DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No.

164948 Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and

- versus -
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
petition[3] for the adoption of minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos,[4] Elma Dizon Ramos,[5] and
Eugene Dizon Ramos.[6] The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990,[7] the children
were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria
Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia,
went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel
Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption.
That the minors are being financially supported
by the petitioner and her children, and relatives
abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23,
2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children;
the minors have given their written consent[8] to
the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown
by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married,
gainfully employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to
the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent[9] to the
adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income,
signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to
this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the
adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the
minor childrens name follow the family name of
petitioner.
equitable under the premises.[10]
The lower granted such petition for adoption.
The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court
of Appeal.
The CA rendered a decision[22] reversing the
ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to
adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural
mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of
the petitioners children could not also be
admitted in evidence as the same was executed
in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular
office, and although petitioner has a job, she
was not stable enough to support the children.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the CA denied.
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
(a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt
the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos;
(b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopters children sufficiently complies with the
law; and
(c) whether or not petitioner is financially
capable of supporting the adoptees.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is
hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or
over;
 (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter, if living
with said adopter and the latters spouse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting
or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice
to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of
the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.[32]
Clearly, the written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of
a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed
to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption.
is no longer supporting her legitimate children,
as the latter are already adults, have individual
lives and families. At the time of the filing of the
petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed
on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15
an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Petitioners main intention in adopting
the children is to bring the latter
to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua
Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still
being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that
the limited income might be a hindrance to the
adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
children in the US. She only has a part-time job,
and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims
that she has the financial support and backing
of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct
in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between
the former and the latter. Moreover, the
records do not prove nor support petitioners
allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to
support the minors herein. The Court,
therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on
this issue.

As the alleged written consent of petitioners

legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated
by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the makers.[47]

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was

introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled

that petitioner was not stable enough to
support the children and is only relying on the
financial backing, support and commitment of
her children and her siblings.

According to the Adoption Home Study

Report[49] forwarded by the Department of
Public Health & Social Services of the
Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
The facts:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie
was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed
that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and
that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption.
After a careful consideration of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, and in the absence
of any opposition to the petition, this Court
finds that the petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and
that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for
and educate the child to be adopted; that the
grant of this petition would redound to the best
interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds
that the petitioners care and custody of the
child since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance with
the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be
meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural
mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth
be the petitioners legitimate child and legal
heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be
entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the
National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration[5] praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of
whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in
depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is
no law prohibiting an adopted child from having
a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every
Filipino to have as middle name the surname of
the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a
part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for
the benefit and best interest of the adopted
child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie
to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy;
and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her
middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her
middle name, the surname of her natural
mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain
Stephanies filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code,
she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof
of that relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting
Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does
not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a
middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized
by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's
name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives
and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also,
as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing
with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a
name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1)
the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is
that which is given to the individual at birth or
at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs
and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for
the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code
provides the substantive rules which regulate
the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever
may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
married woman or a previously married
woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree
annulling a voidable marriage shall principally
use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add
her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's
surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a
word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and
the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
name and surname. However, she may choose
to continue employing her former husband's
surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again
to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been
granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names
and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname
as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and
surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word Junior can be used only
by a son. Grandsons and other direct male
descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's
surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is
no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as
to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is
only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above,
in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mothers surname
shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what
middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG,
the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding
the surname of the childs mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the
father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a
difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the
fathers surname indicates the family to which
he belongs, for which reason he would insist
on the use of the fathers surname by the child
but that, if he wants to, the child may also use
the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child
chooses to use the surname of the mother, how
will his name be written? Justice Caguioa
replied that it is up to him but that his point is
that it should be mandatory that the child uses
the surname of the father and permissive in
the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas
point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names
change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He
then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since
the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody
calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez
Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers
surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed
Article (12) be modified to the effect that it
shall be mandatory on the child to use the
surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take
note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use
of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10)
they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the
simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that
the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their
second given name and the Latin tradition,
which is also followed by the Chinese wherein
they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in
principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added
that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the
suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law
provides that the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent
whether he can use a middle name. What it
only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a
child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also
as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of
the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges
for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes
pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code
and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanies continued use of her mothers
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them Mama and
Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mothers surname as her middle name will not
only sustain her continued loving relationship
with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides
that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
This provision, according to the Code
Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law
is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized
by some way of interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mothers surname, we find no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use
her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle
name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and
complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE
MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR.
MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to
most less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the
spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew
Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their
own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin
enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the
couple who treated the child like their
own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom
fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally,
in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting
the petition was issued that made all the more
intense than before the feeling of affection of
the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the
court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose
Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years
later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her
petition, she averred -
7. That x x x despite the proddings and
pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused
to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her
husband until the latter died, and even before
his death he had made known his desire to
revoke respondents adoption, but was
prevented by petitioners supplication, however
with his further request upon petitioner to give
to charity whatever properties or interest may
pertain to respondent in the future.
xxxxxxxxx
10. That respondent continued using his
surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the
feelings of herein petitioner, and his records
with the Professional Regulation Commission
showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo
originally issued in 1978 until the present, and
in all his dealings and activities in connection
with his practice of his profession, he is Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxxxxxxxx
13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and
living alone in this city with only her household
helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care
and show of concern from a son, but
respondent remained indifferent and would
only come to Naga to see her once a year.
14. That for the last three or four years, the
medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner
would need most the care and support from a
love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards
petitioner which is not expected of a son.
15. That herein respondent has recently been
jealous of petitioners nephews and nieces
whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material
benefits from petitioner.
16. That in view of respondents insensible
attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded
feelings, knowing that after all respondents only
motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his
alleged rights over the properties of herein
petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown
by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally
eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been
negated for which reason there is no more basis
for its existence, hence this petition for
revocation.[1]
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically
on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552,
also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went
into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now
reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of
Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with
the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s):
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment
by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the
adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis
supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the
petition, contending principally (a) that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b)
that the petitioner had no cause of action in
view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No.
8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to
cases where the ground for rescission of the
adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 348[2] of the Civil Code and Article
192[3] of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court
held thusly:
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369
confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been
designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07
SC.
On the matter of no cause of action, the test on
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the Court could render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al.,
95 Phil. 365).
Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No.
8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind
an adoption earlier granted under the Family
Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition,
indeed there is lack of cause of action.
Petitioner however, insists that her right to
rescind long acquired under the provisions of
the Family Code should be respected. Assuming
for the sake of argument, that petitioner is
entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent
granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have
been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it
appears clear that the legal grounds for the
petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to
the filing of the instant petition on December 1,
1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of
Court)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
consideration, the petition is ordered
dismissed.[4]
Via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner
raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05
May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action
prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins
could provide some insights on the subject. In
ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption
to assure male heirs in the family.[5] The
continuity of the adopters family was the
primary purpose of adoption and all matters
relating to it basically focused on the rights of
the adopter. There was hardly any mention
about the rights of the adopted.[6] Countries,
like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an
effort to preserve inheritance within the family,
neither allowed nor recognized adoption.[7] It
was only much later when adoption was given
an impetus in law and still later when the
welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.[8] Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented and
accepted the Roman law concept of adoption
which, subsequently, was to find its way to the
archipelago. The Americans came and
introduced their own ideas on adoption which,
unlike most countries in Europe, made the
interests of the child an overriding
consideration.[9] In the early part of the century
just passed, the rights of children invited
universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of
Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of
[10]
1948, followed by the United Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child,[11]were
written instruments that would also protect and
safeguard the rights of adopted children. The
Civil Code of the Philippines[12] of 1950 on
adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code[13] and then by the Family Code of
the Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated
the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention,
accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent was geared to
favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured
these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only
in his new family but also in the society as
well. The new law withdrew the right of an
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and
gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No.
8552 should not adversely affect her right to
annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due
[15]
process that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state
action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after
the right has become vested.[17] Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment
is a present interest,[18] absolute, unconditional,
and perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to
adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C.
Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child
and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree
No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial
court had rendered its decision and while the
case was still pending on appeal, the Family
Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband
and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic
argued that the case should be dismissed for
having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and
without being joined by the husband. The Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the
action. The petition to adopt Jason, having
been filed with the court at the time when P.D.
No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs.
Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined
by her husband, according to the Court had
become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller,
both aliens, sought to adopt Michael
Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a
petition to formalize Michaels adoption having
theretofore been taken into their care. At the
time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603
allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of
adoption and while on appeal before the Court
of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into
law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from
adopting Filipino children. The Republic then
prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption
decree. In discarding the argument posed by
the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was
filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in
1975. By then, the new law,[22] had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with
its earlier pronouncements, the Court should
now hold that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into
force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the
statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule
100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges.[24] While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a right, the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is governed by
the states determination on what it may deem
to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child.[26] Matters relating to adoption, including
the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to
nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State.[27] Concomitantly,
a right of action given by statute may be taken
away at anytime before it has been
exercised.[28]
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly
withdrawn from an adopter a consequential
right to rescind the adoption decree even in
cases where the adoption might clearly turn out
to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live
with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an
adopter, while barred from severing the legal
ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons
cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For
instance, upon the grounds recognized by law,
an adopter may deny to an adopted child his
legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the
court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE
P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL
JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside
the Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City,
Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, which dismissed without
prejudice the consolidated petitions for
adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is
an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974,
she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have
a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that
they were the childrens parents. The
children2 were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
Michelle was barely eleven days old when
brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born
on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old
when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic.
His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children
as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the
surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively.
At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven
months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to
the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent.8 Petitioners husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial
court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly
with her new husband. The trial court ruled that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA
8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision but the motion was denied in the
Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the
motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did
not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners
argument that mere consent of her husband
would suffice was untenable because, under
the law, there are additional requirements, such
as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not
even made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are
already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental
authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of
exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from
his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising
the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who
has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint
adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the
paramount interest and welfare of the child to
be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal
maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at
the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was
25 years old and already married, while Michael
was already 18 years of age. Parental authority
is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
courts decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may
adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession
of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good
moral character, has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally
and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his/her children in keeping with the
means of the family. The requirement of sixteen
(16) year difference between the age of the
adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee,
or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications
as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she
has been living in the Philippines for at least
three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of
the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her
country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses;
or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after
the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the
three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not
the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated
from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency
until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has
legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopters country as the latters adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section
7. The children or adoptees are not relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are
the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority
is not anymore necessary since the children
have been emancipated having reached the age
of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children.14 Even the remarriage
of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the
court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the
children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age16
emancipation terminates parental authority
over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of
adoption, thus:
ARTICLE
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases
where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and
the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as
such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any
kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to
love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological
parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1)
sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of
the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to
choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be
legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
still considered a legitimate child of the adopter
with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime
and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to
V
provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family,
as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the
law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v.
Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of
adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that
will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The
law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the
fact that it is intended to provide homes, love,
care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to
affirm the trial courts decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating
the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the
law on the matter is amended, we cannot
sustain the respondent-spouses petition for
adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We
cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that
subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because
Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles
Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution
of the marriage between petitioner and Olario
is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree
of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless
there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that
since, at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, petitioner was married to Olario,
joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the
SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and
LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Westremundo y. De Guzman for private
respondents.
VITUG, J.:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of
the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself
was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia,
Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been
living with the couple even prior to the filing of
the petition. The minors, as well as their
parents, gave consent to the adoption.
On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision granting the petition. a
petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with
this Court, assailing the trial court's decision.
This Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the
trial court's decision.
Hence, the present petition. The petitioner
assigned a lone error on the part of the
respondent court, thus
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES JAMES
ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY
HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO
ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not
qualified to adopt. Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines," is explicit.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior
to the approval of the final accounts rendered
upon the termination of their guardianship
relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt
a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his or her Filipino
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules in inter-country adoption as may be
provided by law.
While James Anthony unquestionably is not
permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3)
of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can
qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). The
problem in her case lies, instead, with Article
185 of Executive Order No. 209, expressing as
follows:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband
and the wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184.
The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree
No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code),
exactly adopted that found in then Article 336
of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter
I, Title II, of the said decree provided :
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In
such case, parental authority shall be exercised
as if the child were their own by nature.
Observe that the law then in force used the
word "may" under which regime, a joint
adoption by the spouses was apparently not
made obligatory. The provision was later
amended, however by Executive Order No. 91,
dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon
C. Aquino. The new Article 29 expressed, thus
to the physical, moral, social and intellectual
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In
such case, parental authority shall be exercised
as if the child were their own by nature.
If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband
and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the
adoption shall not be allowed.
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential
Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory
for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one
of them was an alien. The law was silent when
both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible
uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses
the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses
except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of
the Code, on the subject of parental authority,
can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly
adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child
of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with
this Code.
The respondent court, in affirming the grant of
adoption by the lower court, has theorized that
James Anthony should merely be considered a
"nominal or formal party" in the proceedings.
This view of the appellate court cannot be
sustained. Adoption creates a status that is
closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and
filiation with corresponding rights and duties
that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of
parental authority, use of surname of the
adopter by the adopted, as well as support and
successional rights. These are matters that
obviously cannot be considered inconsequential
to the parties.
We are not unmindful of the possible benefits,
particularly in this instance, that an adoption
can bring not so much for the prospective
adopting parents as for the adopted children
themselves. We also realize that in proceedings
of this nature, paramount consideration is given
welfare of the adopted for whom the law on
adoption has in the first place been designed.
When, however, the law is clear and no other
choice is given, 1 we must obey its full mandate.
Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this
opinion without having to call the attention of
the appropriate agencies concerned to the
urgency of addressing the issue on inter-
country adoption, a matter that evidently is
likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article
184, last paragraph, Family Code).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG,
assisted by their father, ROMEO
DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS
NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA
RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the
respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and
Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive
part of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring
that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and
purposes, the children by adoption of the joint
petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R.
Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal
obedience and maintenance by their respective
parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy
for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and
Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and
their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be
changed with "Agonoy", which is the family
name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of
their adopting parents shall be governed by the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and
entered into the records of the Local Civil
Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal
effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses
Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case,
entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was
docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April
1971 and notices thereof were caused to be
served upon the office of the Solicitor General
and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a
weekly newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in
Laoag City. 3
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed
an opposition to the aforementioned petition
for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero
and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter
named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother,
who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said
spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art.
335 of the Civil Code. 4
After the required publication of notice had
been accomplished, evidence was presented.
Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the
petition for adoption. 5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners
(oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law
and it is whether or not the respondent spouses
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art.
335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
In overruling the opposition of the herein
petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to
add grandchildren in this article where no
grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the
legal maxim that what is expressly included
would naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the
case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the
adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos
would not only introduce a foreign element into
the family unit, but would result in the
reduction of their legititimes. It would also
produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable
disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of
the law that a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and
renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may
have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in
paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt,
are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined
meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include
grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction
to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction. 7
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in
enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines,
obviously intended that only those persons who
have certain classes of children, are disqualified
to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was
once in force in the Philippines, and which
served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the
Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified
persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under
this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt
as they have legitimate grandchildren, the
petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of
the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in
paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the
adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the consolation
of having one, by creating through legal fiction,
the relation of paternity and filiation where
none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present
tendency, however, is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful
and happy life, and every intendment is
sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under
the law now in force, having legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground
for disqualification to adopt. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED.
Without pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.
SO ORDERED.
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing
for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre
died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a
will written in Spanish which she executed at
her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,
Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom
of the will and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof in the presence of Pilar
Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza,
who in turn affixed their signatures below the
attestation clause and on the left margin of
each and every page of the will in the presence
of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S.
Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following
preliminary statement: that she was possessed
of the full use of her mental faculties; that she
was free from illegal pressure or influence of
any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and
from any influence of fear or threat; that she
freely and spontaneously executed said will and
that she had neither ascendants nor
descendants of any kind such that she could
freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in
the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A.
Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix
left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo
building, while the naked ownership thereof
she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who
are the legitimate children of said spouses. The
testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her
sole and universal heir to all the remainder of
her properties not otherwise disposed of in the
will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a
petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set
for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the
requisite publication and service to all parties former from that portion which nullifies the
concerned. legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares
the vacated portion as subject of succession in
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted
favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that
child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
portion which admits the will to probate. And in
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged
this instance both petitioner and oppositor
natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased
assign several errors which, stripped of non-
brother of the same testatrix, filed on
essentials, may be boiled down to the following:
September 2, 1955 an opposition to the
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to
probate of the will alleging the following
intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as
question been duly admitted to probate?; (3)
required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically
Did the probate court commit an error in
and mentally incapable to execute the will at
passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions
the time of its execution; and (3) the will was
of the will and in determining who should
executed under duress, threat or influence of
inherit the portion to be vacated by the
fear.
nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the Rene Teotico?
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
These issues will be discussed separately.
legal personality to intervene. The probate
court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor 1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a
to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca person may be allowed to intervene in a
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor probate proceeding he must have an interest in
amended her opposition by alleging, the the estate, or in the will, or in the property to
additional ground that the will is inoperative as be affected by it either as executor or as a
to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung
latter was the physician who took care of the Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963);
testatrix during her last illness. and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as
After the parties had presented their evidence,
an heir or one who has a claim against the
the probate court rendered its decision on
estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand,
November 10, 1960, admitting the will to
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750,
probate but declaring the disposition made in
December 17, 1962, this Court said:
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs Court, a petition for letters of administration
by way of intestate succession. must be filed by an "interested person." An
interested party has been defined in this
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal
connection as one who would be benefited by
heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
reconsideration of that part of the decision
claim against the estate, such as a creditor
which declares the portion of the estate to be
(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G.
vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction
Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while
that in civil actions as well as special
the oppositor filed also a motion for
proceedings, the interest required in order that
reconsideration of the portion of the judgment
a person may be a party thereto must be
which decrees the probate of the will. On his
material and direct, and not merely indirect or
part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-
intervene and to file a motion for
3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70
reconsideration with regard to that portion of
Phil. 311).
the decision which nullified the legacy made in
his favor. The question now may be asked: Has oppositor
any interest in any of the provisions of the will,
The motions for reconsideration above
and, in the negative, would she acquire any
adverted to having been denied, both petitioner
right to the estate in the event that the will is
and oppositor appealed from the decision, the
denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no
right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to
any property affected by the will, because it
nowhere appears therein any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or
executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-
owner thereof, and while she previously had an
interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta,
she had already disposed of it long before the
execution of the will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied
probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the
testatrix? She would acquire such right only if
she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is
not under our Civil Code. It is true that
oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural
child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
deceased, and also an adopted daughter of
Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any
comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not
give her any right to succeed to the estate of
the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and
Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being
an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law
from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of
her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil
Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; ...
." And the philosophy behind this provision is
well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as
follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate
relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of
succession. They cannot be called relatives and
they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is
a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it.
On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of
the facts and upon the presumption will of the
interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in
turn, hated by the natural child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former
and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
natural child nothing but the product of sin, a
palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family.
Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7
Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from
the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend
to the relatives of the adopting parents or of
the adopted child except only as expressly
provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a
consequence, the adopted is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption,
however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which
they may have after the adoption, except that
the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and
the adopted, and does not extend to the
relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter
and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the
adopted is prohibited to marry the children of
the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes
and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also
Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law
1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right
to intervene either as testamentary or as legal
heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is
whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to
probate. Oppositor claims that the same should
not have been admitted not only because it was
not properly attested to but also because it was
procured thru pressure and influence and the
testatrix affixed her signature by mistake
believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly
attested to is contradicted by the evidence of
record. In this respect it is fit that we state
briefly the declarations of the instrumental
witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in
perfect state of health at the time she executed
the will for she carried her conversation with
her intelligently; that the testatrix signed
immediately above the attestation clause and
on each and every page thereof at the left-hand
margin in the presence of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public;
that it was the testatrix herself who asked her
and the other witnesses to act as such; and that
the testatrix was the first one to sign and later
she gave the will to the witnesses who read and
signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the
testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix
herself who asked her to be a witness to the
will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign
and she gave the will later to the witnesses to
sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary
public; that on the day of the execution of the
will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was
asked by the testatrix to be one of the
witnesses to the will; that he read and
understood the attestation clause before he
signed the document, and all the witnesses
spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally
said that the instrumental witnesses and the
testatrix signed the will at the same time and
place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully
refuted proves conclusively that the will was
duly executed because it was signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and
the notary public in the manner provided for by
law.
The claim that the will was procured by
improper pressure and influence is also belied
by the evidence. On this point the court a
quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then
living under the same roof with Dr. Rene
Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain
the conclusion that there was improper
pressure and undue influence. Nor is the
alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the
oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed
failure to see personally the testatrix,
attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene
Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years
after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951.
Although those fact may have some weight to
support the theory of the oppositor, yet they
must perforce yield to the weightier fact that
nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had
she really wanted to from subsequently
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect
and express her own testamentary dispositions.
For, as testified to by the oppositor and her
witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the
Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila,
walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on
different occasions, each of them was able to
talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter
and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that
Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico
had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
testatrix simply because she lived in their house
several years prior to the execution of the will
and that she was old and suffering from
hypertension in that she was virtually isolated
from her friends for several years prior to her
death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the
testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion
executed the will under consideration. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make
her express the will of another rather than her
own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is
on the person challenging the will that such
influence was exerted at the time of its
execution, a matter which here was not done,
for the evidence presented not only is
insufficient but was disproved by the testimony
of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court
could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this
Court in a long line of decisions among which
the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained
in Probate proceeding because its only purpose
is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements
of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other
questions than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the
validity or efficiency of the provisions, these
may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The
questions relating to these points remain
entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does
not validate the provisions therein contained, it
does not follow that such provision lack the
efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which
the law recognizes when they are not impugned
by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a
fundamental doctrine that the will of the
testator is the law governing the interested
parties, and must be punctually complied with
in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to
public morals. (Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil.
676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator was in a condition to make
a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings
under the new code for the probate of a will.
(Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In
them the court has no power to pass upon the
validity of any provisions made in the will. It can
not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is
void and another one is valid. (Castaeda v.
Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the
pronouncement made by the court a
quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set
aside as having been made in excess of its
jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend
the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed
to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary,
the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some
relatives of the deceased should also be set
aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion
of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted
the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded
to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF THE
MINOR LUIS ALBERTO MARTIN DE SANTOS,
FREDERICK WILLIAM MALKINSON and ANA
MARIE DE SANTOS MALKINSON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of
the JUVENILE and DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COURT OF MANILA, respondent.
De Santos, Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for
respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal from the dismissal orders of the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila,
the Court, in reversing, reaffirms the
established jurisprudence based on the plain
language of the codal provision that alienage by
itself does not disqualify a foreigner from
adopting a Filipino child and that our Civil Code
"only disqualifies from being adopters those
aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b)
who are residents but the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with
their government." Neither does our Civil Code
require that both adopter and adopted be of
the same nationality.
On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed
with respondent court their verified petition to
adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos,
who was born a Filipino citizen in Madrid, Spain
on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural
child of petitioner Ana Marie de Santos
Malkinson who alone his parents extended him
recognition.
Petitioners-spouses averred that since their
marriage on March 6, 1972, the said child who
owns no property has been living with them
under their care and custody at their residence
at No. 1443 Jose P. Laurel Street, Manila; that
petitioner Frederick William Malkinson is an
American citizen, 1 gainfully employed as a
seaman with an average yearly income of US
$7,000-$8,000, while his co-petitioner spouse is
a Filipino citizen and a property owner in the
Philippines; and that it is to the best interest of
the child that he be adopted by petitioners-
spouses who possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for such legal
adoption.
Judge Vicente M. Santiago, Jr. then on detail
with respondent court issued his order of
October 18, 1972 giving due course to the
petition and setting it for hearing on January 8,
1973 and directed that appropriate notices be
sent to the Solicitor General and the Director,
Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare, Department
of Social Welfare and publication of the order
be made.
Upon respondent judge's return to her court
after her leave of absence, she issued her order
of November 22, 1972, stating that upon a
review of the petition wherein "it is alleged that
petitioner husband is an alien while the child
sought to be adopted is a citizen of this
country" respondent court was of the opinion
that "the petition, for that reason, is not
sufficient in substance, and the same cannot be
given course" and ordered that "the petition
filed herein will be ordered dismissed after the
lapse of 30 days from petitioners' receipt of
notice hereof unless, within said period, proper
proceedings are instituted before the Supreme
Court for the purpose of questioning the
correctness of this Order."
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on the
ground that no law prohibits a resident alien,
who is not a citizen of a country without
diplomatic relations with the Philippines and is
not otherwise legally disqualified, from
adopting a Filipino, and respondent court
denied the same under its order of December
18, 1972.
Hence, the present appeal by certiorari from
respondent court's dismissal orders.
Respondent judge thus ordered the dismissal of
the petition on the basis of her known view that
"a Filipino could not adopt an alien and vice
versa;" hence, since petitioner husband is an
alien while the child sought to be adopted is a
Filipino, she decreed that the petition cannot be
given due course. While aware of the
controlling doctrine enunciated by this Court in
the Therkelsen 2 and Cathey 3 adoption cases
that alienage by itself does not disqualify a
foreigner from adopting a Filipino child and that
the Philippine Civil Code "only disqualifies from
being adopters those aliens that are either (a)
non-residents or (b) who are residents but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations with their
government" 4 respondent court felt that Justice
J.B.L. Reyes' statement in Therkelsen as to its
non-exposition of its reasons for dismissal of
the petition therein as set aside by this Court
left the way open for a review and restudy of
the controlling precedents.
Respondent court thus once again as
in Therkelsen ordered dismissal of the petition
solely on the ground of alienage of the
petitioner husband, maintaining inter alia that
Article 334 the Civil Code (which provides that
"Every person of age, who is in full possession
of his civil rights, may adopt") "cannot be
accepted literally. If Scaevola 5 is correct, it
should be construed as not permitting a citizen
to adopt an alien, or vice versa;" "that the
prohibitions contained in Article 335 (4) an (5)
of the Code should be construed as aimed at
the adoption of aliens by other aliens, and not
at the adoption by an alien of a Filipino;" "that
an alien who has adopted a Filipino child cannot
be expected, by precept and example, to imbue
the adopted with love of the Philippines and
veneration for Filipino national heroes" (under
Article 358 of the Civil Code) and that "solidarity
of a family cannot be achieved if we hold the
view that a Filipino child can be adopted by an
alien."
Petitioners-spouses therefrom urge that under
the clear and plain language of the Civil Code
and the Court's express rulings
in Therkelsen and Cathey, petitioner husband as
an America resident not suffering from any legal
disqualification may jointly with his
co-petitioner Filipino wife legally adopt the
latter's acknowledged natural child.
The Solicitor General in a manifestation in lieu
of appellee's brief dated October 26, 1973
stated that "with all due respect to the opinion
and reasons of the respondent judge for
wanting the above ruling to be reexamined and
restudied by this Honorable Court, undersigned
counsel not only feel bound by said ruling but
also honestly believe that the same, is the
correct, proper, and reasonable interpretation
of our law on adoption; as a matter of fact, in
said cases of Therkelsen and Cathey,
undersigned counsel were also impelled by
reason and the law to place themselves on the
side of appellants in asking for the reversal of
the orders of the same respondent judge in said
cases holding that an alien cannot adopt a
Filipino," and joined petitioners in praying for
reversal of respondent court's dismissal orders.
Petitioners-spouses' appeal must be sustained
on the strength of the controlling doctrine
enunciated in the cited cases.
In Cathey, Justice Jose P. Bengzon ruled for a
unanimous Court that "(A)s this Court pointed
out through Mr. J.B.L. Reyes in Uggi Therkelsen
v. Republic, L-21951, November 27, 1964: "the
present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only
disqualifies from being adopters aliens that are
either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents
but the Republic of the Philippines has broken
diplomatic relations with their government.
Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself
alone does not disqualify a foreigner from
adopting under our laws." " The Court thus held
therein that "(P)etitioner Robert H. Cathey
though an American citizen, is a resident alien
entitled to remain in the Philippines, as his
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit D)
shows. He is legally married to Helen Olalia and
presently is the administrative officer of the
U.S. Naval Construction office at Clark Air Base
with an annual compensation of $6,295.00 and
has P25,000 worth of personal properties in the
Philippines. As petitioners spouses have no child
of their own, they wish to adopt Bertha Ann
Rivera and thus make her their heir.
The welfare of the child being
the paramount consideration under the law
(Art. 363, New Civil Code), the child now sought
to be adopted being virtually unwanted by her
own mother, who, by the way, has seven other
children to feed (Tsn of May 2, 1963, p. 11), We
see no reason why the adoption should not be
granted."
In Therkelsen, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion
to discuss respondent court's contrary view and
to reject for a unanimous Court its imposition of
an additional requisite not imposed by the Civil
Code that both adopter and adopted be of the
same nationality in this wise:
The court a quo denied the adoption sought,
saying:
"In Sp. Proc No. D-00011 adoption of Benigno
Lim, this Court has had occasion rule that a
Filipino cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor
about 19 years old. The adoption would not
confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but
could definitely legalize his stay in this country.
It was also stated that conversely, an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption
would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the
alien's country. As petitioner husband in this
case is a Danish subject it has to be held that he
cannot legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph
Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this
country following that of his natural mother."
If we understand the decision correctly, the
adoption was denied solely because the same
would not result in the loss of the minor's
Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him of
the citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did
not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is
clear that, if pursued to its logical
consequences, the judgment appealed from
would operate to impose a further
prerequisite on adoptions by
aliens beyond those required by law. As pointed
out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the
present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only
disqualifies from being adopters those aliens
that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are
residents but the Republic of the Philippines has
broken diplomatic relations with their
government. Outside of
these two cases, alienage by itself alone
does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a
person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do
not fall in either class.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would
demand as a condition for the approval of the
adoption that the process should result in the
acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien
citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
support in the law, for, as observed by this compassionate objectives of the law. 8
Court in Ching Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-
Finally, aside from the above decisive
11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958, the
consideration that under the plain language of
citizenship of the adopter is a matter political,
the law alienage by itself does not disqualify a
and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it
foreigner such as petitioner-husband from
should be conferred lay outside the ambit of
adopting a Filipino child, the Solicitor General
the Civil Code. It is not within the province of
further enumerated correctly various other
our civil law to determine how or when
factors that show the merit of the petition
citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired.
below, viz, that petitioner wife as the natural
The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child
mother is expressly authorized under Article
in order to forestall circumvention of our
338, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code to adopt
exclusion laws does not warrant denial of the
her natural child and raise its status to that of a
adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien
legitimate child, 9 that under paragraph (3) of
adopting parents, since it is not shown that our
the same article, petitioner-husband as the
public policy would be thereby subverted.
step-father is likewise expressly authorized to
The Court finds no justification for deviating or adopt his stepchild, and that the adoption
departing from the established doctrine. sought would strengthen the family solidarity of
Whatever may be the merit of respondent petitioners-spouses and the child, because the
court's views as above-cited, they go into the child after adoption, would have its status of a
wisdom or policy of the statute which are natural child of petitioner wife and a step-child
beyond the Court's domain. 6 The Civil Code of petitioner-husband raised to that of
provisions on adoption are quite plain and clear legitimate child of both petitioners with all the
and are free from any ambiguity. Under such rights an duties appertaining thereto, as
circumstances, there is no room for provided in Article 341 of the Civil Code.
construction, the law is controlling and the clear
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed dismissal orders of
task of the judiciary is to apply the law as it is. 7
November 22 and December 18, 1972 are
If alienage alone of the adopter or of the hereby set aside and respondent court is
adopted were to be a disqualification, it is directed to give due course to the petition in
inconceivable that the lawmakers would not accordance with the previous order of October
have so explicitly provided, considering that in 18, 1972 and to reset the hearing thereof at the
Article 335 of the Code non-resident aliens and earliest practicable date. In view of the
resident aliens with whose government the established jurisprudence covering the case,
Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are this decision shall be immediately executory
the only two classes of aliens expressly upon promulgation.
disqualified and prohibited to adopt while in
Article 339 only an alien with whose state our
government has broken diplomatic relations is
expressly disqualified and prohibited to be
adopted. Inclusio unius exclusio alterius. This is
but in consonance with the liberal concept that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interest and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration and are designed
to provide homes, parental care and education
for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience
the joys of parenthood and give them legally a
child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be