Statutory Construction made easy by a

Freshman
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2012
Rule1. Apply the Law when it is CLEAR. Do not Interpret or CONSTRUE.

Rule2 in StatCon is IBC, interpret before you CONSTRUE. You CONSTRUE only when
the written law is not enough to give meaning and EFFECT to the INTENT of the LAW.

The RULES are simplified in the middle of this REVIEWER. Done by a Freshman, by ang
aging Freshman who shall be a Lawyer soooooon!!!

literal meaning or plain meaning rule

dura lex sed lex
doctrine of necessary implication
ejusdem generis
limitations of ejusdem generis
expressio unios est exclusio alterius
negative- opposite doctrine
application of expressio unius rule
doctrine of casus omissus
doctrine of last antecedent
reddeddo singula singulis
stare decisis
res judicata
obiter dictum

A legislature is a kind of deliberative assembly with the power to pass,

amend, and repeallaws.[1] The law created by a legislature is
called legislation or statutory law. In addition toenacting laws, legislatures
usually have exclusive authority to raise or lower taxes and adopt
thebudget and other money bills. Legislatures are known by many names,
the most common being parliament and congress, although these terms
also have more specific meanings.

Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may
sometimes be considered by the judiciary when interpreting the law
(see judicial interpretation). The judiciary may attempt to assess legislative
intent where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or
adequately address a particular issue, or when there appears to have been
a legislative drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly,
that the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a
statute could be interpreted in more than one fashion that legislative intent
must be inferred from sources other than the actual text of the statute.

Sources of legislative intent

Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine
the goals and purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it
passed the law:

the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,

amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
the record of hearings on the topic,
legislative records or journals,
speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the
definitions in the statute on question,
other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in
question,
legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or
president,
case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the
problems the legislature was attempting to address with the bill, or
constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have passed
certain sections of a statute 'had it known' about the constitutional
invalidity of the other portions of the statute?").
legislative intent- the reason for passing the law

literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear,

plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal meaning or
plain rule means INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL WORDS words in a statute should
if possible, be given effect.
Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should
not, by CONSTRUCTION, be given a different meaning. When the legislature defines a
word used in a statute, it does not usurp the courts function to interpret the laws but it
merely LEGISLATES what should form part of the law itself.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases
used in statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning
which is supported by the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what
is generally spoken shall be generally understood. It is also the same as GENERALI
DICTUM GENERALITIR EST INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is understood in a
general sense.

WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not

intent to words.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law
does not distinguish, do not distinguish.

dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA
EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the
law is written.

doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is

implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understand by implication to contain all such
provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. The principle is expressed in the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the
necessity of the law.

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to

both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as
indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in
said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry
out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must give way in favor
of the legislative intent;

limitations of ejusdem generis

requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words,
followed by a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the
same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not
exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words
or phrases a broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the
EXCLUSION of OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its

terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be extended to other matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions, what is
not list down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT
REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or savings excludes others.

application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule is used in

CONSTRUCTION of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies,
restricting common rights, and imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as
those statutes which are strictly construed. It is only a tool and not a mandatory rule
used for ascertaining the legislative intent. The rule must also yield to legislative
intent.
negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS
AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED is known as negative-opposite doctrine or
argumentum a contrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro

omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. This rule is not absolute if it can be shown that the legislature did
not intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such
legislative intent is clearly indicated, the COURT may supply the omission if to do so will
carry out the intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language.

doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS

FIAL RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA or relative words refer to the
nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING WORDS
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated.

The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of a statute, by

which "Referential and qualifying phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer
solely to the last antecedent." The rule is typically bound by "common sense" and is
flexible enough to avoid application that "would involve an absurdity, do violence to the
plain intent of the language, or if the context for other reason requires a deviation from
the rule." Evidence
that a qualifying phrase is supposed to
apply to all antecedents instead of only to the
immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that
it is separated from the antecedents by a comma."

reddendo singula singulis when two descriptions

makes it impossible to reconcile, reconcile it to
have a singular meaning to settle the issue.
refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to effect that each
word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriate
related and to which it is most applicable.

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By

rendering each his own; for example, when two
descriptions of property are given together in one mass,
both the next of kin and the heir cannot take, unless in
cases where a construction can be made reddendo
singula singulis, that the next of kin shall take the personal
estate and the heir at law the real estate. 14 Ves. 490.
Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab. Conditions, L.
Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts to abide
by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray duh-see-
sis) n. Latin for "to stand by a decision," the doctrine that a trial court is
bound by appellate court decisions (precedents) on a legal question which
is raised in the lower court. Reliance on such precedents is required of trial
courts until such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the trial
court cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it is
"bad law")
Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final judgment
on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the
parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could have
been litigated in that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the
merits, must then show that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive
as to the matters in the second suit. For example, assume that the plaintiff
in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She
sues the driver of the other auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury
returns a verdict that finds that the defendant was not negligent.
The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that
would help her prove that the other driver was negligent. A court
would dismiss the second lawsuit under res judicata because
the second lawsuit is based on the same Cause of
Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.
Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary
for the decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a
decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such are not binding as precedent.

AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS

.EQUITY never acts in contravention of the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law or RATIO
LEGIS ET ANIMA.

Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes must be

done to avoid evil and injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA
INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat,

the interpretation that will give the thing the EFFICACY is to be adopted.
Law must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which
they are enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will
give LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE without doing VIOLENCE to reason.

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must be

interpreted to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole avoiding the
nullification of provisions. IT is so that a legal provision must not be so
construed as to be a useless SURPLUSAGE. Accordingly, in case of Doubt
or obscurity, that construction should make the statute fully operative and
effective. IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT DO A VAIN
THING IN THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST

OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every statute must be so
CONSTRUED and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of Jurisprudence. ALL laws are presumed to be consistent
with each other.
DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA, distinguish
times and you will harmonize laws.

IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware,

and taken into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject of legislation. Thus,
conflict on same subject is not intended and if such occur, Court must
construe, through reconciliation to give effect to the statute. If it is
impossible to reconcile and harmonize, one statute has to give
way to the other. The latest statute shall prevail being the latest
expression of the legislative WILL.

A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The fact that
one is general and the other special creates a presumption that the special
act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the General Act. One
as a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a Particular
case. This shall apply all the time regardless of which law was enacted
first.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY

CONSTRUCTIONS are made by the EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the
Executive on Statutes, for them to implement it, they must understand it
and interpret it if the language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The executive
makes RULES or IRRs for this statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and
PROCEDURES. These IRRs or RULES issued by the executive to execute
the Statute are CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS of
the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS,
under her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine Republic. The
issuances on how laws are to be prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION of the Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
handling disputes in a QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are
based on their UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by congress, laws that
are enforced. These are CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS and
Constructions.
THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN, WHEN
THERE ARE NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE
VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT, therefore,NO
STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO INTERPRET
AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY MAKE, MAY ALSO DO CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE
BOUND TO FOLLOW.

WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE

RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER
POWER. This is so because the greater includes the lesser as
expressed in the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et
minus.THERE SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A
LAW THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS
INTENDED BY THE LAW.

Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions

as maybe necessary to EFFECTUATE its object and purpose, or to make
effective Rights, powers, privileges or JURISDICTION which it grants,
including all such COLLATERAL and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as expressed in the maxim,
Ex necessitate legis or from the NECESSITY of the LAW. Doctrine of
Necessary Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY.
QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER
OBLIQUUM.
WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of AutolimitationIt is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres to
principles of international law as a limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.

Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either because of the arrival of an expiry
date or because an agency has accomplished the purpose for which it was created. Function is mere FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated facts in
support of the conclusion.

RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part
of the statute ; and the security of men's lives and property, require that they
should be adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct ; and there is
more danger to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition;
because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but,
when all is uncertain, they are left in the dark, and constantly liable to error; for the
same offence which, at one time, was thought entitled to clergy, at another, may be
deemed capital ; and thus the life or death of the citizen will be made to depend, not
upon a fixt rule, but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than
which a more miserable state of things cannot be conceived.

1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the
statute to be valid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is on
the challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed to be
constitutional, and the Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so as to
sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When the constitutionality of an
act is challenged, a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the
challenge. All laws are presumed to be constitutional and this presumption is one of
the strongest known to the law.

b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting

statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations
thereof . Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes
are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends the
earlier enacted statute.
"The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting
c.

legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise
"as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard
the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act, a
formal change-rebutting the presumption of substantial change.

e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used
when it enacted the relevant statute."

f. when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is

a presumption that the CONGRESS, in amending a statute, intended to
effect a substantive change in the law. "Further, we assume that
CONGRESS amendments to a statute are purposeful, rather than
unnecessary.

g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of

statutory construction that, where both general and specific statutes appear to
address a matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision
of law," it is presumed that CONGRESS intended to override any potential
conflicts with earlier legislation.

i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with

administration of those statutes is entitled to great
weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law made by
CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled to deference unless it is proven the
agency erred. The grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or
powers conferred by law. As such, "regulations, promulgated pursuant to
definitive statutory authority, have the force and effect of law. Moreover, those
regulations which "clearly and explicitly mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be
sustained. Any regulation of the Department must be reasonably grounded in an
identifiable and definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court accords substantial deference to an
agency's interpretations of its own regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not violate the
Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j.we will overturn COURTs decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary
or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of delegated discretion." On the other hand, an
"agency does not possess specialized competence over the interpretation of a statute
merely because it addresses topics within the agency's delegable authority. Pure
statutory construction, a matter within the "core competency of the judiciary," . "This
It is emphatically the
axiom stems from basic principles of separation of powers.
province and duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the
law is. It necessarily follows that the a priori question whether the statute delegates
or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one implicating
our duty of de novo review."

k."The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's

reasoning, correctly noting that courts give "great deference" to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This deference stems from
Code 2.2-4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take due
account" of the "experience and specialized competence of the
agency" promulgating the regulation. Even so, "deference is not
abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency
interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction
judicial
courts normally employ. No matter how one calibrates
deference, the administrative power to interpret a
regulation does not include the power to rewrite it.
When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the agency's
position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a
regulation, to create de facto a new regulation." Though agencies may be
tempted to adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations, such
overreaching undermines the notice and public hearing procedures of the
rulemaking process - thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political
accountability of agency policy decisions adopted through the rulemaking
process" and the democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially affected
members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of
determining the rules that affect them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts
with the language of the statute or when the interpretation has not been
consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an
agency's interpretation should be withheld.

m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits

to the implementation of an executive agency, it has no control
over that implementation (except, of course, through further,
more precise, legislation). The legislative and executive functions
are not combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves
to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's
meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than
the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It
seems contrary to fundamental principles of
separation of powers to permit the person who
promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out
of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively
cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in
future adjudications, to do what it pleases.

Construed Against the State/ Vagueness

a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be
construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of
the citizen. The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislature and not in the judicial department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act
which subjects him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which
imposes such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can
be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. If these
principals are violated, the fate of the accused is determined by the arbitrary discretion
of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against
the STATE and in favor of an accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the
STATE in criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an unreasonably
restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the
legislative intent expressed therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague, the
Supreme Court has considered whether the words used have a well-settled . . .
meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally understood" meaning for
adjective in ordinance). "A penal statute is void for vagueness if it both fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that her contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute and encourages selective prosecution
 Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative
Defense
1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications,
exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be
viewed as a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must
disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory
defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the
prosecution. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the
offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a
whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When determining
whether the limiting language is a negative element or a statutory defense, this Court
has identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the exception and its role
in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting
legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition
intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what would
otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether the
matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An application of these
factors to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except as provided by law,"
as used in Code 29.1-553, establishes a statutory defense as opposed to a negative
element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this
case, we first must address the threshold issue of whether the absence of
a valid prescription is an affirmative defense or a negative element of the
offense. If it is the latter, the burden of proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be
shifted to the accused...When construing penal statutes which contain qualifications,
exceptions or exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed as
a negative element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately,
the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused
can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. The ACCUSED
BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF
THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt of his guilt. In determining whether
specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a
statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of
the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective
parties to assert the existence or absence of the
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the
limitation. Accordingly, we should consider the wording of the exception and its
role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation
prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general
prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or
justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets
forth an affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general rule that the
state must prove all the essential facts entering into the
description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that
when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant it is incumbent on him to establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code 18.2-250 relates to
a fact that would be solely within the knowledge of the accused. If we accept
appellant's contention that the STATE must prove appellant had no valid prescription,
the offense would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to obtain a
conviction under the facts of this case, the STATE would be required to prove that no
medical professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had
prescribed the drug to appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of chain
drugstores, as well as independent pharmacies, hospitals, prison infirmaries, etc.
Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an undertaking would most likely be
impossible. CONGRESS clearly did not intend such a result, nor would they enact
such an impotent statute

Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other
rights of the people not therein expressed.

2)The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic
form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and
life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at
the time of its adoption to the extent and therein statedThe purpose and
object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be
looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made
effective. As we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take any
action not prohibited by express terms, or by necessary implications by the
Constitution.
3)A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied
guaranteed by the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon
the constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to
decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to avoid
a constitutional question whenever this is possible.
5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by
CONGRESS (note it is congress construing, not the supreme court, that is why
it is CALLED CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION)is entitled to
consideration, and if the construction is contemporaneous with
adoption of the constitutional provision, it is entitled to great weight. In
addition, Long acquiescence in such an announced construction so strengthens it
that it should not be changed unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR
MANDATORY.

A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its

enforcement.

A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty

or requirement that must be followed.
A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on the
legislature" for its implementation.

7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A

STATUTE DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged,
we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be
constitutional. Where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the
litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a
hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse
impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a
statute, departs from the express limitations of the Constitution and
relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative
usurpation must be very clear and palpable to justify the courts
holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.

9) "This Courts jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is

well established. The fact that many things of a diverse nature are
authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not
expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is authorized by the
act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate
and natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is
sufficient. [I]f there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must
be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the
legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. The analysis of a particular act
must necessarily stand on its own, and we must look to both the body and to
the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act violates the
Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as
applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute
on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as
applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation." We have said that
classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of facts can be reasonably
conceived that would support it." But where the statute creates a "suspect
classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or where it affects a
fundamental constitutional right, the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the
"strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
11)"Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and
is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew," "beginning again."

Retroactive Enactment of Laws

1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of
the parties are to be deemed in accordance with the law in effect when the action is
begun, unless the amended statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our
analysis is guided by the fundamental principles of statutory
construction that retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute
is always construed to operate prospectively unless a contrary
legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply only to future cases
unless there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the
new provision, which shows that the new law was intended to have a retrospective
effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved against a retroactive
operation of a statute, and words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective
operation unless they are so clear, strong and imperative that no
other meaning can be annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be given
to a statute only when legislative intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear,
explicit, and unequivocal terms.

Common Law
1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over
the common law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had the
common law in mind in the enactment of a statute. The statute
must therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and
the latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from
express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of the
statute was to change the common law.

3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not
be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do
so is plainly manifested. Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will
be recognized only in that which is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is
necessarily implied by its language.

4) "A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by
construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the
common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily
implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended.
"When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common
law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are directly and
irreconcilably opposed to the rule

Previous Construction of a Statute

1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts,
and is then re-enacted by the legislature, the
construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned
by the legislature, and thenceforth becomes
obligatory upon the courts." Hence, when the court
finds the old construction should be modified, it cannot
anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old construction
because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the
courts, and therefore, it "carries its historical construction" when used by
CONGRESS in a statute.
3) "We have said that when judicial interpretations have settled the
meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language
in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its
judicial interpretations as well. (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or
STATUTE that is ambiguous even if it was applied to a private case)

New Law New Remedy

4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute
prescribing a new remedy for an existing right should never be construed
to abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of express words or
necessary implication. Further, " 'when a statute gives a new remedy,
and contains no negative, express or implied, of the old remedy, the
new one provided by it is cumulative, and the party may elect
between the two.'

Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject

1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject
should not be read in isolation. Such statutes should be considered in pari
materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be
construed together to achieve a harmonious result, resolving conflicts to give
effect to legislative intent. An accepted principle of statutory construction is that,
when it is not clear which of two statutes applies, the more specific
statute prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes provide
different procedures on the same subject matter, "the general
must give way to the specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your
questions and in accord with the rule of statutory
construction in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated fragments of
law. Such provisions are to be considered as a whole, or as parts of a greater
connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single and complete statutory
compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but one act, so
that sections of one act may be considered as though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a
system of related general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a
fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing
system and to be carried into effect conformably to it, and they should be so construed
as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the system and make the scheme
consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is
shown plainly or with irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the
absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend
to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violate a general statute or system of
statutory provisions the entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily
involved in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary, legislature did not
intend to alter or repeal general statute or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two
statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and
construed together and effect given to all of their provisions.
Statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and
effect should be given the provisions of each.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts should give the fullest possible
effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory
enactment. Potentially conflicting statutes should be harmonized to give
force and effect to each.

5) City
and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the
Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given
effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.

The Meaning of Words

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are
presumed to have their usual and ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be
presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely
necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not intend to do a vain and useless
thing. "It is a well established rule of construction that a statute ought
to be interpreted in such a manner that it may have effect, and not found
to be vain and elusive. "A word or clause contained in a statute may only be
rejected as surplusage if it "appears to have been inserted
through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable of any sensible
meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.

4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase, but will
in the context of the other
construe the words and terms at issue
language used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that
intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal
construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated the related
principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be
preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction." Statutes should
not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd or
irrational consequences.
6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought
to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should receive
a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather
than one which will defeat it.
7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It is unnecessary to resort to any rules of
statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those
situations, the statute's plain meaning and intent govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being
understood in more than one way, refers to two or more
things simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of
doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness.

9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally
sufficient; binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does not provide a statutory
definition we may look to the dictionary definition to determine legislative intent

10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions
with a comma followed by the disjunctive word "nor." We have noted
that, pursuant to the rules of grammar, "phrases separated by a comma
and [a] disjunctive . . . are independent. The disjunctive serves to
connect the two parts of the sentence but also to keep them
separate and independent.
12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it
generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse;
stubbornly, obstinately, perversely[.] The word is also employed to characterize a
thing done without ground for believing it is lawful. The term "willful act" imports
knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The
act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of
another and will probably result in an injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and
culpable" describes conduct. The word "gross" means "aggravated or
increased negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving of blame or
censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts
of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or
indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated
to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and
the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of his
acts
13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute
nor are they permitted to accomplish the same result by judicial
interpretation." Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts
are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign a construction
that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has
stated.

14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by the Department that is in conflict
with the plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.

15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons
or things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the
general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less
general, particular words. Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a
sociis (associated words) when general and specific words are grouped, the general
words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those things identified by the specific words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within
its terms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be
excepted.

17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine, is
particularly applicable here and can be summarized as follows: Referential and
qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears,
refer solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is 'the last
word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the
meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the
provision or clause immediately preceding it. (explaining and applying "the
grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows . . . ."); (noting that construction of a statute according to the last
antecedent rule is "quite sensible as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with
its enforcement cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear
meaning. Amendments of statutes can only be made by the legislature and
not by the courts or administrative officers charged with their enforcement

20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume
that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single
statute, the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as effectively
irrebuttable. We also understand that [m]ost words have different shades of
meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they occur
in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in
the same section. Thus, the natural presumption that identical words
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the
connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion
that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent. Ibid. A
given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association
with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to provide an endnote or footnote citation orreference for
a source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similar in meaning to idem (meaning something that has been
mentioned previously; the same), abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one must look
at the reference preceding it.

21)"Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or,"

are independent. (finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence,
"'but disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in alternatives,
which must be treated separately); (finding that limiting phrase in statute is
independent of and does not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting phrase
is separated from the first two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting
the use of a comma and the disjunctive "or" as implying two separate and
independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by
corporation "out of net earnings, or out of its net assets in excess of its capital").
Accordingly, the phrase, "made by the Defendant to any law enforcement officer,"
is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded
statement or confessions."

The Terms May/Shall

1) The term "may," as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary meaning
intended by the CONGRESS -permission, importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the word "may,"
while ordinarily importing permission, will be construed to be mandatory
when it is necessary to accomplish the manifest purpose of the
 legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute generally implies that its
terms are intended to be mandatory, rather than permissive or directive.
4) "[T]he use of shall, in a statute requiring action by a public official,
is directory and not mandatory unless the statute manifests a contrary
intent."14 "A statute directing the mode of proceeding by public officers is to be
deemed directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed essential to the
validity of the proceedings, unless so declared by statute.

The Term Aggrieved Locus Standi

1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to
determine who is a proper party to seek court relief from an adverse decision. In
order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must affirmatively appear that
such person had some direct interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding that he seeks to attack. . . . The petitioner 'must show that he has an
immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a
remote or indirect interest.' . . . Thus, it is not sufficient that the sole
interest of the petitioner is to advance some perceived public
right or to redress some anticipated public injury when the only
wrong he has suffered is in common with other persons similarly
situated. The word 'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates a substantial grievance and
means a denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of
a burden or obligation upon the petitioner different from that suffered by the public
generally.

Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent

1) "In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary element in
the indictment and proof of a particular crime becomes a question of legislative intent
to be construed by the court. Thus, to insert a mens rea element into the offense, and
to require proof thereof, would defeat the statutory purpose, which is to criminalize
the introduction of firearms into a school environment. So we will not add, by
implication, language to the statute that the legislature expressly has chosen not to
include. Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly decided, in refusing the
instruction in question, that this statute is one of strict criminal liability, and that
the Commonwealth was required to prove only that the defendant had possessed, on
school property, a firearm of the type described in the statute.
2) "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the
Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement
that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious
will." Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early
pronounced the same principle, although a few exceptions not relevant to
our present problem came to be recognized.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence
of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense
individualism.
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were
silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in
the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the
requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law. The
unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that
wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety,
disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental
element.
However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of
different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific
ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious
intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge,"
"fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty
knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental
culpability.
By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect
those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous
common-law crimes....The Government asks us by a feat of construction
radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent
is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit
as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe
the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be
extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative.
3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea was long a requirement of
criminal responsibility. But the list of exceptions grew, especially in the
expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, safety,
and welfare. Id., at 254. The statutory offense of embezzlement, borrowed
from the common law where scienter was historically required, was in a
different category. 13 Id., at 260-261.
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning [401 U.S. 601, 608] of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."

The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority

The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our determination of the powers of
local governing bodies. This rule provides that municipal corporations
have only those powers that are expressly granted, those
necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and those that are
essential and indispensable.
"In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where
a power is conferred and the mode of its execution is
specified, no other method may be selected; any other means
would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable. A
necessary corollary is that where a grant of power is silent upon its mode of execution,
a method of exercise clearly contrary to legislative intent, or inappropriate to the ends
sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine of
implied powers should never be applied to create a power that
does not exist or to expand an existing power beyond
rational limits. Always, the test in application of the doctrine is
reasonableness, in which concern for what is necessary to promote the
public interest is a key element.
Finally, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority
exists only to the extent specifically granted in the statute. It can never go
beyond the authority given .

6)When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative

agency to promulgate regulations, those regulations must neither
exceed the scope of the authority delegated nor be inconsistent
with it. Furthermore, "delegations of legislative power are valid only if they
establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency,
or board in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack
such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void." For example, language
in an enabling statute which provides merely "that the regulations be designed to
protect and promote the safety and health of employees" is insufficient.
7) "We consistently have held that when the primary purpose of an enactment is to
raise revenue, the enactment will be considered a tax, regardless of the name attached
to the act. The General Assembly is directly prohibited from enacting any local,
special, or private law . . . [f]or the assessment and collection of taxes. There is,
however, an exception to this specific prohibition. The General Assembly may by
special act like RA 7160(Local Government Code) delegating the power of
taxation to any province, city, municipality.

Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of
Executive Departments have the force of law, and that any Executive Department
concerned with the execution of a statutes interpretation of its governing statutes,
as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight. Regulations,
however, may not conflict with the authorizing
statute. Whether a regulation is inconsistent with its enabling legislation
is properly a subject of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given
effect, it is the duty of the courts to harmonize them and not nullify
the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with
STATUTES. Such ordinances are inconsistent with state law when they
cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a county or municipal ordinance
enlarges on a statute's provisions does not create a conflict with the statute unless the statute
limits the requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for all cases to its own terms. Thus, if
a statute and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and
apply them together.

A Single Body of Law

1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a
statute with "a view toward harmonizing it with other statutes.
"Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a
court must give it its ordinary meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the
SUPREME Court often examines other related
statutes that contain similar or contrasting
language to help determine legislative intent.
The Exclusion Rule
Ambiguity
1) "Language is ambiguous when it may be understood in
more than one way, or simultaneously refers to two or
more things.
2) "When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a
manner that will give effect to the intent of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern and give
effect to legislative intent, with the reading of a statute as a whole
influencing the proper construction of ambiguous individual provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used in the connection
with the construction of written documents to the effect that an
ambiguous provision is construed most strongly against the person who
selected the language." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive covenant, in particular the phrase "residential purposes," to be
ambiguous in several respects....Indeed, even the circuit court's interpretation that the term "
'[r]esidence' means more than mere physical presence and less than domicile" is ambiguous. It
can be argued that a nightly or weekly rental is more than mere physical presence. Moreover, if
the phrase "residential purposes" carries with it a "duration of use" component, it is ambiguous
as to when a rental of the property moves from short-term to long-term. Under our case law, a
restrictive covenant of "substantial doubt or ambiguity" must be interpreted "in favor of the free
use of property and against restrictions

Criminal Versus Civil Intent of a Statute

The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal
is a matter of statutory construction." First, one must determine whether the
legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates either expressly
or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where the
legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, one must
address "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate that intention

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution

1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
supersedes any conflicting state law. The preemption of Local laws by
STATUTES may occur by express statutory language or other clear indication that
Congress intended to legislate exclusively in the area. Even if Congress does not
intend the enactment of a STATUTORY scheme completely to preempt Local laws in
the area, congressional enactments in the same field override Local laws with which
they conflict.
The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which
preemption may occur:
(1) Congress may adopt express language setting forth the
existence and scope of preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that
"occupies the field" and leaves no room for states to adopt
supplemental laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with the constitution, typically when
compliance with both laws is a "physical impossibility" or the statute
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.
2) "Settled legal principles provide that the Constitution, not a state
court erroneous interpretation of it, is controlling. (in context of
determining whether to apply retroactively a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions, adopting Blackstonian view that judges...find the
law rather than make the law and that judicial declaration of law is
merely a statement of what the law has always been.

Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the lawmakers on matters of
economics, sociology and public policy. . . . Those considerations
belong exclusively in the legislative domain. Regardless of
whether it "may or may not be better public policy". Meaning COURTS
do not interpret provisions for ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY and
PUBLIC POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the "propriety, wisdom,
necessity and expediency" of legislation. We ask only whether
the statutory classification erects an irrational, arbitrary
distinction - one that no conceivable state of facts could
reasonably sustain.
Posted 19th October 2012 by AGINGLAWYER