,and reading,I foundthatmany
people (and even some sympathycards) claimed sympatheticfeelings
were inexpressibleand proved it by having troublearticulatingtheir
nebulous conceptionsof sympathy.Some of those who would venture
definitionssaid sympathyis "feelingsorryfor someone," "a sense of
understanding," and "feelingbadly forpeople with problems,whether
you know themor not."
People oftenconfusedsympathyitselfwiththeir(chieflynegative)at-
titudestowardgivingand gettingit. Asked to describesympathy,a per-
son mightsay, "I don't believe in sympathy"(middle-agedwoman), or
"I'm not a knee-jerktype"(middle-agedman), or "I don'tknow,but I'd

293
 AmericanJournalof Sociology

much ratherbe seen as a sympatheticpersonthan as unsympathetic"

(middle-agedman). Values toward sympathizing have replaced defini-
tionshere.
Some got tangledup tryingto explain that sympathizing can entail
A typistin her50s,
owing,feeling,and expressingin variedproportions.
forinstance,in claimingthat "feelingsorryfor someone"was not the
same as "beingsympathetic,"said:

It's notreallysympathyifyouhearthatsomeonehas cartrouble andyou

just say, "Oh, I'm sorryto hearthat."You have to followthrough
by
offeringthatpersona ride.Thenit'ssympathy.

For her,truesympathyrequiresbothfeelingand acting,as it did forthe

physiciansin myepigraphwho bothfeltsorryforTony and actedto help.
Otherpeople contended,however,thatfeelingsalone are enoughto con-
stitutesympathy one'sconcernfor
and that,in fact,openlydemonstrating
othersis a weak, damaging,or uselessactivity.

SYMPATHY COMPONENTS
Despitethemuddlednatureofpeople'stalkabout sympathy, I detecteda
core,taken-for-granted,three-partdefinition
ofsympathy.2 This emotion
mayentailan internally feltsentiment,a behaviorexpressedto others,or
both.3Priorto eitherof theseis a thirdsympathycomponentthatI will
call empathy,or role taking.
Empathy.-Following Stark(1978) and Lerner(1980), I use the term
empathyto referto takingtheroleoftheother,independentofa senseof
concernor concerndue. Mead also saw "takingtheattitudeoftheother"

2 Closelyrelatedtermsincludecompassion, pity,mercy,commiseration, consolation,

and the like. Hochschild(1983), pp. 228, 232) contendsthat"compassion"is felt
towardequals,while"pity"is heldforsubordinates. My respondents, however,were
just as likelyto use thewordpitytowardan equal or superioras a subordinate, and
theyspokeoffeelingcompassion forearthquakevictimsin Mexicoand forthepoorin
U.S. urbancenters.If anything, thewords"compassion" and "pity"appearto signify
stronger emotionalitythanthewordsympathy, but all threewordswereused inter-
changeablyto referto peopleofvariouscastesand classes.
3There is muchconceptual blurring oftheconceptsofempathy and sympathy. Smith
(1853)and Hume (1948)used theminterchangeably. Shott(1979)does also at times,
althoughat one pointshedistinguishes "affective
empathy" from"cognitive roletak-
ing"(p. 1329).GeorgeHerbertMead (1962,pp. 298-303,366-67),however,speaksof
sympathy as involvingmoreand differentsentiments
thanempathy, as do Stark(1978,
p. 27, passim)and Lerner(1980,p. 77). Manypresent-day psychologists (see Hoffman
1978)use thetermempathy to referexclusively
tothatsentiment I call sympathy, and
socialpsychologists Lauer and Handel(1983)use "synesicrole-taking."

294
 Sympathy

(empathy)as a distinctprocess that was a necessarypreconditionfor

sympathy([1934] 1962, p. 366). Empathic processescan lead to sym-
pathy,but theydo not necessarilydo so. One can take the role of the
other,understandthe other'splightand his or herfeelingsabout it, and
feeleithertheemotionsappropriateto theotheror emotionsnotappropri-
ate to theother.Empathywithone'scompetitor in a sportingcontestor in
a competitionforpromotionon the job is necessaryformaliciousglee,
just as it is forsympathy.(As Gordon[1981, p. 596] pointsout, Ameri-
cans are less attunedto and willingto admit the possibilityof gleeful
feelingsover another's misfortunethan are Germans, whose word
Schadenfreudedenotesjust such a sentiment.See also Goffman1952.)In
short,empathyis necessarybut not sufficient forsympathy.
Sentiment.-Distinctfromempathy,sympathy sentiment is used here
to mean "fellowfeeling,"rangingfromactuallyfeelingthe other'semo-
tionto feelingfor theother'semotion(Scheler1954).Of course,sympathy
sentiment variesin intensity. It is likelythatitsintensityis relatedbothto
thedegreeofempathyexperiencedand tojudgmentsoftheotherand the
other'splight.It may also be relatedto guiltover one's own relatively
good fortune:"WhenI thoughtabout how luckyI was to be able to walk,
all ofa suddenI felta surgeofsympathy for[a womanwithan atrophied
leg]"(professionalwoman in her40s). Sympathysentiment, then,is akin
to, but different from,feelingsof revenge,righteousindignation,and
other"angry"reactionsto another'sinjusticeand misfortune. My work-
ing definition of sympathysentimentis the counterpart in one personof
another'ssense of discomfort, loss, sorrow,and the like.4
Expressionor display.-Producing a culturallyappropriateexpression
of sympathysentiment,whetherheartfeltor feigned,also requiresem-
pathy.A carefulreadingof the circumstances is necessaryto displaythe
propertypeand amountofsympathy fortheproblem.One must"takethe
feelings"of the otherto be able to definea situation.Does it call for
toleranceand listening;forgestures,facial expressions,postures,verbal
expressions,and "soothingtouches";forvisitationsand offerings of food
or flowers;or fortimeoff(Pratt1981)?As mydata make clear,empathy
can lead to sympatheticsentiment,withor withoutdisplay,and to dis-
play, withor withoutsentiment.
Display in the absence of sentimentcan, firstof all, serveto enhance
thedonor'sself-concept or to impressothers.For therecipient,it maynot
have as muchvalue as displayofsincereemotions,butit is notvalueless.
Feigned sympathy("surfaceacting" [Hochschild 1983, p. 49, passim])

4In a strict
sense,sympathy
sentiments
couldincludefeeling
happyforothers(e.g., at
weddings, births,victories,
and anniversaries
[Znaniecki1967,pp. 538-42])as wellas
feelingsorryforothers.In thispaper,theformerare slighted,
thelatterspotlighted.

295
AmericanJournalof Sociology

may be weaker than spontaneous,sinceresympathyor sympathypro-

duced by "deep acting"(Hochschild1983, p. 49, passim),but it is stron-
ger and morereassuringto the personwithproblemsthanno sympathy
displaywhatsoever.A computertechnicianin hismid-30sexplains:"You
go to a wake to show. .. sympathy to therelatives.Even if[thedeceased
is] not someoneyou were close to. It's not as much sympathyas if you
weremoretouchedby the person'sdeath,but it's sympathy."The act of
feigningan emotionsignifiesand validatesthenotionthattheemotionis
due the other. This "dueness" constitutesa considerablegiftin itself
(Hochschild1983,pp. 80-83). Furthermore, emotionaldisplaymayserve
to make deep actingeasier (Hochschild 1983, pp. 47-48; Thoits 1985,
p. 235), as theinteractionspirals.Znanieckiprovidesillustrationof how
conversationbetween sympathizerand sympathizeemay suggestemo-
tionsto the former:

[A]mong[Polish]peasants,whena relativecomesto sympathize

witha
widowin herbereavement, shepersuades
herto talkaboutthedeceased,
extolhis virtues,recollectvariousepisodes of theirconjugal life . . . in a
word,sheinducesherto showin detailwhatthelossmeansto her... so
thatthefriend
can bothunderstandthelossfromthepointofviewofthe
widow and actuallysorrowwithher. [(1936) 1967, pp. 540-41]

The friend,respondingto culturalnormsforwhen and how to display

sympathy, setsin motiona processthatcreatesin herselftheappropriate
sentiment.
In brief,sympathyconsistsof empathyplus sentiment,empathyplus
of sympathyimpliesa conceptionof
display,or all three.This definition
how it "works"in social interactionthatI will now sketch.

SYMPATHY FLOW
For sympathyto exist,theremust be two people-a sympathizeeand
a sympathizer.(Even ifwe includeself-pity in thecategoryof sympathy,
we can say thattwo selves are involved,one to feelforanother.)Rules,
meanings,and consequencesdifferbetweensympathy donorsand recipi-
ents.
A set of loose, unwrittenrules-an "emotionaleconomy"(Collins
1981)-governs how feelingsflow.I am usingthe termemotionalecon-
omyto mean merelya system,producedand reproducedby interacting
groupmembers,forregulatingemotionalresourcesin a community. An
emotionaleconomyis a methodfordispersingthroughout the groupthe
feelingcurrencynecessaryforcreatingand maintainingconnectedness in
general-and valued social identitiesin particular(Franks 1985). It pro-

296
 Sympathy

economy
motesgroupsurvivaljust as a money-based,goods-and-services
does.5
Such capitalistprinciplesas theprofitmotiveusuallyplaylittlepartin
the emotionaleconomy;to aim forunlimitedpersonalemotionalgain at
others'expenseis, in fact,a violationof the rules.Instead, the people I
observed,interviewed,and read about followeda sympathyeconomy
based on two principles.Sympathizersshould adhere to the relatively
socialistictenetofthestrongsupporting the"deserving"weak. Recipients
shouldreciprocate.
Sympathizersare expectedto displaysympathy,not indiscriminately,
butin a mannerappropriateto thepersonand to theplight.In whatmay
be a split second, a potentialsympathizer considersthe moralworthof
theother,thesympathyworthinessoftheother'splight,theother'scom-
plicityin the plight,and one's own situationrelativeto the other's.The
outcomemay or may not be sympathy.

5 If we defineeconomyas a normatively regulatedinterchange or exchange,and not

merelyas pricing,buying,and selling,we can imagineseveralmoreor less separate
economieswithrulesof reciprocity or exchange:a money-goods-and-services econ-
omy,an emotionaleconomy,a dutyeconomy,a sexualeconomy,a helpor aid econ-
omy(seeBoulding1973),and more.As Simmelhas argued,"exchangeis a sociological
phenomenon sui generis,an originalfunctionof sociallife.It is in no way a logical
consequenceof . . . utilityand scarcity"(1978,p. 100).It is probablethatemotional
(and other)economiespredateand serveas modelsformoneyeconomiesratherthan
theotherway around(L6vi-Strauss1969). Emotionaland moneyeconomiesin the
same societydo notnecessarily operateby thesame principles; one maybe, forin-
stance,moresocialistic,the othermorecapitalistic.These two typesof economies
may,however,be mergingat pointsin modernWesternsocieties;as Hochschild's
(1983)studyofflight attendants suggests,emotionsare increasingly incorporatedinto
white-collarjob descriptions. In an emotionaleconomy,intangible commodities are
interchanged orexchanged(Collins1981).I see emotional commodities, incudingsym-
pathy,as gesturesthatsymbolizethe sentiments of one person,whichare of use,
advantage,orvalue to another.The dangerin usingtheterm"commodity" toreferto
emotionsis thatof implyingthatpeople use the same relatively precise,inflexible
principlesas thoseofthemoneyeconomywhentheyinterchange emotions.I contend
thatrulesforemotionalexchangeare unique,butmoresimilarto money-goods-and-
servicesrulesthanwe believeor wantto believe(see also Whyte1941,p. 657). First,
emotionalledgerkeepingis a routinefeatureof everydaylife.Oftensentiment and
display emerge spontaneouslyand consistentlywith expectations,but ". . . when it
comeshard . . . we recognizewhathas been trueall along:thatwe keep a mental
ledgerwith'owed' and 'received'columnsforgratitude, love,anger,guilt,and other
(Hochschild1983,p. 78), includingsympathy.
feelings" AmongmysubjectsI found
evidencethatsome were veryaccurateand acute ledgerkeepers,alertto minute
differencesin others'emotionaldisplays,regardlessof whetherthe displaysrepre-
sentedclaimsorreturns. Second,moneyeconomies arenotas "rational"andpreciseas
we tendto think;goodsand moneyare symbolic (Blumer1962).Recentrisesin barter
and bargaining remindus ofvariablepricing.We shouldalso remember, "Goodsare
notonlyeconomiccommodities, butvehiclesand instruments forrealitiesofanother
order,suchas power,influence, sympathy, statusand emotion"(Levi-Strauss1969,
p. 54).

297
AmericanJournalof Sociology

One ofthefirstprinciplesforsympathizers is to determinewhetherthe

otherperson'splightis includedin thegroundsthatthesocietyconsiders
sympathyworthy.My data show that in our culturethesegroundsin-
clude loss of a loved one, illness,divorce,loss ofone'sjob, crimevictim-
ization,car trouble,and even noisyneighborsor fatigue.In theepigraph,
damage to Tony's home and futurefinancialsituationconstitutedthe
groundsforsympathy.Grounds,of course,change over timeand vary
amongsubcultures.
My evidencealso indicatesthatsympathizers are influenced
bypeople's
social statuses.Children,forinstance,oftenelicitmoresympathythan
adultswiththesame problems,and perhapsthemiddleclass elicitmore
than eitherthe wealthyor the destitute.More sympathyand aid go to
disastervictimsin friendly nationssuchas Mexico and Colombiathanto
those in dislikednations like the Soviet Union. Further,statusesand
plightscan interactto produce veryspecificsympathynorms.For my
interviewees, womenwithcar troublewarrantmoresympathy thanmen
because of men'spresumablysuperiormechanicalskills.Widowerswith
small childrenoftenrate moresympathythanwidows withchildrenbe-
cause ofwomen'spresumablygreatertalentsin childcare. A multitudeof
such normsawait further empiricalspecification.
The givingof sympathy,in additionto being subject to a batteryof
norms,also has unique meaningsforthedonor.Givingsympathy sendsa
dual message: it is a sign both of caringor connectednessand of the
superiority or moralworthof thedonor(see Simmel[1908] 1971,p. 152;
Mauss [1925] 1954; Schwartz1967, p. 8; Mitchell1978, pp. 166-73). In
fact,Shottcontendsthatpeople sometimessympathizepreciselybecause
doingso elevatestheirown feltworthand repairsdamagedself-concepts
(1979, p. 1327). Sympathizingcan enhanceone's "niceness,"but it can
also increaseone's "softness."Many interviewees triedto strikea balance
betweenseeminghard and seemingsentimental.
Sympathydonorsare also affectedbycognitiveconsistency. Describing
theirreactionsto a vignettein whicha youngwomanis brutallybeaten,
manyof mysurveyrespondentsinventeddetailsthatwould make sense
of the occurrenceand justifyblamingthe victim,such as: "She should
neverhave pickedup a stranger";"Whatkindofa girlwould go to a bar
alone?"; and "She probablylied to thepolice. Maybe she made thewhole
thingup."
Previous researchershave laid victim blaming to "belief in a just
world"(Lerner 1980).6Those who hold thisview believethatwhatever

6 It has beenwidely
assumedthatsomepeoplebelieveina justworldand somedo not.
It seemsmorelikelythateach ofus makessomejust-world interpretations
and some
sympathy interpretations.
Even the "weakestsister"blamessomevictims,and the

298
 Sympathy

events,fortunateor unfortunate, befallpeople are deserved.In Lerner

and Simmons'sclassic experiment(1966), forexample,about two-thirds
of theirsubjects derogatedand denigratedan unknownand innocent
"victim"of electricshocks(theexperimenters' confederate). Surprisingly,
subjectswere mostlikelyto reporthostileand negativefeelingstoward
the blamelessvictimwhen theybelieved she was a "martyr"who had
agreed to sufferto help the subjects themselvesfulfillcourse require-
ments,and when theyfeltunable to compensateher(Lerner1980). Peo-
ple blame victimswhen theirworthinessis low or when it has been
cognitivelyreducedto fitthe plight.
Sympathizing, on theotherhand,usuallyresultsfroma convictionthat
the worldhas been unjust to someone.Fate or luck is seen as the agent
thathas operatedimproperly. As we saw withTony'splight,whatbefalls
one may cause more miserythan one "deserves"and thustriggersym-
pathy.At times,however,beliefin a just worldmayalso providemotiva-
tion to sympathizeand console. People who value believingthat the
worldis just maywantto encourageothersto sharetheirview. Theymay
intenda giftofsympathy to convincea victimthatall is notbleak. Thus,
theyseek to equalize the victim'sluck and preventhim or her from
leaving the group. In Goffman'sterms,theytryto "cool the mark in"
(1952).
As it flows fromdonor to recipient,sympathyleaves invisiblebut
importanttiesand debtsmarkingits path. Receivingsympathy can both
because normalroleobliga-
benefitand obligatetherecipient.It benefits,
tionsand standardsare relaxed.In addition,theacceptance,caring,and
validation demonstratedby othersare rewarding.As Goffman(1952)
stated,consolationis indeeda prizethatcan cool outor cool in thevictims
oflife'smisfortunes. Beneficialconsequencesincludethetangibleas well
as the psychological.Receivingsympathycan make the difference be-
tween gettingfiredand not gettingfired,betweengoingto prisonand

toughestsympathizeson occasion.The interactionist perspective

prompts us tosearch
forcircumstances,past experiences,and statuscharacteristics of thejudge and the
judged thatlead to just-worldinterpretations, but thatsearchhas barelybegun.
Lernernotesthatwhenexperimental subjectshad an opportunity torepaya "victim,"
theyusuallydid so; otherwise,the majorityblamedthe victim(1980, pp. 47-50).
Thesefindingssuggestthatsympathy is linkedto thedonor'sassessment ofhisor her
own situational
power:thegreatertheabilityto help,themoresympathy. Giordano
(1983),focusing
on thesocialstandingand powerofdeviants,arguesthatattributions
ofnormalityto "high-status"deviantsstemfromtendencies towardcognitive consis-
tency.Thus, thelowerthe generalpowerof thedefiner relativeto thedefined,the
moresympathy. Another setofresearchfindings summarized byShott(1979)indicates
thatthedonor'sfeelingsofguiltmaymotivatethegivingofsympathy and aid, sincea
consequenceof sympathizing is "repair[ing]one's self-conception
or self-presentation
and convinc[ing]othersof one's moralworthiness or competence"(p. 1327). The
donor'sown socialmarginis at issuehere.

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

goingfree.Tony's case illustratesthispoint,too; sympathyled his part-

nersto help him avoid punishmentforMedicare fraud.
Receiving sympathyobligates, because acceptingthe role of sym-
pathizeerequiresone to reciprocateforthe giftsof sympathyand accep-
tance (Simmel1971, pp. 150-78; Blau 1964; Gouldner1960; Hochschild
1983, p. 78). A varietyof emotionalcommodities,such as gratitude,
deference,and futuresympathy,serveas returnson the originalgift.
Many othersocial variables-such as how intimatea relationshipis
and how poweris configured-affect thecomplexprocessesofgivingand
takingsympathy.Space does not permitanalysisof themall. The vari-
able to whichI turnnow is the sympathymargin,or account,set up by
the donor forthe recipient.Sympathyflowin the emotionaleconomy
worksvia sympathymargins.

THE CONCEPT OF SYMPATHY MARGIN

In life,as in theliterature
thatsocializesus, to receivesympathy one must
be a "sympathetic character."But whatconstitutes a sympatheticcharac-
ter?Part of the answerhas to do withone's social statuses,and mydata
suggestthatanotherpartis relatedto relationships builtup overtimeand
involvingconsiderablereciprocity.JacquelineWiseman (1979), in her
analysisof theplightof skid row men and of theagentsofsocial control
who deal withthem,pointsto a conceptthathelps us understandhow
sympathyand compassioncome about. That conceptis "social margin,"
thatis, ". . . theamountofleewaya givenindividualhas in makingerrors
on thejob, buyingon credit,or steppingon thetoes of significant others
withoutsuffering such seriouspenaltiesas beingfired,deniedcredit,or
losingfriendsand family.... A personwithmargincan gethelp"(1979,
p. 223). Wisemanclaimsthatrespectability, especiallyin workand fam-
ily careers, must be maintainedto acquire margin (Wiseman 1979,
p. 224).
Wiseman'sinsightshave generalutilityin explaininginteraction in the
emotionaleconomyofeverydaylife.One's moralworthand networkties
affecthow manyemotionalcommodities,including"units"of sympathy
and compassion,can be claimed fromothersand that othersfeel they
owe. Social marginthus includessympathymargin.Margin(social and
otherwise)mustbe ascribedbyothers.Sincewe all interactwitha variety
of others,we may speak of people as havingmanymarginsof variable
widths-one witheach specificotherin one's network.
In keepingwithWiseman'sterminology, I have drawna bankinganal-
ogy with sympathyflow. Each group memberhas, I maintain,what
amountsto an "account" of "sympathycredits"(similarto Goffman's
conceptof social credits[Wiseman1979,p. 325] and Hollander'sconcept

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 Sympathy

of deviancecredits[1958])held forhimor herby each othergroupmem-

ber.A certainnumberofsympathy creditsare automatically on depositin
each of the sympathyaccountsof the ordinarygroupmember,available
forcashingin when theyare needed. They are a rightof groupmember-
ship.7
The rightto sentiment.-Simply put, groupmembersare expectedto
feelsome sympathy towardeach other.How muchsympathy (how many
credits)each membercan claimfromeach othermembervaries,butthere
is some minimum,albeit an unspecifiableand unquantifiableone. In
general,people involvedin "close" or "deep" relationships have an obli-
gationto createwidersympathymarginsforeach otherthando acquain-
tancesor secondarygroupmembers(Coser 1982). More sympathy is due
per occasion, more genuinesympathyis due, and it is due in a wider
rangeof circumstances.We may,forexample,feelsympathyforstrang-
ers or even enemiesin what are considereddisastrousor freakcircum-
stances(beingpushedundera subwaycar or beingsubjectedto an earth-
quake or a terroristattack),yetour friendsand loved ones can call out,
and counton, our sympathiesfortheirminorproblemsas well as fortheir
disasters.Also, creditis more freelygiven to an intimatethan to an
acquaintance,even beforeaccountshave been settled.
The rightto empathy.-Furthermore, thereis an obligationto be em-
pathic and to search forevidence that group members,especiallyinti-
mates, have problemsthat meritsympathy(see Locker 1981, p. 62).
WhenGoffman(1983, p. 13) discussestheroleof"knowership," he recog-
nizesthispoint,notingthatin close relationships,one is supposedto keep
the friend'sbiographyin mind, ask questionsabout how issues in that
person'slifehave been resolved,referto his or herpast illnesses,and the
like. Focusing conversationon each other'sbiographiesenhancescom-
municationand empathybetween"knowers."
The rightto display.-Abundant evidence also exists to show that
group membersare obligated to display sympathyappropriateto the
personand theplight.Sometimeswordsofsympathy are expected,some-
timesnonverbalmessagesand kid glove treatment.Some problemscall
for"off-the-rack"sentimentsavailable in greetingcards.8

7 Of course,as we willsee in rule2, somedegreeofexemption fromsympathizing is

allowedifone has one'sown troubles.
8 The greeting card industry-whichsells Americans7 billion cards per year
(McGough1986)-both reflects and influencesdisplaynorms.Sympathy cardsmar-
ketedforthosesympathizing withthebereavedare graveand solemnin tone(they
usuallyare whiteor gray);oftenhave no picturesorpicturesofflowers(as appropriate
symbolsof sympathy); and use a vocabularyof deep, sincere,or heartfelt concern,
caring,and understanding. Sympathy cardsthatare "suitableforbusinesssettings"
usuallyofferonly"sympathy" or "condolences."Getwellcards,in contrast, are often

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 AmericanJournalof Sociology

Sudnow's(1967) studyofhospitalstaffprovidesexamplesofthedisplay
normsexpectedof thosedealingface to facewithbereavedfamilymem-
bers. Physiciansgiving"bad news"to relatives"cannot,likethetelegram
deliverer,merelypresentthenewsand leave thescene,butmustevidence
some degreeof generalconcernand responsibility" (p. 129). The relative
has the rightto cry,moan, screamout, in otherwords,"to suspendhis
concernfornormallyenforceablerequirements of... composure"(p. 136)
on hearingof the death. He or she also has the rightto indicatewhen
interactionmay proceedafterthe periodof "carryingon" (p. 142). The
staffmemberhas the obligationto deferto the other,to presenthim-or
herselfsolemnly,with appropriatetone of voice, facial expression,and
the like.
Among my own interviewees,a 40-year-oldprofessionalwoman, in
reporting herreactionto a friend'sillness,said: "I can remember sayingto
myself,'Now, thisis a shock,and you haven'ttakenit in yet,but you'd
betterlookserious.'" Anotherwoman,a 36-year-oldwaitressand college
student,in notingviolationsof displaynorms,said: "My childrenwere
shockedto see [distantrelatives]laughingand drinkingat theirgrandma's
funeral.In fact,so was I!" Interestingly enough,when myinterviewees
merelybegan to think,in theinterviewsituation,about theirreactionsto
others'plights,theyfrequently adopted the facial expressions,postures,
and tonesofvoice appropriateto sympathy display-erasing smiles,knit-
tingeyebrows,sittingup straighter, and speakingin "concerned"tones.

Changes in SympathyMargin
A given sympathyaccount or marginheld by a specificotherdoes not
always remain constant.It is continuallynegotiatedand may be in-
creased,decreased,replenished,or used up entirely.Beyondthenumber
ofsympathy creditsautomatically"on account"in one's margins,a group
membercan earn credits,forexample,by investingsympathy, help,and
concernin others.The natureoftherelationship betweenthetwo parties
mayalso changeas thesympathymarginsof one or bothchange.Invest-

humorous, sexy,or cheery(cheeris themostcommonly used wordin nonhumorous

cards).Theypictureflowers, animals,bugs,peoplein beds,and hospitalpersonnel.
One exception is thetypeofcardlabeled"suitableforseriousillness,"whichstillmay
mentioncheerbutdoes notsuggestthattherecipient "getwellquick."Morespecial-
ized cards are also available forthosewho have lost pets and forthosewho are
remembering the anniversary of the loss of a loved one. Finally,the new "coping
cards"offercomfort, commiseration, and, often,licenseto eat chocolatesto people
whoare "down"or "blue."The underlying themeofall thesecards,a themeexplicitly
statedin many,is thatthesenderis connected to therecipient,
despitethetemporary
separation,figurativeor literal,requiredby theplight.The factthatsuchcardsare
purchasedand sentis evidenceofsympathy-display norms.

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 Sympathy

ing in anotherusuallyimplies(whetheras a consequenceor a cause) a

greaterdegreeof intimacybetweenthe parties.
Sympathycreditscan also be cashed in. Claimingor acceptingsym-
pathyreducesone's margins,and one shoulddraw againstaccountsthat
are solvent.The sickpersonwho does nottryto getwell,liketheskidrow
man who does not tryto reform,may soon findhis or her sympathy
accounts depleted or even overdrawn(Parsons 1951; Wiseman 1979,
p. 223). The numberof sympathycreditsis limited.
Of course,it is possibleto overdrawone's accountswithsomepeoplein
one's networkbut not withothers.One might,forinstance,tryto claim
equal amountsof sympathyfroman acquaintanceand froman intimate
and findthattheformerclaim is nothonoredwhilethelatteris. Further,
a given sympathyaccount sometimesdepends on the total amount of
sympathya personis receiving.Thus, as severalinterviewees stated,co-
workersmay believe that marriedpeople will get sympathyfromtheir
spousesand, consequently,offerlittlethemselves.My observationsshow
thatthemembersof a networkoftenknoweach otherand discussamong
themselveshow much sympathya givenmemberhas claimedand how
muchothershave given. The accountsheld by some of thesepeople are
small because theybelieve that othersare offering "enough."Accounts
were drainedcompletelyin severalcases involvingprolongedperiodsof
unemployment, divorce,extendedillness,seriesof mishaps,and claims
feltto be exaggerated.The potentialsympathizeehad to findnew net-
worksof significant others-open new accounts-when sympathywas
stilldesired.
To be ascribedsympathymarginby others,one musthave dealt prop-
erlywithsympathy in thepast. That is, sympathymarginsare affectedby
one's sympathybiography-previousadherenceto the protocolsor eti-
quetteforowing,giving,claiming,and acceptingsympathy perse. I will
now presentthe rules of sympathyetiquettethat my researchhas un-
covered.

SYMPATHY ETIQUETTE: RULES FOR SYMPATHIZEES

Rule 1: Do Not Make False Claims to Sympathy
The foremostrule of sympathyetiquetteis not to falselymanipulate
others'sympathyby pretendingto need it, by exaggerating claims,or by
courtingdisasterwith the intentof calling out emotionsin others.In
short,one should not claim another'ssympathyneedlessly.
Aesop providesan interesting illustrativecase, the familiartale of the
boy who cried wolf. The boy's firstfew crieswere heeded, but in each
case no concreteevidenceofthewolf'svisitcouldbe found.He was given

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 AmericanJournalof Sociology

some marginby others,but eventuallyhis sympathyaccounts disap-

peared. When the wolf actuallythreatened,the boy was judged to be
lyingand undeservingof sympathy.
A personwho engagesin any oftheabove practices,and who is caught
out, erodes bases fortrust.All of his or her claims may be called into
question.Sympathyaccountsmay be closed. Otherswill findthemselves
notmakingefforts to empathize,notfeelingsympathy sentiments,and/or
not feelingobligationsto display sympathyin otherwisesympathy-
worthysituations.A youngworking-class man explainedhis reactionsto
a co-worker'sclaims: "I can't take the timeto sortout whichthingsshe
claims are real. Now everything she says is suspectto me."
My intervieweeswere,on thewhole,quite concernedabout violations
ofthisrule.9Theyreportedfeeling"takenadvantageof,""betrayed,"and
"conned" when otherpeople played on theirsympathiesfortheirown
gain. A psychologist in her 50s said of her sister:
Amy'sa disasterarea!But . . . she makesherownproblems. She calls
collectfromHawaiitotellmethatherhusbandis sellingthehouseoutfrom
underthem.She wantsmeto say,"PoorAmy!"I haveto sayto her,"He
can'tdo thatunlessyousignthepaperstoo."But shewon'tthinkor do
anything forherself.. . . She makesthingsbad forherself
to getsym-
pathy.... I usedto feelsorry forher,butnowI tryto avoidher.
Anotherinterviewee,a 37-year-oldreal estateagent,spoke heatedlyof a
man who had gothisfriend'sparentsto feelsorryforhimbecausehiswife
divorcedhim. The friend'sparentswere quite sympathetic. They rented
him a house cheaplyand thensold it to him forhalfthe marketvalue.
The intervieweecomplained:"He just used the[former landlords],and I
could neverhelp him out again knowingwhat he's like."
What is at issue here is a breach of public trust,a loss of faiththat
otherswill play by the rules. Despite the fact that we know to expect
cynicaland manipulativeperformances in everydayencounters,it comes
as a shockwhenour expectationsare realizedand cannotbe overlooked
or explainedaway-when the fictionsthat make interactioneasier are
shattered.The tags "untrustworthy" and "con artist"are affixedto those
who mishandleothers'emotionsas well as to those who abuse their
moneyor property.One withsuch a reputationwill have littlesympathy
margin.

Rule 2: Do Not Claim Too Much Sympathy

Even whenlegitimategroundsexist,do not claim "too much"sympathy
"too often"or for "too long." That is, one should not overdrawone's
9 A smallnumberdid admitadmiration forother'screativeabilitiesin evokingsym-
pathyto getout ofschool,work,or familyobligations.

304
 Sympathy

sympathyaccounts. The personwho does so risksreceivingsympathy

displayswithless sentimentthan would be forthcoming otherwise,dis-
plays withoutsentiment,or, worse,no displaysat all.
AlthoughthepointofAesop'sstorywas thatpretensesto sympathy are
interpersonally
dangerous,I contendthateven iftherehad actuallybeen
an unlimitednumberof wolves,theboycould nothave hopedto receive
unlimitedsympathy.In our terminology here,theboy had cashed in his
sympathy credits.Afterhis firstfewclaimswerehonored,he had already
receivedhis sympathyallotmentand depletedhis sympathyaccounts.
Thereis a varietyofwaysto ask fortoo muchsympathy. First,one can
ask too muchfora particularproblem.One's own plightmayseemdire,
but othersmay have perceivedit as low in sympathy-worthiness. For
example:
EverytimeI see her,I think,"Herewe go again!"She'slikea broken
record."Samdidthistome;Samdidn'tdo thatforme." I'msorry, buta lot
of us have beenthrough divorcesand survived.She's gonecompletely
overboard.[Fieldnotes,teacherin his30s]
And:
Shelookslikeshe'sabout30. I mean,whatdoesshewant?WhyshouldI
feelsorryforherjust becauseshe'shavingherfortieth
birthday?
[Field
notes,45-year-old
woman]
Second,one can ask fortoo muchfora particularother'spresentsitua-
tion. People who have theirown problemsare, to some extent,exempt
fromthe obligationto feelor displaysympathyto others-especiallyto
othersin less seriousplights.These commentsof a surveyrespondent,a
Hispanic custodianin her50s, showthatshe appliedthis"ruleforbreak-
ingrules"to herself:"WhyshouldI feelsorryforthosepeoplein thatstory
[about hurricanedamage]?I've got no job, and myhusbanddied."
Third, in specificencountersand relationships,claims to sympathy
may be consideredexcessive,as panhandlersregularlydiscover.Fourth,
one can ask fortoo muchsympathy fora particularsetting.For instance,
a claimthatwould be honoredat lunchmaynotbe honoredin theoffice.
Finally, sympathymay be claimed over too long a period of time-a
pointthatmeritsfurther comment.
The estimateddurationof a problemis relatedto the size of one's
sympathy accountsin a curvilinearfashion.Problemsofeitherveryshort
or verylongdurationwillengenderless,or less consistent,sympathy than
intermiediate-rangeproblems.Problemsthatare over quickly,such as a
painfulmedicaltestlastingonlya fewmoments,elicitminimalsympathy
because these situationsare not "worth"much. Long-termproblems,
whiletheymaybe worthmoresympathy, maycall forgreateremotional
expendituresthan otherscan or will put forth.For instance,thosewho

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 AmericanJournalof Sociology

grievetoo long (Wood 1975) or who cannot recoverfroma divorceor

disasterin a timelyfashionmay findtheirmarginsdiminished.Chronic
illness-arthritis,forexample-may thusbe awardedless sympathy than
an intermediate-range, acute illness, such as pneumonia (see, e.g.,
Strausset al. 1982, p. 256).10
Regardlessofone's misfortune, then,claimingand acceptingsympathy
can seriouslydiminishothers' capacity to sympathize.George Eliot
speaksofphysicallimitson how muchsympathy can be feltor displayed:
Ifwe had a keenvisionandfeeling
ofall ordinary
humanlife,itwouldbe
likehearingthegrassgrowandthesquirrel's
heartbeat,andwe shoulddie
of thatroar whichlies on the otherside of silence.[(1872) 1981, p. 191]
Wisemanconcurs:
Charityand compassion are notavailablein unlimited
supply,theBible
notwithstanding.
Likeso manyotherstrong emotions,compassioncannot
be calledforthon everypossibleoccasionwithout thegiver.
exhausting
[1979, p. 242]

Sympathyrecipientsare expectedto be sensitiveto thesacrificesof sym-

pathizers.If theyare not,theymay diminishothers'willingnessto sym-
pathize.For bothphysicaland culturalreasons,then,thereappearsto be
a maximumamountof sympathythat an individualmay claim froma
specificotherin a givenperiod.
Those I observedand interviewedrecognizedtheselimitson others'
sympathy.Several noted that, if theyhad recentlyreceivedsympathy,
help, time offfromwork, and the like, they were reluctanteven to
mentionnew problemsthat croppedup soon after.As one man, a car-
penterin his 50s, put it,
Thatmonth whenI hadthreedeathsinthefamily andmycarbrokedown
andmymother-in-law neededconstant careandthekidsweresick,well,it
was too unbelievable.
I was embarrassed to eventellpeoplewhatwas
happening.I didn'tbringup all thedetails.
An intervieweein her 30s, who had experiencedsurgery,a death in the
family,and job problems,stated,
I hadtodealwithitjokingly.
I'd listalltheterrible andlaugh.There
things
werejusttoomanythingsall at once.
She takes care to protecther significant
others,therebyprotectingher
sympathymarginsas well.
10 Partlyforthisreason,manyelderlypeoplefindtheirsympathy marginswithyoun-
gerpeoplesmallerthantheyexpect,especiallywhentheyhavefewresources in
tooffer
socialexchanges (Dowd 1980).Furthermore,rulesforclaimingsympathymaybe more
permissiveinsubculturesoftheelderlythaninthelargersociety(JayLivingston
1986,
personalcommunication).

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 Sympathy

The otherside of thissympathyruleis that,ifone does notclaimvery

muchsympathyor help veryoften,one may be, in commonsenseterms,
"due for"it. Note thecase ofMr. F, citedby Locker(1981). He is a stoic
who has veryrarelyclaimedsympathyand attentionforillnessand who
is thoughtby his wifeto deservesome:
. . . he had verybad flu,it'sthefirst
timehe'sbeenill sincewe'vebeen
married,and I couldn'tget the doctorto comeand see him. OK, so
everybody hasflu,buthehada hightemperature....I feltthatifDr. M.
[theirformerphysician]and his old receptionist
had been there. . . they
Mr.F neverevercomesnearus,hemustreallynotbe
wouldhavethought:
well, or even if he's not . . . we owe him a visit. [P. 108]

Many of us, like Mr. F, may storeup sympathycreditsby beingcompe-

tent,functioninggroup members.(That we can go too far with this
practiceis the subject of rule 3 below.)
Corollary2a: Do not acceptsympathy too readily.-In additionto not
needingtoo muchsympathy,one shouldnotappear to wantit too much.
One should not expect, take for granted,or demand sympathybut,
rather,underplayproblemsand countblessings.
Givingexpressionsof strength,independence,and braveryhelps one
avoid being perceivedas self-pitying or as enjoyingothers'displaysof
sympathy. The oft-repeated question,"How are youbearingup?" implies
thatone should be tryingto bear up. The appropriateresponseis, "I'm
okay," or "Prettywell." One's tone of voice, energylevel, and other
nonverbalcues may indicateotherwise-forinstance,one may exhibit
what a characterof HenryJames'scalled "the droop of the misunder-
stood"(James[1881] 1963,p. 192). But verbalexpressionsofbraveryare
expected.One intervieweepointedout thatshe oftencatalogshermisfor-
tunesand problemsforothersbut expresslydeclinessympathy:"I guess
I'm conveyingthatI could ask fortheirsympathy, butI'm not.I'm being
brave" (youngtypist).
Underplayingproblemsis quite common,as Sudnow also foundin his
(1967) researchon dyingand the bereaved. "Personsare engaged,so it
seems,in thecontinualde-emphasisoftheirfeelingsofloss,outofrespect
forthe difficultiesof interactionfacingthoseless intimately involvedin
thedeath thanthemselves"(p. 140). For instance,sympathyphonecalls
which Sudnow managed to overhearincludedremarksinitiatedby the
bereavedabout theconcernsofthesympathizer: "How are yourchildren
thesedays?" (p. 137). Underplayingrepresents, emotion
first,significant
workundertakento alignfeelingswiththenormsofvariousinteractional
settingsand, second, a meaningfulgestureto the nonbereaved.
On thoseoccasionswhen people do not "keep a stiffupperlip," sym-
pathyis, in effect,claimed.And, ofcourse,claimsdiminishmargins.An
interviewee,a medical researcherin his 40s, reacted to a sympathy-

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

demandingco-workeras follows:"I always tell people to watch out for

Josh. He can be quite a leech if you let him. His problemsare end-
less. You just have to keep yourdistance."The "greedy"sympathizeeis
shunned.
The victimof circumstancesis also commonlyexpectedto focus on
othergood luck or blessingsthatare thoughtto compensateforthepres-
ent bad luck. Hurricanevictims,interviewedby networknewscastersin
the fall of 1984, lived up to thisexpectation.Indeed, none whose inter-
views were aired failedto strikea positivenote. For example:"It could
have been worse"(middle-agedwoman). "At leastwe'restillalive" (mid-
dle-aged man). "We'll just startrebuildingand tryto forgetall this"
(elderlyman).
My surveyrespondents reactingto thevignetteabouthurricanevictims
echoedthistheme:"I feelsorry,but at leastthey'vegoteach otherand no
one was killed" (housewifein her 50s). "Sometimesa disasterlike this
draws people together.They're fortunatebecause they'llprobablybe
closernow" (youngsecretary).
One typical get well card from Hallmark makes the count-your-
blessingsnormexplicit.It attemptsto convincethe "unlucky"sufferer
thathe or she is really"lucky."
CHEER UP!
ThingsCouldbe Worse!
Supposeyouhad a SNEEZING FIT
Or youmaybehad theGOUT,
SupposeyourARCHES all FELL IN
Or all yourHAIR FELL OUT-
You'rereallyluckywhenyouthink
OfwhatitMIGHT HAVE BEEN-
Butjustthesame,here'shoping
You willSOON BE WELL AGAIN!
Other cards, presumablyfor a male audience, exhortthe hospitalized
personto pay attentionto thenursesratherthanto thepain and danger.
To summarizethiscorollary,one who eagerlyand openlyacceptssym-
pathy is an embarrassmentbecause she or he is not meetingthe role
obligationsofthesympathizee.Each ofus has a rightto somesympathy,
but interactionalstrategiesthatexplicitlycall fortheserightsto be hon-
oredwill diminishsympathymarginsrapidly.The resultingsentiment is
usuallyless sincere,and display,if thereis any, may be empty.

Rule 3: Claim Some Sympathy

Prescriptionsof braverynotwithstanding, to keep sympathymarginsvi-
able one should claim and accept some sympathyfromotherswhen cir-

308
 Sympathy

cumstancesare appropriate.This sympathyruleis perhapsless obvious

thantheothers.Taken togetherwithrule2, it suggeststhatthereis some
optimal amount of sympathyto claim. The self-reliant-whoremain
independent,pay cash, and do not develop creditratingsby borrowing
and repaying-may nothave sympathyaccountsin timesof need. Para-
doxically,thosewho have historiesof nevercryingwolfmayfindno one
heeding theirlegitimatecries. This rule is most clearlyapplicable in
relationshipsinvolvingintimatesor equals, butit operatesto someextent
fornonintimates, subordinates,and superiorsas well.
Justas theact ofclaimingsympathy has a varietyofmeanings,so, too,
does not claimingor acceptingsympathy.In general,one who never
claimsor acceptssympathyfromanotherovera periodoftimein a stable
relationship maysimplycome to be definedas an inactivememberofthe
interactionnetwork.(This definitionresultsespecially,but not only,
whenone giveslittlesympathyto othersas well.) Nonacceptersare ofthe
groupbut not in it. When roleshave solidifiedand becomehabitual,an
out-of-character claim forsympathymay not "compute."
As myintervieweesindicated,a numberof signalsmay be sentif one
does not,fromtimeto time,claim and accept some sympathy.One may
In theformercase, one is unworthy
appear too loftyor too self-possessed.
of sympathy;in the latter,not in need. Or, like a rate-buster's, one's
fortuneis too good or theabilityto cope too expertcomparedwiththatof
the average person. The followingcase shows that highlycompetent
people who rarelyclaim sympathycan easilyfindthemselvesdefinedas
not needingsympathy,as not having the problems,worries,or stage
frightcommonamong the less able:
I wasso surprised-shocked-at thereaction
ofmycolleagues lastweek.I
had to givea bigpresentation
thatlastedtwodays.I've doneshorter ones
before, I foundmyself
butthiswasfrightening. gettingnervousandtriedto
talktomyfriends aboutit.Theyjustsaid,"Oh,you'lldo okay.You always
do." Not an ounceofsympathy! Andthesewere"near"friends, too,not
justpeopleI know.
Althoughthisyoungeditorgivessympathyto others,she rarelyfindsthe
need to claimit. The eventshe describesled herto recognizethatshe had
no sympathy accountswithherco-workers.She reportedthatshe intends
to changetheirperceptionsof her by lettingthemknow moreabout her
insecurities-thatis, by claimingsome sympathy.
My intervieweesalso attributedsuch meaningsto not acceptingsym-
pathyas theunwillingness to incurobligations,theunwillingnessto allow
othersto dischargetheirobligations,and the unwillingnessto admit
othersintobackstageregionswhereproblemsand vulnerabilities are ap-
parent.Finally,nonclaimersmay give the impressionthattheyfeeltoo
"lowly"to expectothers'attentionand sympathy.

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

Rule 3 shows that,as a particularsympathyexchangeunfolds,group

boundariesare created. Insiders and outsiders,intimatesand noninti-
mates are defined.At the same time, group structure-thesystemof
powerand statusrelationships-is affected.
To beginwith,A's claimand B's subsequentgiftofsympathy create(1)
a bond of"knowership"(Goffman1983,p. 13) or intimacybetweenthem
and (2) truston thepartof thesympathizee.Further,thedirectionof the
exchangecrystallizesthe statusesand roles of those in the relationship
along a superordinate-subordinate dimension.Mutual exchangesofsym-
pathycommonlysymbolizeequality,whereasone-waygiftsof sympathy
usuallysignifyinequality.
If one bothgives and receivessympathy,one is a friend,intimate,or
peer. Formeracquaintanceswho have not been particularlyclose may
findtheirrelationship takingon a moreintimatecast, once sympathy has
been exchanged.
On theotherhand, thepersonwho giveswithoutclaimingor accepting
sympathyin returndoes notallow recipientsa chance to dischargetheir
obligations.Rather than enhancingequality,these situationsengender
the "parent-child"relationshipbetweendonor and recipientthatMead
(1962, p. 367) saw as the essentialformof sympathy.And the "parent"
may be rightlyor wronglyperceivedas not requiringor needingsym-
pathyforhim-or herself.Furthermore, thestateofowingengenderedin
the "child" (recipient)may be so uncomfortable as to cause resentment
againstthe donor,providingjustification fornot returning sympathyor
actuallyinterfering withfeelingit.
To recap,thereappears to be an optimalamountofsympathy to claim
and/orreceive(dependingon therelativepowerand authority oftheactor
and the desiredclosenessof the relationship),if one wants to keep ac-
counts open. Claiming too little,as well as claimingtoo much, may
diminishmargins.

Rule 4: Reciprocateto Othersforthe Giftof Sympathy

A finalrule formaintainingan adequate supplyof sympathycreditsis
thatone mustreciprocate.Dependingin part on one's positionvis-a-vis
thedonor,one may be expectedto repaythegiftofsympathy withgrati-
tude, deference,and esteem,or to pay back sympathy.Whethercon-
scious of the fact or not, people usually expectreturnswhen theygive
sympathy.
This sympathyruleillustratesthe partplayed by normsof reciprocity
and exchangein negotiatingsympathyencountersand sympathymar-
gins.Commonsensebeliefstellus thatsympathy can be misspent,and we
oftenexhortone anothernot to "waste yourpity"on thosewho do not

310
 Sympathy

appreciateitsvalue. McCall contends,"Whensomeonehas expended. . .

scarce resources. . . in establishinga relationship,he cannotaffordto
throwthemaway withoutrealizingsubstantialreturns"(1970, p. 8). If,
on theotherhand, recipients"regularlydischargetheirobligations,they
prove themselvesworthyof further credit"(Blau 1964, p. 98).
As Levi-Strauss(1969,p. 54) pointsout,returnsforsocial"gifts"do not
have to accrueto theoriginaldonorto be consideredvaluable. Returnsto
familymembers,friends,and even to charitiesor thecommunity at large
mayserveto erase obligations.For instance,ifA receivessympathy from
B, A can dischargethe debt by showinggratitudeto B's spouse or by
givingsympathyto B's childrenshouldtheyexperienceproblems.But a
recipientwho nevermakesa good-faith effortto showappreciationto the
groupmay come to be ignored.
The minimaland mostimmediatetypeofreturnexpectedforsympathy
is gratitude.Payinggratitudeforsympathysignifiesthat one is in, and
acknowledgesbeing in, a positionof need. She or he is "one-down"or
"one-less-up."First,the recipientis in trouble,ailing,or otherwisenot
able to functionin usual social roles, or the sympathywould not be
needed. Second, he or she has "burdened"the sympathizerbecause of
Third, the recipientknows that the sympathizerwell
these difficulties.
could have "believed in a just world" and offeredblame ratherthan
sympathy.To refuseto pay gratitudecan imply,then,a refusalto recog-
nize thestateofneed,a refusalto acceptthesympathy and well-wishesof
othergroupmembers,or an expectationthatsympathy is a rightinvolv-
ing no obligations.Any of these signals can create a gap betweenthe
sympathizeeand the sympatheticother,who may feel(to use my inter-
viewees'words)"used," "takenforgranted,"or "unappreciated. " On the
otherhand, showinggratitude,even minimallywitha nod or a look, can
serveto cementties. In the Outer Hebridesof Scotlandand some rural
communities in theUnitedStates,a gratitudecolumnin whichrecipients
of sympathyvisits and flowerspublicly give acknowledgmentsand
thanksis a regularfeatureof weeklynewspapers.Some potentialsym-
pathizees-students, skid row residents,low-incomecrime victims-
may even be requiredto displaygratitudebeforetheyreceivesympathy
(see Wiseman 1979, p. 243).
The typeof gratitudeexpectedin returnforsympathy varies withthe
relativesocial standingsof donorand recipient.Those whomI observed
and interviewedrarelymentionedreceivingsympathy froma subordinate
but noted receivingit from"personages."They rememberedand re-
markedbasketsof fruitsentby companypresidentsat timesof bereave-
mentand cards sentto formerpet ownersby veterinarians (even though
such cards were routinelysigned and mailed by secretaries).Giftsof
sympathygivenby superiors(especiallywhenthesuperioris frugalwith

311
AmericanJournalof Sociology

such gifts)1"are imbued with greatervalue than the same giftfroman

equal or an inferior.For this reason, as Schwartz(1967) argues, the
returnsappropriatefor a giftfroma superiordifferfromthe returns
appropriateforpeers. What is owed a superioris gratitudecum defer-
ence. Deferenceis a weightierand dearer commoditythan gratitude.
Deferentialbehavior implies that one is inferiorto the recipientin a
fundamentaland perhapspermanentway, gratefulforthe valuable gift
fromthesuperior,and unable to repaythedebtwithan equallyvaluable
gift.A lack of deferenceand gratitudeis oftenseen as arrogance,and
arrogancecan diminishsympathymargin(see, e.g., Chambliss 1973;
Wiseman 1979, p. 72).
Sympathizeesmustnot onlyshow gratitudeand deference,theymust
show them even when the sympathydisplays theyhave receivedare
crude,inept,hurtful,or unwanted.Sudnow's researchon bereavement
suggeststhat "offersof sympathymustbe acceptedwithoutinvitation"
(1967, p. 156). In some of his cases, an open-doorpolicyexistedthat
allowed anyoneto enterthe house of the bereaved to offersympathy,
whetherit was timelyor not. Moreover,the awkwardnessoftenfeltby
sympathizers may resultin bungledcommunications, emptyphrases("I
just don't know what to say"), jocular attemptsto cheerup the victim
thatactuallyinducetearsor horror,and thelike. Anothercommonmode
of sympathizing is the recitationof the sympathizer's own problems("I
knowjust how you feel,because thesame thinghas happenedto me and
I . . ."). This sort of communicationis intended,one may assume, to
refocusthesympathizee's attentionand to indicatethatone is notalone in
misfortune. (A sympathy recipientmayfeelcompelledto listento or even
to elicitsuchremarks,therebyswitchingroleswiththesympathizer.) The
sympathizeemustput up withall oftheabove typesof communications,
because themerefactofexpressingsome sympathy is thoughtto indicate
thatthe sympathizer means well.
Beyondgratitude,anotherimportanttypeof returnis sympathyitself.
Payingback past awards replenishessympathycredits,a factthatI infer
fromcontraryevidence:

mydistance.... I gavehima lot

He's havinga hardtime,butI'mkeeping
of sympathy. . . but he didn'teven noticewhenI needed it. [25-year-old
man,teacher]

I wasbyhersideathermother's Wherewasshewhenmybrothers
funeral.
died?I don'tcountheras partofthefamily secretary,
anymore.[Retired
age 70]

l reviewerforthisinsight.
I am indebtedto an anonymous

312
 Sympathy

Althoughthese people feel that theirpast investmentsentitlethemto

sympathy, thereis no FDIC to guaranteeemotionalreturns.The people
who failedto repaydebtswhen an occasion arose riskedand got closed
accounts.
Rules for repayingsympathywith sympathy,like those for paying
gratitude,are contingenton power relations.For example, repayinga
superiorwith sympathy(an equal return)may be consideredan insult;
gratitudeis oftenpreferred.The peeror intimateis morelikelyto receive
sympathyforsympathy.
In general,then,sympathizers expectrecognitionoftheirgiftsof sym-
pathy,and sympathizees acknowledgethefactthattheyincurdebtswhen
theyaccept such gifts.The rulesdo notspecifycommensurate returnsin
everycase, because it is hard to measurehow much has been received
(and is therefore
owed) and because people maywant to maintainrather
thanerodepowerdifferences. On thewhole,though,mostpeopledo not
receivemuchmoresympathy thantheyrepaywiththeirgratitudeor their
own sympathy.Marginsnot replenishedsoon becomeoverdrawn.

UNDER- AND OVERINVESTORS: DEVIANT SYMPATHIZERS

As we want sympathizeesto live up to therulesdescribedabove, we also
want sympathizersto followtheirown norms.We expectall people to
judge othersand to mete out appropriaterewards,gifts,and punish-
ments.All of us are expectedto be sympathygatekeepersand agentsof
social control.People who depart fromrules forgatekeepingare often
labeled and sanctionedthemselves."Underinvestors" are thosewho do
not recognizeothers'rightsto sympathy,and "overinvestors" are those
who give sympathyto otherswho have deviantsympathybiographies.
Culturalfashionsof how muchsympathyto give in what circumstances
varyamonggroupsand withhistoricaland politicaltides.It is, therefore,
notalways easy to knowtheboundariesbetweenunderinvesting, overin-
vesting,and holdingpeople properlyaccountablefortheirown lives.
Underinvestors, in storiesand in real life, may findthemselvesos-
tracized,the buttsof gossip,and friendless.Several of myinterviewees
learnedthe hard way that theyhad violated rules requiringsympathy
giving,even when the object of thatsympathyhas expresslydeclinedit.
One woman, a 32-year-oldtelephoneoperator,explained:

I rememberwhat happenedto me once whenI didn'texpresssympathy.A

friendof mine'smotherdied threeyearsago . . . when[myfriend]toldme
notto send a card or flowers,I was relieved.In fact,she said forme notto
bringit up. Well! Did I ever get in trouble!I did what she said.... Two
yearslater,she toldme thatshe harboreda lingering resentment againstme

313
AmericanJournalof Sociology

died. .. I reallylearned
whenhermother
becauseI hadn'tdoneanything
mylesson!

Whatlessonwas that?
whensomeonedies.
To alwaysgivesympathy
The friend'srightto sympathy at thedeathofhermotherwas, in hereyes
at least, so greatas to outweighher own denials of need.
A 37-year-oldbusinesswomansummarizesa commonview ofunderin-
vestors:"[They]live a crummykindoflife.So uninvolved.So dispassion-
ate. But theyneverhave to do anythingforanybody.. . . It's selfish"
(Field notes,Aug. 1985). The underinvestor's sin, it seems,is to be aloof
and removedfromthe group.
At the other extremeare those who make significantoverinvest-
ments-both ofsympathy sentiment and display-ratherthanclosingthe
accountsofclaimantswho are notworthy,whoseplightsare notworthy,
and who do not adhere to the rules of sympathyetiquette.One of my
interviewees,forexample,told of her feelingsabout her husband,who
takes her sympathyforgrantedbut never asks about or listensto her
problems:"I shouldleave him.It's stupid,butI'd feelsorryforhimtrying
to managealone. He's used to havingsomeonearound"(housewifein her
5Os).
To explainwhatappearsto be overinvestment ofsympathy, we needto
consider:(1) othertypesof currencybeingexchangedin relationships, (2)
rules for establishingmoral worth,and (3) social rewardsotherthan
gratitudeor sympathy.
First, sympathyis not the only commoditypeople are exchanging.
Money,love, and supportforsocial identitiesare amongthemanyothers
(Lofland1982). A person'sfailureto followsympathyrulesmaylead to a
closed account unless othercommoditiesbeing exchangedcan compen-
sate. Further,a sympathy accountmaybe closed,butthatdoes notmean
thatall otherkindsof accounts-respect accountsor instrumental duty
accounts-are closed simultaneously.A relationshipmay be continued
because it affordsotherrewards,but it may become distantor hostile
thereafter ifthemotivationto empathizeand sympathizeis lackingin one
because of the other'sdeviant sympathybiography.Empty sympathy
displays,dutifully performed, maybe one result.Or a spiralmaybeginin
whichA's perceptionof B's failingsleads A to refuseto sympathizewith
B, whichleads B to refuseto sympathizewithA, and so on.
A secondreasonforapparentoverinvestment is thatculturalruleslink
the act of givingto moralworthin general(Mauss 1954; Mitchell1978)
and to the requirementsof certainsocial roles. The "nice" person,the
morallyworthyperson,shouldfeelthatit is betterto givethanto receive,

314
 Sympathy

even when othershave not proved themselvesworthyof the gift.The

good persongives and gives freely,withoutkeepingtrackor attaching
strings.
Furthermore,it is not "nice" to calculate costs and benefitsbefore
feelingor displayinga positive,other-orientedemotionsuchas sympathy.
For one thing, we value authenticityof feeling(Hochschild 1983,
pp. 190-94), and calculatingpossiblereturnsbeforefeelingor expressing
an emotiondestroysit. And calculatingcostsand benefits impliesthatone
questionsothers'intentionsto repay-which is tantamountto question-
ingtheiridentityclaimsas nicepeople. Seemingto questionothers'inten-
tionscan impede the smoothflowof interactionand alterrelationships
(Goffman1959, pp. 13-14).
A good person makes allowances forothers'flawedsympathybiog-
raphies. Making allowances means constructing "excuses and justifica-
tions" (Scott and Lyman 1968) of others'actionsforthem. It involves
searchingforevidencethat theyare legitimately exemptfromfulfilling
theirobligations.In the case of a sympathizer, thiscourseis ofteneasy,
because the sympathizeeis accordedthisstatuspreciselybecause she or
he has problems.And the nice or good personmay exemptthe one with
problemsfromfulfilling roleobligationsuntiltheproblemsare resolved.
Of course,all of the above statements hold even morestrongly forthe
"good son," "good friend,""good mother,""good wife,"and so forth,
thanforthe general"good person."
Finally,rewardsdo not have to come directlyand immediatelyfrom
the sympathyrecipientto stimulateinvestment.Rewards can come in-
stead fromanticipationof futuregesturesby the recipient,fromothers'
elevated opinions, fromperceptionsof rewards fromthe generalized
other,fromoneselfin the formof self-congratulation or
(or self-pity),
fromGod (Titmuss1971).Most ofthesetypesofreturnsserveto enhance
self-esteem and moralworth(Shott1979).In fact,one who experiencesor
displayssympathyfora "difficult case" mayfeeleven worthierand more
selflessand saintlythanifthesympathizee had had a faultlessbiography.
Whetherthesekindsofrewardsare sufficient untothemselvesdepends
on boththe individualdonor'sassessmentand theculturalrulesforhow
nice, how selfless,one can be beforeothersview one as a "chump,"
"doormat,"or "martyr."(See Ferraro and Johnson1983, on battered
wives, and Lerner 1980, on "martyrs"in experiments.)Most of us are
nice-up to a point; we give freelyand forgiveour debtorsuntilthey
overstepthe boundaries we have learned to set for them. Rules for
goodnessand nicenessexistside bysidewithrulesforsympathy etiquette,
creatinga classic double bind.
Even the selfless,non-cost-accounting donor is rarelyable to deny
completelythathe or she holdsexpectationsofreturn.She or he mayfeel

315
AmericanJournalof Sociology

betrayed,let down, or angrywhen,as timegoes by, no good reasoncan

be foundforanother'sfailureto displaygratitudeor returnsympathy.
These feelings,howeverstrong,stillmaynotbe sufficient to overriderole
requirements callingforsympathizing.Dutifulfamilymembersnursing
sickor elderlyrelativesmaycometo resentcalls foremotionalinvestment
thatare notreturned.They maynot,however,be physically, financially,
or emotionallyable to withdraw.People locked by tradition,commit-
ment,or lack of alternativesinto role relationships
withotherswho de-
mand sympathy withoutreciprocating oftenfindthemselvesin an almost
constantstateof depressionor anger,whichtheybelievetheyhave little
rightto feelor express.Some, in fact,becomealmostparalyzedby their
unreciprocated sympathy,as cases frommyfieldnotesshow.

Mr. Palmer'swifehad contractedLou Gehrig'sdiseasethreeyearsprevi-

ously,whichleftherall butparalyzed.The care ofhis wifeand theirthree-
year-olddaughterhas fallento him almostentirely,as otherrelativesand
friendshave abandoned the family.His own healthand workhave been
adverselyaffected.He has lostseveraljobs and findsitalmostimpossibleto
keep financiallyafloat.He reportedthat:
"Sometimesshe tries to get back at me if she thinksI haven't done
somethingfastenough. But I can't leave her, I'm her husband. I feelso
sorryforher. She wantsto hangon to see [thedaughter]growup. How can
you argue withthat?But it's a lonely,hard life."[Field notes,Aug. 1985]

StephanieWoods is the23-year-old daughterofSouthernBaptistparents

withproblems.Mr. Woods drinksdaily and abuses his wifeverballyand
physically.The situationhas gone on forseveralyears. Yet Mrs. Woods,
forreligiousreasons,refusesto divorceher husband. She telephonesher
daughterat workto ask forsympathy.Stephaniereported,
"If I don'tlistenshe calls me a rottendaughter.She saysshe'dkillherself
withoutme to talk to . . . I just couldn'thave thaton my conscience."
Near the breakingpointherself,Stephanieclaimsshe cannotseverher
tieswithherparents,despitethefactsthatshe maylose herjob and she has
becomeincreasingly irrationaland withdrawn.
"I can't leave mymotherlike that. . . I feelso sorryforherlivingwith
him. But I feelsorryforhimtoo. I reallygetangry,though,whenshe calls
and won'tlet me tellher about myproblems.I blew up at mybestfriend
today.... What's wrongwithme thatI feelso sorryand so angryat the
same time?I'm losingit. I'm a wreck."[Field notes,May 1984]

For bothMr. Palmerand Ms. Woods, sympathizing is a duty,a partof

the rolerequirementsof the good husbandand good daughter.Expecta-
tionsof returndo existbut are not as importantto themas othercon-
siderations.
Overinvestorsand underinvestors are deviantsympathizers.Theirac-
tionsmay be justifiableand understandable,but theyhave stillviolated
rulesthatprescribehow and whento setup sympathy marginsforothers.

316
 Sympathy

CONCLUSIONS
In sum, I have argued that sympathysentimentand displayflowun-
evenlyamonggroupmembers,usuallyin patternedand institutionalized
ways. People who have acceptable sympathybiographiesare ascribed
marginby others-theyhave a rightto sympathy in appropriatecircum-
stances. Having an acceptable sympathybiographymeans following
rulesof etiquette:not makingfraudulentclaims,not claimingtoo much
too readily,claimingsome sympathy,and reciprocating for sympathy
gifts.A flawed sympathybiographyleads to closed accounts, except
when rulesof nicenessor goodness,perhapscombinedwithduty,moti-
vate people to keep marginsopen.
The implicationsof thesesympathyrulesand processesare numerous.
For one thing,sympathyis relatedto themicropolitics ofrelationships.
12
Because of an awareness of sympathyrules, some people may, con-
sciouslyor unconsciously,give sympathyto manipulateothersintoposi-
tionsof closenessor positionsof owing. Indebtednessaffectspowerand
status relationships.The debt may not be one that the debtorfreely
contracts;it can be imposed by the sympathizer.Furthermore, giving
sympathymay belittlethe recipientbecause it pointsup problemsand
insufficiencies.
The followingcase explicitlyillustratestheconsciousma-
nipulationof sympathyby a workerto belittlea boss:
I remember
thatI onceusedsympathyonpurposetotrytoknocksomeone
downa peg.I hada bosswhowasalwaysdoingandsaying toputme
things
downin a semi-niceway . . . I gottiredofit,so I turneditaroundon him.I
was in hisoffice,
and I said,"Oh,Mr. Wall,lookat all thosereports
you
haveto getdone.I feelso sorryforyou.I wouldn't wantyourjob forthe
world." He changedcolors,andI couldseehewasmad.He justsaid,"Oh,
I can getthisdonein a snap.Nothing to it!"and edgedme outthedoor.
Normally he wouldhavechatteda while.So I reallygotina goodzinger.
[Middle-aged professional
woman]
Micropoliticsare also affectedwhen, through"deep acting,"one ma-
nipulatesone's own sympathysentimentto counteractfear,hatred,or
angerand maintaina senseofefficacy. Fearingor hatinga personmaybe
more unpleasantthan feelingsorryfor him or her. Flight attendants
interviewedby Hochschild admittedworkingup sympathywhen con-
frontedwith an unrulyor obnoxiouspassengertheyinitiallydetested
(Hochschild 1983, p. 55; see also Thoits 1985, p. 234). Several of my

12 Manymodesofinteracting-touching (Henley1977),waiting(Schwartz1973),ad-
dressing (Derber1979;Zimmerman
(Brown1965),and interrupting andWest1975)-
meaningsin interaction.
can have political(power-related) High-prestige and high-
powerpeoplemayfeelrelatively morefreedom to initiatetouching,to causeothersto
wait,to addressothersbytheirfirstnames,and to interrupt thelesspowerful.In all
thesecases,rulesforactingare keyedto relativesocialstanding.

317
AmericanJournalof Sociology

intervieweesreportedthattheyhad eliminatedfeelingsof dread, annoy-

ance, or "highblood pressure"by "talkingthemselvesinto"or "making
themselves"feelsorryforchildren,bosses,co-workers,or spousestoward
whom theywere inclinedto hold more negativeemotions.The pitied
otherseemsto threatenor to intrudeintoone's consciousnessless; his or
her powerto disruptone's equilibriumis diminished.
Not claimingor acceptingsympathy maysimilarlyplaya partin power
relationships.Refusingto accept sympathythoughengagingin one-way
sympathydisplayscan reducethe others'social powerand raise or rein-
forceone's own. In some cases, givingsympathywithoutreceivingit in
returnbecomes "a part of the job" if one is a supervisor,parent,or
teacher. A young college professor,normallysympathetictoward stu-
dents in her course on death and dying,illustratedthis link between
powerand sympathywhen a studentofferedto give her sympathy.

He wantedmetostarttellinghimall myproblems.I thoughttomyself,

"I
don'twanttogetanyclosertoyou.I don'twanttotellyouanymoreabout
Andwhatmakesyouthinkyoucan helpme?". . . I knewwhatI
myself.
to preserve
was doing:trying myposition as professor.
[Fieldnotes,Oct.
1985]

Acceptingthe student'ssympathywould have alteredthe relationship

irrevocably,making it closer and jeopardizingher superiorstanding.
Thus, she refusedtheofferedsympathy.The studentquicklyleft,appar-
entlyembarrassedby his misstep.The sympathy marginhe triedto open
forthe professorhad been purposelyrejected.
Finally,people can even pay gratitudein returnforsympathyto en-
hance theirprestigein cases where public displaysof thankslink the
sympathizeewithpowerfulor prestigiousothers.Gratitudecolumncon-
tributors,for example, show the communitythat theyare worthyof
worthypeople's sympathy.The ads oftenthank"friends"anonymously
but name superordinatesympathizers.
Beyondissues of power,thereremain,of course,manymoreimplica-
tionsof sympathyrulesand behavior.For example,followingsympathy
etiquettecan help to counteract,in everydaylifeand in courtsof law,
being blamed for one's life situations.Also, social controlis, in part,
effected(and conformity and respectabilityare promoted)by theneed to
maintainsympathymargins.And mydata suggestthatsympathy norms
are partofa largeremotionaleconomy;theyare entwinedwithnormsfor
givingand gettinggratitude,love, guilt,respect,and thelike.The flowof
theseemotionsmaybe crucialforsurvivalofthegroupand forindividual
survivalin the group,forging,as theydo, self-concept, a sense of moral
worth,and role identities.
In this paper, I begin to outlinesympathyprocessesin everydayin-

318
 Sympathy

teraction,but I also raise questionsscarcelytouchedon here. I have

essentiallylimitedmy commentsto dyadic encounters,but people are
oftencalled on to divide sympathiesbetweentwo partiesin a divorce,
between victim and alleged criminalin a trial, between membersof
familieswho are in conflict,and betweencharactersin a novel. Littleis
understoodabout how sympathiesget divided. Further,how do sym-
pathyrulesvaryacrosseras, cultures,and subcultures?What groupsset
up wide margins,what groupsset up narrowones? Are rules of moral
worthmore salientthan rules of reciprocity forsome groups?Another
lacuna is in knowledgeof how sympathyprotocolsare learned. What
socializationprocessesexistto trainthosein variousstatusesto deal with
others'problems-and withtheirsympathy?
Last, what are theeffectson sympathy-exchange processesofmodern-
izationand specialization?I suspecta paradoxicalanswer.On one hand,
societiesthat are movingaway fromtraditionalism and culturallypre-
scribed beliefin fate have more room for interpersonalintimacyand
sympathysentiment.We might,therefore, predicta risein sympathyin
everydayencounters.On the otherhand, postindustrial societieshave
also developed emotionalspecialists(counselors)and emotionalagents
and brokers(lawyers,charityorganizers,and insuranceagents), who
have taken over sympatheticfunctionsfromintimates,leading to an
overalldeclinein public sympathy.(Nonemotionalspecialistswhose oc-
cupationalroles call specificallyfor unsympathetic behavior[e.g., bill
collectors,disciplinarians,and governmentalbudgetcutters]have also
beencreated.)These countervailing trendslinkmacrolevelprocesseswith
microsocialconcernsand suggestissues forfutureresearch.

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