Pastor Endencia vs Saturnino David PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. thereof and so violates the Constitution.
FERNANDO JUGO vs. thereof and so violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that the
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the
taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and
other judges) salary pursuant to Sec. 13. No salary wherever received
by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law. The judges however argued that under the case
of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation this is also in
observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive,
to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that
under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of
judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that
taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see
Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution). The Solicitor General, arguing in
behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was
rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of
powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes
laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase:
payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. Here, Congress is
already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of
their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of
the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of
the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was
before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping
a judicial function in defining a term. The interpretation and application
of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such
a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
SATURNINO DAVID
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
Facts: Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the
taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary
pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment
of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the
Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue,
the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received
favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation,
Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To bring home his point, the
Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion
in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act
No. 590.
Issue: 1. Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of
Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme
Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution?
2. Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 constitutional?
Held: On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the
judges, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and
held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto
vs.Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional, the court believes that this is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the
phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to
the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiat as enunciated in
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of
a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of
the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was
before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping
a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates the doctrine
laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and
that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein
that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their
task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section 13, Republic
Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial
officer shall be considered not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law, constitutes and invasion of the
province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is of the
opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the
fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. In the light
of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissenting
opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries
are subjected to the Income Tax Law prevailing. The debates,
interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the
issue of imposing income tax on judges salaries.
Nitafan vs. CIR [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of
withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and
other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
en banc on 4 December 1987. Petitioners are the duly appointed and
qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of
the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila.
They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the
filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through
judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter
administratively.
Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income
taxes.
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Held: No. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to
members of Judiciary, The salaries of members of the Judiciary are
subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent
was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of
the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-
8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include
in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of
income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the
Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded
the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David. The 1973
Constitution has provided that no salary or any form of emolument of
any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV) which was
not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The
salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the
contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original
concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Equality of
branches of government effected by modifications in provision. The
term diminished be changed to decreased and that the words nor
subjected to income tax be deleted so as to give substance to equality
among the three branches in the government. A period (.) after
decreased was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is
subject to tax. With the period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David is understood not to apply anymore. Justices and
judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in
accepting service in government and yet subjected to income tax. Such is
true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.
Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people
adopting the law.
The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article
VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law
fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate
must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284
FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding
over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of
their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of
an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Chairman,
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court shall direct
its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries
of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by
the Court en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from
income taxes.
HELD: No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but
in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.
The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is
a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs.
Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded.
The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people,
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the
spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share the burden of general
income taxation equitably. Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is
hereby dismissed.
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the
City Court of
Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C.
ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR.,
VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA,
petitioners, vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUITCO,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice,
respondents
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funs Therefor and for Other
Purposes was passed. De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister
of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which
mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to
MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. Petitioners assail its validity
saying that said law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of judges of the court. He averred that only
Supreme Court can remove judges and not the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, is
unconstitutional, considering it violates the security of tenure of justices
and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
HELD: No. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of
an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
2
faith suffers from no infirmity. What is really involved in this case is not
the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services.
What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled
as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought
to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility
to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing
the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act
would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would
save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.
Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba
Facts: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for
Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in
Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one
of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred
that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly
removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is
empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect,
no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore,
it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way
of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is
there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive
to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in
this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus
be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
Santiago vs Bautista
FACTS: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the
public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the
school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee on the
Rating of Students for Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned
at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its
graduating class. The above-named committee deliberated and finally
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr.
as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation
exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that
date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother,
and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of
honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case
in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.
They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor
students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year
1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent
teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the
said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction
prayed for was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965,
the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then
already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of
the same would be shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the
community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that yearly
happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero
Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21,
with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the
petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of the
case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss,
on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2)
that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought
before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by
petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was
granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper
and for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the
Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of
the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of
certiorari.
The CFI thereafter ruled that the petition states no cause of action and
should be, as it is hereby dismissed, on the ground that the Committee
On The Rating Of Students For Honor is not the "tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for
certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
3
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law
requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
In its ruling, the CFI declared that administrative remedies were
neglected by petitioners. All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner
personally appealed to the school authorities who only 'passed the buck
to each other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner formally
availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department
of Education. The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint
of petitioner against his teachers. The administrative agencies of the
Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the
petitioner with dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner
negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Committee on the Rating of Students for
Honor" exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the performance
of its assigned task
RULING: No. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action
instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions.' A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in
the nature of the action of the court. In order that a special civil action of
certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following
circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy
involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought
before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their
respective rights and obligations; (2) the tribunal, board or officer before
whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to
pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing
and applying the laws to that end; (3) and the tribunal, board or officer
must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the
judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department.
It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed
with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.
"Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of
legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone
who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial
power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a
matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.
The distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial
functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function does not
depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the
importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to
the organic law of the state and the division of power of government. In
the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of
discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of
the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to
make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought,
and judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within
that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary,
or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to
either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not
judicial. As to what is judicial and what is not seems to be better
indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.
It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or
quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in
regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the writ of
certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be
performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it,
that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly
and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when
applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi
judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their
decision, whatever may be their public character.
The precise line of demarcation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative
or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or
ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions
is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee
on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this
case exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the
performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the
decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer
may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a
law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is
and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about
any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors,
such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they
are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
Daza vs Singson
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989
Facts: The House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12
seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized; resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. 24 members of the Liberal
Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised
its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza
and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the
chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as
the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA
and the assumption of his seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his
petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC
issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from
serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his
election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of the
4
House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political
party and has not yet attained political stability.
Issue: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in
nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Held: No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The
issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives
that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Garcia v. Board of Investments (G.R. No. 92024)
191 SCRA 288
November 9, 1990
Facts: As the court ordered in G.R. No. 88637 entitled Garcia v. Board
of Investments, the Board of Investments set a hearing for the petitioner
concerning his opposition to the amendments made in the application for
registration of Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (formerly known as the
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation) specifically the transfer of the site
from Bataan to Batangas and the change of feedstock fuel from naphtha
only to naptha and liquefied gas petroleum which BOI approved. On
January 1990, a resolution was made that the BOI has the final word on
prospective projects based on Art. 7 Section II of the Omnibus
Investments Code.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was initially
denied as the court deemed his absence in the hearing as a sign of
disinterest. However, a minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera,
Gancayo, Sarmiento, and this ponente voted for the motion of
reconsideration to be granted again to the petitioner stating that the prior
hearing was premature as the resolution was not yet final and executory.
Issues:
1. Whether or not LPC should remain in Bataan;
2. Whether or not the feedstock fuel should remain to be naphtha
only instead of naphtha and LPG
3. Whether or not BOI committed grave abuse in its discretion by
yielding to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding
Ruling: LPCs amended certificate of registration approved by BOI is
set aside as null and void.
1. Yes, LPC must remain in Bataan. Its original name bore the term
Bataan when it was approved because a huge parcel of land was already
reserved in Limay as petrochemical zone through P.D. No. 1803.
Purchasing land in another area will incur additional cost.
2. Yes, naphtha must remain the only feedstock fuel. BRC in Bataan
already produces 60% of naphtha in the Philippines while LPG, despite
Pilipinas Shells capacity to produce it, serves other purposes hence the
need for wise consumption. The exemption of naphtha from ad valorem
tax through R.A. No. 6767 will also help reduce cost.
3. Yes, BOI committed grave abuse of discretion. As stated in Article
XII Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution, BOI a government entity
must decide for the best interest of the country. BOI should not have
yielded to the preference of LPCs Taiwanese investors as it could have
properly managed LPC along with PNOC, another government entity, in
Bataan given the latters role as custodian of the petrochemical zone.
Garcia vs Board of Investments
G.R. No. 92024 November 9 1990
FACTS: The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese
private corporation, applied for registration with the Board of
Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of
Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an
amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the
change of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District
of Bataan requested a copy of BPCs original and amended application
documents. The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors in
BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the documents
requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects
the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose. The
BoI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a
second hearing or publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia
filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Immigration committed grave
abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor, national
interest notwithstanding.
RULING: The Court ruled that the Bureau of Immigration violated
Garcias Constitutional right to have access to information on matters of
public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court
found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an interest in the establishment
of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital
because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they
breathe The Court also ruled that BPCs amended application was in
fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and
a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that all
applications and their supporting documents filed under this code shall
be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the
consent of the applicant, the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides
for disclosure on the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. The
Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application,
amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI
under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information,
the Constitution does not open every door to any and all information
because the law may exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny. Thus it excluded the trade secrets and confidential,
commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security from its order. The Court did not provide a
test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to
access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that
BPC could withhold under its ruling.
5
PACU vs Secretary of Education GR No 5279 31 October 1955
Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1)
They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They
deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
However, the Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of
the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have
permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for
relief.
Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the
Court.
Held: Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the
constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent
that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy
and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when
the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their
protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is
insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might
under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not
constitute a justiciable controversy.
G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF
TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and
Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor
General Francisco Carreon for respondents.
FACTS: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made
a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the
Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory
for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on
the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges
as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights
and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions
conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion
to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation
of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706: It shall be the duty of the Secretary of
Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all
private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall
furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class
and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to
advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to
determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of
Education before opening a school is not originally included in the
original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the
petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a
citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the
said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative
submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no
justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the
constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the
validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the
petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?
HELD: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and
needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no
justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established
principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely
invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and
legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to
all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to
declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant
require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual
cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of
statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting
claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as
contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and
it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between
litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to
obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a
mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court
however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and
state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to
invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by
officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the
litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of
legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate
which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for
being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the
petition for prohibition.
Tan v. Macapagal
Facts: Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the
Filipino people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the
deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to
consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present
Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than
the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being]
merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution
without altering the general plan laid down therein."
Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi.
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: 1. No. Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement."Pascual v. The Secretary of
Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers
only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer."
2. No. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized
any resolution that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore
not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-
Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually
inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power
departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The
6
Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying
out their duties; judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties
well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness.
Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections
Facts: Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He
has already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement
benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same
office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is
class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked
equal protection in the eye of the law. His petition was joined by Atty.
Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a
taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the
provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of
complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of
action.
HELD: No, the SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for
this case should have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different
from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet
all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to
require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be
a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence
of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it
might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective
local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also
be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither
be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree
could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
OPLE vs. TORRES
G.R. No. 127685/ July 23, 1998
PUNO
Facts: President Fidel V. Ramos, on December 12, 1996 issued A.O.
No. 308 also known as Adaptation of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Blas Ople on the other hand, prays
that the Supreme Court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds. One, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of A.O. 308 by the President in
establishing a national computerized identification reference system is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.
Ruling: While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. Corollary to the power of control, the
President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a
subject that should be covered by law. From these precepts, the Supreme
Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by an administrative order. The dissenting opinions of the
Justices unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and
consequently erode the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of
administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many
regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-
making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority
to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power
to make laws." Thus, Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" was declared
null and void for being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City
of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of
Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon,
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas
vs. Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura
Administrator National Mapping & Resource Information
Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention Muslim
Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim
Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,
Facts: Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August
05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated
by this court namely;
7
 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor
Pinol on its prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD
disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to
declare null and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents
from signing the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec.
Ermita.
GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al,
praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative
effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a
judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other
agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-
AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by
and between the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in
1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities;
and the following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the
early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the
peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when
the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was
hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of
Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended
all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the
ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim
and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in its final
form was born.
MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF.
Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli
Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such
as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam
i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The
body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These
people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland
to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the
Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and with
a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro.
As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present
ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM
in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, A which
will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and
B which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE
shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline
of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall
stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland
Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management
over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the
territorial waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries
and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries,
as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include
aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the
duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have participation
in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the
specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border
agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent
to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE
shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing
between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And
they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship
between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further
discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was
highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right
to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which
shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitions have complied with the
procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review; and
2. Whether or not respondents violate constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and
3. Whether or not the contents of the MOA-AD violated the
Constitution and the laws.
Held: The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the
Constitution.
On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed
a need for the exercise of judicial review. The power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic
questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is
no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and
does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations.
Such was denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation
of their duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence
states that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by
violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the
Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy
ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is
aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not
necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in
question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the
Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan,
City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan
Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus
8
standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if
include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano,
in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds
would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be
given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an
intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-
Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for
justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao;
and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government
organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to be benefited or
prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the
MOA-AD has already been suspended and that the President has already
disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot
and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and
that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by
the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and
try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or
injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the
disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic.
The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the
Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the
public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the
petitions. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be
subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are
capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the
prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become
moot and academic considering that parties have already complied
thereat.
On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the
right of the people to demand information, and integrated therein is the
recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete
ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a
mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and
essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-
executory with reasonable safeguards the effectivity of which need not
await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is
corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback
means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of the
respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to
be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right
to information and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed
grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot
invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he
complied with the Courts order to the unqualified disclosure of the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. In addition, the LGU
petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace
talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully
at all levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain,
hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the
ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the
excess in authority exercised by the respondentsince they allowed
delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in
any law to the effect.
On matters of the Constitution.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be
no question that they cannot be all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them: Association as the type of relationship
governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in crafting the
MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law.
In international law, association happens when two states of equal power
voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the associate,
delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while
maintaining its international status as state; free association is a middle
ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains
many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of
association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the
BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the principle of
association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies
power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government;
even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such
concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is
nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD merely
expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the
BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become
part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD
that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the
express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion
of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since
9
those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the
ARMM and not to the BJE.
On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend
that the powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-
paragraph 9 of sec 20, Art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage
of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the
agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment
calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will
not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making
power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that
only the President has the sole organ and is the countrys sole
representative with foreign nation. Should the BJE be granted with the
authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be
amended consequently. Section 22 must also be amendedthe
provision of the law that promotes national unity and development.
Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not
epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The
associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international
practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly
not conducive to national unity.
On matters of domestic statutes.
Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the
adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD.
Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and
the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD
which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.
Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and
recognition of the ancestral domain is a clear departure from the
procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of
reference of the MOA-AD.
On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international
law as part of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-
determination has long been recognized which states that people can
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external self-
determination internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external
which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession.
This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to
the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is
only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the
meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination.
International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and
exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory
is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.
On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that
indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law, but
they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right
to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well
as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the
right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee
the indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it
shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the
protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous
people, the law does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the
near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.
On the basis of the suspensive clause.
It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take
effect until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to
Memorandum of Instructions from the President stating that negotiations
shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the
countrysuch was negated by the provision on association incorporated
in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held
invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to
advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even
constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence
hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such power as
delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule
that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
possess. The power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public
peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of
peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the
Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may
not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers
viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act
upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment
and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those
powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that
does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the
principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting
peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those
policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not
unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act
in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The
Presidents power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the
Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending
proposed amendments or revisions.
The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition
but is a term because it is not a question of whether the necessary
changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the
stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal
framework which changes would include constitutional amendments.
Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the
President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a
virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the
"consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck
down as unconstitutional.
On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or
unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The
MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act
of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies
not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem,
the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give
10
their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount
to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and
joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class
suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial
Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question. The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss,
further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
2. Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
3. Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in
the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of
the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right
to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides
for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows
the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by
which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment
clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights. Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED
and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
KILOSBAYAN V. GUINGONA, JR.
G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with
a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract
of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)
in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and
conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for
the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public
companies in Malaysia," became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through
its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in
March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the
medium through which the technical and management services required
for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.
The bid of PGMC was later on approved which resulted to the
petitioners objection.
Petitioners Contention:
1.) That the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract
of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO
would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
11
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other
similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Even
granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the
contemplation of "collaboration" or "association," an analysis, however,
of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a "collaboration,
association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in
the holding of the On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and
conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual
lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
2.) That paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or
authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will
connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC
cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct,
install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No.
3846, as amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or
controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for
that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents Contention:
1.) It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work,
(i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by
PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and (2) as such
independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery
franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in
collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC as such
statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent, and spirit of
Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa 42." It further
claims that as an independent contractor for a piece of work, it is neither
engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to the
telecommunications network, which the petitioners even consider as an
"indispensable requirement" of an on-line lottery system.
2.) That the execution and implementation of the contract does
not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality"
of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial
or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the
"petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the
subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the locus standi to file
the petition.
2. Whether or not the challenged Contract of Lease violate or
contravene the exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with" another.
Held:
1. YES. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)."
Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it
"is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained, or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or
not."
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute
actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies
or instrumentalities
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the
public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a
category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which
the respondents tried to take advantage of.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity, whether domestic or foreign."
The language of the section is indisputably clear that with respect to its
franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. This is
the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase "except for the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, "charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities."
2.) YES. notwithstanding its denomination or designation as a
(Contract of Lease). We are neither convinced nor moved or fazed by the
insistence and forceful arguments of the PGMC that it does not because
in reality it is only an independent contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the
building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by the PCSO in
the operation of its lottery franchise. Whether the contract in question is
one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the
contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. In order to give life or
effect to an instrument, it is essential to look to the intention of the
individual who executed it. And, pursuant to Article 1371 of the Civil
Code, "to determine the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered."
To put it more bluntly, no one should be deceived by the title or
designation of a contract.
A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a
consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease
under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece
of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the
contracting parties. Collaboration is defined as the acts of working
together in a joint project. Association means the act of a number of
persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. Joint
venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets
and share risks. It requires a community of interest in the performance of
the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection
therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in
profit and losses.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment
Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment
and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket
or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of
12
lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995.
A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the
Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract
of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has
become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from
the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not
parties to the contract.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases
are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue
actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot
again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to
issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved.
When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination
of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional
law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in
INTEREST.
IBP vs Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The
IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military.
HELD:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility
to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their
duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be
properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount
to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement
in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Joya, et al. vs. PCGG
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993
Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the
authority granted by then Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment
Agreement allowing Christies of New York to auction off Old Masters
Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of
the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and
in behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for
Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding with the
auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim
that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the
paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by
them and the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art
alleging that they have been deprived of their right to public property
without due process of law, they have the legal personality to restrain the
respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the
Constitution and RA 4846.
Issue: Whether or not the petition complies with the legal requisites for
the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
Held: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing,
i.e. a personal and substantial interest in the case such that they have
sustained or would sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged, because they are not the legal owners of the
artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation
established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in
fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The
mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners seek is the
enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not
because they are after the fulfilment of a positive duty required of the
respondent public officials which is the only ground for a writ of
mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since
the items in question were acquired from private sources and not with
public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not
be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot
and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Since
the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which
had long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic.
Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
13
standing when paramount public interest is involved. However, there is
no such justification in this petition. Petition dismissed.
Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA
"to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On
the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). On January 19, 1988, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred
ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988,
the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Paraaque City. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On
June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approve the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in
Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among
the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which
the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of
Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government
Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the
JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity)
as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner
prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office
of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of
subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the
principle of governing the hierarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information
on on-going negotiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for
the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the
amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and
AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the
petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the
meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of
the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution,
which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public
domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary
commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership
to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay
to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly
government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations
which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue
raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA
to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands.
Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to
mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case
without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant
case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the
terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA
make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original
JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not
of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory
duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal
duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The
principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire
lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule
that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the
petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of
citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino
Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation
of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional
duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions
14
questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,'
and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well
being of the people.' We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a
citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters
of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus
standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving
public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution, thus: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information
"contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement
for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can
never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the
JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his
expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how
to conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public
dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of
general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other
works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private
individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by
the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to
property used for some specific public service and open only to those
authorized to use the property.Property of public dominion referred not
only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used
but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some
economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to
public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-
executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law,
must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial
defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to
private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither
timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes
other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and
not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural
purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is
the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the
lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject
to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be
leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of
the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations
of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain
is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set
up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual
could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a
convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a
special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national
park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the
classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned
by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation
of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake
the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or
through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands
of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the
approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop,
sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands
of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No.
525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred
"ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to
PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks
PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide,
dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the
PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
15
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property
may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same
committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the
Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it
also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The
original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750
hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving
only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of
750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of
the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain
automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units
and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance
with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable
lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The
alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public
lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can
declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the
hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire
. . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there
is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier
of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates
Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and
VOID ab initio.
David vs Macapagal Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017
declaring a state of emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-
out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President.
. . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017,
directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on
the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech
and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal
arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant
to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP
1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners
did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
HELD: The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three
important provisions, thus: First provision: by virtue of the power
vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. PP 1017
is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the
decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an
act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
16
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare
a state of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To
the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power; hence,
no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate
a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise
to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress
may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected
with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,
it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state
of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power
to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by
which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not
yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
DEMETRIA V ALBA
G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 |
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec
44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens,
members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest
common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the
primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue
delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override
the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal
standing of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government
cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of
duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition
has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was
where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant
thereof), which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
Issue: 1. Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed
executive act.
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program
of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without
any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure
of public funds to naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as
part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say
that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this
high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.
Gonzales v. Narvasa
G. R. No. 140835
August 14, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, as a citizen and taxpayer assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers, and assistants. The PCCR was created by President
Estrada by virtue of EO 43 to study and recommend proposed
amendments and revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of
implementing the same. Gonzales in this petition seeks to enjoin the
PCCR and the ones in the specified positions from acting as such, to
enjoin Secretary Zamora from enforcing their advice and
17
recommendations, to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing the
audit expenditures for the PCCR and finally seeks to compel Zamora to
furnish him with the information, requesting for the names of executive
officials holding multiple positions in the government, copies of their
appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the
Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.
Gonzales contends that the PCCR is a public office, which only the
Congress can create by way of a law, and that the President through the
PCCR is amending the Constitution, a power not granted to him.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner has the locus standi for the
present petition.
2. Whether or not the respondent has the obligation
to furnish the petitioner with the information requested, in respect of the
right to information of the petitioner.
HELD:
1. No. The Court rules that the action is already moot, for it no longer
presents a justiciable controversy due to the extension granted to the
PCCR, first instructed to complete its task on June 30, 1999, but
eventually was changed to December 31, 1999 by EO 70. Therefore the
PCCR already submitted its recommendations to the President on
December 20, 1999 and was subsequently dissolved. Thus the body
sought to be enjoined has already ceased to exist, making prohibition an
inappropriate remedy. In addition to that, the petitioner has no standing
as a citizen and a taxpayer for he did not establish that he is suffering or
that will suffer some actual or threatened injury due to the creation of the
PCCR, or the creation of the positions. Likewise, there is no illegal
disbursement of funds in the exercise of Congress of its spending or
taxing power, for the source of funds for the PCCR will not come from
an act of appropriation by the Congress, but will be sourced out the
funds of the Office of the President.
2. Yes. On the issue of whether or not Secretary Zamora can be
compelled to furnish the petitioner with information: the names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of
their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized
by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang, the Court
rules in favor of the petitioner. As secured by the Constitution, the right
to information is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any
citizen to assert a public right. The right to information of the people on
matters of public concern shall be recognized, subject to limitations as
may be provided by law such as in RA 6713, which provides that, in the
performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are
obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within 15 working days
from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public
documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours,
subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.
The Court further held that the right to information is the key in having a
meaningful democratic decision-making, to enable the society to cope up
with the exigencies of the times. It is for the courts to determine in a
case-by-case basis whether the matter is of public interest or importance,
thus agreeing with the petitioner that Secretary Zamora has the
constitutional duty to answer the request, involving matters of public
concern appointments made to public offices and the utilization of
public property, also allowing the inspection and copying of the copies
of the appointment papers, subject to reasonable limitations.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent
Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.
PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited
time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case
of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as
the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Facts: While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo,
through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which
they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. Petitioners
senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued.
They assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first
having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President
can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while
Congress is in session.
Issue: Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as
acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional.
Held: On the Mootness of the Petition
The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President
Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on 23
September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its
resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents
appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.
On the Nature of the Power to Appoint
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference
in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe
the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that
office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to
appoint any particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of
members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not
legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it
exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments. Thus:
xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution.
Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said
Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission
do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution.
Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the
Commissioner are purely executive in nature.
On Petitioners Standing
The Solicitor General states that petitioners may not claim standing as
Senators because no power of the Commission on Appointments has
been "infringed upon or violated by the President. If at all, the
18
Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual
members of the Congress) may possess standing in this case."
Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its
certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President.
Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President
Arroyos appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity
while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners
cite Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary as basis, thus:
To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive
which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to
the courts.
Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from
Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case
as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting
appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of
Congress.
Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the
Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as
Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor
Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator
Osmea as members.
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the
Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara,
Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea have standing in the present petition. This
is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who,
though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of
Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.
Constitutionality of President Arroyos issuance of appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed
respondents as acting secretaries because "in case of a vacancy in the
Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated
as Acting Secretary." Petitioners further assert that "while Congress is in
session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a
vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent."
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited
time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case
of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as
the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation
to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications
to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress
is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the
President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a
department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may
or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make
it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
Express provision of law allows President to make acting appointment
Sec. 17, Chap. 5, Title I, Book III, EO 292 states that [t]he President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service
or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
But does Sec. 17 apply to appointments vested in the President by the
Constitution? Petitioners assert that it only applies to appointments
vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the
only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of
Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to
law, and judicial decisions.
Petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity
is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section
17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated
this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an
acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-
interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices
but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is
readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year. (Aquilino Pimentel vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005)
KILOSBAYAN V. GUINGONA, JR.
G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994
FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with
a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract
of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)
in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and
conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities," the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for
the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public
companies in Malaysia,"became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through
its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in
March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the
medium through which the technical and management services required
for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.
The bid of PGMC was later on approved which resulted to the
petitioners objection.
Petitioners Contention:
19
1. That the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease
with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would
hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other
similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Even
granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the
contemplation of "collaboration" or "association," an analysis, however,
of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a "collaboration,
association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in
the holding of the On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and
conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual
lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
2. That paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes
PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will connect all
the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do
that because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install,
establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846,
as amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled
corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose
because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents Contention:
1. It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the
building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the
operation of its lottery franchise); and (2) as such independent
contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with
PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or
joint venture' with PGMC as such statutory limitation is viewed from
the context, intent, and spirit of Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas
Pambansa 42." It further claims that as an independent contractor for a
piece of work, it is neither engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service"
relative to the telecommunications network, which the petitioners even
consider as an "indispensable requirement" of an on-line lottery system.
2. That the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate
the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the
lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or
legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the
"petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the
subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
ISSUES: 1 Procedural Whether the petitioners have the locus standi to
file the petition.
2.Substantial WON the challenged Contract of
Lease violate or contravene the exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169,
as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with"
another.
RULING:
1. YES. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821)."
Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it
"is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained,"
or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not."
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute
actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies
or instrumentalities
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the
public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a
category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which
the respondents tried to take advantage of.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity, whether domestic or foreign."
The language of the section is indisputably clear that with respect to its
franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. This is
the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase "except for the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, "charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities."
2. YES. notwithstanding its denomination or designation as a (Contract
of Lease). We are neither convinced nor moved or fazed by the
insistence and forceful arguments of the PGMC that it does not because
in reality it is only an independent contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the
building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by the PCSO in
the operation of its lottery franchise. Whether the contract in question is
one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the
contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. In order to give life or
effect to an instrument, it is essential to look to the intention of the
individual who executed it. And, pursuant to Article 1371 of the Civil
Code, "to determine the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered."
To put it more bluntly, no one should be deceived by the title or
designation of a contract.
A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a
consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease
under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece
of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the
contracting parties. Collaboration is defined as the acts of working
together in a joint project. Association means the act of a number of
persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. Joint
venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets
and share risks. It requires a community of interest in the performance of
the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection
therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in
profit and losses.
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that
the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens
20
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying
that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the
terms it uses. Particularly, these terms are: combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on
the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack
the validity of the law using the facial challenge.
Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not
constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a
fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize
cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is
clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be
made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A
facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge
of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in
the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is
dismissed for lacking merit.
Umali vs. Guingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)
Facts: The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the petition for
Certiorari Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against the
respondents. It was on October 27, 1993 when Osmundo Umali was
appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by
Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received a memorandum
alleging against the petitioner in violation of internal revenue laws
during the incumbency as Regional Director. On October 6, 1994,
President Ramos issued an Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing the
petitioner from service with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits
provided by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration. December
1, 1994, a petition is brought to the regional Trial Court of Makati
pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of Administrative
Order No. 152.
Issues: 1. Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the
petitioner's right to security of tenure;
2. Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in
the issuance of administrative order no. 152;
3. Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government
agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of its
constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's decision;
4. Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution
dismissing the charges against petitioner, there is still basis for
petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative
order no. 152.
Held:
1. NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner
asserts as his security of tenure. The petitioner claimed that as a
Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he is CESO eligible
entitled to security of tenure however it is anemic of evidentiary
support. But it was fatal that he wasn't able to provide sufficient
evidence on this matter.
2. NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to
be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due processes before the
PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other
pleadings with respect to his alleged violations of internal revenue laws
and regulations and he attended the hearings before the investigatory
body.
3. The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in
his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late
stage of the proceedings below.
4. The administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the
institution of the criminal case. Administrative Order No. 152 were
based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not
on the criminal charges before the ombudsman.
Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues raised by the
petitioner does not constitute any valid legal basis for overturning the
findings and conclusions by the Court of Appeals. However considering
antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has decided to consider
the dismissal and because the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally the Solicitor
General has no more basis to enact Administrative Order No. 152.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive
supervening events, and in the exercise of its equity powers, the Court
hereby GRANTS the petition Accordingly Administrative order no 152
is considered LIFTED and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full
benefits No pronouncement as to costs.
Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013)
FACTS: These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo,
Japan. The latter case also, prays for a writ of mandamus to fully
disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the
sale of the Roppongi property.
The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparation Agreement entered into
with Japan. The other three (3) properties include Nampeidai Property
(present site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial
Property (commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking lot for
consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is
now vacant).
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M
would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual
21
schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. The procurements are to be divided into government sector
and those for private parties in projects, the latter shall be made available
only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in national
development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading Government
Sector for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major repairs. However, the
Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since that time.
Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision to
have buildings built at the expense of the lessee, the same was not acted
favorably upon by the government. Instead, President Aquino issued EO
No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions.
Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive
branch of the government pushed for the sale of reparation properties,
starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure,
while the second has been postponed and later restrained by the
SC.Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the laws of
Japan where the property is located. They relied upon the rule of lexsitus
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the
acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind
be alienated by the Philippine Government?
2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers
and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi
property?
3. Whether or not EO No. 296 is constitutional?
HELD:
1. NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public
dominion and the respondents have failed to show that it has become
patrimonial.
The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion
happens only if property is withdrawn from public use, through an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment must be a
certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. The EO does not
declare that the properties lost their public character, merely intending
the properties to be made available to foreigners and not to Filipinos
alone, in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore, it is based
on the wrong premise that the Japan properties can be sold to end-users,
when in fact it cannot. Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the
properties into patrimonial properties, merely stating that sources of
funds for its implementation be sourced from proceeds of the disposition
of the Government in foreign countries, but not that the Roppongi
property be withdrawn from being classified as a property of public
dominion.
CONFLICT OF LAW
Furthermore, the respondents argument that the Japanese law and not
our Civil Code shall apply is incorrect. There is no conflict of law in
this situation. A conflict of law arises only when:
a. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such
that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined.
b. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. Both elements
doesnot exist in the case. The issues are not concerned with the validity
of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to
the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the government officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the state and the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should be governed by
Philippine law The rule of lex situs does not apply.
2. NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property is needed. None has been
enacted for this purpose.
3. The SC did not anymore pass upon its constitutionality.
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts: Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the
Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties
given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by
the latter to the former during the war.Petitioner argues that under
Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As
such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall
apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that
the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated.
2. Whether or not the Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
Held:
1. The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of
public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated.
2. The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable,
such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2)
A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is
no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs
does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not
tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations
nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing
who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that
it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the
properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of
22
the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by
Filipinos is inapplicable.
Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
FACTS: Following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in the
above-captioned case on July 5, 2011, the petitioners present for
resolution several issues concerning the said Decision. To recall, in the
2011 Decision, the Court ordered, among others, that the lands subject of
Hacienda Luisita Incorporateds (HLI) stock distribution plan (SDP) be
placed under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme
of the CARP and declared that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker
beneficiaries (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of
HLI.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is applicable to the present
case;
II. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 is constitutional;
III. Whether or not the Court properly determined the coverage of
compulsory acquisition;
IV. Whether or not the matter on just compensation has been correctly
passed upon by the Court;
V. Whether or not the subject agricultural lands may be sold to third
parties though they have not been fully paid;
VI. Whether or not HLI violated any of the provisions under the SDP;
VII. Whether or not the ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI is valid;
HELD:
1. The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited to invalid or
unconstitutional laws. Contrary to the stance of respondents, the
operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared
unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts
subsequently declared as invalid. The "operative fact" doctrine is
embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a
legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional
by the courts, is valid and must be complied with. Evidently, the
operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the
same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in
nature.
2. As We have succinctly discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, it took
the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some eighteen
(18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The question of constitutionality
will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and
presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is,
therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question
should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue
must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis
mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being
critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to
avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which
judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law,
such recourse is favored. Based on the foregoing disquisitions, We
maintain that this Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
3. FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it
limited the maximum area to be covered to 4,915.75 hectares, whereas
the area that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares, which is
the agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held
by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco). We cannot subscribe to
this view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of
the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only
as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.
4. In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just
compensation for the remaining agricultural land that will be transferred
to DAR for land distribution to the FWBs." We also ruled that the date
of the "taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP
per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.
We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date
when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in
view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to
own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be
precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the
SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice
of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
5. There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita
were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May
11, 1989, then the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded
lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, and, consequently, the
qualified FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands with
respect to their land interests to third parties, including HLI, regardless
of whether they have fully paid for the lands or not. The proposition is
erroneous. Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be
transferred or conveyed after ten (10) years from the issuance and
registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not
yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point
is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the
agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
6. AMBALA and FARM reiterate that improving the economic status of
the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP and is an
imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10. FARM further asserts
that "[i]f that minimum threshold is not met, why allow [stock
distribution option] at all, unless the purpose is not social justice but a
political accommodation to the powerful."
Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM, nowhere in the
SDP, RA 6657 and DAO 10 can it be inferred that improving the
economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI
under the SDP or is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10,
a violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution
option.
7. Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, we realize that the
FWBs will never have control over these agricultural lands for as long as
they remain as stockholders of HLI. In line with our finding that control
over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, we
reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of
the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under SDP and will only be
treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as
stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no
longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657. In addition to the
foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and
homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation
to refund or return them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5,
2011 Decision, "the benefits x x x were received by the FWBs as
farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other fringe benefits
were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining
agreement with Tadeco."
Agbayani vs PNB [G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971]
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939,
maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13
23
1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the
loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both
alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed,
fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other
hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the
period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 was issued,
to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the
period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for
the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such contention
persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the
Act extending the Moratorium Law before the same were declared
invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD:
YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official.
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the judicial
recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the
plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear
its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity
that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiffs suit is thus manifest.
From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank,
the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight
days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of
Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint
against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE
ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the
order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and
Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed
them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development
(Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent
performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were
duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs.
Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the
return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due
process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private
residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby
making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one
for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: Whether or notthe Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD:
PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of
search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to
be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following
principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only
judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner
of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS: Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the
issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in
every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects
and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political
activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
24
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors
of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy,
as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The
RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and
the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious
freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is
not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and
present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates
the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to
manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they
shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the
issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners
lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised,
the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one
hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the
RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy;
2. Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
HELD: 1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not
have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are
not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged
with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any
of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In
short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The
rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words,
the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right,
on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly
public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on
its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. The Court is not
persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known
as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.
has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
25
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion
and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by
the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced
and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi. Locus standi or legal standing is
defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule
that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts
a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that
in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions
are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to
the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be
resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom
of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all
these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society,
the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and
the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life
to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time
when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be
violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at
stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law,
claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,
prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one
for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed
legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a
birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated
as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the
Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of
the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population.
While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy,
it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the
RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of
modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and
post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe,
non-abortificient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole
idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the
central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections
including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill
rule.
26
2. It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys
the right to life. Even if not formally established, the right to life, being
grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment
of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18,
1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the
country has long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting
women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
wellbeing. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known
as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding
this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has
always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but
rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to
afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should
not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual
members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on
the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads: Section 12. The State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no
unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution
is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins.
The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have
conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned
from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.
On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception
refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the
recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where
the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the
word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and
reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of
becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as
the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting
in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions. Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal
personality.
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention
of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to
the moment of "fertilization."
From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended
that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it
determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that
kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under
medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is
a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at
a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
27
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to
him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages
in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."
Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm
that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal
or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to
the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object -it is a living human being complete with DNA and chromosomes.
Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those
who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual
infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In
this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and
promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution
provides: Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to
provide for the health of the people, viz: Section 11. The State shall
adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical
care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and
drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower
development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and
problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person
for their rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their
integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: Section 9. The State shall
protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.
It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not
question contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays
that the status quo -under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -be maintained.
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to
leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all
to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to
be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to
the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution
and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there
exist adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives
that are safe are made available to the public.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices,
it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect,
and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all
possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any
injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet
been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the
Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by
the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH
Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick
as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe
and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the
inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the
EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory.
There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut
of contraceptives is "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without
the proper scientific examination.
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous
society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious
beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in
law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious people of
different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be,
and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested
their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people,
shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions,
and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the
State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in
Article II, Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 6. The
separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on
mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs
of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it.
It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the
28
other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation
follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a
mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an
ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article
III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution. In
short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The
establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates
strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it
prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand,
the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee,
the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of
individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free
exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs
with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with
rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two
religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use
either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices. Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is
the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The
first part is absolute. The second part however, is limited and subject to
the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the
support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to
one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise,
while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters,
as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing
the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the
whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the
principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would
limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few
in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also
means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes.
And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's
belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. Apparently,
in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a
couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the
mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at
all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the
infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not
presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes
to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. Other
than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the
State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-
related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to
say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature
to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other
legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act,
R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to
the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. Granting
that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a
measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m
exchange for blind conformity.
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception
set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot
be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures.
In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would
amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life
of a mother in grave danger.
The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity. At any rate,
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the
invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive
members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the
youth is superior to that of the State. It is also the inherent right of the
State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of
the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation building.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory
reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction
with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other
interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates
Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.
29
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other
parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt
from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem
family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods
necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give
reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical
procedures.
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection
clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because
it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition
of terms of the law.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by
its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities."
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and
extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)
It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." For a
classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are
to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class.
It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be
in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "under
include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in
Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion
as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the
OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health
being a privilege and not a right. The point of the OSG is well-taken. It
should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right
but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very
lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress
to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and
the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades,
even to the point of revoking such right altogether. Moreover, as some
petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bona service. Other than non-
accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty is imposed should they choose
to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be
an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should
be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow
them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,
suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis
for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is
not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are
mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the
past or present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a
written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained
that the Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms to both the Constitution and natural law. Rather,
natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the
taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It
30
only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government
by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives
more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional
insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State. In conformity with the
principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot
be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony
may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other. As healthful as
the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court
that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these
perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution
of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain
as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in
the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on
such a program generations ago, are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore,
even with incentives, is failing. Indeed, at the present, the country has a
population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like
the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or
lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her religious
beliefs;
6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding
the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
and
8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as
extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as
the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
constitutional.
People vs. Ramos, 39 SCRA 236
Facts: Feliciano M. Ramos filed a petition through the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 50, of Villasis, Pangasinan for the automatic
review of the death penalty imposed upon him by the 11th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Villasis-Sto. Tomas at Villasis,
Pangasinan.
On October 16, 1995, Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint for
rape against him. It was alleged therein that appellant was able to
perpetrate the felony against the minor complainant through the use of
force and intimidation in its execution. After considering the evidence
presented during the trial and the arguments presented by appellant, the
MCTC found out that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The court a quo condemned appellant to death, the penalty prescribe for
the crime of rape because the complainant is not only a minor (14 yrs.
old) but the very own child of the appellant. It is stated under the
amendatory provisions introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court further ordered
appellant to indemnify his victim in the amount of P50, 000.00 and to
pay her moral damages of P25, 000.00 and exemplary damages in the
sum of P25, 000.00.
Issue: Whether or not, death penalty should be imposed against Feliciano
M. Ramos.
Held:
NO. The court a quo arrived at this conclusion under the notion that the
particular rape involved is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Then, taking the relationship of appellant and complainant as a generic
aggravating circumstance, the MCTC imposed the higher of the two
indivisible penalties which is the capital punishment. Treating
relationship as a generic aggravating circumstance, MCTC considered
the relationship of appellant and complainant as attendant in the case
despite the absence of any allegation thereof in the information.
Appellant takes issue in this point, by asserting that since the fact of
relationship was not alleged in the information, only the penalty
prescribe for simple rape can be imposed upon him. This is where the
RTC depart from the conclusions of the lower court and agree with
appellant's position.
A rape by a father of his minor daughter is punishable by the single
indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death, as the
lower court erroneously believed.
31
While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the
crime of rape attended by any of the seven new circumstances
introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, the Court has referred
to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However,
with or without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the
minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender gives a
different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335.
They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from
reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an
effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into
the nature of a special qualifying circumstance.
As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in
the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape
because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of
qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person
accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. This right finds amplification and
implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court.
The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of
which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. This
recital of the essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of
accusation against an accused.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed
must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information
to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that
with which he is charged in the complaint or information on which he is
tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt
may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried or is
necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed of the nature
of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To
convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint
or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of
that right.
Moreover, it would be a denial of the due process of law, if he is charge
with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with
death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on
which he was arraigned.
Contrary, therefore, to the pose of the lower court and the Solicitor
General, the non-allegation of the relationship between appellant and
offended party in an information for a rape is a bar to the imposition of
the death penalty since relationship in this particular form of rape is a
qualifying and not merely aggravating. Having been informed only of
the elements of simple rape, appellant can only be convicted of such
crime and accordingly be punished with reclusion perpetua.
Now, it is accepted that qualifying circumstances not pleaded in the
indictment but duly proven without objection during the trial may be
considered as aggravating circumstances. The general principles of
criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged
in the information, may be proven during the trial over the objection of
the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such
evidence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the
offense and its consideration by the courts do not violate the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
However, in the case before the RTC, the aggravating circumstance of
relationship becomes inconsequential in view of the nature of reclusion
perpetua prescribe for the felony of simple rape. The general criminal
code states that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed. Therefore, the appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death penalty.
People vs Mateo
FACTS: In a Complaint dated November 2, 1995, AAA, assisted by her
father, BBB, charged Norberto MATEO (appellant) with rape by means
of force and intimidation. The Assistant City Prosecutor certified that it
was filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor. Upon
arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged.
Upon medical examination, Dr. Reyes testified that AAA could have
been laid on a rough surface as shown by the multiple linear abrasions
found at her back and the anterum medial aspect of her thigh;that she
had been sexually penetrated possibly with the use of force and violence;
that he noticed that AAA was suffering from some form of mental
retardation as she was not responding to his question like a 17-year old
girl should, compelling him to refer her to a neuro-psychiatrist for
examination; that based on the result forwarded to him, AAA had a
mental age of 5 years and 8 months with an IQ of 38.
After trial, the RTC found MATEO guilty of raping a mental
retardate. This was affirmed by the CA. MATEO questioned the
affirmation of the CA in the SC, arguing that 1) there was no proof
beyond reasonable doubt there was no physical struggle by the
victim, and 2) the court a quo erred in finding that the victim AAA
was a mental retardate.
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant
for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor
General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an
acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the
Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the constitution on
automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death.
HELD:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is
not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the
Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point
of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that
the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would
32
accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on
the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,
the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which
the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet,
it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct
mandate to review factual issues.
Villavert vs. Desierto
Facts: An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against
Villavert, Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The
Graft Investigation Officer recommended the dismissal of the case.
However, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Memorandum finding
Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of
RA 6770.
Issue: Whether or not decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases be appealed to the Supreme Court?
Held:
No. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in
the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman. (Villavert vs. Desierto,
G.R. No. 133715. February 23, 2000)
MARTINEZ vs CA
Facts: Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela
De la Paz entered into an oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante
Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of
Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the
sum of P15,000.00. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in
the name of Claudia De la Paz, mother of private respondents, although
the latter had already sold it to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated. He was assured by them that
the lot belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner
would give a downpayment of P3,000.00 to private respondents De la
Paz and that the balance would be payable by installment. After giving
the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a
house on the lot and began paying the real estate taxes on said property.
In the meantime, in a Deed of. Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase,
private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right to repurchase the
same within one year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and
Susan Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was
the lot previously sold to petitioner. Petitioner discovered that the lot he
was occupying with his family had been sold to the spouses Veneracion
after receiving a letter from private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion
claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the
property and remove their improvements thereon.16 Petitioner, in turn,
demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private
respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was
the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from
private respondents De la Paz.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in
good faith of the lot in dispute as to make them the absolute owners
thereof in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of
immovable property.
HELD: No. The deed of sale executed by private respondents Godofredo
and Manuela De la Paz in favor of private respondents spouses Reynaldo
and Susan Veneracion is null and void.
In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private
respondents Veneracion are the owners of the disputed lot on their
reliance on private respondent Godofredo De la Paz's assurance that he
would take care of the matter concerning petitioner's occupancy of the
disputed lot as constituting good faith. This case, however, involves
double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that
where immovable property is the subject of a double sale, ownership
shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the
person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title.26 The requirement of
the law, where title to the property is recorded in the Register of Deeds,
is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. To be
entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only prove prior
recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e., without
knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good
faith should be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the
purchase of the land.
1. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion,
private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10,
1981, 18 days before the execution of the first Deed of Sale with Right
to Repurchase, he inspected the premises and found it vacant.28
However, this is belied by the testimony of Engr. Felix D. Minor, then
building inspector of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
that he conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in
dispute in the performance of his duties as a building inspector to
monitor the progress of the construction of the building subject of the
building permit issued in favor of petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that
he found it 100 % completed. In the absence of contrary evidence, he is
to be presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.Thus, as
early as October, 1981, private respondents Veneracion already knew
that there was construction being made on the property they purchased.
2. With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of
sale between the parties, it should be noted that this Court in several
cases,35 has ruled that a purchaser who is aware of facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later
claim that he acted in good faith. Private respondent Reynaldo himself
admitted during the pre-trial conference in the MTC in Civil Case that
petitioner was already in possession of the property in dispute at the time
the second Deed of Sale was executed on June 1, 1983 and registered on
March 4, 1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already occupants on
the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other than
the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put
private respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioner's right over
the property. But he never talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his
right. He merely relied on the assurance of private respondent Godofredo
De la Paz, who was not even the owner of the lot in question, that he
would take care of the matter. This does not meet the standard of good
faith.
3. The first contract of sale between the private respondents
shows that it is in fact an equitable mortgage. The requisites for
considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an equitable
mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
contract of sale and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt
by way of mortgage.A contract of sale with right to repurchase gives rise
to the presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of the
following cases: (1) when the price of a sale with a right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession as
lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase, another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser retains for
himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself
to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may be
fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right
to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage. In this case,
33
the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents
intended the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract
of sale: (1) Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession
of the three lots; (2) Private respondents De la Paz remained in
possession of the Melencio lot which was co-owned by them and where
they resided; (3) During the period between the first sale and the second
sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any effort to
take possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption
had expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the
De la Pazes that they are offering the lots for sale to another person for
P200,000.00, they never objected. To the contrary, they offered to
purchase the two lots for P180,000.00 when they found that a certain Mr.
Tecson was prepared to purchase it for the same amount. Thus, it is clear
from these circumstances that both private respondents never intended
the first sale to be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to
secure a debt of P150,000.00.
Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified
his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have
been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in
truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for
decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of
supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively
liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised
Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee
arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination
whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE
Facts: Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA
1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and
privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan
covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The
Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him
to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of
a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he
may be investigated only by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he was
suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this case
claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank
equivalent to a judge).
HELD:
No. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank
and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be
suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine
of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with
an administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
Petitioners theory that the grant of privilege of a Judge of First
Instance includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the
Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the legislature
had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. This includes (a) the
Judicial Superintendent of the DOJ; (b) the Assistant Solicitors General;
(c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City; (d) the City Fiscal of Manila and (e)
SEC Commissioner.
Also, the resolution of the consult a by a Register of Deeds is NOT a
judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and
binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves.
Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that
they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consult as is but
a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.
Petition is dismissed.
NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE
FACTS: Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2
of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the
Court of First Instance."
On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter
requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering
areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he
enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and
investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be
submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to
section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the
Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence
and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above
charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the
contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming
lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining
writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that
petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial
functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First
Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of
34
Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public
officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may
not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except
when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it
would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment
upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and
privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
HELD:
it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land
Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
Petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First
Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the
Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature
had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the
Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be
removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the
Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature,
through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature
when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of
Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the
suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance
applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and
unequivocal language.
If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First
Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be
suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then
such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court
with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
Petition dismissed
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET
AL., respondents.
Fact: Sec. 11 of Act 1446 provides: Whenever any franchise or right of
way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the
terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of
way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other
person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the
Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority
of whom shall be final.
Said Act provides that for every franchise granted, terms as to the usage
and compensation to be paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the
members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority
vote is required and this is final.
Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court
requesting the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of
arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies
shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO.
Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is the Pasay
Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which disclaimed any interest.
ISSUES: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can sit as
arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this
case
HELD: No. The Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only
which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by
any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required
to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and
such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec.
26).
When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by
the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise
of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense
of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot
be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and
powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government,
and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the
court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other
duty. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide
the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established,
and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila
Electric Company.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS
MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that
Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform
administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which
involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order
No. 856, it is provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice
shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shag not be designated to any agency
performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges an administrative
35
function, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained
to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in
the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to
be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a
plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in
him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected,
to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary
can be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude
of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City
Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the
structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As
public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable
purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SB NG. TAGUIG vs JUDGE ESTRELLA
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from an election protest filed
by then mayoralty candidate Ricardo R. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B.
Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the
May 8, 1995 elections. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig and was eventually raffled to the sala of respondent judge. The
issue narrowed down to the determination of the number of Garcia votes
that should have been considered stray, there having been another
candidate named Garcia.
A revision committee was formed and thereafter reported that Papa
objected to a total of 11,290 ballots and 3,049 were plain Garcia votes.
Respondent judge issued an order directing the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the presence of a
representative of both parties. After the examination of the NBI, the
ballot boxes were ordered by the respondent to be removed from his
custody and transferred to another RTC Branch. The NBI submitted its
report and Garcia moved to be furnished with the said report.
Respondent judge denied the motion. Only the court was furnished with
the copy of the NBI report. After several motions and petitions for the
resetting of the promulgation of judgment, a judgment was promulgated
in favor of Papa. On the day of the promulgation of judgment, Garcia
was given only by the respondent judge a few minutes to go over several
pages of questioned documents. In his complaint, Garcia alleged that
respondent judge gave unwarranted benefits to Papa, which caused
undue injury to him as well as the people of Taguig by depriving them of
their duly elected mayor. Respondent judge denied Garcia's allegations.
The Court referred the matter to the Court Administrator for report and
recommendation.
The Office of the Court Administrator consented to the Comelec's
finding that the respondent's action showed utter disregard of the
appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in the
disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.
ISSUES: Whether or not the judge is impartial?
RULINGS: Yes. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence (Rule1.01, Canon 1).
Indeed, in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts and applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion,
or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Thus, the Court has continually reminded members of the bench that;
The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice. He must view himself as a priest for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the
same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred
ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with
impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence repose in
him.
On this score, the court finds pertinent their ruling in the recent case of
Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M. Agcaoili (A.M. No. RTJ-95-
1308, April 12, 2000), that; A judge should, in pending or prospective
litigation before him, he scrupulously careful to avoid such action as
may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business
relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial
course.
He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should
do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his
fairness, impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly applies
the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of
impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less
than impartial and honest.
Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. These stringent standards are intended to
assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is
capable of dispensing impartial justice in every issue in every trial.
YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Facts: 13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos
in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order
No. 626-A.
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported
in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture
by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of
National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao). This amended
E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age.
Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner
filed supersede as bong of P12,000.00. Trial Court (TC): confiscation of
carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the bond; declined to rule
on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed
validity. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC.
Petitioners arguments:
1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao
or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process.
3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.
36
Issue/s: Whether or not EO 626-A is constitutional. Bernardino Marcelino vs Fernando Cruz, Jr. De Roma v. CA

Held:
EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersede
as bond cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to
petitioner.
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower
courts subject to review of the Supreme Court . . . ...While lower courts
should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.
Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.
On the presumption of constitutionality
Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted
On due process
Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable
language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain
also conveniently resilient; flexibility
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing intended as
safeguard against official arbitrariness.
On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A
The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD
issued by Pres. Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws
were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6.
Facts: Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On
August 4, 1975, the prosecution finished presenting evidence against
Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of both
parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their
respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave
them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a
memorandum.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy
of his decision, his decision bears the same date of November 28,
1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976.
Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer promulgate
judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period)
within which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus,
the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the
allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4,
1975 (date of last day of filing of the memoranda by the respective
parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz
had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a
rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is
the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge
Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because
November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January
1976, could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily
comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and
Rosalinda. She died intestate. When administration proceedings were
ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of
the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties
donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been
included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10, 297.50 and the value is not
disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when
Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of
Donation sa pamamagitanng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli
which the TC interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the
legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On appeal, it was
reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an
express prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held:
The pertinent Civil Code provisions are: Art. 1061. Every compulsory
heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition. (1035a)Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among
compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if
the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as in officious. (1036) The SC affirmed the appellate courts
decision and that it merely described the donation as irrevocable. The
Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the
donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of the
NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent
donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had
been the donors intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the
rule not the exemption should be applied.

But it was not shown that there is a sufficient exigency to exercise the
extraordinary power Police power as used by the government to justify
E.O. 626-A. Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used
in the case, but this is the same with the fit between means and objective
test) 1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on
them for energy needs. Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable
connection between conservation of carabaos (not having them
slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of carabaos.
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the
effectivity of this constitution, the maximum period within which case or
matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall
be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts
and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal
when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merely
directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret
such provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice
system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases
within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an
excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
37