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Wolterstoff

83-84 The definition of what is rational is contested, Lockes argument of entitlement

Locke believes that in pursuing such procedure of inquiry one could get to the natural law reasons
that are accessible without the aid of non-independent sources, including reasons about God. But
this is not from tradition, rather it is the employment of optimal practice - the verification of the
things as they are.

86-87 Many moral beliefs are not entitled, same for religious, and many are, including religious.

88 In Locke probability inferences counts as much as deductive in morality, but a science of morals
was not developed by him

89 In forming beliefs in response to experience, I do not and cannot operate as a generic human
being. I operate as a person with such-and-such a contour of beliefs, such-and-such a contour of
affections, such-and-such a contour of habits and skills of attention and so forth. What I come to
believe is a function of my experience plus what I already believe. (89)

Traditions plays a major role in defining the content of what is rational

98 Rawls does not spell out what is reasonable, but he believes that public reason should address
each citizens reason. The problem, again, is that our common human reason is always a
programme human reason; what we come to believe by the function of our reason (whatever Rawls
might have in mind by that) is a function, in part, of what we already believe. And we differ in our
beliefs differ in particular, now, in our comprehensive perspectives

101 disagreement on the criteria of rational is allowed by Rawls. Then, public reason itself comes
up as an ideal.

108 Rule of the majority: liberal in the end try to be communitarian rather than live with different
communities

155 liberal democracies were not suppose to coerce the good life, but logic of the parliament
prevails over the logic of the Quaker assembly

156 Audi we can coerce people to do only what they would autonomously do if appropriately
informed and fully rational
Generality of reasonableness as secular

160 respect is not neutrality, as I need to understand respect from the point of view of the hearer
and not only the speaker. Respect is conversation, and exchange of reasons

Law of the majority yet. Politics of earthly citizens (Augustinian point)

161 the point of full rationality appears to lead to idealisations that overrides diversity.

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