UST Persons and Family Relations Digest

Deans
Circle 2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
PERSONS AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS
LAW
First Sem Cases
Persons and Family Relations Law Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
Preliminaries ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Human Relations ............................................................................................................................14
Prejudicial Question .......................................................................................................................29
Civil Personality ..............................................................................................................................33

Citizenship ......................................................................................................................................34
Marriage .........................................................................................................................................35
Void Marriages ...............................................................................................................................46
Psychological Incapacity .................................................................................................................53
Voidable Marriages ........................................................................................................................76
Legal Separation .............................................................................................................................78
Rights and Obligations between Husband & Wife .........................................................................81
Property Relations ..........................................................................................................................85
The Family as an Institution .........................................................................................................103
Family Home .................................................................................................................................106
Paternity and Filiation ..................................................................................................................108
Adoption .......................................................................................................................................125
Support .........................................................................................................................................130
Parental Authority ........................................................................................................................131
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Preliminaries
LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, ESCOLIN, J.
The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.
Facts:
Tanada seeks for the issuance of writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish or
cause to be published in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders
because it involves public interest. Tuvera dismissed the case outright beacause Tanada has no legal
personality to file petition for mandamus since he is not an aggrieved party which what the law
requires that only a person who is personally and directly affected by non-publication of laws would
have the personality to file such. Tuvera further contends that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates and since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
Issue:
Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.

Ruling:
No. The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1.There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published.
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon public officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves public officials with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
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excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents.
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette
as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
LORENZO M. TANADA ET AL v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, CRUZ, J.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" under Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Facts:
Tanada requested for publication of presidential decrees for public purposes. The
government argued that while publication is necessary as a ruled, it is not so when it is "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval.
Issue:
Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself
Ruling:
Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision, SC have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the
disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
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supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
SC holds therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v. THE HON. SECRETARY

OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties
Facts:
Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged

in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. It recruited private respondents for
employment in Saudi and made to pay placement fees. However when the private reached the Saudi
they were made to sign contracts resulting to some reduction of their benefits but they refused to do
sp. Due to their refusal they, were terminated and repatriated back in the Philippines. Thereafter, the
filed a complaint of illegal exaction against Philsa which the Secretary of Labor found it guilty of such
for collecting fees beyond the prescribed by law. Philsa insists however, that it cannot be held liable
for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Issue:
Whether or not Philsa is guilty of illegal exaction despite the fact that the POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983 was not published.
Ruling:
No. In Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
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Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties."
Applying this doctrine, SC ruled that the abovementioned Memorandum shall be ineffective
since it lacks publication which makes Philsa not liable for illegal exaction.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, NOCON, J.
It is a settled rule that when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Facts:
Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes were students of Unciano Paramedical College Inc. After
their first term, they were no longer allowed to enroll due to allegedly being members of National
Union of Students of the Philippines and League of Filipinos Officers which they organized despite
the prohibition to organize such. Unciano cited the ruling in Alcuaz which was promulgated on 1988
that when a college student registered in a school, it is understood that he is only enrolling for the
entire semester. Thus it also refuted the argument of Villegas and Magallanes that since in a more
recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames promulgated in 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the
Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in Alcuaz since it was promulgated later when
the contract has already been terminated. Thus, it cannot apply retroactively.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in the case of Ariel Non et al vs. Hon Dames may be applied
retroactively.
Ruling:
No. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Under Article 4 of the New Civil Code, Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. Furthermore, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decision
applying or interpreting the laws or constitution shall form a part of the legal system. Thus, since
judicial decisions are laws it shall not have retroactive effect unless otherwise provided.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before
its promulgation. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools
similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case.
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EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961, CONCEPCION, J.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract
as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual
rights.
Facts:
Cui was a student of Arellano University from prelaw up to fourth year first semester in the
College of law. By that time he was a scholar of such university and his tuition fees were reimbursed
after each semester. The scholarship agreement however stipulates that in consideration of the
scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash. But after in his
fourth year last semester, he transferred to College of Law Abad Santos University thus he graduated
therein. The conflict arose when he needed his law school records for taking up the bar exam but
Arellano University contended that it will only release such upon payment of reimbursed tuition fees.
Thus, Director of private schools issued a Memorandum which states that the amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution for it is against public
policy. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships
are merited and earned. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school.
Issue:
Whether or not the Contract of Scholarship entered into by the Cui and Arellano waiving the
formers right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University the equivalent
of his scholarship cash is void for it is against public policy.
Ruling:
Yes, Under Article 6 of the New Civil Code states that Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the
contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society,
or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. It has been consistently held that under the principles relating to the doctrine of
public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty.
Thus, if Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships it should
have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui, which is a direct violation of the Memorandum
and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was
repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN

G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974, ANTONIO, J.
Decisions of the Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean.
Facts:
Jose Jabinal was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition without the
required license permit on 1964. However, he contended that he was a Secret agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas for prevention of crimes as well as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander for prevention of smuggling. Thus the said appointments carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm. His argument was relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in People vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958). However, the RTC
convicted the accused on the basis that such decisions were already overturned by latest decision
promulgated by the SC in People vs. Mapa on 1967 thereby Secret Agents were no longer exempted
from license permit. Thus such ruling shall apply retroactively convicting the accused of such crime.
Issue:
Whether or not People vs. Mapa shall be applied retroactively, thus convicting Jabinal for
illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
No, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system. Decisions of this
Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of
the law, of the land, at the time Jabinal was found in possession of the firearm in question and when
he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where
it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that Jabinal conferred his appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, He may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to
be punishable.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
While it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
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Facts:
Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines was married to Richard Upton a US citizen. They
were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines. However
due to conflicts, they obtained a divorce in Nevada US and later on Alice Van Dorn remarried to
Theodore Van Dorn. Conflict arose when, Upton claimed in the RTC through a petition that Alice
Vandorns shop in Ermita is a conjugal property which he orders the latter to render an accounting
and that he be declared to manage the property. Van Dorn then filed motion to dismiss on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in divorce proceedings before Nevada Court
which was acknowledge by Upton that they had no community property. However, it was denied by
the RTC on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. Hence this petition. Upton averred that the Divorce Decree issued
by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding as between the parties.
Ruling:
Yes, it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of Van Dorn. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as Vandorn's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as Upton does, that, under our laws, Vandorn has to be considered still married
to him and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just. Vandorn should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Upton. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND BLANDINA DANDAN

G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.
Citizenship at the time the divorce decree was obtained is necessary for the purpose of
recognition of such in the Philippine Courts.
Facts:
Fe. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan both Filipinos were married in the Philippines. However, they
obtained a divorce decree in San Francisco California USA. Later on, she remarried twice. When
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Padlan died, she claimed for the estate of such and invoking that the divorce decree was not valid in
the Philippines since at the time they obtained divorce, they were both Filipino citizens and thus, she
is entitled to the estate of Padlan. Meanwhile, Dandan the second wife of Padlan claimed that she is
the lawful wife and that Quita was already an American Citizen at the time of the divorce which
makes Padlan entitled validly remarry. RTC invoking Tenchavez v. Escao which held that a foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction, thereby disregarded the divorce between
Qiuta and Padlan. However the trial court did not bother to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at
the time the divorce decree was obtained.
Issue:
Whether or not citizenship at the time of the divorce is necessary for the divorce decree to
be recognized in the Philippine Courts.
Ruling:
Yes, If Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo, this
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of
a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in
Tenchavez v. Escao. Thus Quitas citizenship of was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Thus, since RTC has failed to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the time of the
divorce, then the case must be remanded to such for trial.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO CATALAN AND

MEROPE BRAGANZA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Facts:
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to

the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof and later on allegedly
divorced. Orlando remarried to Braganza though the later had prior subsisting marriage with
Eusebio Bristol. Felicitas then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Orlando
and Merope. RTC granted such petition but on Appeal it was reversed by the CA ruling that Felicitas
does not have the legal capacity to file the petition since they already obtained divorce thus severing
her ties with Orlando.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicitas has the legal capacity to file the petition assuming arguendo that
they obtained divorce decree after they were naturalized as American citizens.
Ruling:
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No, If there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage. Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former
spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage
that the other might subsequently contract.
Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent
marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not
affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.
EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented.
Facts:
Felicisimo San Luis had three marriages. His first marriage was dissolve because his first
wife died. His second marriage was with Merry Lee an America citizen though they obtained divorce.
His third marriage was with Felicidad San Luis. Felicisimo died, which prompted Felicidad in filing
for petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. It was then opposed by the
children of Felicisimo in his first marriage contending that the marriage between Felicidad and
Felicisimo was bigamous due to the fact that the divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines
since Felicisimo is a Filipino and the Philippine Laws does not grant divorce. Felicidad then
presented the divorce decree but it was opposed by the children of Felicisimo from his first wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the presentation solely of divorce decree is sufficient to prove its
authenticity and due execution.
Ruling:
No, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
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accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT
G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in

the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Facts:
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot (Rebecca) and Vicente Madrigal Bayot (Vicente) were
married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified
Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA. Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured
as the latter initiated divorce proceedings in the CFI of Dominican Republic which ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.
Rebecca filed a petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed
an opposition, insisting her Filipino citizenship, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
The RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application for support
pendente lite. The CA dismissed the petition of Rebecca and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued
in relation to the case.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic.
2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in
this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated
being an American citizen. The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino
citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of,
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or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
2. Yes. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital
vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of
matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the code
ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963, LABRADOR, J.
Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with a conflict of law
and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private international law rules.
Facts:
Edward E. Christensen executed a will bequeathing a part of his property located in the
Philippines to Maria Helen Christensen his acknowledge daughter. He was a citizen of US and State of
California but domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. Lucy his other child alleged that
under the State of California Law acknowledge children shall not inherit. Furthermore, Article 16 of
the Civil Code states that in case of testamentary succession with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the deceased. Thus, Helen shall not inherit. Helen Christen on the
other hand alleged that since there is no single American law to such issue for the disposition of
property located in the domicile of the deceased what shall govern is the State of California Law that
under Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, if there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile. Moreover in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.
Ruling:
Yes, Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with a conflict
of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private international law rules. This
can apply when considering foreign issues arising in succession planning and in administering
estates.
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Thus, Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that intestate and testamentary successions
with respect to order of succession and amount of successional right is regulated by the national law
of the deceased. While California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property
in the form and manner he desires. Furthermore, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that
if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the
person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question
of validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedents domicile the
Philippines. The conflicts of law rule in California Law Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of
question of law to the testators domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as
directed in the conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is
referred back and forth between 2 states.
SC finds that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS v. EDWARD A. BELLIS ET AL.
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967, BENGZON, J.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
He therefore executed a will in the Philippines in favor of his children and his first wife then later on
died. Thereafter, when the will is probated, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis were
claiming to be the illegitimate children of Amog and contended that they were deprived of legitimes.
However, the Probate court denied the claim on the ground that the national law of Amos G. Bellis
does not grant legitimes to illegitimate children relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code. They argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code that prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code which
renders applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 17 last paragraph of the civil code is an exception for the application
of national law of decedent in Article 16 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
No. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code
as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph
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of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision,
under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. The parties admit that
the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEAL, AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, PARDO, J.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Facts:
Lorenzo N. Llorente (Lorenzo) was married to his first wife Paula llorento (Paula). However
they obtained a divorce because of Paulas infidelity to Lorenzos brother. The divorce was obtained
long after Lorenzo was naturalized as American Citizen. He then married his second wife Alice and
begot three children. He executed a will in the Philippines and bequeathing his properties situated
therein to his second wife and three children the later on died. Paula then claimed that she was the
surviving spouse of Lorenzo and that the divorce was not valid in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes. In long line of cases decided by the SC it ruled that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Once proven that Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from Paula, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and Paula could
very well lose her right to inherit from him. Thus the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from
his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Human Relations
ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.

G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956, FELIX, J.
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A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be
compensated by damages.
Facts:
Shell supplies fuel needs of CALI. However, due to financial crisis it failed to pay Shell and its
other creditors. Thus, they entered into an agreement that they would present suits against the
corporation but to strive for a pro-rata division of the assets, and only in the case of non-agreement
would the creditors file insolvency proceedings. However, when Shell PH assigned the credit to Shell
oil its American Sister Corporation, the latter filed a case against CALI for the collection of assigned
Credit attaching the C-54 plane of CALI which the creditors opposed and filed damages against Shell
for breach of their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes, Under Article 21 of the Civil Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. This is the legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
Another rule is expressed in Article 23 which compels the return of a thing acquired without
just or legal grounds. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for
centuries. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: Even if an act or event
causing damage to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Shell, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited with mere much more
reason the Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of
confidence.
Shell taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by
CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the
insolvent asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such
understanding as it was really the case schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation
in the United States, where CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation
efficaciously disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter, of the opportunity to recover
said plane to the detriment of the other creditors.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, CORTES, J.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the NCC are known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, which sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
Facts:
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Restituto M. Tobias (Tobias) herein private respondent was an employee of Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp (GMCRC) herein petitioner. Herbert Hendry (Hendry) herein petitioner, was
the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GMCRC. Sometime in 1972, GMCRC discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
Thereafter, Hendry ordered Tobias to take a force leave so as to have Tobias investigated. Hendry
declared that Tobias was their number one suspect in the anomaly. Thus, criminal complaints for
estafa were filed against Tobias. These charges were however dismissed for lack of probable cause.
Subsequently, Hendry dismissed Tobias from employment. Claiming that he was illegally dismissed,
Tobias filed a complaint for damages against GMCRC and Hendry with the RTC.
The RTC decided in favor of Tobias. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Now, GMCRC and Hendry
assail the decision of the CA. It asseverates that the dismissal of Tobias was in lawful exercise of its
right. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not GMCRC and Hendry exercised lawfully their right to dismiss Tobias.
Ruling:
No. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might
be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected
from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly
uncalled for. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not
be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
BARONS MARKETING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998, KAPUNAN, J.
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another.
Facts:
Sometime in 1973, Barons Marketing Corp (Barons) herein petitioner, appointed Phelps
Dodge Phils Inc (Phelps) herein private respondent, as its dealer for the sale of electrical wires and
cables. Phelps was given by Barons credit for the formers purchases of the latters electric products.
Thereafter, Phelps, purchased on credit from Barons various electric wires and cables. These wires
and cables in turn, were sold by Phelps to MERALCO. Subsequently, Barons demanded payment from
Phelps the amount covering the wires and cables. However, Phelps was unable to pay the same. This
prompted Barons to file a complaint for collection against Phelps.
The RTC held in favor of Barons and ordered Phelps to pay Barons. On appeal with the CA,
the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Now Phelps assails the decision of the CA. It avers that Barons
abused its right as credit to the prejudice of Phelps. Hence this appeal.
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Issue:
Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.
Ruling:
No. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the
burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has
failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioners allegation that private
respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that
private respondent itself may deal directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At
most, such supposition is merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for
rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed
out by private respondent, the corporation had its own cash position to protect in order for it to pay
its own obligations. This is not such a lame and poor rationalization as petitioner purports it to be.
For if private respondent were to be required to accept petitioners offer, there would be no reason
for the latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the
interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see
that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances,
we do not deem private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. ACT THEATER, INC.

G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004, CALLEJO SR., J.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms provided by Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the NCC resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held
accountable.
Facts:
This case stems from a criminal complaint filed by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) herein petitioner, against the employees of Act Theater (AT) herein respondent.
Thereafter, MWSS disconnected the water services provided to AT. This prompted AT to file a
complaint for damages against MWSS for having allegedly abused its right to the prejudice of AT.
The RTC ruled in favor of AT. The CA affirmed. This prompted MWSS to elevate the case,
assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not MWSS abused its right in cutting the water supply services to the prejudice
of AT.
Ruling:
Yes, it has abused its right. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the
respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondents water
service connection. As correctly found by the appellate court:
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While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior
to the disconnection of the latters water services, this was done only a few hours before
the actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the
matter, Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he
was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Acts
water services were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the
employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived
of the water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to
provide water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit
with MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo and
the appellate court that the petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent,
justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
SOLEDAD CARPIO v. LEONORA A. VALMONTE

G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, TINGA, J.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.
Facts:
Leonora Valmonte (Valmonte) herein respondent, is a wedding coordinator who was

engaged by one Michelle del Rosario (Michelle) and Jon Sierra (Jon) for their wedding. On the day at
the wedding and within the Manila Hotel where the Michelle and Jon were billeted, Valmonte was
overseeing the preparations for the wedding. Upon entering the suite where the bride, brides maids,
parents, relatives, make-up artist, assistants, photographers and fashion designers were located,
Soledad Carpio (Carpio) herein petitioner exclaimed, Ikaw ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. Thereafter,
Carpio ordered one of the ladies at the suite to search the body of Valmonte. Apparently, the million
dollar pieces of jewellery owned by Carpio were missing and Carpio was speculating the Valmonte
had it. Throughout the event, Valmonte was being accused by Carpio of taking the pieces of jewellery
owned by Carpio. Thereafter, Valmonte filed a complaint for damages against Carpio alleging that her
ordeal has caused her humiliation, and has besmirched her reputation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of Valmonte. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. It held Carpio liable for damages in favor of Valmonte. Now, Carpio comes before
the Supreme Court assailing decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Carpios imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled
for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewellery inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
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innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but out-rightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewellery in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of
the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually
stole the jewellery is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner
had wilfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs.
Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewellery cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She
did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to
prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S. OROPEZA

G.R. No. 199338, January 21, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with
Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however, obtain: ( 1) there is
a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Facts:
Eleazar Padillo (Padillo) herein petitioner, deceased and represented by his heirs, was an
employed by Rural Bank of Nabunturan Inc. (RBNI) herein respondent, as its Bookkeeper. Thereafter,
on 2007, Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to hypertension which consequently impaired his ability
to effectively pursue his work. On September 10 2007 he wrote a letter addressed to Mark Oropeza
(Oropeza) President of RBNI expressing his intention to avail of an early retirement package.
However despite several follow-ups, Padillos request remained unheeded. Thus, on October 3, 2007,
Padillo was separated from employment due to his poor and failing health. Not having received his
claimed retirement benefits, Padillo filed a complaint for recovery of unpaid retirement benefits.
The LA dismissed the complaint of Padillo. On appeal with the NLRC, the NLRC reversed and
set aside the decision of the LA. Subsequently, the CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC and affirmed
the decision of the LA. Among others, Padillo avers that the act of RBNI and Oropeza in ignoring his
request for the early retirement package constitutes bad faith and thus susceptible for the damages.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of ignoring the request of Padillo is a violation of the NCC on Human
Relations
Ruling:
No, it is not. The Court finds no bad faith in any of respondents actuations as they were
within their right, absent any proof of its abuse, to ignore Padillos misplaced claim for retirement
benefits. Respondents obstinate refusal to accede to Padillos request is precisely justified by the fact
that there lies no basis under any applicable agreement or law which accords the latter the right to
demand any retirement benefits from the Bank. While the Court mindfully notes that damages may
be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or
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duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records
reveal that none of these elements exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse
of right may he recovered.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC
CENTER and BU CASTRO v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the
Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some
legal provision.
Facts:
Ranida Salvador (Ranida) herein respondent underwent a HBs Ag test for the purpose of
determining whether Ranida had Hepatitis B. The test was conducted by Bu Castro (Castro) of the
Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) represented by Orlando Garcia (Garcia) herein petitioners.
Subsequently, it was determined that Ranida was positive of Hepatitis B. As a result, Ranida was
terminated from her employment. Because of Ranidas alleged positive identification for Hepatitis B
which resulted to her termination, Ramon Salvador (Ramon) herein respondent and father of Ranida,
suffered a heart attack and was forced to be admitted to the hospital for medication. Thereafter,
Ranida sought further tests from other medical practitioners and it was later found out that Ranida
was in truth and in fact, not suffering from Hepatitis B. Verily, CDC conducted a second test on Ranida
the test yielded a negative result. Thus Ranida was reinstated in her employment. Thereafter, Ranida
and Ramon filed a complaint for damages. They anchored their claim on the fact that Ranida lost her
job, suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless night. In the same vein, Ramon avers that
he was hospitalized and had therefore lost business opportunities because of the erroneous test
results of CDC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
held CDC and Castro liable. Now, CDC and Castro comes before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not CDC and Castro are liable for damages in favor of Ranida and Ramon.
Ruling:
Yes. The failure of petitioners to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for
the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would observe. Thus, their act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply with
the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and JUAN O. CHAVES
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988, YAP, J.
The act of MERALCO in disconnecting the electricity of the Chavez' without prior notice
constitutes a violation of Article 21, NCC and hence, therefore a ground for award of damages.
Facts:
Sometime in 1965 Pedro Yambao (Yambao) representing Manila Electric Company

(MERALCO) herein petitioners, sent two (2) overdue bills representing the unpaid electricity of Isaac
Chavez Sr. et al (Chavez et al). Thereafter, Chavez et al caused the payment of one (1) of the electric
bills. Subsequently, MERALCO disconnected its power services without prior notice to the prejudice
of Chavez et al. The day after, Chavez et al caused the payment of the other overdue bill. Later on,
Chavez et al sued MERALCO for damages on the ground that they have suffered embarrassment,
humiliation, wounded feelings, and hurt pride because of the undue disconnection.
The RTC ruled in favor of Chavez et al and held MERALCO liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Meralcos act of disconnecting the electricity of Chavez et al without prior
notice is a ground for damages
Ruling:
Yes it is a ground. We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. One cannot
deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of
electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in
such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas justifying the exercise by
the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in
which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section
97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the
manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a
similar case, where we said:
Petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without

prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The
prematurity of the action is indicative of intent to cause additional mental and moral
suffering to private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides
that wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
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SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS
v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, REGALADO, J.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Facts:
This case stems from a civil case filed by Pacifico Mabasa (Mabasa) against Spouses Custodio
(Sps.Custodio) and Spouses Santos (Sps. Santos) herein petitioner for easement or right of way in
favor of Mabasa. The RTC decided in favor of Mabasa and ordered Sps. Custodio and Santos to give
Mabasa his right of way. In the same case however, the RTC denied the claim of damages filed by
Mabasa. Thus, the Heirs of Mabasa (Heirs) appealed to the CA only as regards the claim for damages.
The CA held in favor of the Heirs and ordered the Spouses Custodio and Santos to pay the Heir
damages for unrealized rentals resulting from the easement or right of way. Now, Sps. Custodio and
Santos come before the Supreme Court, assailing, among others the award of damages. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sps. Custodio and Santos are liable for damages.
Ruling:
No. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in
the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430
of the Civil Code provides that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitude. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment
and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES

G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, DAVIDE JR. J.
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The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Facts:
Gashem Shookat Baksh (Baksh) herein petitioner is an Iranian citizen who is studying here
in the Philippines. On the other hand Marilou Gonzales (Gonzales) herein private respondent is a
Filipino citizen. Sometime in 1987 Baksh courted and proposed to Gonzales for the purpose of
marrying the latter. Thereafter, Baksh and Gonzales went to the latters parent so as to obtain their
consent. Thus, Baksh and Gonzales started to live together under one roof. Subsequently, a week
before their marriage, their relationship turned sour. Baksh started to abuse, maltreat and
threatened to kill Gonzales. This ordeal culminated to a confrontation before the barangay whereby
Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement, asked Gonzales to leave and disclosed that he was
already married to another woman. Aggrieved, Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Baksh
with the RTC.
The RTC held in favor of Gonzales and awarded damages in her favor. On appeal with the CA,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Now, Baksh comes before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Baksh can be held liable for damages for his breach of promise to marry
Gonzales.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court is of the opinion that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honour and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may
not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had
qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was
not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner.
Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
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VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega v. GONZALO

PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO RADAM
G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001, VITUG, J.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act
with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in
a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.
Facts:
Gonzalo Pellosis, Inesita Moste, and Danilo Radam (Pellosis et al) herein respondents, were
lessee on the land of one Marta Reyes. During their lease, they erected houses upon the land owned
by Reyes. Thereafter, Reyes died. Without the knowledge of Pellosis et al, Vicente Rellosa (Rellosa)
and his daughter Cynthia Ortega (Ortega) herein petitioners, bought the leased land where the
houses of Pellosis et al were located. Thus, titles covering the aforementioned land were issued in
favor of Ortega. Subsequently, Ortega filed a petition for condemnation with the Office of the Building
Official (OBO) praying for the demolition of the houses and evacuation of its occupants, namely
Pellosis et al. The OBO issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses. Copies of the
resolution were served upon Pellosis et al on December 7, 1989. The following day, Ortega hired
workers to commence the demolition of the houses of Pellosis et al. Pellosis et al were able to timely
intervene averring that the resolution for demolition was not yet final and executory hence
appealable. On December 11, 1989, Pellosis et al filed their appeal to the OBO. However, on
December 12, 1989 Ortega once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of the
houses of Pellosis et al. This prompted, Pellosis et al to file a complaint for damages for untimely
demolition of the houses against Ortega.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pellosis et al. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC. It held Ortega liable for damages in favor of Pellosis et al. Now, Ortega comes
before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of Ortega of demolishing prematurely the houses of Pellosis et al is a
ground for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is not without
limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person
to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is
exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much
about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of whether or
not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19
of the Civil Code.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after
respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for
a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the
Building Official but by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents
(prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse.
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The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and
Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to
secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the
right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly
indefensible.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.

G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Where a person merely uses a right pertaining to him, without bad faith or intent to injure, the
fact that damages are thereby suffered by another will not make him liable.
Facts:
Sometime in 1987 the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) herein petitioner issued
invitations to bid for the supply of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in
Batangas. One of the bidders was the Philipp Brother Oceanic Inc (PHIBRO) herein respondent. After
public bidding, PHIBROs bid was accepted. Thereafter a contract was entered into between
NAPOCOR and PHIBRO whereby it stipulates that within thirty (30) days from the transmission of
the Letter of Credit (LC) by NAPOCOR, PHIBRO would ship the coal. However, PHIBRO failed to
undertake such obligation. PHIBRO imputed such failure on the fact that there was an on-going strike
somewhere in Australia involving workers who carry out the exportation and transfer of the coal.
PHIBRO was able to transmit the coal only after ninety (90) days after the LC was sent. Subsequently,
NAPOCOR advertised once more for the delivery of coal. PHIBRO again submitted an application to
bid. However NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBROs application because of PHIBROs purported failure to
ship the coal on time as per their contract. This prompted PHIBRO to file a complaint for damages
against NAPOCOR.
The RTC and CA held in favor of PHIBRO and ordered NAPOCOR to pay PHIBRO damages for
proscribing PHIBRO to bid. Now, NAPOCOR comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NAPOCOR exercised its right legally when it disapproved PHIBROs
application to bid.
Ruling:
Yes, it exercised its right legally. Accordingly, a bidder has no ground of action to compel the
Government to award the contract in his favor, nor to compel it to accept his bid. Verily, a reservation
of the government of its right to reject any bid, generally vests in the authorities a wide discretion as
to who is the best and most advantageous bidder. The exercise of such discretion involves inquiry,
investigation, comparison, deliberation and decision, which are quasi-judicial functions, and when
honestly exercised, may not be reviewed by the court. The discretion to accept or reject a bid and
award contracts is vested in the Government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion
given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere
therewith, unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award.
Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the propriety of
NAPOCORs act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles regulating human
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relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Accordingly, a person will be protected only
when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. We went over the record of the case with
painstaking solicitude and we are convinced that NAPOCORs act of disapproving PHIBRO's
application for pre-qualification to bid was without any intent to injure or a purposive motive to
perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a
seriously-impaired track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted from believing so.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL v. EDERLINA P. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958, July 11 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Article 22, NCC is expressed in the maxim MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO
PROTEST" (No persons should enrich himself at the expense of another). However, this article does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.
Facts:
Alfred Fritz Frenzel (Frenzel) a German national met Ederlina Catito (Catito) a Filipino
citizen. Frenzel and Catito were married respectively to other persons. However, despite such
marriage of each, Frenzel and Catito decided to have an amorous or common law relationship
without the benefit of marriage. Thereafter, Frenzel bought real properties in the Philippines but had
it named to Frenzel. Sometime after, their relationship turned sour resulting to their separation.
Now, Frenzel seeks the return of the real properties he allegedly bought and named in favor of Catito
contending that it was his money which was used in the acquisition of such real properties.
The RTC and CA found scant merit in the position of Frenzel. They opine that Frenzel is not
qualified to own real properties in the Philippines since it is proscribed by the Constitution. Now,
Frenzel comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Frenzel has a legal right to cause the return of the real properties in his
favor.
Ruling:
No. The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the
petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The evidence on record shows that
the petitioner in fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased
the subject properties under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even
if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner were capacitated to marry, the
petitioner is still disqualified to own the properties in tandem with the respondent.
The reliance of petitioner on Art. 22 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. The said provision
does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of
the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but,
as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth
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of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as
between him and the plaintiff."
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella) v. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG and
HARRISON LUMBER, INC.
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003, CARPIO, J.
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied
in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural
remedies.
Facts:
David Reyes (Reyes) herein petitioner, was the owner of a parcel of land somewhere in
Pasay City. Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber Inc (HLI) herein respondents, are lessee in
the aforementioned parcel of land owned by Reyes. Sometime in 1994, Reyes entered into a Contract
to Sell with Jose Lim (Lim) herein respondent for the sale of the parcel of land owned by Reyes. In the
Contract to Sell, it was stipulated that in case of failure by Reyes to have Keng and HLI vacate the
premises, Reyes would pay Lim a percentage of the contract price agreed into between Reyes and
Lim. The agreed contract price was P28M. P10M was paid when the Contract to Sell was entered into.
Thereafter the remaining P18M would be paid after the Deed of Absolute Sale has been entered into
and the lessee namely Keng and HLI, be vacated from the land. However, Keng and HLI did not vacate
the aforementioned land. This prompted Reyes to sue for annulment of contract against Lim, Keng
and HLI. Reyes imputed that Lim, Keng and HLI were in connivance in making sure that Keng and HLI
would not vacate the premises. During the proceedings with the RTC, Lim requested in open court
that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10M down payment with the cashier of the RTC. The RTC
granted said motion. Thereafter, Reyes filed a motion to set aside the aforementioned ordered on the
ground that it is not one of the remedies provided for by the Rules of Court in civil proceedings.
The RTC denied the motion. On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the deposit of P10M ordered by the trial court is valid.
Ruling:
Yes, it is valid. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive
rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved
party has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision
of law. Courts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party,
during the pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the
Rules of Court.
Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a buyer if the
seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently sold the same property to
another buyer. By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily offers to return what he has received from
the buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust
enrichment and ensure restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit.
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There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience. In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order
the deposit of the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense
of Lim.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo Cum Alterius Detrimento
Locupletari Potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others.
Facts:
The National Development Company (NDC) herein petitioner, wholly owns the subsidiary
National Corporation (NSCP) which offers shipping services for containerized cargo between the Far
East ports and the US West Coast. Subsequently, the NDC Board of Directors sent out invitations to
bid for stock ownership of the NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels. Thereafter, a Notice
of Award was issued to Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation (MWHLC) since it won the bidding
process. Thus, NDC and MWHLC entered into a Contract of Sale whereby MWHLC acquired NSCP, its
assets, personnel, records and its three (3) vessels. Later on, MWHLC was flabbergasted when the US
Internal Revenue Service sent MWHLC a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes
on gross transportation income derived from US sources for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 when
NSCP was still owned by NDC. Thus MWHLC was constrained to pay. Subsequently, MWHLC sought
reimbursement from the NDC for the expenses it incurred for the payment of NSCPs taxes. However,
MWHLCs demand fell on stony ground. This prompted MWHLC to sue NDC.
The RTC and CA found MWHLCs position meritorious. Now, NDC comes before the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of the CA holding it liable for reimbursement of taxes paid by MWHLC.
Issue:
Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no dispute that petitioner was aware of its US tax liabilities considering its
numerous communications with the agents of the United States Internal Revenue Service, just prior
to the sale of NSCP and the marine vessels to respondent. The NSCP itself made an ambiguous
contingent provision in its Unaudited Financial Statements for the year ending December 1993,
thereby indicating its awareness of a possible US tax assessment. It bears stressing that petitioner did
not convey such information to respondent despite its inquiries. Obviously, such concealment
constitutes bad faith on its part.
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo cum alterius
detrimento locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
others. This principle of equity has been enshrined in our Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:
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Art. 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another or by any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and
reimburse respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust enrichment on the part of
petitioner to be relieved of that obligation.
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA v.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, GUTIERREZ JR., J.
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.
Facts:
Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Ismael Gonzalgo, and Jose Farley (Padilla et al) herein
petitioners, were charged with the crime of Grave Coercion by one Antonio Vergara (Vergara) for
allegedly preventing the latter from closing his stall at the public market and by subsequently
forcibly opening the door of the said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying the
same.
The RTC found Padilla et al guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal with the CA, acquitted
Padilla et al on the ground of reasonable doubt but were ordered to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P9,600.00 as damages. To this, Padilla et al appealed as regards the civil aspect of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Padilla et al may be held civilly liable for damages despite their acquittal
Ruling:
Yes, they may still be held civilly liable. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision
in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal
action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the
legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party
to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
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Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
filed.
Prejudicial Question
LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988, GANCAYCO, J.
The civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and is thus not a prejudicial question in the crime of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts; otherwise, the presumption is that the first marriage exists.
Facts:
Paz B. Abayan and Leonilo C. Donato lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of wedlock for at least five (5) years. In 1978, Paz married Leonilo, without knowing that the latter
had a subsisting marriage with another woman. Upon discovering the truth, Paz left Leonilo and filed
a criminal complaint for bigamy. Before Leonilo was arraigned, Paz filed a civil action for declaration
of nullity of her marriage with Leonilo. Taking advantage of the situation, Leonilo moved to suspend
the criminal proceedings on the ground that civil case for nullity of marriage filed by private
respondent raises a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial
question to the criminal case.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a prejudicial
question to suspend the criminal action, it must appear that (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, and that (2) the resolution of
the issue/s raised in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The civil case does
not determine Leonilos guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
the competent courts; otherwise, the presumption is that the first marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA

BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, AND FELIPE GAZA
G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988, FERNAN, J.
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Even if the cases involved are civil and administrative in nature, a prejudicial question exists so
long as the following requisites are present: (a) the (administrative) case involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the (civil) case; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the (civil) action may proceed.
Facts:
Ricardo Quiambao filed an administrative case against Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, et al.
before the Office of the Land Authority. Ricardo questioned Zenaida, et al.s right of possession over a
parcel of land in Malabon, Rizal. During the pendency of the case, Ricardo went to the subject
property, fenced it, and began construction of a house thereon. Zenaida, et al. thereafter filed a civil
case against Ricardo for forcible entry. Ricardo argued that the pending administrative case poses a
prejudicial question which bars the civil case.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrative case questioning Zenaida, et al.s right of possession over
the property poses a prejudicial question to the civil case for forcible entry.
Ruling:
Yes. The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in
character. This means that technically speaking, prejudicial question does not exist. Equally apparent,
however, is the intimate correlation of the issues between the said cases. The right of Zenaida, et al.
in the civil case to eject petitioner over the subject property is intertwined on their right of
possession over the said parcel of land, which is the subject of the administrative case. Likewise, the
resolution of the administrative case necessarily determines whether or not the civil case may
proceed. Hence, the administrative case posed a prejudicial question as against the civil case.
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA AND LEONILO JACALAN v. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON.
CELSO V. ESPINOSA, AND SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. AND ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995, MENDOZA, J.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Facts:
A case for declaration of nullity of Rositas title over a parcel of land in Lapu Lapu City was
filed in 1990. Three (3) years later, Rosita and her husband filed a criminal complaint against Isabelo
Apa, et al. for violation of the Anti-Squatting law, alleging therein that Rositas ownership over the
subject lot was violated by Isabelo, et al.s occupation of a portion of Rositas said real property.
Isabelo, et al. moved for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
declaration of nullity of Rositas title posed a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case questioning Rositas title over the property poses a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting law.
Ruling:
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Yes. A prejudicial question exists if: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The issue of Rositas ownership in the prior civil
case is intimately related to the criminal case, which alleges violation of Rositas right of ownership.
Likewise, resolving Rositas right of ownership in the civil case will determine if the criminal action
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, which hinges on Rositas claim of ownership, will proceed.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO

TUAZON, JR., BEING THE JUDGE OF THE RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the civil and criminal cases
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Facts:
Meynardo L. Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married in 1973. Years later, Meynardo
abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with another woman. In 1997, Meynardo filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine responded with a criminal complaint for concubinage against Meynardo. To forestall his
arrest, Meynardo moved to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground that the civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question the criminal case for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of Meynardos marriage poses a
prejudicial question to the criminal case for concubinage.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the civil and
criminal cases determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Since Article 40 of the
Family Code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of marriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, Meynardo
does not need the final judgment in the civil case to prove the nullity of his marriage for purposes of
his acquittal in the criminal case.
In any case, a subsequent declaration of nullity of his marriage in the civil case is not a valid
defense in a criminal complaint for concubinage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG AND LOLITA T. PAHANG v. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,

PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 56, MANDAUE CITY,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 56 AND
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
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G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.
A prejudicial question exists if the issues involved in the first case are similar or intimately related
to the issues raised in the second case.
Facts:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage which secured Sps. Antonio and Lolita Pahangs loan upon the latters default. The property
was sold to Metrobank at public auction and a certificate of sale was issued. Metrobank informed Sps.
Pahang about the looming deadline of the redemption period. But instead of redeeming the property,
Sps. Pahang filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale on the ground that their obligations
were bloated by Metrobank.
After expiration of the redemption period, Metrobank consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed property and filed a Petition for Writ of Possession. Sps. Pahang opposed the Petition on
the ground that their complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale constituted a prejudicial question
to Metrobanks petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for annulment of extrajudicial sale poses a prejudicial question
to the land registration case for the issuance of writ of possession.
Ruling:
No. In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale
is a civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A,
Block 1 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can
arise from the existence of the two actions.
The focal issue in the civil case filed by Sps. Pahang was whether the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Sps. Pahang in favor of Metrobank and the sale of
their property at public auction are null and void. The issue in the land registration case was whether
Metrobank was entitled to the possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption
had lapsed and title was issued.
Civil Personality
ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961, REYES, JBL, J.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a provisional personality (conceptus
pro nato habetur), or a personality burdened with a condition or an express limitation that the child be
subsequently born alive.
Facts:
Nita Villanueva became pregnant for a third time with her husband Antonio Geluzs child.
Unknown to Antonio, Nita had two (2) previous abortions and is planning another one through the
aid of Dr. Oscar Lazo. Nita succeeded again in aborting her two-month old fetus; but this time,
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Antonio discovered the latest abortion. Thereafter, Antonio, for and in behalf of the dead foetus, filed
an action for damages against Dr. Oscar.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages may be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received.
Ruling:
No. An action for damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured. The action presupposes that the one injured has juridical personality. Under Article 40
of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a provisional personality (conceptus pro nato habetur), or
a personality burdened with a condition or an express limitation that the child be subsequently born
alive.
Here, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mothers womb.
Since the conceived childs personality was extinguished by its pre-natal death, no cause of action for
such damages accrued in behalf of the said unborn child. Likewise, since no action for damages could
be instituted on account of the injuries the unborn child received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
Citizenship
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHULE Y. LIM

G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Since the requirement applies only to
legitimate children, an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother automatically becomes a Filipino upon birth.
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim was born as an illegitimate child of her Chinese father and Filipino mother in
1954. Her birth records show that she is a Chinese citizen. Nearly four (4) decades later, Chule filed a
petition for correction of entries of her birth records, alleging among others that she is a Filipino
citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Chules citizenship as shown in her birth records should be changed from
Chinese to Filipino.
Ruling:
Yes. Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 625, states that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
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party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of Chule who was concededly an
illegitimate child. As such, Chule was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, Chule
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013, SERENO, J.
By using a passport, a person positively declares that he is a citizen of the country which issued
the passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.
Facts:
Rommel Arnando was a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter, he acquired American citizenship

by naturalization. By virtue of Republic Act No. 9225, Rommel reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Rommel likewise renounced his
American citizenship as a prerequisite for running as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the
May 2010 elections. Nevertheless, Rommel continued using his American passport at least six (6)
times after his renunciation, even if he already holds a Philippine passport. His qualifications were
soon challenged before the COMELEC on the ground that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
Issue:
Whether or not Rommel is a dual citizen disqualified to run for local elective positions on the
ground that his renunciation was rendered nugatory by his subsequent use of his American passport.
Ruling:
Yes. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the
one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to
do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality. After all, by using a passport, a person positively declares that he is a citizen of
the country which issued the passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the country which
issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
Here, since Rommel continued to use his American issued passport long after his
renunciation, he is still deemed to be both a Filipino and an American citizen for purposes of applying
the dual citizenship disqualification found in Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
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Marriage
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014, PEREZ, J.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate.
Facts:
Tecla Hoybia Avenido and Eustaquio Avenido were married in 1942 in Talibon, Bohol, but
the records of the Local Civil Registrar therein, including their marriage certificate, were lost due to
World War II. Their union bore four (4) children. Eustaquio soon abandoned his family in 1952, and
married Peregrina Hoybia Avenido in 1979.
After Eustaquios death, Tecla filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of
Peregrina and Eustaquio on the ground that Tecla is Eustaquios legal wife. Tecla presented as
evidence the certifications of loss of her marriage certificate, the birth certificates of her children, as
well as the testimonies of witnesses who attended Tecla and Eustaquios marriage ceremony.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented during trial proves the existence of Teclas marriage
to Eustaquio.
Ruling:
Yes. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a persons birth certificate, the testimony of the witnesses to the marriage, and
even the testimony of the solemnizing officer may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between the parties. Likewise, since the due execution and loss of the marriage certificate
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestamentary and
documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the
genitals of the infant. Without a law recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex at
the time of birth is immutable, if not attended by error.
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a Filipino, was born male per his birth certificate. Feeling
trapped inside a mans body, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand and
transformed himself into a woman. Since then, Rommel lived as a female and is in fact engaged to
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his American fianc. To allow him to marry his fianc under Philippine law, Rommel filed a petition
to change his name from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.
Issue:
Whether or not Rommel can change his sex from male to female by law or equity.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate, which includes a declaration
of a persons sex, is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of
a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Since there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
The change cannot also be granted even on the grounds of equity, since the changes would
have serious and wide-ranging consequences. Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. Changing Rommels sex
in his birth certificate will substantially alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow
the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008, Quisumbing, J.
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the intersexed person, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex.
Facts:
Jennifer B. Cagandahan was born and registered as a female in her birth certificate. She was
later diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition wherein a person is
genetically female but secretes male hormones. Because of Jennifers very rare condition, she has
both male and female sex organs, did not develop breasts or ovaries, and never had her monthly
period. Feeling that she has become a male person in mind and body, she filed a Petition to change
her name from Jennifer to Jeff, and her sex from female to male.
Issue:
Whether or not Jennifer can change her sex from female to male.
Ruling:
Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like Jennifer (now Jeff), having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. Since the gender of intersexed persons is fixed
only at maturity, the original entries in the birth certificate are thus correctible under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
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In this case, intersexed Jeff lets nature take its course without taking unnatural steps to
interfere with such development. Nature made him male over time and Jeff simply chose what nature
has given him.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.
For consent to be valid, it must be freely given, i.e. real in the sense that it is not vitiated, and
conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act of marriage.
Facts:
Liberty D. Albios, a Filipina, paid Daniel Lee Fringer, an American, $2,000.00 for the latter to
marry Liberty for purposes of immigration. In 2004, Liberty and Daniel were married out of jest.
Immediately after the marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife. However,
Libertys immigration application was denied. In 2006, Liberty filed a Petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Daniel on the ground that they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship and in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
Ruling:
No. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given. A "freely given" consent must be real in
the sense that it is not vitiated by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family
Code, and must also be conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act.
Here, Liberty and Daniels freely given consent is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In any case, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,
and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid,
notwithstanding the possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the
presumption of regularity.
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Facts:
Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years after meeting
Gloria Goo Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of Glorias mother in Manila,
Glorias mother arrived with two (2) men. Syed underwent a ceremony as a requirement for his
stay in the Philippines. They signed a document, which Syed learned later on was a marriage
certificate. Upon investigation, Syed discovered that the marriage license was procured in Carmona,
Cavite, where neither Syed nor Gloria resided. Likewise, the marriage license was issued under a
different name, and that no marriage license was ever issued for Syed and Gloria per certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared void ab initio
based on the lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Yes. A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise
enjoys the presumption of regularity, and such presumption may only be rebutted upon proof of the
claimant that no diligent search was made or that the certification did not categorically state that no
such marriage license was made or found.
In this case, not only did Gloria fail to explain why she procured a marriage license in
Carmona, Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof that diligent search was made by
the Municipal Civil Registrar to find Syed and Glorias marriage license since they were able to trace
the marriage license written at the marriage certificate, albeit registered in another couples names.
Since a marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license, then the
marriage between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and
void.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013, CARPIO, J.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
Facts:
On September 1973, Benjamin married Azucena. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic

relationship with Sally. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-
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existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin to Sally was valid and existing.
Ruling:
No. The Court sees no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall
be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent.
In relation to the above ruling, the marriage of petitioner and respondent was not bigamous.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
RENE RONULO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014, BRION, J.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of
the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest refused
to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having
been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
Now, Fr. Ronulo, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of
blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
Issues:
Whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Ruling:
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Yes. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that
the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.
The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly
squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same
controversy all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.
Facts:
In 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion (Oscar) filed a petition before the San Pablo City RTC (Civil
Case 4341-95) seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent alleging his wifes
psychological incapacity. The case was dismissed upon the finding that petitioner failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.
In 1999, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging
that his marriage with respondent Edith Alcantara (Edith) was null and void due to the fact that it
was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Yes. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case. Petitioner forgets
that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. In both petitions, petitioner
has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the
ground upon which the cause of action is predicated.
Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain
judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all
matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same
controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred
by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded
the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects
therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision in Civil Case No. 4341-95.
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RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996, ROMERO, J.
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized,
the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons.
Facts:
Municipal Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by MCTC Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. First, that respondent Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between
Tagadan and Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife
without institution of summary proceeding for the declaration of wifes presumptive death; and
second, that the judge performed a marriage ceremony between Sumaylo and del Rosario outside his
court's jurisdiction upon the written request of del Rosario only. Judge Domagtory holds office and
has jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized
at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 km away
from the municipality of Dapa.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the marriage between Tagadan and Borga is valid.
(2) Whether or not the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario is valid.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 41 of the Family code provides that for the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to his first wife.
(2) Yes. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Hence, while it
was only the latter who made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in
Article 8 of the Family Code, their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
ZENAIDA S. BESO v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Facts:
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Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the

marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judges
residence in Calbayog City, Samar. Respondent alleged that was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "an overseas worker, who,
respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy." Respondent Judge further averred that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "he believed
in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be
too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Beso and Yman conducted outside the judges
jurisdiction is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom only (1) at the point
of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these instances was present in this case.
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
Calbayog. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Facts:
In 1997, Respondent Crasus L. Iyoy, married to Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, sought the nullity of
their marriage held on the year 1961 on the basis of Article 36, FC, alleging that Fely was hot-
tempered, a nagger and extravagant. He averred also that in 1984, Fely left the Philippines for USA
and obtained a divorce. She married another man in 1985. In Felys Answer, she alleged that she had
been an American citizen since 1988.
RTC and CA declared their marriage null and void finding merit on Felys psychological
incapacity and the applicability of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code. Consequently, OSG filed
this petition for review alleging that abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity and that Article 26, paragraph 2 is inapplicable to the
case at bar.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity of Fely.
(2) Whether or not paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code applies in the case.
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Ruling:
(1) No. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified.
If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at
the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
(2) No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she
was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity,
even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, QUISUMBING, J.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
Facts:
On May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido (Cipriano) married Villanueva. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Villanueva, the wife left for the US bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cirpriano learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same.
The OSG now contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC is not applicable because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien. Hence, Orbecido cannot remarry.
Issue:
Whether or not Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC applies in the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
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The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010, BRION, J.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioner Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Sto. Tomas but
subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to
the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was
eventually granted.
Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He
went to the civil registry to register the divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of NSO informed Corpuz that the former marriage still
subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce
by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or

declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. RTC denied the same and concluded that Corpuz
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Corpuz has no legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
Ruling:
No. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. While the alien spouse can claim no
right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse, such unavailability does not necessarily strip Corpuz of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
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HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto.
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife David Manzano, having been married to him
in 1966. In 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.
On the other hand, respondent Judge averred that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. However, in his later
Manifestation, he maintained that the affidavits of both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years, and that since their respective marriages had
been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore. Hence, on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the solemnization of a marriage between Manzano and Payao who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is valid.
Ruling:
No. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for
a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained
a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto,
as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge Sanchez take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of Manzano and
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage
vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Void Marriages
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA,

Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan
G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.
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Facts:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
were married were the parents of Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-
Suntay filed a criminal case against her husband. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the CFI
a complaint for legal separation. TC declared in its dispositive portion the marriage null and void and
of no effect as between the parties. The body of the decision however stated that the legal basis for
setting aside the marriage is paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code.
In 1995, Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the RTC a petition for issuance in
her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay in representation of her father, Emilio. Petitioner moved to dismiss the same and
argued that since CFI declared the marriage of the respondent Isabels parents null and void, the
latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother
the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Emilio and Isabel is null and void as stated in the
dispositive part of the decision making the respondent an illegitimate child.
Ruling:
No. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while
Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. The fundamental distinction
between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at
all. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89. On the other hand, a
voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter
shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction.
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of
the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect
to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. A reading of the pertinent portion of the decision
of the CFI shows that the marriage is voidable.
ENGRACE NINAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NINAL, INGRID
NINAL, ARCHIE NINAL & PEPITO NINAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
Facts:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her in 1985. One year and 8 months
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thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article
47 of the Family Code.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the second marriage is null and void ab initio
(2) Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person can file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death
Ruling:
(1) Yes. At the time Pepito and Normas marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife.
(2) Yes. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
LOLITA D. ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-

MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003 thereof makes it the
sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
Facts:
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in 1962. They begot seven children, herein respondents.
On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married the petitioner. Six months later,
or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. Thereafter, respondents filed with the RTC an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico since the same was
entered into without the requisite marriage license. Article 34 FC, which exempts a man and a
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woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from
securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have
lived together under the circumstances required by said provision.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only
the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Eulogio can seek the declaration of the nullity of his marriage
after his death.
Ruling:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003 applies
in this case. Section 2(a) thereof makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
While it is true that in Ninal case, no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death
of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage
therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Ninal recognized that
the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code,
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in
2004.
OFELIA P. TY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
When the second marriage of private respondent was entered into, the prevailing rule was
found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage
is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Therefore, we conclude that
private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Facts:
Private respondent married Villanueva in a civil ceremony in 1977. Then they had a church
wedding on the same year. However, in 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC
declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of license and consent. However, even before
the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, private respondent wed Ty, herein
petitioner, in 1979. In 1991, private respondent sought the nullity of his marriage to Ty alleging that
at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Villanueva and the decree of nullity of his
marriage had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage was rendered only on August 4,
1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
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The RTC declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio. CA affirmed. It
ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly.
Ruling:
No. We must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The lower court and the CA
cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by private respondent were solemnized
prior to the FC. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil
Code contains no express provision to that effect. Therefore, we conclude that private respondents
second marriage to petitioner is valid. The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children.
DOROTHY B. TERRE v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992, PER CURIAM
The prevailing case law of this Court holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Dorothy against her husband for gross immorality.
She posited that the respondent made her believe that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab initio being incestuous (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), that
she was still legally single and free to marry him. She also alleged that the respondent contracted a
second marriage and lived with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
In his answer, he sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary for purposes of remarriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo
merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we
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are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must
be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND
FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be

contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as
provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Facts:
Yasuo Iwasawa and Felisa Gangan were married on November 28, 2002. It was only in 2009
when Yasuo learned about his wife's previous marriage to Raymond Arambulo upon Felisa's
confession when she learned of Raymond's death. This prompted Yasuo to file a petition for the
declaration of his marriage to Felisa as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous
one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the FC. The RTC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence to prove Felisa's prior existing valid marriage to another man. It was only Yasuo
who testified about said marriage who has no personal knowledge of Felisa's prior marriage nor of
Raymond's death. It also held that Yasuo's testimony about the NSO certification is likewise
unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Yasuo and Felisa is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which
is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. In this
case, Raymond died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that Felisas marriage with
Raymond was deemed to have been dissolved. The second marriage of Felisa to Yasuo is bigamous,
hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage
was contracted.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Yasuo are all public
documents. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, CARPIO, J.
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When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage.
Facts:
Maria Paz Galela Marinay was first married to Minoru Fujiki on January 24, 2004. Without
her first marriage being dissolved, Marinay married Shinichi Maekara on May 15, 2008. Marinay left
Makeara when she allegedly suffered physical abuse from him. She then started to contact Fujiki. In
2010, Marinay's marriage with Makeara was declared void on the ground of bigamy by a family court
in Japan. In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign judgment. The
RTC dismissed the petition citing Secs. 2 and 4 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). It took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Issue:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
Yes. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, the Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file
a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy." (See Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 646 SCRA 637, March 30, 2011)
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.
In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak
of.
Facts:
When Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR),
she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, in 2002.
She then filed a petition for cancellation of entries in the marriage contract especially the entries in
the wife portion thereof. She impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
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husband, as parties to the case. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did
not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. The RTC granted her petition. Petitioner
then contends that there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Also, it was
asserted that the grant of the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract" is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Ruling:
No. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, Olaybar showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate
was a forgery. While the Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity
of marriage, the Court cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Olaybar indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Psychological Incapacity
DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON

G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, Carpio, J.
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the
petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Diana. It was alleged that
during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. She withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband when she suffered several miscarriages. She
even requested him to leave the conjugal dwelling. The petition further alleged that Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. Diana filed a
motion to dismiss the said petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The petition
is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, that it
existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, it is
devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of Diana to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, it did not even state the marital obligations
which Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
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Issue:
Whether or not the petition states a cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes. The petition states the legal right of Tadeo, the correlative obligation of Diana, and the
act or omission of Diana in violation of the legal right.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriage provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
The petition states the ultimate facts on which Tadeo bases his claim in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert
opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, TORRES, JR., J.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Facts:
On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao-Tsoi. However, since their marriage until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Gina then filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Chi Ming Tsoi on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Gina claims that Chi Ming Tsoi is impotent and a closet homosexual.
According to Chi Ming Tsoi, the fault lies with his wife since everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his her, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of their marriage. The
CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not refusal to have sexual intercourse constitutes psychological incapacity.
RULING:
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Yes. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As stated by the CA, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the
sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL

a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.
Facts:
David and Sharon Dedel were married in 1966. However, during the marriage, Sharon
turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with
several men. Petitioner alleged that despite confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment,
Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom
she had two children. David then filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the civil and church marriages between
David and Sharon null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the Sharon to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. The CA reversed the said decision dismissing the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not aberrant sexual behavior fall within the term "psychological incapacity."
Ruling:
No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very
complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case,
respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at
the inception of the marriage.
Sharon's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16
or sexual promiscuity.
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MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS v. BRIX FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Armida Perez-Ferraris was married to Brix Ferraris. She filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Brix on the ground of his psychological incapacity. The RTC denied her
petition holding that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and the
evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. The CA affirmed the said judgment where it
held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that Brix was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Brix Ferraris is psychologically incapacitated to comply with marital

obligations.
Ruling:
No. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the FC, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The Court finds
that the alleged mixed personality disorder of Brix, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and
lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
BRENDA B. MARCOS v. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Facts:
The marriage between Wilson and Brenda Marcos was declared null and void in a petition
filed by Brenda pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC. Wilson was declared psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards Brenda and their children. However, the said decision was reversed by
the CA ratiocinating that Wilson was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that
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the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the
marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her unable to assume them.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

constitutes psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Roridel alleged that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance;
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them. She asserted that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual. Their marriage was declared void ab initio by the RTC which decision was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue:
Whether or not "opposing and conflicting personalities" is equivalent to psychological

incapacity.
Ruling:
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No. It appears to the Court to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical. It must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. It must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO

G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, CORONA, J.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
Facts:
In 1988, Lolita Quintero-Hamano was married to Toshio Hamano. Eight years later, Lolita
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. As
alleged, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to Lolita for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, she learned from her friends that Toshio visited
the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Their marriage was declared null and
void by the RTC. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. In Molina, the guidelines provided the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. In this case, the Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. His act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it
would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This Lolita did not do.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
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be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations
essential to marriage. (See Republic vs. CA, 268 SCRA 198, 1997)
LEOUEL SANTOS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, VITUG, J.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
Facts:
The marriage between Leouel and Julia took place on September 20, 1986. In 1988, Julia
went to the US to work as a nurse. Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a
complaint to have his marriage with Julia declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Leouel argues that Julia's failure to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to
enter into married life. Leouel asserts that "a wife who does not care to inform her husband about
her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated." The RTC
and the CA both dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The factual settings in the this case, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. It should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
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inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO

G.R. NO. 158896, October 27, 2004, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
Facts:
Manuel Siayngco filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juanita
Siayngco on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Manuel alleged, among others, that
his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him, she incessantly complained
about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office
and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office
and with other trivial matters, she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house
within the hearing of their neighbors and she cared even less about his professional advancement as
she did not even give him moral support and encouragement. In her answer, Juanita contended that
it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations and that she
supported Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering. The RTC dismissed Manuel's
petition. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Juanita/Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to comply with marital

obligations.
Ruling:
No. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies
of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which Manuel was not
able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent
wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
As to the allegation of psychological incapacity on the part of Juanita, Manuel failed to prove
that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself
to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. The record clearly shows that the root cause of
Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but
from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their
son to enter the priesthood, her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to
conceive.
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JAIME F. VILLALON v. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Jaime Villalon filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Corazon
Villalon pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. He cited as one of the manifestations of his psychological
incapacity his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation. He admitted
that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw
other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married Corazon. Dr. Dayan was
presented to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Casanova Complex. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to
gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person
with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to
another. When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, Corazon averred that she did not
know whether her husband's acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two instances
of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. The RTC declared their marriage null and void. The said
decision was reversed by the CA dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Jaime failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder.
While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder as self-centered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to
others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the
presence of any of these symptoms.
The Court is not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as he wants the
court to believe. As stated by Corazon, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which
occurred 13 years apart could be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances
involved the same woman. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from
Casanova Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, TINGA, J.
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as

opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
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Facts:
Petitioner Leonilo Antonio filed a petition to declare his marriage with respondent Marie
Ivonne Reyes be declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Antonio claimed that Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. Reyes allegedly
concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, which she represented to
Antonio as adopted child of the family. She fabricated stories, misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist, claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent and even invented imaginary friends.
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of
the parties, which was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. Thereafter, the trial court declared
the marriage of the parties null and void. Despite the rulings of the Catholic tribunals, the CA
reversed the RTCs judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of

marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The evidence to establish
psychological incapacity must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto.
Respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
personality. Respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. In persistently and constantly
lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is
based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such
repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. The Court of
Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Respondents psychological incapacity was considered
so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent
from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ

G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, CARPIO, J.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is
downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Facts:
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Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan under Article 36
of the Family Code. Jordan allegedly had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts. He was alleged to
be a Mamas boy as he depended on his mother for support and supplies of milk and diapers for their
son. Jeanice also alleged that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather
than help her take care of their son. Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that Jordan was afflicted
with Borderline Personality Disorder.
The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void. The trial court
declared that Jordans psychological incapacity, which was specifically identified as Borderline
Personality Disorder, deprived him of the capacity to fully understand his responsibilities under the
marital bond. The CA dismissed Jordans appeal and motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations.
Ruling:
No. The Court has declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there
is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced
by the person alleging said disorder. In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of
Gates on Jordans psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and
the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanices testimony before the trial court. Consequently,
Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates testimony should have thus been dismissed for being
unscientific and unreliable.
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordans alleged psychological incapacity
was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, BRION, J.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Jocelyn Suazo and Angelito Suazo got married when they were 16 years old. They lived with
Angelitos parents as they have no means to support themselves. They stopped schooling and Jocelyn
was forced to work. Angelito allegedly refused to work and became an alcoholic and heavy gambler.
Jocelyn alleged that Angelito beat her, thus prompting Jocelyn to leave Angelito. Ten years after their
separation, Jocelyn filed a petition to declare their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
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Family Code. The psychologist diagnosed Angelito with Anti-Social Personality Disorder. The trial
court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void. However, the CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Jocelyn and Angelito should be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively
show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition. The
psychologist, using meager information coming from Jocelyn, a directly interested party, could not
have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition.
Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek

employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the
marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty,
neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot
be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife Charmaine Felix on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Charmaine subsequently
sued Meynardo and his paramour for concubinage. Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings
Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He contended that the pendency
of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The said motion was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC questioning the denial of his motion to defer
the proceedings in the concubinage case. Said petition was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Meynardo Beltran could be convicted of the crime of concubinage
despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has held that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes
of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity
is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
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remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the
herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. In the case at bar, it
must be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with
a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage.
ROBERTO DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, ROMERO, J.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense.
Facts:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and petitioner Roberto Domingo got married
while the marriage of Roberto with one Emerlina dela Paz was still subsisting. Hence, Emerlina sued
Roberto for bigamy. Thereafter, Delia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Roberto and separation of property. Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is unnecessary. The trial
court denied the motion. Roberto then filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus, which
was dismissed by the CA. Roberto contended that the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for the
recovery and the separation of properties.
Ruling:
Yes. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive
of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
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and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter
into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous
one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy.
Facts:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan while his marriage with Ma. Thelma Oliva was still
subsisting. Hence, Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado. Subsequently, Mercado filed a
petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva. The petition was granted and the
marriage between Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted
Mercado of the crime of bigamy.
Mercado contended that since his previous marriage had been declared null and void, he
cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy as there was no first marriage to speak of.
Issue:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict
petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void. It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then.
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LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004, QUISUMBING, J.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in the Philippines. When Barrete returned to
Canada to work, she filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
Morigo which was granted by the court. Consequently, Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in
the Philippines. Morigo subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
with Barrete on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Thereafter, Morigo was
charged with the crime of bigamy, and later convicted by the RTC. Pending appeal to the CA, the trial
court declared the marriage between Morigo and Barrete null and void. The CA eventually affirmed
the conviction of Morigo.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete is valid, thereby
warranting the conviction of Morigo of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
No. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus,
there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being
declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is
null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute
an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
ANTONIA ARMAS y CALISTERIO v. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, VITUG, J.
Under Article 83 of the New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. For
the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the
spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good
faith.
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Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate and was survived by his wife, respondent Marietta
Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years after James had disappeared,
without Marietta having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Petitioner
Antonia Armas, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Teodorico with the RTC. She claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico, and that the
marriage between the Teodorico and Marietta is bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta, who
opposed the petition, stated that her first marriage with James had been dissolved due to the latter's
absence for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. The
RTC ruled in favor of Antonia. Marietta went to the CA contending that the trial court erred in
applying the provisions of the Family Code despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New
Civil Code was the law in force. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and declared the marriage
between Marietta and Teodorico valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta is valid, despite
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Mariettas first husband, James.
Ruling:
Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code
which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Under Article 83 of the New Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above
rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be
held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have
done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional
cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing
the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
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EDUARDO P. MANUEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
Facts:
Eduardo Manuel married Tina Gandalera while his marriage with Rubylus Gaa was still
subsisting. Thus, Gandalera sued Manuel for bigamy. Gandalera alleged that she married Manuel
based on the latters representation that he was single when in fact he was not. Manuel, on the other
hand, allegedly declared he was single in his marriage contract with Gandalera because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He stated that he was merely forced to marry Gaa
and that after Gaa was imprisoned for estafa, he had not heard from her for more than 20 years. He
thought that there was no more need to nullify his first marriage before marrying Gandalera. The
RTC convicted Manuel of the crime of bigamy, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Manuel should be convicted of bigamy considering the absence of
judicial declaration of presumptive death of Rubylus Gaa under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie
of marriage established by law. The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated
in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance
with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of
years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification
for bigamy. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he
had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a
decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is not a
prejudicial question.
Facts:
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Respondent Isagani Bobis got married three times. The first was with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier, the second was with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis, and the third was with a certain Julia
Sally Hernandez. An Information for bigamy was filed against Isagani. Subsequently, Isagani filed a
civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case for bigamy, Isagani filed a motion to suspend
the proceedings in the criminal case, which the lower court granted. Imelda moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the
time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the
first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the
second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration
of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO v. SUSAN YEE CARIO

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Facts:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first was
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario, and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cario. SPO4
Cario passed away under the care of respondent, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining
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to the deceased from various government agencies. Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the
P146,000.00 death benefits which petitioner received from various government agencies.
Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed to be in good faith since she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without
the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between SPO4 Santiago Cario and petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario is valid, thereby entitling her to the entire subject death benefits.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void
ab initio.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in
the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to
be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 of the Family Code is
therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits
from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim
the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. Even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner
to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining
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to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005, GARCIA, J.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247 of the Family Code, are immediately final and executory.
Facts:
Nine years after she left her husband due to the latters violent character, Gloria filed a
verified petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his absent spouse with the RTC
under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code.
The RTC granted the petition and declared Francisco presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code. Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under Article 247 of
the Family Code, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC elevated the records to the CA. The CA,
treating the case as an ordinary appealed case, denied the appeal and affirmed the appealed RTC
decision. Without filing any motion for reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed a petition for review
for certiorari under Rule 45, maintaining that the petition raises a pure question of law that does not
require prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment declaring Francisco presumptively dead is final and executory,
and therefore, not appealable.
Ruling:
Yes. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Section 247, Family Code, are immediately final and executory. It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republics appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision

of law, is immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of
due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the
Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately
final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of
the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. The Court of
Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the
Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not
appealable.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION)

and ALAN B. ALEGRO
G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Alan Alegro filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea)
Julaton. Alan stated when he arrived home from work one day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan
thought that Lea merely went to her parents house but when he went there, Lea was not there. He
sought the help of his friends, Leas friends, and the barangay captain, to locate his wife but to no
avail. He even went to Manila to look for her, but he also failed. Alan then decided to report Leas
disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI. The RTC granted the petition and declared
Lea presumptively dead. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The OSG contended that Alan failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead since Alan did not exert
reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not Alan had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead and thus, Lea
should be declared presumptively dead.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the spouse present is burdened
to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The belief of the
present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after
the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present
spouse.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan
Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person
from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand,
the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law, his father-in-law
told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice. The respondent declared that
Lea left their abode after he chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house,
and told her that it would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with
the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she
received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent
failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his
petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries
from his parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of
Radio DYMS. The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI
to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss
his petition in the RTC.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, BRION, J.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Facts:
Jerry Cantor, the husband of respondent Maria Fe Cantor, left their conjugal home after
having a violent quarrel about respondents inability to reach "sexual climax" and Jerrys expression
of animosity toward the respondents father. More than four years from the time of Jerrys
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code. She stated that she had a well-founded belief
that Jerry was already dead. She allegedly exerted efforts to look for her husband by inquiring from
her in-laws, neighbors and friends of Jerrys whereabouts, but to no avail. She further alleged that she
checks the patients directory whenever she went to a hospital hoping to find Jerry. The RTC granted
the petition and declared Jerry presumptively dead. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
Ruling:
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to
the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a
"well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse
must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate
the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry. These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. The respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband. She did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. She did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and friends, who
can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. There was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to
conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief
that her husband was already dead.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, FELICIANO, J.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Facts:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England during
one of his ship's port calls. The two became sweethearts and eventually got married in the
Philippines. Nolasco obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left Parker with his
parents. After Parker gave birth to their son, she left the Philippines. Nolasco allegedly exerted
efforts to look for her in England, but to no avail. He, however, admitted that he did not report
Parkers disappearance to the Philippine government authorities. Nolasco filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC granted
the petition, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it
superseded, the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the
Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article
390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or
of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim that
Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had
married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be
said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were
all returned to him. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he
had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify
those friends in his testimony. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a
court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
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Voidable Marriages
AURORA A. ANAYA v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970, JBL Reyes, J.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity"
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Facts:
Palaroan filed for an action for annulment of his marriage with Anaya on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The CFI of Manila dismissed his complaint
upholding their marriage. Anaya also filed for annulment of marriage on the ground that Palaroan
had divulged to Anaya that months prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his which Anaya considered a fact that wrecked their marriage thus she averres that
there was fraud in the contracting of their marriage. The court considered Anayas allegation of fraud
as insufficient thus they dismissed her claim.
Issue:
Whether or not non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship is a ground for annulment of

marriage.
Ruling:
No. Non-disclosure of pre-marital relationships is not a ground for annulment. Non-

disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall
give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with
the rule or not.
FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on
the lower part of the abdomen.
Facts:
Delizo, at the date of her marriage to Aquino, concealed the fact that shewas pregnant by
another man that four months after their marriage, she gave birth to a child which she claims that the
child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and Aquino. The trial court dismissed the
complaint for Aquino did not show any birth certificate to show the child was born within 180 days
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after the marriage between the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof tho the
childs birth but still his petition was denied. The CA denied Aquinos appeal on the theory that it was
not impossible for the parties to have sex during their engagement so that the child could be their
own and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he
married her. In a motion for reconsideration filed by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an
answer thus the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Aquinos complaint is correct.
Ruling:
No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the
fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared
to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as
alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus,
making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
Furthermore, The Court of Appeals should not have denied the motion praying for new trial
simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the
Government precisely to prevent such collusion.
JOEL JIMENEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960, PADILLA, J.
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear as under the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Facts:
Jimenez is praying for a decree to annul his marriage with Canizares on the ground that the
office of her vagina was to small to allow the penetration of the penis for copulation which he states
existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Canizares did not file an answer when she was
summoned. Canizares did not respond as well to subsequent calls to her by the court thus the MTC
entered a decree annulling the marriage between Jimenez and Canizares.
Issue:
Whether or not amarriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband.
Ruling:
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No. It is not enough proof. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be
proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether
the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do
without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with
any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to
tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Legal Separation
JOSE DE OCAMPO v. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960, BENGZON, J.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for
one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a
matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce.
Facts:
After years of marriage, Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife was
maintaining illicit affairs with a Jose Arcalas when Ocampo sent her to study beauty culture in Manila.
When she finished her course, she left Ocampo and that he even caught her with an affair with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Ocampo filed for legal separation. She did not made any
answer to the RTC and admits having such sexual relation so when the case was appealed to the CA,
the CA construed such confession a confession of judgment thus they did not decree the legal
separation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was collusion between Ocampo and Floreniano.
Ruling:
No. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring
about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The
defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send
her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced
deception at such a personal risk.
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In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that
the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not
by itself collusion.
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG v. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956, FELIX, J.
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on
terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Facts:
Bugayong is married to Ginez. They lived together with their sisters in Manila. After some
time, Ginez left the dwelling and informed her husbnad that she will be staying with her mother in
Pangasinan from which she moved to Dagupan to study in a local college there. Bugayong began
receiving letters from his sister in law and from other unknown writers stating that Ginez was
performing acts of infidelity. Bugayong went to Pangasinan to meet with his wife and when they met,
they stayed in the house of Bugayongs cousin for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and day. Bugayong
tried to verify the truth of Ginez alleged infidelity to which Ginez responded by merely packing her
bags and leaving to which he took as a confirmation for the acts. He could not find Ginez anymore.
Bugayong filed with the CFI of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation to which Ginez answered
denying the averments of the complaint. She set up the posive defense that her acts were condoned
by Bugayong.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in the part of Bugayong.
Ruling:
Yes. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those

portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the
supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for
the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a
reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to
come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house
of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one
night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as
husband and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of
infidelity amounting to adultery.
It has been held that condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the
other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and
justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the
husband's guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong.
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ELISEA LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962, BARRERA, J.
The wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the
separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
Facts:
Elisea was legally separated from his former husband Enrique. She desired to use her
maiden name Elisea Laperal on the ground that she had long been separated from Enrique so she
filed an action with the court to which at first was denied with respect to Article 372 of the Civil Code
but later granted by the court treating the action as a change of name which the City Attorney of
Baguio opposed to.
Issue:
Whether or not Elisea is allowed to use her maiden name since she is legally separated from
her husband.
Ruling:
No. According to Article 372 of the Civil Code, the wife, even after the legal separation has
been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This
is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative
of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the
petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of
name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live
with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of
name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with
regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103
to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in
our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
Facts:
After 3 years of marriage Williamn and Lucita would almost quarrel every day to where
William began to physically assault Lucita in different ways for petty reasons. William also
committed physical violence to his children. He also said offensive and insulting language to her.
William denied the allegations. The RTC ruled in favor of Lucita finding the acts of William
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detrimental to their marriage. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision finding the testimonies of Dr.
Elinzano, the doctor who treated Lucitas wounds and Linda, Lucitas sister to be proven true.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in decreeing a legal separation.
Ruling:
Yes. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and
label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there
would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek
relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which
provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening
the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the
enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life,
as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. As Lucita
has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to
affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife
MARIANO B. ARROYO v. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921, STREET, J.
Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not
amount to legal cruelty
Facts:
Mariano and Dolores lived together as husband and wife in Iloilo with a few short intervals
of separation. There came a time when Dolores went away to be separated from Mariano on the
ground that she was cruelly treated by Mariano. Mariano opted for her to return home to resume
their married life but Dolores wanted to be legally separated from him. The trial court ruled in favor
Dolores ruling that it was Marianos ill treatment that caused Dolores to leave.
Issue:
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Whether or not the Dolores may choose not to cohabit with respect to Marianos cruelty
towards Dolores.
Ruling:
No. Dolores must cohabit. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without
a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. The tales of cruelty on the part of the
husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than
highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from
time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition
exhibited by the wife.
Cruelty has been defined as what merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be
admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere
austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and
accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not
amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent
surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under
such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the
suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must
subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer
in silence. .
Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and
that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with
him.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA v. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his
domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country.
Facts:
Eloisa and Jose were married and after a month, Eloisa left to return to her parents. It was
alleged in Eloisas complaint that Jose had her do unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals and
other obscene demands to which Eloisa did not agree to thus Jose treated him harshly. Jose even did
not comply with the marital duties of a husband. Eloisa thus filed for an action of support against her
husband.
Issue:
Whether or not Eloisa can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
Ruling:
Yes. She may claim for support. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife
is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her
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in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave
the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with
and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes
his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is
obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining her in his own home.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO
v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO
G.R. No. 139789 and G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000, PARDO, J.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any
other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans
free choice.
Facts:
Erlinda and Potenciano were once married but were separated for undisclosed reasons.
When Potenciano returned from the US, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo where their children
claimed that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of his antidepressant drug which caused
Potencianos health to deteriorate. Erlinda filed with the RTC for guardianship over Potenciano due
to his failing health. After a meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and lived in
Makati thus Erlinda filed for a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. She
alleged that the other respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibit
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses can furnish a writ of habeas corpus to compel one another to live
with each other.
Ruling:
No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To
justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal
or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
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No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by
any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
womans free choice.
ARTURO PELAYO v. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909, TORRES, J.
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and spouses are mutually
bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored.
Facts:
Pelayo filed a complaint against Lauron and Abella when they refused to pay him for services
he rendered in the birth of their daughter-in-laws child. They claimed in their answer the she died
after the childbirth and that she lived with her husband independently of them and that they are not
bound to pay for their daughter-in-laws expenses. The trial court ruled in favor of Lauron and Abella.
Issue:
Whether or not Lauron and Abella should be liable for the expenses of the operation.
Ruling:
No. If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and spouses are
mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by
reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable
obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and
he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such
support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the
defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law,
the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his
assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of
the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that
medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as
has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he
is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
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Property Relations
MOISES JOCSON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989, MEDILEA, J.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Facts:
The petitioner and respondent are the surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. Poblete died before emilio without her estate being settled. Emilio died shortly.
Emilio executed three documents in his lifetime which conveyed by sale to Agustina, one of the
respondents, majority of his property including 1/3 share in the estate of Agustina. The petitoner,
Moises, assailed the documents and prayed for their nullity. and the properties be partioned between
him and Agustina. The RTC ruled in favor of Moises in which the CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is part of Emilio and Alejandras conjugal property.
Ruling:
No. The property is not part of their conjugal property. It is thus clear that before Moises
Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the
disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The
certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof
that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under
dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after
his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as
married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. There being no showing also that
the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the
spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive
properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996, VITUG, J.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are
prima facie presumed to be equal.
Facts:
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Antonio Valez filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition directing them to start proceedings on
the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to
comply with Articles 50, 51 and 52. Consuelo asserted that the Family Code contains no provisions
on the procedure for the liquidation of property in unions without marriage. The RTC clarified that
suich provision applies.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit
of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike
the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
BENIGNO TODA, JR v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA

ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA v. BENIGNO TODA, JR.
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 and G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990, REGALADO, J.
The separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement
of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y
upon judicial approval, without which it is void.
Facts:
Benigno and Rose Marie Toda were married until the alleged infidelity of Benigno which
promted Romse Marie to file for the termination of their marriage for alleged mismanagement and
dissipation of conjugal funds against Bengigno. The parties agreed to file a joint petition for judicial
approval of conjugal partnership on April 1, 1981. This petition was signed by the both of them on
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March 30, 1981 embodied with a compromise agreement in the separation of their properties. Such
agreement was approved in June 9, 1981.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is correct in stating that the compromise agreement is effective only
on June 9, 1981.
Ruling:
Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the compromise agreement became effective only on
June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it
was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is
not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of
the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without
which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be considered
dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint petition for voluntary
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Conformably thereto, the cash dividends declared on July 1,
1981 and July 25,1981 in the amount of P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to
Rose Marie; and that declared on April 2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid to
Benigno, pursuant to Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise agreement which awards to Benigno the
conjugal assets not otherwise specifically assigned to Rose Marie.
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO
SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991, FERNAN, C.J.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
Facts:
Romarico and Katrina Henson were married spouses and had 3 children. Even during their
marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. Romarico bought a parcel of land
from his father using money he borrowed from an officemate. Katrina entered an agreement with
Anita Chan where the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same
thus Anita demanded for payment of the value jewelry thus Katrina issued a check but was
dishonored. Anita Chan and Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and
her husband Romarico. The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs where a writ of execution was
issued attaching 4 lots in Angeles City in the name of Romarico married to Katrina. Such lots were
sold to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Josn. Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision
which was meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties are exclusively owned by Romancio.
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Ruling:
No. The properties are not owned exclusively by Romarico. The presumption of the conjugal
nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico.
While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his
salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is
of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired
by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the
purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and
her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the
trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for
the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of
the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the
wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances
occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to
them.
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY v. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ

GR NO. 116668, July 28, 1997, ROMERO, J.
The property acquired by one spouse while living in an illicit relationship with another still
belongs to the conjugal partnership or community property of his/her valid and legal spouse.
Facts:
Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. Their marriage was described by the
frequent absence and separation of Miguel and Carlina due to Miguels leaving abroad. In 1972,
Miguel returned to the Philippines for good but did not choose to leave with his wife and daughter
Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old
Erlinda Agapay. In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan.
Upon the death of Miguel in 1981. Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the
ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan. To counter, Erlinda defended
claiming that it was her sole property, having bought the same with her own money with facts
however providing that she only has a sari-sari store as her source if income.
Issue:
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Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void
marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina
and Miguel)
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by
one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was
already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of
subject property, there being no proof of the same.
Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case
from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced
their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland
was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of
actual contribution would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
SPOUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS v. SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS, GR NO.
158040, APRIL 14, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the consent of the
wife was annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the purchase price to the buyers.
Facts:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owns a land property in which Onesiforo sold to
respondent spouses Victor and Elena Alinas without Rosarios consent. Onesiforo's signature appears
in an Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989, selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The
records show a notarized document and captioned Agreement whereby petitioner Onesiforo
acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS
and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived
whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may have over
the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said documents, TCT No. 17394 covering Lot
896-B-9-B was issued in the name of respondent spouses.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid notwithstanding the absence of Rosarios (wife) consent.
Ruling:
No. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter
IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. Hence, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family
Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo
alone is void in its entirety.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense,

the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners spouses should reimburse respondent spouses the
redemption price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the
time of filing of the complaint.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO v.

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. NO. 118305, February 12, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by the husband
redounded to the benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal
to him.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300, 000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to
PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements
making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay
the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo
Ching. As a result the conjugal property of spouses Ching was sought to answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property is liable for the husbands obligation as a surety of
PBM.
Ruling:
No. The evidence of Ayala Investment indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching
signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Ayala should have adduced evidence
to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we underscored the
requirement that: there must be the requisite showing of some advantage which clearly accrued to
the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or
not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or (b)
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Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much
and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching family.
Ayala Investment (AIDC) insist that the corporate debt in question falls under the exception
laid down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan procured from AIDC was for the
sole advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of Ching. Appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine
Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM.
These salaries and benefits, are not the benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family
Code. The benefits contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived
directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and
used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband Ching or his family. The alleged benefit, if any,
continuously harped by respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.
WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A foreigner husband cannot claim reimbursement from the amount he contributed from the
purchase of a private land they acquired during the marriage upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership for it violates the constitution.
Facts:
Willem Beumer a Dutch national and Avelina Amores a Filipina were married in 1980.
During their marriage they acquired properties. This Includes several house and lot in which
instruments and deeds were named before her wife acknowledging the incapacity of Willem to
acquire private lands. When their marriage was dissolved on the ground of psychological incapacity
of Willem Beumer, in a similar vein, the latter upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership claims
for the reimbursement of the amount of money he contributed for the acquisition of the land. The
RTC and CA denied Willems claim on the ground of the constitutional prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not Willem may claim reimbursement?
Ruling:
No. In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
petitioner Beumer given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue
of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely,
a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,
Beumer cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had
spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an
unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment
does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.
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Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.
Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in
owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses
standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to
partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimoni6 and
it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
HONORIO L. CARLOS v. MANUEL T. ABELARDO

G.R. No. 146504, April 9, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The conjugal property is liable for the debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited
Facts:
Manuel Abelardo and Maria Abelardo were husband and wife. To start their journey as
spouses they contracted loan from Honorario Carlos for the payment of the house and lot that would
serve as their conjugal dwelling. Notably, Manuels wife Maria executed an instrument
acknowledging the loan but which respondent Manuel did not sign. When they failed to pay for their
obligation the spouses were sued by herein petitioner Carlos.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses Abelardo is liable?
Ruling:
Yes. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants spouses Abelardo never
denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not
deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle,
acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its
proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband Manuel Abelardo and
defendant-wife Maria Abelardo are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
While respondent Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment
executed and signed by his wife Maria Abelardo, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of
the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent Manuel,
under Art. 121 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife
Maria.
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. CELSO
ATAYAN, HEIRS OF GARCIA, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 111547, Januiary 27, 1997, FRANCISCO, J.
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For the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership to apply proof of its
acquisition during marriage must first be established.
Facts:
Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Garcia were husband and wife. Santiago has five children with
his first wife Consuelo and four others from another for a total of nine children. The subject property
in controversy in this case was inherited by Santiago prior to his marriage with Consuelo. However it
was named and registered only during their marriage in which providesSantiago Garcia married to
Consuelo Gaza. After the death of Santiago a writ of attachment was issued in favor of petitioner
Estonina against Consuelo Garcia. 55% of the subject property was included in the attachment which
means the share plus 1/10 share of Consuelo claiming that the subject property is presumed
conjugal property since it was issued during their marriage that would entitle Consuelo to share of
the property.
On the other hand, respondent Atayan claiming interest from the other heirs claimed that it
is not a Conjugal property. Hence, Consuelo only has 1/10 interest to the property which
consequently would give only 1/10 right of attachment for petitioner Estonina. The RTC ruled in
favor of Estonina. The CA on appeal reversed the RTC and held that it is not a conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the title to land Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza give rise to
presumption of conjugality.
Ruling:
No. The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter lead us to
concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed
the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that
the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the
conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bench, the
petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during
the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question
that formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his
death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at
public auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo
Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by
the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo
Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the
spouses Atayan.
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER v. SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER

and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While we could concede to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family
Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse
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upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Facts:
Alfredo and Josefa Ferrer were husband and wife. Alfredo owns a lot which he acquired prior
to his marriage to Josefa. Upon their marriage improvements were introduced by Josefa. However,
before the death of Alfredo and at the time when Alfredo was allegedly was already bedridden the
respondents Ferrer were able to acquire the subject lot including its improvements through a deed of
sale contracted with Alfredo. Josefa then questioned the validity of sale. However, in a decision of the
Supreme Court it was finally held that it was a separate property in which Alfredo can rightfully sell
without his wifes consent.
Hence, as a final attempt to recover Josefa now claims that since she introduced some
improvements and since the subject land was the only property of his deceased husband Alfredo she
now has the right of reimbursement from the buyer spouses Ferrer pursuant to Article 120 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Josefa Ferrer may claim reimbursement from the buyer spouses pursuant to
Art.120 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time
of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of
the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was
precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
However, in this case what is incontrovertible is that the respondents Ferrer, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not
petitioner Josefas spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the
obligation to reimburse Josefa for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse Manuel Ferrer who has the
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as
the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents Ferrer do not have the obligation to respect
petitioner Josefa Ferrers right to be reimbursed.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. MIGUELA C. DAILO

A real estate mortgage without the consent or authority of the wife is void.
Facts:
Marcelino Dailo Jr. and Miguela Dailo were husband and wife married in 1967. During their
marriage they acquired house and lot. In 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of
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Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in
San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from
petitioner Homeowners Bank. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real
Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of Homeowners Bank. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place
without the knowledge and consent of Miguela.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Mortgage executed by Marcelino Dailo Jr. without the consent of his
wife Miguela valid as to his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family.
Ruling:
1. No. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
2. No. For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, it was not
sufficiently provided. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability
that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER v.

HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
An alien spouse cannot claim reimbursement from the money used to purchase a land property
due to the constitutional prohibition.
Facts:
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were husband and wife married in Germany
in 1989. During the subsistence of their marriage the spouses acquired a land in Antipolo from the
money of Helmut but was named after Elena due to their acknowledgement of the constitutional
prohibition. However, Due to incompatibilities and Helmuts alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. Consequently, Helmut now claims reimbursement
of the money used for the acquisition of the land property in Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING:
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No. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose
of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of Elena
Mullers marriage to Helmut Muller. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, Helmut Mullers disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not
even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
the fraud.To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Thus, in the instant case, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfers of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a
futile exercise on Helmut Mullers part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit Helmut to
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. v. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO

G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000, MENDOZA, J.
Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties
in union are incapacitated to marry each other.
Facts:
Eustaquio Mallilin,Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo, both married and with children, but separated
from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation, with Eustaquio as president and chairman of the board of directors, and Ma.
Elvira as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and Eustaquio and Ma. Elvira
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in Ma. Elviras name. In 1992, due
to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Eustaquio demanded from Ma.Elvira his share in
the subject properties, but Elvira refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in
her name. In her defense, Elvira claimed that it was her sole property and that there cannot be a co-
ownership between them because of an illicit relationship.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership can occur in an illicit/adulterous relationship.
Ruling:
Yes. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not
capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they
could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-
ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couple are not
capacitated to marry each other.
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THELMA A. JADER-MANALO v. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA

G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
Facts:
An advertisement was posted by the spouses Camaisa with regard to the property they are
selling. After seeing the Ad petitioner Jader-Manalo became interested and offered to buy the
property to the spouses Camaisa. An initial negotiation took place in which the spouses Camaisa and
Jader-Manalo was present. In their second meeting Manalo paid a down payment to Edilberto
Camaisa (husband) who received it, based on the latters promised of the follow up consent of her
wife Norma Camaisa. When Norma was later on informed of the payment she did not consent and did
not sign the contract. Consequently, the initial down payment was returned then to Manalo.
However, Manalo now claims that the sale was already perfected and valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the wifes written consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Respondent
Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma Camaisa actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties,
which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly,
petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may
have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely
aware of a transaction is not consent.
Finally, Manalo argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures
to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted. The
argument is bereft of merit. Manalo is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the
other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will
give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed
that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. In this case, Manalo failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma
was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes
incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought
IMELDA RELUCIO v. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ

G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002, PARDO, J.
Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses. Stated otherwise, the administration of
the property of the marriage is entirely between husband and wife, to the exclusion of all other persons
Facts:
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Angeline Lopez filed for judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership
or absolute community property, accounting and forfeiture arising from her marriage to Alberto J.
Lopez. In addition to his husband, Imelda Relusion was also impleaded by Angeline on the alleged
illicit relationship thereof to his husband which resulted to the abandonment and the abuse of their
conjugal propertys administration to the detriment of Angeline and four children. Nonetheless,
Imelda defended by claiming lack of cause of action against her that should warrant the dismissal of
the case against her.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Imelda as a party defendant in special proceeding for judicial
appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property,
accounting and forfeiture between spouses Lopez should prosper.
Ruling:
No. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Angeline alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her
first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between Imelda and
Angeline that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of
action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by Angelines husband. The accounting of
conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Imelda has nothing to do with the
marriage between Angeline and Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against Imelda
on this ground.
Further, Angelines asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez share alone. Failure of
Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in Angelines favor, results in
a breach of an obligation to Angeline and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action,
however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not Imelda.
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA v. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA,

RUFINO M. GARADO, and CASIANO HOMBRIA
G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
The husband alone in a suit involving the conjugal property may sign the certificate against
forum shopping pursuant to the right granted by law to administer it.
Facts:
A case in which the conjugal property of the spouses Docena was involved is filed. Pursuant
to this case, however, rather than both spouses signing the certification against forum shopping it is
only Antonio the husband in behalf of the conjugal property signed the certification against forum
shopping. The private respondent Casiano Hombria assails this claiming that the certification is
invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification against forum shopping signed by the husband alone
involving conjugal property is valid.
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Ruling:
Yes. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this
endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined
by the wife. Corollary, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum
shopping to accompany the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal
property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of
the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone,
with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband
and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife
always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is
believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal
property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached
certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
Therefore, in view of the circumstances of this case, namely, the property involved is a
conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action
for recovery brought against the spouses, and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and the wife, as pointed out in the Motion for Reconsideration in respondent court, was
in the province of Guian, Samar, whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid
application of the rules on forum shopping that would not authorize a husbands signing the
certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is clearly uncalled for.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
Without authority or consent of the spouse any disposition or encumbrance by the other spouse
is null and void.
Facts:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz where spouses. In January of 1990 when Gilda was away
looking for work Judie Corpuz sold their house to spouses Guiang. Upon her return, she was informed
that his husband Judie already left with his new wife and that their house was already sold to the
spouses Guiang. When Gilda stayed in the house and refused to accede with spouses Guiangs order
to leave the house, the latter filed a case for trespassing against Gilda Corpuz and children.
At the barangay level, Gilda Corpuz was forced to sign an amicable settlement in relation to
the trespassing case filed against her. Nonetheless, she stayed and claimed that she was forced by the
barangay captain to sign it. Spouses Guiang now claims that the sale is valid and if ever it is voidable
on account of Gildas lack of consent it was nonetheless ratified by the amicable settlement
subsequently rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the house without the wifes consent is valid.
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Ruling:
No. Petitioner spouses Guiang insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was
validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of
private respondent Gildas consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil
Code. However we cannot agree for ART. 124 of the Family Code is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The provision in the civil code giving the wife ten (10) years during
the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is
thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took
effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and
void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners
were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through
misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the
deed of sale between the husband Judie Corpuz and the petitioners-spouses Guiang for doctrinally
and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. The fact remains that such contract was entered into
without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of Gildas consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent. Here, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property
acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its
acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
Facts:
Spouses Mario and Lourdez Fernandez filed an ejectment suit against Guillarma Tumlos.
Spouses Fernandez claimed that the apartment building where Guillerma stays is owned by them and
that they allowed Guillermas possession by mere tolerance. In her defense, Guillerma said that she
had a relationship with Mario that would entitle her to the possession of the property being the co-
owner thereof. Guillerma alleged that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived
together in the property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma is entitled to the possession of the property.
Ruling:
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No. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely
on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Likewise, her claim of having administered
the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not
justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the
property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for Guillermas claim
of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondent spouses
Fernandez.
LUPO ATIENZA v. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, GARCIA, J.
There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, De Castro sufficiently established that she
derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also
as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail.
Facts:
Despite Lupo Atienza being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in
consortium. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways. Consequently, Lupo filed in the RTC a complaint against Yolanda De Castro for the
judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati City wherein he alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union
with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. Moreover,
he averred that the property in question was acquired by De Castro sometime in 1987 using his
exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in De Castros name without
his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their
affair was still thriving. He further argued that pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, he was in no
way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or
without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under
Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their
extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the
rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is commonly owned by the parties.
Ruling:
No. Atienzas claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not
only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very
trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the
respondent. True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with
persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties
may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already
stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the
trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family
Code. In contrast to Atienzas dismal failure to prove his cause, De Castro was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here,
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De Castro sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her
earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and
bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the
subject property.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR v. BRUNO FEHR

G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003, PUNO, J.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This
provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
Facts:
The RTC declared the marriage between Bruno and Elna Fehr void ab initio under Article 36
of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. Petitioner
however questioned the order of the RTC with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG
Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply
in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a common property of the parties and their property
regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
Ruling:
Yes. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without
the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It
has not been shown that Elna and Bruno suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his
residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased
on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when they were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of the parties.
JACINTO SAGUID v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94,
BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship requires proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
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Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when
she met Jacinto Saguid. However, after 9 years of cohabitation, the couple decided to separate. Rey
filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against Saguid
wherein she alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able
to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as
an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture
and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole
owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution
to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Issue:
Whether or not Saguid was able to prove her actual contribution as provided under Art.148
of the Famiy Code.
Ruling:
No. It is not disputed that Rey and Saguid were not capacitated to marry each other because
the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the
parties. Rey alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their
house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on
November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand,
while there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were
valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the
petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Family as an Institution
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999, MENDOZA, J.
Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the requisite showing of
earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
Facts:
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Spouses Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents before the
RTC. Later, the spouses filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful.
In due time, private respondents filed an answer in which they denied that earnest efforts had been
made to reach a compromise but the parties were unsuccessful. The RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore,
it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not the Art. 151 of the Family Code is applicable herein.
Ruling:
NO. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively
among family members. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes
the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of
the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by
affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the
spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for
purposes of Art. 151.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES, ET. AL

G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ, J.
If the respondents as partiesdefendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to
petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a
compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu
propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
Facts:
Claiming that the donation made prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with
Capitolina filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition
of property before the RTC. The latter nullified the said deed. On appeal, the CA motu proprio ordered
the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for
failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
Ruling:
NO. A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among
members of the same family is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a
cause of action. The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a
motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect
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the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure
assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the CA. Therefore, the rule on deemed
waiver of the nonjurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the
respondents as partiesdefendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a
compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu
propio order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B.
BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994, BELLOSILLO, J.
"Sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil
Code as members of the same family.
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Pedro Hernando. However the same was dismissed by the RTC
on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law, the complaint should have alleged that earnest
efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Gaudencio Guerrero argued however that since
brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards
a compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in
Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the
Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be
instituted and maintained.
Ruling:
No. The Court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters"
as members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art.
217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats
essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", the Court find no reason to alter
existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that Guerrero,
being a brother-in-law of Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
before filing the present suit.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his capacity as Pairing
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
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Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his
wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Moreno failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. The RTC however denied the motion and agreed with Moreno that earnest efforts
towards a compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-
entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family. Also, as it is Remedios who stands to be
benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a member of the same family as that of Alberto, only
she may invoke said Art. 151.
Issue:
Whether or not earnest efforts towards a compromise is required in the case herein.
Ruling:
NO. In Magbaleta, the Court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving
members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be
made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. Article 151 of the Family Code applies to
cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members. Petitioner makes much of the
fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the
ruling in Magbaleta inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the present case. In
the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the
provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under
Article 150 of the Family Code. Since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of
the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the
same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of
that same family.
Family Home
FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.

G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by
Manacop.
Facts:
Jose Manacop and his wife purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with a bungalow. E
& L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before
the RTC to collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer, Manacop and his company entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved by the court. A motion for execution was filed which the
lower court granted. Manacop and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution
and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them.
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Issue:
Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
Yes. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said
Code. However, Modequillo ruling explicitly enunciated that said provision of the Family Code does
not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the
Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no
proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it
follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the debt involved
herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988,
Manacop cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, ET. AL

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990, GANCAYCO, J.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.
Facts:
A judgment against Jose Modequillo was rendered by the CA. The said judgment having
become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff levied on a parcel of
residential land owned by Modequillo. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was
filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land is where the family home
is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the
family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by
way of execution of the subject residential property.
Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the residential house and lot of Modequillo was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication
in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code
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have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted
as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Thus, the family home of Modequillo is not exempt from execution of the money judgment. The
debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino
Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did
not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
Facts:
Perla Patricio and her two sons inherited from her husband several properties including a
parcel of land with a residential house. Marcelino Marc, one of her sons, instituted an action for
partition before the RTC which was granted. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by Dario III on
appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint for partition filed by Patricio and Marcelino Marc for lack of
merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long
as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of
private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino Dario and Perla Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home,
it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in
which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario
IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite
residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario
IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the
third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct
from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Paternity and Filiation
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEAS
v. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG
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G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
As a rule, a child presumed to be legitimate if he was born within three hundred (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300
next preceding the birth of the child.
Facts:
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his
brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His
sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could
hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with
Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942,
Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1,
1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June
17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano can be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943,
that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within
three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial period of
conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10,
1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano. On
the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano and his wife
were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he
and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. The Court admit that Emiliano was already suffering from
tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed,
his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal
intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in
the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. There is neither
evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor
was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in
favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
TEOFISTA BABIERA v. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn
her legitimacy. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented
during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
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Facts:
Presentacion Catotal questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. She
asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of
informant forged, and contained false entries. Catotal ask the court to declare Babiera's certificate of
birth void and ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the
hereditary rights of Catotal who inherited the estate. Babiera countered that she and Catotal are full-
blooded sisters, as showed therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School
Report Card.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Catotal has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art.
171.
(2) Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of
limitation.
(3) Whether or not the public record of Babiera's birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Catotal.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it
applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and
shows that the alleged mother, Hermogena, did not give birth to Babiera. The present action does not
impugn Babiera's filiation to Eugenio and Hermogena, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the
first place. The reason why Catotal took interest on Babiera's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.
(2) No. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for
action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's
Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not
prescribe because it was allegedly declared void ab initio.
(3) No. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented
during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was
different from other signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as
evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age.
Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to Teofista and that the
latter was not hers of Eugenio.
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL

G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994, PUNO, J.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar because
said provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a
certain couple.
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Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both died
intestate. The special proceedings for administration of the properties were filed with the trial court.
Vicentes sister, Victoria Lirio, filed for issuance of letters of administration in favor of the nephew.
Marissa Badua opposed the petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Marissa and that she
is capable of administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and
testified that the spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove
through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage. Victoria
categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child of the spouses who were unable to
physically procreate. The RTC relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of
Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is
not the biological child of the late spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Marissa is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.
Ruling:
NO. Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar.
The above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological
child of a certain couple. In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child
by: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or
other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; and (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
speak of the prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file an action
impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late Benitez are
contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was
not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth
was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente,
saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the estate.
ARTEMIO G. ILANO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented
by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994, NOCON, J.
The possession of illegitimate status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity.
Facts:
While Leoncia De Los Santos and Artemio Ilano were living together, Merceditas Ilano was
born. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los
Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her
parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in
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their residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was
already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He
would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at
restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.
Issue:
Whether or not Merceditas is a duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
Ruling:
Yes. Since Artemio had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was
conceived, she is a spurious child. The possession of illegitimate status means that the father has
treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment
though without publicity. There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection
and care.
The mere denial by Artemio of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the
evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate
of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that
Merceditas is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment. It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant,
who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process
falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. The natural, logical and coherent evidence of
plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and Artemio, their living together as
circumstances of Merceditas birth, the acts of Artemio in recognizing and supporting Merceditas, find
ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably
doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.
JANICE MARIE JAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO
G.R. No. L-49162, July 28, 1987, PADILLA, J.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as
to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity.
Facts:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico
Jao. Perico denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course
conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible
offspring of Perico and Arlene. Upon Salgado's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court declared the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood
grouping test could have been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there
was no showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Perico's contention
and reversed the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity.
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Ruling:
Yes. As held by the Court in the case of Co Tao v. CA, the NBI experts report of the blood tests
stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child."
From this statement the defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man.
The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was
the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely
establish that appellant is the father of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the
use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to
non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child
is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is
born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that
of the alleged father. Thus, the Court holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the
case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner
Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is
to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005, CORONA, J.
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court
of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage.
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. In their
complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship and impregnated Fe. Arnel, however, denied having sired Martin. Fe and Martin, as a
result moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing.
Issues:
Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means to prove paternity.
Ruling:
Yes. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. The Court has long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
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perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. The Court therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternity.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some
instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York pointed out that a determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or
judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing
paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood
test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable
to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the
99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
JOEY D. BRIONES v. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, G.R.
No. 156343. October 18, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J.
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody,
absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Facts:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones alleged that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son
with respondent Loreta P. Miguel and that he wanted to obtain custody of his minor child.
Respondent Miguel, however, prayed that the custody of her minor child be given to her by reason of
the minors illegitimacy.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child.
Ruling:
Yes. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of natural child is
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important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child
remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing
in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time
of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article
176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
fathers recognition of him.
CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents. [G.R. No.
124814. October 21, 2004, CORONA, J.
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
Facts:
Florencia Regodos filed a petition in behalf of her minor son for recognition and support
from petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania, however, denied the alleged paternity and insisted that
Florencia was already pregnant when they had sex. The RTC gave more probative weight to the
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in
reality, her husband was alive.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be compelled to acknowledge private respondent Camelo

Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.
Ruling:
No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code. Private
respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was
without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. In the same vein, the Court ruled that, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect
to the childs paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates
are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
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based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, G.R. No.
123450, August 31, 2005, CORONA, J.
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Facts:
Gerardo Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa Almonte annulled
on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married
one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The RTC annulled Ma. Theresas marriage to
Gerardo for being bigamous and as a result declared Jose Gerardo as an illegitimate child. The
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma.
Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative
father of an illegitimate child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed
from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use
the mothers surname. When brought to the appellate court, it held that Jose Gerardo was not the son
of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Gerardo was the son of Mario during Ma. Theresas first marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy
to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child
is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption
should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa
and Mario, stands. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
surnames. A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed
on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the
eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
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JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, represented by their mother,

CAROLINA A. DE JESUS v. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V.
DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and FORMS
MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001, VITUG, J.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.
Facts:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and it was during this marriage that
Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized
document, a certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When Juan G. Dizon died intestate, petitioners filed a
complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC. Respondents
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint would call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to
instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G. Dizons own illegitimate children.
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article
170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred
by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, v. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS
G.R. No. 105619, December 12, 1995, ROMERO, J.
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Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the
rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural
children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.
Facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein
petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in love and married Conchita Talag
de Santos, herein private respondent in another country. This union produced eleven children. Less
than a month later, after the death of Sophia, Antonio and private respondent contracted another
marriage celebrated under Philippine laws.
After the death of Antonio, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. After six
years, petitioner Santos decided to intervene. She argued that private respondent's children were
illegitimate. The RTC declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon
instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio
de Santos. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition
contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as
legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized.
Ruling:
No. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born
out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and
natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As
has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The
rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be
placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children:
legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, G.R.
No. 108366, February 16, 1994 PUNO, J.
While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Facts:
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Petitioners filed an action for recognition and support against private respondent Carlito.
Violeta, the mother of the two petitioners pointed Carlito as the father of her two sons. She averred
they were married in civil rites and discovered that the marriage license which they used was
spurious. To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their
certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of
petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken
during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the
home of Violeta Esguerra. Respondent Carlito, however, denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the
two petitioners. Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners. On appeal, the CA found that the "proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove the
private respondent's paternity and filiation of petitioners."
Issue:
Whether or not proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove the private respondent's
paternity and filiation of petitioners.
Ruling:
Yes. Firstly, petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante
Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering
affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its
preparation. In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father
are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that
private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted
by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together
as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this
illicit relationship, two sons were born. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as
his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Respondent soon filed a petition
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for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, and Correction/Change of Surname of Minors before the RTC.
Petitioner on the other hand, speculated that Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 9255, may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of their mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:
No. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code. It is clear that
the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit. Art. 176
gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity,
one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN

CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG v.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married,
they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner, however sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because he may be discriminated against in
Singapore. The RTC ruled that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
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right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should
now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that
when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name.
Ruling:
No. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our
laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless
their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that
the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name
is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from
his registered complete name.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. v. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN,

TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO
G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002, DE LEON, JR., J.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Facts:
William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents
before the RTC. Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that his mother, Corazon, had been living separately for
ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William
Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when
petitioner was conceived and born.
Respondents, on the other hand, stated that their parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married and that Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo and was
not legally separated from her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate
of his supposed father, William Liyao.
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Ruling:
No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It
is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William
Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting
marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE

G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, CORONA, J.
Illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such.
Facts:
Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni
N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Respondent Capote claimed that Giovanni Gallamaso is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso and was born prior to the
effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father
despite the absence of marriage between them. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time
Giovanni was born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities to him on matters of
financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands
with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname.
Issue:
Whether or not the minor Giovanni is entitled to have his surname changed to that of his
mothers surname.
Ruling:
Yes. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given
name and his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated
by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or
private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his
fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.
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The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that
the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under
Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate
his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in
the way of the reunification of mother and son.
NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.
Facts:
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against petitioner

Narciso Salas. Respondent Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the father of her son. Petitioner
Salas, however, denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. The RTC rendered its decision in favor
of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent satisfactorily
established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo. Respondent presented the Certificate
of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which
is not signed by him.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to
establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can
only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
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authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS

SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA
SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
Facts:
When spouses Teodoro and Isabel Bautista died, their properties were left in the possession
of Private respondents Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claimed to be their
children. Petitioners, however, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The petitioners, in addition, argued that Doribel is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition
for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. The action was resisted by private
respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
Ruling:
Yes. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true,
as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may
be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her
earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact
that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth
certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the
evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN
G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the
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father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before
the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.
Facts:
Private respondent Emilie Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor
Chad D. Cuyugan filed a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner, the
administrator of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner submitted that Article 175 of
the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the
putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private
respondent, however, insisted that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged
parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years
from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 285 of the Civil Code applies in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case
since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the
mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court.
The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in
holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Adoption
HERBERT CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and

MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, ROMERO, J.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.
Facts:
Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the natural children of Herbert Cang and Anna
Marie Clavano. Later due to the extramarital affairs of Herbert, Anna filed a petition for legal
separation which was granted. The decree of legal separation conferred Anna the custody of the
children. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and
sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed a petition for adoption the three children before the Branch 14 of
RTC Cebu City. This petition was accompanied by an affidavit of consent executed by Anna. The
affidavit further alleged that Herbert had long forfeited his parental rights over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for adoption, went home to the
Philippines and interposed his opposition to the adoption claiming that the petition was defective
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since it lacks his consent. He also moved for the reacquisition of his custody over his children and the
same was later granted by Branch 19 of RTC Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree
granting the petition for adoption and in doing so, the RTC ruled that Herbert has abandoned his
children and such abandonment is a ground for dispensing with his consent to the adoption. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption. Motion for reconsideration filed by Herbert was
likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption was defective for lack of Herberts consent.
Ruling:
Yes. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption is a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his
consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary
issue that an adoption court must first confront. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent,
the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to,
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE
C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES v. GINA CARREON
FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, PADILLA, J. (Resolution)
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child.
Facts:
Angelie Anne Fajardo, the child of Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon out of their common
law marriage, was offered for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes. Affidavit
of Consent to the adoption of the child was also executed by Gina Carreon. Later, Spouses Cervantes
filed a petition for adoption before the RTC of Rizal which granted the petition making Angelie Anne
Cervantes the child of the spouses Cervantes.
Later, the spouses Cervantes received a letter from the biological parents of Angelie
demanding a sum of money to which they never heeded. The biological parents threatened to get
back the child in case of non-payment. True to their word, Gina Carreon took the child and brought
her to her residence. Demand to return the child were also unheeded. This prompted spouses
Cervantes to file a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
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Whether or not Gina Carreon is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
No. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age,
will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare
of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the
contending parents. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman
other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband
and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the
minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded
person.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of
the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be
exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the
adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
Facts:
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is the biological child of Honorato B. Catindig and Gemma
Astorga Garcia out of wed-lock. Due to the demise of Gemma, Honorato filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child and prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mothers surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial
court granted the petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Later, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name. The trial court, however, denied the same holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
Yes. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
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Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. Furthermore, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name
will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
Furthermore, it is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.

LAHOM")
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, VITUG, J.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
Facts:
In an order granting the petition for adoption filed by spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and
Isabelita Lahom, Jose Melvin Sibulo became the child of spouses Lahom. Later, however, Mrs. Lahom,
filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC on the grounds of strained
relationship and utter disregard of Jose Melvin Sibulo of the needs and feelings of Mrs. Lahom who
was then sick. However before the institution of the case, RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) took
effect and such law deleted the right of the adopter to rescind a decree of adoption. The RTC
dismissed the petition holding that by virtue of RA 8552, petitions lack of cause of action. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
Ruling:
No. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action
to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. The Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
MACARIO TAMARGO et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992, FELICIANO, J.
Retroactive effect may not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child.
Facts:
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Due to a shooting incident that led to the death of Jennifer Tamargo, a civil case for damages
was filed by Macario Tamargo and spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, the adopting parent and
natural parents of Jennifer Tamargo, respectively, against spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, natural
parents of Adelberto Bundoc, a minor. Prior to the incident, there is pending petition to adopt
Adelberto Bundoc filed by spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura before the RTC of Ilocos Sur. The said
petition was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, the spouses
Bundoc contended that due to the approval of the petition for adoption, parental authority over
Adelberto has already shifted to the spouses Rapisura, hence they the indispensable party to the case.
The RTC dismissed the petition holding that Spouses Bundoc is not the indispensable party. Motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied due to failure to file it within the reglementary period and
failure to observe the 3-day notice rule. The Tamargos then elevated the case to the CA via petition
for mandamus and certiorari however the same was also dismissed. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be
given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling:
No. The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority
was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages. The Court does not believe that parental authority is
properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. Retroactive effect may not be given to
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to
hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden
them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent
with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort
was committed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES

G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration.
Facts:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat before the RTC. Petitioner
contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which
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requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argued that the Family Code must be applied retroactively
to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat
by the mere filing of her petition for adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption should be dismissed.
Ruling:
No. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not
yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires
jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be
for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended
the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for
several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents
since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the
adopters.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to
be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts.
Support
EDWARD V. LACSON v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented
by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006, GARCIA, J.
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no
less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Facts:
Edward V. Lacson and Lea Daban Lacson are the parents of Maowee Daban Lacson and
Maonaa Daban Lacson. For unknown reason, Edward left their conjugal home thereby leaving Leah
to fend for their children. For a period of 18 years, Leah and her children transferred from one
dwelling place to another not their own. Records reveal that in a note dated December 10, 1975,
Edward promise to give support to his daughters however, aside from occasional giving of some
amount, Edward failed to fulfill his promise.
In 1995, Leah instituted an action for support in behalf of her daughter before the RTC of
Iloilo City demanding the amount of the support her daughters should have received. The RTC ruled
in favor of the plaintiff sisters and ordered Edward to pay them the amount equivalent to 216-month
worth of support in arrears. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The motion for
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reconsideration filed by Edward was likewise dismissed. Hence this appeal. Before the SC, Edward
contended that the demand required by law was never complied with by Leah thus the award of
support in arrears is not proper.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother of the petitioner failed to make a demand for support as required
by law.
Ruling:
No. The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may
be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in
the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would
pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support
owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a
plea.
Edwards insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face
of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own
handwriting. Said note stating that he will "sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa" also
stated "as requested by their mother" thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having
been made by mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that Edwards obligation to pay support in
arrears should commence from 1976.
Parental Authority
NERISSA Z. PEREZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ,
G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996, ROMERO, J.
The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Facts:
Ray Perez II (Ray Junior or RJ) is the only child of Spouses Ray and Nerissa Perez and was
born after successive miscarriage suffered by Nerissa. Nerissa is a resident alien of United States
while Ray only had tourist visa. The spouses and the child later went home to the Philippines for a
vacation however after the lapse of such period, Ray decided to stay together with RJ to take care of
his sick mother but has promised to follow Nerissa. However, this never happened. Later the
relationship of the spouses went sour. Despite church mediation, reconciliation has failed.
Subsequently, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender the custody of their
son to her.
The RTC ruled in favor of Nerissa holding that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother. However on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision holding that
granting custody to the boy's father would be for the child's best interest and welfare. Nerissa filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to Nerissa.
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Ruling:
Yes. When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word
"shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes
a mandatory character. The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother finds its raison d'tre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only
the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such a child to
someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.
DAISIE T. DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR

G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995, MENDOZA, J.
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant
in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each
other, it does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
Facts:
Ramon R. Villar, a married man, had three children with Daisie T. David out of their amorous
relationship namely; Christopher J, Christine and Cathy Mae. Such relationship became known to the
legal wife and family of Villar. Later, the legal family of Villar accepted the children. During one of
Villars family vacation, they invited Christopher J., then six years of age, with Daisies permission.
However after such vacation, Villar refused to give back the child. This prompted Daisie to file a
petition for habeas corpus.
The RTC ruled in favor of Daisie and ruled that she has the rightful custody over Christopher
J. However on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the petition for
habeas corpus is not proper and that the question of custody and the question of custody should be
brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper to recover the custody of a
child.
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is
relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated
from each other, it does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at
bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, Ramon R.
Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of
the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a consequence
of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived
of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
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Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who,
by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG v. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA

MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995, MELO, J.
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function
to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests.
Facts:
While Teresita Masauding was still in a subsisting marriage, she maintained a common law
relationship with Reynaldo Espiritu which begot two children, Rosalind and Reginald. Later the
Espiritu and Masauding got married. The marriage went sour and Teresita left their conjugal home
and went to California. Due to his assignment abroad, Reynaldo has to leave his children with his
sister, Guillerma Layug.
Later, Teresita went back to the Philippines and filed a petition for habeas corpus against
Reynaldo and Guillerma to gain custody over the children. The petition was, however, dismissed thus
conferring upon Reynaldo the sole parental authority over the children subject to the visitation rights
granted to Teresita. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and gave Teresita the custody of the
children. The CA relied on the presumption that the custody of a child below seven years of age will
be lodged to the mother. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not custody of the children should be given to Reynaldo.
Ruling:
Yes. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial
function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is
under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. In
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the
court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and
award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They
understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their
best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a
certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an
"unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. Not only are the children over seven years old
and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already
caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at
least in Rosalind.
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CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG
G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damages.
Facts:
Due to an incident that led to the death of Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, a case for
damages was filed by Spouses Felipe and Shirley Gotiong, parents of Julie Ann, against Spouses
Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi, parents of Wendell. Prior to the incident, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts however eventually their relationship went sour. Attempt of Wendell
for reconciliation likewise failed which led to threats against Julie Ann. Both Julie Ann and Wendell
died due to gunshots. The gun recovered in the crime scene was licensed under the name of
Cresencio Libi, the father of Wendell.
Spouses Gotiong contends that it was Wendell who shot their daughter and thereafter committed
suicide. As such, Spouses Gotiong wanted to claim damages against Spouses Libi arising from the
latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. On appeal, the IAC reversed the RTC decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Libi are liable for vicarious laiability.
Ruling:
Yes. Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or
under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their
children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under
21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony
or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners
liable for damages arising therefrom. Spouses Libi failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi
patris familias to prevent such damages.
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA
G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, ROMERO, J.
Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
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Facts:
Leouel Santos, Jr. is the only child of spouses Leouel Santos, Sr., and Julia Bedia. After his
birth, he had been under the care and custody of Spouses Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia, his maternal
grandparents. Since then, spouses Bedia are the ones providing for the support for the child. Before
Julia went abroad to work, she entrusted the custody of her son to her parents. Later, Spouses Bedia
alleged that Santos, Sr abducted the child which prompted the former to file a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC of Iloilo City,
After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC granted the petition and awarded the custody of the child
to spouses Bedia. On appeal, the CA affirmed such decision. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Leouel Santos, Sr was likewise denied. Before the SC, Leouel Sr. contended that since Spouses Bedia
failed to show that he is unfit and unsuitable father, the grant of substitute parental authority to them
is inappropriate.
Issue:
Whether or not custody of the child should be given to Spouses Bedia.
Ruling:
No. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The law vests on the father and
mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case
of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
The consideration where the decision of CA is couched upon is insufficient to defeat

petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel
Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS et al.

G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002, PARDO, J.
To be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.
Facts
During an enrollment drive conducted by St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, the vehicle
used by its student turned turtle and caused the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Records showed that
the vehicle used was then driven recklessly by James Daniel II, a minor. Later, Spouses William and
Lucia Carpitanos, parents of Sherwin Carpitanos, filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
before the RTC of Dipolog City.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Capistrano. St. Marys Academy was ordered to pay
damages and in case of its insolvency, James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel, parents of James Daniel II,
shall be subsidiary liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision but reduced the amount of
actual damages. Motion for reconsideration to this decision was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal.
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Issue:
Whether or not St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
Ruling:
No. For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Significantly, respondents did not
present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which St. Marys Academy had
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for
the death resulting from such accident.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL v. HELEN G. BELMES

G.R. No. 13222, June 19, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner to be Vincents guardian.
Facts:
Reeder C. Vancil and Helen G. Belmes are common law husband and wife and they had two
children out of such relationship namely Valerie and Vincent. Due to the death of Reeder, a US-based
Navy serviceman, Bonifacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder, filed a guardianship proceeding over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent before the RTC of Cebu City.
Later, the RTC appointed Bonifacia as the legal and judicial guardian of the persons and
estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. Subsequently, Helen Belmes filed an opposition to such
proceeding contending that she initiated a similar proceeding. Belmes also filed a motion for the
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in
actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors
The RTC denied the motion of Belmes and directed Bonifacia to perform her duties. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and ruled that under the law, parents are ipso
facto the guardian ad litem of their minor child. During the pendency of the petition, Valerie attained
the age of majority thus making the guardianship proceeding, in so far as she is concern, moot and
academic.
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Issue:
Whether or not Helen Belmes should be the guardian of Vincent Vancil.
Ruling:
Yes. Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that
of petitioner to be Vincents guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and
has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner
merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her
(respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no
longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of
Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
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Prejudicial Question .......................................................................................................................29

Civil Personality ..............................................................................................................................33

Void Marriages ...............................................................................................................................46

Psychological Incapacity .................................................................................................................53

Voidable Marriages ........................................................................................................................76

Legal Separation .............................................................................................................................78

Rights and Obligations between Husband & Wife .........................................................................81

Property Relations ..........................................................................................................................85

The Family as an Institution .........................................................................................................103

Family Home .................................................................................................................................106

Paternity and Filiation ..................................................................................................................108

Parental Authority ........................................................................................................................131

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.

Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

LORENZO M. TANADA ET AL v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v. THE HON. SECRETARY

Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN

ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding as between the parties.

FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND BLANDINA DANDAN

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO CATALAN AND

Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to

EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in

ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.

PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEAL, AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE

Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.

ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.

Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v.

Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. ACT THEATER, INC.

SOLEDAD CARPIO v. LEONORA A. VALMONTE

Leonora Valmonte (Valmonte) herein respondent, is a wedding coordinator who was

Whether or not Carpios imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.

ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S. OROPEZA

Sometime in 1965 Pedro Yambao (Yambao) representing Manila Electric Company

Petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES

VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega v. GONZALO

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL v. EDERLINA P. CATITO

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION

Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.

LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF

RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO

SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG AND LOLITA T. PAHANG v. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,

G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.

ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHULE Y. LIM

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Rommel Arnando was a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter, he acquired American citizenship

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN