Technical Aspects of Storage Tank Loss Prevention
Szu-Ying Huang and M. Sam Mannan
Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX, 77843-3122; mannan@tamu.edu (for correspondence)
Published online 8 February 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.11550
Storage tanks are the most common chemical containing
vessels within the process industries. There have been many
accidents associated within storage tank (material deficiency,
structure design failures, operation error etc.) or among stor-
age areas throughout the history. Both human error and nat-
ural disasters can result in devastating incidents for tanks
that are usually kept outdoors under weather influences, as
well as the tank bodies and accessories are poorly designed,
abused, or are not effectively inspected and maintained. There
are potential hazards which must be assessed carefully before
construction, during operation, and after shutdown of any
storage areas including hazardous or flammable chemicals.
This article offers an overview of the tank and tank farm
with significant incident causes about aboveground tank
design failures, operation problems, and maintenance issues,
with the relating discussion about the implementation of pro-
cess safety management and regulations. Also, some innova-
tive storage unit technologies including groundings, roof
design, safer filling procedures, and tank fire mitigation sys-
tems are introduced to give a proper information session to
help industry understand the tank hazards and implement
adequate actions to prevent incidents and losses. V C 2013
American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog
32: 2836, 2013
Keywords: storage tank incidents; loss prevention; tank
design; tank inspection; hazardous material storage
regulations
INTRODUCTION
Storage tanks are the fundamental for the storing of liq-
uid, gas, and other chemical fluids. Storage tanks provide
accommodation of inventory for raw materials, additives
reactants, intermediate materials, finished products, and
wastes. Thus, the safety on tank itself is important, as it is
the first layer in contact with chemical materials and con-
nected with other process devices.
Among the various functions, design, and shapes of tanks,
the most discussed and applied one is the category of
aboveground storage tanks (AST). ASTs are easy to manage
and maintain as long as they are above the ground and
would suffer less from the soil contaminations, pressure of
structure design, and spacing with other infrastructure system
of the location of tank farm. Usually, crude oil products,
intermediates, and raw chemicals with flammable or toxic
hazards are likely to be stored in ASTs. This work will con-
sider the more general classifications of storage units by
operation conditions and containing materials, with respect
to the design differences on these two main categories of
C 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
V hood. The collapsing tank wall seriously injured the welder
28 March 2013
tanks. Also, as long as most oil and gas industry pay atten-
tion to low-pressure atmospheric tankage and the related
loading/discharging of railcars, ships, and road trucks found
in terminals or tank depots, being a specific area of tank
farm incidents occurrence studies (BP Process Safety Series,
2005), reviews of previous storage tank studies will be con-
sidered and the main concern of this article.
To analyze random process elements, there are three
main parts which shall be considered carefully: design speci-
fications, operation conditions (pressure, temperature, flow
parameters), and maintenance (including regular repair
works, monitoring of abnormal cases, and re-startup checks).
The tank selections (cone roof, open top, internal floating,
etc) are based on the operating conditions, containing mate-
rials, and local environmental cases. Each of these requires
more concern on technology innovations for the potential
hazards due to their specifications. The statistics [1] of tank
and tank farm incidents expresses that overfilling has caused
69 out of 242 reported tank-related incidents happening in
the US region from 1960 to 2006, while in the same time
range there were 80 lightning-caused fires destroying many
storage tanks. Many aspects of tank in process or even not-
in-use can go wrong. The tank spacing, grounding devices,
relief valves, level control, monitoring system, and many
other layers of protection in technical point of view shall be
carefully analyzed.
In summary, this article will provide the following
information to review the process safety of storage tank and
depot areas:
 Learn from history: anything small can cause huge
troubles
 Tank and tank farm hazards analysis
 Recent technology and regulations on loss prevention of
tank and tank farms
 What else can we do to make tank/tank farm safer
EXAMPLE CASE OF STORAGE TANK AND TANK FARM INCIDENT
Chemical plant incidents attract unwanted attention. Tank
and tank farm issues are not the exception. In November 2008,
there was a catastrophic tank collapse happened in Allied Ter-
minal Inc. Tank storage area at Chesapeake, Virginia. On the
day of the incident, Allied employees were filling the incident
Tank with liquid fertilizer UAN32 to check for leaks prior to
painting the tank. During the filling, a welder and his helper
sealed leaking rivets on the tank. At a fill level about 3.5 inches
below the (calculated) maximum liquid level, the tank split
apart vertically, beginning at a defective weld at midway up
the tank. The liquid fertilizer overtopped the secondary con-
tainment, partially flooding the site and adjacent neighbor-
Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1)
and his helper. Over 200,000 gallons of the liquid fertilizer
were not recovered; some entered the southern branch of the
Elizabeth River, causing serious contamination.
According to Chemical Safety Boards (CSB) investigation,
the causes of the incident shall be traced back to 2 years
before the incident tank was put into use [2]. Originally, the
tank (numbering Tank 201) was used for petrochemical stor-
age; Allied modified the welding in order to make it a liquid
fertilizer container. Since the chemicals had different specific
gravity, Allied Inc. contracted G&T to modify Tank 201 by
replacing the vertical riveted joints with butt-welded joints.
This was to increase the strength of the joints, which would
permit an increase in the maximum liquid level and allow
more fertilizer to be stored in Tank 201. In 2007, While G&T
was modifying Tank 201, another contracted inspector HMT
performed an American Petroleum Institute (API) 653 Out-of-
Service inspection saying that the safety filling height was
25.65 feet. This number was increased to 27.01 feet based on
an April 2001 metallurgical test report provided by Allied Inc.
On the day of incident, as the tank was being filled, when
the tank reached a level of 26.72 feet, a vertical split started
midway up the shell and rapidly ruptured to the floor and to
the roof of the tank on the side opposite the workers. As the
pressure of the liquid fertilizer inside the tank opened the split,
the tank shell separated from the bottom and roof, quickly
spilled and released the contents and caused damages.
The main issues regarding this incident had brought multi-
ple layers of problems. First, Allied did not ensure that welds
on the plates to replace vertical riveted joints met generally
accepted industry quality standards for tank fabrication. Sec-
ond, the company had not performed postwelding inspection
(spot radiography) required for the calculated maximum liquid
level for the tank. Finally, the employer had no safety proce-
dures or policies for work on or around tanks that were being
filled for the first time following major modifications and
directed contractors to seal leaking rivets while tank was being
filled to the calculated maximum liquid level for the first time.
Making the responsible statement clearer, Allied Inc. did
not use an authorized inspector or an engineer experienced
in storage tank design to approve the modifications to the
tank. Their contractor of welding, G&T, did not use qualified
weld procedures or welders to perform the modification in
accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section XI: Welding and Brazing Qualification. They did not
require or perform spot radiography on tank, while in this
case a thorough radiography crack check is necessary for
hazardous contents. Last but not least, the testing contractor,
HMT, calculated a maximum liquid level for the tank using
the requirements for weld joints that are spot radiographed.
HMT calculated a maximum liquid level for the tank based
on an average wall thickness in lieu of a minimum wall
thickness, which is likely to be overestimated.
Starting from the incident, this brought out the issues that
may lead of enormous accidents. On the other hand, if there
is more understanding and awareness of the tank and tank
farm hazard, the incidents can be more thoroughly controlled.
TANK HAZARDS AND TECHNICAL PROTECTIONS
The failure of liquid storage tanks originates from inad-
equate tank design, construction, inspection, and mainte-
nance. Tank design and construction have already been
discussed throughout industry facilities, academic research,
and various projects. The failure rate for tanks already in
service can be reduced via tank maintenance and weld
inspections. To minimize the severity of possible tank fail-
ures, there should be a secondary containment such as a
dike surrounding the tank. In terms of tank inspection, prior
to startup a close external inspection of leaks and corrosion
should be made. External inspections should be performed
Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1) Published on behalf of the AIChE
both regularly during normal operating rounds and periodi-
cally by individuals who assure the mechanical integrity of
the tanks. Periodic internal inspections of the tanks are by
far the most important. These inspections should include
thickness readings of the walls and the tank floor.
The CSB has identified hot works around tanks as signifi-
cant ignition sources for tank fires (CSB, 2009) [3]. A proper
hot work permit system must be in place to prevent possible
ignition sources from encountering flammable atmospheres.
These hot work permits should incorporate gas testing for
flammables.
The followings are a series of hazards identification
regarding tank and tank farms, the technical protection avail-
able for loss prevention and mentioning of related regulatory
standards to guide and require the construction, evaluation,
operation, and maintenance of storage tanks.
Design Issues
Material Rupture and Corrosion
Tank body structure and material hazards. The design of
the storage tanks themselves is the first aspect of the tank
farm safety issue. A good design must balance the desired
performance with allowable costs. The material selection of
tank body according to tank area location, compatibility of
materials storage, ease of fabrication, and resistance to corro-
sion [4] heavily influences both factors. The most widely
used tank materials are composed of carbon steel, due to
high corrosion resistance or climate factors. Aluminum, stain-
less steel, and fiber glass are also used as tank building mate-
rials in certain situations. API 650, the tank fabrication
standard details the principles on steel structure and plates
stresses requirements for different types of storage. Corrosion
is also one of the main causes of storage tank structure fail-
ures excluding the material characteristics mentioned above.
This phenomenon occurs in: (a) external surfaces exposed to
the ambient environment, (b) under the tank bottom, and (c)
the internal liquid/vapor space of the tank. The atmospheric
corrosion usually takes place on the roof or shell, especially
when storage depot is close to warm, humid regions. The
oxidization from the air may cause tank corrosion, while
strong winds can form rusts to scratch through tank body
over time increase the severity of surface damage. The side/
bottom corrosion is usually due to ground level water layers,
construction racks linked to tank supports (especially ele-
vated tanks and spherical tanks). This is likely to happen on
crude oil storage tanks with two-phase products that include
corrosive chlorides; pitting from the latter will appear at the
bottom part of tank surface. Internal corrosion, especially in
two-phase systems, is very significant factor for tanks con-
taining refined hydrocarbon or acidic product tanks. The liq-
uid-vapor interface has the most serious corrosion because
of oxygen-moisture interaction. This kind of corrosion typi-
cally occurs in floating-roof, as the material is usually alumi-
num alloys which are relatively light and controllable, but
have lower corrosion resistance.
There are some related phenomena coming with corro-
sion-risky conditions, such as hydrostatic testing fluid pitting,
erosion due to filling impingment, static electricity, cavitation
damage, thermal fretting/frictions, and hydrogen embrittle-
ment. Along with these aspects, design considerations must
also include the storage chemical properties, operating con-
ditions, and the environment issues to produce a functional
and safe storage tank system.
Technical protection. Materials grouping in API 650 can
be classified into three main factors of discussion: (1) killed/
semikilled (2) normalizing (3) quenching and tempering
DOI 10.1002/prs March 2013 29
plates [18]. API 650 categorized the variables into eight
groups (six main groups and two subcategories). The com-
parison of the property of these cases is listed in detail in the
regulations, and minimum tolerances for tank performance
are specified for industrial reference. Factors affecting brittle
fracture are also presented. Brittle fractures can trigger huge
failures for tanks, leading to accidental spills and releases
from the structure cracks and rupture spots. Local stress
allowance is important in analyzing the fracture issue. API
650 contains the averages of longitudinal and transverse
plate Charpy V-notch test (CVN test) results for the eight cat-
egories of steel materials, and the acceptance requirements
can explain design specification of storage tanks. Parameters
such as operating temperature, welding, material composi-
tions, and thicknesses are also considered as well in early
design stage of material selection, surface treatment, and
other analysis.
Another important aspect of tank body condition can be
done by radiography and nondestructive tank shell checking.
This is significant to observe and find out the material structure
failures. There are various nondestructive methods used to pre-
vent tank collapse and failure on the structure design, built, and
prestartup evaluation. Radiography of tanks is one of the most
important, widely used one among the tools. The basic design
is usually the sensor connected with the data acquisition system,
monitoring the level of filling with regard to the welding surfa-
ces, and tracks back the defects. The basic categories of the
tools are: (a) spot radiography: a radiographic technology that
allows real-time examination of the longitudinal weld; (b) full
radiography: with Lethal material stored in the tank or tank is
under extreme operation/maintenance conditions; and (c)
nonintrusive tests: IR image, Sonics, Tank Floor, Electro-Mag-
netic Acoustic Transducers, thermal imaging.
Tank Roof Failures
Roof problem hazards. Except for the installation failure
itself, tank roofs can experience several other hazardous
cases which will lead to potential damage. From a incident
investigation study of a naphtha tank fire in Singapore [5],
they found a main factor causing this incident was also roof
failure, due to a combination of heavy rain, maintenance
problems, and inherent design features caused the floating
roof on naphtha tank to start sinking. Tank roof safety is
sure to be a significant issue regarding loss prevention.
a. Internal Beam Rupture: usually triggered by material cor-
rosion or pitting. The welding of the roof and tank body
is an important failure point, as damage to the joint can
be the starting point of both atmospheric corrosion and
internal corrosion. The structure damage of the tank
beam may even influence the rim seals, the deck, and
the construction pontoons.
b. Vent System Failures: the vacuum or overpressure due to
operation problems, ventilation system flaws, and incor-
rect setting procedures, or inadequate inspection and
maintenance of the vent controls.
c. Snow/Rain Topping issue: Leaks can occur as the weight
and drifts of heavy snow or rain cause fittings, joints, and
sometimes even the entire tank to shift. This process can
also cause leaks and disruptions to the fittings. Snow cov-
ering a tank roof can prevent leaking gas from escaping
and thus create a pocket of gas that can fuel a massive
explosion. Besides, exhaust vents for tank top can be
clogged by heavy snow or rain if the collecting and
draining systems were not properly designed according
to the climate of that storage area.
d. Frangible Roof-Shell Joints: a term defined in the main tank
construction standards BSEN 14015 and API650. The con-
cept of frangible roof only applies to flat bottom, cone roof
30 March 2013 Published on behalf of the AIChE
tanks with limited roof apex angle. A Frangible roof is a roof
to shell joint or junction that is weaker than the rest of the
tank and will preferentially fail if the tank is over pressur-
ized. Since this junction will fail before any other part of the
tank, such as the shell, the bottom, or the shell to bottom
joint, the bottom and shell can be relied on to be intact.
e. Seismic Zone Design Failure: In API 650 Appendix E,
there are series of advices mentioning the seismic issues
about minimum requirement available in tank foundation
design. Failure of tanks during Chilean earthquake of
1960 and Alaska earthquake of 1964 led to beginning of
many investigations on seismic analysis of liquid storage
tanks. Following two aspects came to forefront:
 Due consideration should be given to sloshing effects
of liquid and flexibility of container wall while evalu-
ating the seismic forces on tanks.
 It is recognized that tanks are less ductile and have
low energy absorbing capacity and redundancy com-
pared to the conventional building systems.
The failure modes of seismic design are likely to be: tear
piping, base separated from shell, floating roof collapse, and
sloshing wave damages [23]. Seismic motions caused tank
roofs to lose buoyancy and go to the direction of gravity
with relative velocity on seismic force. Even though API 650
Appendix E has been updated continuously, the API AST
committees still consider these recommendations to be a
work in progress. The earth activity zone regarding soil layer
structures, earthquake scales, and seismic waves resulting
sloshing waves had been causing many serious accidents to
liquid storage tanks containing flammable chemicals, such as
1998 Turkey Ismit Tank farm incidents due to earthquake,
and 2002 Japan Hokkaidos Chemical Tank Incidents [6]
Technical protections. There are various ways to prevent
tank roof failures. From a study done in 2004 by Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company [7], the roof failure location, con-
ditions, and possible consequence if the safeguard does not
exist/function are listed as Tables 1 and 2.
From the study, we can clearly see that the safeguard
shall be put in place especially in terms of overpressure and
overfilling prevention, better basic structure of tank roof,
good welding practices, and avoiding objects collision, such
as heavy snow, rain, or other external loads. In this logic,
the ventilation of excess pressure, storage contents, and roof-
top loads shall be carefully designed and put in service. The
instruments which monitor the level control and pressure
rise due to various reasons need to be kept in function and
connected to relief system and alarms. More examples will
be given in later sections about operation errors.
Walkways. Another attempt to create a bond between
the roof and the shell relies on the tanks walkway. Nearly,
all tanks have a walkway or ladder where the upper end is
attached to the rim of the tank, and the lower end is resting
on the floating roof. The quality of this electrical connection
is questionable. The upper connection is a bolted hinge sub-
ject to loosening, corrosion, and surface-covering paints. The
lower end is a pressure connection with only two wheels
resting on rails and is also subject to corrosion and surface-
covering paints. This can also be a significant consideration
while dealing with roof failure prevention.
Potential Ignition Source and Flammable Vapor
Tank fire hazards. With existence of ignition sources
from nearby area of the tanks, the failures from design issues
mentioned above will be the source of significant hazards.
The possible ignition sources are everywhere in tank area:
welding equipment, cables, static electricity, and other
DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1)
Table 1. Internal floating roof tank hazards (Adapted from Ref. [12]).

Operating Mode Potential Hazards Cause Effects if No Safe Guard in Place

Startup Filling the tank with legs landed
Normal operations Excessive fill rate
Maintenance Release of hydrocarbon vapors
from unexpected source in
roof seal
Inspection Release of hydrocarbon vapors to
environment during internal
inspections
Startup Flammable environment in head
space
Normal operations If operators are not aware of
floating roof level, may
inadvertently land the roof,
creating vapor in head space
Maintenance Minor fires during maintenance
Normal operations Product on the roof
Normal operations Roof hangs up, causing internal
fire
Normal operations High snow loads, with less heat
available in IFR design
Normal operations Static electricity and induced
charge differentials
Maintenance Mixer motor replacement creates
flammable head space
Maintenance Worker injury due to reduce
working space from floating
roof
On initial fill, this should
normally occur
Operator error
Maintenance in tank
Internal inspection as required
by regulations
On initial fill, this should
normally occur
Instrument error, operator error
Maintenance in tank, maybe
more difficult to clean IFR
tank prior to maintenance
Roof hangs up on columns,
earthquake
Hangs up on columns,
earthquake, turbulence during
fill, wax build-up
High snow loads, but less benefit
from product heat, area above
roof open to environment
Fluid flow, improper grounding,
wax buildup, lightning
Mixer motor failures that requires
tank entry
Inherent IFR tank design
Effect range from no impact to
possible fire or environmental
release
Environmental release, possible
roof sunken, or pool fire
Worker injury
Environmental release
Effect range from no impact to
possible fire or environmental
release
Effects ranging from seal fire to
explosion
Minor fire during maintenance
Fire in head space
Flammable space below floating
roof or burning liquid above
floating roof
Increase snow removal on the
cone roof, with commensurate
worker injury exposure
Provides an ignition source
which can ignite vapors
stemming from a seal leak,
leading to seal fire
Possible fire, worker injury
Possible fire, worker injury

Table 2. Cone roof tank hazards (Adapted from Ref. [12]).

Operating Mode Potential Hazards Cause Effects if No Safe Guards in Place

Startup Flammable environment in head On initial fill, this should Possible fire or explosion
space normally occur
Maintenance Minor fire during maintenance Maintenance in tank Minor fire during maintenance
Normal operations High snow load High snow loads, but less benefit Snow removal on the cone roof,
from product heat, vents and potential for worker injury
open manways open to the exposure
environment
Normal operations Overfill Operator error, level indication Spill crude to the environment,
and alarm failure potential for pool fire
Normal operations Static electricity and induced lightning Provides an ignition source
charge differentials which can ignite vapors
through an opening in the tank
Maintenance Mixer motor replacement leads to Mixer motor failure Possible tank fire
flammable environment in tank
Normal operations Process safety hazard from vapor Typical causes of leaks in Effect range from seal fire to
recovery system rotating equipments explosion
Inspection Release of hydrocarbon vapors to Internal inspection as required Environmental release
the environment during by regulation
internal inspection

Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 10.1002/prs March 2013 31
miscellaneous sources from human error. Static electricity is
dependent on two properties: generation and accumulation.
Generation of static electricity occurs whenever two objects
are rubbed against each other. With the existence of flamma-
ble fuel vapor on the top of storage tank, near leaking or
release points, and even the more serious vapor cloud formed
near tank farm, the ignition sources may cause major
incidents.
The generation of static electricity cannot be completely
prevented but should be reduced for tank safety. API 2003
mentions several means of static electric generation: flow
generation, pumping, changes in vortex or pipeline diameter,
flow through filters or fittings, splashing, spraying, and tank
filling. Under ideal conditions, though, the charge immedi-
ately dissipates. The generation of static electricity can be
handled without hazard if accumulation does not occur.
Accumulation occurs when the generation of electricity is
greater than the dissipation. 0.16% of tanks have a rim fire
every year, 95% of those are caused by lightning. The sparks
are due to the accumulation of electricity and can lead to
huge fires and losses.
Technical protection. Inerting [16] [17]. The elimina-
tion of flammable fuel vapors in commercial aircraft fuel
tanks is a principal safety priority. Proper inerting of a fuel
tank can significantly decrease the risk of explosions and
fires. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers and ground level
tank farms are required to have inerting systems to prevent
such incidents. Inerting refers to the rendering of the ullage
(the air above the fuel) unable to propagate a reaction given
flammable conditions and an ignition source. In this case, it
refers specifically to reducing the oxygen concentration in
the tank. This effectively eliminates one side of the fire trian-
gle. Usually, a pump is used to exhaust the oxygen rich
waste to ambient pressure, an inert gas generating system in
order to improve the performance of the permeable mem-
brane air separator component and to insure sufficient gen-
eration of inert gas when available source air pressure is
low. Nitrogen inerting systems are another safeguard which
is often employed. Chemical plants that have fixed roof tanks
and are concerned about flammable atmospheres or the in-
halation of moisture may relay on nitrogen pads. Com-
pressed nitrogen is piped into the vessels and maintains a
few ounces of pressure. This avoids the potential for air to
be sucked out of the tank as the internal pressure drops due
to cooling or liquid being pumped out.
Shunts for floating roof tanks. NFPA 780 requires that
stainless steel shunts be spaced no more than 10 feet apart
around the roof perimeter. These shunts are bolted to the
edge of the floating roof and connect with the inside of the
shell. Unfortunately, shunts do not bond well for several rea-
sons. First, some components of heavy crude oil, such as wax,
tar, and paraffin, tend to coat the inside of the tank wall, form-
ing an isolating barrier between the shell and the shunts. Sec-
ond, rust on the inside of the shell creates a high-resistance
connection between the shells and the shunts. Third, 10 to
25% of tanks are painted on the inside, typically with an ep-
oxy-based paint which insulates the shell from the shunts.
Finally, large tanks may become elliptically distort by several
inches, which can cause the shunts to pull away from the
shell. Another method uses shunts submerged in the stored
product. These submerged shunts may provide some benefits
when arcing occurs, since no air is present, however, the sub-
merged shunts still rely on pressure contact that is subject to
all the conditions outlined above. In addition, submerged
shunts are exceedingly difficult to inspect and maintain.
Roof-shell bonding cable. Another method is to install a
cable from the top of the shell to the middle of the roof, typ-
ically on the order of 250 to 500 MCM. The cable is con-
32 March 2013 Published on behalf of the AIChE
nected to the top of the rim near the top of the internal
ladder, suspended along the bottom of the ladder, and
bonded to the center of the roof. The cable must be long
enough to connect to the roof at its lowest position. Although
at 60 Hz this cable has low impedance, at lightning frequen-
cies it has very high impedance. For example, at 100 kHz, the
impedance of 100 feet of 250 MCM cable is estimated at over
32 ohms. Therefore, when thousands of amps of electricity
flow across the tank, the impedance of the roof-shell bonding
cable is too high to prevent sustained arcing at the shunts.
A Retractable Grounding Assembly device (RGA) was
developed by Lightning Eliminators & Consultants, Inc., cre-
ates a permanent electrical bond between the roof and shell.
When properly applied, multiple RGAs provide low-imped-
ance pathways to safely discharge the long duration current
responsible for many tanks fires. The RGA attaches between
the roof and shell with a wide, spring-loaded cable con-
structed from 864 strands of #30 AWG tinned copper wire
braided to form a wide, flat strap 1.625 inches wide by 0.11
thick. This has been studied and proved to be applicable for
most grounding and current suspending case.
Loading rates. Loading of liquid contents, as mentioned
in the hazard section, is also an important factor of static
electricity generation and accumulation. There are multiple
ways to eliminate this charge gathering. A previous study [8]
on the IEC TC31/101 JWG29 new model for IEC Technical
Specification 60079-32-1, Explosive AtmospheresPart 32-1:
Electrostatic hazards Guidance, Britton and Smith model
was introduced and was able to address range of flow rate
for transfer of single-phase, static-accumulating flammable
liquids into vertical cylindrical tanks containing no significant
sediment or water bottom. The research had put together a
series of theoretical analysis on factors having impact on
dielectric constant, threshold surface potential, and maximum
velocity of filling/loading to storage tanks. They also pro-
vided comparisons between smaller and larger size tanks in
various chemical properties and filling depth. This shall be a
referable model development in the static electric reduction
for practical use.
Operation Issues
Common Operational Hazards
Tank overpressure and vacuum. Operations and situa-
tions which may result in tank overpressure are: (1) pumping
rate failure; (2) temperature change; and (3) physical state
change due to failure of venting systems or poor practices.
OSHA Standard 45 CFR 39.20-11 has mentioned the hazard
and protection of the overpressure. Cargo tanks venting sys-
tem should be capable to ventilate 1.25 times the maximum
transfer rate, while the pressure in the vapor space of each
tank connected to the vapor collection system does not
exceed the maximum designed working pressure of this
tank.
Overpressure is usually caused by excessive operating
pressure, resulting in rupture of hoses or tank, or release of
cargo through the pressure relief valves (if rupture disk and
fittings do not properly adjunct), with possible risk of injury
and spillage. Vacuum, on the other hand, created in tank dur-
ing pumping out, or as a result of tank cooling after system
cleaning, or after discharge of heated cargo. Vacuum could
result in damage to tank shell [11]. Workers must ensure that
tank is vented (via manhole or air-line) during cargo discharge
or after steam cleaning, or discharge of heated cargo.
Tank level measurement and overfilling. Hazards associ-
ated with operating procedures are important to consider
when designing tank farms. Proper management of the
DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1)
storage area can prevent incidents. Level measurement is
vital to preventing overfilling. The loss of level control has
contributed to three significant industrial incidents:
1. In Australia, the Esso Longford explosion in September
1998 resulted in two fatalities, eight injuries, and more
than $1 billion in losses.
2. In the United States, the BP Texas City explosion in
March 2005 caused 15 fatalities and more than 170 inju-
ries, profoundly affected the facilitys production for
months afterward, and created losses exceeding $1.6
billion.
3. In the United Kingdom, the Buncefield explosion in
December 2005 injured 43 people, devastated the Hert-
fordshire Oil Storage Terminal, and led to total losses of
as much as $1.5 billion.
Tank filling requires proper procedures and protection
systems. Overfilling usually leads to major accidents [9]. The
key causes of this failure are: lack of hazard recognition,
underestimation of overfilling frequency, insufficient training
for operators, ill-defined safety fill limits, and lack of applica-
ble mechanical integrity.
Atmospheric tanks (internal design pressure >2.5 psig)
should be vertical cylinders constructed above ground. A ver-
tical, fixed-roof tank consists of a cylindrical metal shell with a
permanently attached roof that can be flat, conical, or dome-
shaped, among other styles [13]. Fixed-roof tanks are used to
store materials with a true vapor pressure less than 1.5 psia.
These tanks are less expensive to construct than those with
floating roofs and are generally considered the minimum ac-
ceptable for storing chemicals, organics, and other liquids.
Technical Protection for Overpressure and Overfilling
Overpressure and vacuum protection. Each fixed roof
tank should be provided with proper over pressure and under
pressure devices. These devices must be properly sized for
the worse possible conditions and be periodically inspected
to assure that they are serviceable. Vents must be tamper
proof. Vents must be checked for buildup or choking. No
alterations must be made to the vents or the relief devices
without the use of Management of Change policies.
Overfilling and tank capacity. Before designing or select-
ing a tank, the capacity needs to first be determined. The
total capacity is the sum of the inactive capacity and the
overfill protection capacity. The inactive working capacity is
the volume below the bottom invert of the outlet nozzle,
normally at least 10 inches above the bottom seam to avoid
weld interference [10]. The net working capacity is calculated
as the volume between the low liquid level and the high liq-
uid level. For an in-process tank, the net working capacity is
calculated by multiplying the required retention time of the
liquid by its flow rate. In some cases, the required
networking capacity may be divided up into multiple tanks if
the size of a single tank is physically unrealistic, or if sepa-
rate tanks are needed for other reasons, such as dedicated
services or rundowns.
Tank Spacing and Facility Siting [11]
When discussing the safety of tank farms, it is of upmost
importance to take into account the siting of the entire area.
The relative positions, distances, and levels control for each
vessel are just some of the factors that should be taken into
further considerations. The impact of potential incidents may
also be addressed by the following factors, among others:
 Adequately separating tanks;
 Segregating different risks;
 Minimizing the potential for an impact or explosion;
Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1) Published on behalf of the AIChE
 Minimizing the potential for and exposure to toxic
releases;
 Maintaining adequate spacing for emergency personnel,
including firefighting;
 Minimizing the exposure to fire radiation;
 Considering the prevailing wind directions in site layout;
 Considering potential future expansions during site
layout.
The relative elevation of a site area is important to consider
when designing site layout. Whenever practical, locate open
flames (process units with heaters, direct fired utility equip-
ment) at higher elevations than bulk quantities of flammables
(tanks and storage); this minimizes the potential for the igni-
tion of vapor releases or liquid spills as spills will migrate
downhill [22]. Where it is not feasible to locate storage tanks at
elevations lower than process areas, increased protection
measures may be required to offset the increased potential for
ignition. These measures may include: dikes, high-capacity
drainage systems, vapor detection, increased fire protection,
shutdown systems, and other safety systems. NFPA 30 [14] has
mentioned series of tank spacing according to the category of
tanks, tank body diameter, and operating conditions. For spe-
cifically large oil tanks, the spacing shall be paid special atten-
tion to. From a study by Meng et al. [15] that when the
capability of oil tanks significantly increases, the risks substan-
tially increase due to high property density and energy density,
thus people cannot ignore the risk anymore. The Domino
effects regarding the safety performance increases as the tank
capability increases. Standards still require updates as the tank
spacing and siting issues come to ultra-large oil tanks.
As a summary, the hazards of tanks and storage area can
be drawn into a fishbone figure as Figure 1. The operation,
installation, and related design/maintenance are important in
the hazard analysis and loss prevention.
REGULATIONS ABOUT TANK AND TANK FARMS
Among the previous sections, we had mentioned the haz-
ards and technical protections regarding tank and tank farm.
We also referred to regulation requirements pointing out fail-
ures and guiding inspection procedures. In this section, the
study offered more overall regulatory standards. Tank stand-
ards are written by committees comprised of individuals
from tank operating companies, tank building companies,
and consultants. The multiple standards that apply to above
ground storage tanks are as follows for reference:
API Standard Related to Tanks
API Standards 650, 653, and 620 are the primary industry
standards by which most aboveground welded storage tanks
are designed, constructed, and maintained. These standards
address both newly constructed and existing ASTs used in
the petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical industries. API
650 is considered to be the most general and widely used
standards for inspector certification and procedure of tank
design, installation, operation, and evaluation compliance.
There are other related standards which are compensation
of the instrumentation guides, such as 2000, 2517, and 2550
[19]. These guidelines point out significant issues for meas-
uring tank capacity, containments, and construction work of
ASTs.
API-650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage
API-651 Cathodic Protection for Above Ground Petroleum
Storage Tanks
API-652 Lining of Above Ground Petroleum Storage
Tanks
API-653 Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and
Reconstruction
DOI 10.1002/prs March 2013 33
Figure 1. Fishbone risks about tank farm (Adapted from Ref. [1]).
API-620 Design and Construction of Large Welded Low
Pressure Storage Tanks
API-2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage
Tanks
API-2517 Evaporating Losses from External Floating Roof
Tanks
API-2519 Evaporating Losses from Internal Floating Roof
Tanks
API-2350 Overfill Protection for Petroleum Storage Tanks
API-2015 Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks
API-2550 Measurements and Calibration of Petroleum
Storage Tanks
For Individual Certification Program of inspectors, there
are three mostly required API items:
API-510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code
API-570 Piping Inspection Code
API-653 Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and
Reconstruction
Non-API Codes Related to Tanks
Except for API codes, other institutes consulting tank and
tank farm sustainability also provide reference tools and sug-
gestions for handling hazardous materials regarding storage
tanks. NFPA-30 mentions important factors of tank spacing and
depot arrangements. CFR standards include mostly oil or chem-
icals pollution prevention and bulk material storing issues.
NFPA-30 National Fire Protection Association Flammable
and Combustible Liquids Code
EPA-40 CFR 112 Oil Pollution Prevention and Response;
Non-transportation related onshore and offshore facilities
DOT-33 CFR 154 Facilities transferring oil or hazardous
materials in bulk
DOT-33 CFR 155 Oil or hazardous material pollution pre-
vention regulations for vessels
DOT-33 CFR 156 Oil and hazardous materials transfer
operations
34 March 2013 Published on behalf of the AIChE
DOT-49 CFR 172 Hazardous materials, provisions, com-
munications, emergency response, training requirements,
and security plans
OSHA Standards
Frequently Cited
The following standards were the most frequently cited
by Federal OSHA from October 2009 through September
2010, in Oil And Gas Field Services (SIC code 138).
 Guarding floor and wall openings and holes
 Permit-required confined spaces
 Mechanical power-transmission apparatus
 Logging operations
 Specifications for accident prevention signs and tags
 Abrasive wheel machinery
Other Highlighted Standards
General Industry (29 CFR 1910)
 1910 Subpart D Walking-working surfaces
 Fixed industrial stairs
 1910 Subpart E Exit routes, emergency action plans, and
fire prevention plans
 Emergency action plans
 1910 Subpart G Occupational health and environment
control
 1910 Subpart H Hazardous materials
 Flammable and combustible liquids
 Process safety management of highly hazardous
chemicals
 Hazardous waste and emergency response Standard
In general, ASTs are primarily regulated by states laws as
well as the overall design rules regulated by federal guide-
lines. The requirements can usually found in environmental
regulations and/or the fire code. There may be a require-
ment to paint the tank, or a fill pipe, a certain color to
DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1)
identify its contents, provide alarms in addition to those
federally required, and registration of the tank.

FUTURE WORK ON TANK LOSS PREVENTION

The important good work practices are important to both
facility and surrounding area. A good safety integration pro-
gram with strict installation, code review, operation, mainte-
nance, and follow-up evaluation shall be done by the
facilitators. With the need of new technology in the future,
there are several parts needed to be taken into consideration:

New, Corrosion-Proof, and Chemical-Resistant

Materials
ASTM standards include discussion concerning appropri-
ate corrosion-resistant materials. Many studies also focus on
tank design and material selections. ASTM D3299 mentioned
the specifications of commercial storage tanks and their
building materials, glass-fiber-reinforced polyester or vinyl-
ester thermoset resin fabricated by filament winding for
above-ground vertical installation, which were likely chosen
to contain aggressive chemicals at atmospheric pressure,
which is the usual operation area conditions.
The corrosion study is not only important for tank body
but also for the surrounding dikes, connected piping sys-
tems, and coatings near monitoring devices. Choosing
adequate tank body materials is the first step. The material
shall be compatible to the chemicals stored inside. What can
be done and controlled except for original materials shall be
the exterior addition of corrosion prevention. Anodes are the
better direction for most of the storage tanks. They are
usually long-line, flexible, cable-like anodes, placed in con-
tinuous close proximity to the target structure, and provide
uniform distribution of current. The anodes allow current to
flow long distances down the center conductor, while allow- Figure 2. Overfilling prevention measurements with radar
ing sufficient cathodic protection current to continuously devices (a) single point measurement (b) continuous mea-
pass through the conductive polymer all along the length of surement (TankGauging Inc., Tank System Instrumentation
the anode. The fabric materials, better conductive polymers Design). [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which can prevent being corroded, and a tight adhesion to which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
the target tanks are the issues future research shall focus on.

Good Measuring Methods and Tools to

Prevent Overfilling
There are many facilities and companies trying to find out
a better solution for tank gauging with the instrumentation
proved for least interruption to the system. Radar tank gauge
is one potentially useful method which can be further devel-
oped into quicker, more accurate reading values. There are
two defined methodologies initiated by TankGauging Inc. as
in Figure 2, which are to improve measurement for overfill-
ing: single point measurement and continuous measurement.
Installation and integration of third-party equipment from
industry leading manufacturers into a central system of con-
trol for remote monitoring and alarm in addition to the
required local alarms at the crucial process value point.
Single point measurement devices can be installed at the
high level. Common technologies used are mechanical
switches, electronic conductor, or optical sensors. For contin-
uous measurement, a standard level gauge is a common
solution. Any of the major gauging technologies can be
used: float and tape, servo, radar, or magneto-astrictive tech-
nologies. The process shall be kept in a smooth surface
while taking measurement, which is usually in the prestartup
check or normal pressure conditions.
production, storage, transport, and evaluation of tanks and con-
taining chemicals, shall be considered as a target for an optimiza-
tion control program. The proven solution for liquid bulk storage
and distribution is an uprising issue nowadays in tank field. The
new technology gives tank farm the automation at most, but the
near-miss events or actually incidents still happen even with the
least portion of human error participation. This is why we have
to consider a best, optimized way to deal with bulk storages.
Optimization in tank farm can be separated into several
aspects: optimized safety, optimized reliability, optimized tank
life sustainability, and optimized automation with communica-
tion and management assurance. Safety integrated level is used
and studied as a criterion of tank management in automation
instruments. Flow-weighbridges, hydraulic fluid piping, leak
detection (pump stations, sensor, and alarm), and pressure con-
trol (valves, fittings, and indicators) should be combined to-
gether as a whole program to design and run a storage field.
Each node of the control line should be clearly defined and
communicated to employees, while all the online workers get
adequate training and proper work shifts. The automation sys-
tem should also consider the fire protection, sprinklers, and
other related emergency response that a facility needs to have.

Optimization Control [19] LITERATURE CITED

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DOI 10.1002/prs Process Safety Progress (Vol.32, No.1)