BAIL CASE DIGESTS
forwarded to branch 33 presided over by Judge Bulado.
#2 225 SCRA 110
EVANGELINE L. DINAPOL, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, Regional Trial Court, Branch
45, Bais City, respondent.
In this case complainant charges the respondent Judge with grave
abuse of discretion, ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a
member of the bench in entertaining the accuseds (spouses Crozoro
Palermo and Jovy Palermo) petition for bail and setting the same for
hearing despite opposition of complaining witness.
Facts:
February 28, 1992 an information for murder was filed
before the respondent Judges sala.
March 3 - the respondent Judge issued a warrant for the
arrest of the accused.
March 9 accused filed a motion to grant and fix bail which
respondent judge set for hearing on April 24
April 10 Evangeline Dinapol, the complaining witness and
a sister of the victim in the murder case filed a vigorous
opposition to the motion.
April 24 accused did not appear; respondent Judge issued
an order (a) denying the motion to grant bail on the ground
that the court "has not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused," (b) ordering the issuance of an alias warrant
of arrest and (c) directing the PNP of Guihulngan "to exert
utmost efforts for the arrest of the accused
On that same date, however, the accused this time through
Atty. Alfonso Briones filed an urgent motion for the
reconsideration of the 24 April 1992 Order on the ground
that "the accused are forthcoming, and are willing to
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court"
May 4 resetting the hearing of the motion to grant and fix
bail for May 7, subject to the condition that "the accused
shall surrender to the custody of the court." Respondent
Judge further directed the issuance of subpoenas to the
prosecution witnesses and warned the prosecution "that
failure to present evidence on said date without justifiable
reason will be considered as lack of strength of its evidence"
May 7 accused failed to appear on the set date; the
respondent Judge issued on the said date an order resetting,
once again, the hearing of the motion for 30 June and 1 and
3 July 1992. This extension was, however, subjected to the
condition that "on or before June 30, 1992, accused shall
have voluntarily surrendered and submitted themselves to
the custody of this court
June 19 - warrant had not been duly served as the accused
"are not found here in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental," and the
information gathered that they were temporarily residing in
Cebu City proved to be false
Prosecution filed a "Motion Entreating Hon. Ismael O.
Baldado to Consider Whether or Not to Continue Presiding
Over the Above-Entitled Case." Alleged therein that the
respondent Judge had acted with patent bias and partiality in
the accused's favor as may be gleaned from his (Judge's)
actuations as above-indicated, and from the fact that "the two
(2) accused . . . have even been seen conspicuously after the
filing of the petition for bail inside the Chambers of this
Court [RTC] accompanied by a younger brother of a
congressman.
July 27 respondent judge inhibited and ordered the case
However, the latter also inhibited since prosecution witness
Alfredo Bulado is his first cousin or a relative within the
fourth civil degree; Judge Bulado decreed the return of the
case to the court of origin
Respondent Judge alleges that (a) there is no clear and direct
proof to support the allegation that both accused were in his
chambers for, as a matter of fact, the Prosecutor himself, in
his Reply of 9 July 1992, admits that the said allegation "is
not of our personal knowledge"; (b) "not a single politician
has made interventions or at least insinuate (sic) to intervene,
in any case pending before him"; and (c) there are parties
working "behind the scene of this malicious charge" against
whom he will, in due time, undertake legal recourse.
He did not, however, categorically deny the charge that the
accused were in his chambers after the motion for bail was
filed, and the allegation that a congressman sponsored his
appointment to the Judiciary.
Issue: WON the accused in the said murder case can move for the
granting of bail.
Ruling:
No. The accused may not move for the granting of bail.
Section 1 Rule 114 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions"
specified in Section 2 thereof. A person is considered to be in the
custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant
of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a
warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities. Elsewise stated, the purpose of requiring bail is to relieve
an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. An accused can move for the granting of bail
only if the court has acquired jurisdiction over his person.
However, "only those persons who have been either arrested, detained
or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek
the benefits of said provision. Thus, it logically follows that no petition
for bail can be validly entertained for as long as the petitioner is NOT
in the custody of the law.
Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were not arrested by
virtue of both the original warrant arrest and the alias warrant of arrest,
and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they
had no standing in court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the court have
any business setting the same for hearing. By setting the said motion
for hearing despite the fact that his court had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, the respondent Judge
blatantly disregarded established rule and settled jurisprudence. While
he subsequently rectified his error by denying the motion in his Order
of 24 April 1992, he nevertheless backtracked by granting the motion
for reconsideration and setting anew the hearing of the motion for bail
this time with a warning to the prosecution that its failure to present
evidence on the scheduled date "will be considered as lack of strength
of its evidence." We find neither rhyme nor reason for this warning
because if there was any party to be warned, it should have been the
accused who had abused the liberality of the respondent Judge and
belittled the authority of the court.

#9 142 SCRA 149
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,
vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal
stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc
Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds
no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former
corporation.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker
Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in
the United States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders,
filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The
petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case
No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a
Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw,
Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management
committee was organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and
Exchange Commission requested the then Commissioner of
Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities,
Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate
criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as
president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc.
In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by
the investigating fiscal.
In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of
P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating
as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed
said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before CA
which was then dismissed. Dissatisfied with the appellate court's
ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on
April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave
to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion, petitioner stated that his
presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the
obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He
attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief executive officer
of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W.
Miller 9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the
people and companies who would be involved in its investments."
Issue: WON a person facing a criminal indictment and
provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel.
Ruling:
No. A person released on bail do not have an unrestricted right to
travel.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving
the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put
the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed
of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the
custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their
charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded
merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties
become invested with full authority over the person of the principal
and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive
such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal
remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this
inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave
the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.
In this case, petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed
travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely
alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country
without the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or
recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take
any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the
sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety
on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his
assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to
postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to
permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the
order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered
moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal
cases pending before said judge, we see the rationale behind said order.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an
absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail
constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision.