On Deferred Indefeasibility:
DAWALING SUMAIL vs. HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF COTABATO, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and MELQUIADES GEPULIANO
G.R. No. L-8278 April 30, 1955
Facts: Herein private respondent Gepuliano had filed a free patent application for
a parcel of land, which was approved and was finally issued to him on September
26, 1949. The Patent was registered in the office of Register of Deeds (RD), which
office thereafter issued to him Original Certificate of Title (OCT). Consequently,
herein petitioner filed a civil case for the cancellation of the OCT issued to
Gepuliano, alleging that the latter thru fraud and misrepresentation had filed
with the Bureau of Lands a falsified application for free patent for the lot, stating
in his application that the parcel was not occupied or claimed by any other person
and that he had entered upon it and introduced improvements thereon, when as
a matter of fact, Gepuliano had never occupied the land nor introduced
improvements thereon, and that it was him who had been in possession since
shortly before the end of the Spanish regime and that the Director of Lands
through mistake or inadvertence had approved the application and later issued
Free Patent.
The Court issued an order stating that the subject lot was public land; that it was
applied for free patent by Gepuliano and the corresponding Patent had been
issued to him; that it does not appear from the complaint of Sumail that he had
exhausted all the remedies available to him such as an appeal to the Secretary of
the Department, and that the courts will not interfere with the administrator by
the Bureau of Lands of the public domain. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Sumalis action is proper
Held: No
In ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts
may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree,
only when application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within
one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Here, there
was no decree of registration because instead of an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act Gepuliano applied for
free patent under the Public Land Act.
Assuming that even in bringing public land grants under the Land
Registration Law, there is a period of one year for review in cases of
fraud, how shall that period of one year be computed?
o For all practical purposes we might regard the date of the
issuance of the patent as corresponding to the date of the
issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases,
because the decree finally awards the land applied for
registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent
issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants,
awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.
The purpose and affect of both decree and patent is the
same.
o Assuming the Civil Case filed by Sumail was intended as a
petition for review of the public land grant and conveyance
to Gepuliano, on the ground of fraud, was it filed within the
period of one year?
No. It was only filed on July 21, 1952, or almost
3 years after the issuance of the free patent. It
is, therefore, clear that the trial court no longer
had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for
the reasons already state, but not as contended
by the Director of Lands that it involved public
land, over which he had exclusive and executive
control, because once the patent was granted
and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public
domain and became private property over
which the Director of Lands has neither control
nor jurisdiction.
If Sumalis action will be regarded as an action for reversion to the
Government of the lot in litigation, under the provisions of sections 91
and 124 of the Public Land Act, which provide for the annulment of
patents and titles previously issued, and the reversion of the lands
covered by them to the state, may he bring said action may he bring
such action?
o No. Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides that all
actions for the reversion to the Government of Lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted
by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance based on Fraud:
EMILIANO S. CASIPIT and ANTONIA C. CASIPIT VDA. DE BEATO vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS et. al.
G.R. No. 96829 December 9, 1991
Facts: On April 1987, a complaint was filed by herein petitioners against private
respondents mainly for the recovery of a property, alleging that Emiliano Casipit
is the true and lawful owner of the questioned property located at Sinalhan, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna by virtue of continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful, open and public
possession in the concept of owner since 1930; that they were deprived of
ownership thereof by the Beatos through Narciso Beato, who filed a Petition for
Reconstitution of Titles in the name of Gabriel Beato, using fictitious documents.
Petitioners therefore prayed that TCT and other succeeding titles be cancelled, as
well as the tax declarations; that the questioned property be reconveyed to them;
that the document entitled, "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati," insofar as
it included the questioned property be rescinded; and that private respondents
be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees.
The lower court dismissed the petition, holding that the defendants have a better
right than the plaintiffs, that the cause of action of the plaintiffs being based on
fraud, has prescribed for it must be filed within 4 years after the cause of action
arose. The issuance of the reconstituted title over the subject lot and its
registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, in 1963 is the starling
date for the prescriptive period to commence. The respondent court affirmed the
said decision and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, this
petition.
Petitioners Contention: pursuant to the Certification issued by the Bureau of
Lands that Patent over the questioned property has not been issued to Gabriel
Beato, the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati" is therefore a void contract.
This being the case, the action taken by petitioners is imprescriptible. Private
respondents Diaz spouses were buyers in bad faith because they had full
knowledge that Emiliano Casipit has been in actual possession in the concept of
owner of the questioned property and paid the real property taxes thereon.
Issue: Whether petitioners action already prescribed
Held: Yes
There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a void
contract is imprescriptible. However, this is not the case at bar.
The action filed by petitioner before the trial court was 1) for
reconveyance based on fraud since the ownership of private
respondents over the questioned property was allegedly established
on "false assertions, misrepresentations and deceptive allegations";
and 2) for rescission of the "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati.
Thus, the action for reconveyance based on fraud filed by petitioners
before the trial court is subject to prescription.
Based on jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance
of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title.
o Conformably with these settled jurisprudence, the
prescriptive period for petitioners' action for reconveyance
is 10 years from August 30, 1963, the date of the issuance
of TCT in favor of Beato. Obviously, the discussion on this
subject matter is not beneficial to petitioners because they
filed the action for reconveyance only on April 27, 1987.
Hence, petition was dismissed.
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance based on Void Contract:
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S. VIRATA and the DBP
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
Facts: Petitioner, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title
against the respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the registered owner of
a parcel of land (a friar land) located at Imus, Cavite, which was covered by a
Certificate of Title issued on February 24, 1976; that Virata, during his lifetime
thru the use of fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title on September 1,
1959 thru an administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original title covering
the same parcel of land; that by reason of the said reconstitution and subsequent
issuance of TCT, there now exists a cloud on the title of petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent Virata denied the allegations in the complaint,
contending that his predecessor, one Mabini Legaspi, bought the subject
property through a public bidding, wherein consequently, a TCT was issued in his
name, and that subsequently a deed of sale was executed in favor of Virata. Such
deed was then registered with the Register of Deeds, who later on issued a TCT
to Virata. However, the Provincial Capitol building of Cavite which housed the
Registry of Deeds was burned, destroying land records and titles in d registry
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among which were the records relating to the subject property. Hence, the RD
administratively reconstituted the original TCT based on owner's duplicate
certificate.
Issue: Whether petitioners contention is meritorious
Held: Yes
Sale of the subject land to Mabini Legaspi, respondents predecessor
is void
o There was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was
with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. The absence of such approval made the
supposed sale null and void ab initio.
o Without the certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the
ownership of the land from the government Mabini
Legaspi and without the required approval of the sale by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, he did not in
any manner acquire ownership over the land in 1943.
o The ownership or title over the subject land remained in
the government until Pearanda, petitioners predecessor,
lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot on February
28, 1969 by virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not
vest ownership upon respondent over the land nor did it validate the
alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it
has been held that registration does not vest title. It is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. Our land registration
laws do not give the holder any better title than that what he actually
has
Did petitioners action prescribe? NO
o Although a period of one year has already expired from the
time the certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi
pursuant to the alleged sale from the government, said
title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void
since the acquisition of the property was in violation of law.
o Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land
in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is imprescriptible.
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance Action to Quiet Title:
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, Assisted by Her Husband, BENITO LAYNO vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA
G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984
Facts: Herein petitioner and Mariano De Vera were first cousins. When De Vera
died, his widow and later on his nephew, herein private respondent, became the
administrator of his land property covered by an original certificate of title. When
an inventory was conducted on all properties of De Vera, a discrepancy between
the title and inventory was found. Such land discrepancy was occupied by herein
petitioner. Consequently, Estrada instituted suit against petitioner for recovery
of the Disputed Portion, which she resisted, mainly on the ground that the
Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in the OCT, so that
an implied or constructive trust existed in her favor. She then counterclaimed for
reconveyance of property in the sense that title be issued in her favor.
The Court held that petitioners action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust has prescribed after 10 years, i.e. the subject land was
registered on September 1947 while petitioners action only commence on
March 1967.
Issue: Whether petitioners action already prescribed
Held: No
The evidence discloses that petitioner, and his farther, had been in
actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
disputed portion in the concept of owner for about 45 years, until said
possession was disturbed in 1966 when Estrada informed petitioner
that the Disputed Portion was registered in Mariano DE VERA's name.
To substantiate her claim for fraud, petitioner declared that during his
lifetime, DE VERA, her first cousin, borrowed from her the Tax
Declaration of her land purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan
and sugar quota application; that relying on her cousin's assurances,
she acceded to his request and was made to sign some documents the
contents of which she did not even know because of her ignorance
Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for 20
years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when
this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the
deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his
successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim
to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator
ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only when he
noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in
the title.
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a certificate
of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's
true ownership of all the property described therein for he does not
by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land
illegally included. A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to
decree a lot to persons who have never asserted any right of
ownership over it.
Petitioner, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the
name of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third
parties, can properly seek its reconveyance.
Prescription cannot be invoked against petitioner for the reason that
as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of
action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the
property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title
to property in one's possession is imprescriptible.
o Her undisturbed possession over a period of 52 years gave
her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity
to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and the effect on her own title.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's right to quiet title, to seek
reconveyance, and to annul the title accrued only when she was made
aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the
statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to
run against her. Hence, petition was granted.
On Prescription of Action for Reconveyance Res Judicata:
HEIRS OF TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 138660 February 5, 2004
Facts: A petition to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered
parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to corporation respondent before the RTC
on the ground of actual fraud was filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas. This
was granted by the Supreme Court, on appeal (in a previous case). Subsequently,
Meycauyan filed a petition to intervene in the said case, alleging that it purchased
three parcels of land from Maguesun which form part of the property awarded
to the heirs of Roxas and that since it is a purchaser in good faith and for value,
the Court should afford it the opportunity to be heard, that the adverse decision
in the previous case cannot impair its rights as a purchaser in good faith and for
value. This was denied.
The heirs of Roxas then filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession with the
land registration court, after their motion for clarification was granted.
Meycauayan filed a Complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title
with the trial court. Such complaint is almost an exact reproduction of the Petition
for Intervention filed by Meycauyan. Consequently, the trial court dismissed for
lack of merit Meycauayan's complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting
of title, holding that the nullity of the OCT of Maguesun where Meycauyan is not
a party in the suit and which is the source of Meycauayan's title, is now res
judicata.
Issue: Whether Meycauyans action for reconveyance, damages and quieting of
title can be validly tried by the court
Held: No
Courts will simply refuse to reopen what has been decided. They will
not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question,
once it has been considered and decided with finality. Litigations must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and
efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has
become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits
of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same
parties.
This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which has the
following elements: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and the second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.
The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not require
absolute identity of parties but merely substantial identity of parties.
o There is substantial identity of parties when there is
community of interest or privity of interest between a
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 party in the first and a party in the second case even if the
first case did not implead the latter.
The Court ruled in the previous case that Meycauayan's predecessor-
in-interest, Maguesun, committed actual fraud in obtaining the
decree of registration of the subject properties. The decision is such
case binds Meycauayan under the principle of "privity of interest"
since it was a successor-in-interest of Maguesun.
Exception to Curtain Principle: Caveat Emptor:
JUAN DACASIN, JOSE, MARIA, SORAHAYDA, FLORDELIZA, and FILIPINAS
MARAMBA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE CAPUA, SINFOROSA PADILLA,
GUALBERTO CALULOT and OLIMPIA LOMIBAO
G.R. No. L-32723 October 28, 1977
Facts: A parcel of land situtated in the barrio of Patayac Municipality of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan was being possessed by petitioner Jose Maramba, whose
possession was subsequently grabbed by Sabina Capua. Maramba filed a civil case
against Capua, but notwithstanding the same, the latter remained in possession
and later on sold the property to Gualberto Calulot, herein one of the private
respondents. The court ruled in favor of Maramba and ordered Capua to vacate
and deliver the land to the former. Unfortunately, the decision was not executed
within the reglementary period of 5 years from the time it had become final.
Several years after, Calulot sold the subject land to respondent spouses Felipe
Capua and Padilla, who possessed the same despite a writ of possession was
executed in favor of Maramba. He then filed a case for revival of judgment which
was granted by the court. Upon Marambas death, his heirs sold the property to
petitioner Dacasin. Capua, together with Calulot, then filed an action against
petitioners, praying that he be declared as the absolute owner of the subject
property virtue of his purchase in good faith and by the continuous possession of
his immediate predecessor-in-interest Gualberto Calulot. This was denied by the
trial court, which was however reversed by CA, holding that Capua has squarely
raised the question of his own title obtained thru acquisitive prescription; that it
must have to be admitted that the property being unregistered, ownership
therein could be defeated by acquisitive prescription.
Issue: Whether the respondent court erred in its decision
Held: Yes
Jose Marambas filing of action against Sabina Capua, latters
possession was thereby interrupted, hence, acquisitive prescription
did not transpire.
The facts are aundisputed that the deed of sale executed between
Jose Maramba as vendee and Emiliana Abad as vendor in 1958 was
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds as well as the deed of sale
executed in 1929 between Emiliana Abad and the original owner
Florentino Quinajon.
Under the law, Article 709 of the New Civil Code, titles of ownership
or of other rights over immovable property duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property constitute notice to third
persons and affords protection in favor of him who in good faith relies
upon what appears in the registry.
As between two parties relying on their respective instruments of sale
of the same property, law and justice command that he who has
registered his deed must prevail over his adversary who has not done
so.
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the
supposed title of the vendor and he who buys without checking the
vendor's title takes all the risks and consequent to such failure. None
of the deeds of sale evidencing the ownership of Gualberto Calulot
and Felipe Capua were registered in the Registry of Property, hence
they cannot prevail over the rights of the petitioner who holds in his
favor the instrument of sale duly registered
Exception to Curtain Principle: Caveat Emptor on Mortgage of Real Property:
SOCORRO COSTA CRISOSTOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SAN JOSE,
DIANA J. TORRES
G.R. Nos. 91383-84 May 31, 1991
Facts: Petitioner was the registered owner of a residential house and lot, located
in Mandaluyong and covered by a TCT. She has occupied the property ever since
she had her house built and has introduced other improvements thereon. Later
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
Rivad, Sherine L., 2011 0007
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
on, private respondent Norma San Jose offered to buy the property, which was
accepted by petitioner, payment of which shall come from proceeds of a loan by
San Jose using petitioners title as collateral but she issued postdated checks to
petitioner. On San Joses request, another deed of sale was executed over the
same property, which was then registered, such that petitioners TCT was
cancelled and a new TCT was issued.
Because of unfulfilled promises to make good the postdated checks, petitioner
demanded San Jose for the return of the title. However, the latter informed that
the title was in the possession of Diana J. Torres, the mortgagee. San Jose never
returned the said title as she had promised nor did she ever make any payment
to the petitioner.
Issue: Whether respondent Torres is a mortgagee in good faith
Held: No
There are strong indications that Atty. Flor Martinez, the lawyer of
Diana J. Torres, the mortgagee, knew of the defect of San Jose's title.
When Atty. Martinez personally inspected the property with San Jose
for her client Torres, she allowed herself to be introduced to Socorro
Crisostomo who was then actually occupying the house, as a Bank
Inspector of the Development Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan from
whom the loan was being obtained, obviously to convince Crisostomo
that the procedure is in accordance with her agreement with San Jose.
Finally, when Torres herself visited the property she carefully evaded
seeing Crisostomo personally, the actual occupant thereof, who could
have easily enlightened her as to the true owner
Based on jurisprudence, a person dealing with registered land has a
right to rely upon the fact of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make further inquiries
o Even assuming that Torres does not in fact know the
circumstances of the sale, she is bound by the knowledge
of Atty. Martinez or by the latter's negligence in her
haphazard investigation because the negligence of her
agents is her own negligence
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and
then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was
no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.
o His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his
willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value, if
it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective,
and it appears that he had such notice of the defects as
would have led to its discovery had he acted with the
measure of precaution which may be required of a prudent
man in a like situation
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