DOMESTIC AND INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil
RULE 99 ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the action for
RULE 100 RESCISSION AND REVOCATION OF ADOPTION
1. ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as
"DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
(re: development of Philippine adoption laws; nature of adoption proceedings;
exception to rule on the non-applicability of dura lex sed lex)
Facts:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their
own. The trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Years later, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities and that respondent
was indifferent towards petitioner and would only come to see her once a
year.
Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption
Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No.
8552 now reads: "Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not
be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."
The trial court dismissed the petition.
Issue:
WON the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 and WON the adopters action had
prescribed.
Ruling:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in
the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case,
it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law had
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA
8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of R A8552, an action to set aside the adoption
is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that
the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of
that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition
that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The
concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to
be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by
a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
However, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his
legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ZENAIDA ELEPANO, Presiding
Judge of RTC Kalookan, Branch 128 and CORAZON SANTOS PUNSALAN,
G.R. No. 92542, October 15, 1991
(re: nature and purpose of adoption)
Facts:
The private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a verified petition for
adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXXVIII
praying that after due notice and hearing, the minors Pinky Gonzales
Punsalan, the daughter of her full blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan
Urbano, the daughter of her full blood sister, be declared her daughters by
adoption for all intents and purposes. However, private respondent filed a
"MOTION FOR TAKING OF DEPOSITION" on the ground that she received
an urgent call from the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland
requiring her to report for work, so much so that she will not be able to
testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be scheduled by the respondent
judge. The respondent judge granted the motion and ordered that notice of the
taking of the deposition be furnished to the OSG (the only known oppositor in
the case). The private respondent's deposition was taken. Despite notice, no
representative from the OSG appeared to oppose the taking of the deposition.
The OSG, however, subsequently filed an "Opposition to the Deposition",
averring that Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court allows deposition
by leave of Court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or property subject of the action. Since the jurisdictional requirement of
publication has not been complied with, the OSG goes on to argue, the
lower court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. The
respondent judge denied the said Opposition. The respondent judge granted the
petition for adoption
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON the jurisdictional requirement of publication should be complied first to
allow the deposition taking in adoption proceedings.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
While it is true that in an action in personam, personal service of summons
within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is essential for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, in an adoption case
which involves the status of a person, there is no particular defendant to
speak of since the action is one in rem. In such case, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking of a
deposition for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over
the res, to render judgment with respect to such "thing" (or status, as in
this case) so as to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection against the right so established. (Banco Espanol Filipino vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Greg Alba vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49).
Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption is
necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but not for the purpose merely
of taking a deposition. In taking a deposition, no substantial rights are
affected since depositions may or may not be presented or may even be
objected to when formally offered as evidence at the trial of the main case
later on.
In the instant case, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
judge in allowing the taking of private respondent's deposition. Due to urgent
and compelling reasons beyond her control, private respondent could not be
present to testify at the trial of the main case for adoption. The OSG, however,
was notified of the scheduled taking of the deposition, as well as of all the
hearings of the petition for adoption, but the OSG chose not to attend ALL the
said hearings, without explanation. The OSG, therefore, has no reason to invoke
lack of procedural due process.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption
statutes is to promote the welfare of the child and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. (Santos et al. vs.
Aranzanso, et al. 16 SCRA 353). In the instant case, the record shows that
private respondent's adoption of the minors shall redound to the best interests
of the latter.
3. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON.
JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976
(re: construction of adoption laws; applicability of dura lex sed lex)
Facts:
a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days
old) 7 was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife
Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan
with the aforementioned espouses appearing in the records of said baptism as
the parents of said child;
b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant
from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her
(the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want
to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The
mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her child;
c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the
child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required
by law;
d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez
that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the
court then pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother.
The witness refused to divulge the same on the ground that there existed an
attorney and client relationship between them. She had been instructed by her
client not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now violate such privilege
communication.
Petition was dismissed by the trial court;
The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that ... the
consent given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the
express requirement of the law. 3
Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:
Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the following to
the adoption shall be necessary:
2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.
"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in
mandatory terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the
persons who will give the consent to the adoption in the order as follows:
parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.
It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the
mother who gave her the child. This being the case, the proper person who
is supposed to give the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in
the order of preference, the parent or the mother herself. 4
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June
27, 1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry
Christensen Duncan.
Issues:
1. WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such
consent.
2. WON Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the
abandoned waif may be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the
person standing in loco parentis of said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of
the Civil Code.
Ruling:
1.) Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly
described by law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the
required written consent. They are:
Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge
of the person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in
Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known
living parents "who has not abandoned such child." The father's consent here
is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.
Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty: Corazon de Leon
Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had
consequently caused the rejection of the petition, this Tribunal will now look
into her alleged authority or lack thereof to give the controverted consent.
Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition,
undisputedly declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its
mother to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and unwedded
mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court
which started in mid- year of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered
to inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the
livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short, this parent is the
antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not
insane Or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are
convinced that in fact said mother had completely and absolutely
abandoned her child. This Court has previously declared that
abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces
a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. 12 Applying this
legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case can be
declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with all
legal consequences attached thereto.
Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown
parent, there appears to be no more legal need to require the written
consent of such parent of the child to the adoption.
2. It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the
hands of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire
need of someone who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and
fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child
and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been
no showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial
court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present herself
before the court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required
by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as
the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since
there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not
being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any
benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian
of said infant.
Dura lex sed lex
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal
maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision
it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many
other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened
so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane
understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children,
particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver
spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love, care
and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical
street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social
problems, should be given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and
assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the
achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully
possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the
chances for human life to exist with a modicum promise of a useful and
constructive existence.
If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be
doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse,
it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other
children who might be similarly situated. It is Our view that it is in consonance
with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to
uphold, encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family relations.
4. HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, G.R. No. 105308, September 25,
1998
(re: construction of adoption laws; substantial compliance rule; parental consent
in adoption proceedings; meaning of abandonment)
Facts:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her
husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the
petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States.
The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving
the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor
children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already
granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188
of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the
children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned
the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support
to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
Issue:
WON the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
Ruling:
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has
abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It
means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care
and support which parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would
forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find
pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone,
and send them packages catered to their whims.
Meaning of Abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to
forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect
or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their
children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parents
presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection.
5. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ
LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
(re: effect of non-observance or non-conduct of adoption proceedings)
Case:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992.
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the
grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24,
1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of private
respondent Aguilar before the RTC of San Pablo City. They alleged that,
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or
descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims
or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given
the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who
pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial,
were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one
Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood
is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir.
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is
the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering
his estate.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate
child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted
documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2)
Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter;
and (4) School Records. She also testified that the said spouses reared and
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand,
private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the
said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel,
then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan,
a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria
Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically
declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who
were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It
dismissed the private respondents petition for letters and administration
and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the
spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29,
1992 by the Court of Appeals declaring that Marissa Benitez is not the biological
daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez.
Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the
intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, denied; said
petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the
lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in accordance with law and the Rules. In
juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
Issue:
WON the appellate court erred in finding that Marissa Benitez is not the
biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente
O. Benitez.
Ruling:
No. The petitioners evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her
biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the
evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said
couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late
Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and
without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared,
considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her the status as
not so, such that she herself had believed that she was really their
daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
The evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and
sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married
for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten
or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and
the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years.
There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O.
Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being
the only boy and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through
law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on
family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they
wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked
for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel
wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and
uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told
his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's
child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to
travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her
residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak
physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez
Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may
be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in
material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under
her oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of
the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna
(Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in
this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they
never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa
Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or
at any time at all, and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates.
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used
to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that
she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never
delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day
she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked
the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that the child was
brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it".
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well
as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public
eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not
have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen
mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather
late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that baby.
Petitioners birth certificate with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the
informant is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel,
who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly
the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should
the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and
caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan,
since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and
quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in
appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife
attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice
in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a
judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the
civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he
could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through
court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the
child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the
child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so either
because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child
the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.
6. RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE
LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979
(re: how to prove adoption; applicability of the rule on evidence of pedigree)
Facts:
Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate, he was survived by his wife, Margarita de
Asis and his two adopted twin daughters, Nora de Leon and Irma Lazatin.
One month after Mariano's death, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate
proceeding. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted
illegitimate children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened.
Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another
admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after or on April 11,
1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will
executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of
support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to
Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the
People's Bank and Trust Company which either she or respondent Nora L.
de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L.
de Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon,
opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of
stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L.
Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent
Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith,
believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole
reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other
small items deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the
bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court
to do so, in view of her mother's death. Private respondents then filed a
petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis. Days after having
learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box,
petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court,
claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that
submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed
for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon
admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document
resembling a will therein. Upon the order of the probate court, the safety
deposit box was opened, at which time it was found to be empty, because
prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its
contents. Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the
late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate child. Under the
same date, Ramon filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita
de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety
deposit box, Whereupon, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de
Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of
Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano
Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of
respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato
Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an
adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother
of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son"
of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on
August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M.
Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in
the estate of Margarita de Asis at which hearings petitioner presented no decree
of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private
respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his
parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was
known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta.
Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his
present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de
Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy
Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they
continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be
presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed
herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and
petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is
"Renato Lazatin."
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to
the admission of petitioner's evidence but when petitioner could not present
evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court
discontinued the hearing on the ground that Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara do
not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding
where the adoption of the parties above named were taken up by any court.
Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a
proceeding in court where the adoption of the above named persons was held.
The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child
which, however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to
intervene in this proceedings.
Issue:
WON Renatos petition successfully established his status and WON his
evidence is admissible to prove his pedigree.
Ruling:
Court ruled in the negative. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem
which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural
law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation,
the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed,
but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The
destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would
have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption
nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be
presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been
said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the
provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of
such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.
Petitioners evidences fail to show that at one time or another a specific
court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding
initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of
the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are
presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a
nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928
and 1932. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as
provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has
lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish
such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his
lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted
him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his
family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish
the fact of adoption. 10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed,
educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child,
necessarily establish adoption of the child.
The court further ruled that pedigree testimonies, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expression of persons who
must know the truth but before a declaration of a deceased person can be
admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant,
by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof,
must ordinarily be established by competent evidence.
Secondary evidence may also be admissible where the adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of
such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. Secondary proof may only be
introduced if it has first established that such adoption paper really
existed and was lost. This is indispensable. Petitioner's supposed adoption
was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of
the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the
deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really
made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at
the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or
destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced.
Thus, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted
child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate
proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one
who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like
a creditor.
7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE
and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994
(re: joint adoption by husband and wife)
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and
Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen on August
19, 1988, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a twelve (12) year old minor
who is Evelyn's youngest brother. They got married on June 4, 1981. Since 1981
to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala
was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon
gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate
her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and
Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the
best interest and welfare of the minor, the trial court granted the petition.
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending
that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not
qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
Issue:
WON Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt;
Ruling:
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates
the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent
Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former
Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately,
the petition foradoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and
wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. 11
Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. 12 It is not the
bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the
principal criterion in adoption cases. 13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds
that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount
consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do
not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.
Petition is GRANTED.
9. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR ROSSANA E. CRUZ.
ROSALINA E. CRUZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-20927,
July 26, 1966
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)
Facts:
The petitioner, Rosalina E. Cruz, of 39 years of age, is the childless wife of
Francisco de la Cruz and is a resident of Zamboanga. Francisco de la Cruz
gave his consent to the adoption by his wife, in an affidavit attached to the
petition, and also testified thereabout. The minor child sought to be adopted
was born on 26 December 1959 and recorded in the local civil registrar's
office as Rossana Esperat Bucoy ; but said child was baptized on 19
September 1960 as Rossana E. Cruz , already following the surname of the
would-be adopting parent, who reared and took care of the girl since
birth, and who has developed a strong maternal love for her. The child's
parents by nature, Lucilo Bucoy and Ana E. Bucoy, that aside from their
written consent, they testified in court on their consent to the adoption.
The court, in an order on 11 January 1962, set the petition for hearing and
directed the publication of the order once a week for three consecutive weeks in
the "Zamboanga Times".
The child's name in the petition for adoption, and as published in the
newspaper, is Rossana E. Cruz, her baptismal name, instead of Rossana E.
Bucoy her name in the record of birth; thus oppositor-appellant Republic
of the Philippines claims that "the lower court erred in taking cognizance
of the instant petition for adoption despite the fact that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by reason of a substantial defect in the petition
and the published order of hearing".
Issue:
WON jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption has been
complied with.
Ruling:
No.
The name of a person as recorded in the civil register, and not his baptismal
name, is, for legal purposes, his real name, baptismal names having never been
legally recognized, nor the practice of using baptismal names sanctioned by the
law (Chomi vs. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004). It follows,
therefore, that the use of the baptismal name of the child to be adopted,
instead of its name in the civil register, would countenance or permit that
which has always been frowned upon.
A proceeding in adopting is a proceeding in rem (Ellis, et al. vs. Republic, L-
16922, 30 April 1963; Van Matre vs. Sankey 148 III. 536; 36 NE 628) in which
notice is made through publication (Sec. 4 of former Rule 100, now Section
4 of Rule 99) to protect the interests of all persons concerned (3 Moran
534, 1963 Ed.). Said interests will not be protected if the notice by
publication does not carry the true name of the child to be adopted
because the persons to be served by the notice have the right to expect the
use of the child's officially recorded name. The defect, in the present case,
amounts to a failure of service by publication, and the court a quo
acquired no jurisdiction over the case (Cf. Yuseco vs. Republic, L-13441, 30
June 1960).
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby reversed; and the
petition for adoption dismissed, but without prejudice to reinstituting the
proceedings in conformity with law
10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B.
CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)
Facts:
On September 21 1988, spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto
filed a petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old,
who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he
was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19,
1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: declaring the
child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purpose,
dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and that the
surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that
the first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected
to "MICHAEL."
The case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto,
Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified.
Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor,
being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the
correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued
that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous
error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of names cannot be
effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his
appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was
"Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his
Certificate of Live Birth.
Issue:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption even if the
notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child?
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption. The present
case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the
child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the
substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as
"Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the
child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause
any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the
publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose
has been served by publication of notice in this case.
11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA
C. BOBILES, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)
Facts:
Dissatisfied with the decision of CA on February 20, 1990 which affirmed in toto
the decision of RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of private respondent
to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the
present petition for review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family
since he was four (4) months old, before the RTC of Legaspi City.
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on
March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably
served on the Solicitor General, of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child;
and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was
posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had
required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at
the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with
that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted
in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the minor
child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and
purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local
Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision.
Issues:
1. WON CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively
to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and

2. WON CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the
petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.
Ruling:
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on
February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603,
the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption
may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the
trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on
August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and
wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for
adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the
mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-
inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect,
hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be
taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must
be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or
a special proceeding. We further apprehend that this objection has been
raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall
clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of
errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that
such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right
which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created
after the right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right
to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband
therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her
explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof,
her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already
vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the
trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing
law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case such facts
as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and
foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article
185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily
accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to
pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they
will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their
enactment.
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and
procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment
although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment.
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending
actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate
proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed
by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises.
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case
is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot
be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in
force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in
form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was
filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the
case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a
court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code
should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the
trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent
Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider
this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the
petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to
the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof,
shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The
pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to
adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years
old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the
Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said
minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court,
now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my
lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have
continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of
maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the
care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for
whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this minor
child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me,
DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open
court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then
obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the
legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party
to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in
language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be
eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid
adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply
to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein
that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the
adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges
coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to
hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory
requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to
indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat
its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every
material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the
judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may
be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid
an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the case with the
inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial
compliance with the statute. The technical rules of pleading should not be
stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important
that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which
may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct
as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all
facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
In determining WON to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and
welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The welfare of
a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and
the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application
for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its
interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make
rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in
the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in
accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of
the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be
disturbed.
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the
petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for
several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with
the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the
sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for
adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated
by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and
considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, We are of the opinion and so
hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way
towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life."
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the
adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys
of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
12. MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch
20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, G.R. No.
85044, June 3, 1992
(re: parental authority during trial period)
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he
was living at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was
granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, the spouses
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by
the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. The
CA dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition
Issue:
WON the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages sustained by
Jennifer Tamargo.
Ruling:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or the
doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom
he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
who is in their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of course,
only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting
parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. To
hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would
be unfair and unconscionable.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural
parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by
petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint,
the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural
mother and guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA
GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI, G.R. No. L-32181, March 5, 1986
(re: adoption strictly personal between adopter and adoptee)
Facts:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The Solicitor General filed an opposition
to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil
Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary
proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil
status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued
an order directing the publication of the petition. Leonor also filed her reply to
the opposition admitting the present petition seeks substantial changes
involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but
alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil
status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the
proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the
allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have
complied with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be
given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order for
the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu also filed its motion to dismiss averring that the petition seeks to change
substantial corrections and not merely clerical ones as they do involve
citizenship and status of the minors and their mother. Lower court denied their
motions and ordered the lower court to make the necessary correction. The
Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of petition for review.
Issue:
WON the lower court erred in ordering the correction the petitioners
citizenship and civil status of her minor children.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Corrections involving matters such as civil
status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed provided
the proper suit is filed. The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are- (1)
the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of
the court to- (l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the
petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil
registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". The fact that the Civil Registrar opposed the petition
sought to be corrected and was actively prosecuted, such proceedings became
adversary in nature. The court was of the opinion that the petition filed by the
respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and
publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter
could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. To follow
the Solicitor Gens argument that Rule 109 is not the appropriate proceeding
without any advice as to what the correct proceeding is or if such proceeding
exist at all would result in manifest injustice.
14. PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO
and DEMETRIA VENTURA, G.R. No. L-23828, February 28, 1966
(re: adopted child as intestate heir of adopter)
Facts:
A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old,
was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was
alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could
not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said
minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said
children have been continuously been in petitioners care and custody. The
consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by
the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the
petition for the adoption.
Subsequently eight years later Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating
among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of
the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among
others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want
of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not
abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and
mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the
pleadings filed by Aranzanso.
The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a
collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain
the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the
adoption void ab initio.
Issue:
WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement
proceeding.
Ruling:
No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was
abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.
Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct on the
part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents
owe to their children.
Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal
depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the
determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral
attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack,
the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children
had abandoned them
15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO
WONG, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992
(re: name of the adopted child)
Facts:
Private respondent, at two and a half years old was together with his sister was
adopted by Spouses Wong, naturalized Filipinos. Private Respondent sought to
have his Chinese surname changed to that of his natural Filipino parents upon
reaching the age of twenty-two. He alleged that the use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese
surname, thus hampering his business and social life. The lower courts decision
granting the petition was affirmed by the appellate court.
Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that the reversion of
petitioner to his old name violates Arts.341and 365 of the Civil Code which
require an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify
him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed
his relationship with his adoptive parents.

Private Respondent contended that he did as the law required, I.e, upon
adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already
emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by himself. His adoptive
mother consented to the petition for change of name and made it clear that it
would not affect the legal adoption.

Issue:

WON an adopted child can change his surname from that of his adopter to that
of his natural parents.

Ruling:

YES. While it is true that under Art. 365 of the Civil Code, an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the
change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the
object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, which is, that
of parent and child. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new
status of relationship between the child and his/her adoptive parents, the
change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident
than an object of the proceeding.

The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an

application for adoption. Under the circumstances, there could be no possible
confusion as to the Private Respondents legal status or adoptive paternity and
his successional right.