Land Ti Concept To PD 1529

L A ND T I T L E S C A S E S (1 s t ) |1
F. MODE OF ACQUISITION
G.R. No. 78903 February 28, 1990
SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJE-DALION, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND RUPERTO SABESAJE, JR., respondents.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on May 26, 1987, upholding the validity of the sale of a parcel of
land by petitioner Segundo Dalion (hereafter, "Dalion") in favor of private respondent Ruperto Sabesaje, Jr. (hereafter, "Sabesaje"), described thus:
A parcel of land located at Panyawan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, declared in the name of Segundo Dalion, under Tax Declaration No. 11148, with an area
of 8947 hectares, assessed at P 180.00, and bounded on the North, by Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso, East, by Feliciano Destriza, by Barbara Bonesa
(sic); and West, by Catalino Espina. (pp. 36-37, Rollo)
The decision affirms in toto the ruling of the trial court 1 issued on January 17, 1984, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment.
(a) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the parcel of land subject of this case, declared in the name of Segundo Dalion previously under
Tax Declaration No. 11148 and lately under Tax Declaration No. 2297 (1974) and to execute the corresponding formal deed of conveyance in a public
document in favor of the plaintiff of the said property subject of this case, otherwise, should defendants for any reason fail to do so, the deed shall be
executed in their behalf by the Provincial Sheriff or his Deputy;
(b) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P 500.00 as litigation expenses, and to pay the costs; and
(c) Dismissing the counter-claim. (p. 38, Rollo)
The facts of the case are as follows:
On May 28, 1973, Sabesaje sued to recover ownership of a parcel of land, based on a private document of absolute sale, dated July 1, 1965 (Exhibit
"A"), allegedly executed by Dalion, who, however denied the fact of sale, contending that the document sued upon is fictitious, his signature thereon,
a forgery, and that subject land is conjugal property, which he and his wife acquired in 1960 from Saturnina Sabesaje as evidenced by the "Escritura de
Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit "B"). The spouses denied claims of Sabesaje that after executing a deed of sale over the parcel of land, they had pleaded with
Sabesaje, their relative, to be allowed to administer the land because Dalion did not have any means of livelihood. They admitted, however,
administering since 1958, five (5) parcels of land in Sogod, Southern Leyte, which belonged to Leonardo Sabesaje, grandfather of Sabesaje, who died
in 1956. They never received their agreed 10% and 15% commission on the sales of copra and abaca, respectively. Sabesaje's suit, they countered, was
intended merely to harass, preempt and forestall Dalion's threat to sue for these unpaid commissions.
From the adverse decision of the trial court, Dalion appealed, assigning errors some of which, however, were disregarded by the appellate court, not
having been raised in the court below. While the Court of Appeals duly recognizes Our authority to review matters even if not assigned as errors in the
appeal, We are not inclined to do so since a review of the case at bar reveals that the lower court has judicially decided the case on its merits.
As to the controversy regarding the identity of the land, We have no reason to dispute the Court of Appeals' findings as follows:
To be sure, the parcel of land described in Exhibit "A" is the same property deeded out in Exhibit "B". The boundaries delineating it from adjacent lots
are identical. Both documents detail out the following boundaries, to wit:
On the North-property of Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso;
On the East-property of Feliciano Destriza;
On the South-property of Barbara Boniza and
On the West-Catalino Espina.
(pp. 41-42, Rollo)
The issues in this case may thus be limited to: a) the validity of the contract of sale of a parcel of land and b) the necessity of a public document for
transfer of ownership thereto.
The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale on the basis of Secs. 21 and 23 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
SEC. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved.-Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By a subscribing witness
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 23. Handwriting, how proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person,
and has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge. (Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court)
And on the basis of the findings of fact of the trial court as follows:
Here, people who witnessed the execution of subject deed positively testified on the authenticity thereof. They categorically stated that it had been
executed and signed by the signatories thereto. In fact, one of such witnesses, Gerardo M. Ogsoc, declared on the witness stand that he was the one
who prepared said deed of sale and had copied parts thereof from the "Escritura De Venta Absoluta" (Exhibit B) by which one Saturnina Sabesaje sold
the same parcel of land to appellant Segundo Dalion. Ogsoc copied the bounderies thereof and the name of appellant Segundo Dalion's wife,
erroneously written as "Esmenia" in Exhibit "A" and "Esmenia" in Exhibit "B". (p. 41, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
Against defendant's mere denial that he signed the document, the positive testimonies of the instrumental Witnesses Ogsoc and Espina, aside from
the testimony of the plaintiff, must prevail. Defendant has affirmatively alleged forgery, but he never presented any witness or evidence to prove his
claim of forgery. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations (Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court). Furthermore, it is presumed that a person
is innocent of a crime or wrong (Section 5 (a), Idem), and defense should have come forward with clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff
committed forgery or caused said forgery to be committed, to overcome the presumption of innocence. Mere denial of having signed, does not suffice
to show forgery.
In addition, a comparison of the questioned signatories or specimens (Exhs. A-2 and A-3) with the admitted signatures or specimens (Exhs. X and Y or
3-C) convinces the court that Exhs. A-2 or Z and A-3 were written by defendant Segundo Dalion who admitted that Exhs. X and Y or 3-C are his signatures.
The questioned signatures and the specimens are very similar to each other and appear to be written by one person.
Further comparison of the questioned signatures and the specimens with the signatures Segundo D. Dalion appeared at the back of the summons (p.
9, Record); on the return card (p. 25, Ibid.); back of the Court Orders dated December 17, 1973 and July 30, 1974 and for October 7, 1974 (p. 54 & p.
56, respectively, Ibid.), and on the open court notice of April 13, 1983 (p. 235, Ibid.) readily reveal that the questioned signatures are the signatures of
defendant Segundo Dalion.
It may be noted that two signatures of Segundo D. Dalion appear on the face of the questioned document (Exh. A), one at the right corner bottom of
the document (Exh. A-2) and the other at the left hand margin thereof (Exh. A-3). The second signature is already a surplusage. A forger would not
attempt to forge another signature, an unnecessary one, for fear he may commit a revealing error or an erroneous stroke. (Decision, p. 10) (pp. 42-43,
Rollo)
We see no reason for deviating from the appellate court's ruling (p. 44, Rollo) as we reiterate that
Appellate courts have consistently subscribed to the principle that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial courts are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, since it is undeniable that the trial court is in a more advantageous position
to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., G.R. No. L-20395,
May 13, 1985, 136 SCRA 365; Pring v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41605, August 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 185)
Assuming authenticity of his signature and the genuineness of the document, Dalion nonetheless still impugns the validity of the sale on the ground
that the same is embodied in a private document, and did not thus convey title or right to the lot in question since "acts and contracts which have for
their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument" (Art.
1358, par 1, NCC).
This argument is misplaced. The provision of Art. 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability.
It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by mere consent. No particular form is required for its validity. Upon
perfection of the contract, the parties may reciprocally demand performance (Art. 1475, NCC), i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of ownership of
the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold (Art. 1458, NCC).
The trial court thus rightly and legally ordered Dalion to deliver to Sabesaje the parcel of land and to execute corresponding formal deed of conveyance
in a public document. Under Art. 1498, NCC, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof is equivalent to the delivery of
the thing. Delivery may either be actual (real) or constructive. Thus delivery of a parcel of land may be done by placing the vendee in control and
possession of the land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive).
As regards petitioners' contention that the proper action should have been one for specific performance, We believe that the suit for recovery of
ownership is proper. As earlier stated, Art. 1475 of the Civil Code gives the parties to a perfected contract of sale the right to reciprocally demand
performance, and to observe a particular form, if warranted, (Art. 1357). The trial court, aptly observed that Sabesaje's complaint sufficiently alleged
a cause of action to compel Dalion to execute a formal deed of sale, and the suit for recovery of ownership, which is premised on the binding effect
and validity inter partes of the contract of sale, merely seeks consummation of said contract.
... . A sale of a real property may be in a private instrument but that contract is valid and binding between the parties upon its perfection. And a party
may compel the other party to execute a public instrument embodying their contract affecting real rights once the contract appearing in a private
instrument hag been perfected (See Art. 1357).
... . (p. 12, Decision, p. 272, Records)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the ruling of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
G. LAWS IMPLEMENTING LANDS REGISTRATION, PURPOSES OF LAND REGISTRATION
G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998
LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEKSHENG, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his father, herein private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his
parents. 2 In his answer with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered
in petitioner's name only as a trustee considering that at that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private
respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not
for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation. 3 Petitioner
assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no
avail. 4
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it
was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it
would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be
improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of
ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily for private respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not material to this case. The annotation of a notice
of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.
The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 6 (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently
confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 7 Besides, the certificate
cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 8 Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only
be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to petitioner's fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by
private respondent. 9 What the latter disputes is the former's claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may have become
incontrovertible one year after issuance, 10 yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership. 11
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of
procedure 12 or substance, 13 a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the
notice on the legally untenable grounds that such annotation amounts to a collateral attack of petitioner's certificate of title or that ownership cannot
be adjudicated in a partition case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the
whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own
risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties are still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective
claims of ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public that parcel of
land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect partition of the property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires
the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. 16 Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens is proper. 17
Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired
by the spouses during their marriage. 18 In addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed
lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective
allegations. 19Considering that this is a partition case, the court is required to inquire into the "nature and extent of title" of the supposed
claimant. 20 The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D.
1529, although the latter may be considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY, respondents-appellees.
AQUlNO, J.:
These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are existing and whose reconstitution was,
therefore, uncalled for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan,
now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal both dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding
cancelled titles for those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact
in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No.
915. She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she could not specify, was "N.A." or not available
(Civil Case No. C-677). The petition was sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52, Consolidated Record on
Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of hearing was published in the Official
Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54,
Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.
4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada presented her evidence before
the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot
to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot were
approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of Laborada. The order of
reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot No. 915
was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan. The
register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59,
61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisco S. Bombast, single, residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate,
Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N.A" or not available. She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the
title covering it was destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16, 1967, before
Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on
Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was
published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining
owners (22, Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan
City and Rizal, the officials who would be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of the
title was really missing.
9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon,
Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner
Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The
technical description of the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who submitted a report recommending the
reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the
register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer Certificate of Title No. N.A. 4(R) dated August 27, 1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a
resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021
San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was
issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent
thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation
were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from
accepting or recording any transaction regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate answers containing mere denials. The Commissioner of Land
Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint
trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the two cases holding that the State's evidence was
insufficient to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were
purchasers in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally
and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the originals before the reconstitution" (pp.
160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The State appealed.
15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders of reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no
longer be set aside on May 26, 1970, when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if there were
irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer
the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the registration of any
other person as owner of such land".
The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity
of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763, were simply devices employed by petitioners
Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable
value.
The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court and the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B.,
Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly
reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast on the false or perjurious assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification of the judicial process. One and the
same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully
reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the
evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham
and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and
benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or
titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The
reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of
that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing
(See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent
machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of
registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because the title
of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted. That circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the
necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-
677 and C-763 are declared void and are set aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared
void. The register of deeds is directed to cancel the said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918
of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private respondents-
appellees. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B,
Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parcels to which attention need be given in the present
appeal is Parcel A.
From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.
I. General description. It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92,
94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig
River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for
62.10 meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.
II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the
topographical plan of a lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located
in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on
the plan with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez
was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the topographical operations,
the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net
| Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |

| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |
| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |

| B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |
| D to E | S. 40 50' E | 13.20 | |
| E to F | N. 49 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
| F to G | N. 52 00' E | 10.94 | |
| G to H | N. 37 10' W | 24.90 | |
| H to I | N. 35 45' W | 6.56 | |
| I to J | N. 50 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
| J to K | N. 35 00' W | 7.60 | |
| K to A | N. 42 05' W | 25.50 | |
The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its
boundaries are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the
heirs of Antonio Enriquez.
The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."
{bmc 029035a.bmp}
By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S.
44, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters.
Attention is called to this difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but its importance to the questions presented will
be discussed below.
Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said
persons, as follows:
The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land conterminous with this estate are, according to my information:
The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P.
Roxas, 154 Malacaang, San Miguel.
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the
examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on
the 5th day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well
as the other parcels, the recommends the registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions
of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the following notice:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and
Chandler and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No. 92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No.
96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler,
No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva
No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs of
Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores
Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San Miguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste
No. 122, and Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140,
district of Sampaloc; all of the city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:
Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre
Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the following described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements
of strong materials thereon, situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as follows:
Parcel A. Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S.
intersection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42
E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt. "E"; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38
40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N.
44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.
Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.
Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April,
A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer of said application shall not be granted; and unless
you appear at such court at the time and place aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as confessed, and you will be forever
barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon.
Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year nineteen hundred and six.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.
In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to
each of the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including the
representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff
of the city of Manila, that said notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in two daily
newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.
On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the following certificate relating to the notice and to the
publication of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.
I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice
referring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was
published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and
year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado,
Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes,
a copy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the purposes of the necessary procedure,
I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April, 1906.
A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement
to the court calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error.
The said attorney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the original petition. Our attention has not been
called to any order made by the lower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.
In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906,
at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of
Antonio Enriquez."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the
petitioner and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again
to the fact that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the
existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said
Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order
or judgment in default against all persons:

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION. No. 1895.
Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real estate described herein, vs.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon
Geneto; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams &
Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maxi mo Cortes and
Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants.
The present case having been duly tried, and
Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due from referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of
general circulation, one printed in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia
of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice was effected;
Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish
language to each one of the persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein;
Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land included in the application a certified copy of the notice in
Spanish, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding that set for the
termination of the period fixed;
Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the application, within the period fixed by the law;
This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who may be concerned in opposing the application, which is
granted.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows:
Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the
absolute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is hereinafter set forth:
A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE.
by the Pasig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.
Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W. from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of
Calle Escolta and Passage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42
E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G;
thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to poi nt J; thence N., 38 50' W.,
4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to point of beginning;
having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.
All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey, December 26, 1905.
Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the
aforesaid Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act that may be in
force and effect.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six,
at eight o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian.
Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.
A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the
property became registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court
of Land Registration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we find
that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.
MOTION.
The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and respectfully represents;
I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of closure greater than 1/1500;
II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a portion of said land for use as a public street;
Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in the plan filed in this case.
Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.
It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B,
C, and D), which were included in the petition of the petitioner.
On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila
to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in
said plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with
section 4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the
certificate issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.

L A ND T I T L E S C A S E S (1 s t ) | 10
Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and represents:
1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four
estates, among them the following:
(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.
2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230
Calle Rosario, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the year just past, and it
cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.
3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United
States currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b) was assessed at
55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at 15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated
by the letter (c) was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars United States currency.
4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are
annexed to the above-entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under consideration there are erected
buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry
in that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (c).
5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land
and the buildings stated.
6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the
buildings erected on them are likewise mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the application;
but in the certificate of the decree or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the parcel of land corresponding
to each estate was given, but the respective building on each was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743,
which accompany this application.
8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the
rights of issuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts and vouchers
wherefore do not accompany this application because the applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but averring
that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court of Land Registration and the office of the register of
deeds, as has been ascertained by a person delegated therefor by the applicant.
9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the
building existing thereon, the same as in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed that said omission
is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request
that you order the correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land, without modification or alteration, the
same buildings that existed when legalization of title thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-entitled
case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.
10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building
erected on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein are stated the two points
mentioned.
11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings,
correction of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein record be made of
the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third paragraph of this application.
Manila, February 28, 1912.
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.
On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her
rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple
Association of Manila requested the judge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.
On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance
with the order of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the original
plan presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see page 48):
After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;
(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in
accordance with her original petition; and
(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from
Maria del Consuelo
{bmc 029048.bmp}
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian after notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings
on said motion were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in
addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon the question of the correctness of the original plan
presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some objection
to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and
specific statement of their objections appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears that their
objections to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was
based upon the ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A.
Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous
decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions
of the lower court were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective
parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion,
and the case was appealed to this court. In this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error:
1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and appellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.
2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.
3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be
discussed together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument against the decision of the court rendered on
the 24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued July
21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of the original action to confirm the title of said property."
Appellants now admit that a notice of the pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants
now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The
record shows, as we have pointed out above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of the heirs
of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that
they were the representatives of said heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present proceedings.
So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the various hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that
said attorneys were not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show
any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that
"personal notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first
instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid,
but that the original certificate (No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the question whether or
not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite
to the validity of said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of the original petition had been
given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expiration
of the period during which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court
made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate
of the clerk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be
conclusive proof of such service."
On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No.
496 provides: "If no person appears and answer within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom
it may concern," all the world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by the report
of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of
personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall
bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the
general description 'To all whom it may concern.'"
There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens
system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners
and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in
registration cases is not by law required to give any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31 and
32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such a manner and to such persons
as it may deem proper." Thus it is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give motive to any
person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant
be subjected to harassment or delay or additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice? Section 101
and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with
the law. (Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the
provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree
of registration and the granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an
"innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of
the land to an innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud, in the slightes degree.
While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point.
The requirements relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because of
the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been presented to this court. The same question was
presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that
fraud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In
passing upon that question, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):
In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a party- defendant by publication, but was not
personally served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the world.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction
is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The
record shows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged
even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has
and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration
of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that lands may be acquired by said system of registration.
It is intended only that the title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever
character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent
transfer of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come
into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims,
for the reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible
unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of titles.
Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of
the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first
established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His
ship was found in the most distant ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its
business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might
also, perchance, cause damage to other craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to continue
its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing,
and not its real owner. Consequently there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader purposes of the
Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court
of the State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing
this question, said:
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be
instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter
any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.
As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make a distinction between the constitutional
rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714,
727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which
that may occur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714,
727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice
by publication may be had. Also unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the condemnation
of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.
The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quited "by notice by publication to all persons."
(Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal., 580.)
Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The
state had control over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen,
are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for
the purpose of determining these question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195;
Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70;
Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency
to establish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc.,
Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem, or in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118;
Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's National Bank vs. Cleveland,
117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa,
343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo.,
24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable
method for securing substituted services against residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known
persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it be made to operate on all interest and persons
known or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution,
a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as
known claims indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end and unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service
upon the claimant."
Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue
that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and
to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the state to deal
with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference
to the subject with which the statute deals."
The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe
in suitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen,
notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of
his estate without any actual knowledge of the process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this legislation,
that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the
legislature to determine in the particular instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of constructive notice
shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the Legal steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss,
219 U.S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the
facts and the decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention
of the appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows:
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the country San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and
19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was
destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable
possession of the parcels of land in controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee
simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss,
prayed that the be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee
simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss,
prated that he be adjudged to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that no one else had
any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency of the action was published in certain newspaper,
as was required by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of
the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the complaint, a default was ordered against all persons,
and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and entitled
to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part
thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after
the entry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in
the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple,
absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San
Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law, and that said superior court, in said action
and proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain
jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other
than his rights of possession and occupation." The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not
seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no service was made
upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the
defendant, Zeiss, demurred.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the question involved to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S.,
47), decided each of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court
below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the purpose of registrating his title to the same under an act of the
legislature of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction
of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a method whereby owners in possession of real
estate, where records had been destroyed to such an extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which
would furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that practically all of the public records of title in
several counties in the State of California had recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that
whenever the public records in the office of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by
flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons
holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all the world,
in the superior court for the county in which said real property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all persons
claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular
description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or notice was required to be issued, containing the
names of the court and the country in which the action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved,
which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was
brought, at least once a week for a period of two months.
The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the
plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom
it is herein directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person and
every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the
possession and control of said property, for the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which
is provided for in the law.
In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of
the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual
notice of the application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been
above indicated, that the law was constitutional and that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in the case of the American Land
Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the appellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the
title of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law; and
Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties connected with said action, we are forced to the
conclusion that the appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we deem of importance. It is the question of the right
of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the
petition for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the registration. All the steps in the procedure
required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It is then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the
lines in the plan, said plan will not close that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corners of the wall would not meter. We
believe that an error of the character may be corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the original
petition. Upon the question whether the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or different lands than were included in the original petition,
we find the following statements made by one of the judges who ordered said plan amended. The statements is:
At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is incumbent upon the court than to determine the property as it was
adjudicated in this case.
Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should be the holding on this particular point.
We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to the same question, in an answer presented by
him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition
involved practically the same question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or not additional lands had been included
in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:
Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established
by an order of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be that the dividing line
between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties
beginning on the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description and approved by the court; in other words,
the premises in question of the said Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have not been
changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except
possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roots of the petitioners' building over the aforesaid
registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while
the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of
the certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record
contains no application why the original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That
error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the
Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian to have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located upon the
parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12, 1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of
land in question, together with the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the land as described
in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been
an errors. on the part of the clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors. Section 112 provides that
the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original certificate
was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel
of land, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are
not mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original
certificate be amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as well.
With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no sufficient reasons for not granting the same.
Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with
costs.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to
them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by
him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted
to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however,
without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's
land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and
that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs
had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered
in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant
and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever
right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may
he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the
wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all,
or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system
of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the
law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under
the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and
binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29
Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government.
After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who
are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of
the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any
better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate
of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should
not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not
even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy.
There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be
the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same
between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there
can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The
title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In
some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48;
Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is
a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate
or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the
issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where
two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description
"To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry
of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for
fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that
purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold
to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the
vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think,
in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of
the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in
date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al.
were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his
right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to
Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted
in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold
their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was
the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the
name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906.
"Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the
ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon
which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his
mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the
appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That
is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other
of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier
certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor
only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would
not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is
to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by
him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the
phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land,
is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected
under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights
or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is
never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing
with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y.,
351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable.
He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would hav e
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a
record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may
be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record
contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of
that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when
third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the
plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory,
notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser,"
when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38,
55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser.
He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be
an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate
and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe
the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in
his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he
had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of
the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion
that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from
the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present,
rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors
should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge
of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge
with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained
the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If
that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens
system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as
may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well
as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-13479 October 31, 1959
MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellee UP.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an area of about 430 hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City alleging that for many years prior to March 25, 1877
and up to the present they and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of the land
in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been
paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1356 embraces practically all of plaintiff's property, while the other defendant University of the Philippines began also asserting
title thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the remaining portion; that defendants are not innocent purchasers for
value, having had full notice of plaintiff's actual possession and claim for ownership thereof; and that the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the
technical boundaries set out in defendants' titles was a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants' predecessors in-interest exercised dominical
rights over plaintiff's property.
On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that it is
barred by the statute of limitations; that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; and that in the event the motion is not granted, defendant is
separated from the case and be impleaded in a separate action. To this motion plaintiffs filed a reply alleging that the complaint on its faces alleges a
valid and sufficient cause of action upon which the court could render a valid judgment. Defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the
other hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars to which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On November 20, 1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose Pearanda
filed a motion for intervention which was likewise opposed by plaintiffs. On December 11, 1957, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint
on the ground of lack of cause of action and that it is already barred by the statute of limitations, leaving unresolved the other points raised in the
pleadings for being unnecessary. From this order plaintiffs took the present appeal.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of sufficient cause of action for the reason that on its
face said complaint alleges sufficient facts on which a valid judgment could be rendered against defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint
alleges the following facts: that plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to
plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession
of the land as owners pro indiviso; that sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is embraced and covered
by their respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership
of plaintiffs, and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens system since 1914 when it has been originally
registered in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff's property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant University of the Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of the land which
embraces the remainder of the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. It is therefore, clear that the land in
question has been registers in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-inters since 1914 under the Torren's system and that notwithstanding what
they now claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they have never taken any step to nullify
said title until 1957 when they instituted the present action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what
they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest.
Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the
ground of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581;
Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. 1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as
the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period within
which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed
an action may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the
indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520).
Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and
claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for such averment is sufficient to establish a
cause of action against defendants. This contention overlooks the fact that the land in question is covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that
defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation bought the portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property
said defendant knew of any defect in the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or encumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to
defendant University of the Philippines. It likewise acquired the portion of the property on question sometime in 1955 from its predecessor-in-interest
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. There is also nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property
it knew of any defect in the title appealing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrace. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be purchasers
for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or
the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens System." (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64
Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622; Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as contended, their right however to bring the instant action may
be considered barred by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens system. It
appears that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim
thereto when they brought the present action. In the recent case of Domingo vs. Mayon Realty Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz., 4954),
September 30, 1957 this Court said: "Like Ciriaco Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein could have raised the issue of the validity of the
certificate of title issued to Valle Cruz since 1928, when the foreclosure sale in her favor was confirmed. They failed to do so until 18 years afterwards,
and their action (if any) now should be held by their own laches and negligence."
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records
in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other case even when such case had been tried by the same court and notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been tried before
the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as
noted by former Chief Justice Moran:
In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in the controversy.
Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator of an estate arising from an appeal against the report of the committee on claims appointed
in the administration proceedings of the said estate, to determine whether or not the appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the
record of the administration proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a
moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.
Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely technical because they do not dispute the fact that appellant
Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration
of the same parcel of land which application was denied by the court. It appears that in the registration case the oppositors were the People's Homesite
& Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in effect
it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two case
there is not only identity of subject matter but identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint
on the ground of res judicata.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September
14, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00
as attorneys fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship
developed until petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979. 3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company.4 Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as
husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."5
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani
S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan." 6
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy." 9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the
property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square
meter property in Don Enrique Heights. 10
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
respondent.12 However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. 13 Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition14 of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and
worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied
petitioners claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to
his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of
the company which she and respondent established.19
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.20 He
countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent
and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added
that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. 23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC
decided to give considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the
income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner
argued that the trial courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.25
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity
of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the
ownership of the subject realties itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored
her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not
to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to
the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as husband and
wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper
delineation between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified
property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and,
second assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s).
Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property
without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellants claim of co-
ownership.26
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondents interest as to the existence of co-ownership between
the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership
of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondents self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. 27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls
under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is
necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition
is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may
end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It
may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition
shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with
the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x 29 (Emphasis
supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between
the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering
the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would
not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, 32 but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. 33 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known
as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.34 Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership
is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.36 In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee,
or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. 37 Needless to say, registration
does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed
to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent
with the facts alleged by him.38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made;
and (d) be adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement
of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well,
who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse
may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other
matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial
court, we do not commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of
his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent
himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself and
petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has
no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal
wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in respondents favor is DELETED.
TORRENS SYSTEM: A. CONCEPT, BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE:
G.R. No. 147072 May 7, 2002
FRANCISCO H. LU, petitioner,

vs.
Spouses ORLANDO and ROSITA MANIPON, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The registration of a sale of real estate will not protect a buyer in bad faith, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud. On the other hand, the
preferential right of a first registrant in a double sale is always qualified by good faith.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the October 25, 2000 Decision and the February 9, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55149. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that [petitioner] is directed
to convey Lot 5582-B-7-D covered by TCT No. 171497 to [respondent] Rosita C. Manipon without being entitled to any payment from the
latter."2
The assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration.3
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows:
"On May 9, 1981, Juan Peralta executed a [D]eed of [S]ale by installment in favor of spouses Orlando and Rosita Manipon [herein respondents]. Therein,
Juan Peralta agreed to sell by installment to the said spouses 350 square meters of the 2,078 square-meter lot he owned, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 137911 and located at Barrio Dilan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The said [D]eed was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
"On June 10, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the aforesaid lot to Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). He however failed to pay the loan he
obtained for which the mortgage was constituted and so the same was judicially foreclosed and sold to TSLAI for P62,789.18 which was the highest
bidder. The latter in turn sold the same on July 15, 1988 in the amount of P80,000.00 to the [petitioner]. Thereafter, on August 30, 1989, [petitioner]
caused the subdivision of the said lot into five (5) lots, one of which is Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339 square meters covering the lot which was
earlier sold by installment to [respondents]. The said lot is now covered by TCT No. 171497. In the interim, or on July 30, 1983, Juan Peralta executed
a [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of [respondents] after the couple paid a total amount of P8,000.00 for the subject lot. The aforesaid [D]eed was however
also not registered.1wphi1.nt
"On January 22, 1990, [petitioner] through counsel wrote the [respondents] regarding the presence of the latter's house, which was also being occupied
by them, on the lot in question. Efforts were apparently made by both parties to settle the brewing dispute but to [no] avail. Hence, on February 26,
1990, [petitioner] filed the present action alleging therein that he is the owner of the lot in question including that which was being occupied by
[respondents. Petitioner] further claims that his ownership was confirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, in Civil Case
No. U-4399. He also averred that for reasons unknown to him, [respondents] were claiming ownership of Lot 5582-B-7-D and have constructed a house
thereon on January 22, 1990.
"In the Answer filed by [respondents], they claim that [petitioner] is a buyer in bad faith because even before he bought the 2,078 square-meter lot,
he knew for a fact that they already bought Lot 5582-B-7-D from the original owner of the said lot and have been residing therein since 1981.
[Respondents] also asserted that [petitioner] had knowledge of their claim over the said property because when the whole lot was foreclosed they
shared the same problem as [petitioner] also bought a lot with the 2,078 square-meter lot of Juan Peralta.
"Trial ensued and thereafter, the trial court rendered the questioned judgment. x x x." 4 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not a buyer in good faith despite the fact that he was able to register his ownership of the disputed lot. He
admitted knowing that respondents had constructed a house on the disputed lot in 1984, even before he purchased the property from the loan
association in 1990. Indeed, he waited more than ten (10) years before contesting respondents' occupation and possession of the land. The RTC
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
"1). The [petitioner] is hereby ordered to convey to the herein [respondent] Rosita Manipon, (defendant Orlando Manipon is already dead) the lot
consisting of 339 square meters denominated as Lot 5582-B-7-D and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 171497 after paying the sum of
P13,051.50 plus legal interest to the herein [petitioner] anytime after the finality of this decision.
"2). The third-party defendant, Juan Peralta, is ordered to refund to the defendants Manipons the amount of P18,000.00 paid by the latter to him;
"3). x x x no pronouncement as to damages in favor [of] or against either of the parties." 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court with the modification that respondents would no longer be required to pay petitioner the value of the
disputed portion in a "forced sale." The appellate court said that petitioner knew that Lot 5582-B-7-D had already been sold by Juan Peralta to
respondents before the mother lot was mortgaged, foreclosed and eventually purchased. He bought the entire property from the foreclosing bank,
because he feared that he might lose what he had earlier bought in 1981 a 350 square meter lot which also formed part of the mother lot.
Hence, this Petition.6
The Issues
In his Memorandum,7 petitioner raises the following issues:
"1. Who between petitioner and respondents have a better right of ownership over the lot in question, Lot 5582-B-7-D, with an area of 339 square
meters?
"2. Whether respondents' claim over the lot can rise [above that of] their predecessor in interest Juan Peralta[.]
"3. Whether respondents are under estoppel to question petitioner's ownership over the lot in question[.]
"4. Whether petitioner was in bad faith in the acquisition of the lot in question[.]
"5. And even assuming without admitting that petitioner is under obligation to convey the lot in question in favor of respondents, whether the
consideration of the lot be paid by respondent is P2,000.00 per square meter[.]" 8
These issues can be summed up into three questions: (1) who has a better right to the disputed property? (2) was petitioner a purchaser in bad faith?
and (3) what should be the purchase price of the disputed lot?
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Better Right to the Disputed Lot
Petitioner claims to have a better right to the disputed portion of the real property. First, although respondents had bought it first, he was the first to
register his purchase of the mother lot. Second, respondents' ownership follows that of their vendor who mortgaged to the bank his title to the mother
lot and failed to redeem it.
Petitioner avers that, although respondents purchased the disputed lot by installment on May 9, 1981 and fully paid for it on May 30, 1983, they failed
to register their sale with the Registry of Deeds. In the meantime, on June 18, 1981, Juan Peralta mortgaged the mother lot including the disputed
portion to the Thrift Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (TSLAI). The mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold on July 10, 1988. Petitioner, on
the other hand, bought the whole lot from the bank for P80,000 on July 15, 1988 and registered it in his name on September 23, 1988.
Third, petitioner claims that from the time respondents fully paid for the lot until they received a Notice to Vacate, they did not do anything to perfect
their title thereto; hence, they are now estopped from questioning his ownership of it.
We are not convinced. In estoppel, a person who by deed or conduct induces another to act in a particular manner is barred from adopting an
inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another. 9 This equitable principle will not apply to respondents,
because they exercised dominion over the property by occupying and building their house on it. On the other hand, it was petitioner who, despite
having knowledge of the existence of respondents' house on the disputed portion, bought the whole lot. Before acquiring the mother lot from the
bank, he knew of respondents' claim of ownership and occupation. He cannot now pretend to be an innocent buyer in good faith.
Registration is not the equivalent of title.10 Under the Torrens system, registration only gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. 11 It
was not established as a means of acquiring title to private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. 12 Moreover, the RTC and
the CA have correctly ruled that the preferential right of the first registrant of a real property in a case of double sale is always qualified by good
faith under Article 154413 of the Civil Code.14 A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot
be used as a shield for fraud. 15
"When the registration of a sale is not made in good faith, a party cannot base his preference of title thereon, because the law will not protect anything
done in bad faith. Bad faith renders the registration futile. Thus, if a vendee registers the sale in his favor after he has acquired knowledge that there
was a previous sale of the same property to a third party, or that another person claims said property under a previous sale, or that the property is in
the possession of one who is not a vendor, or that there were flaws and defects in the vendor's title, or that this was in dispute, the registration will
constitute x x x bad faith, and will not confer upon him any preferential right. The situation will be the same as if there had been no registration, and
the vendee who first took possession of the real property in good faith shall be preferred."16
Equally important, under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529), every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted on the certificate and enumerated therein. Petitioner is evidently not a subsequent
purchaser in good faith. Therefore, between the parties, respondents have a better right to the property based on the concurring factual findings of
both the trial and the appellate courts. We quote with approval the following ruling of the CA:
"x x x We are persuaded that [petitioner] knew of the fact that Lot 5582-B-7-D was sold by Juan Peralta to [respondents] before Lot 5582-B-7, the
mother lot of Lot 5582-B-7-D, was mortgaged, foreclosed, sold and [its ownership] transferred x x x to him. In fact, [w]e are convinced that the main
reason why [petitioner] bought the entire lot from the TSLAI was hi fear of losing the 350 square meter-lot he bought sometime in 1981 which also
forms part of Lot 5582-B-7. Having been aware of the 'defects' in the title of TSLAI as far as Lot 5582-B-7-D is concerned, he cannot now claim to be a
purchaser in good faith and for value even if he traces his ownership [to] TSLAI which [w]e believe was a purchaser in good faith the latter not being
aware of the sale that transpired between the [respondents] and Juan Peralta before Lot 5582-B-7 was sold to it in a public auction.
"One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or an interest therein. Thus, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner] was not aware of the sale between Juan
Peralta and the [respondents], still he cannot be considered as a purchaser in good faith because he had personal knowledge of [respondents']
occupation of the lot in question. This fact alone should have put him on guard before buying the land. But as he admitted during the trial, he was not
interested in the [respondents'] reason for occupying the said lot[;] all that he was interested in was to buy the entire lot. This 'devil-may-care' attitude
of [petitioner] has placed him where he is now. Consequently, he cannot be entitled to the relief he is seeking before this [c]ourt.
"True, the purchaser of a registered land is not required to go behind the title to determine the condition of the property. However, a purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of
a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably
be required of a prudent man in a like situation."17
All told, the right of a buyer to rely upon the face of the title certificate and to dispense with the need of inquiring further is upheld only when the party
concerned had no actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to conduct further inquiry.18
Second Issue:
Bad Faith
Petitioner denies being a purchaser in bad faith. He alleges that the only reason he spoke to the respondents before he bought the foreclosed land
was to invite them to share in the purchase price, but they turned him down. This, he argues, was not an indication of bad faith.
Petitioner's contention is untenable. He might have had good intentions at heart, but it is not the intention that makes one an innocent buyer. A
purchaser in good faith or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it, at the time of the purchase or
before any notice of some other person's claim on or interest in it.19 One cannot close one's eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard
and still claim to have acted in good faith. As aptly explained by Vitug:
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the
first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33.) Conversely,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with
bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabaa (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656),
it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering
his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).1wphi1.nt
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which
considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694).
On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any
prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The
only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to
him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs.
Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981)."20
By his own allegations, petitioner admits he was not a purchaser in good faith. A buyer of real property which is in the possession of another must be
wary and investigate the rights of the latter. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer cannot be said to be in good faith. 21
Basic is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court are given great weight, even finality, when they affirm those of the trial court, 22 unless
they fall under the exceptions enumerated in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals.23 Petitioner has not shown that this case falls under any of those exceptions;
hence, we find no cogent reason to depart from this general rule.
Third Issue:
Proper Purchase Price
Petitioner protests respondents' exception from paying him P13,051.50 with legal interest for the conveyance of the disputed portion. Instead, he
pleads that this Court modify the price to P2,000 per square meter.
We are not persuaded. While neither party appealed the issue of the purchase price, petitioner did question the conveyance of Lot 5582-B-7-D to
respondents upon payment of the said price. Hence, the payment was also effectively put in issue. It is well-settled that appellate courts have ample
authority to rule on matters not specifically assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded
issues.24
However, the CA modification exempting respondents from paying petitioner is flawed, because the RTC had ordered Juan Peralta to refund
the P18,000 paid to him by petitioner as the purchase price of the disputed lot. Thus, the trial court correctly ordered (1) respondents to pay petitioner
13,051.5025 plus legal interest for Lot 5582-B-7-D and (2) the third-party defendant Peralta to refund to respondents the P18,000 they had paid for the
lot. The CA ruling would unjustly enrich respondents, who would receive double compensation. In short, the RTC ruling should have been affirmed in
its entirety.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED without the MODIFICATION ordered by the CA. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEGARDS vs SALEEBY (Case above)
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Plaintiff, Capitol Subdivision, Inc., seeks to recover from defendant, the Province of Negros Occidental, the possession of Lot 378 of the cadastral survey
of Bacolod, Negros Occidental, and a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said lot by the defendant from November 8, 1935, in
addition to attorney's fees and costs. On June 28, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal
taken by the defendant, this judgment was, however, set aside by the Supreme Court (see G.R. No. L-6204, decided on July 31, 1956), which, likewise,
ordered the case remanded to the lower court "for further trial", after which another decision was rendered by said court of first instance dismissing
plaintiff's complaint and ordering plaintiff to execute a deed conveying Lot 378 to the defendant. The case is, once again, before us, this time on appeal
by the plaintiff, the subject matter of litigation being worth more than P200,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
The main facts are not in dispute. Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan, consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407, 410, 1205, 1452 and 1641 of the
aforementioned cadastral survey, with an aggregate area of over 502 hectares, originally registered in the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar
Amenabar. Lot 378 has an area of 22,783 sq. meters, more or less, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 (Exhibit 4), issued on August
25, 1916, in the name of the Amenabars. On November 30, 1920, the latter sold the aforementioned hacienda to Jose Benares (also referred to in
some documents as Jose Benares Montelibano) for the sum of P300,000, payable installments, as set forth in the deed of sale, Exhibit 21. On February
8, 1924, said Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 was cancelled and Jose Benares obtained, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 in his
name. Meanwhile, or on March 12, 1921, the Hacienda, including Lot 378, had been mortgaged by Jose Benares to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. for
the sum of P27,991.74 (Exhibit Y-2). On December 6, 1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine
National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (Exhibit Y-1). These transactions were duly recorded in the office
of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, including said Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6295, covering Lot 378.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed, in pursuance of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated
September 29, 1931 (Exhibit U-1), and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6295 was cancelled and, in its stead, transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 0151 which, owing to its subsequent loss,
had to be reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1371 in the name of the Bank, was issued on March 14, 1934 (Exhibit P). Soon, later,
or on November 8, 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual
installments, subject to the condition that, until full payment thereof, title would remain in the Bank (Exhibit R). Thereafter, Carlos P. Benares
transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.
Hence, on September 29, 1949, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff (Exhibit Q) and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1798, covering 378 was issued, in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17166 (or reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-1371), in plaintiff's
name (Exhibit O).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At this juncture, it should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property
for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in
favor of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit Q) by the Bank, on
September 29, 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial
Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately, thereafter, or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the
status of said occupation and, not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer dated June 24, 1950, defendant maintained that it had acquired Lot 378 in the year; 1924-1925, through expropriation proceedings; that
immediately after the commencement of said proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and began the construction thereon of the provincial
hospital, which was completed in 1926; that since then it had occupied said lot publicly, adversely, notoriously and continuously as owner thereof;
that, "for some reason or other and for cause beyond comprehension of the defendant title thereto was never transferred in the name of said
defendant"; that said lot had been placed in defendant's name for assessment purposes under Tax Declaration No. 16269 (dated December 31, 1937);
and that plaintiff had acted in bad faith in purchasing said lot from the Bank in 1935, for plaintiff knew then that the provincial hospital was where it is
up to the present, and did not declare said lot in its name for assessment purposes until 1950, aside from the fact that Alfredo Montelibano, the
controlling stockholder, president and general manager of plaintiff corporation, was the first City Mayor of Bacolod which contributed to the support,
operation and maintenance of said hospital. In an amended answer, dated November 8, 1950, defendant alleged, also, that the aforementioned
expropriation case was "amicably settled as between the parties herein, in the sense that the ... Province of Negros Occidental would pay ... and did in
fact pay to Jose Benares the assessed value of Lot 378 ... and whatever consideration pertaining to said lot in excess of its assessed value which was
paid by the Province would be donated and was in fact donated by said ... Jose Benares in favor of the Province purposely for hospital site".
The main question for determination in this case is whether or not defendant herein had acquired Lot 378 in the aforementioned expropriation
proceedings. This decision appealed from in effect decided this question in the affirmative and declared that plaintiff merely holds it in trust for the
defendant, in view of which it ordered the former to convey said lot to the latter. This conclusion is predicated, substantially, upon the following
premises, namely that case No. 3041 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for the expropriation of the hospital site of said province, was
actually commenced on January 26, 1924; that, among the lands sought to be expropriated in said case was Lot 377 of the aforementioned cadastral
survey, belonging to one Anacleta Agsam, who sold it, on July 10, 1926, to the defendant (Exhibit BB), in whose favor the corresponding transfer
certificate of title (Exhibit BB-2) was issued on July 12, 1926; that, according the testimony of Jose Benares, the expropriation of Lot 378 was settled
amicably upon payment to him of the sum of P12,000; and that defendant's failure to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title to Lot 378
was due to "the mistaken notion or belief that said lot forms part of Lot No. 405-B" in the plan (Exhibit X.).
The testimony of Jose Benares does not deserve, however, full faith and credence, because:
1. Jose Benares appears to be strongly biased and prejudiced against the plaintiff and its president, for the former believes that the latter had
"manipulated" to exclude him from plaintiff corporation, and there have been four (4) litigations between Jose Benares and plaintiff, all of which have
been finally decided against the former;
2. The testimony of Jose Benares is extremely contradictory. Thus: (a) he testified to having been paid P12,000 by the Government, although, at the
rate of P1,000 a hectare at which, he would have us believe, he agreed to sell Lot 378; he should have received less than P3,000 for its 22,783 sq.
meters; (b) he claimed to have received said sum of P12,000.00 "in the year 1924 or 1925", about "2 or 3 days" after the Government had taken
possession of the land, and to have sent the money next day to Pilar Amenabar, but the latter acknowledged to have received the said sum of P12,000
on November 7, 1928;
3. Said testimony was contradicted by that of defendant's witness Jose Marco, former deputy clerk of court of Negros Occidental, for: (a) Jose Benares
asserted that there was a written compromise agreement between him and the Government, whereas Marco averred that agreement was merely
oral; and (b) Marco stated that Benares had agreed to accept, as compensation for Lot 378, the assessed value thereof, which was P430, and to donate
to the Government the difference between this sum and the true value of the property, but Benares affirmed that he was first offered P300 per hectare,
which he rejected, and that he later demanded P1,000 a hectare, which the Government agreed to pay, although, subsequently, he said that Rafael
Alunan and Mariano Yulo had prevailed upon him to accept P1,000 per hectare;
4. Jose Benares was, also, contradicted by defendant's witness Ildefonso Coscolluela, the provincial treasurer of Negros Occidental at the time of the
expropriation, who positively assured the Court that the expropriation case "was not yet terminated" and that "negotiations were still pending" for the
acquisition of Lot 378 by the Government when he retired from the service in 1934.
Upon the other hand, several circumstances strongly indicate that no compromise agreement for the acquisition of the land by the Government had
been reached and that the expropriation had not been consummated. For instance:
1. The only entries in the docket relative to the expropriation case refer to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the corresponding notices
(Exhibit 1);.
2. The registration of the deed of sale of Lot 377 by Anacleta Agsam to the Government, followed by the cancellation of the certificate of title in her
name and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of another title in the name of the Province, when contrasted with the absence of a similar deed of assignment
and of a transfer certificate title in favor of the Province as regards Lot 378, strongly suggest that no such assignment or agreement with respect to Lot
378 had been made or reached;.
3. The property was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. since March 12, 1921, and this mortgage, duly registered and annotated, inter alia,
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1776, in the name of Jose Benares, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Moreover, Lot 378 could not have
been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. Yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings;
4. On December 26, 1926, Jose Benares constituted second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378
not belonged then to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated subsequently thereto without the Bank's knowledge and
participation. What is more, in the deed executed by the Bank, on November 8, 1935 (Exhibit R), promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos
Benares, it was explicitly stated that portions of Lots 405, 407 and 410, forming part of said Hacienda and designated as Lots 405-A, 407-A; 407-B and
410-A, had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been
expropriated.
The decision appealed from says:
... It is evident that there were no further proceedings in connection with the expropriation case and the chances are that the case was dismissed. The
Court had to examine carefully and minutely every single piece of evidence adduced by both parties in order to arrive at the correct solution of the
mystery. The Court believes that the failure of the government to secure the corresponding transfer of title to Lot 378 lies in the mistaken notion or
belief that said lot forms a part of Lot 405-B. This conclusion was arrived at after examining closely the plan, Exhibit X. The plan shows that while all the
subdivided lots were properly identified by lot numbers, that particular portion at the lower corner of the plan encircled with red pencil, marked Exhibit
X-1, is not labelled with the corresponding lot number and that portion is precisely lot No. 378, now in question, where the hospital building was
constructed. This plan was prepared for the government on May 12, 1927 by public land surveyor, Mr. Formento, embracing lots covering over 22
hectares for the Capitol and hospital sites. The fact that this particular portion was not labelled with the corresponding lot number might have misled
the authorities to believe that it formed a part of lot 405-B, which adjoins it, although separated by the creek. This lack of reasonable explanation why
the government failed to secure the corresponding certificate of title to lot 378, when there is sufficient proof that Jose Benares was paid and he
executed the deed of sale in favor of the government.
Although said decision appears to have been prepared with the conscientiousness and moral courage that account for the well earned reputation and
prestige of the Philippine judiciary, we find ourselves unable to concur in the foregoing view. To begin with, there is no evidence, and defendant has
not even tried to prove, that the expropriation case had ever been dismissed insofar as Lot 378 is concerned. Hence, the lower court merely speculated
about the "chances that the (expropriation) case was dismissed." By the way, the contrary was intimated by defendant's witness, Ildefonso Coscolluela,
for he testified that the expropriation case was still pending in 1934, when he ceased to be the provincial treasurer, and the record before us suggests
that since the Province took possession of the land in 1924 or 1925 and completed the construction of the hospital in 1926, there were no further
proceedings in said case..
With respect to the plan, Exhibit X, there is, likewise, no evidence whatsoever that the authorities had been "misled ... to believe" that the portion at
the lower corner of said plan which was enclosed, during the trial, within a circle in red pencil, and marked as Exhibit X-1 formed part of Lot 405-
B, which had been expropriated by the Province of Negros Occidental. In fact, said portion, Exhibit X-1, is not part of the land covered by the plan
Exhibit X. A close examination of the latter shows that the boundaries of said portion are not delimited on the plan. More important still, on the right
hand side of Exhibit X, the following appears in bold letters: "Subdivision & Consolidation PLAN of Lots Nos. 400, 401, 403,405, 406, 407 and 410
Bacolod Cadastre as surveyed for the Provincial Government of Bacolod, Negros Occidental (Capitol site)". The absence of Lot 378 from said
enumeration and the explicit statement in Exhibit X to the effect that it refers to the "Capitol Site", negates the possibility of its being mistaken by any
body, much less by government engineers, as including the hospital site, and, hence, said Lot 378. Lastly, the very evidence for the defendant herein,
specially the assessor's field sheets and declarations of real property for tax purposes (Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) show that the Government had
always regarded Lot 378, not Lot 405, as part of the Provincial Hospital Site. In any event, said possibility of mistake, if any, which would be remote,
cannot suffice to warrant in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary the conclusion that Lot 378 has already been acquired by the
Government.
How about the P12,000 received by Jose Benares from the Government and applied by him to the payment of his debt to Pilar Amenabar? Said amount
could not possibly be the price of Lot 378, for, at the rate of P1,000 a hectare allegedly agreed therefor, its price could not have exceeded P3,000.00.
In this connection, it should be noted that, aside from the expropriation proceedings for the hospital site, another expropriation case for the Capitol
site, affecting another property of Jose Benares, appears to have been instituted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Jose Benares may
have mistaken the payment for his land included in the Capitol site, as one intended for Lot 378, which was affected by the hospital site. And this
possibility may amount to a probability when we consider that he erroneously believed that there had been only one expropriation case, instead of
two cases, against him, and that Lot 378, was not included in the mortgage constituted by him in favor of the Philippine National Bank. Evidently, he
did not have, at least, an accurate recollection of the events or transactions affecting his properties, and, hence, his testimony may not be relied upon.
Thus, the evidence on record is far from sufficient to establish the alleged acquisition by the defendant of Lot 378, which must be held, therefore, to
be the exclusive property of plaintiff herein.
The lower court entertained no doubts about the veracity of the testimony of plaintiff's president to the effect that he did not know until 1949 that
the land on which the Provincial Hospital Building stands is Lot 378. Yet, it held that plaintiff was "not a purchaser in good faith for having constructive
knowledge of defendant's possession of the property at the time it was bought by the plaintiff", because Carlos P. Benares whose right to buy the
Hacienda Mandalagan from the Bank was acquired by plaintiff "is a part owner of the Capitol Subdivision and holds a responsible position therein";
because the hospital was already constructed in Lot 378 since 1926 and the lot was declared in the name of the Government" and "when plaintiff
bought the lot in 1935 the purchaser should have inquired as to its location and improvement"; because "it took the plaintiff 14 years to sleep over the
supposed rights to take possession of lot No. 378"; and because "of the overwhelming fact that lot No. 378 was erroneously or inadvertently included
by the deeds of sale (Exhibits Q & R) executed by the Philippine National Bank in favor of the plaintiff subdivision and that same lot was occupied by
the defendant government for the provincial hospital for the last 34 years, as owner thereof".
As above stated, however, and the lower court conceded, plaintiff's president did not know until 1949 that lot 378 was the very land occupied by the
provincial hospital. Moreover, there is a total absence of evidence that this fact was known to Carlos P. Benares before 1949. Neither may such
knowledge be deduced from the circumstances that he is a son of its former owner, Jose Benares, for even the latter appears not to be well-posted on
the status of his properties. Indeed, Jose Benares did not apparently know that there were two (2) expropriation proceedings effecting said properties:
that the P12,000 received by him from the Government was not meant for Lot 378; and that this lot was one of the properties mortgaged by him to
the Bank.
"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry
(Tiburcio vs. PHHC, L-13479, October 31, 1959; Revilla vs. Galindez, G.R. No. L-19940, March 30, 1960; Manacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, G.R. No. L-13791,
February 27, 1961). In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the
land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the hospital site had
begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the mortgage, duly registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on December 26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage
in favor of the Bank, which acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934. When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the
property to Carlos P. Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as well as when the bank executed the deed of
absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on September 20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that sugar centrals as well
as banks are known to have an array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified in assuming that said
institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were satisfied that the same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were
constituted, and to the Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In short, we find that plaintiff herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to
expropriate Lot 378 is not contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due by reason of the expropriation of said lot. In
short, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time when possession thereof was actually
taken by the defendant, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from which consequential damages the consequential benefits, if
any, should be deducted, with interests, at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking. The
case should be remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the reception of evidence on the date of said actual taking and the amount of compensation
collectible from the defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, as above stated,
with costs against the defendant. It is so ordered..
LAKBAYAN vs SAMOYE (Case above)
PD 1529: A. LAND REGISTRATION
G.R. No. 129760 December 29, 1998
RICARDO CHENG, petitioner,

vs.
RAMON B. GENATO and ERNESTO R. DA JOSE & SOCORRO DA JOSE, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 dated July 7, 1997 in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
44706 entitled "Ricardo Cheng, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon B. Genato, defendant-appellant, Ernesto R. Da Jose & Socorro B. Da Jose, Intervenors-
Appellants" which reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 of Quezon City dated January 18, 1994. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered ordering;
1. The dismissal of the complaint;
2. The cancellation of the annotations of the defendant-appellant's Affidavit to Annul Contract to Sell and plaintiff-appellee's Notice of Adverse Claim
in the subject TCT's, namely, TCT No. T-76.196 (M) and TCT No. T-76.197 (M);
3. Payment by the intervenors-appellants of the remaining balance of the purchase price pursuant to their agreement with the defendant-appellant to
suspend encashment of the three post-dated checks issued since 1989.
4. Ordering the execution by the defendant-appellant Genato of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject two lots covered by TCT No. T-76.196 (M)
and TCT No. T-76.197 (M) in favor of intervenors-appellants Spouses Da Jose;
5. The return by defendant-appellant Genato of the P50,000.00 paid to him by the plaintiff-appellee Cheng, and
6. Payment by plaintiff-appellee Cheng of moral damages to herein intervenors-appellants Da Jose of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00,
attorney's fees of P50,000.00, and costs of suit; and to defendant-appellant, of P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, P50,000.00 in attorney's fees. The
amounts payable to the defendant-appellant may be compensated by plaintiff appellee with the amount ordered under the immediately foregoing
paragraph which defendant-appellant has to pay the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED. 2
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Ramon B. Genato (Genato) is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan covered by TCT No.
T-76.196 (M) 3 and TCT No. T-76.197 (M) 4 with an aggregate area of 35,821square meters, more or less.
On September 6, 1989, respondent Genato entered into an agreement with respondent-spouses Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose (Da Jose
spouses) over the above-mentioned two parcels of land. The agreement culminated in the execution of a contract to sell for which the purchase price
was P80.00 per square meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was duly annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on the same
day. Clauses 1and 3 thereof provide:
1. That the purchase price shall be EIGHTY (P80.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency per square meter, of which the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS shall be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR as partial down payment at the time of execution of this Contract to Sell.
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the VENDEE, Thirty (30) DAYS after the execution of this contract, and only after having satisfactorily verified and confirmed the truth and
authenticity of documents, and that no restrictions, limitations, and developments imposed on and/or affecting the property subject of this contract
shall be detrimental to his interest, the VENDEE shall pay to the VENDOR, NINE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P950,00.00) PESOS. Philippine Currency,
representing the full payment of the agreed Down Payment, after which complete possession of the property shall be given to the VENDEE to enable
him to prepare the premises and any development therein.
On October 4, 1989, the Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles mentioned in clause 3 as aforequoted, asked for and was granted by
respondent Genato an extension of another 30 days or until November 5, 1989. However, according to Genato, the extension was granted on
condition that a new set of documents is made seven (7) days from October 4, 1989. 6 This was denied by the Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the aforesaid extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the
Contract to Sell, 7 on October 13, 1989. Moreover, no annotation of the said affidavit at the back of his titles was made right away. The affidavit
contained, inter alia, the following paragraphs;
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That it was agreed between the parties that the agreed downpayment of P950,000.00 shall be paid thirty (30) days after the execution of the Contract,
that is on or before October 6, 1989;
The supposed VENDEES failed to pay the said full downpayment even up to this writing, a breach of contract;
That this affidavit is being executed to Annul the aforesaid Contract to Sell for the vendee having committed a breach of contract for not having
complied with the obligation as provided in the Contract to Sell; 8
On October 24, 1989, herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng (Cheng) went to Genato's residence and expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On
that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell
with the Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the aforementioned Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the
back of the titles.
Despite these, Cheng went ahead and issued a check for P50,000.00 upon the assurance by Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses
will be annulled for which Genato issued a handwritten receipt (Exh. "D"), written in this wise:
10/24/89
Received from Ricardo Cheng

the Sum of Fifty Thousand Only (P50.000-)
as partial for T-76196 (M)
T-76197 (M) area 35.821 Sq.m.
Paradise Farm, Gaya-Gaya, San Jose Del Monte
P70/m2 Bulacan
plus C. G. T. etc.
Check # 470393 (SGD.) Ramon B. Genato
10/24/89 9
On October 25, 1989, Genato deposited Cheng's check. On the same day, Cheng called up Genato reminding him to register the affidavit to annul the
contract to sell. 10
The following day, or on October 26, 1989, acting on Cheng's request, Genato caused the registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in
the Registry of Deeds, Meycauayan, Bulacan as primary entry No. 262702. 11
While the Da Jose spouses were at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan on October 27, 1989, they met Genato by coincidence.
It was only then that the Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested
against the rescission of their contract. After being reminded that he (Genato) had given them (Da Jose spouses) an additional 30-day period to finish
their verification of his titles, that the period was still in effect, and that they were willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down payment,
later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was formalized in a
conforme letter dated October 27, 1989.
Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his contract with the Da Jose spouses and the return of Cheng's
P50,000.00 check. Consequently, on October 30, 1989, Cheng's lawyer sent a letter 12 to Genato demanding compliance with their agreement to sell
the property to him stating that the contract to sell between him and Genato was already perfected and threatening legal action.
On November 2, 1989, Genato sent a letter 13 to Cheng (Exh. "6") enclosing a BPI Cashier's Check for P50,000.00 and expressed regret for his inability
to "consummate his transaction" with him. After having received the letter of Genato on November 4, 1989, Cheng, however, returned the said check
to the former via RCPI telegram 14 dated November 6, 1989, reiterating that "our contract to sell your property had already been perfected."
Meanwhile, also on November 2, 1989, Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse claim 15 and had it annotated on the subject TCT's.
On the same day, consistent with the decision of Genato and the Da Jose spouses to continue with their Contract to Sell of September 6, 1989, the Da
Jose spouses paid Genato the complete down payment of P950,000.00 and delivered to him three (3) postdated checks (all dated May 6, 1990, the
stipulated due date) in the total amount of P1,865,680.00 to cover full payment of the balance of the agreed purchase price. However, due to the filing
of the pendency of this case, the three (3) postdated checks have not been encashed.
On December 8, 1989, Cheng instituted a complaint 16 for specific performance to compel Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject
properties plus damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial
payment to the total agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which Genato acceded. Thus, their
contract was already perfected.
In Answer 17 thereto, Genato alleged that the agreement was only a simple receipt of an option-bid deposit, and never stated that it was a partial
payment, nor is it an earnest money and that it was subject to condition that the prior contract with the Da Jose spouses be first cancelled.
The Da Jose spouses, in their Answer in Intervention, 18 asserted that they have a superior right to the property as first buyers. They alleged that the
unilateral cancellation of the Contract to Sell was without effect and void. They also cited Cheng's bad faith as a buyer being duly informed by Genato
of the existing annotated Contract to Sell on the titles.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to Cheng unerringly meant a sale and not just a priority or an option
to buy. It cannot be true that the transaction was subjected to some condition or reservation, like the priority in favor of the Da Jose spouses as first
buyer because, if it were otherwise, the receipt would have provided such material condition or reservation, especially as it was Genato himself who
had made the receipt in his own hand. It also opined that there was a valid rescission of the Contract to Sell by virtue of the Affidavit to Annul the
Contract to Sell. Time was of the essence in the execution of the agreement between Genato and Cheng, under this circumstance demand, extrajudicial
or judicial, is not necessary. It falls under the exception to the rule provided in Article 1169 19 of the Civil Code. The right of Genato to unilaterally
rescind the contract is said to be under Article 1191 20 of the Civil Code. Additionally, after reference was made to the substance of the agreement
between Genato and the Da Jose spouses, the lower court also concluded that Cheng should be preferred over the intervenors-Da Jose spouses in the
purchase of the subject properties. Thus, on January 18, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 executed between defendant Ramon Genato, as vendor, and intervenors Spouses Ernesto
and Socorro Da Jose, as vendees, resolved and rescinded in accordance with Art. 1191, Civil Code, by virtue of defendant's affidavit to annul contract
to sell dated October 13, 1989 and as the consequence of intervenors' failure to execute within seven (7) days from October 4, 1989 another contract
to sell pursuant to their mutual agreement with defendant;
2. Ordering defendant to return to the intervenors the sum of P1,000,000.00, plus interest at the legal rate from November 2, 1989 until full payment;
3. Directing defendant to return to the intervenors the three (3) postdated checks immediately upon finality of this judgment;
4. Commanding defendant to execute with and in favor of the plaintiff Ricardo Cheng, as vendee, a deed of conveyance and sale of the real properties
described and covered in Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-76-196 (M) and T-76.197 (M) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, at
the rate of P70.000/square meter, less the amount of P50,000.00 alreaddy paid to defendant, which is considered as part of the purchase price, with
the plaintiff being liable for payment of the capital gains taxes and other expenses of the transfer pursuant to the agreement to sell dated October 24,
1989; and
5 Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff and the intervenors as follows:
a/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to plaintiff;
b/ P50,000.00, as nominal damages, to intervenors;
c/ P20,000.00, as and for attorney's fees, to plaintiff;
d/ P20,000.00, as and for attorney's fees, to intervenors; and
e/ Cost of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decision, herein respondents Ramon Genato and Da Jose spouses appealed to the court a quo which reversed such
judgment and ruled that the prior contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly rescinded; that the subsequent contract to sell between
Genato and Cheng, embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without force and effect due to the failure to rescind the prior contract; and that Cheng
should pay damages to the respondents herein being found to be in bad faith.
Hence this petition. 21
This petition for review, assails the Court of Appeals' Decision on the following grounds: (1) that the Da Jose spouses' Contract to Sell has been validly
rescinded or resolved; (2) that Ricardo Cheng's own contract with Genato was not just a contract to sell but one of conditional contract of sale which
gave him better rights, thus precluding the application of the rule on double sales under Article 1544, Civil Code; and (3) that, in any case, it was error
to hold him liable for damages.
The petition must be denied for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error which would warrant a contrary ruling.
No reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no valid and effective rescission or resolution of the Da Jose
spouses Contract to Sell, contrary to petitioner's contentions and the trial court's erroneous ruling.
In a Contract to Sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a
situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. 22 It is one where the happening of the event
gives rise to an obligation. Thus, for its non-fulfillment there will be no contract to speak of, the obligor having failed to perform the suspensive condition
which enforces a juridical relation. In fact with this circumstance, there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent, the suspensive
condition not having occurred as yet. 23 Emphasis should be made that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor's
failure to comply with an obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to render binding that obligation. 24
Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose
spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses' contention that no further condition was agreed when they were
granted the 30-days extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 should be
upheld for the following reason, to wit; firstly, If this were not true, Genato could not have been persuaded to continue his contract with them and
later on agree to accept the full settlement of the purchase price knowing fully well that he himself imposed such sine qua non condition in order for
the extension to be valid; secondly, Genato could have immediately annotated his affidavit to annul the contract to sell on his title when it was executed
on October 13, 1989 and not only on October 26, 1989 after Cheng reminded him of the annotation; thirdly, Genato could have sent at least a notice
of such fact, there being no stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his titles and make it available
to other would be buyers. It likewise settles the holding of the trial court that Genato "needed money urgently."
Even assuming in gratia argumenti that the Da Jose spouses defaulted, as claimed by Genato, in their Contract to Sell, the execution by Genato of the
affidavit to annul the contract is not even called for. For with or without the aforesaid affidavit their non-payment to complete the full downpayment
of the purchase price ipso facto avoids their contract to sell, it being subjected to a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a suspensive
condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. 25 If the suspensive
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. 26
Nevertheless, this being so Genato is not relieved from the giving of a notice, verbal or written, to the Da Jose spouses for his decision to rescind their
contract. In many cases, 27 even though we upheld the validity of a stipulation in a contract to sell authorizing automatic rescission for a violation of its
terms and conditions, at least a written notice must be sent to the defaulter informing him of the same. The act of a party in treating a contract as
cancelled should be made known to the other. 28 For such act is always provisional. It is always subject to scrutiny and review by the courts in case the
alleged defaulter brings the matter to the proper courts. In University of the Philippines vs. De Los Angeles, 29 this Court stressed and we quote:
In other words, the party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action,
but it proceeds at its own risk. For it is only the final judgment of the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action
taken was or was not correct in law. But the law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and
wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the other's breach will have to passively sit
and watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that
he should exercise due diligence to minimize its own damages (Civil Code, Article 2203).
This rule validates, both in equity and justice, contracts such as the one at bat, in order to avoid and prevent the defaulting party from assuming the
offer as still in effect due to the obligee's tolerance for such non-fulfillment. Resultantly, litigations of this sort shall be prevented and the relations
among would-be parties may be preserved. Thus, Ricardo Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was
rescinded or resolved due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.
Anent the issue on the nature of the agreement between Cheng and Genato, the records of this case are replete with admissions 30 that Cheng believed
it to be one of a Contract to Sell and not one of Conditional Contract of Sale which he, in a transparent turn-around, now pleads in this Petition. This
ambivalent stance of Cheng is even noted by the appellate court, thus:
At the outset, this Court notes that plaintiff-appellee was inconsistent in characterizing the contract he allegedly entered into. In his complaint. 31 Cheng
alleged that the P50,000.00 down payment was earnest money. And next, his testimony 32 was offered to prove that the transaction between him and
Genato on October 24, 1989 was actually a perfected contract to sell. 33
Settled is the rule that an issue which was not raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first tim e on appeal. 34 Issues of fact
and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 35 In fact, both courts below correctly held that the receipt which was the result of their agreement, is a
contract to sell. This was, in fact Cheng's contention in his pleadings before said courts. This patent twist only operates against Cheng's posture which
is indicative of the weakness of his claim.
But even if we are to assume that the receipt, Exh. "D," is to be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it
was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded
a condition never met, as Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier contract with the
Da Jose spouses. In fact, a careful reading of the receipt, Exh. "D," alone would not even show that a conditional contract of sale has been entered by
Genato and Cheng. When the requisites of a valid contract of sale are lacking in said receipt, therefore the "sale" is neither valid or enfoceable. 36
To support his now new theory that the transaction was a conditional contract of sale, petitioner invokes the case of Coronel vs. Court of Appeals 37 as
the law that should govern their Petition. We do not agree. Apparently, the factual milieu in Coronel is not on all fours with those in the case at bar.
In Coronel, this Court found that the petitioners therein clearly intended to transfer title to the buyer which petitioner themselves admitted in their
pleading. The agreement of the parties therein was definitively outlined in the "Receipt of Down Payment" both as to property, the purchase price, the
delivery of the seller of the property and the manner of the transfer of title subject to the specific condition that upon the transfer in their names of
the subject property the Coronels will execute the deed of absolute sale.
Whereas, in the instant case, even by a careful perusal of the receipt, Exh. "D," alone such kind of circumstances cannot be ascertained without however
resorting to the exceptions of the Rule on Parol Evidence.
To our mind, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the agreement between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell, which was, in
fact, petitioner connection in his pleadings before the said courts. Consequently, both to mind, which read:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents he oldest title, provided there is good faith.
However, a meticulous reading of the aforequoted provision shows that said law is not apropos to the instant case. This provision connotes that the
following circumstances must concur:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly the same subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions.
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller.
These situations obviously are lacking in a contract to sell for neither a transfer of ownership nor a sales transaction has been consummated. The
contract to be binding upon the obligee or the vendor depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of an event.
Notwithstanding this contrary finding with the appellate court, we are of the view that the governing principle of Article 1544, Civil Code, should apply
in this situation. Jurisprudence 38 teaches us that the governing principle is PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE (first in time, stronger in right). For not
only was the contract between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer. This principle
only applies when the special rules provided in the aforcited article of the Civil Code do not apply or fit the specific circumstances mandated under said
law or by jurisprudence interpreting the article.
The rule exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer to be able to displace the first buyer are:
(1) that the second buyer must show that he acted in good faith (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of
acquisition until title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession; 39
(2) the second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership
through prior registration as provided by law. 40
Thus, in the case at bar, the knowledge gained by the Da Jose spouses, as first buyers, of the new agreement between Cheng and Genato will not
defeat their rights as first buyers except where Cheng, as second buyer, registers or annotates his transaction or agreement on the title of the subject
properties in good faith ahead of the Da Jose spouses. Moreover, although the Da Jose spouses, as first buyers, knew of the second transaction it will
not bar them from availing of their rights granted by law, among them, to register first their agreement as against the second buyer.
In contrast, knowledge gained by Cheng of the first transaction between the Da Jose spouses and Genato defeats his rights even if he is first to register
the second transaction, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.
"Registration", as defined by Soler and Castillo, means any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict
sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even marginal notes. 41 In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and
permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. 42 We have ruled 43 before that when a Deed of Sale is inscribed in the registry of property on
the original document itself, what was done with respect to said entries or annotations and marginal notes amounted to a registration of the sale. In
this light, we see no reason why we should not give priority in right the annotation made by the Da Jose spouses with respect to their Contract to Sell
dated September 6, 1989.
Moreover, registration alone in such cases without good faith is not sufficient. Good faith must concur with registration for such prior right to be
enforceable. In the instant case, the annotation made by the Da Jose spouses on the titles of Genato of their "Contract To Sell" more than satisfies this
requirement. Whereas in the case of Genato's agreement with Cheng such is unavailing. For even before the receipt, Exh. "D," was issued to Cheng
information of such pre-existing agreement has been brought to his knowledge which did not deter him from pursuing his agreement with Genato.
We give credence to the factual finding of the appellate court that "Cheng himself admitted that it was he who sought Genato in order to inquire about
the property and offered to buy the same. 44 And since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to inquire, of the rights of the Da
Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further elaborate
in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement. As we have held in Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co.: 45
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect . . . of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against . . . . an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry
and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's
title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent
man in a like situation. Good faith, or lack of it, is in its last analysis a question of intention; but in ascertaining the intention by which one is actuated
on a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may with
safety, be determined. So it is that "the honesty of intention," "the honest lawful intent," which constitutes good faith implies a "freedom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry," and so it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of good
faith in which the courts always indulge in the absence of the proof to the contrary. "Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible fact that can
be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judge of by actual or fancied tokens or signs." (Wilder vs. Gilman, 55 Vt.
504, 505; Cf. Cardenas vs. Miller, 108 Cal., 250; Breaux-Renoudet, Cypress Lumber Co. vs. Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-2098; Pinkerton Bros. Co. vs.
Bromely, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.) (Emphasis ours)
Damages were awarded by the appellate court on the basis of its finding that petitioner "was in bad faith when he filed the suit for specific performance
knowing fully well that his agreement with Genato did not push through. 46Such bad faith, coupled with his wrongful interference with the contractual
relations between Genato and the Da Jose spouses, which culminated in his filing of the present suit and thereby creating what the counsel for the
respondents describes as "a prolonged and economically unhealthy gridlock 47 on both the land itself and the respondents' rights provides ample basis
for the damages awarded. Based on these overwhelming evidence of bad faith on the part of herein petitioner Ricardo Cheng, we find that the award
of damages made by the appellate court is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED EN TOTO. SO ORDERED.
B. PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF REGISTRATION IN GENERAL
Lee Tek Shecg vs CA (Case above)
G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1

vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision 2dated February 12, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled
"Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero, Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City."
The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:
Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon favorable report and
recommendation of the District Land Officer, Guerreros application was approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with the boundaries of the land
awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is contained at the
back of the Order of Award.
Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was issued in favor of respondent. Pursuant thereto the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.
On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud,
false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her
house is situated and where she has been residing since 1961.
A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director of Lands issued an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z.
Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the then Minister of Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a Decision dated
July 22, 1985.
Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22, 1985. Acting on the motion for reconsideration, the President, , ordered
that the case be remanded to the DENR [Department of Environment and Natural Resources] for the latters office to conduct an ocular investigation
and resurvey of the disputed area. The said directive is contained in the Order dated October 30, 1987(Exhibit "J").
Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and relocation survey was conducted by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K")
was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of the titled property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL
PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the physical possession of
Guerrero. It was also found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the Order of Award in favor of Guerrero,
shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz: bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public Land.
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR] Ocular Investigation and Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") , issued
an order directing the DENR to implement the Report for the proper correction of the technical description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28
issued to respondent.
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines] instituted the instant action
[Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition , alleging among other things, that the RTC of Quezon
City was without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands petition and that the said petition was defective in form and substance, inasmuch as it failed
to name [Guerrero] who holds a certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) over the properties subject of the petition, as respondent in the action, and that the
title sought to be amended was irrevocable and can no longer be questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Trial of the petition followed with the Director of
Lands, on one hand, and [Guerrero], on the other, presenting their respective evidence and witnesses.3 [Words in bracket added.]
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its allegation that respondent obtained the sales patent and the
certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the original
certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1) year from the
entry of the decree of registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated February 12, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, rationalizing as
follows:
It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other
certificate of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other
similar patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if
ownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or reopened within one year after the entry thereof, upon a charge of actual
fraud, a patent awarded in accordance with the Public Land Law may be reviewed within one year from the date of the order for the is suance of the
patent also on the ground of actual fraud.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx there is no showing that at the time the [respondent] applied for his miscellaneous sales patent, there were third persons who had been in
occupation of the land applied for. While subsequent survey documents, prepared as a consequence of the protest filed by the Bustamentes, report
the possession of the Bustamantes of a portion of the land, and the erection of their house thereon, these reports do not indicate if such st ructures
were existing at the time the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent,
and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of March 23, 1998.5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in holding -
I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondents
title was procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent despite the
final ruling of the Office of the President from which ruling respondent did not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third person of the land, or a portion thereof, after the award and issuance of
the patent to the applicant despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed within one year from the issuance of patent. 6
Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation. To support its basic
posture, petitioner points to the verification survey conducted by Engr. Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that
respondents entitlement to a public land award should have been limited to a 91-square meter area instead of the 174 square meters eventually
granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the
Torrens system of registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition the presence of fraud is factual. As a general rule, this Court
does not review factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has
consistently held, factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court,7 save when the
judgment of the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that court overlooked certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 8Obviously, petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having the
Court review the factual determinations of the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent procured Miscellaneous
Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 through fraud and misrepresentation.
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement,
is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land
Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the
fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law
warrants or reserves.9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him complete
peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands belonging to the Government of the [Republic of the Philippines] are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the
duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before its delivery
to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances,
whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed,
grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration
shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds
for the province where the land lies. xxx. (Words in bracket added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of registration
obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says so:
SEC. 38. xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the [Republic of the Philippines] and all the branches thereof, . Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the decree of registration within
one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests
and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action,
or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day
in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant. 13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review
or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consi sts in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in deliberately
failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the
true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects
and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and
not collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the
presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise
agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case.15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not
adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding
certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting
its case by reason of such fraud. In fact, other than its peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial court that "the patentee, Benjamin
Guerrero, obtained the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts," 16 petitioner did not
specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by respondent in procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered
to substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.17 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as
varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. 18 Thus,
the law requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. 19
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report 20 which stated that respondent Guerrero was entitled to only 91 square meters of the subject
lot instead of 174 square meters which was awarded to him. There is, however, no proof that the area eventually awarded to respondent was
intentionally and fraudulently increased. It was never proven that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award of a bigger area of 174
square meters instead of 91 square meters. Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error which may have been committed by its agents
who had surveyed the subject property nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as to the reason for such discrepancy. Thus, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted
for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the material facts set out in the application.22 The law also requires sufficient notice to the municipality
and barrio where the land is located in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent filed his miscellaneous sales application, an actual investigation
and site verification of the parcel of land was conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that the land was free from claims and
conflicts.24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the lot in question was posted at the District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon City Hall, and
at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965 which was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot.
The said notice was worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of Lands, Manila on or before the date of the sale; otherwise such claim
shall forever be barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of Patent"27 dated June 28, 1982 were both duly signed by the Director
of Lands. The "Order of Award" even declared that Guerrero has in good faith established his residence on the land in question. On the other hand,
the "Issuance of Patent" stated that the land consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim and that Guerrero has fully paid the
purchase price of the lot. Having complied with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the issuance of the patent, respondent was thus issued
MSP No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly performed their official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land
registration that led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in respondents name are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this
legal presumption will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce
the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. 28 Besides, this presumption of regularity has not been overcome by the
evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain petitioners contention that fraud tainted the sales patent granted to respondent
Guerrero, as well as the certificate of title issued in consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail itself of the remedy within the prescribed period. Under Section
38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of the patent by the government. 29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an action to amend respondents
certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to
timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerreros title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired property is not barred by prescription. Thus, it can still recover the
land granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an action, even after the lapse of one year, for the reversion
to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private individuals. 30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of
in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke this
defense for, as discussed earlier, it was never proven that respondents patent and title were obtained through actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the corresponding certificate of title ceases to be part of the public domain.
As such, it is considered a private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. 31
Petitioner likewise insists that respondents title had yet to attain the status of indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file
a protest on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-year prescriptive period.
We do not agree.
While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of
Lands instead of with the regional trial court as mandated by the aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states
that a petition for review of a decree of registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court). The law did not say
that such petition may be filed with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law contemplates in allowing a review of
the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court where each party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and
where each of them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required
in administrative proceedings. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, than
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32On the other hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the merits
before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of achieving a more in-depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.
Hence, contrary to petitioners assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the Bureau of Lands cannot be considered in t he context of a petition
to review the decree of registration issued to respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with
the RTC and obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of
land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be
that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should
be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment of OCT No. 0-28, derogates the very integrity of the system as it
gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like herein respondent, that their titles can be questioned by the same authority who had approved their
titles. In that case, no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for land registration officers can question
his title any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he had
bought the subject lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now impugning his title.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, 35 justice and equity demand
that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever
to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who
are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.37
Respondents certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Legards vs Saleeby (Case above)
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of
these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our
resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate
of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The
Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No.
25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired,
ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29,
1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the
petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March 25, 1983,
which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983.
The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the respondent court should now be
implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel
for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession
and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate
Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court
and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as
raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the
issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court
and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered.
(pp. 107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No.
64432. On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion
of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the
meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the
same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in
G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court
(First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No.
64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court
and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared
valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for."
(p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo,
Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No.
67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional
Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to
register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for.
Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the
Court Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November
6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito,
Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of
Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the
writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present motion is
hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed
for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its order
dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the
date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered
to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain
a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed
a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned
in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating
therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this
Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds
AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates
of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of
TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried
out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated
February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February
12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987
order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the
petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and
to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding
section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding
was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case
No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido,
Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the
registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
(pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the
Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for
reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling
the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens
certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners'
Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido,
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos
who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and
the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners
Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name
of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel
Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full
implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs
of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could
rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the
results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing
cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the
cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10
SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending
and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far
presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal
Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis
pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case
No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when
in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated
October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed
that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the
issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a
torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him
of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance
of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by
the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register
of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular
Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register
instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the
English Language the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or
directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him,
he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No.
4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as
excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under
their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan,
and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went
to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title.
Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is
considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without
violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name
of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or
heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register
of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and
P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required
of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that
the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner
of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided
by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission
of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for
the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. 1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence
or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties
affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions?
If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after,
not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards.
(Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in
doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do
is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step
to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party
in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by
the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered
lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such
cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution
of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after
receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any
party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who
thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers
of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1wph1.t
G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 14, 2010 and the Resolution2dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70235, which affirmed with modification the assailed Decision 3 dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina
City, Branch 273, in Civil Case No. 96-274-MK.
The following facts are found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court:
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. 4 Sometime in 1988 when the parties were still
engaged, Shirley was working as a domestic helper in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money 5 for the purchase of a residential lot
in Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home. Rogelio was then also working abroad as a seaman. The following year, or on
September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) 6 from Rodeanna Realty
Corporation. The subject property has an aggregate area of one hundred eleven square meters (111 sq. m.) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. N-133844.7 Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject
property with the developer through SSS8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations. On October 19, 1989, TCT No.
1719639 over the subject property was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal solely under the name of Rogelio.
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While
overseas, she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, and was
able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as his wife.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal
Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. Shirley later withdrew the complaint for legal separation and liquidation of
property, but re-filed10 the same on January 29, 1993. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the
subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers - one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) - of the
existence of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and
terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale 11 dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's
consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner's undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on
the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.
Meanwhile, in a Decision12 dated May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70, granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the dissolution
and liquidation of the regime of absolute community of property between Shirley and Rogelio, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the instant petition for legal separation between the subject spouses with all its legal
effects as provided for in Art. 63 of the Family Code. Their community property is consequently dissolved and must be liquidated in accordance with
Art. 102 of the New Family Code. The respondent is thus hereby enjoined from selling, encumbering or in any way disposing or alienating any of their
community property including the subject house and lot before the required liquidation. Moreover, he, being the guilty spouse, must forfeit the net
profits of the community property in favor of the petitioner who is the innocent spouse pursuant to Art. 43 of the aforesaid law. Finally, in the light of
the claim of ownership by the present occupants who have not been impleaded in the instant case, a separate action must be instituted by the
petitioner against the alleged buyer or buyers thereof to determine their respective rights thereon.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila and the National Statistics
Office (NSO), sta. Mesa, Manila.
SO ORDERED.13cralawlawlibrary
Rogelio appealed the above-quoted ruling before the CA which denied due course and dismissed the petition. It became final and executory and a writ
of execution was issued in August 1995.14
On August 27, 1996, Shirley instituted a Complaint 15 for Rescission of Sale and Recoveiy of Property against petitioner and Rogelio before the RTC of
Marikina City, Branch 273. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on February 14, 2001, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Shirley Nuega and against defendant Josefina Nobleza,
as follows:
1) the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the one half (1/2) portion of plaintiff
Shirley Nuega is concerned, is hereby ordered rescinded, the same being null and void;
2) defendant Josefina Nobleza is ordered to reconvey said 55.05 square meters to plaintiff Shirley Nuega, or in the alternative to pay plaintiff
Shirley Nuega the present market value of said 55.05 square meters; and
3) to pay plaintiff Shirley Nuega attorney's fees in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
For lack of merit, defendant's counterclaim is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, while Rogelio did not appeal the ruling of the trial court. In its assailed Decision promulgated on May 14, 2010,
the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court's ruling, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, subject to the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 14 February 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina
City, Branch 273 in Civil Case No. 96-274-MK is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 December 1992 is hereby
declared null and void in its entirety, and defendant-appellant Josefina V. Nobleza is ordered to reconvey the entire subject property to plaintiff-
appellee Shirley B. Nuega and defendant Rogelio Nuega, without prejudice to said defendant-appellant's right to recover from defendant Rogelio
whatever amount she paid for the subject property. Costs against defendant-appellant Nobleza.
SO ORDERED.17cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated July 21, 2010, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition
raising the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I.] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY SUSTAINING THE FINDING
THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH.
[II.] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY DECLARING AS NULL AND
VOID THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 29 DECEMBER 1992 IN ITS ENTIRETY. 18
We deny the petition.
Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property,
for which a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some other person
in the property.19 It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not enough
to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith.20 To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is that first and
foremost, the "buyer in good faith" must have shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did
everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns
when placed in such a situation. The prudence required of a buyer in good faith is "not that of a person with training in law, but rather that of an
average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
nil.'"21A buyer in good faith does his homework and verifies that the particulars are in order such as the title, the parties, the mode of transfer and the
provisions in the deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence can be shown by making an ocular inspection of the
property, checking the title/ownership with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the minutiae such
as the parameters or lot area, the type of ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily includes an
inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property in
the possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the surrounding facts and
circumstances like what any prudent man in a similar situation would do. 22
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good faith of the subject property which is titled under the name of the seller Rogelio A.
Nuega alone as evidenced by TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724.23 Petitioner argues, among others, that since
she has examined the TCT over the subject property and found the property to have been registered under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is an
innocent purchaser for value and "she is not required to go beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of the subject property at the time of the
consummation of the sale and at the date of the sale." 24
We disagree with petitioner.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding
circumstances relevant to the sale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong,25 petitioners therein - as does petitioner herein - were also harping that due to the indefeasibility
of a Torrens title, there was nothing in the TCT of the property in litigation that should have aroused the buyer's suspicion as to put her on guard that
there was a defect in the title of therein seller. The Court held in the Spouses Raymundo case that the buyer therein could not hide behind the cloak
of being an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the land purchased is the seller. The
Court ruled in this case that the buyer was not an innocent purchaser for value due to the following attendant
circumstances, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, we are not convinced by the petitioners' incessant assertion that Jocelyn is an innocent purchaser for value. To begin with, she is
a grandniece of Eulalia and resides in the same locality where the latter lives and conducts her principal business. It is therefore impossible for her not
to acquire knowledge of her grand aunt's business practice of requiring her biyaheros to surrender the titles to their properties and to sign the
corresponding deeds of sale over said properties in her favor, as security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on guard for any possible abuses that
Eulalia may commit with the titles and the deeds of sale in her possession. 26cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in the case of Arrofo v. Quio,27 the Court held that while "the law does not require a person dealing with registered land to inquire further
than what the Torrens Title on its face indicates," the rule is not absolute. 28 Thus, finding that the buyer therein failed to take the necessary precaution
required of a prudent man, the Court held that Arrofo was not an innocent purchaser for value, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to act as a prudent buyer. True, she asked her daughter to verify from the Register of Deeds if
the title to the Property is free from encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that the Property is within the neighborhood and that she conducted
an ocular inspection of the Property. She saw the house constructed on the Property. Yet, Arrofo did not even bother to inquire about the occupants
of the house. Arrofo also admitted that at the time of the sale, Myrna was occupying a room in her house as her lessee. The fact that Myrna was renting
a room from Arrofo yet selling a land with a house should have put Arrofo on her guard. She knew that Myrna was not occupying the house. Hence,
someone else must have been occupying the house.
Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the house, and if a lessee, who received the rentals from such lessee. Such inquiry would have led
Arrofo to discover that the lessee was paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and Myrna, who claimed to own the Property. 29cralawlawlibrary
An analogous situation obtains in the case at bar.
The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the seller Rogelio himself who was therein also described as "single". However, as in the
cases of Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are circumstances critical to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the ruling of both the appellate
and lower courts that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
First, petitioner's sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirley's house - the subject property - in Ladislao Diwa
Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of the subject
property. Had petitioner been more vigilant, she could have inquired with such facility - considering that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa
Village where the property is located - if there was any person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the subject property.
To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village - including petitioner's sister - not to engage in any
deal with Rogelio relative to the purchase of the subject property because of the cases she had filed against Rogelio. Petitioner denies that respondent
had given such warning to her neighbors, which includes her sister, therefore arguing that such warning could not be construed as "notice" on her part
that there is a person other than the seller himself who has any right or interest in the subject property. Nonetheless, despite petitioner's adamant
denial, both courts a quo gave probative value to the testimony of respondent, and the instant petition failed to present any convincing evidence for
this Court to reverse such factual finding. To be sure, it is not within our province to second-guess the courts a quo, and the re-determination of this
factual issue is beyond the reach of a petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law may be reviewed. 30
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale also pose question on the claim of petitioner that she is a buyer in good faith.
As correctly observed by both courts a quo, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated on December 29, 1992. However, the Community Tax
Certificates of the witnesses therein were dated January 2 and 20, 1993.31 While this irregularity is not a direct proof of the intent of the parties to the
sale to make it appear that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on December 29, 1992 - or before Shirley filed the petition for legal separation on
January 29, 1993 - it is circumstantial and relevant to the claim of herein petitioner as an innocent purchaser for value.
That is not all.
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the civil status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while petitioner as buyer was indicated as
"single," viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with postal address at 2-A-2 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter
referred to as the VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and with postal address at No. L-2-A-3 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila,
hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE.32cralawlawlibrary
It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly claimed that Rogelio is "single" under TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723
and D-012-04724, his civil status as seller was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale - further creating a cloud on the claim of petitioner that she is
an innocent purchaser for value.
As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did not err when it modified the decision of the trial court and declared that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in its entirety.
The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the subject property is Rogelio alone, respondent was able to prove at the trial court
that she contributed in the payment of the purchase price of the subject property. This fact was also settled with finality by the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case for legal separation and liquidation of property docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510. The pertinent portion
of the decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the parties prior to their marriage forms part of their community property regime, xxx
From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial contribution for the purchase of the house and lot covered by TCT 171963. Thus, the
present lot which forms part of their community property should be divided equally between them upon the grant of the instant petition for legal
separation. Having established by preponderance of evidence the fact of her husband's guilt in contracting a subsequent marriage xxx, Shirley alone
should be entitled to the net profits earned by the absolute community property. 33cralawlawlibrary
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent's financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property.
Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defin es what constitutes
community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by
the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the
marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income,
if any, of such property.
As held in Quiao v. Quiao:34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property
of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name
appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold
the subject property via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 - or during the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96
of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is
void, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. 35cralawlawlibrary
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent
or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void. As correctly explained by the appellate
court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject property to defendant-appellant Josefina on 29 December 1992 or during the existence
of Rogelio's marriage to plaintiff-appellee Shirley, without the consent of the latter. The subject property forms part of Rogelio and Shirley's absolute
community of property. Thus, the trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale null and void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the
one-half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-appellee Shirley. In absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells
(their) property, such sale is void. The consent of both the husband Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of one
renders the entire sale null and void including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio who contracted the sale with
defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the Deed of Absolute Sale x x x entered into by and between defendant-appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio
dated 29 December 1992, during the subsisting marriage between plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio, was without the written consent of Shirley,
the said Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in declaring the said Deed of Absolute Sale as void only insofar as the
1/2 portion pertaining to the share of Shirley is concerned. 36cralawlawlibrary
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire
consideration of the contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of her
payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall only be "liable for x
x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x."
As correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the
family, respondent cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2010 and
July 21, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70235 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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L A ND T I T L E S C A S E S (1 s t ) |1

G.R. No. 78903 February 28, 1990

SPS. SEGUNDO DALION AND EPIFANIA SABESAJE-DALION, petitioners,

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment.

(c) Dismissing the counter-claim. (p. 38, Rollo)

The facts of the case are as follows:

On the North-property of Sergio Destriza and Titon Veloso;

On the East-property of Feliciano Destriza;

On the South-property of Barbara Boniza and

On the West-Catalino Espina.

(pp. 41-42, Rollo)

(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By a subscribing witness

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

... . (p. 12, Decision, p. 272, Records)

G. LAWS IMPLEMENTING LANDS REGISTRATION, PURPOSES OF LAND REGISTRATION

G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998

G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs.

G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,

| Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |

| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Date of survey, December 26, 1905.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

The present case having been duly tried, and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 1895.

Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.

Manila, February 28, 1912.

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

From the record the following facts appear:

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-13479 October 31, 1959

MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants,

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner,

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This suit stemmed from the following facts.

Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:

I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.

I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;

We find the petition bereft of merit.

TORRENS SYSTEM: A. CONCEPT, BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE:

G.R. No. 147072 May 7, 2002

FRANCISCO H. LU, petitioner,

The assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration.3

Ruling of the Trial Court