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1. G.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989 Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch I an action for recovery of damages sustained as a
JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner, result of the stone-throwing incident. After trial, the court a quo rendered
vs. judgment with the following dispositive part:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC., respondents. Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered:

Martin Badong, Jr. for petitioner. 1. Ordering defendant transportation company to pay plaintiff Jose Pilapil the
sum of P 10,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing actual and material
Eufronio K. Maristela for private respondent. damages for causing a permanent scar on the face and injuring the eye-sight
of the plaintiff;

2. Ordering further defendant transportation company to pay the sum of P


PADILLA, J.:
5,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the plaintiff as moral and exemplary
damages;
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision* rendered by the Court
of Appeals dated 19 October 1979 in CA-G.R. No. 57354-R entitled "Jose
3. Ordering furthermore, defendant transportation company to reimburse
Pilapil, plaintiff-appellee versus Alatco Transportation Co., Inc., defendant-
plaintiff the sum of P 300.00 for his medical expenses and attorney's fees in
appellant," which reversed and set aside the judgment of the Court of First
the sum of P 1,000.00, Philippine Currency; and
Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 7230 ordering respondent
transportation company to pay to petitioner damages in the total sum of 4. To pay the costs.
sixteen thousand three hundred pesos (P 16,300.00).
SO ORDERED 1

The record discloses the following facts:


From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent- where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354R. On 19 October 1979,
defendant's bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five, rendered judgment
1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said bus No. 409 was in due course reversing and setting aside the judgment of the court a quo.
negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga City, upon reaching the
vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the Hence the present petition.
way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national
In seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above
his left eye. Private respondent's personnel lost no time in bringing the contends that said court has decided the issue not in accord with law.
petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and Specifically, petitioner argues that the nature of the business of a
treated. transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks, and the
stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is
Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from
to Dr. Malabanan of Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since liability.
there was no improvement in his left eye's vision, petitioner went to V. Luna
Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the We do not agree.
treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the
eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not
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give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law
goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law requires. 5
imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
Petitioner contends that respondent common carrier failed to rebut the
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe presumption of negligence against it by proof on its part that it exercised
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them, extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers.
according to all the circumstances of each case. The requirement of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is restated in Article We do not agree.
1755: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Further, in case
established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of
of death of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers
diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a
to be at fault or to have acted negligently. 2
fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the
in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private
negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its
the absolute safety of its passengers. 3 duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with
the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable.
only such as human care and foresight can provide. what constitutes To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute
compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
circumstances.
Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their passengers, it would
on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined
relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the when intervening acts of strangers is to be determined directly cause the
negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of injury, while the contract of carriage Article 1763 governs:
evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by
proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event. 4 of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission or omission.
and Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common
carriers in the conduct of their business. Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which
causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held
transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent
that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that
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when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in
the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a
family.

Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the ground that


the injury complained of could have been prevented by the common carrier if
something like mesh-work grills had covered the windows of its bus.

We do not agree.

Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury


complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to
require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable
precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not
charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely
prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the
most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the same
occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in
suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this
respect. 6

Finally, petitioner contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a


carrier were made liable for such stone-throwing incidents rather than have
the bus riding public lose confidence in the transportation system.

Sad to say, we are not in a position to so hold; such a policy would be better
left to the consideration of Congress which is empowered to enact laws to
protect the public from the increasing risks and dangers of lawlessness in
society.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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2. G.R. No. 119756 March 18, 1999 At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who
pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was
vs. Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier
COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE U.CAORONG, and minor childrenYASSER Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the
KING CAORONG, ROSE HEINNI and PRINCE ALEXANDER, all side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which
surnamed CAORONG, and represented by their mother PAULIE U. caused him to slump on the steering wheel. The one of the companions of
CAORONG, respondents. Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the
passenger at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passenger to
get off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the
bus and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway. 2
MENDOZA, J.:
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated
overhead rack. at that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on
July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness,
Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. The aforesaid decision of the trial
heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he
court dismissed the complaint of public respondents against petitioner for
was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The
damages for breach of contract of carriage filed on the ground that petitioner
armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated the warning that they
had not exercised the required degree of diligence in the operation of one of
were going to burn the bus along with its driver. During this exchange
its buses. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein,
between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left
was a passenger of the bus and was killed in the ambush involving said bus.
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the
The facts of the instant case are as follows: highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the
passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire.
Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning
Caorong is the widow of Atty. Caorong, while private respondents Yasser bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died
King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander are their minor children. while undergoing operation.3

On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in
jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. In its decision, dated
passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding as
volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit No. X, follows:
conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the
jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was
certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning informed of the "rumors" that the Moslems intended to take revenge by
some of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. burning five buses of defendant is established since the latter also utilized
Reynaldo Bastasa of the Philippine Constabulary Regional Headquarters at Crisanto Generalao as a witness. Yet despite this information, the plaintiffs
Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa, he went to see charge, defendant did not take proper precautions. . . . Consequently,
Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, its main office in Cagayan plaintiffs now fault the defendant for ignoring the report. Their position is that
de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the the defendant should have provided its buses with security guards. Does the
safety of lives and property would be taken. 1 law require common carriers to install security guards in its buses for the
protection and safety of its passengers? Is the failure to post guards on
omission of the duty to "exercise the diligence of a good father of the family"
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which could have prevented the killing of Atty. Caorong? To our mind, the were likely to be carried out such as where the earlier accident occurred or
diligence demanded by law does not include the posting of security guard in the place of influence of the victims or their locality. If frisking was resorted
buses. It is an obligation that properly belongs to the State. Besides, will the to, even temporarily, . . . . appellee might be legally excused from liabilty.
presence of one or two security guards suffice to deter a determined assault Frisking of passengers picked up along the route could have been
of the lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe so, but implemented by the bus conductor; for those boarding at the bus terminal,
again, perhaps not. In other words, the presence of a security guard is not a frisking could have been conducted by him and perhaps by additional
guarantee that the killing of Atty. Caorong would have been definitely personnel of defendant-appellee. On hindsight, the handguns and especially
avoided. the gallon of gasoline used by the felons all of which were brought inside the
bus would have been discovered, thus preventing the burning of the bus and
xxx xxx xxx the fatal shooting of the victim.

Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of Appellee's argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its
Mr. Generalao and the fact that it did not provide security to its buses cannot, buses and that the safety of citizens is the duty of the government, is not well
in the light of the circumstances, be characterized as negligence. taken. To be sure, appellee is not expected to assign security guards on all its
buses; if at all, it has the duty to post guards only on its buses plying
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assalants did not have the least
predominantly Maranaos areas. As discussed in the next preceding
intention of the harming any of the passengers. They ordered all the
paragraph, least appellee could have done in response to the report was to
passengers to alight and set fire on the bus only after all the passengers were
adopt a system of verification such as the frisking of passengers boarding at
out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and unforseen
its buses. Nothing, and no repeat, nothing at all, was done by defendant-
occurrense over which defendant had no control. Atty. Caorong performed an
appellee to protect its innocent passengers from the danger arising from the
act of charity and heroism in coming to the succor of the driver even in the
"Maranao threats." It must be observed that frisking is not a novelty as a
face of danger. He deserves the undying gratitude of the driver whose life he
safety measure in our society. Sensitive places in fact, nearly all important
saved. No one should blame him for an act of extraordinary charity and
places have applied this method of security enhancement. Gadgets and
altruism which cost his life. But neither should any blame be laid on the
devices are avilable in the market for this purpose. It would not have weighed
doorstep of defendant. His death was solely due to the willfull acts of the
much against the budget of the bus company if such items were made
lawless which defendant could neither prevent nor to stop.
available to its personnel to cope up with situations such as the "Maranaos
threats."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed. For
lack of merit, the counter-claim is likewise dismissed. No costs. 4
In view of the constitutional right to personal privacy, our pronouncement in
this decision should not be construed as an advocacy of mandatory frisking in
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed. It held:
all public conveyances. What we are saying is that given the circumstances
In the case at bench, how did defendant-appellee react to the tip or obtaining in the case at bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because of a
information that certain Maranao hotheads were planning to burn five of its vehicular collision involving one of appellee's vehicles; (b) appellee received a
buses out of revenge for the deaths of two Maranaos in an earlier collision written report from a member of the Regional Security Unit, Constabulary
involving appellee's bus? Except for the remarks of appellee's operations Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the two deceased were
manager that "we will have our action . . . . and I'll be the one to settle it planning to burn five buses of appellee out of revenge; and (c) appelle did
personally," nothing concrete whatsoever was taken by appellee or its nothing absolutely nothing for the safety of its passengers travelling in
employees to prevent the execution of the threat. Defendant-appellee never the area of influence of the victims, appellee has failed to exercise the degree
adopted even a single safety measure for the protection of its paying of dilegence required of common carriers. Hence, appellee must be adjudge
passengers. Were there available safeguards? Of course, there were: one was liable.
frisking passengers particularly those en route to the area where the threats
xxx xxx xxx
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WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the
rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of
following: its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado
Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing
1) P3,399,649.20 as death indemnity; to protect the safety of its passengers.

2) P50,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance as attorney's fee and Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to
see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under
Costs against defendant-appellee. 5
the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends:
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
(A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED DECEMBER 28, 1990 DISMISSING THE passenger's constitutional rights. As this Court amended in Gacal v. Philippine
COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE COUNTERCLAIM, AND FINDING FOR PRIVATE Air Lines, Inc., 6 a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a
RESPONDENTS BY ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE GARGANTUAN SUM hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.
OF P3,449,649.20 PLUS P500.00 PER APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, AS
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner's employees failed to prevent
WELL AS DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FRO RECONSIDERATION AND THE
the attack on one of petitioner's buses because they did not exercise the
SUPPLEMENT TO SAID MOTION, WHILE HOLDING, AMONG OTHERS, THAT
diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable
THE PETITIONER BREACHED THE CONTRACT OF THE CARRIAGE BY ITS
for the death of Atty. Caorong.
FAILURE TO EXCERCISE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF DILIGENCE;
Second. Seizure of Petitioner's Bus not a Case of Force Majeure
(B) THAT THE ACTS OF THE MARANAO OUTLAWS WERE SO GRAVE,
IRRESISTABLE, VIOLENT, AND FORCEFULL, AS TO BE REGARDED AS CASO
The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants
FORTUITO; AND
was a fortuitous event for which it could not be held liable.
(C) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurence which
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE PROVIDED ADEQUATE SECURITY
could not be foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 7 we held
IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS AS PART OF ITS DUTY TO OBSERVE
that to considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the
EXTRA-ORDINARY DILIGENCE AS A COMMON CARRIER.
breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the
event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurence must
The instant has no merit.
be render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
First. Petitioner's Breach of the Contract of Carriage. manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation
of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for above would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other
passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 8 it was held that the common carrier
act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the was liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against an
present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made of several passengers. The event was forseeable, and, thus, the second
possible. requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to
the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
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were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing
and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of
foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt negligence, let alone recklessness.
petitioner from liabilty.
Fourth. Petitioner Liable to Private Respaondents for Damages
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 9 and De Guzman
v. Court of Appeals, 10 in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong,
by the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, 11 it private respondents herein, are entitled to recover from the petitioner.
was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills
Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206
on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries cause by rocks hurled at
thereof, provides for the payment of indemnity for the death of passengers
the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of
caused by the breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier. Initially
Appeals, 12 it was ruled that a common carriers is not responsible for goods
fixed in Art. 2206 at P3,000.00, the amount of the said indemnity for death
lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistable threat,
has through the years been gradually increased in view of the declining value
violence, or force.
of the peso. It is presently fixed at P50,000.00. 13 Private respondents are
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the entitled to this amount.
prensent case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is
Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that "except as provided by law or by
bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
pecuniary loss suffered by him as has duly proved." The trial court found that
for all the circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the
the private respondents spent P30,000.00 for the wake and burial of Atty.
respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions
Caorong. 14 Since petitioner does not question this finding of the trial court, it
against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such
is liable to private respondent in the said amount as actual damages.
as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of
unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased." The trial court
buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo)
found that private respondent Paulie Caorong suffered pain from the death of
that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by
her husband and worry on how to provide support for their minor children,
petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander. 15 The
petitioner likewise does not question this finding of the trial court. Thus, in
Third. Deceased not Guilty of Contributory Negligence
accordance with recent decisions of this Court, 16 we hold that the petitioner
The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory is liable to the private respondents in the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong damages for the death of Atty. Caorong.
did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that "in contracts and quasi-
the violence were petitioners and its employees, not its passengers. The
contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in
assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent reckless manner."
result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the
In the present case, the petitioner acted in a wanton and reckless manner.
two Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had
Despite warning that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge against the
hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended
petitioner by burning some of its buses, and contary to the assurance made
to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to
by its operations manager that the necessary precautions would be take, the
retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his
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petitioner and its employees did nothing to protect the safety of passengers. 3. moral damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
Under the circumtances, we deem it reasonable to award private respondents (P100,000.00);
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. 17
4. exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
Attorney's Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorney's fees may be recovered (P100,000.00);
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. In the recent
case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 18 we held an award of 5. attorney's fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees to be reasonable. Hence, the private
6. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of two million one
respondents are entitled to attorney's fees in that amount.
hundred twenty-one thousand four hundred four pesos and ninety centavos
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in (P2,121,404.90); and
relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides that in addition to the indemnity for
7. cost of suits.
death arising from the breach of contrtact of carriage by a common carrier,
the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
SO ORDERED.
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." The
formula established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity is as
follows:19

Gross Necessary

Net Earning = Life x Annual Living

Capacity Expectancy Income Expenses

Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference


of eighty (80) and the age of the deceased. 20 Since Atty. Caorong was 37
years old at that time of his death, 21 he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3 more
years. 22 His projected gross annual income, computed based on his monthly
salary of P11,385.00. 23 as a lawyer in the Department of Agrarian Reform at
the time of his death, was P148,005.00. 24 Allowing for necessary living
expenses of fifty percent (50%) 25 of his projected gross annual income, his
total earning capacity amounts to P2,121,404.90. 26 Hence, the petitioner is
liable to the private respondents in the said amount as a compensation for
loss of earning capacity.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express,
Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to private respondents Paulie,
Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander Caorong:

1. death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);

2. actual damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00);


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3. G.R. No. L-37632 July 30, 1982 imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Victoriano Paman, namely, the petitioner
GREGORIA VDA. DE PAMAN, ROMEO PAMAN, ELISBERTO PAMAN, and Gregoria Vda. de Paman and her three children, in the amount of P12,000.00,
CESARIA PAMAN, petitioners, the dispositive portion of the Decision reading as follows:
vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. SEERIS, as Judge of CFI, Branch II, Zamboanga WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Teodoro de los Santos, by his own
City, WESTERN MINDANAO LUMBER COMPANY and TEODORO DE LOS admission, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple
SANTOS, respondents. Imprudence resulting in Homicide as defined and penalized under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in his favor the two
GUERRERO, J.: mitigating circumstances above-mentioned not offset by any aggravating
circumstance, hereby SENTENCES him to an imprisonment of TWO (2)
This is a petition for mandamus to order the District Judge of the Court of
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the
First Instance of Zamboanga City, 16th Judicial District, Branch II, to perform
late Victoriano Paman, namely: Gregoria Guevara Vda. de Paman and her
his allegedly ministerial duty to execute the judgment in Criminal Case No.
three children, in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), with
2953 entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiffs, versus, Teodoro de los
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but which however, shall not
Santos, accused," for Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence In Violation of
be more than one (1/3) third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs of
Section 52 of Act 3992, As Amended, in order to enforce the subsidiary
the proceedings.
liability of employer respondent Western Mindanao Lumber Company
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The facts of the case are SO ORDERED. 1

simple and uncontradicted.


On the same day, accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos commenced his
On May 24, 1961, accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos was charged by service of sentence. On August 4, 1972, petitioner Gregoria Vda. de Paman,
the City Attorney of Zamboanga City in the following information: widow of the victim, filed the first motion for execution of the judgment to
enforce the civil liability of the P12,000.00 of the accused-respondent. This
The undersigned City Attorney accuses TEODORO DE LOS SANTOS, with
was followed on August 28, 1972 by the filing of petitioner of an ex
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 52 of ACT
parte motion for execution of judgment against the accused. In both
3992 AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
instances, Western Mindanao Lumber Company was duly notified.
That on or about December 21, 1956, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines,
On August 31, 1972, respondent Judge issued an order granting the said
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned accused, driver
motion for execution. However, on September 4, 1972, the Sheriff's Return of
of a cargo truck with plate No. T-15341, owned and operated by the Western
Service showed that the accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos had no
Mindanao Lumber Co., and without due precaution, considering the width,
property registered in his name.
grades, curvature, visibility and other conditions of the road, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, thru his recklessness and lack ofUpon discovery that accused-respondent is insolvent, petitioner filed on
foresight while driving said cargo truck cause one Victoriano Paman to fall September 19, 1972, a "Motion for Execution on Subsidiary Liability of
therefrom who was riding the said truck and as a consequence, the latter Employer Western Mindanao Lumber Company under Article 103 of the
sustained injuries on his person which caused his death. Revised Penal Code." Petitioner contended therein that the subsidiary liability
of the employer Western Mindanao Lumber Company in the event the
CONTRARY TO LAW.
accused is insolvent, is executory in nature and there is no need for a
separate action or a further civil case to be filed in the enforcement of the
Upon arraignment on June 26, 1972, accused-respondent Teodoro de los
decision aforementioned. On October 11, 1972, petitioner filed a
Santos entered a plea of guilty. In view of said plea, the respondent Judge,
"Supplemental Motion for Execution for Subsidiary Liability of Employer under
Alberto Seeris, rendered a Decision sentencing said respondent to suffer an
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 10

Art. 103 of the Penal Code." Petitioner, thru counsel, cited therein the case prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law. 3 Said provision
of Fernando vs. Franco, 37 SCRA 311, where this Court held that: will be rendered meaningless if the subsidiary civil liability is not allowed to be
enforced in the same proceeding.
It may be stated further that since it was not only in the latter part of
October, 1962 that the decision against the driver attained finality and To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged
became executory, had plaintiffs relied on suing out a writ of execution employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra)
against the employer, it could have had until October 1967 at the latest to to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary hability of the
take such step. alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein
that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be
Petitioner concluded that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A
subsidiary liability of the employer may be enforced in the same proceeding. case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so
that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no
On September 8, 1973, respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion
question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general
for issuance of writ of execution against the employer of Teodoro de los
supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with
Santos. He opined that the alleged employer not having been notified that its
it the right to determine very question of fact and law which may be involved
driver was facing a criminal charge, a separate civil action must be filed.
in the execution.
Hence, this petition for mandamus.
Moreover, it has been invariably held that a judgment of conviction
This case finds parallelism in a case involving the same respondent Judge,
sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any
i.e. Lucia S. Pajarito vs. Hon. Alberto V. Seeris et al., 87 SCRA 275, where
collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon
the only issue involved is whether or not the subsidiary liability established in
the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal
liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
case where the award was made, or in a separate civil action.
amount. 4 This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea vs. Halili, 109 Phil.
495 that the court has no other function than to render decision based upon
As in the aforementioned case, the apparent drawback in the enforcement of
the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or
the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is the lack of due
modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A
process to the alleged employer. Not being a party to the case, he is not
separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only
heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Besides, even if the
unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim.
employer-employee relationship is not disputed, still, in order that an
employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
WHEREFORE, the order dated September 8, 1973 of respondent Judge is
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in
hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to conduct further
any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the
proceedings in the same case on whether the requisite facts to impose
discharge of his duties, and (2) that he is insolvent. 2
subsidiary civil liability on the alleged employer of Teodoro de los Santos are
present. Costs against private respondents.
Against the foregoing considerations, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court provides, however, that "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
SO ORDERED.
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately." That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one
complete with the same completeness as any of the two normal persons
composing the twins. It means that the civil action may be tried and
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 11

4. G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that
AIR FRANCE, petitioner, Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
vs. they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
APPEALS, respondents. plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner. 1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso. findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent
court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid
before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent
rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between
statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall
first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of
that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of
the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of
fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
suit.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on
attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential
Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice
appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
The case is now before us for review on certiorari. evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental
evidence of record", are: process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary
left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in
contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the
of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his
the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the
"first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 12

testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every
testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions arestation for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by
that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant
within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never
meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that
... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the honored or not.22
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has
been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of
value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18 petitioner's contention, thus:

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there
from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-
the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or 1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael
to review the questions of fact. 20 Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does
fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment. this OK mean?

3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims? A. That the space is confirmed.

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received Q. Confirmed for first class?
from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did
not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
xxx xxx xxx
class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability
and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first
of first class seats.
class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The
court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in
cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B",
its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which
"B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show
reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed
that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
reservation whatever.
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first- the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 13

"first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class
confirmation in Hongkong. 23 seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better
right to the seat?
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of
a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of 4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's
the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract;
respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of
the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing
First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the on this issue are:
assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment 3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine
affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for
construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this and in behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was
point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with
ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
conclusions of the trial court. 26
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence
therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead
easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long
defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that
Bangkok after he was already seated.
spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience
is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the
and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to
oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to
Manila.32
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there
are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that
xxx xxx xxx
respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class
seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the 2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish,
subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury,
"surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his
office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told xxx xxx xxx
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 14

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to
contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; The Court of appeals further stated
and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was
by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold
already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing
the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being
resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the
ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then
contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the
safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that
stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the
respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is
to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for
was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified
(b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented as follows:
without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to
passenger has arranged with you?
justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was
cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247,
not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
June 19, 1959)
declared:
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of
this point:
the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have
will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent.
court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of
plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows: the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and
for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene", If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in
Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-
testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the
passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of
presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is
produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances,
noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied
the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the
this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 15

defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we
throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages
the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness are recoverable. 42
Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first from any other contractual relation. 43And this, because of the relation which
transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39 injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in
with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this,
airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also
(defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when
proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40 train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a
not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Civil Code says:
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a
compensate the latter for the damage. case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus



TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 16

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser? of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to
accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
there because I am protesting to this transfer". employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to
have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such
Q Was she able to note it? entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the
matter.
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible
Q About that purser?
in evidence.
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court
have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to
ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-
me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded in
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The
French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
Mr. VALTE
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the
said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition
COURT that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49 10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00,
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of
made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals
go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we
intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to
is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, the reasonableness thereof.57
but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer
from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue petitioner. So ordered.
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued
to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 17

5. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
SALVA, respondents. truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver
Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

MENDOZA, J.: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed
on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action
to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
for breach of contract of carriage.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente
Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden
stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. (3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck (5) to pay the costs.
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
SO ORDERED.
rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a
fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting,
that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground
during said period.
that it is not supported by evidence.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
The petition has no merit.
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 18

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
of res judicata does not apply. them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his articles 1755 and 1756.
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed 1733 and 1755.
to transport his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of death or
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
common carrier the burden of proof.
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
Traffic Code, which provides:
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight,
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers
with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same
law. It provides:
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 19

Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue
allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left leg . . . has a
registered capacity. defect already."

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is
only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair,
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence just and reasonable.
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated
taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an exception, such damages are
akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was as provided in Art. 2220.6
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.3 This In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith
breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission
in causing the injury to the of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight
with its body protruding two meters into the highway. of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena
that he was the one at fault for the accident.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is
excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and
its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student SO ORDERED.
in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical
Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second
semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of
continuing with her schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to
pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has
a defect already."

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under


confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of
her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 20

6. G.R. No. 139875 December 4, 2000 Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors' Hospital, but he succumbed to
his injuries the day after.
GREGORIO PESTAO and METRO CEBU AUTOBUS
CORPORATION, petitioners, "Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Gregorio Pestao,
vs. [Respondents] Teotimo and Paz Sumayang, as heirs of Ananias Sumayang,
Spouses TEOTIMO SUMAYANG and PAZ C. SUMAYANG, respondents. filed this civil action for damages against Gregorio Pestao, as driver of the
passenger bus that rammed the deceased's motorcycle, Metro Cebu, as
PANGANIBAN, J.: owner and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de Seguros, as
insurer of Metro Cebu. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6108.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial judge, are
binding on this Court. In quasi-delicts, such findings are crucial because "On November 9, 1987, upon motion of [Petitioner] Pestao, Judge Pedro C.
negligence is largely a matter of evidence. In computing an award for lost Son ordered the consolidation of the said case with Criminal Case No. 10624,
earning capacity, the life expectancy of the deceased, not that of the heir, is pending in Branch 16 of the same Court, involving the criminal prosecution of
used as basis. Gregorio Pestao for [d]ouble [h]omicide thru [r]eckless [i]mprudence. Joint
trial of the two cases thereafter ensued, where the following assertions were
The Case
made:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
'[Respondents] rely mainly on the testimonies of Ignacio Neis, Pat. Aquilino
Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision and the August 6, 1999
Dinoy and Teotimo Sumayang, father of the deceased. Neis declared that he
Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 30289. The
saw the incident while he was sitting on a bench beside the highway; that
questioned Decision disposed as follows:
both vehicles c[a]me from the North; that as the motorcycle approached the
junction to Tab[a]gon, the driver Ananias Sumayang signalled with his left
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.
arm to indicate that he was taking the Tab[a]gon Road; that the motorcycle
The assailed Decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
did turn left but as it did so, it was bumped by an overspeeding bus; that the
aforesaid modification regarding the award of death penalty."
force of the impact threw Ananias Sumayang and his companion Manuel
The Resolution of August 6, 1999 denied reconsideration.2 Romagos about 14 meters away. The motorcycle, Neis continued, was badly
damaged as it was dragged by the bus.
The Facts
'On the other hand, Pat. Dinoy testified that he was in the nearby house of
The events leading to this Petition were summarized by the Court of Appeals Ruben Tiu [when] he heard the sound or noise caused by the collision; that
as follows: he immediately went to the scene where he found Ananias Sumayang and
Manuel Romagos lying on the road bleeding and badly injured; that he
"It appears from the records that at around 2:00 o'clock [o]n the afternoon of requested the driver of a PU vehicle to take them to a hospital; that he took
August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the note of the various distances which he included in his sketch (Exh. J) that the
national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was his friend probable point of impact was at the left lane of the highway and right at the
Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway junction to Tab[a]gon (Exh J-11); that he based his conclusion on the
connected with the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger 'scratches' caused by the motorcycle's footrest on the asphalt pavement; that
bus driven by [Petitioner] Gregorio Pestao and owned by [Petitioner] Metro he described the damage caused to the motorcycle in his sketch (Exh J); that
Cebu Autobus Corporation (Metro Cebu, for brevity), which had tried to on the part of the bus, the right end of its front bumper was bent and the
overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the right portion of the radiator grill was dented. Pat. Dinoy acknowledged that
pavement. Both Ananias Sumayang and Manuel Romagos were rushed to the he met at the scene Ignacio Neis who informed him that he saw the incident.
hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was pronounced dead on arrival.
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 21

'On the contrary, Pestao blamed Sumayang for the accident. He testified dangerous speed as they were coming upon a junction in the road, and as the
that when he first blew the horn the motorcycle which was about 15 or 20 motorcycle was about to turn left towards Tabagon. The court likewise found
meters ahead went to the right side of the highway that he again blew the Metro Cebu directly and primarily liable, along with Pestao, the latter's
horn and accelerated in order to overtake the motorcycle; that when he was employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as [Petitioner] Metro Cebu
just one meter behind, the motorcycle suddenly turned left towards the failed to present evidence to prove that it had observed . . . [the] diligence of
Tab[a]gon [R]oad and was bumped by his bus; that he was able to apply his a good father of a family to prevent damage. Nor has Metro Cebu proven that
break only after the impact. Pestao's testimony was corroborated by Ireneo it had exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees and in the
Casilia who declared that he was one of the passengers of the bus; that the maintenance of vehicles."3
motorcycle suddenly turned left towards Tab[a]gon [R]oad without giving any
signal to indicate its maneuver; that the bus was going at 40 kph when the Ruling of the Court of Appeals
accident occurred.
The CA affirmed respondent's liability for the accident and for Sumayang's
'To substantiate its defense of bonos pater familias [petitioner] [c]orporation death. Pestao was negligent when he tried to overtake the victim's
recalled to the witness box Gregorio Pestao who explained how his driving motorcycle at the Tabagon junction. As a professional driver operating a
experience and ability were tested by the company before he was hired. He public transport vehicle, he should have taken extra precaution to avoid
further declared that the management gave regular lectures to drivers and accidents, knowing that it was perilous to overtake at a junction, where
conductors touching on various topics like speeding, parking, loading and adjoining roads had brought about merging and diverging traffic.
treatment of passengers, and that before he took to the road at 2:30 AM of
The appellate court opined that Metro Cebu had shown laxity in the conduct
that day he checked together with the mechanic the tires, brake, signal lights
of its operations and in the supervision of its employees. By allowing the bus
as well as the tools to be brought along. He did the same thing before
to ply its route despite the defective speedometer, said petitioner showed its
commencing his return trip from Hagnaya, San Remegio later in the day.
indifference towards the proper maintenance of its vehicles. Having failed to
'The corporation also presented its maintenance supervisor, Agustin Pugeda, observe the extraordinary diligence required of public transportation
Jr., and its manager, Alfonso Corominas, Jr. who corroborated Pestao's companies, it was held vicariously liable to the victims of the vehicular
testimony that his driving ability was thoroughly tested, and that all drivers accident.
underwent periodic lecture on various aspects of safety driving including
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the CA raised to P50,000 the
pertinent traffic regulations. They also confirmed the thorough checkup of
granted indemnity for the death of the victim. It also affirmed the award of
every vehicle before it would depart and that the performance of the drivers
loss of earning capacity based on his life expectancy. Such liability was
was being monitored by several inspectors posted at random places along the
assessed, not as a pension for the claiming heirs, but as a penalty and an
route.'
indemnity for the driver's negligent act.
"In judgment, the lower court found [petitioners] liable to the [respondents],
Hence, this Petition.4
in the amounts of P30,000.00 for death indemnity, P829,079 for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased Ananias Sumayang, and P36,000.00 for
Issues
necessary interment expenses. The liability of defendant Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc., however, was limited only to the amount stipulated in the Petitioners submit the following issues5 for our consideration:
insurance policy, which [was] P12,000 for death indemnity and P4,500.00 for
burial expenses. 1) The Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting
the result of the case.
"In so ruling, the lower court found [Petitioner] Pestao to have been
negligent in driving the passenger bus that hit the deceased. It was shown 2) The Court of Appeals misapplied R.A. 4136 as regards the behavior of the
that Pestao negligently attempted to overtake the motorcycle at a deceased at the time of the accident.
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 22

3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the award of damages turning left to Tabagon, but that the latter and his companion were thrown off
representing income that deceased could have earned be considered a the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding bus.
penalty.
These contentions have already been passed upon by the trial and the
4) The Court of Appeals, contrary to Article 2204, Civil Code, raised the appellate courts. We find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual
award of P30,000.00 damages representing indemnity for death to findings. The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collision was
P50,000.00. caused by Pestao's negligence when he attempted to overtake the
motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he
5) The Court of Appeals used as basis for the loss of earning capacity, the life should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous
expectancy of the [d]eceased instead of that of the respondents which was maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
shorter."6
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and
In short, they raise these questions: whether the CA erred (1) in applying binding on this Court. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this case falls
Section 45 of RA 4136 when it ruled that negligence in driving was the under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.7 Indeed, the issue of
proximate cause of the accident; (2) in increasing the civil indemnity from negligence is basically factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of
P30,000 to P50,000; and (3) in using the life expectancy of the deceased damages.
instead of the life expectancies of respondents.
Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty
The Court's Ruling speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had
this instrument been properly functioning.
The Petition has no merit.
This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the
First Issue: Negligence
Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by
their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
Petitioners contend that Pestao was not under any obligation to slow down
an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in
when he overtook the motorcycle, because the deceased had given way to
the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be
him upon hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left side of the road was
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic, Pestao accelerated his speed to
and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the
pass the motorcycle. Having given way to the bus, the motorcycle driver
supervision of its employee.8
should have slowed down until he had been overtaken.
The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective
They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road
speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its
nearest to the junction as found by the trial and the appellate courts, but was
business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to
on the inner lane. This explains why the damage on the bus were all on the
here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the
right side - the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the radiator
accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty
grill were bent and dented. Hence, they insist that it was the victim who was
speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its
negligent.
employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct
We disagree. Petitioners are raising a question of fact based on Pestao's its business with the diligence required by law.
testimony contradicting that of Eyewitness Ignacio Neis and on the location of
Second Issue: Life Indemnity
the dents on the bumper and the grill. Neis testified that as the two vehicles
approached the junction, the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 23

Petitioners aver that the CA erred in increasing the award for life indemnity
from P30,000 to P50,000, without specifying any aggravating circumstance to
justify the increment as provided in the Civil Code.9

This contention is untenable. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-


delict used to be pegged at P3,000, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years
because of the declining value of our currency. At present, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.10

Third Issue: Loss of Earning Capacity

Petitioners cite Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,11 which held:

"The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased


person has therefore no fixed basis. . . . The life expectancy of the deceased
or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor . . . "

They contend that the CA used the wrong basis for its computation of earning
capacity.

We disagree. The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning


capacity based on the life expectancy of the deceased,12 and not on that of
the heir.13 Even Villa Rey Transit did likewise.

The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors: (1) the
number of years on which the computation of damages is based and (2) the
rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed.14 The first factor refers
to the life expectancy, which takes into consideration the nature of the
victim's work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to the accident. The
second refers to the victim's earning capacity minus the necessary living
expenses. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the
earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would have received the
net earnings of the deceased.15

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 24

7. G.R. No. 127934 August 23, 2000 "On July 27, 1984, a criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed against the two drivers, Dela Cruz and Parma, docketed as
ACE HAULERS CORPORATION, petitioner, Criminal Case No. Q-37248 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA "While the criminal action was pending, on March 11, 1985, respondent
ABIVA, respondents. Ederlinda Abiva filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a
separate civil action for damages against the two accused in the criminal
DECISION case, as well as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the
owners of the vehicles involved in the accident and employers of the accused.
PARDO, J.:
"In her complaint, respondent Abiva prayed that:
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, "1. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment be immediately issued against the
Branch 106, except for the award of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as properties of the defendants as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
exemplary damages, which was deleted. The dispositive portion of the trial that may be recovered;
court's decision reads as follows:
"2. Defendants in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 as
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay actual damage;
plaintiff:
"3. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as
"1. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) as actual damages; attorneys fees;

"2. the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages; "4. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of moral and
exemplary damages which this Court may reasonably assess."
"3. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages;
"On January 31, 1986, petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed
"4. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees;
a motion to dismiss bringing to the trial courts attention the fact that a
criminal action was pending before another branch of the same court, and
"5. Costs of suit.
that under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent
"SO ORDERED."2 civil action arising from a quasi-delict is no longer allowed. Furthermore, said
defendants alleged that respondents private counsel actively participated in
The facts, culled from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are as follows: the criminal proceedings, showing that the respondent was in fact pursuing
the civil aspect automatically instituted with the criminal case.
"The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which
took place on June 1, 1984, involving a truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers "On February 21, 1986, respondent filed an opposition to the motion arguing
Corporation and driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz, and a jeepney that she was not pursuing the civil aspect in the criminal case as she, in fact,
owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a manifested in open court in the criminal proceedings that she was filing a
motorcycle, was bumped and dragged by the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel separate and independent civil action for damages against the accused and
Abiva, was run over by the truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers their employers, as allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Corporation, causing his death. Upon his untimely demise, Fidel Abiva left
behind a wife, respondent Erderlinda Abiva and their three (3) children. "On February 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the action for damages on
the ground that "no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution in a case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide".
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 25

Respondent Abivas motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was motion of respondent Abiva, the petitioner was declared as in default.
also denied by the trial court. She then elevated the case before the Furthermore, defendants Jesus dela Cruz, Isabelito Rivera and Rodolfo Parma
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) by way of a petition for certiorari, were discharged as defendants, and the case against them dismissed.
docketed as Civil Case No. 09644. The appellate court reversed the dismissal
order of the trial court. It was then petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and "On June 30, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ruling against
Jesus dela Cruzs turn to appeal the judgment of the IAC before the Supreme petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation. The trial court summarized its findings
Court. On August 3, 1988, the Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the thus:
petition for review of Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz for failure "to
"Hence, Mrs. Ederlinda Abiva as part of plaintiffs evidence, testified that she
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
is 43 years old, a widow and housekeeper, residing at Cefels Subdivision,
error in the questioned error". The case was remanded to the trial court for
Deparo, Novaliches, Quezon City. She told the Court that she is the widow of
further proceedings.
Fidel Abiva, who died on June 1, 1984 after he was ran over by Isuzu Cargo
"In the meantime that the petition for review was pending before the Truck Plate No. NWY-T Phil 93 owned and operated by the defendant Ace
Supreme Court, fire razed the portion of the Quezon City Hall building which Haulers Corporation, then driven by Jesus dela Cruz and that because of the
housed the trial courts and the records of the case were among those that death of her husband, she suffered damages, among which, moral,
the fire reduced to ashes. It was not until March 26, 1992 that the records of exemplary and actual damages for her expenses and attorneys fees. She
the case was reconstituted by the trial court. claimed that she is lawfully married to the late Fidel Abiva as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract (Exhibits A and A-1). Out of their wedlock, (sic)
"While the pre-trial proceedings in the civil action for damages was still being they begot three (3) children, namely: Noel, Gina and Argentina with ages
set and reset upon motion of the opposing parties, on July 6, 1992, the RTC, 25, 21 and 15, respectively. Her husband died on June 1, 1984 at around
Quezon City, Branch 83 rendered judgment in the criminal case, finding as 11:45 p.m. (Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2), because of the vehicular accident
follows: which involved the wheeler truck of Ace Haulers Corporation driven by Jesus
dela Cruz, a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, then driven by Rodolfo Parma
"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt and a motorcycle driven by her husband. Her husband, after his death, was
the guilt of both accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz for the offense autopsied, as reflected in an Autopsy Report (Exhibit C) and by the
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, this Court finds them guilty of Postmortem Finding (Exhibit C-1). This was also covered by a police report
said offense charged and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and (Exhibit D) which shows that Jesus dela Cruz is the driver of the defendant
undergo imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY of prision (Exhibit D-1). This fact is reiterated in a sworn statement which she
correccional as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN executed relative to this vehicular accident (Exhibit E) wherein the said
(10) DAYS also of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs. driver mentioned and confirmed the name of his employer (Exhibit E-1). A
criminal case was lodged against the drivers of the two vehicles and a
"Accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz are hereby ordered to pay the
Decision was rendered thereon in Criminal Case No. Q-37248 entitled People
heirs of the deceased Fidel O. Abiva, jointly or pro rata, the amount of FIFTY
of the Philippines versus Jesus dela Cruz and Rodolfo Parma finding both of
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnification for his death and the
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. (Exhibits F, F-1,
amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) by way of actual damages.
F-2, F-3, F-4 and F-5). This decision has now acquired finality as no
appeal was taken by the accused. It is established, however, that prior to the
"SO ORDERED."
filing of the instant case, Mrs. Abiva pleaded to Ace Haulers to compensate
"On March 9, 1993, the pre-trial conference of the civil case was finally set on her for the death of her husband. But her plea went (sic) to deaf ears. She
April 6, 1993, and notices thereof were sent to the parties and their was thus constrained to file this case for damages.
respective counsel. On the appointed date, however, no representative nor
"Further testimony of Mrs. Abiva revealed that before the death of her
counsel for petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation appeared. Consequently, upon
husband, he was employed with Philippine Airlines (PAL) earning
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 26

P4,600.00.00 a month, as evidenced by the Pay Statement covering the "Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or
period of 4-15-84 in the amount of P2,065.00 (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence,
G-3); that when he died, he was only 40 years old and healthy, and that if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
based on the life history and pedigree of his family where some of its quasi-delict x x x (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
members lived up to 100 years, she expects her husband to live for no less
than 15 years more and could have earned no less than P828,000.00 for the "Corollary to this, is the civil law concept that:
family. But this, her family was deprived, because his life was snatched away
"The obligations imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
by this accident while her husband was riding in a motorcycle which he
own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is
bought for P11,850.00 (Exhibits H and H-1) which was also totally wrecked.
responsible (Art. 2180, 1st paragraph, New Civil Code)
"Resulting from her husbands death, Mrs. Abiva told the Court that she
x x x x x x
incurred expenses for his burial and funeral in the total amount of no less
than P30,000.00 and for his wake of six days, in the amount of about
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
P40,600.00 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6). She also spent
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, x x x
around P80,000.00 as litigation expenses, in her quest for justice since she
(Article 2180 paragraph 5, New Civil Code).
has to engage the services of four (4) counsels from the time of the filing of
this case before the Hon. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Presiding Judge of "Taken in their appropriate context, and predicated on the evidence adduced
this Court who once dismissed this case, and which led eventually to an which has not been evidentiarily traversed by the defendant, this Court is left
appeal by certiorari which was later elevated up to the Supreme Court. to (sic) no other recourse but to grant the remedies and reliefs which in her
(Exhibits K, K-1, K-2, K-3, K-4, K-5 and K-6). Blaming the defendant, complaint plaintiff prays for, all of them having been by her adduced
Mrs. Abiva claimed that had Ace Haulers exercised diligence, care and evidence, preponderantly shown and established and out of which, she has
prudence in the selection and supervision of its employees, her husband shown herself to be completely deserving."3
would have been spared from this accident. Hence, her prayer for the award
of P200,000.00 for the death of her husband, who by now, could have risen On September 13, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.4
in the promotional ladder to a senior Executive of PAL and could be earning
about P30,000.00 salary per month by now. She further prays for award of On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 exemplary damages of dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
P100,000.00, attorneys fees of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of
"WHEREFORE, except for the award of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) as
P50,000.00.
exemplary damages, which is hereby set aside, the Decision appealed from is
"After the testimony of Mrs. Abiva as the lone witness for the plaintiff, hereby AFFIRMED in all other respect.
counsel formally offered his exhibits and rested his case.
"SO ORDERED."
"Gathered from the evidence presented, testimonial and documentary, the
Hence, this appeal.5
Court finds enough legal and factual basis to grant the claim for damages by
the plaintiff. The insinuations of negligence on the part of defendants driver
The issues raised are whether or not in an action for damages arising from a
is amply shown as one, who drove his vehicle fast, impervious to the safety
vehicular accident plaintiff may recover damages against the employer of the
of life and property of others, his utter lack of care and caution and his
accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil case for
unmitigated imprudence, rolled into one, all these predicated the occurrence
damages based on quasi delict, but not recover twice for the same act; (2)
of this accident which took away a precious human life. whether the Court of Appeals erred in not lifting the order declaring petitioner
as in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference; and (3) whether
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 27

the damages awarded in the civil case were excessive, much more than the The attorney's fees awarded is reduced to P20,000.00 which is ten (10%)
previous award in the criminal case. percent of the amount of actual damages.1wphi1

In Padua v. Robles,5 we held that "Civil liability coexists with criminal WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and
responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs) has the AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals,11 with modification. The Court
option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based deletes the award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action and reduces the attorney fees to twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery No costs.
of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission."6
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.7

Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva shall have the choice which of the
awards to take, naturally expecting that she would opt to recover the greater
amount. It has not been shown that she has recovered on the award in the
criminal case, consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner
in the civil case.

As to the second issue raised, we find that petitioner was rightly declared as
in default for its failure to appear during the pre-trial conference despite due
notice. This is a factual question resolved by the Court of Appeals which we
cannot review.8

As to the third issue regarding the award of damages to respondent Abiva,


we find the award of actual damages to be supported by preponderant
evidence. "Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of
loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof."9 However, there is no
basis for the award of moral damages, which is hereby deleted. The person
claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough
that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as
the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be
shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.10
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 28

8. G.R. No. 135802 March 3, 2000 In its answer to the complaint, respondent Northwest Airlines did not deny
that the baggages of petitioners were not loaded on Northwest Flight 29.
PRISCILLA L. TAN, petitioner, Petitioner's baggages could not be carried on the same flight because of
vs. "weight and balance restrictions." However, the baggages were loaded in
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondent. another Northwest Airlines flight, which arrived in the evening of June 2,
1994.
PARDO, J.:
When petitioner received her baggages in damaged condition, Northwest
Petitioner Priscilla L. Tan appeals via certiorari from the decision of the Court
offered to either (1) reimburse the cost or repair of the bags; or (2)
of Appeals 1 affirming with modification 2 the decision of the trial
reimburse the cost for the purchase of new bags, upon submission of
court, 3 ordering respondent to pay petitioner the following amounts: (1)
receipts.
P15,000.00, as actual damages; (2) P100,000.00, as moral damages; (3)
P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; (4) P30,000.00, as and for attorney's After due trial, on June 10, 1996, the trial court rendered decision finding
fees; and (6) costs. respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. liable for damages, as follows:

The case before the Court traces its roots from an action for damages for WHEREFORE judgment is rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff
breach of contract of air carriage for failure to deliver petitioner's baggages the following amounts:
on the date of her arrival filed on June 29, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Branch 150 against respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc., a foreign 1. P15,000.00, as actual damages;
corporation engaged in the business of air transportation.
2. P100,000.00, as moral damages;
The antecedent facts are as follows:
3. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
On May 31, 1994, Priscilla L. Tan and Connie Tan boarded Northwest Airlines
Flight 29 in Chicago, U. S. A. bound for the Philippines, with a stop-over at 4. P30,000.00, as and for attorney's fees and
Detroit, U. S. A. They arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
5. Costs.
(NAIA) on June 1, 1994 at about 10:40 in the evening.
SO ORDERED.
Upon their arrival, petitioner and her companion Connie Tan found that their
baggages were missing. They returned to the airport in the evening of the
Given this 10th day of June, 1996 at Makati City.
following day and they were informed that their baggages might still be in
another plane in Tokyo, Japan. ERNA FALLORAN ALIPOSA
4
Judge
On June 3, 1994, they recovered their baggages and discovered that some of
its contents were destroyed and soiled. Respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. appealed from the trial court's decision to
the Court of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in finding it guilty
Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights and great
of breach of contract of carriage and of willful misconduct and awarded
damage" because of Northwest's failure to inform them in advance that their
damages which had no basis in fact or were otherwise excessive.
baggages would not be loaded on the same flight they boarded and because
of their delayed arrival, they demanded from Northwest Airlines On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
compensation for the damages they suffered. On June 15, 1994 and June 22, partially granting the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
1994, petitioner sent demand letters to Northwest Airlines, but the latter did damages and reducing the attorney's fees, specifically providing that:
not respond. Hence, the filing of the case with the regional trial court.
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 29

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is hereby GRANTED Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent did not act in bad
partially. The Decision of the lower court dated June 10, 1996 is AFFIRMED faith. 9
with the modification that the award of moral and exemplary damages is
deleted and the amount of attorney's fees is reduced to ten thousand pesos "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a
(P10,000.00). dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes
No pronouncement as to costs. of the nature of fraud." 10

SO ORDERED. 5 "Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not
shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is
Hence, this appeal. 6
limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation
which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that
The issue is whether respondent is liable for moral and exemplary damages
case, such liability does not include moral and exemplary damages." 11
for willful misconduct and breach of the contract of air carriage.
Consequently, we have no reason to reverse the decision of the Court of
The petition is without merit.
Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent was not guilty of willful
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of merit. The Court
misconduct. "For willful misconduct to exist there must be a showing that the
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals deleting, however, the award of
acts complained of were impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were
attorney's fees.1wphi1.nt
in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or
shamefully wrong or improper conduct." 7 No costs.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was nothing in the conduct of SO ORDERED.


respondent which showed that they were motivated by malice or bad faith in
loading her baggages on another plane. Due to weight and balance
restrictions, as a safety measure, respondent airline had to transport the
baggages on a different flight, but with the same expected date and time of
arrival in the Philippines. As aptly explained by respondent:

To ensure the safety of each flight, Northwest's personnel determine every


flight's compliance with "weight and balance restrictions." They check the
factors like weight of the aircraft used for the flight gas input, passenger and
crew load, baggage weight, all in relation to the wind factor anticipated on
the flight. If there is an overload, i.e., a perceived safety risk, the aircraft's
load will be reduced by off-loading cargo, which will then be placed on the
next available flight. 8

It is admitted that respondent failed to deliver petitioner's luggages on time.


However, there was no showing of malice in such failure. By its concern for
safety, respondent had to ship the baggages in another flight with the same
date of arrival.
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 30

9. G.R. No. 142305 December 10, 2003 respondent and about 25 other passengers stranded in the Changi Airport in
Singapore.6
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
vs. Upon disembarkation at Singapore, the respondent approached the transit
ANDION FERNANDEZ, respondent. counter who referred her to the nightstop counter and told the lady employee
thereat that it was important for her to reach Manila on that day, January 28,
DECISION 1991. The lady employee told her that there were no more flights to Manila
for that day and that respondent had no choice but to stay in Singapore.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Upon respondents persistence, she was told that she can actually fly to Hong
Kong going to Manila but since her ticket was non-transferable, she would
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
have to pay for the ticket. The respondent could not accept the offer because
Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
she had no money to pay for it.7 Her pleas for the respondent to make
Pasig City, Branch 164 in Civil Case No. 60985 filed by the respondent for
arrangements to transport her to Manila were unheeded.8
damages.
The respondent then requested the lady employee to use their phone to make
The Case for the Respondent
a call to Manila. Over the employees reluctance, the respondent telephoned
Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano here in the Philippines her mother to inform the latter that she missed the connecting flight. The
and abroad. At the time of the incident, she was availing an educational grant respondent was able to contact a family friend who picked her up from the
from the Federal Republic of Germany, pursuing a Masters Degree in Music airport for her overnight stay in Singapore.
9

majoring in Voice.3
The next day, after being brought back to the airport, the respondent
She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on February 3 proceeded to petitioners counter which says: "Immediate Attention To
and 4, 1991. For this singing engagement, an airline passage ticket was Passengers with Immediate Booking." There were four or five passengers in
purchased from petitioner Singapore Airlines which would transport her to line. The respondent approached petitioners male employee at the counter to
Manila from Frankfurt, Germany on January 28, 1991. From Manila, she make arrangements for immediate booking only to be told: "Cant you see I
would proceed to Malaysia on the next day.4 It was necessary for the am doing something." She explained her predicament but the male employee
respondent to pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe; and to uncaringly retorted: "Its your problem, not ours."
10

rehearse and coordinate with her pianist her repertoire for the aforesaid
The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight
performance.
from Singapore to Malaysia on January 29, 1991, through the efforts of her
The petitioner issued the respondent a Singapore Airlines ticket for Flight No. mother and travel agency in Manila. Her mother also had to travel to Malaysia
SQ 27, leaving Frankfurt, Germany on January 27, 1991 bound for Singapore bringing with her respondents wardrobe and personal things needed for the
with onward connections from Singapore to Manila. Flight No. SQ 27 was performance that caused them to incur an expense of about P50,000.11
scheduled to leave Frankfurt at 1:45 in the afternoon of January 27, 1991,
As a result of this incident, the respondents performance before the Royal
arriving at Singapore at 8:50 in the morning of January 28, 1991. The
Family of Malaysia was below par. Because of the rude and unkind treatment
connecting flight from Singapore to Manila, Flight No. SQ 72, was leaving
she received from the petitioners personnel in Singapore, the respondent
Singapore at 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991, arriving in Manila at
was engulfed with fear, anxiety, humiliation and embarrassment causing her
2:20 in the afternoon of the same day.5
to suffer mental fatigue and skin rashes. She was thereby compelled to seek
On January 27, 1991, Flight No. SQ 27 left Frankfurt but arrived in Singapore immediate medical attention upon her return to Manila for "acute urticaria."12
two hours late or at about 11:00 in the morning of January 28, 1991. By
then, the aircraft bound for Manila had left as scheduled, leaving the
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 31

On June 15, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision with the following dispositive THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
portion: PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIMS.15

ACCORDINGLY and as prayed for, defendant Singapore Airlines is ordered to The petitioner assails the award of damages contending that it exercised the
pay herein plaintiff Andion H. Fernandez the sum of: extraordinary diligence required by law under the given circumstances. The
delay of Flight No. SQ 27 from Frankfurt to Singapore on January 28, 1991
1. FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as compensatory or actual for more than two hours was due to a fortuitous event and beyond
damages; petitioners control. Inclement weather prevented the petitioners plane
coming from Copenhagen, Denmark to arrive in Frankfurt on time on January
2. TWO HUNDRED and FIFTY THOUSAND (P250,000.00) PESOS as moral
27, 1991. The plane could not take off from the airport as the place was
damages considering plaintiffs professional standing in the field of culture at
shrouded with fog. This delay caused a "snowball effect" whereby the other
home and abroad;
flights were consequently delayed. The plane carrying the respondent arrived
in Singapore two (2) hours behind schedule.16 The delay was even
3. ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages;
compounded when the plane could not travel the normal route which was
4. SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and through the Middle East due to the raging Gulf War at that time. It had to
pass through the restricted Russian airspace which was more congested.17
5. To pay the costs of suit.
Under these circumstances, petitioner therefore alleged that it cannot be
SO ORDERED.13 faulted for the delay in arriving in Singapore on January 28, 1991 and causing
the respondent to miss her connecting flight to Manila.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner further contends that it could not also be held in bad faith
On June 10, 1998, the CA promulgated the assailed decision finding no because its personnel did their best to look after the needs and interests of
reversible error in the appealed decision of the trial court.14 the passengers including the respondent. Because the respondent and the
other 25 passengers missed their connecting flight to Manila, the petitioner
Forthwith, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the
automatically booked them to the flight the next day and gave them free
following errors:
hotel accommodations for the night. It was respondent who did not take
petitioners offer and opted to stay with a family friend in Singapore.
I
The petitioner also alleges that the action of the respondent was baseless and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT AWARDED DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT it tarnished its good name and image earned through the years for which, it
FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO EXERCISE was entitled to damages in the amount of P1,000,000; exemplary damages
of P500,000; and attorneys fees also in the amount of P500,000.18
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE.

II The petition is barren of merit.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular
flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has
PETITIONER ACTED IN BAD FAITH.
every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date. If
III he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of
carriage.19
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 32

The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, the Indeed, in the instant case, petitioner was not without recourse to enable it to
law requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human fulfill its obligation to transport the respondent safely as scheduled as far as
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious human care and foresight can provide to her destination. Tagged as a
persons with due regard for all the circumstances.20 In an action for breach of premiere airline as it claims to be and with the complexities of air travel, it
contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the was certainly well-equipped to be able to foresee and deal with such
common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove is situation. The petitioners indifference and negligence by its absence and
the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the insensitivity was exposed by the trial court, thus:
carrier.21
(a) Under Section 9.1 of its Traffic Manual (Exhibit 4) "flights can be delayed
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the respondent carried a confirmed to await the uplift of connecting cargo and passengers arriving on a late in-
ticket for the two-legged trip from Frankfurt to Manila: 1) Frankfurt- bound flight" As adverted to by the trial court,"Flight SQ-27/28 maybe
Singapore; and 2) Singapore-Manila. In her contract of carriage with the delayed for about half an hour to transfer plaintiff to her connecting flight. As
petitioner, the respondent certainly expected that she would fly to Manila on pointed out above, delay is normal in commercial air transportation" (RTC
Flight No. SQ 72 on January 28, 1991. Since the petitioner did not transport Decision, p. 22); or
the respondent as covenanted by it on said terms, the petitioner clearly
breached its contract of carriage with the respondent. The respondent had (b) Petitioner airlines could have carried her on one of its flights bound for
every right to sue the petitioner for this breach. The defense that the delay Hongkong and arranged for a connecting flight from Hongkong to Manila all
was due to fortuitous events and beyond petitioners control is unavailing. In on the same date. But then the airline personnel who informed her of such
PAL vs. CA,22 we held that: possibility told her that she has to pay for that flight. Regrettably, respondent
did not have sufficient funds to pay for it. (TSN, 30 March 1992, pp.8-9; RTC
.... Undisputably, PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a Decision, pp. 22-23) Knowing the predicament of the respondent, petitioner
fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs did not offer to shoulder the cost of the ticket for that flight; or
contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole
one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed to be equipped to deal with (c) As noted by the trial court from the account of petitioners witness, Bob
situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be Khkimyong, that "a passenger such as the plaintiff could have been
stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter accommodated in another international airline such as Lufthansa to bring the
has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carriers premises. plaintiff to Singapore early enough from Frankfurt provided that there was
Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in prior communication from that station to enable her to catch the connecting
safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers flight to Manila because of the urgency of her business in Manila(RTC
until they have reached their final destination... Decision, p. 23)

... The petitioners diligence in communicating to its passengers the


consequences of the delay in their flights was wanting. As elucidated by the
"...If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, trial court:
it has to be the sole and only cause (Art. 1755 C.C., Art. 1733 C.C.). Since
part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver It maybe that delay in the take off and arrival of commercial aircraft could
its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendants failure to not be avoided and may be caused by diverse factors such as those testified
provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using to by defendants pilot. However, knowing fully well that even before the
extraordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and plaintiff boarded defendants Jumbo aircraft in Frankfurt bound for Singapore,
exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant it has already incurred a delay of two hours. Nevertheless, defendant did not
airline could have prevented, defendant becomes liable to plaintiff." take the trouble of informing plaintiff, among its other passengers of such a
delay and that in such a case, the usual practice of defendant airline will be
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 33

that they have to stay overnight at their connecting airport; and much less warranted under the circumstances. The lady employee at the counter was
did it inquire from the plaintiff and the other 25 passengers bound for Manila unkind and of no help to her. The respondent further alleged that without her
whether they are amenable to stay overnight in Singapore and to take the threats of suing the company, she was not allowed to use the companys
connecting flight to Manila the next day. Such information should have been phone to make long distance calls to her mother in Manila. The male
given and inquiries made in Frankfurt because even the defendant airlines employee at the counter where it says: "Immediate Attention to Passengers
manual provides that in case of urgency to reach his or her destination on the with Immediate Booking" was rude to her when he curtly retorted that he was
same date, the head office of defendant in Singapore must be informed by busy attending to other passengers in line. The trial court concluded that this
telephone or telefax so as the latter may make certain arrangements with inattentiveness and rudeness of petitioners personnel to respondents plight
other airlines in Frankfurt to bring such a passenger with urgent business to was gross enough amounting to bad faith. This is a finding that is generally
Singapore in such a manner that the latter can catch up with her connecting binding upon the Court which we find no reason to disturb.
flight such as S-27/28 without spending the night in Singapore23
Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a contractual or quasi-
The respondent was not remiss in conveying her apprehension about the contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
delay of the flight when she was still in Frankfurt. Upon the assurance of defendant had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
petitioners personnel in Frankfurt that she will be transported to Manila on malevolent manner." In this case, petitioners employees acted in a wanton,
the same date, she had every right to expect that obligation fulfilled. She oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is,
testified, to wit: therefore, warranted in this case.

Q: Now, since you were late, when the plane that arrived from Frankfurt was WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
late, did you not make arrangements so that your flight from Singapore to AFFIRMED.
Manila would be adjusted?
SO ORDERED.
A: I asked the lady at the ticket counter, the one who gave the boarding pass
in Frankfurt and I asked her, "Since my flight going to Singapore would be
late, what would happen to my Singapore-Manila flight?" and then she said,
"Dont worry, Singapore Airlines would be responsible to bring you to Manila
on the same date." And then they have informed the name of the officer, or
whatever, that our flight is going to be late.24

When a passenger contracts for a specific flight, he has a purpose in making


that choice which must be respected. This choice, once exercised, must not
be impaired by a breach on the part of the airline without the latter incurring
any liability.25 For petitioners failure to bring the respondent to her
destination, as scheduled, we find the petitioner clearly liable for the breach
of its contract of carriage with the respondent.

We are convinced that the petitioner acted in bad faith.1wphi1 Bad faith
means a breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill will, may well have
been the motive; but it is malice nevertheless.26 Bad faith was imputed by
the trial court when it found that the petitioners employees at the Singapore
airport did not accord the respondent the attention and treatment allegedly
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 34

10. G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003 The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,
instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August
vs. 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents. "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the
DECISION latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:

VITUG, J.: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the 2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified
the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig "b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding
"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
"d) Costs of suit.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening,
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing
for lack of merit.
a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard "The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate
evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously. "WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the
appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead,
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held
Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and
Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security
guards.
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and


TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 35

e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees."2 employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis
because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then not of the LRTA.
as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already
existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that
show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common
hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by carrier.
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of
could not have stopped the train. its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of
exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. 4 The Civil
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
resolution of 10 October 2000. passengers, provides:

In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the "Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
appellate court; viz: far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"I.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755."
"II.
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees,
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority
or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"III.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
supervision of their employees."
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
the factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a
passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or
sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a
of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the
common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an
or omission."
act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA
would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an
TRANSPO | Assign No 9 | 36

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in breaches the contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
pursuance to the contract of carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said
negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the
stopped the act or omission.7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and 8 by simple proof of Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of
injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee,
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court
carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the
majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how case.
the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court,
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is
have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,10 an
guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.11
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of liable only for his own fault or negligence.
its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable.
the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
suffered by him.18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-
carriage.
exist with compensatory damages.19
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
for tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is
conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for
DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No
the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
costs.
Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
SO ORDERED.
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must
the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A

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