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Frank Jackson, Michael Smith (eds.

), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy,


Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

We wanted a volume that would give readers a sense of the range and excitement of
contemporary analytic philosophy p. v

p. 25 meta-etic (cognitivism i non-congnitivism, realism i non-realism, internaliti i


externaliti, naturaliti i realiti, descriptivi i evaluativi)
Etic normativ sau deontologic (p. 58) Julia Driver
Epistemologie moral p. 63 - Karen Jones
Psihologie moral p. 86 - R. Jay Wallace
Perspectiva empiric asupra eticii (p. 114) - John M. Doris i Stephen P. Stich

Chapter 11: Intentionality. Gabriel Segal (p. 283)

Intentionality derives from the work of Franz Brentano, in the analytic philosophy tradition.
intentional objects - mental objects
Brentano held that the objects of thought and exeperience were always such intentional
entities p. 284
Gndurile sunt adevrate dac proprietile obiectului intenional corespund cu cele ale
obiectului real (p. 284)

intentionality must involve a real relation among real-world objects p. 284 dar i inversul e
valabil
Frege a propus o teorie a reprezentrii bazat pe conceptul de referent. Referentul unei
expresii contribuie la valoarea de adevr a unei propoziiii. Referina este relaia real dintre o
expresie i un obiect.

The sense of an expression is supposed to be a mode of presentation of its referent, a way


the referent is presented in thought p/ 285

Russell's Descriptive Solution (p. 287)


Kripke's Objection (p. 288)
Hilary Putnam
Chapter 12. Consciousness. Frank Jackson (p. 310)

n ultimul timp, teoriile materialiste ale minii au reflectat pe marginea posibilitii de a


include contiina sau subiectul n cadrelor explicative de natur fiziologice (p. 210)

Filosofia minii definete contiina, din perspectiv materialist, ca ceva ce nu trebuie


adugat descrierii fizice a unei persoane (p. 311)

Perspectiva realist asupra contiinei (p. 312)

We can distinguish the phenomenola mental states from the non-phenomenal ones (p. 312)
the conscious mental states are those with a phenomenology

phenomenal mental states aare such a challenge to materialism (p. 313)

The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism


Diaphanousness is the thesis that teh qualities of experience are qualities of the object of
experience p. 322
Intentionalism is the thesis that the qualities of experience are properties of an intentional
object in the sense tha they are properties of the way things are being represented to be p.
322
p. 323

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