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DETROIT DOWNTOWN
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
et al.
Defendants.
____________________________/
On June 19, 2017, this Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs motion for a temporary
restraining order or, in the alternative, for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 8). Because Plaintiffs
have not carried their burden to show that the circumstances clearly demand injunctive relief, their
motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are Wayne County residents who claim that the votes they cast in past millage
elections entitle them to halt financing related to the Little Caesars arena project in Detroit. See
Am. Compl. 16-17 (Dkt. 15). The defendants named in the motion for preliminary injunction
are the Detroit Downtown Development Authority and the Detroit Brownfield Redevelopment
Authority entities created by local governments, pursuant to a state statute, for the purpose of
In the City of Detroits November 2012 general election, voters approved the renewal and
restoration of the 18-mills Detroit Public Schools Operating Millage. Id. 31. Plaintiffs argue
that Defendants plan to unlawfully use revenue generated from the school operating millage, as
well as the 2016 Wayne County Parks millage, for a purpose other than the purposes approved by
voters. See id. 165; Pl. Br. at 22. Specifically, Defendants allegedly will use approximately
$34,500,000 collected pursuant to these millages to fund certain aspects of the relocation of the
Detroit Pistons professional basketball team from Auburn Hills, Michigan, to Detroit. See Am.
Compl. 170.
According to Plaintiffs, Michigan statutes require that all millage proposals fully disclose
each local unit of government to which the revenue from that millage will be disbursed, Mich.
Comp. Laws 211.24f(1). See Pl. Br. at 14; see also Am. Compl. 32. Plaintiffs also argue that,
pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws 380.1211, revenues levied for school operating purposes, in
particular, may only be used for that purpose. Pl. Br. at 10. Plaintiffs argue that both statutes have
been violated because the millage ballot proposals did not identify that Defendants would receive
the funds, and that the funds would be used for the non-school purpose of supporting the relocation
Although Plaintiffs amended complaint asserts several causes of action, the instant motion
for preliminary relief is only based on Plaintiffs claim that Defendants alleged conduct violates
II. DISCUSSION
When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a district court considers the
substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would
be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.
McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assn, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
These factors are to be balanced against one another and should not be considered prerequisites
to the grant of a preliminary injunction, Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000),
but [a] finding that there is no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal, Lumpkins-El
v. Dept of Corr., 3 F. Appx 401, 402 (6th Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of
proving that the circumstances clearly demand it. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty.
Plaintiffs have not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The sole basis for
their motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction is that the perceived misuse of funds collected
pursuant to the millages violates their fundamental right to vote. See Pl. Br. at 8, 22. But
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the right to vote guaranteed by the United States Constitution
is somehow abridged by the violation of state laws regulating government financing that is subject
to voter approval. This is especially true here, where the alleged misconduct only occurred after
the votes had been, by all accounts, properly and fairly cast and counted.
fundamental. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). But in determining whether the
federal constitution protects a particular invocation of that right, context is critical, as Reynolds
itself demonstrates. There, the Court found unconstitutional a state reapportionment plan that
diluted votes by drawing state legislative districts with grossly unequal numbers of voters. In
doing so, the Court vindicated the right to vote not as a substantive right in itself but only
insofar as the state reapportionment plan debased the equality of the voters through unequal
districts. This equal protection reading of Reynolds is the view of the Sixth Circuit. See Phillips
v. Snyder, 836 F.3d 707, 716 (6th Cir. 2016) ([T]he issue in Reynolds was the principle of one
person, one vote under the Equal Protection Clause. Any asserted right in Reynolds was in the
context of that Clause. Reynolds thus stands for a right to vote for state legislators on an equal
footing with other voters in the state rather than a stand-alone right to vote for legislators.).
Thus the fundamental dimension of the right to vote is that citizens not be subjected to
disparate or discriminatory treatment that would bar or degrade the exercise of the franchise. See
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) ([O]ne source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal
weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 (1972) ([A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections
on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380
(1963) (The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot
in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.); see also
Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of rehg and rehg
en banc (June 23, 1998) (Although federal courts may invalidate state election laws that deny
some voters equal protection of the law, unduly burden free speech, or violate a federal statute, we
must normally defer to the states regulatory interests when these federal rights are not
implicated.).
Here, Plaintiffs make no claim of disparate or discriminatory treatment. They were not
turned away from the polls based on some invidious classification. Neither free speech nor a
federal statute is implicated. Their sole claim is that the state laws regulating how government
financing authorization is secured have not been respected. However, simply because one aspect
of that authorization process involves voter approval does not transform a disagreement about the
operation of such laws into a federal claim for denial of the right to vote. Otherwise, every dispute
regarding how later government action was taken following a ballot authorization would justify a
federal court lawsuit. The vacuousness of such a position is confirmed by Plaintiffs inability to
cite a single case that meaningfully supports their position that the fundamental right to vote
includes a right to have government actors implement the results of a referendum in a particular
way.
Plaintiffs brief exhaustively recounts Michigan statutory law without citing a single
context-specific case dealing with the right to vote. See Pl. Br. at 19-20; see also Pl. Reply at 6
(Dkt. 27). They principally rely on South Haven v. Van Buren County Board of Commissioners,
734 N.W.2d 533 (Mich. 2007), which involved a state statute that required that proposals for voter-
approved tax levies for roads and bridges conform to a specific formula for distribution among the
county, cities, and villages. While the court held that the enactment of the millage had violated
the statute, it did not find any violation of a right to a vote; in fact, the aggrieved party was the city
that had lost out by virtue of the improper adoption. South Haven is hardly a precedent for finding
a federal constitutional right when millage proceeds are allegedly improperly used.
It is Plaintiffs burden to identify a viable legal basis for their claim. By pointing only to
Michigan statutes governing the contents of ballots and the uses of certain revenues, Plaintiffs have
not carried their burden to show that an alleged violation of these statutes implicates the right to
vote.1
1
Defendants set forth a lengthy argument about how the Michigan statutes should be interpreted,
claiming that they have complied with the statutes. See Defs. Resp. at 13-20. This Court takes no
position on the correctness of this argument at this time.
5
B. Irreparable Harm
Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiffs seek the issuance
of a writ of mandamus compelling the Defendants to refund collected taxes to the taxpayers. Am.
Compl. 167; see also id. 164. Plaintiffs only other alleged damages are statutory damages
under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) and attorney fees and costs. Id. at 64-66 (prayer for relief). Plaintiffs
Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 809 (6th Cir.2001). As discussed above, however, this Court
completely remedied by an order compelling the return of that money to the appropriate coffer,
Plaintiffs have not shown irreparable harm. This cuts strongly against the issuance of preliminary
relief.
C. Harm to Others
substantial harm to others. Based on the proofs submitted to date, this Court concludes that this
Plaintiffs conclude that there is simply no conceivable evidence that the issuance of an
injunction in this case would cause any harm to anyone. Pl. Br. at 32.
Defendants respond that, in fact, the injunction that Plaintiffs seek would cause great harm
to the City of Detroit by making it very likely that the DDA would default on $250 million in bond
obligations, which in turn would greatly damage Detroits creditworthiness. See Defs. Resp. at 2.
see also Kantor Aff., Ex. 1 to Defs. Resp (Dkt. 24-2); Jensen Aff., Ex. 2 to Defs. Resp. (Dkt. 24-
3). And the Detroit Pistons relocation plans would not merely be delayed if an injunction issues;
instead, there is a significant likelihood that the plans would be canceled entirely, causing a ripple
effect of lost business revenue in the district for years to come. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs do not address
Having considered the unrebutted evidence offered by Defendants that an injunction would
cause harm to them, as well as the City of Detroit and those living and working within it, this Court
The comparable harm faced by Plaintiffs if an injunction does not issue only highlights
how much is at stake for Defendants: Plaintiffs have not stated a cognizable right-to-vote claim,
suggesting that Defendants alleged wrongdoing is a matter of state law and, in any case, fully
compensable by money damages. It is not the type of harm that the extraordinary remedy of a
The fourth prong asks whether the issuance of an injunction would serve the public interest.
Of course, it is always in the public interest to enjoin the violation of citizens constitutional rights,
but as discussed above, no such violation is properly alleged here; and, rather than articulating how
those allegedly entitled to the revenues at issue would be harmed by the tax increment finance
plan, Plaintiffs allegations concerning the public interest pertain only to the publics voting rights.
Defendants have submitted unrebutted evidence that, rather than serving the public interest, an
injunction would cause them harm and most if not all of the harms that would befall Defendants
and the City of Detroit are harms that eventually would be felt by the public at large. The loss of
anticipated commercial activity connected to the Detroit Pistons downtown presence would be
regrettable, but the loss of the Citys hard-won creditworthiness caused by defaulting on existing
bond obligations, see Kantor Aff. 6(a), (b), would do catastrophic damage to the status quo.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court concludes that each of the four preliminary-
injunction factors weigh against the issuance of an injunction at this time. Plaintiffs motion (Dkt.
8) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail
addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 19, 2017.
s/Karri Sandusky
Case Manager