Magnitskiy 2

From: John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.
com>
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:10:37 AM
To: Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Magnitskiy

Thanks.
On Tuesday, April 26, 2016 9:58 AM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
http://russian-untouchables.com/eng/testimonies/
His testimonies. See the October 2008, 4th page, 2nd full para.
Sent from my iPad
From: Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:14:18 AM
To: John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>

On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge threw the case out of court. Browder touts this. But the
judge also stated that Browder had no evidence that Karpov was involved in Magnitskiy's torture and murder.
I don't have my files here, but I do have the complete verdict at home
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 7:10 AM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Thanks.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:32:42 AM

Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June testimony multiple times and Magniskiy refers back to it in the October
document.
As for embellishment, I have a theory/hypothesis that's best left for a face to face chat.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder supplemented with stuff from novaya. There's no doubt that the individuals
involved were are a part of a corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished along the way, which may come back to haunt
him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge threw the case out of court. Browder
touts this. But the judge also stated that Browder had no evidence that Karpov was involved in
Magnitskiy's torture and murder.
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/24/2016 03:15:17 PM
To: Kyle Parker <kyle@kyleparker.net>
Cc: David Kramer <David.J.Kramer@asu.edu>
Subject: Re: I am in LA on vacation

Actually, I am incorrect AKA wrong. Magnitskiy does name a figure in October document. On the 4th page, 2nd full paragraph.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 24, 2016, at 11:02 AM, Kyle Parker <kyle@kyleparker.net> wrote:
Correct, but in the October complaint he references his June complaint which mentions Kuznetsov 15 times and
Karpov 11 times and he further accuses this group (without restating the names explicitly since they are coverd by his
confirmation of the June complaint) of the theft of the $230 million. Make sense?
On Sunday, April 24, 2016, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Am including David since he is aware of the matter.
On the rebuttal document: I read it quickly and you should be aware that Magnitskiy does not name a figure in the
October 2008 testimony. Rather, he's describing the mechanism thru which the money was stolen; that is, the illegal
rarebit ration. I mention this in case NBC has a Russian reader at its disposal.
On the other hand, there is a Roman Anin novaya piece that investigated the Klyuev group and concluded that same
crowd was responsible for just about a billion dollars in theft through the same same or similar mechanisms.
I am not at home and don't have the same facility with the iPad that I do with my desktop, but am willing to seek
that Anin piece out if you think it will help.
Bob
Sent from my iPad
Yes
I assume you have let David in on all of this?
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 06:58:38 AM
To: John P Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Subject: Magnitskiy

Sent from my iPad
From: John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:19:57 AM

Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished along the way, which may come back to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge threw the case out of court. Browder touts this.
But the judge also stated that Browder had no evidence that Karpov was involved in Magnitskiy's torture and
murder.
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/24/2016 10:34:14 AM
Subject: Fwd: I am in LA on vacation

Registration , not rarebit ration. I told you I don't have the same facility......
Sent from my iPad
Begin forwarded message:
Date: April 24, 2016 at 10:32:43 AM PDT
On the rebuttal document: I read it quickly and you should be aware that Magnitskiy does not name a figure in the
October 2008 testimony. Rather, he's describing the mechanism thru which the money was stolen; that is, the illegal
rarebit ration. I mention this in case NBC has a Russian reader at its disposal.
On the other hand, there is a Roman Anin novaya piece that investigated the Klyuev group and concluded that same
crowd was responsible for just about a billion dollars in theft through the same same or similar mechanisms.
I am not at home and don't have the same facility with the iPad that I do with my desktop, but am willing to seek that
Anin piece out if you think it will help.
Bob
Sent from my iPad
Yes
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:35:10 AM
To: John P Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Subject: Andrei Nekrasov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Not a Putin fan

Andrei Nekrasov
Andrei Lvovich Nekrasov (Russian: Андре́й Льво́вич Некра́сов; born January 1, 1958 in Saint Petersburg) is a
Russian film and TV director from Saint Petersburg.
Andrei Nekrasov studied acting and directing at the "State Institute for Theater and Film" in his native Saint Petersburg.
He studied comparative literature and philosophy at the University of Paris, taking a master's degree, and film at Bristol
University Film School. In 1985, he assisted Andrei Tarkovsky during the filming and editing of The Sacrifice. Nekrasov
then made several internationally coproduced documentaries and TV arts programs (notably A Russia of One's Own,
Pasternak, The Prodigal Son, and Children's Stories: Chechnya). His first drama short, Springing Lenin (1993) won
the UNESCO prize at the Cannes Film Festival that year, and in 1997 his first feature, Love is as Strong as Death won
the FIPRESCI prize at Mannheim-Heidelberg. The director’s second feature, Lubov and Other Nightmares (2001)
won recognition at a great many of festivals all over the world (including Sundance and Berlin) and confirmed his status as
a rebel among Russian filmmakers.
Andrei Nekrasov is also a playwright and a theater director. His German productions (of his own plays) include: Der
Spieler ("The Gambler") in Euro Theater Central in Bonn and Koenigsberg in the Volksbuehne Theatre in Berlin.
Nekrasov's 2007 film, Rebellion: the Litvinenko Case presents interviews with assassinated former FSB officer
Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya. The movie contends that Russian state security service FSB, the
successor agency to the KGB, organized bombings of apartments in Moscow and taking hostages in a Moscow theater to
justify the second war in Chechnya and bring Vladimir Putin to power.
His films include the documentary Disbelief (Недоверие) on the 1999 Russian apartment bombings. This film is available
in DVD as an extra to Rebellion: The Litvinenko Case, but a low resolution version is available on Google Video.
"Russian Lessons, co-directed and produced by his wife Olga Konskaya and Norwegian Producer Torstein Grude deals
with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It documents a journey by two directors-protagonists, Olga Konskaya and
Andrei Nekrasov, one on each side of the frontline during the hostilities. For this documentary, Nekrasov was named The
Person of 2009 in the Georgian Public Broadcaster's internet survey.
In 2011 Nekrasov received an Oxfam Novib/PEN Award.
In 2012 Nekrasov released "Farewell Comrades!" a six-part documentary series on the last phase of communism in
Eastern Europe, produced for ARTE, YLE and many other European networks by Artline Films (France) and Gebrueder
Beetz Filmproduktion (Germany). Nekrasov received the GRIMME Award 2013 for "Farewell Comrades!"
In the autumn of 2015 Al Jazeera English broadcast "In Search of Putin's Russia", a four-part documentary series made
by Nekrasov in collaboration with British film-maker Melanie Anstey which explored the attitudes of ordinary Russians
towards Vladimir Putin and the country's recent history.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:53:06 AM
Subject: Re: Andrei Nekrasov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Not a Putin fan

No I did not. But I did send you a write up of my meeting with Browder, an email.
There is also the chronology of the case. Julia G's team did it before she went to the NIC but gave us some credit.
Sent from my iPad
do you remember doing an RW piece on the case?
Andrei Lvovich Nekrasov (Russian: Андре́й Льво́вич Некра́сов; born January 1, 1958 in Saint
Petersburg) is a Russian film and TV director from Saint Petersburg.
Andrei Nekrasov studied acting and directing at the "State Institute for Theater and Film" in his native
Saint Petersburg. He studied comparative literature and philosophy at the University of Paris, taking a
master's degree, and film at Bristol University Film School. In 1985, he assisted Andrei Tarkovsky
during the filming and editing of The Sacrifice. Nekrasov then made several internationally coproduced
documentaries and TV arts programs (notably A Russia of One's Own, Pasternak, The Prodigal Son,
and Children's Stories: Chechnya). His first drama short, Springing Lenin (1993) won the UNESCO
prize at the Cannes Film Festival that year, and in 1997 his first feature, Love is as Strong as Death
won the FIPRESCI prize at Mannheim-Heidelberg. The director’s second feature, Lubov and Other
Nightmares (2001) won recognition at a great many of festivals all over the world (including Sundance
and Berlin) and confirmed his status as a rebel among Russian filmmakers.
Andrei Nekrasov is also a playwright and a theater director. His German productions (of his own plays)
include: Der Spieler ("The Gambler") in Euro Theater Central in Bonn and Koenigsberg in the
Volksbuehne Theatre in Berlin.
Nekrasov's 2007 film, Rebellion: the Litvinenko Case presents interviews with assassinated former
FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya. The movie contends that Russian
state security service FSB, the successor agency to the KGB, organized bombings of apartments in
Moscow and taking hostages in a Moscow theater to justify the second war in Chechnya and bring
Vladimir Putin to power.
His films include the documentary Disbelief (Недоверие) on the 1999 Russian apartment bombings.
This film is available in DVD as an extra to Rebellion: The Litvinenko Case, but a low resolution version
is available on Google Video.
"Russian Lessons, co-directed and produced by his wife Olga Konskaya and Norwegian Producer
Torstein Grude deals with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It documents a journey by two directors-
protagonists, Olga Konskaya and Andrei Nekrasov, one on each side of the frontline during the
hostilities. For this documentary, Nekrasov was named The Person of 2009 in the Georgian Public
Broadcaster's internet survey.
In 2012 Nekrasov released "Farewell Comrades!" a six-part documentary series on the last phase of
communism in Eastern Europe, produced for ARTE, YLE and many other European networks by
Artline Films (France) and Gebrueder Beetz Filmproduktion (Germany). Nekrasov received the
GRIMME Award 2013 for "Farewell Comrades!"
In the autumn of 2015 Al Jazeera English broadcast "In Search of Putin's Russia", a four-part
documentary series made by Nekrasov in collaboration with British film-maker Melanie Anstey which
explored the attitudes of ordinary Russians towards Vladimir Putin and the country's recent history.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 01:53:14 PM

Part of this "reporter's" argument is that Magnitsky only mentioned the $230 million tax evasion scheme after
Browder raised it publicly. Do you know whether that's true? (passing on this question from elsewhere)
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June testimony multiple times and Magniskiy refers back to it in the
October document.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder supplemented with stuff from novaya. There's no doubt that
the individuals involved were are a part of a corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished along the way, which may come back to haunt
him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge threw the case out of court. Browder
touts this. But the judge also stated that Browder had no evidence that Karpov was involved in
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 07:50:19 AM
Subject: Re: Andrei Nekrasov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Not a Putin fan

do you remember doing an RW piece on the case?
Andrei Lvovich Nekrasov (Russian: Андре́й Льво́вич Некра́сов; born January 1, 1958 in Saint Petersburg) is
a Russian film and TV director from Saint Petersburg.
Andrei Nekrasov studied acting and directing at the "State Institute for Theater and Film" in his native Saint
Petersburg. He studied comparative literature and philosophy at the University of Paris, taking a master's degree,
and film at Bristol University Film School. In 1985, he assisted Andrei Tarkovsky during the filming and editing of
The Sacrifice. Nekrasov then made several internationally coproduced documentaries and TV arts programs
(notably A Russia of One's Own, Pasternak, The Prodigal Son, and Children's Stories: Chechnya). His first
drama short, Springing Lenin (1993) won the UNESCO prize at the Cannes Film Festival that year, and in 1997
his first feature, Love is as Strong as Death won the FIPRESCI prize at Mannheim-Heidelberg. The director’s
second feature, Lubov and Other Nightmares (2001) won recognition at a great many of festivals all over the
world (including Sundance and Berlin) and confirmed his status as a rebel among Russian filmmakers.
Andrei Nekrasov is also a playwright and a theater director. His German productions (of his own plays) include:
Der Spieler ("The Gambler") in Euro Theater Central in Bonn and Koenigsberg in the Volksbuehne Theatre in
Berlin.
Nekrasov's 2007 film, Rebellion: the Litvinenko Case presents interviews with assassinated former FSB officer
Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya. The movie contends that Russian state security service
FSB, the successor agency to the KGB, organized bombings of apartments in Moscow and taking hostages in a
Moscow theater to justify the second war in Chechnya and bring Vladimir Putin to power.
His films include the documentary Disbelief (Недоверие) on the 1999 Russian apartment bombings. This film is
available in DVD as an extra to Rebellion: The Litvinenko Case, but a low resolution version is available on
Google Video.
"Russian Lessons, co-directed and produced by his wife Olga Konskaya and Norwegian Producer Torstein Grude
deals with the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It documents a journey by two directors-protagonists, Olga
Konskaya and Andrei Nekrasov, one on each side of the frontline during the hostilities. For this documentary,
Nekrasov was named The Person of 2009 in the Georgian Public Broadcaster's internet survey.
In 2012 Nekrasov released "Farewell Comrades!" a six-part documentary series on the last phase of communism
in Eastern Europe, produced for ARTE, YLE and many other European networks by Artline Films (France) and
Gebrueder Beetz Filmproduktion (Germany). Nekrasov received the GRIMME Award 2013 for "Farewell
Comrades!"
In the autumn of 2015 Al Jazeera English broadcast "In Search of Putin's Russia", a four-part documentary series
made by Nekrasov in collaboration with British film-maker Melanie Anstey which explored the attitudes of ordinary
Russians towards Vladimir Putin and the country's recent history.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 03:00:37 PM
To: John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>

Does Kelly know you will be out?
Did you go to David's?
As for the chronology, Hermitage filed complaints about the theft of the firms as early as February 2008.
Public statements, however, would not be in my memory bank. When Browder et al went public is a topic you'd need nexus
Lexus to accomplish. I only started following this matter closely after his death, which is when Browder made all this stuff public
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 2:45 PM, John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Yeah I know...this may still be around on your return. I will be out Monday by the way.
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 26, 2016, at 5:42 PM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Um, huh? What difference does that make?
The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007. That's the day the tax authority 28 authorized the
rebate to the firms illegally reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration of the three companies that applied for the rebate at
least as of June 2008. He doesn't mention any theft of budget funds in the June testimony, though.
That comes in October 2008 - 4th page 2nd full para that I already sent.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the theft only in July 2008 and Hermitage filed complaints
that same month: see the documents at the bottom of the page.
http://russian-untouchables.com/eng/230m-theft-from-budget/
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public before the October testimony, but he claims he got the
info from Magnitskiy.
Am I missing something?
Good thing I didn't file a leave slip.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 1:53 PM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Part of this "reporter's" argument is that Magnitsky only mentioned the $230
million tax evasion scheme after Browder raised it publicly. Do you know
whether that's true? (passing on this question from elsewhere)
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June testimony multiple times and
Magniskiy refers back to it in the October document.
As for embellishment, I have a theory/hypothesis that's best left for a face to
face chat.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder supplemented with stuff
from novaya. There's no doubt that the individuals involved were are a part of a
corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished along the
way, which may come back to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge
threw the case out of court. Browder touts this. But the judge also
stated that Browder had no evidence that Karpov was involved in
I don't have my files here, but I do have the complete verdict at
home
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 7:10 AM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
wrote:
Thanks.
On Tuesday, April 26, 2016 9:58 AM, Bob
<robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
His testimonies. See the October 2008, 4th page, 2nd
full para.
Sent from my iPad
From: Kyle Parker <kyle@kyleparker.net>
Sent time: 04/24/2016 11:02:51 AM
Subject: I am in LA on vacation

Correct, but in the October complaint he references his June complaint which mentions Kuznetsov 15 times and Karpov 11 times
and he further accuses this group (without restating the names explicitly since they are coverd by his confirmation of the June
complaint) of the theft of the $230 million. Make sense?
On the rebuttal document: I read it quickly and you should be aware that Magnitskiy does not name a figure in the October 2008
testimony. Rather, he's describing the mechanism thru which the money was stolen; that is, the illegal rarebit ration. I mention this
in case NBC has a Russian reader at its disposal.
On the other hand, there is a Roman Anin novaya piece that investigated the Klyuev group and concluded that same crowd was
responsible for just about a billion dollars in theft through the same same or similar mechanisms.
I am not at home and don't have the same facility with the iPad that I do with my desktop, but am willing to seek that Anin piece
out if you think it will help.
Bob
Sent from my iPad
Yes
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/24/2016 10:32:43 AM

On the rebuttal document: I read it quickly and you should be aware that Magnitskiy does not name a figure in the October 2008
testimony. Rather, he's describing the mechanism thru which the money was stolen; that is, the illegal rarebit ration. I mention this in
case NBC has a Russian reader at its disposal.
On the other hand, there is a Roman Anin novaya piece that investigated the Klyuev group and concluded that same crowd was
responsible for just about a billion dollars in theft through the same same or similar mechanisms.
I am not at home and don't have the same facility with the iPad that I do with my desktop, but am willing to seek that Anin piece
out if you think it will help.
Bob
Sent from my iPad
Yes
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 02:42:40 PM

The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007. That's the day the tax authority 28 authorized the rebate to the firms illegally
reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration of the three companies that applied for the rebate at least as of June 2008. He
doesn't mention any theft of budget funds in the June testimony, though.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the theft only in July 2008 and Hermitage filed complaints that same month: see the
documents at the bottom of the page.
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public before the October testimony, but he claims he got the info from Magnitskiy.
Sent from my iPad
Part of this "reporter's" argument is that Magnitsky only mentioned the $230 million tax evasion
scheme after Browder raised it publicly. Do you know whether that's true? (passing on this question
from elsewhere)
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June testimony multiple times and Magniskiy refers back
to it in the October document.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder supplemented with stuff from novaya. There's
no doubt that the individuals involved were are a part of a corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished along the way, which may come
back to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge threw the case out of
court. Browder touts this. But the judge also stated that Browder had no evidence that
Karpov was involved in Magnitskiy's torture and murder.
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
Sent from my iPad
From: John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Sent time: 04/26/2016 02:45:57 PM

Yeah I know...this may still be around on your return. I will be out Monday by the way.
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 26, 2016, at 5:42 PM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007. That's the day the tax authority 28 authorized the rebate to the firms
illegally reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration of the three companies that applied for the rebate at least as of June
2008. He doesn't mention any theft of budget funds in the June testimony, though.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the theft only in July 2008 and Hermitage filed complaints that same
month: see the documents at the bottom of the page.
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public before the October testimony, but he claims he got the info from
Magnitskiy.
Sent from my iPad
Part of this "reporter's" argument is that Magnitsky only mentioned the $230 million tax
evasion scheme after Browder raised it publicly. Do you know whether that's true?
(passing on this question from elsewhere)
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June testimony multiple times and Magniskiy
refers back to it in the October document.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder supplemented with stuff from
novaya. There's no doubt that the individuals involved were are a part of a corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished along the way, which
may come back to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK, the judge threw the
case out of court. Browder touts this. But the judge also stated that Browder
had no evidence that Karpov was involved in Magnitskiy's torture and murder.
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
Sent from my iPad
From: Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Sent time: 04/12/2016 11:54:06 PM
To: Robert Otto <OttoRC@state.gov>
BCc: swallen@1scom.net; chris.bort@gmail.com; naterey80@gmail.com; donald.jensen8@gmail.com
Subject: Fwd: 2011 Zavtra Stuff on Magnitskiy

Yuliya’s piece reminded me that last year when Chayka burped up his nonsense on the film, we got stuff
similar to the themes in the Zavtra piece below: the all powerful Bill & his minions.
The NAK below is the Kabanov outfit (anti-corruption), not the Bortnikov anti-terrorist
From: Robert Otto [mailto:robertcotto@verizon.net]
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2011 5:53 AM
To: Robert Otto
Subject: Zavtra etc on Magnitskiy
http://zavtra.ru/content/view/2011-08-1621/

1) Browder & Magnitskiy cooked up illegal schemes to buy Gazprom shares before the "ring"
2) On top of this, Magnitskiy devised schemes to avoid taxes: bought 7% of the shares for 300m
and sold for 4b w/o paying taxes
used three firms registered in Klamykiya using invalids
3) in 2007 Browder evacuated everybody
4) Gasanov then proposes three Russians Kurochkin (dies in Spring 2008), Markelov &
Khlebnikov head the Hermitage connected firms
5) Gasanov dies from heart failure
6) Korobeynikov takes Gasanov's place
7) Browder worked with Stepanova of the 28th Tax Inspectorate (no wonder he has stuff on
her).
8) 28th Tax Inspectorate returns 5.4b to Korobeynikov
9) 24 September 2008 Korobeynikov turns up dead, fell from his balcony
10) November 2008: Silchenko
11) November 2008 Magnitskiy allegedly plans to leave & arrested instead.
12) Markelov arrested in 11/08 - didn't know Browder, but knew Gasanov, Korobeynikov, &
Magnitskiy
13) 11/09 Magnitskiy dies
14) Khlebnikov testifies agst Magnitskiy, Gasanov, & Khayretdinov
15) Browder didn't want a live Magnitskiy
16) 2 May 2011: RosGaz publishes piece noting all 4 deaths
- http://www.rg.ru/2011/05/02/magnitskii-site.html
------

Zavtra asks five questions:
1) How did Browder pull off all this stuff under the eyes of spets? Are they complicit?
2) How does Stepanova, corrupted by Browder, get to work for Serdyukov?
3) Why don't the authorities publsih forensic examination of Magnitskiy death
4) If he was poisoned how could this happen w/o spets
5) how could browder make 4 billion

and is it not strange the president is relying on NAK, a body w/o authority/powers
---------
Ovchinskiy

http://echo.msk.ru/blog/vso/799056‐echo/
1) why wasn't browder arrested in 2005?
2) why was criminal investigation stopped
3) why aren't the three other deaths being investigated
4) why aren't the three cases connected w Magnitskiy (tax avoidance, illegal return of tax money,
death) united into one
5) Is NAK correct? is there a conflict of interest or not?
Sent time: 04/12/2016 10:16:46 PM
Subject: Magnitskiy Connection - Klyuev - Panama Papers’ Russian Mob Connection - The Daily Beast

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/12/panama-papers-russian-mob-connection.html
Panama Papers’ Russian Mob Connection
A Swiss law firm implicated in the Panama Papers also has links to an alleged Russian mafia, The Daily Beast has discovered.
As reported last week in the disclosure of leaked documents from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, the Zurich-based
firm Dietrich, Baumgartner & Partner played an integral role in the transfer of some $2 billion from a close circle of friends and
associates of Vladimir Putin—money widely thought to belong at least in part to the Russian president.
Dietrich, Baumgartner is known in Switzerland for its influential Russian client base. It even keeps code names for the ones whose
notoriety demands a commensurate lack of transparency. The firm’s founding partner Andres Baumgartner is quite ostentatious
about his Eastern connections. He’s quoted in the Guardian as having told his colleagues: “I have relationships with people from the
KGB. Right up to Vladimir Putin.”
There are also two known connections between Baumgartner’s firm and the so-called Klyuev Group, which U.S. Sen. John McCain
has called a “dangerous transnational criminal organization” that has “colluded with senior Russian officials to engage in bribery,
fraud, embezzlement, company thefts, and other serious financial crimes.”
Members of the Klyuev Group have been sanctioned by the U.S. government under a law named for its most high-profile victim:
Russian tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. In 2007 and 2008, Magnitsky uncovered a $230 million tax fraud allegedly perpetrated by ex-
convict Dmitry Klyuev and his confederates, which included state tax officials and Interior Ministry investigators. Magnitsky was
then framed by the very men he exposed; he was beaten to death in a Moscow prison hospital in 2009.
Documents seen by The Daily Beast show that on April 13, 2011, Altem Invest Ltd., a Cyprus-registered company controlled by
Dmitry Klyuev, transferred $4,499 into a Swiss bank account belonging to Dietrich, Baumgartner & Partner. The law firm has also
represented Vladlen Stepanov in a money laundering case opened in 2011 by the Swiss attorney general in relation to the Magnitsky
affair. Stepanov, said to be a member of the Klyuev Group, is the ex-husband of Olga Stepanova, who formerly headed Moscow
Tax Office No. 28, which processed part of the fraudulent $230 million refund.
Leaked documents available at the website Russian Untouchables show that, prior to the Stepanovs’ divorce in 2010, they jointly
controlled nearly $39 million in assets, including multiple offshore companies, an award-winning Moscow dacha, a seaside villa in
Montenegro, and a six-bedroom, seven-bathroom “signature villa” in Dubai’s artificial archipelago Palm Jumeirah, as well as two
luxury apartments in the Kempinski Resort on the same Gulf island chain. This, despite the couple’s official combined salary at the
time equaling $38,381.
Dietrich, Baumgartner featured in the Panama Papers scandal as the main law firm used by the controlling interests of Bank Rossiya,
the central Russian financial institution that moved huge sums of money to offshore companies owned by Dmitry Roldugin, Putin’s
best friend and a concert cellist. Bank Rossiya was sanctioned in March 2014 after Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea
because, as the U.S. government stated, it is “the personal bank for senior officials of the Russian Federation.”
One White House official named Yuri Kovalchuk, single largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, as the “personal banker” for many of
these same officials, including Putin. Kovalchuk was part of the Ozero Cooperative, a lakeshore district in St. Petersburg where a
coterie of Putin’s associates from the 1990s once lived and, apparently, pooled their collective fortunes. All members of the
cooperative are today on-paper billionaires. Roldugin was not one of them, and the musician’s true portfolio as seven-figure bagman
for the president was mostly speculative, until the Panama Papers came to light.
Vladimir Khotimsky, an investment manager at Bank Rossiya, would email Andres Baumgartner instructions at the latter’s Zurich
office. Baumgartner “would pass on Khotimsky’s orders—to enact loans or make share deals—to Mossack Fonseca’s branch office
in the same town,” as the Guardian reported last week. “The Panamanian firm then used its own network of offices in far-flung
jurisdictions to operate anonymous shell companies, in the [British Virgin Islands], Panama itself, or Belize.”
Roldugin was also one of the few members of Putin’s inner circle to evade U.S. sanctions in 2014; as such, his prominence in Bank
Rossiya’s offshore network only grew in the last two years. Dietrich, Baumgartner registered a new Swiss bank account in his
name.
The “linchpin of the entire Putin-linked network,” according to to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), is
a Roldugin-owned company called Sandalwood Continental Limited. It borrowed huge sums from Russian Commercial Bank, the
Cyprus-based subsidiary of the Russian state bank VTB.
From 2009 to 2012, Sandalwood had $800 million in credit lines; it lent $600 million in 2009 and $350 million in 2010 “to a borrower
who had no discernible business model that would allow it to pay back the money,” ICIJ found. “The loans carried no security.
Most did not require installment payments but instead relied on a promise that the entire amount would be returned after a certain
time span.”
In one particularly dubious loan, Sandalwood borrowed $103 million from RCB at a 4.7 percent interest rate and transferred it
immediately to Horwich Trading, a Cypriot company, at a 7.8 percent rate. Jurgen Mossack, a founding partner of Mossack
Fonseca, wrote: “I believe this is delicate…we could be witnessing payments of questionable origin and purpose.”
Dietrich, Baumgartner & Partner processed some of the loan’s paperwork, as its reputation was enlisted the Panamanian firm to
legitimate the transaction. “As we are working with this client from a reputable Russian bank for some years now, and our legal
client of reference is a well-known Swiss law office, I think we can accept the explanations and go ahead,” one attorney at
Mossack’s Lichtenstein office wrote.
The Russian Commercial Bank denies being a clearinghouse for any high-ranking Russian officials. Putin has blamed the Panama
Papers revelations on a U.S. disinformation campaign designed to destabilize Russia, citing a conspiratorial tweet published by
WikiLeaks founders Julian Assange. As for Roldugin, Putin insists that his lifelong friend has spent “almost all the money he earned
on acquiring musical instruments from abroad and bringing them to Russia.”
From: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>
Sent time: 04/15/2016 02:14:51 PM
To: Wayne and Stacy Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>
Subject: Internet Notes 15 April 2016
Attachments: IN15April16.docx

Internet Notes 15 April 2016
More on the call-in (Domestic affairs over foreign policy; No more gifts from Putin)
The call-in SMS messages (On corruption)
Rapid results from the call-in
Quotes from Putin’s call in
Putin’s income and property
Solovey on Russian propaganda abroad and the Panama Papers
Rossiya TV on Navlaniy’s “Secret correspondence”
Belkovskiy on Navalniy/Yashin vs. Kasyanov
A crisis in the Russian opposition? (Kasyanov)
Kamenshchik house arrest extended
Chayka vs Bastrykin on Kamenshchik

More on the call-in (Domestic affairs over foreign policy; No more gifts from Putin)
See yesterday’s notes…
Stanovaya noted not long ago that Putin was turning back to domestic affairs…See the 8 April notes.
Putin answered 80 questions…Vedomosti notes that domestic issues dominated the call-in:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/04/15/637808-prezident-predpochel
The majority of the questions were about economic and social matters—bad roads, wage arrears, the deficit of affordable
medicines, the “energy bridge” to Crimea, reforming communal services, as well as “manual control” questions and requests from
citizens. There was a complaint from fishermen who hadn’t been paid—and towards the end of the program, it was announced
that representatives of the Prosecutor’s office, Rostrud, and the Investigative Committee were on their way to look into the
matter…The Carnegie Center’s Aleksandr Baunov says that the focus on domestic matters means that the Kremlin is not planning
any further foreign interventions—there was more talk about problems with garbage than about Ukraine. Last year, Putin seemed
bored and annoyed by domestic issues, this year he was trying to show he was taking care of managing things at home.
Another one from Vedomosti: http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/04/15/637818-krizisnaya-pryamaya
Last year, Putin, commenting on domestic affairs, told everyone to be patient, that the government had an anti-crisis plan. And this
year? The same problems came up—and Putin said, yes, medicine is too expensive, communal services rates are too high, the
roads are bad, I understand…In the past, the classic call-in format was used to convince citizens that the plan’s in operation and
would work. This time around, nobody got any gifts from the president, either real or symbolic ones (Comment: There as bit
yesterday about Putin giving away his watch to someone in the past. He joked about it, saying he wasn’t wearing a
watch), no promises this time (Comment: There were a few, just not as many, maybe)…Politilog Aleksey Makarkin says that
Russian society has gone through a denial phase on the crisis, then a phase of believing it represented an opportunity for change,
and is now in a state of depression. Putin didn’t spend so much time on stressing positive statistics this time—society is at a stage
of no longer being able to bear the dissonance of the happy talk while facing the reality of the crisis in their everyday lives…
The call-in SMS messages (On corruption)
An e-mail from a reader:
Problem: I can't find a video on youtube that replicates the live feed.
But
Go to the 2:38:25 mark of this one & listen as two business guys talk about checks & corruption with great bitterness. When
Putin answered we got something like "when will we be done with corruption" flashed on the screen and the audience laughs. Putin
refers to the laughter & points during his answer:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3hbgu4f3No
Rapid results from the call-in
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/five-rapid-results-from-putins-call-in-marathon/565961.html
For hapless officials across Russia, President Putin's annual call-in marathon is a wake-up call like no other.
This year, the president received more than 5 million questions, many asking for his assistance. The show lasted for 3 hours 40
minutes, with Putin answering 80 questions from across the nation.
After presenting their concerns to the great leader himself, Russians all over the country are now seeing their problems being solved.
Here is just a small selection of things that have already changed for ordinary Russian citizens, less than 24 hours after Putin's
television phone-in with the nation.
Broken Roads in Omsk
Officials in the Siberian city of Omsk have promised to repair 21 roads in the city after one resident complained to Putin during the
show's very first call.
“Look at the condition of our roads: one hole after another. Our cars break down and wheels fall off. The government does not respond to
our concerns and requests,” Omsk resident Yekaterina told the president via a video call, even showing him one of the pot-holed roads.
Omsk authorities have reacted before the program had even ended. Before three hours were out, one television presenter announced the
roads would be mended by May 1.
Children's Camp for Yaroslavl Wonderkid
One academically-gifted eight year-old from Yaroslavl, Ilya Rayevsky, complained to the president that he had not been accepted into
the prestigious Artek summer camp due to his young age.
“This is obvious neglect,” said Putin. “It means that those who are organizing this camp were not wonderkids themselves, and we'll fix
that.”
Yaroslavl officials stepped in to solve the problem, promising that the boy will attend Artek during the upcoming summer.
Ilya, who is already studying in the fifth grade and is fond of science, has been invited to Moscow's Skolkovo innovation foundation to
share his ideas.
Criminal cases over unpaid wages in Sakhalin and North Ossetia
Complaints from workers at several Russian businesses that their wages had been delayed sparked Putin's outrage- and quick
responses from officials.
Russia's Investigative Committee in the Sakhalin region opened a criminal case into the director of the Ostrovnoy fish plant on Shikotan
island minutes after the workers turned to the president to help them claim unpaid wages.
Workers told Putin that they found themselves in the position of slaves, that they hadn't received wages for several months, and that
they didn't even have money to leave the island. They also said that an appeal to the prosecutor's office had brought no results.
The plant currently owes 53 of its workers 6.8 million rubles ($102,000) in unpaid work. On Friday, the company's director general,
Alexei Popov, apologized to staff for the delays and reimbursed them with part of their owed wages. He explained that delays in were
caused by a bad catch.
A criminal case has also been opened into BPS-Gidrostroy, a building company in Russia's republic of North Ossetia, following a phone-
in complaint. BPS-Gidrostroy owes unpaid wages worth 63 million rubles ($947,000) to 750 of its employees.
Long-awaited wages for Chelyabinsk workers
Another case involving delayed payments raised during Putin's call-in show had a happier ending.
Employees at the Uralavtopritsep factory in Chelyabinsk received their wages in full three hours after asking Putin for help.
Father of four Dmitry Dudkin told Putin that workers hadn't received wages for three months.
Although the President noted that the automotive sector had been badly affected by the crisis, he told the audience, “but to not pay
wages- it shouldn't be like this.”
The Russian Investigative Committee branch in the Chelyabinsk region has also started the looking into the case.
The plant paid its employees a total of 13 million rubles ($195,000) in unpaid wages.
Plots of land for large families in the Stavropol region
A mother from the town of Nevinnomyssk in the Stavropol region was given a plot of land from local authorities after she pleaded for
Putin to help.
In her letter, Maria Solomatina said her family had been given a plot of land in the Stavropol region but had later lost it due to changes in
regional law that reclassified large families like hers to be not 'in need.'
Solomatina’s appeal could make the life of other large families in the region easier too.
Governor of the Stavropol region, Vladimir Vladimirov, has announced that the local government will simplify the registration procedure for
large families in order to improve their living conditions.
Comment: Putin’s call in is like one of those audiences a king might have had in which the subjects come to plead for
justice and voice complaints about the lords. A good monarch steps in to help the people and confirm his status in
dispensing justice. Putin’s been good at it—his effectiveness in playing that role is one reason for his relative
popularity. Russians expect to be mistreated, they expect chaos, but they also expect the leader to step in to correct
the worst injustices from time to time or at least slap the boyars around a little, giving the people some satisfaction in
that regard. But woe to the monarch who loses the aura of power. That’s trouble.
Quotes from Putin’s call in
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putins-annual-call-in-brightest-quotes/565842.html
Putin's 14th annual call-in marathon this Thursday lasted three and a half hours: enough time for the president to answer 80 questions
from across Russia.
Of course, the seasoned statesman was sure to use the platform to showcase his skill, wit, and political knowledge.
Here is a short wrap up of the session's best quotes.
“If someone has decided to drown, no one can help them.”
An unusual response to a question from 12-year old Varya Kuznetsova, who asked the President which foreign leader he would save
from a watery death: Turkish President Recep Erdogan, or Ukraine's Petro Poroshenko. Putin showed no favorites, although he did add,
“Russia will give a helping hand to any partner who wants it.” Earlier, Putin said that: “Turkey has been, and remains, a friend and
partner of Russia. However, problems arise with the leaders of countries whose responses to situations are inadequate.”
“Here in Russia, we can imagine the bribe in the form of greyhounds puppies, but violins and cellos? I've never heard of that!”
Putin used the show to comment on the Panama Papers, a leak which exposed the secret offshore accounts of many from Putin's inner
circle. In particular, his close friend cellist Sergei Roldugin was targeted. According to Putin, all the money earned by Roldugin was
spent on the musical instruments.
"Husband and wife are the same devil."
Putin used this old Russian proverb to respond to questions on U.S. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Putin couldn't help but note
how long the same two parties had been in power in this supposed flagship of democracy. "There were the Bushes,” he said, “and now
the wife of Bill Clinton is running for president. Where is the diversity?"
"The fewer teeth you have, the more you like porridge"
One little girl asked Putin if he too was forced to eat porridge when he was a child. The president said that he was never being forced to
do anything he didn't want to, although he has always liked porridge and still eats it each morning with pleasure.
"There is such sin in Russia, and we will pray for forgiveness"
Putin was asked by one caller if he swore when not being filmed. "Sometimes, but I only swear at myself,” he confessed. “It happens
when I am dissatisfied with myself."
Putin’s income and property
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putins-income-increased-to-89-million-rubles-in-2015/566004.html
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s official income rose by 1 million rubles (roughly $15,000) in 2015, according to his annual declaration of
property and earnings. It brings his total annual pay to 8.9 million rubles ($133,000), the Interfax news agency reported Friday.
The Russian leader also declared a modest 1500 square meters of land, a 77 square meter apartment and a garage. He also has the use of a
state-owned apartment with its own parking space.
The amount of property officially owned by the president has not changed since 2014. He also declared three vehicles: a Soviet GAZ-М-21, a
'Niva' model Lada, and a Skiff boat trailer.
There was no mention of Putin's alleged new $1 billion mansion, or any income from shares or investments.
In 2007, a CIA report estimated Putin's wealth at around $40 billion — a statement on which he declined to comment. He has been named as
Forbes' most powerful man for the third year in a row.

Solovey on Russian propaganda abroad and the Panama Papers
http://rus.postimees.ee/3655049/valerij-solovej-rossija-mstit-germanii-cherez-smi
Citing the story of Liza who claimed she was raped by migrants in Germany (See yesterday’s notes), Solovey notes that Russian-
language TV was very effective at stirring up Russians living in Germany. Generally speaking, TV propaganda is effective among
Russians and many Russian speakers in the former USSR (he later notes that Latvia shut down Russian-language “Sputnik” TV,
which he thinks is an overreaction—a lot of those people, especially the younger ones, prefer living in Latvia to Russia) and in
Germany. RT is another story—it’s not very influential in Europe. It’s meant as an alternative to Anglo-Saxon media around the
world, especially in India, Latin America, and SE Asia, but it doesn’t have much influence in Europe. The Kremlin is using TV to
try and strengthen its position on foreign policy issues. As far as Germany, there’s an element of personal vengeance: Putin thought
he had a special personal relationship with Merkel and it turns out that he didn’t. But propaganda is aimed at strengthening ties with
some political forces in Europe who are ready for cooperation with Russia—parties on the right, conservative parties, Euro
sceptics. The Kremlin’s aim is to weaken any anti-Russian coalition…
What kind of impact did the Panama Papers scandal have on Putin’s image abroad and in Russia?
Solovey answers that in Russia, it didn’t change anything—those who consider themselves in opposition still are, with more
evidence confirming their views. Those who support vlast or are neutral still are. The scandal had more impact abroad—it
represents a serious process that will have very important strategic consequences. There will be a demonization of a part of the
elite, not only the Russian elite, either. State officials were involved, there is a suspicion of corruption…Since the Americans think
that the whole world falls under their jurisdiction, they’ll open criminal cases. The American state machine works like a bulldozer—
slow, but inevitably, it will find you anywhere…One consequence of the scandal will be Russia’s self isolation. From the point of
view of the Russian elite, the scandal is directed at the top of the Russian system and the US stands behind it. Reaching agreement
with the US is simply not possible. The consequences will be very serious, but the process will take a while to play out…
Russian TV isn’t talking about the scandal and for a large part of Russian society, the scandal doesn’t exist. Some have heard
about it, but they don’t understand it. If the offshore story comes up, it will be in connection with Poroshenko, but not the Russian
president…The story is that the offshores were for strategic reserves, skirting sanctions, but there are other, conspiratorial stories.
There are more documents yet to be seen—the scandal will continue and it won’t be possible to hide from it.
Investigative Committee wants to question Browder about Magnitskiy’s death
Recall this item from the 11 April notes:
[Rossiya TV on Navlaniy’s “Secret correspondence”

Comment: The first attack was on Kasyanov. Now it’s Navalniy’s turn. The aim is what Belkovskiy mentioned—prevent a “color revolution” and
foreign interference in the elections, control the political process…
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2741466#
From Dmitriy Kiselev’s program…It’s about Navalniy (described as a “corrupt recidivist”) e-mailing (and apparently in Skype conversations with)
another Kremlin enemy, William Browder (a “swindler” who “inspired the Magnitskiy list”), with VGTRK’s Yevgeniy Popov describing the “secret
correspondence” as revealing channels between the Russian opposition and the US and UK. Former Berezovsky security man Sergey Solokolov
(Comment: I’m not sure where he comes into this story—as an informant on goings on in the UK?) says the correspondence was picked up off of
servers set up by the CIA and the MI6 as a channel for their agents (“Freedom”—Navalniy and “Soloman”—Browder) for plotting the overthrow of
the Russian constitutional system (Operation “Drozh” or “Tremor”)…The special operation “Drozh” dates back to 1986 and then-CIA Director
William Casey, who planned the overthrow of the system in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Part of the plan was to gain control over financial flows
and assets.
Former MVD investigator Pavel Karpov (Comment: He was involved in the Magnitskiy affair) says that Browder and Navalniy work parallel to one
another, as well as together…They first made contact in 2006, when Browder was already banned from entering Russia and Navalniy was a young
Yabloko activist. Browder wanted Navalniy to help him with “greenmail projects”—Navalniy was initially skeptical. Browder told Navalniy he would
be a “hero of the minority shareholders” and would accumulate “reputational capital”…Eventually Navalniy agreed and Browder suggested he
start with VTB. Browder’s target list included Gazprom, Rosneft, Sberbank, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz. But Navalniy needed money, so Browder
got him in contact with banker Vladimir Ashurkov (Comment: I think Ashukrov, who at one time worked for Alfa, was a channel for Alfa money to
the non-systemic opposition. I think Alfa supported the “protest wave” in 2011-2012; See the notes from 11 January; 17 May 2015; 29
December 2014; and 6 November 2014 for more on Ashurkov). The report reproduces correspondence it claims was from an MI6 controller who
channeled R100 million to Navalniy and company.
When Magnitskiy (portrayed here as engaging in fraud himself) was arrested, Browder asked for Navalniy’s help. Navalniy suggested that they
play up Magnitskiy’s suffering, something Russians would respond to. But the Western controller (MI6 “Agent Belt”) was unhappy—the story
wasn’t generating enough interest, so the best thing to do was use connections to see to it that medical aid to Magnitskiy was cut off. Then
Magnitskiy died. Sergey Kurginyan chimes in to say that the person most interested in seeing Magnitskiy dead was Browder. Browder
subsequently began his campaign to get the US to set up a “Magnitskiy list”—Navalniy conducted the information campaign in Russia.
Another Browder-Navalniy project was the information attack on Prosecutor General Chayka, beginning with the allegedly illegal businesses of his
son (See, for instance, the 7 December 2016 notes; Comment: Recall that Chayka blamed Browder for the kompromat)—this followed
investigators searching the offices of Browder’s firms on Cyprus.]
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=565839
Russia’s Investigative Committee intends to question British-American investor William Browder about the murder of whistleblower Sergei
Magnitsky, the Committee's website reported Thursday.
Speculation on the involvement of William “Bill” Browder — an outspoken Putin critic — was brought to the Committee's attention by former
Russian Interior Ministry investigator, Pavel Karpov.
In a letter to the Investigative Committee, Karpov suggested that Browder, Magnitsky's employer at the company Hermitage Capital, may have
been involved in his death. He also speculated on the involvement of MI6 agents.
Magnitsky died in 2009 under suspicious circumstances while in police custody. He allegedly had just uncovered a tax fraud involving several
Russian officials.
On Dec. 14, 2012, the U.S. introduced the Magnitsky Act, which banned certain Russians involved in human rights violations from entering the
U.S. The list currently includes 39 individuals, RIA Novosti reported.
Belkovskiy on Navalniy/Yashin vs. Kasyanov
From yesterday’s notes:
[A crisis in the Russian opposition? (Kasyanov)
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/crisis‐in‐russian‐opposition‐as‐two‐withdraw‐from‐election‐primaries/565739.html
Two of Russia’s leading opposition politicians announced Wednesday 13 April their withdrawal from election primaries being organised by the
PARNAS democratic coalition.
Ivan Zhdanov. Head of Law at Alexey Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and Ilya Yashin, PARNAS political party deputy chairman,
announced they would not be standing within the space of 24 hours.
Their reaction comes after PARNAS leader, Mikhail Kasyanov, announced his refusal to withdraw from the list of proposed candidates, despite
recent involvement in a well-publicised scandal.
Kasyanov was the only politician to be included on the list of potential candidates since last December when the coalition was formed.
“I think that Kasyanov's position destroys voters' trust and scraps us from the ability to be an effective opposition coalition,” Yashin said.
Zhdanov's cited similar reasons to Yashin, but added that he was too busy with other political projects.
“The list would have been much more respectable if its leader was elected at primaries. Openness is the core value of the opposition,” Zhdanov
told The Moscow Times. He stressed that the withdrawal was his personal decision and that he hadn't heard of anybody else planning to quit
their candidacy.
The decision to give Kasyanov the privilege of heading the list of candidates had been controversial. The coalition was criticised for being non-
democratic and for giving the Kremlin a chance to concentrate anti-opposition smears on a single figure.
That chance was used when state-controlled television channel NTV aired grainy video footage of Mikhail Kasyanov and a colleague, Natalia
Pelevina, in bed together. They are heard criticizing their opposition colleagues.
“Given such circumstances, we would be answering idiotic questions about who slept with whom and who called someone names in bed
throughout the course of the whole [State Duma election] campaign,” Yashin explained.
Kasyanov told KommersantFM radio that he saw no problems with Yashin's choice. “It's his decision and he has the right for any decision and
it's his opinion,” he said.
Unlike Yashin, Zhdanov has said that his decision had nothing to do with the publication of the film. The lawyer believe that PARNAS still have
good chances at the parliamentary elections, “because there's no alternative”.
“Democratic coalition members now have to choose between bad and worse,” the political expert Alexey Makarkin told The Moscow Times.
Makarkin believes the film scandal will push opposition members away from Kasyanov. He also said that voter activity at the primaries appeared
to be low, and that cancelling them could be an option.
At the same time, Makarkin also believes that the scandal will not result in any dramatic changes: PARNAS will survive, and Yashin will probably
enter the electoral campaign in a single-member district.
“The situation in general is a plus to everyone, not a minus,” Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of Golos, an independent elections monitor, told The
Moscow Times. “It is good when such things pass before the election campaign. When it starts, nothing will distract them. It seems like they [the
opposition]are at a stage when they need to clarify the relationship”.]
Kasyanov says he plans on keeping the first spot on the PARNAS party list for himself, scandal or no scandal, and regardless of
the results of the primaries. So Yashin has refused to take part in the party primaries. Belkovskiy: what we are seeing shows the
contradictions and conflicts within the non-systemic opposition. But this won’t mean the total collapse of the democratic coalition
—it’s of too much value to people like Kasyanov and Navalniy. Yashin represents Navalniy’s team, which wants to seize control of
the opposition and take charge of it—and there is a reason they think that way. A certain part of PARNAS’s assets, regional
structures, consider Navalniy their leader more than Kasyanov and view Navalniy as having better political prospects. The struggle
for power between Kasyanov and Navalniy is certainly damaging to the non-systemic opposition and could cause a split at a time
the opposition needs to consolidate…We understand that the Kremlin will likely not allow a large majority of opposition candidates
into the Duma and under such conditions, consolidation becomes even more important. There’s also a battle going on for the
political-moral legacy of Boris Nemtsov. A lot of PARNAS activists still consider him as a more authoritative figure than
Kasyanov. If Navalniy and Yashin can convince activists that they represent Nemtsov’s legacy better than Kasyanov, then that
would be a trump card in the struggle over the party.
Belkovskiy says he agrees that Navalniy has better prospects as a leader than Kasyanov, but morally he supports Kasyanov—one
can’t use Kremlin provocations as a basis for infighting in the opposition…
Kamenshchik house arrest extended
Recall that the Prosecutor’s office has tried to have Kamenshchik released from pre-trial custody, while the rival Investigative
Committee (SK) has resisted that.
From the 29 March notes:
[Chayka vs Bastrykin on Kamenshchik
Comment: Yesterday, we read that Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir Malinovskiy had recently made some demands to the Investigative
Committee’s Bastrykin regarding legal violations during the investigation of a case against Domodedovo owner Dmitriy Kamenshchik and did
not get any reply. We’ve been reading that Rotenberg wants to take control of Domodedovo and was behind the case against Kamenshchik—see,
for instance, the 26 February notes. Of course, as written up in these notes many times, Bastrykin and Chayka have been rivals for a long time
and have clashed frequently.
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/72416.html
Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir Malinovskiy has noted that his office, acting in its oversight capacity, had earlier called on the SK to close the
case and release Kamenshchik from house arrest, but was ignored (Kommersant reported the story on 22 March:
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2944051; Chayka vs Bastrykin regarding Kamenshchik also came up in the 26 February notes). Now the
Prosecutor’s office is threatening to take the SK to court over the case. ]

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/moscow-court-extends-house-arrest-of-domodedovo-airport-owner/565959.html
A Moscow court has extended the house arrest of Domodedovo airport owner Dmitry Kamenshchik until July 28, the Interfax news
agency reported Friday.
The Basmanny court granted a preliminary investigation into charges connected to terror attacks at the airport in 2011.
Russia’s Investigative Committee announced the arrest of Kamenshchik in February under Article 238 of the Criminal Code, for providing
services “that do not meet safety requirements, resulting in the death of two or more people.”
He was denied a 50 million ruble bail.
The Domodedovo bomb attack in 2011 killed 37 people and injured 170 at the airport's international arrivals lounge on Jan. 24, 2011.
Militant Islamist group ‘Caucasus Emirate,’ a terrorist group banned in Russia, claimed responsibility for the incident.

From: steedman hinckley <steedman@earthlink.net>
Sent time: 04/11/2016 06:00:19 AM
To: Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: RED NOTICE ---- Fwd: Zavtra etc on Magnitskiy

Will be interesting to see what legs this story develops.
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 11, 2016, at 2:08 AM, Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Don’t know whether you filed/kept the stuff I sent, but some of this material (or better, its themes)
surfaced in Chayka’s response to Navalnyy’s movie on his kids.
And there are elements in the recent mess.
From: Robert Otto <robertcotto@verizon.net>
Date: August 7, 2011 5:52:57 AM EDT
To: Robert Otto <ACrotto@us-state.osis.gov>
1) Browder & Magnitskiy cooked up illegal schemes to buy Gazprom
shares before the "ring"
2) On top of this, Magnitskiy devised schemes to avoid taxes: bought 7%
of the shares for 300m and sold for 4b w/o paying taxes
4) Gasanov then proposes three Russians Kurochkin (dies in Spring 2008),
Markelov & Khlebnikov head the Hermitage connected firms
7) Browder worked with Stepanova of the 28th Tax Inspectorate (no
wonder he has stuff on her).
12) Markelov arrested in 11/08 - didn't know Browder, but knew Gasanov,
Korobeynikov, & Magnitskiy
16) 2 May 2011: RosGaz publishes piece noting all 4 deaths -
http://www.rg.ru/2011/05/02/magnitskii-site.html
------
1) How did Browder pull off all this stuff under the eyes of spets? Are they
complicit?
2) How does Stepanova, corrupted by Browder, get to work for
Serdyukov?
3) Why don't the authorities publsih forensic examination of Magnitskiy
death
and is it not strange the president is relying on NAK, a body w/o
authority/powers
---------
Ovchinskiy
4) why aren't the three cases connected w Magnitskiy (tax avoidance,
illegal return of tax money, death) united into one
Спецоперация «Магнитский»
Владимир Матусевич
03 августа 2011 года
Номер 31 (924)
Государственный департамент США 26 июля
утвердил список, состоящий из российских
должностных лиц, которым запрещён въезд в
Соединённые Штаты, и на их счета в американских
банках налагается арест. Таким образом,
должностные лица России подвергаются
беспрецедентной диффамации со стороны
иностранного государства.
ОГРОМНОЕ ДАВЛЕНИЕ, которое сейчас идёт на
Россию: на власть, на судебную систему,
правоохранительные органы, практически
вмешательство во внутренние дела России в связи с
делом Магнитского заставляет разобраться в этом
вопросе.
Любопытно: почему Уильям Браудер, совершивший в
России вместе с Сергеем Магнитским вульгарное
экономическое преступление, по существу —
финансовый мошенник, имеет возможность
использовать для уклонения от суда в России
государственный аппарат Америки и европейских
стран? Откуда такие колоссальные возможности у
предпринимателя, который заработал миллиарды
долларов именно на бизнесе в России?
Второй вопрос: почему Соединённые Штаты и ряд
европейских государств делают громкие заявления
только на основании недостоверной информации
Браудера и совершенно не интересуются подлинными
документами по уголовному делу? А ведь российская
сторона неоднократно предлагала заинтересованным
лицам и организациям познакомиться с этим делом:
пришлите запрос, вам будут направлены
интересующие документы. Все доказательства вины и
Браудера, и Магнитского в совершении экономических
преступлений на территории России имеются. Но
почему-то недружественная по отношению к России
политика выстраивается исключительно на основании
однобокой информации, без всякой проверки её
правдивости, составляются крамольные списки,
объявляются санкции.
Доказательства, которые есть у российского суда, у
органов следствия, представленные в любой
американский или европейский суд, неизбежно
повлекли бы уголовную ответственность Браудера и
Магнитского. Можно не сомневаться, что любая из
стран, которая критикует в связи с этим делом Россию,
в судебном порядке приняла бы решение осудить
обоих.
Именно поэтому Браудер делает всё возможное, чтобы
материалы расследования никогда не поступили в суд.
Знакомясь с обстоятельствами этого дела, приходишь к
выводу, что настоящей причиной смерти Магнитского
является именно это обстоятельство — желание
Браудера, чтобы ни при каких обстоятельствах дело не
получило огласку в суде. Это было бы моральным
крахом Браудера, его компании, перед всем миром
было бы показано истинное лицо финансового
мошенника.
Лживое обвинение российской стороны Браудером
состоит в следующем: якобы, Сергей Магнитский был
арестован за то, что сделал заявление о совершении
сотрудниками правоохранительных органов хищения
денег в размере 230 миллионов долларов США и
мужественно продолжал их изобличать, находясь уже
под стражей. За это его в тюрьме и замучили.
Но ни одного такого рода заявления Магнитского не
существует. Ни одного заявления, данного им, когда он
ещё не находился под стражей, о том, что, вот,
сотрудники совершили хищения. А находясь под
стражей, Магнитский вообще отказался давать любые
показания, пользуясь своим правом, данным статьёй 51
Конституции РФ. То есть заявления не было ни до, ни
после.
Но в ужасающих красках разрисована лживая картина,
по которой, якобы, Магнитский — бесстрашный
обличитель неправедных сотрудников, которые сами
совершили хищения, сами расследовали дело,
заведённое против него. Был создан не
подтверждённый ничем миф, который не только
существует, но и усиленно раздувается.
Браудер, выдвигая обвинения в хищениях, по ходу дела
несколько раз менял суждения: то работники
российских правоохранительных органов —
расхитители, то он заявлял, что хищения совершили
западные инвесторы. (Видимо, ему в тот момент был
нужен механизм давления на западных конкурентов).
А в недавнем заявлении он говорит, что хищение 230
миллионов долларов совершили члены правительства
России. Сообщает, что собирает доказательства,
намекая, что в этом деле есть интерес лично премьера
и президента страны. (Как мы увидим, Браудеру не
привыкать искать компроматы и пользоваться ими,
извлекая из этого вполне конкретную выгоду, в этом он
профессионал).
Американский сенатор Бенджамин Кардин вместе с
сенатором-республиканцем Джоном Маккейном на
основании заявлений Браудера, не подтверждённых ни
одним из документов, указали в своем известном
"списке Магнитского", что тот был арестован без суда
на три года. В России без суда вообще арестовать
невозможно, у нас нет людей, арестованных без
решения суда. А срок в три года, видимо, приведён для
нагнетания ужасов. Это у американцев в Гуантанамо
сидят люди без суда, без следствия, и не на три года
посажены, а бессрочно.
Почему Браудеру, который себя преподносит как
обычный предприниматель, позволено в России
безнаказанно совершать преступления? Почему он
может составить без всякого основания списки лиц,
которые, якобы, виноваты в совершении уголовных
преступлений? Почему его списки сразу
воспринимают на Западе без всякой проверки, а в
России перед ним прогибаются?
ЧТОБЫ ЭТО ПОНЯТЬ, нужно знать, кто такой
Браудер, как он оказался в России и чем здесь
занимался. Вот небольшой экскурс в его биографию.
Дед Уильяма Браудера с тридцатых годов прошлого
века до 1945 года был генеральным секретарём
Компартии США. В 1945 году из партии был исключён:
он подготовил роспуск Компартии, был заподозрен
своими соратниками в измене, в связях со
спецслужбами и за это исключён. То есть, в роду этого
парня не без авантюристов.
Интересна биография и самого Браудера. После
окончания финансовой школы в США он прибывает в
1989 году Великобританию и в начале 90-х годов
принимает британское гражданство. Этот факт сам по
себе интересен: поскольку между Британией и США
существуют особые взаимоотношения, гражданину
США можно заниматься бизнесом, заключить брак,
платить налоги в Великобритании без британского
гражданства.
У принятия гражданства объяснение может быть
таково: оно необходимо для поступления на
государственную службу Великобритании. На какой
вид государственной службы поступил Уильям Браудер
в начале 90-х годов, несложно догадаться. Особенно,
если посмотреть на его деятельность в России, куда он
приехал в 1996 году. Здесь уже находилась компания
"Фаерстоун и Дункан" близкого знакомого Браудера
американского гражданина Фаерстоуна. Фактически
это родственные фирмы: Hermitage Capital, созданная
Браудером, и фирма Фаерстоуна. Находились эти
"тихие американцы" в близких деловых отношениях.
Юридическая фирма Фаерстоуна появилась в России в
1993 году. И сразу же сотрудники попали в
трагическую ситуацию: 3 октября 1993 года Терри
Дункан, партнёр Фаерстоуна, был убит в районе
Останкино при попытке вынести из-под огня
американского журналиста. Дункан — единственный
гражданином США, который был убит во время тех
событий.
Но что делали "мирные американские юристы" во
время тех событий в России? Почему находились в
центре перестрелки и почему фактически
обеспечивали физическую защиту американских
журналистов? Терри Дункан поступил геройски: своим
телом прикрывал журналиста, выводил из-под огня. Но
зачем мирному юристу было находиться там и
выводить из-под огня другого мирного гражданина
Америки? Всё становится ясно, если предположить,
что погиб сотрудник спецслужб, который до конца
выполнил свой долг.
Браудер после прибытия в Россию занялся
деятельностью, которая в западных странах является
преступной. В России она наказуемой не является, чем
он и воспользовался: занимался гринмейлом
(корпоративный шантаж). Он покупал акции
компаний, в том числе крупных. Интересовался
Сбербанком, Газпромом, РАО ЕЭС, Сургутнефтегазом.
И начинал компании "раскачивать": на правах
акционера заказывал аудиторские проверки, добывал
компрометирующие материалы. То есть, основной его
деятельностью был сбор компромата. И затем,
используя компромат, организовывал акции по
дискредитации компаний, в дальнейшем получая
крупные отступные.
НАЦЕЛЕННОСТЬ СОТРУДНИКОВ фирмы
Hermitage Capital и самого Браудера на сбор
компромата в отношении и компаний, и
государственных деятелей, и крупнейших российских
бизнесменов привлекла к нему внимание российских
спецслужб. В результате в 2005 году ему был запрещён
въезд в Российскую Федерацию по соображениям
национальной безопасности. Однако, его фирма
продолжала работать.
Но ещё в 2003-2004 годах Браудер начал незаконно и
очень активно скупать акции Газпрома, хотя тогда
действовал указ президента России о запрете покупки
акций иностранными гражданами и компаниями. (Указ
был издан, чтобы контрольный пакет оказался в руках
РФ и российских граждан. Поэтому эти акции
котировались исключительно на внутреннем
российском рынке и стоили недорого).
Браудер вместе с Магнитским разработали незаконную
схему покупки акций. Для этого они приняли в свою
компанию, зарегистрированную в Калмыкии, граждан
России — половину от числа сотрудников: в таком
случае компания уже не считалась иностранной.
Магнитский, видимо, предложил Браудеру ещё и
сэкономить на уплате налогов, разработав схему ухода
от них. (Схема данного преступления была изъята в
ходе следствия именно из компьютера Магнитского).
То есть, Магнитский, которого сейчас выставляют как
жертву борьбы с коррупцией, просто обслуживал
иностранного финансового делягу и помогал ему
уклоняться от уплаты российских налогов.
Преступление по уклонению от уплаты налогов было
совершено довольно просто. Браудер купил 7% акций
Газпрома (в обход закона) за 300 миллионов долларов.
И перепродал. Прибыль у него превзошла 4
миллиарда, налогов от этой сделки не заплатил.
Как уклонились от уплаты? Приняли в три небольшие
калмыцкие компании инвалидов, людей умственно
отсталых, финансовыми аналитиками, хотя у
некоторых не было даже среднего образования, а кое-
кто не умел читать и писать. Вот, например, какие
волшебные превращения происходили с людьми,
попавшими в поле зрения Браудера и компании. Так,
гражданин Б., например, который, как следует из
официальной справки, "состоит на учёте у психиатра с
диагнозом "лёгкая умственная отсталость", является
инвалидом II-й группы", работавший то штукатуром, то
каменщиком, то сторожем, принят в ООО Сатурн-
инвест (фирма Браудера), о чём свидетельствует
запись, сделанная Магнитским и подпись Браудера,
экспертом аналитического отдела.
Такие вот "финансовые аналитики" создали в фирме
50%-ную массу российских граждан и инвалидов, что
позволило не платить налоги. Да, инвалиды
пользуются льготами, но совпадение двух
составляющих дают право фирме на льготы: инвалиды
должны реально работать там и на той должности, где
они приняты на работу. А в силу своего образования и
состояния здоровья финансовыми аналитиками
принятые работать не могли. Во-вторых, это должно
быть их основное место работы. А эти инвалиды, как
явствует из документов, трудились дворниками,
разнорабочими, на тех реальных рабочих местах у них
были трудовые книжки.
Никакой сложности в виду ясности обстоятельств в
деле Браудера и Магницкого не было. Тем не менее,
это налоговое дело удавалось неоднократно
прекращать, постановление об его возбуждении не раз
отменялось.
У высланного в 2005 году из России Браудера в 2007
году, о чём он сам говорит, появилась надежда на
возвращение: он обратился к будущему президенту
России на "русском вечере" в Давосе. Ему пообещали
разобраться. Он, рассчитывая, что разрешат вернуться
в Россию и заняться бизнесом, платит 11 миллиардов
рублей налогов по итогам работы за 2006 год.
Но в 2007 году возбуждается ещё одно уголовное дело
по неуплате Браудером и его компанией налогов, но
уже не в Калмыкии, а в Москве. И вопрос о
возвращении в Россию отпадает, поскольку им
начинают интересоваться как потенциальным
обвиняемым.
После этого происходит беспрецедентное событие.
Если бы Браудер был просто частным инвестором,
каковым себя и представляет, оно не могло бы
состояться: Браудер вывозит весь состав своей
компании Hermitage Сapital, 20 граждан России, в
Великобританию. Самая настоящая эвакуация.
Каждому из них, хотя визовые вопросы в Англии
решаются очень сложно (порядка 30% — отказов)
сразу выдают визы. Причём, из всего этого персонала
следствие, кроме самого Браудера, интересовал только
один человек— Черкасов, который шёл по
московскому налоговому делу. Остальные были просто
свидетелями. Такая масштабная эвакуация,
безусловно, без поддержки властей, компетентных
органов Великобритании невозможна. Это ещё раз
заставляет усомниться в том, что Браудер — простой
предприниматель. За ним, очевидно, стоят серьёзные
структуры. И последовавшие события, в том числе
разворачивающиеся на наших глазах, это
подтверждают.
В ДЕЛО ВСТУПАЕТ некий Гасанов. Он предлагает
троим российским гражданам: Курочкину, Маркелову и
Хлебникову, — стать на время руководителями
московских фирм Браудера, в отношении которых
расследуются налоговые преступления. А незадолго до
того в офисах этих компаний происходят обыски,
изымается подлинная печать.
Поэтому, скорее всего, Магнитским, изготовляется
несколько дубликатов печатей. Кстати, именно
дубликаты, а не подлинная печать, в дальнейшем
используются при хищении. Этим привлечённым
лицам Гасановым предлагает участвовать в возврате
денег, которые были заплачены Браудером в качестве
налогов.
Факты таковы. Гасанов находит подставных
директоров, лиц, ранее судимых, они соглашаются на
участие в этой операции. Гасанов, действуя по
доверенности владельца этих трёх компаний,
подлинность которой никто не опроверг (а компании
курируются самим Браудером) меняет трёх директоров,
перерегистрирует компании на этих трёх
привлечённых лиц — новых владельцев. Далее следует
обращение в налоговую инспекцию, что выплачены эти
деньги ошибочно, и их надо вернуть.
А как только в сентябре 2007 года происходит
перерегистрация этих фирм, 1 октября этого же года
Гасанов умирает от сердечного приступа. Это первая
смерть в данной истории. Если бы Гасанов был жив, он
мог бы рассказать, кто и каким образом организовал
это преступление. Но он вдруг умирает. После смерти
Гасанова в дело вступает банкир Коробейников, на
счета которого эти возвращённые деньги переводят.
Не может не показаться странным, что государство
вообще принимает решение вернуть совершенно
законно полученные налоговые деньги.
Но дело, может быть, в том, что Браудер ещё с 90-х
годов обслуживался в 28-й налоговой инспекции,
оброс связями и знакомствами. Начальник налоговой
инспекции Степанова и её муж Степанов были
знакомы с юристами Браудера.
Позже Браудер опубликовал компромат на мужа
Степановой и её саму, что у них есть собственность, а
эта собственность оформлялась на Степанова
юридической фирмой самого Браудера. Не значит ли
это, что он коррумпировал органы, чтобы затем их
шантажировать? Так что о причинах возвращения этих
денег версий много. Возможно, в этом деле
участвовали высокопоставленные сотрудники
налоговых органов. Если это так, их необходимо
выявлять.
Налоговая служба после проверки возвращает 5,4
млрд. рублей. Они идут на счета банка гражданина
Коробейникова.
БРАУДЕРОМ БЫЛА ПРОДЕЛАНА ещё одна
уникальная операция. После того, как прошла
перерегистрация фирм, как были поданы документы в
налоговую службу, он организовал направление
заявления генеральному прокурору и в МВД о том, что
у него похитили три фирмы. Он знал, что уголовное
дело не будет возбуждено немедленно. Потому что, во-
первых, эти фирмы были перерегистрированы на
основании подлинной доверенности, выданной
кипрской компанией, подконтрольной Браудеру. (А
спросить Гасанова об обстоятельствах этого дела было
нельзя, так как он к этому моменту был мёртв). Во-
вторых, на тот момент на счетах этих фирм был ноль
рублей ноль копеек. Материального ущерба тут не
было, потому что фирмы не имели собственности. У
них ничего не было, и Браудер, когда писал это
заявление, осознавал, что это не более, чем операция
прикрытия. Нет оснований для возбуждения дела —
нет материального ущерба!
Деньги, поступившие в банк Коробейникова, были
разбиты на мелкие партии. Ушли в Литву, а оттуда — в
"далёкие края". Действительно, в результате было
похищено 230 миллионов долларов, о которых, якобы,
и заявлял Магнитский. В дальнейшем уголовное дело
по этому поводу было возбуждено, но не на основании
заявления Магнитского, — как уже говорилось, он
никаких заявлений о хищениях не делал. Более того,
он был допрошен в июле 2008 года и в ходе допроса
пояснил, что о каких-то махинациях сам узнал из
газеты "Ведомости".
Далее события разворачивались так. Было заведено
уголовное дело о хищении 5,4 миллиардов рублей, был
установлен Коробейников, который знал, каким
образом к нему деньги приходили и уходили, и
которого необходимо было допросить.
12 сентября 2008 года возбуждается уголовное дело по
хищению 5. 4 миллиардов рублей. Начинают
разыскивать Коробейникова, чтобы допросить. Но 24
сентября его труп находят на стройке: он выпал с
балкона. Причина смерти — падение с высоты. А
вскрытие показало: его сердце сильно увеличено, что
свидетельствует о том, что перед падением у него,
скорее всего, случился сердечный приступ. Этот
важнейший свидетель и потенциальный обвиняемый
тоже умер. Кстати, весной 2008 года скончался от
сердечного приступа и один из трёх директоров,
которые совершали непосредственно хищения —
Курочкин. К сентябрю 2008 года уже три важнейших
свидетеля были мертвы.
Далее Магнитского стали приглашать по делу о
налоговом преступлении, речь зашла о предъявлении
ему обвинений. Магнитский остался единственным
человеком в России, кто знал Браудера, работал с ним
и мог дать на него показания, все остальные были либо
в Великобритании, либо скончались. К ноябрю 2008
года все дела по неуплате налогов компанией Браудера
скапливаются в следственной части Следственного
комитета МВД: из Татарстана забирается уголовное
дело о махинациях, из Калмыкии, из Москвы. Дела
объединяются. Расследование поручается следователю
Сильченко.
Со стороны компании Браудера звучали обвинения, что
преступления расследовали те лица, которых
Магнитский обвинял в хищениях. Но, как уже было
сказано, он никого в хищениях не обвинял. Что
касается расследования, действительно, первая
следственная группа включала в себя следователей,
которые работали над делами в Калмыкии, Татарстане
и Москве. Таков порядок: когда принимается решение
об объединении дел, то поначалу все следователи
остаются в группе, потому что они должны дела
передать. Следователи передают дела руководителю
следственной группы, которым был Сильченко.
В ноябре 2008 года поступает информация о том, что
Магнитский собирается уезжать в Великобританию: он
идёт в фотоателье, а на тот момент оперативники его
уже опекали, фотографируется на британскую визу.
Поступила также информация, что Магнитский
заказал билет в Киев. То есть, может улететь, не
дожидаясь в Москве паспорта, который ему передадут
в посольстве Великобритании на Украине. Кроме того,
Магнитский активным образом воздействовал на
свидетелей по делу, склоняя их к даче ложных
показаний.
ПОСКОЛЬКУ ВСЕ СОТРУДНИКИ фирмы Hermitage
Capital уже выехали, а кто не выехал, умерли, у
следователя иного выхода, кроме ареста
подозреваемого, не было. Магнитского задержали,
избирается санкция на арест, потому что это
преступление относится к тяжким, наказание — до 6
лет. Он и был арестован, потому что сомнений в том,
что сбежит, не было.
После ареста Магнитский замыкается, отказывается
давать показания, и никаких заявлений от него не
поступало. Серьёзных заболеваний, препятствий для
заключения под стражу у него не было. Он
действительно, о чём сейчас кричат правозащитники,
переводился из изолятора в изолятор — в связи с
ремонтом, на этот счёт имеется справка. Но ни в
жалобах самого Магнитского, ни в обращениях
адвокатов не говорится о том, что состояние его
здоровья препятствует нахождению в следственном
изоляторе. Последнее ходатайство следователю было в
августе 2009 года о необходимости ультразвукового
исследования. Ему неоднократно проводились и УЗИ,
и исследования в связи с холециститом. Возможно
даже, это обращение было умышленной провокацией.
Ведь ещё с середины 90-х годов, о чём не мог не знать
адвокат, следственные изоляторы выведены из системы
МВД, переданы в систему минюста РФ, они не
подчиняются следствию, и питание, медобслуживание
полностью в компетенции следственного изолятора.
Вопрос о назначении медицинской процедуры —
этому подследственному провести УЗИ, у этого взять
анализ крови — может решать не руководитель
изолятора, а врач. Поэтому совершенно логично, не
выходя за рамки своих полномочий, следователь на
ходатайстве Магнитского о проведении УЗИ пишет:
вам необходимо обратиться к руководству
следственного изолятора. Сейчас правозащитники
обвиняют следователя в том, что он отказал в
удовлетворении этого ходатайства, якобы едва ли не
это привело к смерти.
Смерть Магнитского связана по времени с некими
обстоятельствами, что не может показаться
случайностью. Был задержан один из трёх директоров,
находившийся в розыске Маркелов. Осенью 2009 года
он стал давать показания о том, что пакет документов,
который представляли в налоговую ему и другим
соучастникам — Курочкину и Хлебникову — передал
Магнитский.
Следственная группа решала, предъявлять ли
Магнитскому ещё и обвинение в участии в данном
хищении. Раньше у следователей не было версии, что
Магнитский участвовал и в этом хищении. Вообще,
когда шли поиски людей по данному делу, получалось
так: только найдут человека — он умирает. Только
найдут — умирает.
В деле не было ясности, пока не был задержан
Маркелов, который стал давать показания. Он не знал
Браудера, а знал Гасанова, Коробейникова (к тому
времени умерших) и Магнитского. Поскольку
показаний одного Маркелова недостаточно, было
решено продолжить поиски Хлебникова— третьего
фигуранта по делу. А обвинений Магнитскому на
основании показаний одного лишь Маркелова не
предъявлять.
Магнитского дополнительно допросили по этим
обстоятельством: ему было сказано, что задержан
Маркелов, он даёт такого рода показания. И знаете ли
вы Гасанова, который переназначал на основании
доверенности директоров? Магнитский ответил
категоричным отказом давать показания. Его образ
рисуют как разоблачителя, чему не соответствует
поведение: он постоянно отказывался давать
показания, ссылаясь на 51 статью Конституции РФ. Но
о том, что такие показания есть, стало известно
Браудеру.
Тот наверняка понял степень опасности: появился
некий Маркелов. Он жив. (А жив он, скорее всего
потому, что пустился в бега, как и Хлебников. А
Курочкин умер). И он даёт показания не на Браудера, с
которым не имел дел, а на Магнитского.
В СЕНТЯБРЕ 2009 ГОДА расследование по налогам в
отношении Магнитского закончилось. Дело готовилось
к направлению в суд. Допустить, чтобы над
Магнитским состоялся суд, Браудер не мог, потому что
обвинение было выдвинуто тяжкое: сговор. Это
групповое преступление, в котором роли расписаны. И
если бы Магнитского осудили, был бы приговор, то это
автоматически означало бы, что доказана вина
Браудера, есть понятие преюдиции, то есть
обстоятельства, установленные приговором суда во
время другого суда. И у следствия была возможность
требовать Браудера заочно арестовать, потому что есть
приговор в отношении Магнитского, а преступления
они совершали вдвоем. К тому же суд над Магнитским
был бы открытым, присутствовала бы, возможно,
пресса.
13 ноября 2009 года состоялось заседание суда по
поводу продления срока содержания под стражей
Магнитского, поскольку он с сентября знакомился, но
не успел полностью ознакомиться с материалами дела.
Суд на два месяца продлил содержание под стражей.
Магнитский, услышав это решение, впал в истерику.
Адвокаты, видимо, твёрдо обещали, что его освободят
из-под стражи в зале суда, но этого не случилось:
расследование закончено, срок продлён, дело идёт в
суд. Находясь в возбуждённом состоянии, Магнитский
кричит, что отказывается от услуг адвоката,
предоставленного ему Браудером, что и зафиксировано
в протоколе.
А 16 ноября Магнитский умирает, становясь четвёртым
покойником в этом деле. Причина смерти у всех одна
— сердце.
Первоначальный диагноз, поставленный Магнитскому
— сердечная недостаточность.
Смерть произошла довольно странно. Он впадает в
истерику, бьётся, нападает на персонал, надевает на
голову полиэтиленовый пакет, кричит, что его хотят
убить, — видимо, реально опасался. Ему ли не знать
возможности его "партнеров"? Тем более, трупы уже
есть.
Такое неадекватное поведение вынуждает применить к
нему силу. Чтобы он не повредил себя, ему надевают
наручники и вызывают "скорую помощь". Поскольку
поведение его было неадекватным, вызвали
психиатрическую помощь. Когда она приехала, ему
уже было плохо: изо рта шла пена. Наступает смерть.
Резюме этого дела странное: все лица, знавшие
Браудера, которые могли бы дать на него показания,
либо находятся в Великобритании, либо мертвы.
Задержанный Хлебников, уже после смерти
Магнитского, дал показания, что в этой схеме хищения
участвовали адвокат Хайретдинов, Магнитский,
Гасанов. (Маркелов и Хлебников получили по пять лет
лишения свободы и отбывают наказание).
Желание Браудера не допустить суда над живым
Магнитским потом распространилось и над
нежеланием допустить суда над мёртвым Магнитским.
Наше законодательство допускает, что, если
родственники умершего обвиняемого считают, что
человек не виновен, они могут требовать суда над
мёртвым: это называется "рассмотрение дела судом в
целях реабилитации умершего".
Они могут не согласиться с прекращением дела в
связи со смертью обвиняемого, а требовать, чтобы дело
было прекращено в связи с отсутствием состава
преступления. Но никаких заявлений родственников
или адвокатов Магнитского о направлении дела в суд в
целях реабилитации не поступало.
Если Браудер хотел бы добиться справедливости, он
довёл бы дело до европейского суда. Но он, напротив,
идёт на всё, лишь бы не состоялся суд.
Наверняка резкая активизация, наблюдаемая сейчас в
связи с этим делом, истерика, решение госдепа
связаны с причиной смерти четырёх человек,
замешанных в этом деле. Причина смерти у всех —
сердечный приступ. Если допустить, что Браудер — не
только предприниматель, но и немножко
спецслужбист, то почему не предположить, что в
распоряжении его конторы есть трудно выявляемые
яды, которые вызывают сердечный приступ?
С самого начала Браудер следит за ситуацией и всеми
обстоятельствами. Он сам говорит, что на него
работают 100 человек, которые занимаются этой
проблемой. Но поначалу молчит.
2 МАЯ 2011 ГОДА в "Российской газете" появилась
статья "Тайна смерти. Магнитский оказался не
первым, кто погиб во время следствия о миллиардном
хищении". И Браудер, видимо, понял, что российские
компетентные органы заинтересовались 4 смертями по
схожим причинам и обстоятельствам. Это угрожало
скандалом и новым судом. Суд над Магнитским не
состоялся в связи со смертью того, а если бы в ходе
вскрытия обнаружилось применение яда, да ещё
такого, который применяется спецслужбами, это было
бы для Браудера катастрофой. Поэтому срабатывают на
опережение.
26 мая выходит его публикация в западной прессе "В
России нет государства", где он шантажирует
российские власти, говоря, что знает, кто совершил
преступления, почти открыто угрожает и
разоблачениями, и оранжевой революцией. Он не
упоминает уже о сотрудниках милиции, а говорит о
членах правительства РФ, намекая, что к этому
преступлению причастны и президент, и премьер.
Такая развёрнутая информационная атака с угрозами
подобного рода либо санкционирована, либо
организована не самим Браудером: у простого
бизнесмена, даже богатого, на это нет возможностей.
После публикации активизировались российские
общественники, которые обвиняли органы правосудия
во всех смертных грехах. Причём, как и американские
сенаторы, выносящие постановления, составляющие
списки, эти общественники не знакомились с делом.
Однако к беспочвенным крикам начинают
прислушиваться и власти.
Браудер, понимая опасность, которая грозит в случае
обнародования факта обнаружения в этих трупах яда,
вызывающего сердечный приступ, играет на
опережение. Видимо, именно Браудер посылает мать
Магнитского к следователю, который ведёт дело. И
требует образцы тканей для экспертизы. Матери
отказывают. Она идёт в суд. Суд тоже отказывает в
предоставлении тканей. После этого 19 июля Браудер
выступает с интервью, в котором говорит о том, что
есть версия об отравлении, он пытается добыть
образцы тканей, провести экспертизу по ним.
28 июня Браудер проводит экспертизу в Америке,
которая приходит к выводу, что вопрос об отравлении
Магнитского ядами из списка не зарегистрированных
не изучался, но у последнего есть признаки
токсического шока. А те яды, что не зарегистрированы
и нигде не стоят на учёте, это, как правило, яды,
которые используют спецслужбы разных стран. И их
формула является государственной тайной. Так
делается намёк, что мог применяться такой яд, потому
что поведение Магнитского перед смертью похоже не
на сердечный приступ, а на поведение при
токсическом шоке, то есть отравлении.
Обнаружение яда, формула которого возможно
известна Браудеру или структурам, стоящим за ним,
позволит начать новую кампанию против России уже
под флагом убийства Магнитского. Мол, и Гасанов, и
Курочкин, и Коробейников убиты, поскольку
российские спецслужбы убирают людей, которые
могут дать показания на расхитителей. Но поработали-
то тут другие спецслужбы, и поработали оперативно:
когда не получилось остановить процесс, эти ребята,
действуя на опережение, из обвиняемых переходят в
обвинители.
И скоропалительное решение госдепа США от 26 июля
этого года, когда не дождались даже решения
конгресса, несмотря на угрозу ухудшения отношений с
Россией, указывает именно на то, что это защита
нападением.
Опасение, что будет раскрыта иностранная шпионская
сеть, их методы работы, опасение того, что
спецслужбы, стоящие за спиной Браудера, будут
обвинены в совершении убийств российских граждан
на российской территории, очень сильно. Подобный
провал западных разведок не допустим. Потому в
срочном порядке принимают меры, чтобы обезоружить
российскую сторону. А что? Очень правдоподобная
версия.
НАШЕЙ СТРАНЕ важно установить, где находятся
230 миллионов, куда они пошли. Есть данные, что эти
деньги находятся на Западе. Нужно устанавливать
правдивость информации в отношении любых
должностных лиц России, которых сейчас своим
интервью шантажирует Браудер. Поскольку, если эти
лица будут находиться под влиянием извне,
государству будет нанесён огромный ущерб.
Странно, что Россия ждёт, когда будет обвинена, чтобы
потом оправдываться в том, чего не совершала.
В отношении России применяются беспрецедентные
недружественного характера меры, носящие чисто
пропагандистский характер: вот арестуют счета 60
чиновников (список имеет расширительный характер).
А у кого из них есть там счета? Но создают мнение,
что все, кто работал по делу об этой финансовой афере
— сами нечисты на руку и прячут свои деньги за
границей.
Россия становится объектом воздействия крупной
разведывательной международной операции. Когда-
нибудь мы узнаем её кодовое название, а последствия,
к которым это может привести — утрата нами
независимости во внутренних делах, утрата
юридического суверенитета. Нам диктуют: этого
нельзя преследовать за совершаемые преступления,
вот по такому уголовному делу вы должны поступать
так и так. За делом Магницкого может последовать и
дальнейшее вмешательство. Есть гораздо более
громкое дело Ходорковского. Но никаких санкций нет,
потому что там не действовали службы, стоящие,
видимо, за Браудером, который, кстати, единственный
из западных инвесторов поддержал арест
Ходорковского.
Браудеру нельзя допустить, чтобы расследование шло
по неблагоприятному для него сценарию, чтобы было
прочувствовано его участие. Он наверняка кое с кем
делился своими доходами. В этом и заключается
сложность. И когда он говорит о коррупции, знает, о
чём говорит: он, видимо, сам — один из организаторов
этой коррупции, один из тех, кто порождал ее в России
на достаточно высоких уровнях, чтобы не только
богатеть: он намерен либо управлять нашей страной с
помощью компромата, держа в руках властные
структуры, а это грозит стране потерей суверенитета,
либо способствовать оранжевой революции.
Вот, Немцов, который заявляет, что и сам приложил
усилия к принятию мер со стороны Запада по делу
Магнитского, говорит: "Решение госдепа абсолютно
правильное, надо продолжать в том же духе".
Это крупнейшая после девяносто первого года
пропагандистская операция западных спецслужб.
Смехотворны причины, по которым российским
гражданам грозят санкциями. В "списке Магнитского"
— следователь, который не полномочен назначить
медобследование, обвинён в том, что отказал в
обследовании. Против одного из следователей
выдвинуто обвинение: добился ареста без суда на три
года. Это абсурд!
Одновременно с Браудером отбыл из России и
Фаерстоун. В отношении него тоже есть уголовное
дело за рейдерский захват, в интернете много писали о
педофилии в отношении российских мальчиков. Вот
такие доброхоты на нашу голову!
Российским властям надо твёрдо отстаивать свою
независимость, не прогибаясь ни перед кем. Мы
должны помнить, что больше всех, пусть и с
международных трибун, кричат "держи вора" — сами
воры. Но для отстаивания своей позиции, для борьбы с
любого рода преступниками у властей должна быть
воля и чистые руки.
Текст, который предложен здесь вниманию наших
читателей, поступил в редакцию "Завтра" по почте, и
ряд его особенностей заставляет предположить, что
его появление связано с источниками в
правоохранительных органах или спецслужбах.
Вместе с тем, несмотря на очевидную
информативную насыщенность данного материала,
его содержание вызывает у нас ряд вопросов, которые
мы считаем нужным задать.
Во-первых, если иностранный гражданин, в данном
случае — Уильям Браудер, сумел осуществить на
территории Российской Федерации все
инкриминируемые ему деяния, то что делали и делают
отечественные спецслужбы, которые должны
обеспечивать в том числе экономическую
безопасность нашего государства? Что, их
деятельность является фиктивной, то есть их в
реальности нет, или же они откровенно
попустительствуют деятельности таких фигур, как
Браудер, то есть фактически являются
соучастниками преступлений? И не творится ли
такое же безобразие сейчас в других крупных
финансово-экономических структурах страны?
Во-вторых, как могло получиться, что руководитель
28-й налоговой инспекции г.Москвы Степанова,
которая, как можно сделать вывод из данного
текста, была коррумпирована Браудером, и о
зарубежной собственности которой кричат
многочисленные сайты в интернете, могла после
этого занять ответственный пост в системе
Министерства обороны РФ?
В-третьих, почему наши следственные органы так
медлят с обнародованием результатов судебно-
медицинской экспертизой останков Сергея
Магнитского по установлению причин его смерти,
позволяя стороне Браудера заниматься диффамацией
органов российской государственной власти? И
почему не соглашаются на проведение параллельных
экспертиз (с соответствующими мерами
предосторожности для недопущения всякого рода
подтасовок)? Кроме того, интересно знать: были ли
проведены экспертизы на предмет установления
причин смерти других лиц, связанных с Браудером и
странным образом ушедших в мир иной, по данным
автора материала?
В-четвертых, если Магнитский действительно был
отравлен, то как такое могло произойти в режимном
специзоляторе без участия в этом соответствующих
сотрудников российских спецслужб, которые тогда
выступают как наемные агенты Браудера или его
"хозяев"?
Наконец, в-пятых, каким образом мимо
правительства России могли пройти описанные выше
махинации Браудера и Магнитского с акциями
"Газпрома", в результате которых они только на этой
сделке заработали свыше 4 млрд. долларов?
Редакция "Завтра" задает эти вопросы не только себе
и своим читателям, но и Генеральной прокуратуре
РФ, Следственному комитету РФ, ФСБ и МВД России
в надежде получить на них компетентный ответ о
проведенных следственных действиях и оперативно-
розыскных мероприятиях по представленным в
материале фактам. Ведь весьма странной выглядит
ситуация, когда президент России делает выводы о
событиях вокруг смерти Магнитского не на основании
доклада перечисленных государственных органов,
призванных обеспечивать законность в стране, а на
основе некоего "Заключения Национального
антикоррупционного комитета" — обычной
общественной организации, не имеющей никаких
полномочий!
Sent time: 04/11/2016 05:54:33 AM
Subject: 2011 Zavtra Stuff on Magnitskiy

From: Robert Otto [mailto:robertcotto@verizon.net]
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2011 5:53 AM
To: Robert Otto
http://zavtra.ru/content/view/2011-08-1621/
1) Browder & Magnitskiy cooked up illegal schemes to buy Gazprom shares before the "ring"
2) On top of this, Magnitskiy devised schemes to avoid taxes: bought 7% of the shares for 300m and sold
for 4b w/o paying taxes
4) Gasanov then proposes three Russians Kurochkin (dies in Spring 2008), Markelov & Khlebnikov head
the Hermitage connected firms
7) Browder worked with Stepanova of the 28th Tax Inspectorate (no wonder he has stuff on her).
12) Markelov arrested in 11/08 - didn't know Browder, but knew Gasanov, Korobeynikov, & Magnitskiy
16) 2 May 2011: RosGaz publishes piece noting all 4 deaths - http://www.rg.ru/2011/05/02/magnitskii-
site.html
------



---------
Ovchinskiy

http://echo.msk.ru/blog/vso/799056‐echo/
4) why aren't the three cases connected w Magnitskiy (tax avoidance, illegal return of tax money, death)
united into one
Sent time: 04/11/2016 03:20:45 PM

Belkovskiy on Putin’s assets/Putin’s money, dissatisfaction in his entourage, the National Guard
More from Stanovaya on the Natsguard
Solovey on the latest propaganda
Kadyrov wants more from Moscow
France seizes money owed Russian companies (Yukos)
South Ossetia to hold referendum on making joining the Russian Federation easier
Terrorists killed in thwarted attack on Stavropol police station

Belkovskiy on Putin’s assets/Putin’s money, dissatisfaction in his entourage, the National Guard
http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/27664912.html
Belkovskiy says that when he mentioned Putin being worth $40 billion, for one thing that was back in 2007, so Putin’s assets have
undoubtedly grown since then. Second, he was talking about assets, not about cash. Belkovsky doesn’t think the sum of $2 billion
mentioned in the Panama papers has anything to do with Putin personally—it’s cash his friends have made from machinations with
Rosneft shares. Roldugin seemed caught off guard when asked about the money—he did not immediately deny everything—that’s
because earlier, Putin’s friends (people like the Kovalchuks, Timchenko, the Rotenbergs, Roldugin) thought they were untouchable
because of Putin. They tend to think in term of conspiracies and believe there is one directed against Putin, them, and Russia,
rather than there simply being people who are not afraid to make inquiries. The new reality is that Putin has been transformed into
a full scale enemy of the West and that damages the interests of his friends, who are on the one hand convinced they are being
targeted because they defend the Rodina, and on the other still don’t quite believe that a catastrophe is taking place.
Q: On the one hand, there is talk that there must be dissatisfaction in Putin’s entourage—their interests are being threatened—but
on the other, there does not appear to be any split among them. What’s going on? Is the National Guard a sign that there is
division and Putin has to create a new power structure that is subordinate only to him?
Belkovskiy: In my opinion, there is dissatisfaction in Putin’s entourage—the life strategies of the majority are linked to the West, not
only in the sense of assets, but in terms of health care, their children’s futures, so it’s more than economic interests. They
understand that nothing fundamental regarding relations with the West will change as long as Putin is president—so in that sense,
the specter of a palace coup hangs over the Kremlin. Question is, what will such a coup look like? But Putin’s creating a
Natsguard wasn’t related to dissatisfaction in his circle—he’d been planning to create one since 2013, long before Crimea and
relations with the West deteriorated to the low point we have seen recently. Putin needs several parallel power structures, each
loyal to him personally and capable of neutralizing others if necessary. In this case, the Internal Troops used as the base of the
Natsguard were created to parallel the army, with the army assigned international tasks, the Natsguard domestic ones. We should
not forget that Putin sees a “color revolution” and the “Arab spring” as models for the West to overthrow him as well.
Comment: We’ve seen a number of commentators say that Putin partly had in mind creating a militarized structure
under his personal control that he could fully rely on in an emergency. I buy that. What about the claim that he wants
to neutralize/create a counterweight to an ambitious Shoygu? My view has been that Shoygu looked like a credible
elite successor for Putin if it comes to that—maybe Putin thought so, too, but doesn’t want anything happening in that
regard without his consent and approval. Nothing should happen prematurely, so to speak…And the more he thinks
about that, maybe the less likely any such scenario has of coming to pass. The very idea that someone could be seen
by elites as a viable alternative would make Putin suspicious, I think.
Q: Why did Peskov, then Putin, react to the Panama papers and recent leaks (about the apartments; See, for instance, the 31
March notes)?
Belkovskiy: Because in those cases, we aren’t talking about business figures like the Rotenbergs or Timchenko—Roldugin and the
women involved in the apartments story are people especially personally close to Putin. Putin’s nervousness is also because
accusations are coming from US officials. He can skip commenting on remarks made by a Belkovskiy, but by officials in the US
Treasury Department or Obama’s Press Secretary, well, that’s something else again, because it means the US is using its
intelligence and police capabilities to get at the women and Putin’s closest friends, all his “children,” if you will. It became evident
that the US had crossed a red line and was prepared to take harsh action against people who are very close to Putin.

Q: What is this leading to? There seem to be two roads—one would be to cut off relations with the West, with Putin including in his
close circle only those who don’t have interests or relatives abroad; another tack would be to try and ease tensions and maintain
Russian influence in the West, while trying to control the situation domestically…
Belkovskiy: Putin has long been trying to win the love of the West. He wants an agreement, especially with the US, on dividing up
spheres of influence Yalta-style. At this point, it does not occur to Putin that there’s no going back to that world—he thinks that he
only has to wait until Obama is gone, until Merkel is gone, people who he thinks have something personal against him, then the
West will understand that it should remove sanctions against Russia, it will understand that Ukraine cannot be a contemporary
European state—and it appears that the West is growing disappointed with Ukraine. So Putin thinks he can resolve all these
complex issues in the next few years. He will remain in power, while the Western leaders will be replaced. Putin does not have a
sense of tragic pessimism—he is nervous because he does not want to see the property of people he considers part of the larger
Putin family to be arrested. His nervousness does not mean that he will order a nuclear strike on Washington or anything. Putin is
no strategist, but a tactician, so one can’t analyze his actions as if he’s thinking years ahead. Putin may or may not initiate new
conflicts that could force the West to negotiate with him.
As far as domestic affairs, the task is to fully control the political system, to not allow any outside interference and to prevent any
“Arab spring” or “color revolution” on Russian soil, so the regime won’t go soft. On the other hand, there will not be any mass
repressions, either. Mass repressions are only possible in an ideologically driven society and today’s Russia is not that. There’s no
social base for mass repressions.
Comment: The last point is one I’ve made many times, only I’d add that a country that skews older demographically is
not a likely place for mass repressions, either. Putin’s not thinking strategically is another point I’ve made a number
of times, but Belkovskiy has been saying that for years as well. Another frequent Belkovskiy point is the stuff about
Putin wishing to conclude a “Yalta-2” agreement.

More from Stanovaya on the Natsguard
See the 8 April notes.
http://politcom.ru/print.php?id=20967
…One of the “versions” explaining the creation of the National Guard is that Putin is creating a counterweight to the FSB. The new
structure’s functions will overlap with those of the FSB, in part in combatting terrorism. But it’s doubtful that Putin was trying to
create competition between power structures—the president has more than once made it understood that he thinks “siloviky wars”
undermine the effectiveness of the state. No, we are talking about boosting the National Guard at a time of increased domestic
tensions in the context of international tensions. Nevertheless, competition among the siloviky may be a result regardless of what
Putin intends…
There may be some corrections to the creation of the new structure through amendments to the federal law on the Natsguard. The
creation of the Natsgyard was not just a reaction to the political situation, both domestic and international, but to the weakness of
the MVD—but moving the Internal Troops to the Natsguard will only further weaken the ministry and make Kolkoltsev appear
vulnerable to apparatus foes, which could open to the door to more reforms of the power departments, reforms that could have an
impact on the investigative bodies…


Comment: The first attack was on Kasyanov. Now it’s Navalniy’s turn. The aim is what Belkovskiy mentioned—
prevent a “color revolution” and foreign interference in the elections, control the political process…
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2741466#
From Dmitriy Kiselev’s program…It’s about Navalniy (described as a “corrupt recidivist”) e-mailing (and apparently in Skype
conversations with) another Kremlin enemy, William Browder (a “swindler” who “inspired the Magnitskiy list”), with VGTRK’s
Yevgeniy Popov describing the “secret correspondence” as revealing channels between the Russian opposition and the US and
UK. Former Berezovsky security man Sergey Solokolov (Comment: I’m not sure where he comes into this story—as an
informant on goings on in the UK?) says the correspondence was picked up off of servers set up by the CIA and the MI6 as a
channel for their agents (“Freedom”—Navalniy and “Soloman”—Browder) for plotting the overthrow of the Russian constitutional
system (Operation “Drozh” or “Tremor”)…The special operation “Drozh” dates back to 1986 and then-CIA Director William
Casey, who planned the overthrow of the system in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Part of the plan was to gain control over
financial flows and assets.
Former MVD investigator Pavel Karpov (Comment: He was involved in the Magnitskiy affair) says that Browder and
Navalniy work parallel to one another, as well as together…They first made contact in 2006, when Browder was already banned
from entering Russia and Navalniy was a young Yabloko activist. Browder wanted Navalniy to help him with “greenmail
projects”—Navalniy was initially skeptical. Browder told Navalniy he would be a “hero of the minority shareholders” and would
accumulate “reputational capital”…Eventually Navalniy agreed and Browder suggested he start with VTB. Browder’s target list
included Gazprom, Rosneft, Sberbank, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz. But Navalniy needed money, so Browder got him in contact
with banker Vladimir Ashurkov (Comment: I think Ashukrov, who at one time worked for Alfa, was a channel for Alfa
money to the non-systemic opposition. I think Alfa supported the “protest wave” in 2011-2012; See the notes from 11
January; 17 May 2015; 29 December 2014; and 6 November 2014 for more on Ashurkov). The report reproduces
correspondence it claims was from an MI6 controller who channeled R100 million to Navalniy and company.
When Magnitskiy (portrayed here as engaging in fraud himself) was arrested, Browder asked for Navalniy’s help. Navalniy
suggested that they play up Magnitskiy’s suffering, something Russians would respond to. But the Western controller (MI6 “Agent
Belt”) was unhappy—the story wasn’t generating enough interest, so the best thing to do was use connections to see to it that
medical aid to Magnitskiy was cut off. Then Magnitskiy died. Sergey Kurginyan chimes in to say that the person most interested in
seeing Magnitskiy dead was Browder. Browder subsequently began his campaign to get the US to set up a “Magnitskiy list”—
Navalniy conducted the information campaign in Russia.
Another Browder-Navalniy project was the information attack on Prosecutor General Chayka, beginning with the allegedly illegal
businesses of his son (See, for instance, the 7 December 2016 notes; Comment: Recall that Chayka blamed Browder for the
kompromat)—this followed investigators searching the offices of Browder’s firms on Cyprus.
Navalniy has posted on the story: http://navalny.com/p/4819/
So supposedly a leak of information from the CIA identifies me as “Agent Freedom”—Kiselyov and his writers made up the
dialogue…Who did they consult as “experts”? The former head of Berezovskiy’s security service and Pavel Karpov, implicated in
Magnitskiy’s death, that’s who. Karpov has defended Chayka as well. It’s all a fantasy…
Here’s more: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/navalny-to-sue-media-holding-vgtrk-over-browder-link-
accusations/565407.html
According to Alexey Kovalyov, former employee of the state-run RIA Novosti news agency that is now headed by the TV
anchor Kiselyov, editors of the agency received instructions on Monday not to cover the story due to it "probably being
fake.” Kovalyov cited the email sent to the editors that was shown to him by one of the employees.
Comment: I would not be surprised that Navalniy was in contact with Browder and others—he gets support from
somewhere, I think in the past, at least from Alfa, but Vesti Nedeli just made up the “Agent Belt” stuff.
Navalniy wants a criminal case opened and says he is ready to sue: http://newsru.com/russia/10Apr2016/freedom.html
British journalist Shaun Walker noticed how many errors there were in the English of the supposed MI6 handlers:
Rus TV running whole programme on @navalny recruitment by MI6, featuring "leaked" emails full of article mistakes.
— Shaun Walker (@shaunwalker7) 11:43 - 10 апреля 2016
Solovey on the latest propaganda

http://m.vk.com/wall244477574_16696
A roundup of the latest propaganda…Offshore accounts of Russian state banks were necessary to prevent the Americans from
buying up Russian media…Roldugin’s offshore accounts were meant to buy instruments for Russian musicians… CIA agent
Navalniy corresponded with hi foreign contacts via e-mail…Syria is ready to off contracts worth $500 million for Russian
companies to help rebuild the country…
Kadyrov wants more from Moscow
http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Regions/m.250435.html
Kadyrov wrote a letter to Putin requesting more help from Moscow for a number of projects in Chechnya. He especially
emphasized that he wanted Moscow to transfer 100% of the shares in Chechenneftekhimprom to the republic administration; to
help with moving 25,000 people out of an area damaged by a landslide last year; and financing for refurbishing the Grozny airport.
Official sources say that Putin has assigned Dvorkovich the task of handling these issues (and Dvorkovich assigned various
government ministries and departments to formulate proposals on those issues). Chechenneftekhimprom includes various oil fields,
refineries, oil extraction equipment and more. Putin ordered the government to look into a transfer of shares last December, but
nothing happened. The Chechen administration requested funds for the airport back in 2014. The government allocated R2 billion
for relocating the people in the disaster zone, but only 3869 of them have been moved.
France seizes money owed Russian companies (Yukos)
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/france-seizes-700m-of-money-owed-to-russian-companies-over-
yukos-lawsuit/565364.html
France seized $700 million in payments to Russian space companies Roscosmos and Russian Satellite
Communications in connection with the case of former shareholders of defunct oil company Yukos, The American
Lawyer magazine reported Monday.
In total, France has seized Russian assets worth $1 billion following the Kremlin's refusal to pay damages to former
Yukos shareholders.
In July 2014, The Hague international arbitration court ruled that Russia must pay $50 billion for expropriating the assets of
Yukos.
The seized assets include $400 million owed by French-based satellite provider Eutelsat to the Russian Satellite
Communications company and $300 million owned by French space launch provider Arianespace to Russia's
Roscosmos space agency, the magazine reported, citing the Shearman & Sterling legal firm which represents the Yukos
shareholders.
A representative of GML — which owns the Hulley Enterprises and Yukos Universal companies that won the lawsuit
against Russia — confirmed to the RBC newspaper that the seized assets are related to Roscosmos and Satellite
Communications.
However, he didn't confirm the figures cited by The American Lawyer.
According to GML's representative, Russia has appealed the seizure of money owed to Roscosmos and Satellite
Communications in French courts. Rulings are expected this month.
South Ossetia to hold referendum on making joining the Russian Federation easier
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/disputed-south-ossetia-will-hold-referendum-on-joining-russia/565394.html
South Ossetia is due to hold a constitutional referendum, the results of which will make it easier for the disputed region to
become one of Russia's regions, the republic's president Leonid Tibilov said, TASS reported Monday.
“We are discussing possible dates [for the referendum] at the moment. There's no specific date yet, but it will happen in
the near future. Before August,” the president said in an interview to TASS.
The referendum will center on changing the republic's constitution in a way which would make future incorporation into
the Russian Federation easier.
South Ossetia is a breakaway region unrecognized by international community. In 2008, Russia and Georgia fought a
five-day war over the territory, which is now recognized by Russia and a handful of other states as an independent nation.

Terrorists killed in thwarted attack on Stavropol police station
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/3-suicide-bombers-dead-in-thwarted-attack-on-russian-police-
station/565392.html
Three suicide bombers have died in an attempted attack on a police station in Russia’s Stavropol region, the Interfax
news agency reported Monday.
The militants attempted to gain entry to the building of the Novoselitsky district department of the interior building in
Russia’s North Caucasus region.
“During the attempted attack, two militants were killed and one managed to detonate a device,” Interfax reported, citing a
statement from the regional prosecutor Yury Turygin.
The statement confirmed that all three attackers died in the attempt. No police officers or civilians have been reported
injured but the building and nearby police cars suffered some damage, Interfax reported.

Sent time: 04/11/2016 12:21:13 AM
Eric F Green <greene@state.gov>; John Willams (ofc) <WilliamsJP@state.gov>; Kavalec, Kathleen A <KavalecKA@state.gov>; Fishel, Eugene
To:
<FishelE@state.gov>
Subject: I did It (magnitskiy, trotsky, kennedy, listyev, nemtsov, stolypin) navalnyy retweeted

Пятая Колонка
@5th_kolonna
У нас есть эксклюзивное признание Навального во всём!:
Sent time: 04/10/2016 11:13:30 PM
Subject: Agent Freedom: navalnyy's Post on the Kiselev Attack (browder/magnitskiy)

http://navalny.com/p/4819/
Навальный – агент ЦРУ по кличке Freedom и
он убил Магнитского.
10.04.2016, 17:10
1293
утечка цру
Это новые вершины, друзья мои. Гарантирую вам огромнейшее удовольствие от просмотра свежего шедевра
Дмитрий Киселева.
Сенсационное расследование основанное на «утечке документов ЦРУ» доказывает: Алексей Навальный — это агент
ЦРУ по кличке Freedom. В 2006 году он был завербован Уильямом Браудером для участия в операции «Дрожь».
Сама операция «Дрожь» была начата в середине 80х и уже развалила СССР, а сейчас она должна развалить и
Россию.
Подтверждается все это «приказами на бланках ЦРУ», и также перепиской, которая выглядит примерно так:
Да-да. Это не шутка. Дмитрий Киселев просто выдумал диалоги. Его видеорежиссёр вывел их на экран. И это все —
«украденные документы ЦРУ».
Еще в фильме есть эксперты: какой-то хмырь называющий себя начальником службы безопасности Березовского
(кого-же еще) и —вы будете смеяться– милиционер Павел Карпов, тот самый, обвиненный в причастности к убийству
Магнитского и пойманный на владении имуществом, которое он мог бы купить на свою милицейскую зарплату
только лет через 300.
Совсем недавно, кстати, Павел Карпов уже разоблачил меня — рассказал по телевидению, что семья генпрокурора
Чайки полностью неуиноуна и наше расследование подделка западных спецслужб.
А еще в фильме рассказывают, что именно я придумал убийство Сергея Магнитского, для того чтобы превратить его
в «сакральную жертву» и использовать сочувствие к трагедии в деле развала России.
Фантастика, просто фантастика.
PS Во всей этой ситуации я ужасно рад двум вещам. Первое — кремлевскому ворью настолько нечего мне
предьявить, что в дело пошли «доказательные снимки телеэкрана». Второе — агентурную кличку мне придумали
красивую — агент Freedom.
Картинка по запросу «Agent Freedom»
Sent time: 04/05/2016 10:08:23 PM
To: Chris Bort <chris.bort@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Novaya on the Mikhalchenko Arrest (FSB SEB Directorate K)

After yesterday’s passage in the MONITOR & this elevation, Chris, I played with the idea that Zolotov got this job because Putin
can’t stop the FSB from going after Murov and his guys.
Wish I knew more — make that anything — about the Bortnikov-Voronin relationship.
At any rate, this Natsguard is a potent rival to the FSB domestically I should think. I’d be interested in your teacher’s take
(Igor?).
On Apr 5, 2016, at 9:07 PM, Chris Bort <chris.bort@gmail.com> wrote:
Anyway, after today's events, I guess we can rule this out as an attack on Zolotov...?
On Tuesday, April 5, 2016, Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/72498.html keep in mind that the inimitable Viktor Voronin heads
FSB SEB Directorate K & it/he played a role in the Magnitskiy affair as well as the GUEBiPK scandal.
Что на самом деле стоит за арестом
питерского миллиардера Михальченко.
Расследование
Версия для печати
Расследования / Выпуск № 35 от 4 апреля 2016
37659 Капкан на таможенной тропе
Что на самом деле стоит за арестом питерского миллиардера Михальченко и при чем тут война
силовиков за контроль над российскими портами
<1459729269_927996_8.jpg>
Фото: Светлана ХОЛЯВЧУК / ТАСС / Интерпресс
Совладелец и генеральный директор холдинговой компании «Форум» Дмитрий Михальченко,
которого не без оснований считают одним из самых влиятельных людей Санкт-Петербурга,
не выглядел в зале Басманного районного суда Москвы подавленным и уставшим. В ходе
заседания он, в отличие от других арестованных фигурантов большого расследования о
контрабанде алкогольной продукции, даже позволял себе шутки в адрес следствия и суда.
«Давайте поменьше времени этому уделять. Ну как в цирке!» — кивнул он в адрес то ли
следователя, то ли собравшихся журналистов, энергично переминаясь с ноги на ногу в
«клетке». Спустя двадцать минут, когда судья объявил о помещении бизнесмена в
следственный изолятор, настроение Михальченко переменилось — лицо осунулось, под
глазами пролегли тени.
<1459729270_514007_10.png>До середины марта Дмитрий Михальченко считался одним из самых
успешных российских предпринимателей — его холдинговая компания «Форум» ежегодно
генерировала миллиардные обороты, а сам он находился в товарищеских отношениях с
представителями высшей политической элиты страны. «Дима мог легко проигнорировать просьбы и
настояния условного Полтавченко», — рассказывает знакомый предпринимателя, подчеркивая
значимость Михальченко в бизнес-процессах Северной столицы.
На предприятия Дмитрия Михальченко (среди них — морской перегрузочный порт Бронка, завод по
производству оборудования для нефтегазовой отрасли «Измерон», прядильно-ниточный комбинат) с
рабочим визитом охотно приезжали и упомянутый губернатор Георгий Полтавченко, и его
предшественница, действующий председатель Совета Федерации Валентина Матвиенко.
Сам же бизнесмен, легко находивший общий язык с представителями бизнес- и силовой элиты страны,
осваивал новые рынки: в конце февраля этого года он в Симферополе успел обсудить с премьер-
министром Республики Крым Сергеем Аксеновым свое участие в реализации Федеральной целевой
программы «Социально-экономическое развитие Крыма и Севастополя до 2020 года».
Проблемы же у бизнесмена начались в середине марта — в связи с началом расследования
следственным управлением ФСБ уголовного дела о хищении бюджетных средств, выделенных
Минкульту на реставрацию объектов культурного наследия. Напомню, что «реставрационное дело»
было возбуждено по факту хищения денежных средств в ходе исполнения государственного контракта
на производство работ по сохранению ансамбля Изборской крепости в Псковской области.
Ключевыми фигурантами этого дела стали заместитель министра культуры Григорий Пирумов, а также
начальник департамента управления имуществом и инвестиционной политики Борис Мазо и глава
подведомственного Минкульту ФГУП «Центрреставрация» Олег Иванов.
Вскоре после задержания чиновников федеральные телеканалы и газеты сообщили о раскрытии ФСБ
масштабной коррупционной схемы в Минкульте, выдвинув на передний план скандала фигуру
министра Владимира Мединского, чьей креатурой являлся Пирумов. И лишь немногие обратили
внимание на других задержанных — Александра Коченова и Дмитрия Сергеева, соответственно,
управляющего и генерального директора АО «БалтСтрой», входящего в холдинговую компанию
«Форум» миллиардера Дмитрия Михальченко.
«БалтСтрой» и связанные с ним структуры были основными исполнителями работ, предусмотренных
Федеральной целевой программой «Развитие культуры России до 2018 года». Однако наивно было
полагать, что центральный аппарат ФСБ (оперативное сопровождение этого дела осуществляет
управление «К» СЭБ ФСБ РФ, отвечающее за контрразведывательное обеспечение кредитно-
финансовой системы страны) заинтересовался столь экзотической и чуждой для него деятельностью,
как реставрация.
Буквально на следующий день после того, как обвиняемые по «реставрационному делу» были
арестованы судом и помещены в следственный изолятор «Лефортово», в прессе появились ложные
сообщения о задержании совладельца «Форума» Дмитрия Михальченко. Сам Михальченко в интервью
«Фонтанке» публично высмеял эту дезинформацию: «Сначала было неприятно, потом смешно.
Конечно, пришлось отвечать на звонки товарищей. А что делать? Терплю. Когда звонят друзья, снимаю
трубку и рапортую: арестованный Михальченко у аппарата. <…> Я понимаю, что я не последний
человек в городе».
Михальченко не лукавил, когда объяснял петербургским журналистам, что ключевым объектом
преследования чекистов являются чиновники из Министерства культуры — так, по крайней мере, он
искренне полагал, вернувшись из Москвы после нескольких встреч на Старой площади и в Белом
доме.
Однако, как уже тогда делились с нами источники в ФСБ, сообщения о задержании Михальченко не
были наветами недобросовестных журналистов — а служили намеком бизнесмену и его окружению.
«У него был временной люфт для разумных действий», — говорит сотрудник ФСБ, знакомый с
ситуацией, вероятно, намекая на возможность Михальченко покинуть страну.
29 марта следователь главного следственного управления Следственного комитета (ГСУ СКР) Сергей
Новиков, известный расследованием резонансного уголовного дела об организации преступного
сообщества в ГУЭБиПК МВД РФ бывшим начальником ведомства Денисом Сугробовым и его
заместителем Борисом Колесниковым, возбудил уголовное дело по факту контрабанды алкогольной
продукции (ст. 202.2 УК РФ).
<1459729270_233962_4.jpg>
Фото: portnews.ru
Важно: еще месяц назад в рамках доследственной проверки в Усть-Лужском контейнерном терминале,
оператором которого является ООО «Контрейл Логистик Северо-Запад», была обнаружена
контрабандная продукция — 134 контейнера с мясными деликатесами и два контейнера с коньяком
Courvoisier 1912 года. Вся продукция была привезена в Санкт-Петербург из порта Гамбурга по
подложным таможенным декларациям, позволившим импортеру (ООО «Юго-Восточная торговая
компания») занизить налогооблагаемую базу, и планировалась к реализации в ресторанной группе
Михальченко «Форум». Результаты этой проверки и легли в основу возбужденного СКР уголовного
дела.
На основании следственных поручений Сергея Новикова сотрудники все того же управления «К» СЭБ
ФСБ РФ при помощи спецназа «Град» УФСБ по Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области в тот же
день провели серию обысков в офисах компаний холдинга «Форум» и по месту жительства его
руководителей, задержав первым начальника службы безопасности «Форума» Бориса Коревского.
Коревский ранее служил в УЭБиПК ГУ МВД по Санкт-Петербургу в должности замначальника и, по
словам источника в ФСБ, фактически осуществлял связь с фискальными и правоохранительными
органами «на низовом и среднем уровнях».
Следом опергруппа задержала совладельца оператора Усть-Лужского терминала Анатолия
Киндзерского и гендиректора компании-импортера Илью Пичко. Все трое вечером были доставлены в
Москву, где к тому времени уже был задержан предполагаемый организатор контрабанды — Дмитрий
Михальченко.
Любопытны действия миллиардера в момент задержания: по словам источника в ФСБ, Михальченко
воспринял появление чекистов «довольно легкомысленно», позволив себе колкости в их адрес по пути
в следственное управление. «Сложилось ощущение, что он воспринял это как шутку. Будто бы это
происходило не с ним», — говорит собеседник. 29 марта Сергей Новиков вынес постановление о
задержании Дмитрия Михальченко на 48 часов, однако уже на следующий день миллиардер был
доставлен в Басманный районный суд для избрания ему меры пресечения.
По всей видимости, досрочное «выселение» из изолятора временного содержания вселило в Дмитрия
Михальченко уверенность в удачном разрешении ситуации — в суде он выглядел довольно бодро, а
его выступление больше походило на брифинг на экономическом форуме. «В моем холдинге работает
около семи тысяч человек, мы курируем проект строительства порта Бронка. Я, как гендиректор,
должен участвовать в переговорах. Это стратегический проект не только для холдинга «Форум», не
только для Санкт-Петербурга, но и для России в целом. Я горжусь тем, что я делаю, мне не стыдно за
то, что я делаю. К этому уголовному делу я не имею отношения, я не занимаюсь таможенной
деятельностью и предпринимательством по этому направлению», — уверенно рассуждал Михальченко,
особое внимание уделив сумме инкриминируемого ему «смешного ущерба» — 1,7 млн рублей.
Источник в ФСБ, впрочем, советует не обращать внимания на скромный по своим объемам ущерб,
вмененный в вину Михальченко, а сделать акцент на самой квалификации преступления: «Речь идет не
о мошенничестве, не о растрате, не о злоупотреблении — о контрабанде! Это главное, что надо знать
для понимания роли Михальченко». Также собеседник обращает внимание на место совершения
преступления — Усть-Лужский контейнерный терминал, входящий в порт Усть-Луга.
«Михальченко может сколько угодно рассказывать о Бронке, но зона его влияния простиралась
гораздо шире», — говорит источник, полагая, что бизнесмен обладал возможностями открывать
«зеленый коридор» российским импортерам через большинство портов Санкт-Петербурга.
Если это так, глупо полагать, что контрабанда могла совершаться без ведома высокопоставленных
представителей силового блока.
Равноправным партнером миллиардера в холдинге «Форум» является бывший заместитель начальника
УФСБ по Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области Николай Негодов. Однако главным благодетелем
бизнеса Негодова и Михальченко в последнее время все чаще называют бывшего сослуживца
Негодова, а ныне начальника ФСО Евгения Мурова (подведомственное ему ФГУП «Атэкс», кстати,
заключило с «БалтСтроем» не один контракт на реставрацию объектов, среди которых и резиденции
главы государства).
Впрочем, по словам нашего источника, вряд ли высокопоставленные силовики смогут помочь своему
протеже: «Президент, очевидно, постепенно меняет команду в ФСО — не так давно были прекращены
полномочия первого заместителя директора Александра Белякова. Самому Евгению Мурову в ноябре
исполняется 71 год. Его срок службы подходит к концу».
А для того, чтобы понять, кто начал многоходовую комбинацию в борьбе за порты и таможенные тропы
северо-запада России, нужно подождать не так уж долго: скоро в Усть-Луге, вполне вероятно,
появятся новые игроки, подконтрольные иному блоку силовиков, ну или хотя бы знакомые с
руководством, например, того же управления «К» ФСБ.
From: Chris Bort <chris.bort@gmail.com>
Sent time: 04/05/2016 06:07:36 PM
Subject: Re: Novaya on the Mikhalchenko Arrest (FSB SEB Directorate K)

Anyway, after today's events, I guess we can rule this out as an attack on Zolotov...?
On Tuesday, April 5, 2016, Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/72498.html keep in mind that the inimitable Viktor Voronin heads FSB SEB
Directorate K & it/he played a role in the Magnitskiy affair as well as the GUEBiPK scandal.
Что на самом деле стоит за арестом питерского
миллиардера Михальченко. Расследование
Что на самом деле стоит за арестом питерского миллиардера Михальченко и при чем тут война силовиков за
контроль над российскими портами
Совладелец и генеральный директор холдинговой компании «Форум» Дмитрий Михальченко, которого не
без оснований считают одним из самых влиятельных людей Санкт-Петербурга, не выглядел в зале
Басманного районного суда Москвы подавленным и уставшим. В ходе заседания он, в отличие от других
арестованных фигурантов большого расследования о контрабанде алкогольной продукции, даже позволял
себе шутки в адрес следствия и суда. «Давайте поменьше времени этому уделять. Ну как в цирке!» —
кивнул он в адрес то ли следователя, то ли собравшихся журналистов, энергично переминаясь с ноги на
ногу в «клетке». Спустя двадцать минут, когда судья объявил о помещении бизнесмена в следственный
изолятор, настроение Михальченко переменилось — лицо осунулось, под глазами пролегли тени.
До середины марта Дмитрий Михальченко считался одним из самых
успешных российских предпринимателей — его холдинговая компания «Форум» ежегодно генерировала
миллиардные обороты, а сам он находился в товарищеских отношениях с представителями высшей политической
элиты страны. «Дима мог легко проигнорировать просьбы и настояния условного Полтавченко», — рассказывает
знакомый предпринимателя, подчеркивая значимость Михальченко в бизнес-процессах Северной столицы.
На предприятия Дмитрия Михальченко (среди них — морской перегрузочный порт Бронка, завод по производству
оборудования для нефтегазовой отрасли «Измерон», прядильно-ниточный комбинат) с рабочим визитом охотно
приезжали и упомянутый губернатор Георгий Полтавченко, и его предшественница, действующий председатель
Совета Федерации Валентина Матвиенко.
Сам же бизнесмен, легко находивший общий язык с представителями бизнес- и силовой элиты страны, осваивал
новые рынки: в конце февраля этого года он в Симферополе успел обсудить с премьер-министром Республики
Крым Сергеем Аксеновым свое участие в реализации Федеральной целевой программы «Социально-экономическое
развитие Крыма и Севастополя до 2020 года».
Проблемы же у бизнесмена начались в середине марта — в связи с началом расследования следственным
управлением ФСБ уголовного дела о хищении бюджетных средств, выделенных Минкульту на реставрацию
объектов культурного наследия. Напомню, что «реставрационное дело» было возбуждено по факту хищения
денежных средств в ходе исполнения государственного контракта на производство работ по сохранению ансамбля
Изборской крепости в Псковской области. Ключевыми фигурантами этого дела стали заместитель министра
культуры Григорий Пирумов, а также начальник департамента управления имуществом и инвестиционной политики
Борис Мазо и глава подведомственного Минкульту ФГУП «Центрреставрация» Олег Иванов.
Вскоре после задержания чиновников федеральные телеканалы и газеты сообщили о раскрытии ФСБ масштабной
коррупционной схемы в Минкульте, выдвинув на передний план скандала фигуру министра Владимира Мединского,
чьей креатурой являлся Пирумов. И лишь немногие обратили внимание на других задержанных — Александра
Коченова и Дмитрия Сергеева, соответственно, управляющего и генерального директора АО «БалтСтрой»,
входящего в холдинговую компанию «Форум» миллиардера Дмитрия Михальченко.
«БалтСтрой» и связанные с ним структуры были основными исполнителями работ, предусмотренных Федеральной
целевой программой «Развитие культуры России до 2018 года». Однако наивно было полагать, что центральный
аппарат ФСБ (оперативное сопровождение этого дела осуществляет управление «К» СЭБ ФСБ РФ, отвечающее за
контрразведывательное обеспечение кредитно-финансовой системы страны) заинтересовался столь экзотической и
чуждой для него деятельностью, как реставрация.
Буквально на следующий день после того, как обвиняемые по «реставрационному делу» были арестованы судом и
помещены в следственный изолятор «Лефортово», в прессе появились ложные сообщения о задержании
совладельца «Форума» Дмитрия Михальченко. Сам Михальченко в интервью «Фонтанке» публично высмеял эту
дезинформацию: «Сначала было неприятно, потом смешно. Конечно, пришлось отвечать на звонки товарищей. А что
делать? Терплю. Когда звонят друзья, снимаю трубку и рапортую: арестованный Михальченко у аппарата. <…> Я
понимаю, что я не последний человек в городе».
Михальченко не лукавил, когда объяснял петербургским журналистам, что ключевым объектом преследования
чекистов являются чиновники из Министерства культуры — так, по крайней мере, он искренне полагал, вернувшись
из Москвы после нескольких встреч на Старой площади и в Белом доме.
Однако, как уже тогда делились с нами источники в ФСБ, сообщения о задержании Михальченко не были наветами
недобросовестных журналистов — а служили намеком бизнесмену и его окружению. «У него был временной люфт
для разумных действий», — говорит сотрудник ФСБ, знакомый с ситуацией, вероятно, намекая на возможность
Михальченко покинуть страну.
29 марта следователь главного следственного управления Следственного комитета (ГСУ СКР) Сергей Новиков,
известный расследованием резонансного уголовного дела об организации преступного сообщества в ГУЭБиПК
МВД РФ бывшим начальником ведомства Денисом Сугробовым и его заместителем Борисом Колесниковым,
возбудил уголовное дело по факту контрабанды алкогольной продукции (ст. 202.2 УК РФ).
Важно: еще месяц назад в рамках доследственной проверки в Усть-Лужском контейнерном терминале, оператором
которого является ООО «Контрейл Логистик Северо-Запад», была обнаружена контрабандная продукция — 134
контейнера с мясными деликатесами и два контейнера с коньяком Courvoisier 1912 года. Вся продукция была
привезена в Санкт-Петербург из порта Гамбурга по подложным таможенным декларациям, позволившим импортеру
(ООО «Юго-Восточная торговая компания») занизить налогооблагаемую базу, и планировалась к реализации в
ресторанной группе Михальченко «Форум». Результаты этой проверки и легли в основу возбужденного СКР
уголовного дела.
На основании следственных поручений Сергея Новикова сотрудники все того же управления «К» СЭБ ФСБ РФ при
помощи спецназа «Град» УФСБ по Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области в тот же день провели серию
обысков в офисах компаний холдинга «Форум» и по месту жительства его руководителей, задержав первым
начальника службы безопасности «Форума» Бориса Коревского. Коревский ранее служил в УЭБиПК ГУ МВД по
Санкт-Петербургу в должности замначальника и, по словам источника в ФСБ, фактически осуществлял связь с
фискальными и правоохранительными органами «на низовом и среднем уровнях».
Следом опергруппа задержала совладельца оператора Усть-Лужского терминала Анатолия Киндзерского и
гендиректора компании-импортера Илью Пичко. Все трое вечером были доставлены в Москву, где к тому времени
уже был задержан предполагаемый организатор контрабанды — Дмитрий Михальченко.
Любопытны действия миллиардера в момент задержания: по словам источника в ФСБ, Михальченко воспринял
появление чекистов «довольно легкомысленно», позволив себе колкости в их адрес по пути в следственное
управление. «Сложилось ощущение, что он воспринял это как шутку. Будто бы это происходило не с ним», —
говорит собеседник. 29 марта Сергей Новиков вынес постановление о задержании Дмитрия Михальченко на 48
часов, однако уже на следующий день миллиардер был доставлен в Басманный районный суд для избрания ему
меры пресечения.
По всей видимости, досрочное «выселение» из изолятора временного содержания вселило в Дмитрия Михальченко
уверенность в удачном разрешении ситуации — в суде он выглядел довольно бодро, а его выступление больше
походило на брифинг на экономическом форуме. «В моем холдинге работает около семи тысяч человек, мы
курируем проект строительства порта Бронка. Я, как гендиректор, должен участвовать в переговорах. Это
стратегический проект не только для холдинга «Форум», не только для Санкт-Петербурга, но и для России в целом.
Я горжусь тем, что я делаю, мне не стыдно за то, что я делаю. К этому уголовному делу я не имею отношения, я не
занимаюсь таможенной деятельностью и предпринимательством по этому направлению», — уверенно рассуждал
Михальченко, особое внимание уделив сумме инкриминируемого ему «смешного ущерба» — 1,7 млн рублей.
Источник в ФСБ, впрочем, советует не обращать внимания на скромный по своим объемам ущерб, вмененный в
вину Михальченко, а сделать акцент на самой квалификации преступления: «Речь идет не о мошенничестве, не о
растрате, не о злоупотреблении — о контрабанде! Это главное, что надо знать для понимания роли Михальченко».
Также собеседник обращает внимание на место совершения преступления — Усть-Лужский контейнерный
терминал, входящий в порт Усть-Луга.
«Михальченко может сколько угодно рассказывать о Бронке, но зона его влияния простиралась гораздо шире», —
говорит источник, полагая, что бизнесмен обладал возможностями открывать «зеленый коридор» российским
импортерам через большинство портов Санкт-Петербурга.
Если это так, глупо полагать, что контрабанда могла совершаться без ведома высокопоставленных представителей
силового блока.
Равноправным партнером миллиардера в холдинге «Форум» является бывший заместитель начальника УФСБ по
Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области Николай Негодов. Однако главным благодетелем бизнеса Негодова и
Михальченко в последнее время все чаще называют бывшего сослуживца Негодова, а ныне начальника ФСО
Евгения Мурова (подведомственное ему ФГУП «Атэкс», кстати, заключило с «БалтСтроем» не один контракт на
реставрацию объектов, среди которых и резиденции главы государства).
Впрочем, по словам нашего источника, вряд ли высокопоставленные силовики смогут помочь своему протеже:
«Президент, очевидно, постепенно меняет команду в ФСО — не так давно были прекращены полномочия первого
заместителя директора Александра Белякова. Самому Евгению Мурову в ноябре исполняется 71 год. Его срок
службы подходит к концу».
А для того, чтобы понять, кто начал многоходовую комбинацию в борьбе за порты и таможенные тропы северо-
запада России, нужно подождать не так уж долго: скоро в Усть-Луге, вполне вероятно, появятся новые игроки,
подконтрольные иному блоку силовиков, ну или хотя бы знакомые с руководством, например, того же управления
«К» ФСБ.
Sent time: 04/04/2016 10:55:30 PM
2013-- Russo Chekisto: Anin Exposes former FSB Colonel's Luxury Villa in Italy (dmitry frolov of upravlenie K; the shadow banking sector;
Subject:
Voronin/Magnitskiy; signs of a struggle?)

N.B. passage below on Voronin-Frolov-Magin (GUEBiPK related)
Subject: Russo Chekisto: Anin Exposes former FSB Colonel's Luxury Villa in Italy (dmitry
frolov of upravlenie K; the shadow banking sector; Voronin/Magnitskiy; signs of a struggle?)
Date: August 24, 2013 at 4:33:30 AM EDT
To: Robert Otto <acrotto@us-state.osis.gov>
http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/fsb/structure/ (soldatov's site)
4. Служба экономической безопасности (СЭБ) - Юрий Яковлев, бывший первый заместитель, глава

Управления "П" (источник: Указ Президента № 1615 от 27.12.04), до 13.05.08 генерал армии Александр
Бортников(до него Юрий Евгеньевич Заостровцев ), первый заместитель - до июня 2008 г. - Ю.В. Яковлев
Управление по контрразведывательному обеспечению предприятий промышленности (Управление "П")
Управление по контрразведывательному обеспечению транспорта "Управление Т" - Чернышев Сергей
Михайлович (источник), до него Федоров А.В. (источник: Распоряжение Правительства от 18.04.2005 №431-
р)
Управление по контрразведывательному обеспечению кредитно-финансовой системы (Управление "К") -
Виктор Воронин (источник), заместитель А.И. Егоров (источник)
Управление по контрразведывательному обеспечению МВД, МЧС, Минюста (Управление "М") - Анатолий
Тюков (назначен в декабре 2012), до него Алексей Дорофеев - назначен осенью 2012 года на должность
начальника УФС по Москве (ранее начальник УФСБ Карелии), назначен в феврале 2010, до него Владимир
Крючков (источник)
Организационно-аналитическое управление - Юрий Алешин (источник)
Управление по борьбе с контрабандой и незаконным оборотом наркотиков "Управление Н" - Сергей Фоменко
(назначен осенью 2000 г)
Административная служба
Anin doesn't say whether Frolov was a part of Ignatyev's "одной хорошо организованной группой лиц" responsible for half of
the illegal capital flight in 2012
23-08-2013 00:59:00
Russo chekisto
«Новая газета» обнаружила элитную недвижимость в Италии у семьи полковника ФСБ, наводившего ужас на
банковский сектор России
«Новая газета» обнаружила элитную недвижимость в Италии у семьи полковника ФСБ, наводившего ужас на банковский
сектор России
Итальянский городок Стреза, расположенный на самой
границе со Швейцарией, одним боком упирается в горы, другим — в берег прекрасного озера Маджоре. У этого городка,
должно быть, своя неповторимая аура: по его улочкам любили ходить всемирно известные писатели, художники,
наследники и хозяева монарших престолов, арендовавшие в этих местах виллы с видом на Маджоре. Стреза (как и вся
провинция Вербания, в которой расположен город) и сегодня остается одним из популярнейших мест среди VIP-
покупателей зарубежной недвижимости. У граждан России эти места тоже пользуются спросом. Россия XXI века
сформировала новые элиты, поэтому среди обладателей вилл на Маджоре теперь редко можно встретить представителей
богемы. Зато «местными» здесь стали семьи русских чекистов. «Новая газета», используя государственный кадастровый
реестр Италии, обнаружила на берегах Маджоре дома и каштановые рощи, принадлежащие родственникам бывшего
заместителя начальника управления «К» ФСБ, полковника Дмитрия Фролова.
11 помещений и каштаны
Согласно данным кадастрового реестра Италии, в окрестностях города Стреза провинции Вербания, на улице Монте Дзеда
находятся четыре строения (основной дом из 11 помещений и прилегающие постройки), а также четыре участка земли с
каштановыми рощами, принадлежащие Ольге и Алексею Фроловым. Их данные (годы рождения и идентификационные
номера) полностью совпадают с данными жены и отца полковника Дмитрия Фролова, до июля этого года бывшего
заместителем начальника управления «К» ФСБ России.
«Места и недвижимость с видом на озера, расположенные на севере Италии, очень популярны у россиян, — рассказывает
Варден Авалиани из агентства элитной недвижимостиWelhome. — Озеро Комо считается вип-локацией преимущественно для
богатых, далее по рангу — озера Гарда, Маджоре, Изео — как правило, для состоятельных покупателей». По словам
Авалиани, разброс цен на виллы очень велик, все зависит от места, видов, эксклюзивности объекта. Цены варьируются от 1
млн до 50 млн евро.
«Новая газета», изучая предложения от разных агентств недвижимости, подсчитала, что средняя цена за дом с участком в этих
местах может составлять около 1-3 млн евро. Откуда у семьи сотрудника ФСБ такие деньги?

Куратор банковского рынка
Дмитрию Фролову 43 года, в управлении «К» он начинал в
так называемом банковском отделе, затем дослужился до
заместителя Виктора Воронина, руководителя управления.
Управление «К» входит в Службу экономической
безопасности ФСБ, формально основная задача управления
— контрразведывательное обеспечение кредитно-
финансовой сферы России. Однако из-за нескольких
реорганизаций сегодня задачи управления гораздо шире.
Например, к управлению «К» было присоединено
управление «Н» ФСБ России, в задачу которого входила
борьба с наркотиками, контрабандой и организованной
преступностью. Поэтому на нынешний момент управление
«К» — одно из самых влиятельных в структуре ФСБ, оно
курирует ЦБ, администрацию президента, таможню. Озеро Маджоре
Дмитрий Фролов как замначальника управления отвечал за банковский и финансовый секторы России. Его имя знакомо,
пожалуй, каждому банкиру. По крайней мере, «Новая газета», проводя многие расследования о хищениях в банках или об
отмывании денег, часто слышала это имя от различных источников. Говорили о нем, как правило, шепотом, потому что
считалось, что у Дмитрия Фролова и сотрудников банковского отдела есть колоссальные возможности влиять на кредитно-
финансовый сектор России. Это вполне логично: банковский рынок, как никакой другой, построен на доверии и крайне
восприимчив к малейшим негативным явлениям. Любой обыск или оперативная справка могут в одночасье разрушить банк,
лишив его вкладчиков и клиентов.
С другой стороны, некоторые сотрудники управления «К» имели огромное влияние и на теневой банковский сектор, тот,
который живет за счет процентов от транзита и «обнала» преступных денег. На этом рынке доверие «клиентов», пожалуй,
даже важнее, чем на легальном. Потому что в случае ареста счетов потери клиентов ни одно АСВ не компенсирует.
Оценить успехи управления «К» ФСБ в сфере борьбы с негативными явлениями в кредитно-финансовой сфере России
крайне трудно, учитывая колоссальные объемы сомнительных банковских операций и вывода денег из страны за рубеж.
В силу всех этих причин о полковнике Фролове и некоторых его подчиненных сложилось крайне странное мнение. «Новая
газета» опросила с десяток его знакомых и бывших коллег, но поверить в то количество историй с рухнувшими банками и
«обнальными» площадками, в которых упоминалось его имя, все равно трудно. Хотя некоторые из эпизодов уже известны на
весь мир и имеют более или менее объективное подтверждение. Прежде всего это «дело Магнитского» (руководитель
Фролова Виктор Воронин — один из первых в «списке Магнитского»), дело «АМТ Банка» Мухтара Аблязова и другие.
Последний из громких эпизодов, в котором, по словам источников «Новой», в том или ином свете упоминалось имя Дмитрия
Фролова, — это задержание группы «черных банкиров» во главе с Сергеем Магиным. Этой группе, по данным МВД, за
несколько лет удалось обналичить и вывести за рубеж около 36 млрд рублей.
Увольнение
Перед подготовкой публикации «Новая газета» отправила запрос в ФСБ, где нам сообщили, что «наличие у сотрудников ФСБ
России зарегистрированной за пределами Российской Федерации недвижимости является основанием для их увольнения с
военной службы, если указанная недвижимость в установленном порядке не отчуждена». При этом согласно ответу из ФСБ,
такая информация должна быть отражена в декларации о доходах и имуществе сотрудника. Однако, судя по всему, полковник
Фролов итальянское имущество своей семьи не задекларировал: «Указанный в обращении военнослужащий ранее
представил недостоверные и неполные сведения в отношении супруги, по результатам проведенной проверки он уволен с
военной службы в связи с утратой доверия в июле 2013 года», — говорится в письме ФСБ на наш запрос.
Новость об увольнении Дмитрия Фролова была воспринята сталкивавшимися с ним людьми двояко. С одной стороны, как
рассказали «Новой» некоторые его бывшие коллеги, увольнение в связи с утратой доверия столь высокопоставленного
сотрудника — нечастый случай для ФСБ, где предпочитают не выносить сор из избы. Такая категоричность может говорить о
том, что у руководства ФСБ наконец сложилось понимание истинной роли некоторых сотрудников управления «К» в
банковском мире и желание изменить ситуацию.
Представители банковского мира более пессимистичны. Слухи о роскошной итальянской недвижимости гуляли по коридорам
Лубянки около двух лет, рассказывают источники «Новой». Почему этой истории дали ход только месяц назад — непонятно.
Одна из популярных версий, которая обсуждается в банковских кругах, — это передел рынка незаконных банковских услуг,
рынка транзита и «обнала». «Идет не борьба с обнальными площадками, идет борьба за контроль над ними», — заметил
«Новой газете» один из представителей теневого банковского сектора России.
Связаться с Дмитрием Фроловым или членами его семьи не удалось. Мы обратились ко многим его знакомым, однако ни
один из известных им номеров не отвечает, найти полковника Фролова в Москве никто не смог.
Выписка из кадастра недвижимости Италии

Автор: Роман Анин

Постоянный адрес страницы: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/59646.html

Sent time: 04/04/2016 10:52:18 PM
Subject: Novaya on the Mikhalchenko Arrest (FSB SEB Directorate K)

http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/72498.html keep in mind that the inimitable Viktor Voronin heads FSB SEB
Directorate K & it/he played a role in the Magnitskiy affair as well as the GUEBiPK scandal.
Что на самом деле стоит за арестом питерского
миллиардера Михальченко. Расследование
Что на самом деле стоит за арестом питерского миллиардера Михальченко и при чем тут война силовиков за
контроль над российскими портами
Совладелец и генеральный директор холдинговой компании «Форум» Дмитрий Михальченко, которого не
без оснований считают одним из самых влиятельных людей Санкт-Петербурга, не выглядел в зале
Басманного районного суда Москвы подавленным и уставшим. В ходе заседания он, в отличие от других
арестованных фигурантов большого расследования о контрабанде алкогольной продукции, даже позволял
себе шутки в адрес следствия и суда. «Давайте поменьше времени этому уделять. Ну как в цирке!» —
кивнул он в адрес то ли следователя, то ли собравшихся журналистов, энергично переминаясь с ноги на
ногу в «клетке». Спустя двадцать минут, когда судья объявил о помещении бизнесмена в следственный
изолятор, настроение Михальченко переменилось — лицо осунулось, под глазами пролегли тени.
До середины марта Дмитрий Михальченко считался одним из самых
успешных российских предпринимателей — его холдинговая компания «Форум» ежегодно генерировала
миллиардные обороты, а сам он находился в товарищеских отношениях с представителями высшей политической
элиты страны. «Дима мог легко проигнорировать просьбы и настояния условного Полтавченко», — рассказывает
знакомый предпринимателя, подчеркивая значимость Михальченко в бизнес-процессах Северной столицы.
На предприятия Дмитрия Михальченко (среди них — морской перегрузочный порт Бронка, завод по производству
оборудования для нефтегазовой отрасли «Измерон», прядильно-ниточный комбинат) с рабочим визитом охотно
приезжали и упомянутый губернатор Георгий Полтавченко, и его предшественница, действующий председатель Совета
Федерации Валентина Матвиенко.
Сам же бизнесмен, легко находивший общий язык с представителями бизнес- и силовой элиты страны, осваивал
новые рынки: в конце февраля этого года он в Симферополе успел обсудить с премьер-министром Республики Крым
Сергеем Аксеновым свое участие в реализации Федеральной целевой программы «Социально-экономическое
развитие Крыма и Севастополя до 2020 года».
Проблемы же у бизнесмена начались в середине марта — в связи с началом расследования следственным
управлением ФСБ уголовного дела о хищении бюджетных средств, выделенных Минкульту на реставрацию объектов
культурного наследия. Напомню, что «реставрационное дело» было возбуждено по факту хищения денежных средств
в ходе исполнения государственного контракта на производство работ по сохранению ансамбля Изборской крепости в
Псковской области. Ключевыми фигурантами этого дела стали заместитель министра культуры Григорий Пирумов, а
также начальник департамента управления имуществом и инвестиционной политики Борис Мазо и глава
подведомственного Минкульту ФГУП «Центрреставрация» Олег Иванов.
Вскоре после задержания чиновников федеральные телеканалы и газеты сообщили о раскрытии ФСБ масштабной
коррупционной схемы в Минкульте, выдвинув на передний план скандала фигуру министра Владимира Мединского,
чьей креатурой являлся Пирумов. И лишь немногие обратили внимание на других задержанных — Александра
Коченова и Дмитрия Сергеева, соответственно, управляющего и генерального директора АО «БалтСтрой», входящего
в холдинговую компанию «Форум» миллиардера Дмитрия Михальченко.
«БалтСтрой» и связанные с ним структуры были основными исполнителями работ, предусмотренных Федеральной
целевой программой «Развитие культуры России до 2018 года». Однако наивно было полагать, что центральный
аппарат ФСБ (оперативное сопровождение этого дела осуществляет управление «К» СЭБ ФСБ РФ, отвечающее за
контрразведывательное обеспечение кредитно-финансовой системы страны) заинтересовался столь экзотической и
чуждой для него деятельностью, как реставрация.
Буквально на следующий день после того, как обвиняемые по «реставрационному делу» были арестованы судом и
помещены в следственный изолятор «Лефортово», в прессе появились ложные сообщения о задержании совладельца
«Форума» Дмитрия Михальченко. Сам Михальченко в интервью «Фонтанке» публично высмеял эту дезинформацию:
«Сначала было неприятно, потом смешно. Конечно, пришлось отвечать на звонки товарищей. А что делать? Терплю.
Когда звонят друзья, снимаю трубку и рапортую: арестованный Михальченко у аппарата. <…> Я понимаю, что я не
последний человек в городе».
Михальченко не лукавил, когда объяснял петербургским журналистам, что ключевым объектом преследования
чекистов являются чиновники из Министерства культуры — так, по крайней мере, он искренне полагал, вернувшись
из Москвы после нескольких встреч на Старой площади и в Белом доме.
Однако, как уже тогда делились с нами источники в ФСБ, сообщения о задержании Михальченко не были наветами
недобросовестных журналистов — а служили намеком бизнесмену и его окружению. «У него был временной люфт
для разумных действий», — говорит сотрудник ФСБ, знакомый с ситуацией, вероятно, намекая на возможность
Михальченко покинуть страну.
29 марта следователь главного следственного управления Следственного комитета (ГСУ СКР) Сергей Новиков,
известный расследованием резонансного уголовного дела об организации преступного сообщества в ГУЭБиПК МВД
РФ бывшим начальником ведомства Денисом Сугробовым и его заместителем Борисом Колесниковым, возбудил
уголовное дело по факту контрабанды алкогольной продукции (ст. 202.2 УК РФ).
Важно: еще месяц назад в рамках доследственной проверки в Усть-Лужском контейнерном терминале, оператором
которого является ООО «Контрейл Логистик Северо-Запад», была обнаружена контрабандная продукция — 134
контейнера с мясными деликатесами и два контейнера с коньяком Courvoisier 1912 года. Вся продукция была
привезена в Санкт-Петербург из порта Гамбурга по подложным таможенным декларациям, позволившим импортеру
(ООО «Юго-Восточная торговая компания») занизить налогооблагаемую базу, и планировалась к реализации в
ресторанной группе Михальченко «Форум». Результаты этой проверки и легли в основу возбужденного СКР
уголовного дела.
На основании следственных поручений Сергея Новикова сотрудники все того же управления «К» СЭБ ФСБ РФ при
помощи спецназа «Град» УФСБ по Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области в тот же день провели серию обысков
в офисах компаний холдинга «Форум» и по месту жительства его руководителей, задержав первым начальника
службы безопасности «Форума» Бориса Коревского. Коревский ранее служил в УЭБиПК ГУ МВД по Санкт-
Петербургу в должности замначальника и, по словам источника в ФСБ, фактически осуществлял связь с
фискальными и правоохранительными органами «на низовом и среднем уровнях».
Следом опергруппа задержала совладельца оператора Усть-Лужского терминала Анатолия Киндзерского и
гендиректора компании-импортера Илью Пичко. Все трое вечером были доставлены в Москву, где к тому времени
уже был задержан предполагаемый организатор контрабанды — Дмитрий Михальченко.
Любопытны действия миллиардера в момент задержания: по словам источника в ФСБ, Михальченко воспринял
появление чекистов «довольно легкомысленно», позволив себе колкости в их адрес по пути в следственное
управление. «Сложилось ощущение, что он воспринял это как шутку. Будто бы это происходило не с ним», —
говорит собеседник. 29 марта Сергей Новиков вынес постановление о задержании Дмитрия Михальченко на 48 часов,
однако уже на следующий день миллиардер был доставлен в Басманный районный суд для избрания ему меры
пресечения.
По всей видимости, досрочное «выселение» из изолятора временного содержания вселило в Дмитрия Михальченко
уверенность в удачном разрешении ситуации — в суде он выглядел довольно бодро, а его выступление больше
походило на брифинг на экономическом форуме. «В моем холдинге работает около семи тысяч человек, мы курируем
проект строительства порта Бронка. Я, как гендиректор, должен участвовать в переговорах. Это стратегический
проект не только для холдинга «Форум», не только для Санкт-Петербурга, но и для России в целом. Я горжусь тем,
что я делаю, мне не стыдно за то, что я делаю. К этому уголовному делу я не имею отношения, я не занимаюсь
таможенной деятельностью и предпринимательством по этому направлению», — уверенно рассуждал Михальченко,
особое внимание уделив сумме инкриминируемого ему «смешного ущерба» — 1,7 млн рублей.
Источник в ФСБ, впрочем, советует не обращать внимания на скромный по своим объемам ущерб, вмененный в вину
Михальченко, а сделать акцент на самой квалификации преступления: «Речь идет не о мошенничестве, не о растрате,
не о злоупотреблении — о контрабанде! Это главное, что надо знать для понимания роли Михальченко». Также
собеседник обращает внимание на место совершения преступления — Усть-Лужский контейнерный терминал,
входящий в порт Усть-Луга.
«Михальченко может сколько угодно рассказывать о Бронке, но зона его влияния простиралась гораздо шире», —
говорит источник, полагая, что бизнесмен обладал возможностями открывать «зеленый коридор» российским
импортерам через большинство портов Санкт-Петербурга.
Если это так, глупо полагать, что контрабанда могла совершаться без ведома высокопоставленных представителей
силового блока.
Равноправным партнером миллиардера в холдинге «Форум» является бывший заместитель начальника УФСБ по
Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области Николай Негодов. Однако главным благодетелем бизнеса Негодова и
Михальченко в последнее время все чаще называют бывшего сослуживца Негодова, а ныне начальника ФСО Евгения
Мурова (подведомственное ему ФГУП «Атэкс», кстати, заключило с «БалтСтроем» не один контракт на реставрацию
объектов, среди которых и резиденции главы государства).
Впрочем, по словам нашего источника, вряд ли высокопоставленные силовики смогут помочь своему протеже:
«Президент, очевидно, постепенно меняет команду в ФСО — не так давно были прекращены полномочия первого
заместителя директора Александра Белякова. Самому Евгению Мурову в ноябре исполняется 71 год. Его срок
службы подходит к концу».
А для того, чтобы понять, кто начал многоходовую комбинацию в борьбе за порты и таможенные тропы северо-запада
России, нужно подождать не так уж долго: скоро в Усть-Луге, вполне вероятно, появятся новые игроки,
подконтрольные иному блоку силовиков, ну или хотя бы знакомые с руководством, например, того же управления
«К» ФСБ.
Sent time: 04/10/2016 11:08:27 PM
To: Steedman Hinckley <steedman@earthlink.net>
Subject: RED NOTICE ---- Fwd: Zavtra etc on Magnitskiy

Don’t know whether you filed/kept the stuff I sent, but some of this material (or better, its themes) surfaced in
Chayka’s response to Navalnyy’s movie on his kids.
And there are elements in the recent mess.
From: Robert Otto <robertcotto@verizon.net>
Date: August 7, 2011 5:52:57 AM EDT
To: Robert Otto <ACrotto@us-state.osis.gov>
1) Browder & Magnitskiy cooked up illegal schemes to buy Gazprom shares before
the "ring"
2) On top of this, Magnitskiy devised schemes to avoid taxes: bought 7% of the shares
for 300m and sold for 4b w/o paying taxes
4) Gasanov then proposes three Russians Kurochkin (dies in Spring 2008), Markelov
& Khlebnikov head the Hermitage connected firms
7) Browder worked with Stepanova of the 28th Tax Inspectorate (no wonder he has
stuff on her).
12) Markelov arrested in 11/08 - didn't know Browder, but knew Gasanov,
Korobeynikov, & Magnitskiy
16) 2 May 2011: RosGaz publishes piece noting all 4 deaths -
http://www.rg.ru/2011/05/02/magnitskii-site.html
------
---------
Ovchinskiy
4) why aren't the three cases connected w Magnitskiy (tax avoidance, illegal return of
tax money, death) united into one
Спецоперация «Магнитский»
Владимир Матусевич
03 августа 2011 года
Номер 31 (924)
Государственный департамент США 26 июля утвердил
список, состоящий из российских должностных лиц,
которым запрещён въезд в Соединённые Штаты, и на их
счета в американских банках налагается арест. Таким
образом, должностные лица России подвергаются
беспрецедентной диффамации со стороны иностранного
государства.
ОГРОМНОЕ ДАВЛЕНИЕ, которое сейчас идёт на Россию:
на власть, на судебную систему, правоохранительные органы,
практически вмешательство во внутренние дела России в
связи с делом Магнитского заставляет разобраться в этом
вопросе.
Любопытно: почему Уильям Браудер, совершивший в России
вместе с Сергеем Магнитским вульгарное экономическое
преступление, по существу — финансовый мошенник, имеет
возможность использовать для уклонения от суда в России
государственный аппарат Америки и европейских стран?
Откуда такие колоссальные возможности у предпринимателя,
который заработал миллиарды долларов именно на бизнесе в
России?
Второй вопрос: почему Соединённые Штаты и ряд
европейских государств делают громкие заявления только на
основании недостоверной информации Браудера и
совершенно не интересуются подлинными документами по
уголовному делу? А ведь российская сторона неоднократно
предлагала заинтересованным лицам и организациям
познакомиться с этим делом: пришлите запрос, вам будут
направлены интересующие документы. Все доказательства
вины и Браудера, и Магнитского в совершении экономических
преступлений на территории России имеются. Но почему-то
недружественная по отношению к России политика
выстраивается исключительно на основании однобокой
информации, без всякой проверки её правдивости,
составляются крамольные списки, объявляются санкции.
Доказательства, которые есть у российского суда, у органов
следствия, представленные в любой американский или
европейский суд, неизбежно повлекли бы уголовную
ответственность Браудера и Магнитского. Можно не
сомневаться, что любая из стран, которая критикует в связи с
этим делом Россию, в судебном порядке приняла бы решение
осудить обоих.
Именно поэтому Браудер делает всё возможное, чтобы
материалы расследования никогда не поступили в суд.
Знакомясь с обстоятельствами этого дела, приходишь к
выводу, что настоящей причиной смерти Магнитского
является именно это обстоятельство — желание Браудера,
чтобы ни при каких обстоятельствах дело не получило
огласку в суде. Это было бы моральным крахом Браудера, его
компании, перед всем миром было бы показано истинное лицо
финансового мошенника.
Лживое обвинение российской стороны Браудером состоит в
следующем: якобы, Сергей Магнитский был арестован за то,
что сделал заявление о совершении сотрудниками
правоохранительных органов хищения денег в размере 230
миллионов долларов США и мужественно продолжал их
изобличать, находясь уже под стражей. За это его в тюрьме и
замучили.
Но ни одного такого рода заявления Магнитского не
существует. Ни одного заявления, данного им, когда он ещё
не находился под стражей, о том, что, вот, сотрудники
совершили хищения. А находясь под стражей, Магнитский
вообще отказался давать любые показания, пользуясь своим
правом, данным статьёй 51 Конституции РФ. То есть
заявления не было ни до, ни после.
Но в ужасающих красках разрисована лживая картина, по
которой, якобы, Магнитский — бесстрашный обличитель
неправедных сотрудников, которые сами совершили хищения,
сами расследовали дело, заведённое против него. Был создан
не подтверждённый ничем миф, который не только
существует, но и усиленно раздувается.
Браудер, выдвигая обвинения в хищениях, по ходу дела
несколько раз менял суждения: то работники российских
правоохранительных органов — расхитители, то он заявлял,
что хищения совершили западные инвесторы. (Видимо, ему в
тот момент был нужен механизм давления на западных
конкурентов). А в недавнем заявлении он говорит, что
хищение 230 миллионов долларов совершили члены
правительства России. Сообщает, что собирает
доказательства, намекая, что в этом деле есть интерес лично
премьера и президента страны. (Как мы увидим, Браудеру не
привыкать искать компроматы и пользоваться ими, извлекая
из этого вполне конкретную выгоду, в этом он профессионал).
Американский сенатор Бенджамин Кардин вместе с
сенатором-республиканцем Джоном Маккейном на основании
заявлений Браудера, не подтверждённых ни одним из
документов, указали в своем известном "списке
Магнитского", что тот был арестован без суда на три года. В
России без суда вообще арестовать невозможно, у нас нет
людей, арестованных без решения суда. А срок в три года,
видимо, приведён для нагнетания ужасов. Это у американцев
в Гуантанамо сидят люди без суда, без следствия, и не на три
года посажены, а бессрочно.
Почему Браудеру, который себя преподносит как обычный
предприниматель, позволено в России безнаказанно
совершать преступления? Почему он может составить без
всякого основания списки лиц, которые, якобы, виноваты в
совершении уголовных преступлений? Почему его списки
сразу воспринимают на Западе без всякой проверки, а в
России перед ним прогибаются?
ЧТОБЫ ЭТО ПОНЯТЬ, нужно знать, кто такой Браудер, как
он оказался в России и чем здесь занимался. Вот небольшой
экскурс в его биографию.
Дед Уильяма Браудера с тридцатых годов прошлого века до
1945 года был генеральным секретарём Компартии США. В
1945 году из партии был исключён: он подготовил роспуск
Компартии, был заподозрен своими соратниками в измене, в
связях со спецслужбами и за это исключён. То есть, в роду
этого парня не без авантюристов.
Интересна биография и самого Браудера. После окончания
финансовой школы в США он прибывает в 1989 году
Великобританию и в начале 90-х годов принимает британское
гражданство. Этот факт сам по себе интересен: поскольку
между Британией и США существуют особые
взаимоотношения, гражданину США можно заниматься
бизнесом, заключить брак, платить налоги в Великобритании
без британского гражданства.
У принятия гражданства объяснение может быть таково: оно
необходимо для поступления на государственную службу
Великобритании. На какой вид государственной службы
поступил Уильям Браудер в начале 90-х годов, несложно
догадаться. Особенно, если посмотреть на его деятельность в
России, куда он приехал в 1996 году. Здесь уже находилась
компания "Фаерстоун и Дункан" близкого знакомого Браудера
американского гражданина Фаерстоуна. Фактически это
родственные фирмы: Hermitage Capital, созданная Браудером, и
фирма Фаерстоуна. Находились эти "тихие американцы" в
близких деловых отношениях. Юридическая фирма
Фаерстоуна появилась в России в 1993 году. И сразу же
сотрудники попали в трагическую ситуацию: 3 октября 1993
года Терри Дункан, партнёр Фаерстоуна, был убит в районе
Останкино при попытке вынести из-под огня американского
журналиста. Дункан — единственный гражданином США,
который был убит во время тех событий.
Но что делали "мирные американские юристы" во время тех
событий в России? Почему находились в центре перестрелки
и почему фактически обеспечивали физическую защиту
американских журналистов? Терри Дункан поступил
геройски: своим телом прикрывал журналиста, выводил из-
под огня. Но зачем мирному юристу было находиться там и
выводить из-под огня другого мирного гражданина Америки?
Всё становится ясно, если предположить, что погиб
сотрудник спецслужб, который до конца выполнил свой долг.
Браудер после прибытия в Россию занялся деятельностью,
которая в западных странах является преступной. В России
она наказуемой не является, чем он и воспользовался:
занимался гринмейлом (корпоративный шантаж). Он покупал
акции компаний, в том числе крупных. Интересовался
Сбербанком, Газпромом, РАО ЕЭС, Сургутнефтегазом. И
начинал компании "раскачивать": на правах акционера
заказывал аудиторские проверки, добывал компрометирующие
материалы. То есть, основной его деятельностью был сбор
компромата. И затем, используя компромат, организовывал
акции по дискредитации компаний, в дальнейшем получая
крупные отступные.
НАЦЕЛЕННОСТЬ СОТРУДНИКОВ фирмы Hermitage
Capital и самого Браудера на сбор компромата в отношении и
компаний, и государственных деятелей, и крупнейших
российских бизнесменов привлекла к нему внимание
российских спецслужб. В результате в 2005 году ему был
запрещён въезд в Российскую Федерацию по соображениям
национальной безопасности. Однако, его фирма продолжала
работать.
Но ещё в 2003-2004 годах Браудер начал незаконно и очень
активно скупать акции Газпрома, хотя тогда действовал указ
президента России о запрете покупки акций иностранными
гражданами и компаниями. (Указ был издан, чтобы
контрольный пакет оказался в руках РФ и российских
граждан. Поэтому эти акции котировались исключительно на
внутреннем российском рынке и стоили недорого).
Браудер вместе с Магнитским разработали незаконную схему
покупки акций. Для этого они приняли в свою компанию,
зарегистрированную в Калмыкии, граждан России —
половину от числа сотрудников: в таком случае компания уже
не считалась иностранной. Магнитский, видимо, предложил
Браудеру ещё и сэкономить на уплате налогов, разработав
схему ухода от них. (Схема данного преступления была изъята
в ходе следствия именно из компьютера Магнитского).
То есть, Магнитский, которого сейчас выставляют как жертву
борьбы с коррупцией, просто обслуживал иностранного
финансового делягу и помогал ему уклоняться от уплаты
российских налогов.
Преступление по уклонению от уплаты налогов было
совершено довольно просто. Браудер купил 7% акций
Газпрома (в обход закона) за 300 миллионов долларов. И
перепродал. Прибыль у него превзошла 4 миллиарда, налогов
от этой сделки не заплатил.
Как уклонились от уплаты? Приняли в три небольшие
калмыцкие компании инвалидов, людей умственно отсталых,
финансовыми аналитиками, хотя у некоторых не было даже
среднего образования, а кое-кто не умел читать и писать. Вот,
например, какие волшебные превращения происходили с
людьми, попавшими в поле зрения Браудера и компании. Так,
гражданин Б., например, который, как следует из
официальной справки, "состоит на учёте у психиатра с
диагнозом "лёгкая умственная отсталость", является
инвалидом II-й группы", работавший то штукатуром, то
каменщиком, то сторожем, принят в ООО Сатурн-инвест
(фирма Браудера), о чём свидетельствует запись, сделанная
Магнитским и подпись Браудера, экспертом аналитического
отдела.
Такие вот "финансовые аналитики" создали в фирме 50%-
ную массу российских граждан и инвалидов, что позволило
не платить налоги. Да, инвалиды пользуются льготами, но
совпадение двух составляющих дают право фирме на льготы:
инвалиды должны реально работать там и на той должности,
где они приняты на работу. А в силу своего образования и
состояния здоровья финансовыми аналитиками принятые
работать не могли. Во-вторых, это должно быть их основное
место работы. А эти инвалиды, как явствует из документов,
трудились дворниками, разнорабочими, на тех реальных
рабочих местах у них были трудовые книжки.
Никакой сложности в виду ясности обстоятельств в деле
Браудера и Магницкого не было. Тем не менее, это налоговое
дело удавалось неоднократно прекращать, постановление об
его возбуждении не раз отменялось.
У высланного в 2005 году из России Браудера в 2007 году, о
чём он сам говорит, появилась надежда на возвращение: он
обратился к будущему президенту России на "русском вечере"
в Давосе. Ему пообещали разобраться. Он, рассчитывая, что
разрешат вернуться в Россию и заняться бизнесом, платит 11
миллиардов рублей налогов по итогам работы за 2006 год.
Но в 2007 году возбуждается ещё одно уголовное дело по
неуплате Браудером и его компанией налогов, но уже не в
Калмыкии, а в Москве. И вопрос о возвращении в Россию
отпадает, поскольку им начинают интересоваться как
потенциальным обвиняемым.
После этого происходит беспрецедентное событие. Если бы
Браудер был просто частным инвестором, каковым себя и
представляет, оно не могло бы состояться: Браудер вывозит
весь состав своей компании Hermitage Сapital, 20 граждан
России, в Великобританию. Самая настоящая эвакуация.
Каждому из них, хотя визовые вопросы в Англии решаются
очень сложно (порядка 30% — отказов) сразу выдают визы.
Причём, из всего этого персонала следствие, кроме самого
Браудера, интересовал только один человек— Черкасов,
который шёл по московскому налоговому делу. Остальные
были просто свидетелями. Такая масштабная эвакуация,
безусловно, без поддержки властей, компетентных органов
Великобритании невозможна. Это ещё раз заставляет
усомниться в том, что Браудер — простой предприниматель.
За ним, очевидно, стоят серьёзные структуры. И
последовавшие события, в том числе разворачивающиеся на
наших глазах, это подтверждают.
В ДЕЛО ВСТУПАЕТ некий Гасанов. Он предлагает троим
российским гражданам: Курочкину, Маркелову и Хлебникову,
— стать на время руководителями московских фирм Браудера,
в отношении которых расследуются налоговые преступления.
А незадолго до того в офисах этих компаний происходят
обыски, изымается подлинная печать.
Поэтому, скорее всего, Магнитским, изготовляется несколько
дубликатов печатей. Кстати, именно дубликаты, а не
подлинная печать, в дальнейшем используются при хищении.
Этим привлечённым лицам Гасановым предлагает участвовать
в возврате денег, которые были заплачены Браудером в
качестве налогов.
Факты таковы. Гасанов находит подставных директоров, лиц,
ранее судимых, они соглашаются на участие в этой операции.
Гасанов, действуя по доверенности владельца этих трёх
компаний, подлинность которой никто не опроверг (а
компании курируются самим Браудером) меняет трёх
директоров, перерегистрирует компании на этих трёх
привлечённых лиц — новых владельцев. Далее следует
обращение в налоговую инспекцию, что выплачены эти
деньги ошибочно, и их надо вернуть.
А как только в сентябре 2007 года происходит
перерегистрация этих фирм, 1 октября этого же года Гасанов
умирает от сердечного приступа. Это первая смерть в данной
истории. Если бы Гасанов был жив, он мог бы рассказать, кто
и каким образом организовал это преступление. Но он вдруг
умирает. После смерти Гасанова в дело вступает банкир
Коробейников, на счета которого эти возвращённые деньги
переводят.
Не может не показаться странным, что государство вообще
принимает решение вернуть совершенно законно полученные
налоговые деньги.
Но дело, может быть, в том, что Браудер ещё с 90-х годов
обслуживался в 28-й налоговой инспекции, оброс связями и
знакомствами. Начальник налоговой инспекции Степанова и
её муж Степанов были знакомы с юристами Браудера.
Позже Браудер опубликовал компромат на мужа Степановой и
её саму, что у них есть собственность, а эта собственность
оформлялась на Степанова юридической фирмой самого
Браудера. Не значит ли это, что он коррумпировал органы,
чтобы затем их шантажировать? Так что о причинах
возвращения этих денег версий много. Возможно, в этом деле
участвовали высокопоставленные сотрудники налоговых
органов. Если это так, их необходимо выявлять.
Налоговая служба после проверки возвращает 5,4 млрд.
рублей. Они идут на счета банка гражданина Коробейникова.
БРАУДЕРОМ БЫЛА ПРОДЕЛАНА ещё одна уникальная
операция. После того, как прошла перерегистрация фирм, как
были поданы документы в налоговую службу, он организовал
направление заявления генеральному прокурору и в МВД о
том, что у него похитили три фирмы. Он знал, что уголовное
дело не будет возбуждено немедленно. Потому что, во-
первых, эти фирмы были перерегистрированы на основании
подлинной доверенности, выданной кипрской компанией,
подконтрольной Браудеру. (А спросить Гасанова об
обстоятельствах этого дела было нельзя, так как он к этому
моменту был мёртв). Во-вторых, на тот момент на счетах этих
фирм был ноль рублей ноль копеек. Материального ущерба
тут не было, потому что фирмы не имели собственности. У
них ничего не было, и Браудер, когда писал это заявление,
осознавал, что это не более, чем операция прикрытия. Нет
оснований для возбуждения дела — нет материального
ущерба!
Деньги, поступившие в банк Коробейникова, были разбиты на
мелкие партии. Ушли в Литву, а оттуда — в "далёкие края".
Действительно, в результате было похищено 230 миллионов
долларов, о которых, якобы, и заявлял Магнитский. В
дальнейшем уголовное дело по этому поводу было
возбуждено, но не на основании заявления Магнитского, —
как уже говорилось, он никаких заявлений о хищениях не
делал. Более того, он был допрошен в июле 2008 года и в ходе
допроса пояснил, что о каких-то махинациях сам узнал из
газеты "Ведомости".
Далее события разворачивались так. Было заведено уголовное
дело о хищении 5,4 миллиардов рублей, был установлен
Коробейников, который знал, каким образом к нему деньги
приходили и уходили, и которого необходимо было допросить.
12 сентября 2008 года возбуждается уголовное дело по
хищению 5. 4 миллиардов рублей. Начинают разыскивать
Коробейникова, чтобы допросить. Но 24 сентября его труп
находят на стройке: он выпал с балкона. Причина смерти —
падение с высоты. А вскрытие показало: его сердце сильно
увеличено, что свидетельствует о том, что перед падением у
него, скорее всего, случился сердечный приступ. Этот
важнейший свидетель и потенциальный обвиняемый тоже
умер. Кстати, весной 2008 года скончался от сердечного
приступа и один из трёх директоров, которые совершали
непосредственно хищения — Курочкин. К сентябрю 2008 года
уже три важнейших свидетеля были мертвы.
Далее Магнитского стали приглашать по делу о налоговом
преступлении, речь зашла о предъявлении ему обвинений.
Магнитский остался единственным человеком в России, кто
знал Браудера, работал с ним и мог дать на него показания,
все остальные были либо в Великобритании, либо скончались.
К ноябрю 2008 года все дела по неуплате налогов компанией
Браудера скапливаются в следственной части Следственного
комитета МВД: из Татарстана забирается уголовное дело о
махинациях, из Калмыкии, из Москвы. Дела объединяются.
Расследование поручается следователю Сильченко.
Со стороны компании Браудера звучали обвинения, что
преступления расследовали те лица, которых Магнитский
обвинял в хищениях. Но, как уже было сказано, он никого в
хищениях не обвинял. Что касается расследования,
действительно, первая следственная группа включала в себя
следователей, которые работали над делами в Калмыкии,
Татарстане и Москве. Таков порядок: когда принимается
решение об объединении дел, то поначалу все следователи
остаются в группе, потому что они должны дела передать.
Следователи передают дела руководителю следственной
группы, которым был Сильченко.
В ноябре 2008 года поступает информация о том, что
Магнитский собирается уезжать в Великобританию: он идёт в
фотоателье, а на тот момент оперативники его уже опекали,
фотографируется на британскую визу. Поступила также
информация, что Магнитский заказал билет в Киев. То есть,
может улететь, не дожидаясь в Москве паспорта, который ему
передадут в посольстве Великобритании на Украине. Кроме
того, Магнитский активным образом воздействовал на
свидетелей по делу, склоняя их к даче ложных показаний.
ПОСКОЛЬКУ ВСЕ СОТРУДНИКИ фирмы Hermitage Capital
уже выехали, а кто не выехал, умерли, у следователя иного
выхода, кроме ареста подозреваемого, не было. Магнитского
задержали, избирается санкция на арест, потому что это
преступление относится к тяжким, наказание — до 6 лет. Он
и был арестован, потому что сомнений в том, что сбежит, не
было.
После ареста Магнитский замыкается, отказывается давать
показания, и никаких заявлений от него не поступало.
Серьёзных заболеваний, препятствий для заключения под
стражу у него не было. Он действительно, о чём сейчас
кричат правозащитники, переводился из изолятора в изолятор
— в связи с ремонтом, на этот счёт имеется справка. Но ни в
жалобах самого Магнитского, ни в обращениях адвокатов не
говорится о том, что состояние его здоровья препятствует
нахождению в следственном изоляторе. Последнее
ходатайство следователю было в августе 2009 года о
необходимости ультразвукового исследования. Ему
неоднократно проводились и УЗИ, и исследования в связи с
холециститом. Возможно даже, это обращение было
умышленной провокацией. Ведь ещё с середины 90-х годов, о
чём не мог не знать адвокат, следственные изоляторы
выведены из системы МВД, переданы в систему минюста РФ,
они не подчиняются следствию, и питание, медобслуживание
полностью в компетенции следственного изолятора. Вопрос о
назначении медицинской процедуры — этому
подследственному провести УЗИ, у этого взять анализ крови
— может решать не руководитель изолятора, а врач. Поэтому
совершенно логично, не выходя за рамки своих полномочий,
следователь на ходатайстве Магнитского о проведении УЗИ
пишет: вам необходимо обратиться к руководству
следственного изолятора. Сейчас правозащитники обвиняют
следователя в том, что он отказал в удовлетворении этого
ходатайства, якобы едва ли не это привело к смерти.
Смерть Магнитского связана по времени с некими
обстоятельствами, что не может показаться случайностью.
Был задержан один из трёх директоров, находившийся в
розыске Маркелов. Осенью 2009 года он стал давать
показания о том, что пакет документов, который представляли
в налоговую ему и другим соучастникам — Курочкину и
Хлебникову — передал Магнитский.
Следственная группа решала, предъявлять ли Магнитскому
ещё и обвинение в участии в данном хищении. Раньше у
следователей не было версии, что Магнитский участвовал и в
этом хищении. Вообще, когда шли поиски людей по данному
делу, получалось так: только найдут человека — он умирает.
Только найдут — умирает.
В деле не было ясности, пока не был задержан Маркелов,
который стал давать показания. Он не знал Браудера, а знал
Гасанова, Коробейникова (к тому времени умерших) и
Магнитского. Поскольку показаний одного Маркелова
недостаточно, было решено продолжить поиски Хлебникова
— третьего фигуранта по делу. А обвинений Магнитскому на
основании показаний одного лишь Маркелова не предъявлять.
Магнитского дополнительно допросили по этим
обстоятельством: ему было сказано, что задержан Маркелов,
он даёт такого рода показания. И знаете ли вы Гасанова,
который переназначал на основании доверенности
директоров? Магнитский ответил категоричным отказом
давать показания. Его образ рисуют как разоблачителя, чему
не соответствует поведение: он постоянно отказывался давать
показания, ссылаясь на 51 статью Конституции РФ. Но о том,
что такие показания есть, стало известно Браудеру.
Тот наверняка понял степень опасности: появился некий
Маркелов. Он жив. (А жив он, скорее всего потому, что
пустился в бега, как и Хлебников. А Курочкин умер). И он
даёт показания не на Браудера, с которым не имел дел, а на
Магнитского.
В СЕНТЯБРЕ 2009 ГОДА расследование по налогам в
отношении Магнитского закончилось. Дело готовилось к
направлению в суд. Допустить, чтобы над Магнитским
состоялся суд, Браудер не мог, потому что обвинение было
выдвинуто тяжкое: сговор. Это групповое преступление, в
котором роли расписаны. И если бы Магнитского осудили,
был бы приговор, то это автоматически означало бы, что
доказана вина Браудера, есть понятие преюдиции, то есть
обстоятельства, установленные приговором суда во время
другого суда. И у следствия была возможность требовать
Браудера заочно арестовать, потому что есть приговор в
отношении Магнитского, а преступления они совершали
вдвоем. К тому же суд над Магнитским был бы открытым,
присутствовала бы, возможно, пресса.
13 ноября 2009 года состоялось заседание суда по поводу
продления срока содержания под стражей Магнитского,
поскольку он с сентября знакомился, но не успел полностью
ознакомиться с материалами дела. Суд на два месяца продлил
содержание под стражей. Магнитский, услышав это решение,
впал в истерику. Адвокаты, видимо, твёрдо обещали, что его
освободят из-под стражи в зале суда, но этого не случилось:
расследование закончено, срок продлён, дело идёт в суд.
Находясь в возбуждённом состоянии, Магнитский кричит, что
отказывается от услуг адвоката, предоставленного ему
Браудером, что и зафиксировано в протоколе.
А 16 ноября Магнитский умирает, становясь четвёртым
покойником в этом деле. Причина смерти у всех одна —
сердце.
Первоначальный диагноз, поставленный Магнитскому —
сердечная недостаточность.
Смерть произошла довольно странно. Он впадает в истерику,
бьётся, нападает на персонал, надевает на голову
полиэтиленовый пакет, кричит, что его хотят убить, —
видимо, реально опасался. Ему ли не знать возможности его
"партнеров"? Тем более, трупы уже есть.
Такое неадекватное поведение вынуждает применить к нему
силу. Чтобы он не повредил себя, ему надевают наручники и
вызывают "скорую помощь". Поскольку поведение его было
неадекватным, вызвали психиатрическую помощь. Когда она
приехала, ему уже было плохо: изо рта шла пена. Наступает
смерть.
Резюме этого дела странное: все лица, знавшие Браудера,
которые могли бы дать на него показания, либо находятся в
Великобритании, либо мертвы.
Задержанный Хлебников, уже после смерти Магнитского, дал
показания, что в этой схеме хищения участвовали адвокат
Хайретдинов, Магнитский, Гасанов. (Маркелов и Хлебников
получили по пять лет лишения свободы и отбывают
наказание).
Желание Браудера не допустить суда над живым Магнитским
потом распространилось и над нежеланием допустить суда
над мёртвым Магнитским. Наше законодательство допускает,
что, если родственники умершего обвиняемого считают, что
человек не виновен, они могут требовать суда над мёртвым:
это называется "рассмотрение дела судом в целях
реабилитации умершего".
Они могут не согласиться с прекращением дела в связи со
смертью обвиняемого, а требовать, чтобы дело было
прекращено в связи с отсутствием состава преступления. Но
никаких заявлений родственников или адвокатов Магнитского
о направлении дела в суд в целях реабилитации не поступало.
Если Браудер хотел бы добиться справедливости, он довёл бы
дело до европейского суда. Но он, напротив, идёт на всё,
лишь бы не состоялся суд.
Наверняка резкая активизация, наблюдаемая сейчас в связи с
этим делом, истерика, решение госдепа связаны с причиной
смерти четырёх человек, замешанных в этом деле. Причина
смерти у всех — сердечный приступ. Если допустить, что
Браудер — не только предприниматель, но и немножко
спецслужбист, то почему не предположить, что в
распоряжении его конторы есть трудно выявляемые яды,
которые вызывают сердечный приступ?
С самого начала Браудер следит за ситуацией и всеми
обстоятельствами. Он сам говорит, что на него работают 100
человек, которые занимаются этой проблемой. Но поначалу
молчит.
2 МАЯ 2011 ГОДА в "Российской газете" появилась статья
"Тайна смерти. Магнитский оказался не первым, кто погиб во
время следствия о миллиардном хищении". И Браудер,
видимо, понял, что российские компетентные органы
заинтересовались 4 смертями по схожим причинам и
обстоятельствам. Это угрожало скандалом и новым судом. Суд
над Магнитским не состоялся в связи со смертью того, а если
бы в ходе вскрытия обнаружилось применение яда, да ещё
такого, который применяется спецслужбами, это было бы для
Браудера катастрофой. Поэтому срабатывают на опережение.
26 мая выходит его публикация в западной прессе "В России
нет государства", где он шантажирует российские власти,
говоря, что знает, кто совершил преступления, почти открыто
угрожает и разоблачениями, и оранжевой революцией. Он не
упоминает уже о сотрудниках милиции, а говорит о членах
правительства РФ, намекая, что к этому преступлению
причастны и президент, и премьер. Такая развёрнутая
информационная атака с угрозами подобного рода либо
санкционирована, либо организована не самим Браудером: у
простого бизнесмена, даже богатого, на это нет
возможностей.
После публикации активизировались российские
общественники, которые обвиняли органы правосудия во всех
смертных грехах. Причём, как и американские сенаторы,
выносящие постановления, составляющие списки, эти
общественники не знакомились с делом. Однако к
беспочвенным крикам начинают прислушиваться и власти.
Браудер, понимая опасность, которая грозит в случае
обнародования факта обнаружения в этих трупах яда,
вызывающего сердечный приступ, играет на опережение.
Видимо, именно Браудер посылает мать Магнитского к
следователю, который ведёт дело. И требует образцы тканей
для экспертизы. Матери отказывают. Она идёт в суд. Суд тоже
отказывает в предоставлении тканей. После этого 19 июля
Браудер выступает с интервью, в котором говорит о том, что
есть версия об отравлении, он пытается добыть образцы
тканей, провести экспертизу по ним.
28 июня Браудер проводит экспертизу в Америке, которая
приходит к выводу, что вопрос об отравлении Магнитского
ядами из списка не зарегистрированных не изучался, но у
последнего есть признаки токсического шока. А те яды, что
не зарегистрированы и нигде не стоят на учёте, это, как
правило, яды, которые используют спецслужбы разных стран.
И их формула является государственной тайной. Так делается
намёк, что мог применяться такой яд, потому что поведение
Магнитского перед смертью похоже не на сердечный приступ,
а на поведение при токсическом шоке, то есть отравлении.
Обнаружение яда, формула которого возможно известна
Браудеру или структурам, стоящим за ним, позволит начать
новую кампанию против России уже под флагом убийства
Магнитского. Мол, и Гасанов, и Курочкин, и Коробейников
убиты, поскольку российские спецслужбы убирают людей,
которые могут дать показания на расхитителей. Но
поработали-то тут другие спецслужбы, и поработали
оперативно: когда не получилось остановить процесс, эти
ребята, действуя на опережение, из обвиняемых переходят в
обвинители.
И скоропалительное решение госдепа США от 26 июля этого
года, когда не дождались даже решения конгресса, несмотря
на угрозу ухудшения отношений с Россией, указывает именно
на то, что это защита нападением.
Опасение, что будет раскрыта иностранная шпионская сеть,
их методы работы, опасение того, что спецслужбы, стоящие за
спиной Браудера, будут обвинены в совершении убийств
российских граждан на российской территории, очень
сильно. Подобный провал западных разведок не допустим.
Потому в срочном порядке принимают меры, чтобы
обезоружить российскую сторону. А что? Очень
правдоподобная версия.
НАШЕЙ СТРАНЕ важно установить, где находятся 230
миллионов, куда они пошли. Есть данные, что эти деньги
находятся на Западе. Нужно устанавливать правдивость
информации в отношении любых должностных лиц России,
которых сейчас своим интервью шантажирует Браудер.
Поскольку, если эти лица будут находиться под влиянием
извне, государству будет нанесён огромный ущерб.
Странно, что Россия ждёт, когда будет обвинена, чтобы потом
оправдываться в том, чего не совершала.
В отношении России применяются беспрецедентные
недружественного характера меры, носящие чисто
пропагандистский характер: вот арестуют счета 60
чиновников (список имеет расширительный характер). А у
кого из них есть там счета? Но создают мнение, что все, кто
работал по делу об этой финансовой афере — сами нечисты
на руку и прячут свои деньги за границей.
Россия становится объектом воздействия крупной
разведывательной международной операции. Когда-нибудь мы
узнаем её кодовое название, а последствия, к которым это
может привести — утрата нами независимости во внутренних
делах, утрата юридического суверенитета. Нам диктуют: этого
нельзя преследовать за совершаемые преступления, вот по
такому уголовному делу вы должны поступать так и так. За
делом Магницкого может последовать и дальнейшее
вмешательство. Есть гораздо более громкое дело
Ходорковского. Но никаких санкций нет, потому что там не
действовали службы, стоящие, видимо, за Браудером,
который, кстати, единственный из западных инвесторов
поддержал арест Ходорковского.
Браудеру нельзя допустить, чтобы расследование шло по
неблагоприятному для него сценарию, чтобы было
прочувствовано его участие. Он наверняка кое с кем делился
своими доходами. В этом и заключается сложность. И когда
он говорит о коррупции, знает, о чём говорит: он, видимо, сам
— один из организаторов этой коррупции, один из тех, кто
порождал ее в России на достаточно высоких уровнях, чтобы
не только богатеть: он намерен либо управлять нашей страной
с помощью компромата, держа в руках властные структуры, а
это грозит стране потерей суверенитета, либо способствовать
оранжевой революции.
Вот, Немцов, который заявляет, что и сам приложил усилия к
принятию мер со стороны Запада по делу Магнитского,
говорит: "Решение госдепа абсолютно правильное, надо
продолжать в том же духе".
Это крупнейшая после девяносто первого года
пропагандистская операция западных спецслужб.
Смехотворны причины, по которым российским гражданам
грозят санкциями. В "списке Магнитского" — следователь,
который не полномочен назначить медобследование, обвинён
в том, что отказал в обследовании. Против одного из
следователей выдвинуто обвинение: добился ареста без суда
на три года. Это абсурд!
Одновременно с Браудером отбыл из России и Фаерстоун. В
отношении него тоже есть уголовное дело за рейдерский
захват, в интернете много писали о педофилии в отношении
российских мальчиков. Вот такие доброхоты на нашу голову!
Российским властям надо твёрдо отстаивать свою
независимость, не прогибаясь ни перед кем. Мы должны
помнить, что больше всех, пусть и с международных трибун,
кричат "держи вора" — сами воры. Но для отстаивания своей
позиции, для борьбы с любого рода преступниками у властей
должна быть воля и чистые руки.
Текст, который предложен здесь вниманию наших
читателей, поступил в редакцию "Завтра" по почте, и ряд
его особенностей заставляет предположить, что его
появление связано с источниками в правоохранительных
органах или спецслужбах. Вместе с тем, несмотря на
очевидную информативную насыщенность данного
материала, его содержание вызывает у нас ряд вопросов,
которые мы считаем нужным задать.
Во-первых, если иностранный гражданин, в данном случае —
Уильям Браудер, сумел осуществить на территории
Российской Федерации все инкриминируемые ему деяния, то
что делали и делают отечественные спецслужбы, которые
должны обеспечивать в том числе экономическую
безопасность нашего государства? Что, их деятельность
является фиктивной, то есть их в реальности нет, или же
они откровенно попустительствуют деятельности таких
фигур, как Браудер, то есть фактически являются
соучастниками преступлений? И не творится ли такое же
безобразие сейчас в других крупных финансово-экономических
структурах страны?
Во-вторых, как могло получиться, что руководитель 28-й
налоговой инспекции г.Москвы Степанова, которая, как
можно сделать вывод из данного текста, была
коррумпирована Браудером, и о зарубежной собственности
которой кричат многочисленные сайты в интернете, могла
после этого занять ответственный пост в системе
Министерства обороны РФ?
В-третьих, почему наши следственные органы так медлят с
обнародованием результатов судебно-медицинской
экспертизой останков Сергея Магнитского по установлению
причин его смерти, позволяя стороне Браудера заниматься
диффамацией органов российской государственной власти?
И почему не соглашаются на проведение параллельных
экспертиз (с соответствующими мерами
предосторожности для недопущения всякого рода
подтасовок)? Кроме того, интересно знать: были ли
проведены экспертизы на предмет установления причин
смерти других лиц, связанных с Браудером и странным
образом ушедших в мир иной, по данным автора материала?
В-четвертых, если Магнитский действительно был
отравлен, то как такое могло произойти в режимном
специзоляторе без участия в этом соответствующих
сотрудников российских спецслужб, которые тогда
выступают как наемные агенты Браудера или его "хозяев"?
Наконец, в-пятых, каким образом мимо правительства
России могли пройти описанные выше махинации Браудера и
Магнитского с акциями "Газпрома", в результате которых
они только на этой сделке заработали свыше 4 млрд.
долларов?
Редакция "Завтра" задает эти вопросы не только себе и
своим читателям, но и Генеральной прокуратуре РФ,
Следственному комитету РФ, ФСБ и МВД России в надежде
получить на них компетентный ответ о проведенных
следственных действиях и оперативно-розыскных
мероприятиях по представленным в материале фактам.
Ведь весьма странной выглядит ситуация, когда президент
России делает выводы о событиях вокруг смерти
Магнитского не на основании доклада перечисленных
государственных органов, призванных обеспечивать
законность в стране, а на основе некоего "Заключения
Национального антикоррупционного комитета" — обычной
общественной организации, не имеющей никаких полномочий!
Sent time: 03/28/2016 11:28:12 PM
To: kramer <david.j.kramer@asu.edu>
Subject: bort's write up (combines 2 presentations)

Yevgeniya Albats presentation at David Kramer's roundtable at NED and at Carnegie, 16 - 17 March 2016
In comments over the course of two days to Washington audiences, opposition editor Yevgeniya Albats downplayed the
notion that Russia is a dictatorship and said that her journal The New Times proves it. It perseveres despite pressure, and
even the Kremlin is a subscriber. Corruption is endemic in Russia, but people turn it to their advantage, as Albats herself
has done in subverting an investigation against her journal.
The leadership's anti-Americanism is its main idea. Its worldview is conditioned by the disproportionate number of people in
the leadership from the security services, who were trained to see the US as Russia's likeliest opponent. The elites "hired"
Putin to represent them and to bring them the "good life," including travel and assets abroad. But since the annexation of
Crimea--which was opposed by various insiders, but supported by Patrushev and probably Kovalchuk--and the imposition
of sanctions Putin no longer is delivering good times.
The Russian governing system is nothing new. It is similar to Latin American military-bureaucratic structures from
the 40's - 70's. At some point, as economic troubles continue and Putin fails to provide a way out, interest groups will
stand up and force a change.
Insiders are seeking to legalize their gains through their children, and Albats endorses letting the insiders do so,
because by reassuring them that their children will be able to carry on, the current elite can be encouraged to step
down.
Among Putin's most influential advisers Albats repeatedly singled out banking-media mogul Yuriy Kovalchuk,
placing him even higher than Sergey Ivanov or Arkadiy Rotenberg. There is a rumor that former Gazprom-Media
head MIkhail Lesin was killed in the US over debts to Kovalchuk and his brother.
Putin doesn't have to invade anywhere else to prop up his ratings. It is enough for his media machine to trash the
outside world and convince Russians--few of whom travel abroad--that things are worse everywhere else.
________________________________________________________________________
Albats, editor of the opposition journal The New Times (Novoye Vremya), explained how she came to be associated
primarily with the journal. She used to be a professor at the Higher School of Economics until at a certain point it was
decided that she shouldn't be anywhere near young people. She used to hold Tuesday night gatherings at her house that
were attended by people such as the young Aleksey Navalnyy and Masha Gaydar. The group was called "I Am Free" (Я
Свободен). Vladislav Surkov felt threatened by this, and the school's rector Yaroslav Kuzminov was told by three separate
officials that it was a bad idea to have such professors. So she lost her two courses, and started turning her attention to the
magazine.
The New Times is still being published, without censorship. It has even recently published two big stories on Putin's
daughters. Russia is not a dictatorship and her journal's existence proves this. It is still possible to put out an opposition
journal and Albats speaks her mind on her weekly radio appearances on Ekho Moskvy radio. The only dictatorship in Russia
is the one inside Chechnya, run by Ramzan Kadyrov.
Irina Lesnevskaya, former co-owner of REN-TV used to publish The New Times. When REN-TV was taken over
by Yuriy Kovalchuk's media empire, she sold The New Times.
At the same time, Roskomnadzor - the Russian "censor" - has given The New Times its "first warning." That means
that avoiding a second warning will be difficult. The same thing happened to Novaya Gazeta, at which point Putin's
friend Sergey Chemezov stepped in, offering to "help." Albats is fatalistic about The New Times' future.
What is funny is that The New Times is heavily subscribed to by the powers that be: the President's office, the
Presidential Administration, the Prime Minister's office, the legislative heads - all of them have multiple subscriptions
to The New Times. They actually have a need for the alternative information it offers.
Anti-Americanism is the new theme in Russia: if there are any problems, blame Obama. And the hardest thing to understand
is that people believe it. Sixty seven percent of the leadership are from the special services and came to age in the Higher
School of the KGB or similar. This is the "corporation." The governing pattern is similar to that of Latin American military
juntas from the 1940's to the 70s. It doesn't mean these people are all bad, the educations they got were the best in the
Soviet Union. But the education imparted a certain point of view, including that the US is the "likely enemy" (вероятный
противник). In this view, Europe is a satellite of the US. Russia is seen as a separate civilization. This is why Kazakhstan's
president has curtailed coverage of Kazakhstan by Russian TV; he is worried about its effects on Russian speakers in
Kazakhstan.
Corruption is bad and endemic. But Albats herself has benefited from "corruption." Her office was searched, with
investigators looking for the sources for a story. They filed charges. Michael McFaul, who at the time was senior director
for Russia at the NSC, and who happened to be visiting to Moscow, came to her office at her request. They both knew that
the office was bugged. The next day the colonel investigating the case called her, and then came to her office. They left the
office at his request to talk somewhere else, away from the microphones. He asked Albats, "Am I in trouble?" She said,
what?? He said he was worried that the Americans would put him on the Magnitskiy list. His sister is married to an
American at MIT and he was worried he wouldn't be able to travel. Then he called a few months later and said the case
against The New Times had been closed. Albats claimed that the case had been dropped because President Obama had
asked then President Medvedev to call it off. Albats jokingly wondered if she should hide, or trumpet, the fact that she had
such "power."
Although the authorities love to travel abroad, they still have conspiratorial views of the world. This is a special cabal
of people.
One of the most effective things the US has ever done has been to impose sanctions for seizing foreign territory. The
sanctions have accounted for 1-1.5 percent of negative GDP, while low oil prices account for about twice that. So they
have had a significant effect. Borrowing costs have shot up. Putin and his people will do their best to break EU unity on
sanctions. Russian taxpayers' money is going to support people like Marine Le Pen and right-wing parties like hers as Russia
tries to undermine the EU. This could lead to very unpleasant outcomes.
The elite are aging. They are looking for places to put their money and promote their children. They want to be able to
legalize their holdings. This offers a "tool" against the elite. If the elite feels comforted by the rising power of their children,
they might feel comfortable about walking away from power. Albats says she would take such a deal: let the current elite
feel secure enough that they can leave power.
Q - Who are the people on the inside that Putin really listens to?
Albats lists Nikolay Patrushev; Yuriy Kovalchuk; Aleksandr Bortnikov; Igor Sechin; Sergey Shoygu to some extent;
NOT Vladislav Surkov, not Arkadiy Rotenberg (even though he is a crony), and not Sergey Ivanov.
Q - Is this circle concerned about transfer of their inheritance to the younger generation, or is it those further out who are
most concerned?
These inner elites are concerned about wealth transfer.
The problem of legalizing their wealth is huge. If Putin steps down, they could lose what they have. They need this
money in a safe place. That's the role their children play.
Q - Does the inner circle believe that the situation is really bad?
They now realize that oil prices will not bounce back. As recently as last year they thought they would. Last year the
situation was really dangerous, they appeared on the verge of a real war. Now not so much. Economic
considerations might have been one of the reasons for pulling out of Syria. Chemezov's statement about cutting
defense expenditures by 10 percent is very significant.
Q - Is this a dangerous time, as Russia draws down in Syria and possibly Ukraine and Putin loses the nationalist boost that
those undertakings provided him? Could he move somewhere else?
Russia needs better independent polling. Levada's sample sizes are not big enough. We don't know enough about the
popular mood. Albats says that she met with PA deputy head Vycheslav Volodin prior to the Moscow mayoral
election in September 2013 and the polls that Volodin was getting from the security services were closer to what the
final outcome was.
Putin doesn't need foreign adventures to keep his ratings up. Albats forces herself to watch Kremlin chief
propagandist Dmitriy Kiselev every Sunday, and the events in Syria lately haven't been the top of the news, driving
Putin's popularity. Other issues are taking the forefront, and one of these is Europe's supposed "collapse." The
message from Kiselev-- who Albats claimed reports directly to Sergey Ivanov - is that Europe is bad; no Russian
should want to travel to Europe. And Albats points out that only 4% of Russians ever travel to Europe, so few
Russians are ever exposed to the way things really are.
The state media is now vaunting European right-wing parties. Albats said that Donald Trump is a gift to Russian
propaganda. In short, Putin doesn't need a war in Syria, there will always be something around which to consolidate
popular support.
Q - Is there anyone on the inside who will stand up to Putin and tell him that his threat perceptions are wrong? Because it
doesn't appear that way.
No one knows "who" will stand up to Putin. Putin represents a consensus of like-minded individuals and doesn't do
everything himself. He guarantees stability for them. He made it possible for them to travel, to keep their assets
abroad. And that situation continued until 18 March 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. Some of his people tried to
dissuade him, they told him he should push for a "Kosovo" model for Crimea instead. Fedor Lukyanov was among
those who advocated this position (on behalf of inside elites). But Putin decided - either on his own or with input
from Patrushev and possibly Kovalchuk - to go for annexation. Some insiders then thought, "The boss has gone a
little cuckoo, but he's done so much for us."
As the economic pain (of sanctions, inflation, and other pressures) drag on, the history of Latin America's analogous
political systems from the 1940's through the 70's suggest that at a certain point, it will be decided that "enough is
enough." Albats says she can envision the interests that would advocate for Putin to step down, but not the individual
names. Albats speculated that Putin might have come to see Medvedev as someone who could front for such
interests, and that this might have incentivized Putin to move Medvedev out of the presidency.
No one knows if economic troubles will be enough to force action or if other "triggers" will be involved. Albats says
one of the reasons for drawing down in Syria was the financial aspect. Putin was "hired" by the elites for the good
life, not for the bad life.
Q - What exactly was the decision that was made on 28 February 2012 - to annex Crimea, or just to do something? And did
they decide at that same point to move into eastern Ukraine?
Albats admits she doesn't know the details of the decision. The Kremlin went crazy over the Maydan. The takeover
of Crimea was a brilliant operation. The attempt to takeover eastern Ukraine followed quickly thereafter and had
some initial success. Putin's call for a "Russkiy mir" or Russian World was initially taken seriously, but by late 2015 it
was clear the Russians lacked the money for such a project.
Q - What about Mikhail Lesin? Might he have been trying to get his money out? What's the speculation surrounding his
death and what he was doing in the US when he died?
Albats is trying to find out more about Lesin. Lesin was a "very bad guy." He created a lot of difficulties for Albats.
He asked Venediktov to ban Albats and Shenderovich from Ekho Moskvy. He was key to rolling back media
freedoms. He was a founding father of Russia Today. He was key to shutting down all independent TV stations.
Lesin was close to Kovalchuk and Kovalchuk is very close to Putin. Some say Kovalchuk speaks to Putin every
day. Albats says she hears that Kovalchuk was someone who recommended to Putin that he should annex Crimea.
Lesin helped take over Potanin's media empire. Lesin's Gazprom-Media took it over at a loss. When Lesin was
finally fired from Gazprom-Media he left for the US to visit the Woodrow Wilson Center. He never showed up. He
had just had a baby girl with his girlfriend. When he turned up dead, it was thought in Moscow that Lesin was killed,
probably for debts to the Kovalchuk brothers. Another theory was that he was in the FBI Witness Protection
Program and his "death" had been faked. Lesin's son ("Lessine") is a Hollywood producer. And the word is that Lesin
was worried, when Sen Wicker raised questions about him, that he would lose his assets in Los Angeles.
Q - What about the desperation to get the sanctions lifted? Are elites willing to go to Putin and tell him what he needs to do?
Is there anything they're willing to do to get sanctions lifted?
Putin is a very smart guy. He knew that the people closest to him would suffer, so he came to their rescue. He made
sure that Kovalchuk got transfers from Alfa. Rotenberg's villa in Italy was seized, so Rotenberg got the contract for
the Kerch strait bridge. Yakunin had been the closest guy to Putin, yet he got kicked out when his son applied for
British citizenship, because loyalty is the number one most important criterion.
Business people are moving outside of Russia. But the Kremlin isn't feeling the same pressure yet. Popular
mobilization will not happen, but a split of the elites is likely. The situation will change.
Q - What about Naryshkin? How influential is he?
Naryshkin is not an insider with Putin.
Q - What's the ultimate goal internationally? Has the economic situation changed Russian leaders' minds about the political
situation?
There is no coherent vision of what these people want to do. "Making Russia great" helps by providing an idea.
Q - Re Kadyrov, is he a strength or vulnerability to Putin?
"Kadyrov killed my friend," Nemtsov. He ordered the killing. Do Patrushev and Bortnikov want him dead? Yes,
absolutely. These siloviki weren't even allowed to question the chief suspect Ruslan Geremeyev. Bortnikov can't do
anything about Kadyrov. But Putin sees Kadyrov as a balance.
Q - Was Putin surprised by Nemtsov's murder?
I suppose he was, people say so. I have no proof about Putin's reaction. Nemtsov said something he shouldn't have
and paid for it.
Sent time: 02/25/2016 11:28:18 PM
Subject: sestanovich on litvinenko/magnitskiy

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/01/22/vladimir-putin-and-the-murder-of-alexander-litvinenko/
Vladimir Putin and the Murder of Alexander
Litvinenko
By
Stephen Sestanovich
Jan 22, 2016 2:40 pm ET
Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin this week.
Metzel Mikhail/TASS via Zuma Press
The retired British judge Robert Owen was wrong to say, in his very thorough report on the polonium poisoning of
Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, that Russian President Vladimir Putin “probably approved” the killing. Wrong for
three reasons. First, because doing so diverted attention from the inquiry’s incontrovertible findings. Second, because Mr.
Owen doesn’t really have any idea. Third, it’s a superfluous indictment: A system in which Mr. Putin ordered the killing
would not be any more shocking or horrible than the one we know exists.
The report is an impressive reconstruction of how the poisoning took place. It leaves no doubt that polonium 210, a rare
and lethal radioactive isotope, was used by Mr. Litvinenko’s tea-time companions, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitri Kovtun. They
and others, including spokesmen for the Russian regime, can dismiss and deride the report. They can’t refute it. It’s no
longer credible to ask whether the Chechen mafia or Mr. Litvinenko himself was responsible. Case closed.
Alexander Litvinenko pictured in the Intensive Care Unit of University College Hospital in London in November
2006.
Natasja Weitsz/Getty Images
Still, establishing who committed a murder is not the same thing as knowing who ordered it. Mr. Owen may have
information he cannot divulge, but his case for saying it was “probably” Mr. Putin is weak. Yes, Mr. Litvinenko’s
cooperation with Western governments certainly made him a traitor in Mr. Putin’s eyes. But it made him a traitor in the eyes
of many in the world of Russian intelligence. Some may believe such people would not have acted without Mr. Putin’s say-
so, but that’s really just a guess. Even if the polonium came from a Russian nuclear reactor—and the report seems uncertain
of this—it would be hard to argue that only presidential approval made it possible for the killers to get the material and take it
to London. Fingering Mr. Putin is a leap—not a crazy leap; just one without the firm foundation on which the rest of the
report rests.
It’s right, of course, to ask why, given all the evidence against Mr. Lugovoi and Mr. Kovtun, Mr. Putin would protect (much
less promote) them if he or his immediate associates weren’t directly involved in the affair. Yet he clearly would. Mr. Putin
protects small-time thugs, swindlers, and murderers to whom he has no connection whatever. His protection of the people
who arranged the now well-known murder of Sergei Magnitsky leaves no doubt on this score. Vladimir Putin seems to
believe that pulling on the string of corruption and impunity, which define the system he has built, would eventually bring it
crashing down. He is, as Mr. Owen might say, “probably” right.
Stephen Sestanovich, a professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, is the author of “Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama.” He is on
Twitter: @ssestanovich.
ALSO IN THINK TANK:
The Three Vladimir Putins
Joe Biden’s Mission in Ukraine
Clinton vs. Rubio: Who’s Right About ‘Radical Islam’?
From: Chris Bort <chris.bort@gmail.com>
Sent time: 03/28/2016 02:09:43 PM
To: Me <chrisjb1@ucia.gov>; Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: Fwd: Yevgeniya Albats presentations

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Christopher Bort <chrisbort@me.com>
Date: Thu, Mar 24, 2016 at 7:30 AM
Subject: Yevgeniya Albats presentations
To: Chris Bort <chrisjb1@ucia.gov>, Chris Bort <chrisbort@gmail.com>
Yevgeniya Albats presentation at David Kramer's roundtable at NED and at Carnegie, 16 - 17 March 2016
In comments over the course of two days to Washington audiences, opposition editor Yevgeniya Albats
downplayed the notion that Russia is a dictatorship and said that her journal The New Times proves it. It
perseveres despite pressure, and even the Kremlin is a subscriber. Corruption is endemic in Russia, but people
turn it to their advantage, as Albats herself has done in subverting an investigation against her journal.
The leadership's anti-Americanism is its main idea. Its worldview is conditioned by the disproportionate
number of people in the leadership from the security services, who were trained to see the US as Russia's
likeliest opponent. The elites "hired" Putin to represent them and to bring them the "good life," including
travel and assets abroad. But since the annexation of Crimea--which was opposed by various insiders, but
supported by Patrushev and probably Kovalchuk--and the imposition of sanctions Putin no longer is
delivering good times.
The Russian governing system is nothing new. It is similar to Latin American military-bureaucratic
structures from the 40's - 70's. At some point, as economic troubles continue and Putin fails to provide
a way out, interest groups will stand up and force a change.
Insiders are seeking to legalize their gains through their children, and Albats endorses letting the
insiders do so, because by reassuring them that their children will be able to carry on, the current elite
can be encouraged to step down.
Among Putin's most influential advisers Albats repeatedly singled out banking-media mogul Yuriy
Kovalchuk, placing him even higher than Sergey Ivanov or Arkadiy Rotenberg. There is a rumor that
former Gazprom-Media head MIkhail Lesin was killed in the US over debts to Kovalchuk and his
brother.
Putin doesn't have to invade anywhere else to prop up his ratings. It is enough for his media machine to
trash the outside world and convince Russians--few of whom travel abroad--that things are worse
everywhere else.
________________________________________________________________________
Albats, editor of the opposition journal The New Times (Novoye Vremya), explained how she came to be associated
primarily with the journal. She used to be a professor at the Higher School of Economics until at a certain point it was
decided that she shouldn't be anywhere near young people. She used to hold Tuesday night gatherings at her house
that were attended by people such as the young Aleksey Navalnyy and Masha Gaydar. The group was called "I Am
Free" (Я Свободен). Vladislav Surkov felt threatened by this, and the school's rector Yaroslav Kuzminov was told
by three separate officials that it was a bad idea to have such professors. So she lost her two courses, and started
turning her attention to the magazine.
The New Times is still being published, without censorship. It has even recently published two big stories on Putin's
daughters. Russia is not a dictatorship and her journal's existence proves this. It is still possible to put out an
opposition journal and Albats speaks her mind on her weekly radio appearances on Ekho Moskvy radio. The only
dictatorship in Russia is the one inside Chechnya, run by Ramzan Kadyrov.
Irina Lesnevskaya, former co-owner of REN-TV used to publish The New Times. When REN-TV was taken
over by Yuriy Kovalchuk's media empire, she sold The New Times.
At the same time, Roskomnadzor - the Russian "censor" - has given The New Times its "first warning." That
means that avoiding a second warning will be difficult. The same thing happened to Novaya Gazeta, at which
point Putin's friend Sergey Chemezov stepped in, offering to "help." Albats is fatalistic about The New Times'
future.
What is funny is that The New Times is heavily subscribed to by the powers that be: the President's office, the
Presidential Administration, the Prime Minister's office, the legislative heads - all of them have multiple
subscriptions to The New Times. They actually have a need for the alternative information it offers.
Anti-Americanism is the new theme in Russia: if there are any problems, blame Obama. And the hardest thing to
understand is that people believe it. Sixty seven percent of the leadership are from the special services and came to
age in the Higher School of the KGB or similar. This is the "corporation." The governing pattern is similar to that of
Latin American military juntas from the 1940's to the 70s. It doesn't mean these people are all bad, the educations
they got were the best in the Soviet Union. But the education imparted a certain point of view, including that the US is
the "likely enemy" (вероятный противник). In this view, Europe is a satellite of the US. Russia is seen as a
separate civilization. This is why Kazakhstan's president has curtailed coverage of Kazakhstan by Russian TV; he is
worried about its effects on Russian speakers in Kazakhstan.
Corruption is bad and endemic. But Albats herself has benefited from "corruption." Her office was searched, with
investigators looking for the sources for a story. They filed charges. Michael McFaul, who at the time was senior
director for Russia at the NSC, and who happened to be visiting to Moscow, came to her office at her request. They
both knew that the office was bugged. The next day the colonel investigating the case called her, and then came to her
office. They left the office at his request to talk somewhere else, away from the microphones. He asked Albats, "Am
I in trouble?" She said, what?? He said he was worried that the Americans would put him on the Magnitskiy list. His
sister is married to an American at MIT and he was worried he wouldn't be able to travel. Then he called a few
months later and said the case against The New Times had been closed. Albats claimed that the case had been
dropped because President Obama had asked then President Medvedev to call it off. Albats jokingly wondered if
she should hide, or trumpet, the fact that she had such "power."
Although the authorities love to travel abroad, they still have conspiratorial views of the world. This is a special
cabal of people.
One of the most effective things the US has ever done has been to impose sanctions for seizing foreign territory. The
sanctions have accounted for 1-1.5 percent of negative GDP, while low oil prices account for about twice that. So
they have had a significant effect. Borrowing costs have shot up. Putin and his people will do their best to break EU
unity on sanctions. Russian taxpayers' money is going to support people like Marine Le Pen and right-wing parties
like hers as Russia tries to undermine the EU. This could lead to very unpleasant outcomes.
The elite are aging. They are looking for places to put their money and promote their children. They want to be able
to legalize their holdings. This offers a "tool" against the elite. If the elite feels comforted by the rising power of their
children, they might feel comfortable about walking away from power. Albats says she would take such a deal: let the
current elite feel secure enough that they can leave power.
Q - Who are the people on the inside that Putin really listens to?
Albats lists Nikolay Patrushev; Yuriy Kovalchuk; Aleksandr Bortnikov; Igor Sechin; Sergey Shoygu to some
extent; NOT Vladislav Surkov, not Arkadiy Rotenberg (even though he is a crony), and not Sergey Ivanov.
Q - Is this circle concerned about transfer of their inheritance to the younger generation, or is it those further out who
are most concerned?
These inner elites are concerned about wealth transfer.
The problem of legalizing their wealth is huge. If Putin steps down, they could lose what they have. They need
this money in a safe place. That's the role their children play.
Q - Does the inner circle believe that the situation is really bad?
They now realize that oil prices will not bounce back. As recently as last year they thought they would. Last
year the situation was really dangerous, they appeared on the verge of a real war. Now not so much.
Economic considerations might have been one of the reasons for pulling out of Syria. Chemezov's statement
about cutting defense expenditures by 10 percent is very significant.
Q - Is this a dangerous time, as Russia draws down in Syria and possibly Ukraine and Putin loses the nationalist
boost that those undertakings provided him? Could he move somewhere else?
Russia needs better independent polling. Levada's sample sizes are not big enough. We don't know enough
about the popular mood. Albats says that she met with PA deputy head Vycheslav Volodin prior to the
Moscow mayoral election in September 2013 and the polls that Volodin was getting from the security services
were closer to what the final outcome was.
Putin doesn't need foreign adventures to keep his ratings up. Albats forces herself to watch Kremlin chief
propagandist Dmitriy Kiselev every Sunday, and the events in Syria lately haven't been the top of the news,
driving Putin's popularity. Other issues are taking the forefront, and one of these is Europe's supposed
"collapse." The message from Kiselev-- who Albats claimed reports directly to Sergey Ivanov - is that Europe
is bad; no Russian should want to travel to Europe. And Albats points out that only 4% of Russians ever travel
to Europe, so few Russians are ever exposed to the way things really are.
The state media is now vaunting European right-wing parties. Albats said that Donald Trump is a gift to
Russian propaganda. In short, Putin doesn't need a war in Syria, there will always be something around which
to consolidate popular support.
Q - Is there anyone on the inside who will stand up to Putin and tell him that his threat perceptions are wrong?
Because it doesn't appear that way.
No one knows "who" will stand up to Putin. Putin represents a consensus of like-minded individuals and
doesn't do everything himself. He guarantees stability for them. He made it possible for them to travel, to keep
their assets abroad. And that situation continued until 18 March 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. Some of
his people tried to dissuade him, they told him he should push for a "Kosovo" model for Crimea instead. Fedor
Lukyanov was among those who advocated this position (on behalf of inside elites). But Putin decided - either
on his own or with input from Patrushev and possibly Kovalchuk - to go for annexation. Some insiders then
thought, "The boss has gone a little cuckoo, but he's done so much for us."
As the economic pain (of sanctions, inflation, and other pressures) drag on, the history of Latin America's
analogous political systems from the 1940's through the 70's suggest that at a certain point, it will be decided
that "enough is enough." Albats says she can envision the interests that would advocate for Putin to step down,
but not the individual names. Albats speculated that Putin might have come to see Medvedev as someone who
could front for such interests, and that this might have incentivized Putin to move Medvedev out of the
presidency.
No one knows if economic troubles will be enough to force action or if other "triggers" will be involved. Albats
says one of the reasons for drawing down in Syria was the financial aspect. Putin was "hired" by the elites for
the good life, not for the bad life.
Q - What exactly was the decision that was made on 28 February 2012 - to annex Crimea, or just to do something?
And did they decide at that same point to move into eastern Ukraine?
Albats admits she doesn't know the details of the decision. The Kremlin went crazy over the Maydan. The
takeover of Crimea was a brilliant operation. The attempt to takeover eastern Ukraine followed quickly
thereafter and had some initial success. Putin's call for a "Russkiy mir" or Russian World was initially taken
seriously, but by late 2015 it was clear the Russians lacked the money for such a project.
Q - What about Mikhail Lesin? Might he have been trying to get his money out? What's the speculation surrounding
his death and what he was doing in the US when he died?
Albats is trying to find out more about Lesin. Lesin was a "very bad guy." He created a lot of difficulties for
Albats. He asked Venediktov to ban Albats and Shenderovich from Ekho Moskvy. He was key to rolling
back media freedoms. He was a founding father of Russia Today. He was key to shutting down all
independent TV stations.
Lesin was close to Kovalchuk and Kovalchuk is very close to Putin. Some say Kovalchuk speaks to Putin
every day. Albats says she hears that Kovalchuk was someone who recommended to Putin that he should
annex Crimea. Lesin helped take over Potanin's media empire. Lesin's Gazprom-Media took it over at a loss.
When Lesin was finally fired from Gazprom-Media he left for the US to visit the Woodrow Wilson Center. He
never showed up. He had just had a baby girl with his girlfriend. When he turned up dead, it was thought in
Moscow that Lesin was killed, probably for debts to the Kovalchuk brothers. Another theory was that he was
in the FBI Witness Protection Program and his "death" had been faked. Lesin's son ("Lessine") is a Hollywood
producer. And the word is that Lesin was worried, when Sen Wicker raised questions about him, that he
would lose his assets in Los Angeles.
Q - What about the desperation to get the sanctions lifted? Are elites willing to go to Putin and tell him what he needs
to do? Is there anything they're willing to do to get sanctions lifted?
Putin is a very smart guy. He knew that the people closest to him would suffer, so he came to their rescue. He
made sure that Kovalchuk got transfers from Alfa. Rotenberg's villa in Italy was seized, so Rotenberg got the
contract for the Kerch strait bridge. Yakunin had been the closest guy to Putin, yet he got kicked out when his
son applied for British citizenship, because loyalty is the number one most important criterion.
Business people are moving outside of Russia. But the Kremlin isn't feeling the same pressure yet. Popular
mobilization will not happen, but a split of the elites is likely. The situation will change.
Q - What about Naryshkin? How influential is he?
Naryshkin is not an insider with Putin.
Q - What's the ultimate goal internationally? Has the economic situation changed Russian leaders' minds about the
political situation?
There is no coherent vision of what these people want to do. "Making Russia great" helps by providing an
idea.
Q - Re Kadyrov, is he a strength or vulnerability to Putin?
"Kadyrov killed my friend," Nemtsov. He ordered the killing. Do Patrushev and Bortnikov want him dead?
Yes, absolutely. These siloviki weren't even allowed to question the chief suspect Ruslan Geremeyev.
Bortnikov can't do anything about Kadyrov. But Putin sees Kadyrov as a balance.
Q - Was Putin surprised by Nemtsov's murder?
I suppose he was, people say so. I have no proof about Putin's reaction. Nemtsov said something he shouldn't
have and paid for it.
Sent time: 02/03/2016 02:49:20 PM
Subject: Internet Notes 3 February 2016
Attachments: IN3Feb16.docx

Internet Notes 3 February 2016

Notes on notes (“Privileged” exchange rates)
Kadyrov says that he forgot his term would be up in two months
Deputy Defense Minister Aleksey Dyumin replaces Tula governor
Another Strelkov interview (Putin trying to sit on “two stools”; Putin can’t say he is a patriot, but behave like a liberal)
Putin on patriotism as the “national idea”
Merkel wants Putin to influence the separatists
McCain: EU will discuss lifting sanctions at Munich conference
Lavrov: ISIS uses Georgia’s Pankisi gorge as a training area
Ulyukayev on privatization (Rosneft, Bashneft, Alrosa)
US adds more names to Magnitskiy list
From the 21 January notes:
[Now we read that the Central Bank has called for a meeting with bankers in connection with the ruble’s continued decline—CB chief Nabiullina has
cancelled her trip to the economic forum in Davos: http://meduza.io/news/2016/01/21/tsb-sozval-bankirov-na-ekstrennoe-soveschanie The report
states that on 20 January, the Association of Regional Banks requested such a meeting. The Association, which includes Alfa Bank and VTB, is
requesting a “privileged” exchange rate for their accounting (Comment: I don’t know what they mean)…]
An e-mail from a reader: I asked an economist colleague about your question regarding the Association of Regional Banks' asking the
Central Bank for a "privileged" exchange rating.
He replied that he is not absolutely sure, but he thinks that "what is at stake is the Central Bank's assessment of the sustainability of
individual commercial banks according to their assets, liabilities, capital sufficiency, etc. When the ruble falls as sharply as it has
recently done, the balances of assets and liabilities can change dramatically if a bank has both forex (e.g. dollar) assets and/or
liabilities. Allowing them to report their balance sheets using a more favorable exchange rate can make a lot of difference, e.g., to
capital adequacy."
See yesterday’s notes for a reference to Kadyrov’s term coming to an end in April.
In an Instagram post, Kadyrov says he had forgotten about that until journalists mentioned it:
http://grani.ru/War/Chechnya/m.248275.html He claims he has not made up his mind about running for another term. Anyway, it’s
a really a choice for Putin to make:
"Я над этим не думал. Уверен, что, прежде всего, по кандидатуре должен быть выбор президента России. Если он
говорит, что человек подходит на пост главы республики, и народ его поддерживает, тогда и следует принимать
участие. А политик, рвущихся к власти ради власти, ничего не добьется", - написал Кадыров.
Comment: Well, Putin has said how “effective” Kadyrov is. See the 26 January notes. And one more comment on
my re-playing Belkovskiy’s take on why Putin hasn’t reacted to Kadyrov’s threats to the non-systemic opposition: I
agree with Rostovskiy that on one level, the Kremlin sees the influence of the opposition as “microscopic” (See
yesterday’s notes)—but there is also the elite’s deeply held fear of a popular revolt to consider. I don’t think that
Putin or the Presidential Administration told Kadyrov to play this game. He has his own reasons for doing that
(offering his services to the Kremlin; showing his loyalty; making a PR move to expand his role in Russian politics,
while at the same time making a threat that could alarm the Kremlin—so fork over more cash, more subsidies, more
assets. We read about Rosneft assets being transferred to Chechen control late last year—see the 20 and 21 January
notes and yesterday’s notes). But scaring the “fifth column” isn’t a bad thing. It may alarm the “systemic liberals,”
but the threats don’t bother Putin or some others too much. Killing somebody might, but in the case of Nemtsov, Putin
may have angry about that, but he was not willing to let the siloviky go after Kadyrov over it. So it’s a complicated
picture.
Meanwhile, Dzhambulat Umartov, Chechen Nationalities Minister, claims that the Instagram video that appeared to show
Kasyanov in the sights of a sniper’s rifle was really meant to be a view of the former premier through a periscope:
http://meduza.io/news/2016/02/02/chechenskiy-ministr-nazval-periskopom-pritsel-na-video-s-kasyanovym
The video clip of Kasyanov in the sniper’s sights is available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hh1--hM9o1o
Kasyanov interview: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsrSphIwB88
Kasyanov and Kara-Murza want an investigation of the threatening video: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-
opposition-leader-wants-investigation-into-kadyrovs-threatening-video/558468.html
Mikhail Kasyanov, leader of the PARNAS opposition party, has asked law enforcement agencies to open a criminal
investigation into a video posted on Instagram by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, the Interfax news agency reported.
The request to the Investigative Committee was filed by Kasyanov and PARNAS deputy chairman Vladimir Kara-Murza on
Wednesday, lawyer Vadim Prokhorov told Interfax.
The video in question showed Kasyanov and Kara-Murza in a sniper's crosshairs and was posted on Kadyrov's
Instagram on Feb. 1.
Kasyanov said he sees the video as a direct threat against a state official, Interfax reported Monday.
The controversial clip — later removed by the website — is not the first attack the Kremlin-backed Chechen leader has
made on the Russian political opposition. Last month, Kadyrov labelled Putin's opponents “jackals” and “enemies of the
people.”
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2906839
Vladimir Gruzdev supposedly tendered his resignation voluntarily and was told he would get another job. Dyumin is a former FSO
man who handled security for Putin’s public appearances before getting his MoD post. He was on good terms with Shoygu, after
being appointed just in December, but not considered a member of Shoygu’s team. He was relieved of that post to replace
Gruzdev, but retains his military rank and could return to military service if needed.
Dyumin said the appointment (as acting governor until the elections) was a surprise to him. He had caught the attention of other
people in Putin’s circle—in 2011, he took part in a charity hockey match together with Roman Rotenberg, and in 2012 he was an
advisor to Chairman of the board of the SKA Hockey Club in St. Petersburg, Gennadiy Timchenko. He took part in games of the
“nighttime hockey league” organized by the president.
In 2014, Dyumin was made a major general and put in charge of the Special Operations Forces, which played a key role in
Crimea. His group was also in charge of evacuating Yanukovich to Russia. Putin gave Dyumin high marks for his work. Dyumin
was promoted to deputy ground troops commander.
As far as Gruzdev, Putin said he was moving him to a different post in connection with some family issues—the governor has a
newborn, is a Muscovite, and wants to be closer to Moscow (Comment: So does his family actually live in Moscow?
Probably. Absentee governors are not unheard of—look at Abramovich’s stint as a governor, for example). But a
source close to Gruzdev says he was planning to run again–his term is up in August—and had been starting up his campaign.
Gruzdev took over as acting Tula governor in 2011, replacing Vyacheslav Dudka, who was accused of bribery. According to
Forbes, Gruzdev was the richest Russian governor. There has been talk of his taking a post in the government’s “economic
block”…Gruzdev had worked with United Russia previously, but the word is that he will be removed from the ER council and that
another member of the council, Sergey Chemezov of Rostek, is behind that. There are a number of Tula enterprises that are linked
to Rostek. Under Dudka, those enterprises were “fed” with budget funds, but not so much under Gruzdev. Gruzdev was removed
just now so that a new governor would have time to find out who would be nominated (in “primaries”) for the Duma elections
coming up this fall and to campaign for them.
Comment: We’ve read previously that the Kremlin was concerned about the Duma elections and that replacing some
governors might be related to that concern. There have also been some suggestions that the Kremlin is losing
influence with the governors and is trying to reassert control over them. See the 28 January notes. In this case, the
key factor may be Chemezov and his implied unhappiness with Gruzdev.

Comment: Still no open break with Putin, but some tough words. See the 1 February notes for more on the 25 January
Committee.
http://kolokolrussia.ru/russkiy-mir/igor-strelkov-m-protivostoim-liberalnomu-revanshu
According to Strelkov, Putin is making the same mistakes that Yanukovich did. Yanukovich alienated both his supporters and the
people who supported integration with Europe—Putin is trying to sit on two stools as well (Comment: Strelkov means that
Putin’s “balancing” puts him on “two stools” and that both will come out from under him. A reader reminded me that
the same was said of Gorbachev). Putin is not only heading for the fate of Yanukovich, but of Milosevich (Comment: A
comparison Strelkov has made before). The Kremlin, after confronting the West, is now trying to make a compromise both
externally and with the liberals domestically. Kudrin, Kasyanov and other liberals are more active. Putin is losing the favor of the
patriots, people who risked their lives to fight for Russia in Novorossiya. You cannot say you are a patriot, but behave like a
liberal. You can’t hand over economic policy to the liberals and at the same time say you oppose their values. There are people in
Putin’s circle who don’t even hide their close connections to the West, their desire to return Russia to the status of a raw materials
appendage of the West. They do not hide their readiness to make use of economic problems to increase their own power.
The 25 January Committee is neutral regarding vlast and has no plans to oppose vlast, but the ultraliberal elements, who plan to
destroy all the achievements of the Russian Spring, are completely unacceptable to us…
Strelkov goes on to say that the committee hopes that vlast will listen, but there is less hope for that with each passing day…
Strelkov describes himself as “first among equals” on the committee. Strelkov says that he and the committee members don’t
desire Putin’s approval—what they want is a change in his actions. Then they would support him without any aspirations to power
for themselves. The longer Putin tries to “sit on two stools,” the less chance he has to remain in power…We have a potentially
revolutionary situation with an economic crisis, and the liberals want to take advantage of that situation. Russia has a schizophrenic
foreign policy, suspicious of the US, but trying to make an alliance with Washington in Syria. We knew Assad was in trouble for a
long time, but are entering the war when it’s too late to win it. Our foreign policy is formally anti-American, but the ruble is tied to
the dollar and the US Federal Reserve…
The Kremlin cannot rule as before—the consensus has been wrecked already. That’s the first “revolutionary factor.” The second is
the economic crisis. The fifth column will provide the third factor with its anti-presidential propaganda. The committee does not
see Putin’s overthrow as desirable. Compared to the liberals, Putin looks like the best option for Russia. But can he change the
present situation? I think he can. Some think the train has already left the station, and that the liberals will try and overthrow Putin,
but there is still time. We will oppose the liberals, whether that will be in an alliance with Putin remains to be seen. We do not think
the situation is fatal, but it is close to that.
Along the way, Strelkov says that as Girkin, he worked for the GRU, but upon returning from the Donbass, he lost that post…The
notion that he would mount a rebellion against vlast is wrong—that would play into the hands of Russia’s enemies. He cannot
remain silent while the country is in crisis—that would amount to desertion…Yes, the committee is made up of radicals, including
him to a certain degree. What else would you call someone who is ready to cross borders to take up arms in defense of his
compatriots?
…Despite their differences, the people on his committee are all patriots. And they are all in the same boat, Prosvirnin, Limonov,
Krylov, and the rest—if Khodorkovskiy comes to power, what do you think would happen to all of us? …The liberals are
internationalists, we are not. The liberals say that it doesn’t matter what country you live in so long as you profess certain views.
We are adherents of nationalist, patriotic ideology. We are for defending Russian sovereignty. Sure, it’s only theoretically possible
to unify all patriots—we can unify part of them, anyway. There are no paid, official “patriots” on the committee. The 25 January
Committee will not become a party and will not take part in the Duma elections. What would the party ideology be? Monarchism?
Communism? The committee includes patriots of various political stripes. We have no illusions about how free and fair elections are
in Russia. Elections are merely a ritual allowing vlast to maintain legitimacy. We don’t fit into that system because we will speak the
truth and vlast does not like the truth…
At a meeting with the Club of Leaders (Comment: I don’t know who they are or what the group is all about), Putin, in
answering a question, stated that Russia’s “National idea” is patriotism—there can’t be anything else:
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51263 That idea—of all working together to make Russia stronger—can unify Russians
from all walks of life.
А что касается основной идеи того выступления на Валдае, о котором Вы вспомнили, я исходил из того, что
по смыслу, по содержанию понятно, о чём идёт речь. У нас нет никакой и не может быть никакой другой
объединяющей идеи, кроме патриотизма.
The patriotic idea, said Putin, is not ideology, or the program of a party, but all working together for Russia.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/merkel-asks-putin-to-use-influence-with-ukraine-rebels/558252.html
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to ensure that the Donbass rebels adhere
to the ceasefire declared in eastern Ukraine during a phone talk, the Associated Foreign Press reported Tuesday.
"Here, Russia must use its influence on the separatists," Merkel said according to her spokesman's statement, the AFP
reported.
Merkel told Putin that in order to resolve the situation in eastern Ukraine politically, the ceasefire had to be respected and
access had to be granted to truce monitors, the AFP said.
During their phone conversation, the two leaders agreed that the Minsk agreements are crucial in resolving the situation in
eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin press office reported Tuesday.
Merkel also had talks with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on Monday. Following the talks, she has ruled out lifting
EU sanctions against Russia before a full ceasefire has been implemented in eastern Ukraine, international media
reported.
The Minsk agreements were negotiated in the capital of Belarus in September 2014 and February 2015 by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France. The agreements includes provisions to deliver a full cease-fire, return control of
borders to Ukraine, withdraw heavy weaponry and to hold free elections in the region.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/eu-will-discuss-lifting-russia-sanctions-at-munich--mccain/558362.html
European Union leaders will discuss the possibility of lifting the sanctions against Russia on the sidelines of the upcoming
Munich Security Conference, U.S. Senator John McCain told the Sputnik news agency Wednesday, RIA Novosti reported.
“It won't be out in the open at the conference, but there will be a lot of conversations [about this] among the Europeans,”
McCain said.
The Munich Security Conference is due to take place from Feb. 12-14. Among the key topics on the agenda at the
conference this year are the war in Syria, the refugee crisis and issues of European security.
The EU and U.S. imposed sanctions against Russia in 2014 over its annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its actions
in eastern Ukraine.
In December, European leaders extended anti-Russian sanctions for another six months.
http://www.rt.com/news/330234-georgia-pankisi-isis-lavrov/
There are reports that Islamic State ﴾IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL﴿ is using Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as a training base,
Russian FM Sergey Lavrov said, adding that the terrorist threat is one of the reasons it has been necessary to
strengthen border controls between the countries.
“We are getting reports that IS militants use this remote area to train, rest and replenish their reserves,” Lavrov
told a press conference in Moscow on Tuesday. Russia’s top diplomat added that it hasn’t been possible to open
the borders since a visa regime was introduced between Russia and Georgia back in 2000 largely because the
“terrorist threat coming from the Pankisi Gorge has not faded.”
Lavrov added it makes no sense to discuss the abolition of Russia’s visa regime with Georgia at this stage.
“We are ready to launch a visa‐free regime in the future, but it is a bit strange if we discuss it at a time when we do not
have any diplomatic relations,” the Russian FM said, adding that Georgia, not Moscow, severed its ties with Russia.
Georgia cut off diplomatic relations with Moscow and withdrew its diplomats following a five‐day war in South
Ossetia in August of 2008. Tbilisi unilaterally cancelled its visa regime for Russians four years later. Moscow introduced
simplified visa rules for Georgian nationals in December of last year.
A Georgian diplomat called Lavrov’s comments lopsided.

“In regard to the Pankisi Gorge, minister Lavrov made a tendentious statement, as Georgian authorities fully control this
region,” the Georgian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Russian Affairs, Zurab Abashidze, told journalists, as quoted by
Interfax. At the same time, he admitted that up to 30 locals from the area have left for Syria, but added they face
criminal prosecution upon returning to Georgia.
The issue of renewing diplomatic relations between Tbilisi and Moscow is not on the agenda, Abashidze added.
The gorge became particularly notorious in early 2000s, when it was the center of activity for various terrorist and
extremist groups. As its ethnic population is mainly Chechen, refugees flocked to the area fleeing war in neighboring
Chechnya. A number of armed militants, many of which were reportedly followers of radical Islam, also managed to
filter into the gorge, and cases of kidnappings and other criminal activity have been on the rise there. Foreign militants
from the Middle East have also come to the gorge to train and recruit young people from the region, and many young
locals have reportedly traveled to Syria over the past few years.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/rosneft-bashneft-alrosa-in-first-wave-of-russian-privatization--
minister/558464.html
Two oil firms — Rosneft and Bashneft — and diamond producer Alrosa are among the most likely candidates for
privatization this year, Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said Wednesday.
Officials have touted a major sale of state companies as a way to fill a gaping hole in budget revenues due to the low
price of oil.
Alrosa, Rosneft and Bashneft were included in an existing privatization plan and are already traded on stock markets,
making them easiest to sell, Ulyukayev said, according to the TASS news agency.
The government's shares in Basheft and Alrosa are together worth around 600 billion rubles ($7.5 billion) at current
market prices, and a 19.5 percent share in Rosneft proposed for sale could raise a further 500 billion rubles ($6.5 billion).
Other companies mooted for sale include shipping company Sovkomflot and a stake in banking group VTB, together
worth a further 100 billion rubles.
President Vladimir Putin at a meeting with officials and heads of state companies on Monday said companies should not
be sold “at giveaway prices,” and added that the government should maintain control over strategic firms and buyers
should be registered in Russia. See the 1 February notes.
With share prices — and therefore government revenues from their sale — low, analysts have questioned whether major
privatization will go ahead. It is also unclear who would buy the shares amid a Russian recession and financial sanctions
imposed during the Ukraine crisis in 2014.
But a fiscal emergency could force the issue. The energy industry supplies around half of Russia's budget revenues. The
current spending plan for 2016 anticipated an average price for the year of $50 per barrel and a deficit of 2.3 trillion rubles,
or 3 percent of GDP. However, the price of benchmark Brent crude fell sharply in January and is now hovering a little over
$30 per barrel.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/us-adds-five-more-russians-to-magnitsky-list/558036.html
The United States has sanctioned five more Russian citizens in connection with the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury said in a statement Monday.
The individuals that have been added to the Magnitsky List are Alexei Anichin, Pavel Lapshov, Boris Kibis, Yevgeny
Antonov and Oleg Urzumtsev. They will be banned from entering the U.S. and their U.S. assets will be frozen.
According to a U.S. State Department spokesperson, Antonov was the head of the “Chernokozovo” detention center
where human rights violations were detected, the RIA Novosti news agency reported Tuesday.
The other four individuals added to the list were linked to the investigation into the Magnitsky case and worked in law
enforcement.
Hermitage Capital lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in 2009 in a Moscow jail, where he was beaten and denied medical
assistance, according to human rights activists.
On Dec. 14, 2012, the U.S. introduced the Magnitsky Act that sanctioned Russians involved in human rights violations.
The list of sanctioned Russians currently includes 39 individuals, RIA Novosti reported.

Sent time: 02/03/2016 02:49:20 PM
Subject: Internet Notes 3 February 2016
Attachments: IN3Feb16.docx

Internet Notes 3 February 2016

From the 21 January notes:
[Now we read that the Central Bank has called for a meeting with bankers in connection with the ruble’s continued decline—CB chief Nabiullina has
cancelled her trip to the economic forum in Davos: http://meduza.io/news/2016/01/21/tsb-sozval-bankirov-na-ekstrennoe-soveschanie The report
states that on 20 January, the Association of Regional Banks requested such a meeting. The Association, which includes Alfa Bank and VTB, is
requesting a “privileged” exchange rate for their accounting (Comment: I don’t know what they mean)…]
An e-mail from a reader: I asked an economist colleague about your question regarding the Association of Regional Banks' asking the
Central Bank for a "privileged" exchange rating.
He replied that he is not absolutely sure, but he thinks that "what is at stake is the Central Bank's assessment of the sustainability of
individual commercial banks according to their assets, liabilities, capital sufficiency, etc. When the ruble falls as sharply as it has
recently done, the balances of assets and liabilities can change dramatically if a bank has both forex (e.g. dollar) assets and/or
liabilities. Allowing them to report their balance sheets using a more favorable exchange rate can make a lot of difference, e.g., to
capital adequacy."
See yesterday’s notes for a reference to Kadyrov’s term coming to an end in April.
In an Instagram post, Kadyrov says he had forgotten about that until journalists mentioned it:
http://grani.ru/War/Chechnya/m.248275.html He claims he has not made up his mind about running for another term. Anyway, it’s
a really a choice for Putin to make:
"Я над этим не думал. Уверен, что, прежде всего, по кандидатуре должен быть выбор президента России. Если он
говорит, что человек подходит на пост главы республики, и народ его поддерживает, тогда и следует принимать
участие. А политик, рвущихся к власти ради власти, ничего не добьется", - написал Кадыров.
Comment: Well, Putin has said how “effective” Kadyrov is. See the 26 January notes. And one more comment on
my re-playing Belkovskiy’s take on why Putin hasn’t reacted to Kadyrov’s threats to the non-systemic opposition: I
agree with Rostovskiy that on one level, the Kremlin sees the influence of the opposition as “microscopic” (See
yesterday’s notes)—but there is also the elite’s deeply held fear of a popular revolt to consider. I don’t think that
Putin or the Presidential Administration told Kadyrov to play this game. He has his own reasons for doing that
(offering his services to the Kremlin; showing his loyalty; making a PR move to expand his role in Russian politics,
while at the same time making a threat that could alarm the Kremlin—so fork over more cash, more subsidies, more
assets. We read about Rosneft assets being transferred to Chechen control late last year—see the 20 and 21 January
notes and yesterday’s notes). But scaring the “fifth column” isn’t a bad thing. It may alarm the “systemic liberals,”
but the threats don’t bother Putin or some others too much. Killing somebody might, but in the case of Nemtsov, Putin
may have angry about that, but he was not willing to let the siloviky go after Kadyrov over it. So it’s a complicated
picture.
Meanwhile, Dzhambulat Umartov, Chechen Nationalities Minister, claims that the Instagram video that appeared to show
Kasyanov in the sights of a sniper’s rifle was really meant to be a view of the former premier through a periscope:
http://meduza.io/news/2016/02/02/chechenskiy-ministr-nazval-periskopom-pritsel-na-video-s-kasyanovym
The video clip of Kasyanov in the sniper’s sights is available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hh1--hM9o1o
Kasyanov interview: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsrSphIwB88
Kasyanov and Kara-Murza want an investigation of the threatening video: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-
opposition-leader-wants-investigation-into-kadyrovs-threatening-video/558468.html
Mikhail Kasyanov, leader of the PARNAS opposition party, has asked law enforcement agencies to open a criminal
investigation into a video posted on Instagram by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, the Interfax news agency reported.
The request to the Investigative Committee was filed by Kasyanov and PARNAS deputy chairman Vladimir Kara-Murza on
Wednesday, lawyer Vadim Prokhorov told Interfax.
The video in question showed Kasyanov and Kara-Murza in a sniper's crosshairs and was posted on Kadyrov's
Instagram on Feb. 1.
Kasyanov said he sees the video as a direct threat against a state official, Interfax reported Monday.
The controversial clip — later removed by the website — is not the first attack the Kremlin-backed Chechen leader has
made on the Russian political opposition. Last month, Kadyrov labelled Putin's opponents “jackals” and “enemies of the
people.”
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2906839
Vladimir Gruzdev supposedly tendered his resignation voluntarily and was told he would get another job. Dyumin is a former FSO
man who handled security for Putin’s public appearances before getting his MoD post. He was on good terms with Shoygu, after
being appointed just in December, but not considered a member of Shoygu’s team. He was relieved of that post to replace
Gruzdev, but retains his military rank and could return to military service if needed.
Dyumin said the appointment (as acting governor until the elections) was a surprise to him. He had caught the attention of other
people in Putin’s circle—in 2011, he took part in a charity hockey match together with Roman Rotenberg, and in 2012 he was an
advisor to Chairman of the board of the SKA Hockey Club in St. Petersburg, Gennadiy Timchenko. He took part in games of the
“nighttime hockey league” organized by the president.
In 2014, Dyumin was made a major general and put in charge of the Special Operations Forces, which played a key role in
Crimea. His group was also in charge of evacuating Yanukovich to Russia. Putin gave Dyumin high marks for his work. Dyumin
was promoted to deputy ground troops commander.
As far as Gruzdev, Putin said he was moving him to a different post in connection with some family issues—the governor has a
newborn, is a Muscovite, and wants to be closer to Moscow (Comment: So does his family actually live in Moscow?
Probably. Absentee governors are not unheard of—look at Abramovich’s stint as a governor, for example). But a
source close to Gruzdev says he was planning to run again–his term is up in August—and had been starting up his campaign.
Gruzdev took over as acting Tula governor in 2011, replacing Vyacheslav Dudka, who was accused of bribery. According to
Forbes, Gruzdev was the richest Russian governor. There has been talk of his taking a post in the government’s “economic
block”…Gruzdev had worked with United Russia previously, but the word is that he will be removed from the ER council and that
another member of the council, Sergey Chemezov of Rostek, is behind that. There are a number of Tula enterprises that are linked
to Rostek. Under Dudka, those enterprises were “fed” with budget funds, but not so much under Gruzdev. Gruzdev was removed
just now so that a new governor would have time to find out who would be nominated (in “primaries”) for the Duma elections
coming up this fall and to campaign for them.
Comment: We’ve read previously that the Kremlin was concerned about the Duma elections and that replacing some
governors might be related to that concern. There have also been some suggestions that the Kremlin is losing
influence with the governors and is trying to reassert control over them. See the 28 January notes. In this case, the
key factor may be Chemezov and his implied unhappiness with Gruzdev.

Comment: Still no open break with Putin, but some tough words. See the 1 February notes for more on the 25 January
Committee.
http://kolokolrussia.ru/russkiy-mir/igor-strelkov-m-protivostoim-liberalnomu-revanshu
According to Strelkov, Putin is making the same mistakes that Yanukovich did. Yanukovich alienated both his supporters and the
people who supported integration with Europe—Putin is trying to sit on two stools as well (Comment: Strelkov means that
Putin’s “balancing” puts him on “two stools” and that both will come out from under him. A reader reminded me that
the same was said of Gorbachev). Putin is not only heading for the fate of Yanukovich, but of Milosevich (Comment: A
comparison Strelkov has made before). The Kremlin, after confronting the West, is now trying to make a compromise both
externally and with the liberals domestically. Kudrin, Kasyanov and other liberals are more active. Putin is losing the favor of the
patriots, people who risked their lives to fight for Russia in Novorossiya. You cannot say you are a patriot, but behave like a
liberal. You can’t hand over economic policy to the liberals and at the same time say you oppose their values. There are people in
Putin’s circle who don’t even hide their close connections to the West, their desire to return Russia to the status of a raw materials
appendage of the West. They do not hide their readiness to make use of economic problems to increase their own power.
The 25 January Committee is neutral regarding vlast and has no plans to oppose vlast, but the ultraliberal elements, who plan to
destroy all the achievements of the Russian Spring, are completely unacceptable to us…
Strelkov goes on to say that the committee hopes that vlast will listen, but there is less hope for that with each passing day…
Strelkov describes himself as “first among equals” on the committee. Strelkov says that he and the committee members don’t
desire Putin’s approval—what they want is a change in his actions. Then they would support him without any aspirations to power
for themselves. The longer Putin tries to “sit on two stools,” the less chance he has to remain in power…We have a potentially
revolutionary situation with an economic crisis, and the liberals want to take advantage of that situation. Russia has a schizophrenic
foreign policy, suspicious of the US, but trying to make an alliance with Washington in Syria. We knew Assad was in trouble for a
long time, but are entering the war when it’s too late to win it. Our foreign policy is formally anti-American, but the ruble is tied to
the dollar and the US Federal Reserve…
The Kremlin cannot rule as before—the consensus has been wrecked already. That’s the first “revolutionary factor.” The second is
the economic crisis. The fifth column will provide the third factor with its anti-presidential propaganda. The committee does not
see Putin’s overthrow as desirable. Compared to the liberals, Putin looks like the best option for Russia. But can he change the
present situation? I think he can. Some think the train has already left the station, and that the liberals will try and overthrow Putin,
but there is still time. We will oppose the liberals, whether that will be in an alliance with Putin remains to be seen. We do not think
the situation is fatal, but it is close to that.
Along the way, Strelkov says that as Girkin, he worked for the GRU, but upon returning from the Donbass, he lost that post…The
notion that he would mount a rebellion against vlast is wrong—that would play into the hands of Russia’s enemies. He cannot
remain silent while the country is in crisis—that would amount to desertion…Yes, the committee is made up of radicals, including
him to a certain degree. What else would you call someone who is ready to cross borders to take up arms in defense of his
compatriots?
…Despite their differences, the people on his committee are all patriots. And they are all in the same boat, Prosvirnin, Limonov,
Krylov, and the rest—if Khodorkovskiy comes to power, what do you think would happen to all of us? …The liberals are
internationalists, we are not. The liberals say that it doesn’t matter what country you live in so long as you profess certain views.
We are adherents of nationalist, patriotic ideology. We are for defending Russian sovereignty. Sure, it’s only theoretically possible
to unify all patriots—we can unify part of them, anyway. There are no paid, official “patriots” on the committee. The 25 January
Committee will not become a party and will not take part in the Duma elections. What would the party ideology be? Monarchism?
Communism? The committee includes patriots of various political stripes. We have no illusions about how free and fair elections are
in Russia. Elections are merely a ritual allowing vlast to maintain legitimacy. We don’t fit into that system because we will speak the
truth and vlast does not like the truth…
At a meeting with the Club of Leaders (Comment: I don’t know who they are or what the group is all about), Putin, in
answering a question, stated that Russia’s “National idea” is patriotism—there can’t be anything else:
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51263 That idea—of all working together to make Russia stronger—can unify Russians
from all walks of life.
А что касается основной идеи того выступления на Валдае, о котором Вы вспомнили, я исходил из того, что
по смыслу, по содержанию понятно, о чём идёт речь. У нас нет никакой и не может быть никакой другой
объединяющей идеи, кроме патриотизма.
The patriotic idea, said Putin, is not ideology, or the program of a party, but all working together for Russia.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/merkel-asks-putin-to-use-influence-with-ukraine-rebels/558252.html
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to ensure that the Donbass rebels adhere
to the ceasefire declared in eastern Ukraine during a phone talk, the Associated Foreign Press reported Tuesday.
"Here, Russia must use its influence on the separatists," Merkel said according to her spokesman's statement, the AFP
reported.
Merkel told Putin that in order to resolve the situation in eastern Ukraine politically, the ceasefire had to be respected and
access had to be granted to truce monitors, the AFP said.
During their phone conversation, the two leaders agreed that the Minsk agreements are crucial in resolving the situation in
eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin press office reported Tuesday.
Merkel also had talks with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on Monday. Following the talks, she has ruled out lifting
EU sanctions against Russia before a full ceasefire has been implemented in eastern Ukraine, international media
reported.
The Minsk agreements were negotiated in the capital of Belarus in September 2014 and February 2015 by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France. The agreements includes provisions to deliver a full cease-fire, return control of
borders to Ukraine, withdraw heavy weaponry and to hold free elections in the region.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/eu-will-discuss-lifting-russia-sanctions-at-munich--mccain/558362.html
European Union leaders will discuss the possibility of lifting the sanctions against Russia on the sidelines of the upcoming
Munich Security Conference, U.S. Senator John McCain told the Sputnik news agency Wednesday, RIA Novosti reported.
“It won't be out in the open at the conference, but there will be a lot of conversations [about this] among the Europeans,”
McCain said.
The Munich Security Conference is due to take place from Feb. 12-14. Among the key topics on the agenda at the
conference this year are the war in Syria, the refugee crisis and issues of European security.
The EU and U.S. imposed sanctions against Russia in 2014 over its annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its actions
in eastern Ukraine.
In December, European leaders extended anti-Russian sanctions for another six months.
http://www.rt.com/news/330234-georgia-pankisi-isis-lavrov/
There are reports that Islamic State ﴾IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL﴿ is using Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as a training base,
Russian FM Sergey Lavrov said, adding that the terrorist threat is one of the reasons it has been necessary to
strengthen border controls between the countries.
“We are getting reports that IS militants use this remote area to train, rest and replenish their reserves,” Lavrov
told a press conference in Moscow on Tuesday. Russia’s top diplomat added that it hasn’t been possible to open
the borders since a visa regime was introduced between Russia and Georgia back in 2000 largely because the
“terrorist threat coming from the Pankisi Gorge has not faded.”
Lavrov added it makes no sense to discuss the abolition of Russia’s visa regime with Georgia at this stage.
“We are ready to launch a visa‐free regime in the future, but it is a bit strange if we discuss it at a time when we do not
have any diplomatic relations,” the Russian FM said, adding that Georgia, not Moscow, severed its ties with Russia.
Georgia cut off diplomatic relations with Moscow and withdrew its diplomats following a five‐day war in South
Ossetia in August of 2008. Tbilisi unilaterally cancelled its visa regime for Russians four years later. Moscow introduced
simplified visa rules for Georgian nationals in December of last year.
A Georgian diplomat called Lavrov’s comments lopsided.

“In regard to the Pankisi Gorge, minister Lavrov made a tendentious statement, as Georgian authorities fully control this
region,” the Georgian Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on Russian Affairs, Zurab Abashidze, told journalists, as quoted by
Interfax. At the same time, he admitted that up to 30 locals from the area have left for Syria, but added they face
criminal prosecution upon returning to Georgia.
The issue of renewing diplomatic relations between Tbilisi and Moscow is not on the agenda, Abashidze added.
The gorge became particularly notorious in early 2000s, when it was the center of activity for various terrorist and
extremist groups. As its ethnic population is mainly Chechen, refugees flocked to the area fleeing war in neighboring
Chechnya. A number of armed militants, many of which were reportedly followers of radical Islam, also managed to
filter into the gorge, and cases of kidnappings and other criminal activity have been on the rise there. Foreign militants
from the Middle East have also come to the gorge to train and recruit young people from the region, and many young
locals have reportedly traveled to Syria over the past few years.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/rosneft-bashneft-alrosa-in-first-wave-of-russian-privatization--
minister/558464.html
Two oil firms — Rosneft and Bashneft — and diamond producer Alrosa are among the most likely candidates for
privatization this year, Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said Wednesday.
Officials have touted a major sale of state companies as a way to fill a gaping hole in budget revenues due to the low
price of oil.
Alrosa, Rosneft and Bashneft were included in an existing privatization plan and are already traded on stock markets,
making them easiest to sell, Ulyukayev said, according to the TASS news agency.
The government's shares in Basheft and Alrosa are together worth around 600 billion rubles ($7.5 billion) at current
market prices, and a 19.5 percent share in Rosneft proposed for sale could raise a further 500 billion rubles ($6.5 billion).
Other companies mooted for sale include shipping company Sovkomflot and a stake in banking group VTB, together
worth a further 100 billion rubles.
President Vladimir Putin at a meeting with officials and heads of state companies on Monday said companies should not
be sold “at giveaway prices,” and added that the government should maintain control over strategic firms and buyers
should be registered in Russia. See the 1 February notes.
With share prices — and therefore government revenues from their sale — low, analysts have questioned whether major
privatization will go ahead. It is also unclear who would buy the shares amid a Russian recession and financial sanctions
imposed during the Ukraine crisis in 2014.
But a fiscal emergency could force the issue. The energy industry supplies around half of Russia's budget revenues. The
current spending plan for 2016 anticipated an average price for the year of $50 per barrel and a deficit of 2.3 trillion rubles,
or 3 percent of GDP. However, the price of benchmark Brent crude fell sharply in January and is now hovering a little over
$30 per barrel.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/us-adds-five-more-russians-to-magnitsky-list/558036.html
The United States has sanctioned five more Russian citizens in connection with the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, the
U.S. Department of the Treasury said in a statement Monday.
The individuals that have been added to the Magnitsky List are Alexei Anichin, Pavel Lapshov, Boris Kibis, Yevgeny
Antonov and Oleg Urzumtsev. They will be banned from entering the U.S. and their U.S. assets will be frozen.
According to a U.S. State Department spokesperson, Antonov was the head of the “Chernokozovo” detention center
where human rights violations were detected, the RIA Novosti news agency reported Tuesday.
The other four individuals added to the list were linked to the investigation into the Magnitsky case and worked in law
enforcement.
Hermitage Capital lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in 2009 in a Moscow jail, where he was beaten and denied medical
assistance, according to human rights activists.
On Dec. 14, 2012, the U.S. introduced the Magnitsky Act that sanctioned Russians involved in human rights violations.
The list of sanctioned Russians currently includes 39 individuals, RIA Novosti reported.

Sent time: 04/04/2016 03:18:58 PM

Information attacks (The Panama papers; The Kasyanov tape)
Peskov on “Putinophobia” (Peskov’s wife figures in the Panama papers)
Aleksey Chesnakov on the Panama papers
Russian media reaction to Panama papers
The Kasyanov tape (“Kasyanov day” on NTV; Reactions to the video)
Putin’s got a new girlfriend?
Information attacks (The Panama papers; The Kasyanov tape)
http://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html
panamapapers.icij.org
Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption
Millions of documents show heads of state, criminals and celebrities using secret hideaways in tax havens

The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists

Apr 3, 2016
In this story
Files reveal the offshore holdings 140 politicians and public officials from around the world
Current and former world leaders in the data include prime ministers of Iceland and Pakistan, the president of Ukraine, and the
king of Saudi Arabia
More than 214,000 offshore entities appear in the leak, connected to people in more than 200 countries and territories
Major banks have driven the creation of hard-to-trace companies in offshore havens
A massive leak of documents exposes the offshore holdings of 12 current and former world leaders and reveals how associates of
Russian President Vladimir Putin secretly shuffled as much as $2 billion through banks and shadow companies.
The leak also provides details of the hidden financial dealings of 128 more politicians and public officials around the world.
The cache of 11.5 million records shows how a global industry of law firms and big banks sells financial secrecy to politicians,
fraudsters and drug traffickers as well as billionaires, celebrities and sports stars.
These are among the findings of a yearlong investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, German newspaper
Süddeutsche Zeitung and more than 100 other news organizations.
The files expose offshore companies controlled by the prime ministers of Iceland and Pakistan, the king of Saudi Arabia and the children
of the president of Azerbaijan.
They also include at least 33 people and companies blacklisted by the U.S. government because of evidence that they’d been involved
in wrongdoing, such as doing business with Mexican drug lords, terrorist organizations like Hezbollah or rogue nations like North Korea
and Iran.
One of those companies supplied fuel for the aircraft that the Syrian government used to bomb and kill thousands of its own citizens,
U.S. authorities have charged.
“These findings show how deeply ingrained harmful practices and criminality are in the offshore world,” said Gabriel Zucman, an
economist at the University of California, Berkeley and author of “The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens.” Zucman,
who was briefed on the media partners’ investigation, said the release of the leaked documents should prompt governments to seek
“concrete sanctions” against jurisdictions and institutions that peddle offshore secrecy.
World leaders who have embraced anti-corruption platforms feature in the leaked documents. The files reveal offshore companies linked
to the family of China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, who has vowed to fight “armies of corruption,” as well as Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko, who has positioned himself as a reformer in a country shaken by corruption scandals. The files also contain new details of
offshore dealings by the late father of British Prime Minister David Cameron, a leader in the push for tax-haven reform.
The leaked data covers nearly 40 years, from 1977 through the end of 2015. It allows a never-before-seen view inside the offshore world
— providing a day-to-day, decade-by-decade look at how dark money flows through the global financial system, breeding crime and
stripping national treasuries of tax revenues.
Most of the services the offshore industry provides are legal if used by the law abiding. But the documents show that banks, law firms
and other offshore players have often failed to follow legal requirements that they make sure their clients are not involved in criminal
enterprises, tax dodging or political corruption. In some instances, the files show, offshore middlemen have protected themselves and
their clients by concealing suspect transactions or manipulating official records.
The documents make it clear that major banks are big drivers behind the creation of hard-to-trace companies in the British Virgin
Islands, Panama and other offshore havens. The files list nearly 15,600 paper companies that banks set up for clients who want keep
their finances under wraps, including thousands created by international giants UBS and HSBC.
The records reveal a pattern of covert maneuvers by banks, companies and people tied to Russian leader Putin. The records show
offshore companies linked to this network moving money in transactions as large as $200 million at a time. Putin associates disguised
payments, backdated documents and gained hidden influence within the country’s media and automotive industries, the leaked files
show.
A Kremlin spokesman did not answer questions for this story, but instead went public March 28 with charges that ICIJ and its media
partners were preparing a misleading “information attack” on Putin and people close to him.
The leaked records — which were reviewed by a team of more than 370 journalists from 76 countries — come from a little-known but
powerful law firm based in Panama, Mossack Fonseca, that has branches in Hong Kong, Miami, Zurich and more than 35 other places
around the globe.
The firm is one of the world’s top creators of shell companies, corporate structures that can be used to hide ownership of assets. The
law firm’s leaked internal files contain information on 214,488 offshore entities connected to people in more than 200 countries and
territories. ICIJ will release the full list of companies and people linked to them in early May.
The data includes emails, financial spreadsheets, passports and corporate records revealing the secret owners of bank accounts and
companies in 21 offshore jurisdictions, from Nevada to Singapore to the British Virgin Islands…
Comment: I’m going to skip a lot of this, which can be read at the link, and cut to the parts that are of most interest to
us.
…Until recently, Mossack Fonseca has largely operated in the shadows. But it has come under growing scrutiny as governments have
obtained partial leaks of the firm’s files and authorities in Germany and Brazil began probing its practices.
In February 2015, Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German law-enforcement agencies had launched a series of raids targeting one of
the country’s biggest banks, Commerzbank, in a tax-fraud investigation that authorities said could lead to criminal charges against
Mossack Fonseca employees.
In Brazil, the law firm has become a target in a bribery and money laundering investigation dubbed “Operation Car Wash” (“Lava Jato,” in
Portuguese), which has led to criminal charges against leading politicians and an investigation of popular former president Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva. The scandal threatens to unseat current President Dilma Rousseff.
In January, Brazilian prosecutors labeled Mossack Fonseca as a “big money launderer” and announced they had filed criminal charges
against five employees of the firm’s Brazilian office for their role in the scandal.
Mossack Fonseca denies any wrongdoing in Brazil.
The disclosures found inside the law firm’s leaked files dramatically expand on previous leaks of offshore records that ICIJ and its
reporting partners have revealed in the past four years.
In the largest media collaboration ever undertaken, journalists working in more than 25 languages dug into Mossack Fonseca’s inner
workings and traced the secret dealings of the law firm’s customers around the world. They shared information and hunted down leads
generated by the leaked files using corporate filings, property records, financial disclosures, court documents and interviews with money
laundering experts and law-enforcement officials.
Reporters at Süddeutsche Zeitung obtained millions of records from a confidential source and shared them with ICIJ and other media
partners. The news outlets involved in the collaboration did not pay for the documents.
Before Süddeutsche Zeitung obtained the leak, German tax authorities bought a smaller set of Mossack Fonseca documents from a
whistleblower, a move that triggered the raids in Germany in early 2015. This smaller set of files has since been offered to tax authorities
in the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries, according to sources with knowledge of the matter.
The larger set of files obtained by the news organizations offers more than a snapshot of one law firm’s business methods or a catalog
of its more unsavory customers. It allows a far-reaching view into an industry that has worked to keep its practices hidden — and offers
clues as to why efforts to reform the system have faltered.
The story of Mossack Fonseca is, in many ways, the story of the offshore system itself.
…The offshore system relies on a sprawling global industry of bankers, lawyers, accountants and these go-betweens who work together
to protect their clients’ secrets. These secrecy experts use anonymous companies, trusts and other paper entities to create complex
structures that can be used to disguise the origins of dirty money.
“They are the gasoline that runs the engine,” says Robert Mazur, a former U.S. drug agent and author of The Infiltrator: My Secret Life
Inside the Dirty Banks Behind Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel. “They’re an extraordinarily important piece of the formula of success for
criminal organizations.”
Mossack Fonseca told ICIJ that it follows “both the letter and spirit of the law. Because we do, we have not once in nearly 40 years of
operation been charged with criminal wrongdoing.”
The men who founded the firm decades ago — and continue today as its main partners — are well-known figures in Panamanian
society and politics.
Jürgen Mossack is a German immigrant whose father sought a new life in Panama for his family after serving in Hitler’s Waffen-SS
during World War II. Ramón Fonseca is an award-winning novelist who has worked in recent years as an adviser to Panama’s president.
He took a leave of absence as presidential adviser in March after his firm was implicated in the Brazil scandal and ICIJ and its partners
began to ask questions about the law firm’s practices.
From its base in Panama, one of the world’s top financial secrecy zones, Mossack Fonseca seeds anonymous companies in Panama,
the British Virgin Islands and other financial havens.
The law firm has worked closely with big banks and big law firms in places like The Netherlands, Mexico, the United States and
Switzerland, helping clients move money or slash their tax bills, the secret records show.
An ICIJ analysis of the leaked files found that more than 500 banks, their subsidiaries and branches have worked with Mossack
Fonseca since the 1970s to help clients manage offshore companies. UBS set up more than 1,100 offshore companies through
Mossack Fonseca. HSBC and its affiliates created more than 2,300.
In all, the files indicate Mossack Fonseca worked with more than 14,000 banks, law firms, company incorporators and other middlemen
to set up companies, foundations and trusts for customers, the records show.
Mossack Fonseca says these middlemen are its true clients, not the eventual customers who use offshore companies. The firm says
these middlemen provide additional layers of oversight for reviewing new customers. As for its own procedures, Mossack Fonseca says
they often exceed “the existing rules and standards to which we and others are bound.”
…On Feb. 10, 2011, an anonymous company in the British Virgin Islands named Sandalwood Continental Ltd. loaned $200 million to an
equally shadowy firm based in Cyprus called Horwich Trading Ltd.
The following day, Sandalwood assigned the rights to collect payments on the loan — including interest — to Ove Financial Corp., a
mysterious company in the British Virgin Islands.
For those rights, Ove paid $1.
But the money trail didn’t end there.
The same day, Ove reassigned its rights to collect on the loan to a Panama company called International Media Overseas.
It too paid $1.
In the space of 24 hours the loan had, on paper, traversed three countries, two banks and four companies, making the money all but
untraceable in the process.
There were plenty of reasons why the men behind the transaction might want it disguised, not least of all because the money trail came
uncomfortably close to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
St. Petersburg-based Bank Rossiya, an institution whose majority owner and chairman has been called one of Putin’s “cashiers,”
established Sandalwood Continental and directed the money flow.
International Media Overseas, where rights to the interest payments from the $200 million appear to have landed, was controlled, on
paper, by one of Putin’s oldest friends, Sergey Roldugin, a classical cellist who is godfather to Putin’s eldest daughter. Comment:
RBK reported earlier that Roldugin would be the focus of the anticipated “information attack”—see the notes from 30
March.
The $200 million loan was one of dozens of transactions totaling at least $2 billion found in the Mossack Fonseca files involving people
or companies linked to Putin. They formed part of a Bank Rossiya enterprise that gained indirect influence over a major shareholder in
Russia’s biggest truck maker and amassed secret stakes in a key Russian media property.
Suspicious payments made by Putin’s cronies may have in some cases been designed as payoffs, possibly in exchange for Russian
government aid or contracts. The secret documents suggest that much of the loan money originally came from a bank in Cyprus that at
the time was majority owned by the Russian state-controlled VTB Bank.
In a media conference call last week, Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the government wouldn’t reply to “honey-worded queries”
from ICIJ or its reporting partners, because they contain questions that “have been asked hundreds of times and answered hundreds of
times.”
Peskov added that Russia has “available the full arsenal of legal means in the national and international arena to protect the honor and
dignity of our president.”
Under national laws and international agreements, firms like Mossack Fonseca that help create companies and bank accounts are
supposed to be on the lookout for clients who may be involved in money laundering, tax evasion or other wrongdoing. They are required
to pay special attention to “politically exposed persons” — government officials or their family members or associates. If someone is a
“PEP,” the middlemen creating their companies are expected to review their activities carefully to make sure they are not engaging in
corruption.
Mossack Fonseca told ICIJ that it has “duly established policies and procedures to identify and handle those cases where individuals”
qualify as PEPs.
Often, Mossack Fonseca appeared not to realize who its customers were. A 2015 internal audit found that the law firm knew the
identities of the real owners of just 204 of 14,086 companies it had incorporated in Seychelles, a tax haven in the Indian Ocean.
British Virgin Islands authorities fined Mossack Fonseca $37,500 for violating anti-money-laundering rules because the firm incorporated
a company for the son of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak but failed to identify the connection, even after the father and son
were charged with corruption in Egypt. An internal review by the law firm concluded, “our risk assessment formula is seriously flawed.”
In all, an ICIJ analysis of the Mossack Fonseca files identified 61 family members and associates of prime ministers, presidents or
kings.
The records show, for example, that the family of Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev used foundations and companies in Panama to hold
secret stakes in gold mines and London real estate. The children of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also owned London real
estate through companies created by Mossack Fonseca, the law firm’s records show.
Family members of at least eight current or former members of China’s Politburo Standing Committee, the country’s main ruling body,
have offshore companies arranged though Mossack Fonseca. They include President Xi’s brother-in-law, who set up two British Virgin
Islands companies in 2009.
Representatives for the Azeri, Pakistani and Chinese leaders did not respond to requests for comment.
The list of world leaders who used Mossack Fonseca to set up offshore entities includes the current president of Argentina, Mauricio
Macri, who was director and vice president of a Bahamas company managed by Mossack Fonseca when he was a businessman and
the mayor of Argentina’s capital, Buenos Aires. A spokesman for Macri said the president never personally owned shares in the firm,
which was part of his family’s business.
During the bloodiest days of Russia’s 2014 invasion of the Ukraine’s Donbas region, the documents show, representatives of Ukrainian
leader Petro Poroshenko scrambled to find a copy of a home utility bill for him to complete the paperwork to create a holding company
in the British Virgin Islands.
A spokesperson for Poroshenko said the creation of the company had nothing to do with “any political and military events in Ukraine.”
Poroshenko’s financial advisers said the president didn’t include the BVI firm in his 2014 financial disclosures because neither the
holding company nor two related companies in Cyprus and the Netherlands have any assets. They said that the companies were part of
a corporate restructuring to help sell Poroshenko’s confectionery business.
When Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson became Iceland’s prime minister in 2013 he concealed a secret that could have damaged his
political career. He and his wife shared ownership in an offshore company in the British Virgin Islands when he entered parliament in
2009. He sold his stake in the company months later to his wife for $1.
The company held bonds originally worth millions of dollars in three giant Icelandic banks that failed during the 2008 global financial
crash, making it a creditor in their bankruptcies. Gunnlaugsson’s government negotiated a deal with creditors last year without
disclosing his family’s financial stake in the outcome.
Gunnlaugsson has denied in recent days that his family’s financial interests influenced his stances. The leaked records do not make it
clear whether Gunnlaugsson’s political positions benefited or hurt the value of the bonds held through the offshore company.
In an interview with an ICIJ media partners, Reykjavik Media and SVT, Gunnlaugsson denied hiding assets. When he was confronted
with the name of the offshore company linked to him — Wintris Inc. — the prime minister said “I’m starting to feel a bit strange about
these questions because it’s like you are accusing me of something.”
Soon after, he ended the interview.
Four days later, his wife took the matter public, posting a note on Facebook asserting that the company was hers, not his, and that she
had paid all taxes on it.
Since then, members of Iceland’s parliament have questioned why Gunnlaugsson never disclosed the offshore company, with one
lawmaker calling for the prime minister and his government to resign.
The prime minister has fought back, putting out an eight-page statement arguing he wasn’t required to publicly report his connection to
Wintris because it was really owned by his wife and because it was “merely a holding company, not a company engaged in commercial
activities.”
In 2005, a tour boat called the Ethan Allen sank in New York’s Lake George, drowning 20 elderly tourists. After the survivors and
families of the dead sued, they learned the tour company had no insurance because fraudsters had sold it a fake policy…
Reforming the secret world
In 2013, U.K. leader David Cameron urged his country’s overseas territories — including the British Virgin Islands — to work with him to
“get our own houses in order” and join the fight against tax evasion and offshore secrecy.
He could have looked no further than his late father to see how challenging that would be.
Ian Cameron, a stockbroker and multimillionaire, was a Mossack Fonseca client who used the law firm to shield his investment fund,
Blairmore Holdings, Inc., from U.K. taxes.
The fund’s name came from Blairmore House, his family’s ancestral country estate. Mossack Fonseca registered the investment fund in
Panama even though many of its key investors were British. Ian Cameron controlled the fund from its birth in 1982 until his death in
2010.
A prospectus for investors said the fund “should be managed and conducted so that it does not become resident in the United Kingdom
for United Kingdom taxation purposes.”
The fund did this by using untraceable certificates of ownership known as “bearer shares” and by employing “nominee” company officers
based in the Bahamas, the law firm’s leaked records show.
Ian Cameron’s tax-haven history is an example of how deeply offshore secrecy is woven into the lives of political and financial elites
around the world. It’s also an important economic engine for many countries. The weight of that self-interest has made reform difficult.
In the U.S., for example, states like Delaware and Nevada, which have allowed company owners to remain anonymous, continue to fight
against efforts to require greater corporate transparency.
Mossack Fonseca’s home country, Panama, has refused to embrace a plan for worldwide exchange of information about bank accounts
— out of concern that its offshore industry could be left at a competitive disadvantage. Panama officials say they will exchange
information, but on a more modest scale.
The challenge that reformers and law enforcers face is how to find and stop criminal behavior when it’s buried beneath layers of secrecy.
The most effective tool for breaking through this secrecy has been leaks of offshore documents that have dragged hidden dealings into
the open.
Document leaks uncovered by ICIJ and its media partners have prompted legislation and official investigations in dozens of countries —
and fanned fears among offshore customers who worry their secrets will be revealed.
In April 2013, after ICIJ released its “Offshore Leaks” stories based on confidential documents from the British Virgin Islands and
Singapore, some Mossack Fonseca customers emailed the firm looking for reassurance that their offshore holdings were safe from
scrutiny.
Mossack Fonseca told customers not to worry. It said its commitment to its clients’ privacy “has always been paramount, and in this
regard your confidential information is stored in our state-of-the-art data center, and any communication within our global network is
handled through an encryption algorithm that complies with the highest world-class standards.”
Here’s a bit with more on Roldugin. This piece also mentions Lesin:
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/panama-papers-money-hidden-offshore?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
A network of secret offshore deals and vast loans worth $2bn has laid a trail to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin.
An unprecedented leak of documents shows how this money has made members of Putin’s close circle fabulously wealthy.
Though the president’s name does not appear in any of the records, the data reveals a pattern – his friends have earned millions
from deals that seemingly could not have been secured without his patronage.
The documents suggest Putin’s family has benefited from this money – his friends’ fortunes appear his to spend.
The files are part of an unprecedented leak of millions of papers from the database of Mossack Fonseca, the world’s fourth
biggest offshore law firm. They show how the rich and powerful are able to exploit secret offshore tax regimes in myriad ways.
The offshore trail starts in Panama, darts through Russia, Switzerland and Cyprus – and includes a private ski resort where Putin’s
younger daughter, Katerina, got married in 2013.
The Panama Papers shine a particular spotlight on Sergei Roldugin, who is Putin’s best friend. Roldugin introduced Putin to the
woman he subsequently married, Lyudmila, and is godfather to Putin’s older daughter, Maria.
A professional musician, he has apparently accumulated a fortune – having been placed in ostensible control of a series of assets
worth at least $100m, possibly more.
Roldugin appears to have been picked for this role because of his lesser profile. He has denied in documents to bank officials in
Switzerland and Luxembourg that he is close to any Russian public figures. He has also said he is not a businessman.
Yet the files reveal Putin’s longstanding intimate has a 12.5% stake in Russia’s biggest TV advertising agency, Video International,
which has annual revenues of more than £800m. Previously, its ownership was a closely guarded secret.
Roldugin was also secretly given an option to buy a minority stake in the Russian truck manufacturer Kamaz, which makes army
vehicles, and has 15% of a Cyprus-registered company called Raytar.
He also owns 3.2% of Bank Rossiya. The St Petersburg private bank has been described as Putin’s “crony bank”. The US
imposed sanctions on it after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
These assets are only part of a series of linked financial schemes revealed in the documents that revolve round Bank Rossiya.
The bank is headed by Yuri Kovalchuk. The US alleges he is the “personal banker” for many senior Russian government officials
including Putin. The Panama Papers disclose that Kovalchuk and Bank Rossiya achieved the transfer of at least $1bn to a specially
created offshore entity called Sandalwood Continental.
These funds came from a series of enormous unsecured loans from the state-controlled Russian Commercial Bank (RCB) located
in Cyprus and other state banks. There is no explanation in the files of why the banks agreed to extend such unorthodox credit
lines.
Some of the cash obtained from RCB was also lent back onshore in Russia at extremely high interest rates, with the resulting
profits siphoned off to secret Swiss accounts.
A $6m yacht was purchased by Sandalwood and shipped to a port near St Petersburg.
Cash was also handed over directly to the Putin circle, this time in the form of very cheap loans, made with no security and with
interest rates as low as 1%. It is not clear whether any loans have been repaid.
In 2010 and 2011, Sandalwood made three loans worth $11.3m to an offshore company called Ozon, which owns the upmarket
Igora ski resort in the Leningrad region. Ozon belongs to Kovalchuk and a Cypriot company. Putin is the resort’s star patron and a
reputed resident.
Eighteen months after the loans, the president used Igora as the venue for the wedding of Katerina. Her groom was Kirill
Shamalov, the son of another of Putin’s old St Petersburg friends. News of the ceremony, from which cameras were banished, only
emerged in 2015.
The records were obtained from an anonymous source by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and shared by the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists with the Guardian and the BBC.
…There is nothing inherently illegal in using offshore companies.
The transactions, however, include apparently fake share deals, with shares “traded” retrospectively; multimillion-dollar charges for
vague “consultancy” services; and repeated payments of large sums in “compensation” for allegedly cancelled share deals. In 2011
a Roldugin company buys the rights to a $200m loan for $1. “This is not business, this is creating the appearance of business in
order to continually move and hide assets,” Andrew Mitchell QC, a leading authority on money-laundering, told BBC Panorama.
Such layers of secrecy surrounded the offshore deals that Bank Rossiya staff in St Petersburg sent all their instructions to a
confidential intermediary – a firm of Swiss lawyers in Zurich.
The Swiss lawyers in turn arranged for Mossack Fonseca to set up shell companies, typically registering them in the secretive
British Virgin Islands, with sham nominee directors from Panama to sign approvals for the deals. Even Mossack’s confidential
records of true owners have frequently turned out to be further fronts.
Speculation over the size of Putin’s personal fortune has gone on for almost a decade, following reports in 2007 that he was worth
at least $40bn, based on leaks from inside his own presidential administration.
In 2010, US diplomatic cables suggested Putin held his wealth via proxies. The president formally owned nothing, they added, but
was able to draw on the wealth of his friends, who now control practically all of Russia’s oil and gas production and industrial
resources.
In 2014, after Russia seized Crimea, the White House imposed sanctions on leading members of Putin’s circle, including
Kovalchuk, citing their close ties to “a senior official of the Russian Federation” – a euphemism for Putin himself. The Panama
Papers reveal that the Putin group appeared to have become nervous for unclear reasons after October 2012. Sandalwood was
closed down and its operations switched to another offshore entity registered in the BVI, called Ove Financial Corp.
One of the companies linked to Ove Financial Corp belonged to Mikhail Lesin, Putin’s media tsar and former press minister. Lesin
founded the Kremlin’s propaganda TV channel Russia Today but later fell out of favour. He was mysteriously found dead last
November in a Washington hotel room with blunt force injuries to the head.
Asked about the offshore companies linked to him last week, Rodulgin said: “Guys, to be honest I am not ready to give comments
now … These are delicate issues. I was connected to this business a long time ago. Before ‘perestroika’. It happened … And then
it started growing and such things happened. The House of Music [in St Petersburg] is subsidised from this money.”
Roldugin declined to answer further written questions.
The Putin circle’s use of offshore companies contrasts with the president’s call for “deoffshoreisation”, urging Russians to bring
cash hidden abroad home. Others who make use of offshore companies include oil trader Gennady Timchenko, Putin’s friend of
30 years. The US imposed sanctions on him in 2014. Others in the data are Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Putin’s childhood
friends and former judo partners. They are now billionaire construction tycoons. The Arsenal FC shareholder Alisher Usmanov
also appears. He has at least six companies registered in the Isle of Man. There is no suggestion this is illegal.
Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s official spokesman, declined to comment on specific allegations against the president. Speaking last week,
Peskov said western spy agencies were behind an all-out “information attack” against him to destabilise Russia before elections.
Peskov dismissed the investigation by the Guardian and others as an “undisguised, paid-for hack job”. He said Russia had “legal
means” to defend Putin’s dignity and honour.
RCB Cyprus said it could not disclose information about its clients. It said that in October 2013 it had “refined its strategy”. It had
opened a branch in Luxembourg, received a new investor, and was now under direct European Central Bank supervision. Given
this, it was “utterly unfounded” to suggest the bank was a “pocket” for top Russian officials. The bank said it had voluntarily
submitted the allegations to Cyprus’s money-laundering authority. The auditor PwC Cyprus said it had audited RCB’s accounts but
that it did not provide services to Sandalwood.
Lawyers for Kovalchuk said information about Bank Rossiya was publicly available. “We do not understand why you address
these questions to Mr Kovalchuk.”
US political scientist Karen Dawisha said it was inconceivable that Putin’s friends had become rich without his patronage. “He
takes what he wants. When you are president of Russia, you don’t need a written contract. You are the law.”
More from Solovey; Slon.ru/Novaya Gazeta…
Solovey: http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_16435%2Fall
Moscow will say this is a provocation, an information war against Russia, that Poroshenko, Cameron and the rest are thieves and
scoundrels, and, special for the social networks, that there was a brilliant, secret plan to create a strategic financial reserve through
especially trusted persons, “diamonds for the dictatorship of the proletariat”…
Slon.ru sums up the Panama papers revelations: http://slon.ru/posts/66174
Slon says that Roldugin’s close relationship with Putin explains how the violinist became such a key figure in the financial schemes
revealed by the Panama papers—in 2010, businessman Sergey Kolesnikov wrote an open letter to Medvedev in which he said
that major Russian businesses were obligated to contribute money for the president, 35% of which went offshore to Roldugin’s
companies. These were not direct contributions, but “credits”—the “credits” were issued in part by an offshore connected to
Aleksey Mordashov, owner of Severstal. Another Roldugin-connected company received $30 million for “consultations” from
another Mordashov company. In a deal with Suleiyman Kerimov’s Rostelekom, Roldugin for $1 received R4 billion in credits…
VTB affiliate RCB Bank in Cyprus opened a credit line of $650 million for the Roldugin-connected offshore, Sandalwood
Continental. Even Mossack Fonseca employees had doubts about that credit. It appears that credit made up the operational
budget for Ralduguin and his company. Experts say that the deal has all the marks of money laundering…
The money from the offshores often comes back to Russia, but ordinary Russians don’t benefit—only a narrow circle of people
do. Some of the offshore money, for instance, went to a company that built the Igora ski resort in Leningrad Oblast, the site of
Putin’s daughter’s wedding…There is some unconfirmed information that another presidential mansion is being built in Sortavala
(Karelia) and the company that owns the land got its money from one of Roldugin’s structures. All of these companies are in one
way or another connected to Yuri Kovalchuk and Rossiya Bank. Roldugin is a Rossiya Bank shareholder.
Video International was founded by Mikhail Lesin, recently found dead under mysterious circumstances in Washington. VI at one
point controlled 70% of the Russian TV advertising market. Companies connected to Roldugin own 20% of VI and he receives
millions in dividends. Roldugin also had an option on KamAZ. The investment firm Troiyka Dialog bought 51% of KamAZ,
created Avtoinvest, Ltd., then turned over management of Avtoinvest to an offshore. The offshore could dictate conditions to the
company that owned 51% of KamAZ. Roldugin owned 15% of the offshore. Avtoinvest had an option for 100% of KamAZ, the
country’s major truck producer, for the piddling sum of $100,000. Troiyka Dialog and offshores connected to Roldugin had a
similar arrangement with AvtoVAZ.

Comment: A lot of what slon reported was drawn from Novaya Gazeta’s reporting on the Panama papers story. Here’s
a bit from Novaya on Roldugin: http://krug.novayagazeta.ru/12-zoloto-partituri
Roldugin’s “offshore empire” of companies was registered in 2006-2009, the companies closed in 2014-2015. There were four
companies that played the major role in this story, two of them belonged directly to Roldugin, while the other two belonged to
people linked to him. Roldugin was the owner of Sonnette Overseas (British Virgin Islands) and International Media Overseas
(Panama). His interests in those companies was represented by St. Petersburg businessmen Oleg Gordon and Aleksandr Plekhov,
who were shareholders in Sandalwood Continental and Sunbarn, Ltd.
The companies played different roles—some received funds from the Cyprus-based RCB Bank (substantially controlled by VTB),
then spread the cash among different companies for various purposes; others controlled packets of shares in Russian companies; a
third set of companies played a technical role—for writing off unpaid debts, for example. They were all managed from on place—
Rossiya Bank. $2 billion passed through those companies. Where did the money come from? Questionable non-market deals with
shares from major Russian companies like Rosneft and Gazprom; “donations” from major Russian businesses; and privileged loans
from RCB Bank. As far as the shares deals, if the company terminated the deal and did not sell the shares, Roldugin’s offshore
was awarded compensation. In one case involving Rosneft shares, $750,000—there were lots of those kinds of payments,
allowing the Roldugin firms to conjure up money out of thin air (Comment: Maybe they were bribes or tribute as in the cases
of “donations” from other businesses. It was sort of a shakedown operation or, maybe a reflection of a common
corruption arrangement in which a bureaucrat or policeman takes a bribe, or otherwise profits from illegal activity,
then kicks a percentage upstairs to the boss, who then might pay off other superiors further up the corruption chain).
It’s curious that a similar arrangement—unfulfilled contracts for buying/selling shares—was used by those committing fraud in the
Magnitskiy affair, creating fictitious transactions that were then used to steal budget funds for profits taxes (Comment: I think
Novaya is referring to one form of the tax rebate scams used in that case). In other cases, the sales were made, then the
shares sold back (sometimes the very next day) at a profit. But experts say the transactions may have been fictitious all along, a
mask for payments from other sources. Whatever the case, transactions that should have raised red flags for the banks involved
were not noted—the transactions took place through affiliates of Russian banks overseas.
Comment: Novaya gives us more examples of the $1 loan deals described above and “credits” on more than generous
terms from RCB bank, which seemed to have acted as a cash cow for Roldugin’s “offshore empire.”
What did the money accumulated in the offshores buy? Resorts, mansions, yacht clubs, but also purchases of strategic assets,
including Video International and KamAZ
Peskov on “Putinophobia” (Peskov’s wife figures in the Panama papers)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3522655/Russian-president-blames-Putinophobia-accusations-hid-piles-cash-
Panama-wife-key-adviser-linked-tax-dodge.html
President Putin is the victim of a Western plot designed to topple him through allegations members of his inner circle used an offshore
tax haven, the Kremlin has claimed.
It insisted that 'Putinophobia' has become so great in the West that if there is nothing bad to say about the country it must be 'made
up'.
It comes as the Russian leader was accused of ordering a media blackout of the claims his closest circle laundered money and evaded
tax using the services of Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca.
Among those accused is the glamorous wife of Putin's influential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, despite her claim that she had no
knowledge of 'any offshore companies'.
'Putin, Russia, our country, our stability and the upcoming elections are the main target,' said spokesman Dmitry Peskov today,
following the stunning revelations.
'Although Putin is not mentioned anywhere, for us, of course, it is obvious that our president was and is the main target of such attacks,
especially in the context of the coming parliamentary election, and in the long run, I mean the presidential election in two years.'
He continued: 'Putinophobia has got so hot that a priori nobody can say anything good about Russia, they must say bad things and if
there is nothing to say, one must make something up.'
The wife of Peskov, Tatiana Navka, is listed among the alleged clients of the top-secret Panamanian law firm.
The ice dancer and 2006 Olympic champion was listed as the beneficiary of offshore company Carina Global Assets Ltd - based in the
British Virgin islands - from its 2014 launch, until it was liquidated in November last year.
She was already romantically involved with Peskov at the time, and their daughter was born in August 2014. They then married in July
2015.
Intriguingly, Peskov's wife has been quoted as having no knowledge that she ran the company, despite a leaked document saying that
its purpose was to 'buy investment assets to benefit its beneficiary' - namely her.
'I have never had any offshore companies or bank accounts,' said Miss Navka, 40.
'There were absolutely no foreign companies.'
But a copy of her passport was in the leaked papers for Carina Global Assets, which has a projected $1million assets, it was reported.
When asked if her documents could have been used without her knowledge regarding the offshore operation, she said: 'I don't know who
might have done it. And personally I would like to figure it out.'
In response to the claims that his wife is implicated in the scandal, Peskov added: 'My wife never had any offshore company and does
not have it now, she never opened it and, accordingly, she could not close it down.
'This is why I am inclined to doubt the rest of the information.'
Russian law forbids senior officials and their families from using foreign financial institutions and offshore vehicles.
Nevertheless, several major pro-Kremlin newspapers and websites failed to carry reports of the stunning revelations - leading to claims
that the president has ordered a media blackout.
Among the platforms that have failed to cover the allegations is the official newspaper of the Russian government.
The Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the major website LifeNews are both seen as key supporters of the Putin government.
Others that failed to cover the story were major publications Izvestia, Moskovsky Komsomolets and Komsomolskaya Pravda.
Major television channels also did not rate the story worthy of coverage.
Aleksey Chesnakov on the Panama papers
http://actualcomment.ru/razoblacheniya-byut-mimo-tseli-1604040932.html
Chesnakov, Director of the Tsentr Politicheskoy Konyunktury, says that the Panama papers revelations will only unite the Russian
elite. Two camps will mobilize—the opposition, which will intensify criticism of the regime, and pro-Kremlin groups, which will
intensify their defense of vlast. Neither will read the Panama papers material…
This RT report on the Panama papers doesn’t even mention Putin—his picture shows up on a chart of foreign leaders implicated in
the scandal, but that’s it: http://www.rt.com/news/338270-panama-papers-corruption-report/
Russian media reaction to Panama papers
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/look-theres-jackie-chan-russian-media-responds-to-panama-allegations/564702.html
The release of leaked data from Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca has been greeted with a varied, but largely
muted response by Russian media.
The revelations are the result of a year-long investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)
and the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung on the basis of more than 11 million leaked documents. The records
implicate 72 current or former heads of state, including Iceland's Prime Minister Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson and Ukraine's
President Petro Poroshenko.
In particular, 12 Russian individuals have been implicated. They include Putin's close friend, musician Sergei Roldugin,
who has been accused of being the frontman for the president's own financial empire.
Here is a selection of responses from the Russian media sphere:
Kremlin Press Office
Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, himself implicated in the investigation, noted that the investigation was aimed at
"destabilizing the situation in Russia." Speaking at a press briefing, Peskov said that while the president was not directly
featured in any aspect of the investigation, the "information attacks" targeted him ahead of upcoming elections.
Peskov compared the publication of the investigation to coverage of "Russian success" in Syria. "The situation in Palmyra
was an obvious success, but was hushed up," he said. "Potentially positive news stories had to be interrupted with
something."
United Russia
Peskov was not the only loyalist to take to the airwaves. Irina Yarovaya, a prominent deputy of the Pro-Putin United Russia
parliament faction, said Russian citizens were targeted in the attack. "The multiple information attacks on Russia's
president, the false, deceitful stories are like multiple injections of venom, sprayed in the hope that one would work," the
politician said.
State-Media Silence
State media outlets have been careful, defensive, and mostly totally silent — state television channels generally ignored
the subject.
The TASS news agency noted that "authors of the publication themselves acknowledged there is no mention of the
president's name in any of the documents."
Russia Today, the Kremlin-funded English language media resource toed a similar line. "A huge leak of more than 11.5
million documents from a Panama-based law firm saw the British media jump to accuse President Vladimir Putin of
corruption, despite the Russian president not being named in any of the papers," they wrote.
The pro-Kremlin, privately owned Ren-TV chose to highlight the offshore revelations of Jackie Chan rather than those
related to Putin.
The Godfather
Independent media and bloggers came to different conclusions.
The independent Vedomosti newspaper focused on the personality of Sergei Roldugin, musician and godfather of Putin's
daughter, who, according to the ICIJ-OCCRP investigation was a key player in a shadowy $2 billion offshore network.
"One more millionaire friend of Putin has been found out," the Vedomosti newspaper wrote on Sunday evening.
The Kommersant newspaper said the released documents were "less impressive" than another ICIJ investigation from
2013, as "no direct evidence of Russia's corruption deals have been published."
"The published data does not specifically link the operations of Roldugin with any politician's operations," Kommersant
said. The published investigation will hit the offshore industry, but is unlikely to change business practices.
"The Panama Papers demonstrate that the problem of corruption doesn't lie in the possibility of covering up information
about the illegal transactions or freedom of speech issues, but the problems of democratic institutions, which are not able
to create a truly effective anti-corruption mechanisms — even in large transparent jurisdictions," Kommersant said.
Writing on Facebook, Ilya Shumanov, director of the Kaliningrad branch of Transparency International Russia, suggested
that the individuals mentioned in the ICIJ-OCCRP report may even find themselves included in the next round of
sanctions against Russia.
The head of anti-corruption organization Transparency International, Yelena Panfilova urged readers to understand the
revelations not only as offshore dealings, but corruption. "It's very simple," she wrote. "The 2000 UN Convention on
Organized Crime and Money laundering, ratified and signed by Russia, clearly states that any money movements by
politically exposed persons and individuals affiliated with them — parents, kids, spouses, business partners, etc. —
should be checked for potential corruption.”
Russian bloggers were mostly disappointed by the leak, with some arguing that details about massive government
corruption revealed little new information.
VTB’s Kostin called the Panama papers allegations “nonsense”: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nonsense--russian-
banking-boss-blasts-putin-offshore-accusations/564698.html
Head of state banking group VTB Andrei Kostin has called reports linking Russian President Vladimir Putin’s to more than
$2 billion in offshore account transfers “nonsense,” the RBC business news agency reported Monday.
“I haven’t read anything that would be connected directly to the president,” Kostin said in a live interview with Bloomberg
Television.
“The fact that his daughter celebrated her wedding at the ‘Igora’ ski resort, which is actually not expensive and which
dozens of people in St. Petersburg use for weddings every week. I don't know how this ties Putin to any offshore
dealings,” he added.
Kostin also noted that there was no information that the name of the Russian President appeared in the leaked
documents or registered documents of the offshore companies.
He said that although Russia has no offshore zone, Russians and Russian companies are not violating any law by
registering businesses offshore, RBC reported.
The banker also denied reports that the Cypriot Russian Commercial Bank (RCB) — under VTB control — had given
unsecured loans to companies owned by Sergei Roldugin, the renowned cellist and childhood friend of Putin.
On Sunday, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published reports that implicated members of Putin’s
inner-circle in offshore dealings. Although Putin’s name does not figure in the reports, the information suggested that
friends of the president earned millions from complex offshore deals.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told RBC that a response to the issue would be given at a later date.
The Kasyanov tape (“Kasyanov day” on NTV; Reactions to the video)
Comment: Some of you will remember “Misha 2%” as Kasyanov’s nickname in the past. Looks like the Kremlin
anticipated the media reaction to the Panama papers and sought to soften the impact by showing that the opposition
was dirty, too. And, as I wrote last week, I think Khodorkovskiy, some elites in Russia, and people associated with
them are probably one major source—or at least a major distributor—of dirt like the Baevskiy material we saw last
week (See the 31 April and 1 March notes), so there’s a bit of retaliation going on. The Kremlin is showing that it can
play that game as well. I doubt the illicit liaison will shock anybody, nor will the corruption mentioned by Kasyanov, but
that’s not the point.
http://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/putin-rival-filmed-in-sex-sting-with-british-activist-in-bid-to-destroy-presidential-
ambitions/news-story/f8414158e9f658fff9fa2e7c09220c3f
A BITTER rival of Russian President Vladimir Putin has been caught romping with a British-raised activist in a sex sting.
Married former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, 58, was tipped as one of the few opposition leaders capable of toppling Putin.
But last night his career was hanging by a thread after a grainy 40-minute video of him and a female anti-Putin playwright was shown on Russian
state TV.
The footage showed Kasyanov, who fell out with Putin after serving as PM, in a steamy bedroom clinch with Natalya Pelevine, 39.
The pair were filmed naked or wearing little, their faces fully visible. They were seen embracing, with Pelevine, who grew up in Britain, wearing a bra,
knickers, stockings and suspenders. The black-and-white film did not show explicit sex acts.
Pelevine accused Kasyanov’s family of stealing state assets. He replied: “I buy for five kopeks (cents) and sell for five roubles.”
Kasyanov claimed he was doing the same as Russian oligarchs but “they act on a different scale”.
The politician was also overheard saying how he needed to target a fellow anti-Putin candidate, Alexei Navalny, before parliamentary elections later
this year. Comment: I reader noted yesterday that Navalniy had not reacted to the Kasyanov tape story.
In September Russians go to the polls with wages at their lowest since Putin first came to power 16 years ago.
Changes in the law mean the President can seek a fourth term in office in 2018.
Yesterday Kasyanov refused to comment. Pelevine said she will sue NTV.
Kasyanov, who has two children, works with Pelevine — also known as Natalya Pelevina — who acts as his aide in his RPR Parnas party.
Pelevine was born in the old Soviet Union, but her parents emigrated to Britain when she was still a child.
The video was billed as “Kasyanov Day” on the NTV channel.
A presenter told viewers: “A man resembling Mikhail Kasyanov, the leader of RPR Parnas, is meeting a woman resembling Parnas member Natalya
Pelevina, but there is no doubt that it is Kasyanov and Pelevina.”
Sources last night said the sting smacked of a classic operation by Russia’s FSB, the successor to the KGB. It appeared to have been secretly
filmed using a camera hidden in a dressing table inside a Moscow flat used by the couple.
They were also heard talking about Kasyanov’s links to corruption.
Kasyanov has reacted in a Facebook post reproduced on the Ekho Moskvy site:
http://echo.msk.ru/blog/kasyanov_mihail/1741002-echo/
Kasyanov says he was expecting more pressure on him and PARNAS—blackmail, bribery, and provocation is the way the regime
works…The film shown by NTV, made by the special services, is evidence the regime senses a threat to its existence (Kasyanov
backs up to point to three other incidents indicating this—the Kadyrov Instagram video of Kasyanov in the crosshairs of a sniper’s
rifle, the cake-in-the-face incident outside a Moscow restaurant, and an NTV claim that Kasyanov in 1998 organized the theft of a
$4.5 billion IMF credit). Undoubtedly, says Kasyanov, Russian law enforcement will find no evidence that any laws have been
broken in the case of video of him and Pelevina, though it’s clear there were legal violations. Kasyanov says that the only way to
defend himself is to intensify the political struggle against the regime…
Comment: What about the stuff on property for kopecks and selling it for rubles? No reply? And Navalniy?
A post from Leonid Volkov on NTV’s “Kasyanov day”: http://echo.msk.ru/blog/volkov_l/1740800-echo/
Volkov says Putin ordered the attack on Kasyanov. It was probably an emotional reaction to the material on Baevskiy and the
apartments—a counterattack on Kasyanov’s private life, as the Baevskiy material had been an attack on VVP’s. Maybe this kind
of “manual control” by issuing unlawful orders will run out of steam around the time some realize that Putin is not forever and they
will have to make their way after he is gone. When the time comes, says Volkov, we can’t repeat the mistake of 1991—we cannot
leave the staff of the special services largely intact…In April of this year, the Democratic coalition will be one year old, which is
longer than other such coalitions have lasted in the past 25 years. So the Kremlin is afraid…
Comment: Volkov didn’t comment on the corruption angle or Kasyanov’s remark about Navalniy, either, which
indicated that this latest coalition isn’t any more unified than the others, at least at the leadership level. OK, if he
thinks that Kasyanov may be a corrupt SOB himself, but he’s OUR corrupt SOB and for practical reasons, the
democrats have to play along with him and people like him, why not be honest about it and say so? One of the points
I’ve made in these notes over the years is that I don’t think the opposition leaders are really all that different from the
people in vlast. They share the same political culture—so making a sea change in Russia is going to be more difficult
that just seeing Putin leave the Kremlin, I think.
Khodorkovskiy also thinks the video is evidence that the Kremlin is afraid of the Democratic coalition:
http://openrussia.org/post/view/14005/
This newsru item
http://newsru.com/russia/01apr2016/kasyanov.html links the latest NTV attack on the opposition to past films—“Anatomy of a
Protest” and “Anatomy of a Protest-2”…Pelevina says she will sue…
Putin’s got a new girlfriend?
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3520389/Wendi-Deng-frolics-waves-St-Barts-claims-s-relationship-Russian-
leader-Vladimir-Putin.html
Wendi Deng has been seen frolicking in the tropical waves of St Barts amid claims that she is in a 'serious' relationship with Russian
leader Vladimir Putin.
…Deng has been enjoying a holiday on St Barts aboard the $400 million yacht of Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, a close friend
of Putin.
The Chinese businesswoman is close to Abramovich's wife Dasha Zhukova, who is not with her on the yacht this week and is instead
with friends in South Carolina.
On Thursday Deng was seen standing on the sidewalk in a yellow dress and sandals alongside her daughter Chloe Murdoch and a
group of friends.
US Weekly reported that Deng and Putin, 63, were dating after speaking to an insider close to the Russian leader, who said the
relationship between the two had become 'serious.'
They are both divorced, with Deng and husband Rupert Murdoch splitting in 2013 and Putin separating a year later from
his wife of 30 years Lyudmila Putina.
Deng and her ex have two daughters,Grace, 14, and Chloe, 12, while Putin and his wife also have two daughters, Maria,
30, and Yekaterina, 29.
Putin was linked to Russian gymnast Alina Kabaeva after his split, and there have been claims that he fathered two
children with her, but the Kremlin and Kabayeva have strongly denied these accusations.
There were also allegations the two had been together since as early as 2008, but those claims were also strongly
denied.
Murdoch filed for divorce from Deng after 14 years of marriage citing irreconcilable differences…
Deng and Putin meanwhile have never been spotted together and neither has commented on their rumored
relationship…
Need Text

Sent time: 12/18/2015 09:20:06 AM
To: Wayne and Stacy Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>; Stacy Allensworth <stacy.allensworth@gmail.com>; wayne.allensworth@gmail.com
Subject: Internet Notes 18 December 2015
Attachments: IN18Dec15.doc

Internet Notes 18 December 2015

Levada polls on the economy
Russia will not object to Assad’s ouster after the “peace process” begins
MoD says the Su-24 “black box” was damaged
More from Peskov on Chayka (Spinning the FBK story; Navalniy on what he would do if he were Putin…)
http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/President/m.247021.html
Latynina on why Chayka said Browder was behind the FBK investigation
WP on Magnitskiy
*Reaction from Magnitskiy’s mother, Browder to the re-opening of the case
Latynina comments on the Magnitskiy scandal (Latynina points to Serdyukov in the Magnitskiy affair)
Khodorkovskiy on a new constitution and regime change
A naval blockade of Crimea? (Battle over Crimea assets)
More on Potapenko and “angry businessmen turning on the Kremlin”
Ukraine says it will not repay debt to Russia due this weekend


The polls were conducted in October and November…

http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/17/ekonomicheskij-krizis-i-potreblenie/
57% say they are buying cheaper versions of bigger ticket items (38% in December 2014; 63% in September 2010)…58% say
they are economizing on everyday food items (37%; 70%)…36% say they are spending less on entertainment and vacations or
simply not taking them (22%; 34%)…18% say they have decided not to buy a car, or housing, or land plots (11%; 12%)…9%
are spending savings (7%; 12%)…13% are cutting spending on education or medical treatment (4%; 19%)…6% aren’t doing any
of these things (17%; 1%)…

Is there an economic crisis underway or not? Definitely yes—36% (38% in September; 28% in March; 38% in December 2014)
…Probably—44% (39%; 46%; 41%)…Definitely not—13% (14%; 15%; 10%)…Probably not—2% (3%; 3%; 2%)…Hard to
answer—6% (7%; 7%; 9%)…

How long do you think the crisis will last? (From among those who said there was a crisis underway) 2-3 months--<1% in
October (1% in September; 3% in March; 4% in December 2014)…6 months—5% (4%; 5%; 8%)…A year or a year and a half
—19% (23%; 19%; 19%)…Not less than two years—22% (24%; 22%; 21%)…The crisis will be a long one and the
consequences will last for years—21% (23%; 17%; 16%)…Right now, it’s hard to say how long it will last or how deep the crisis
will be—23% (16%; 24%; 21%)…

What portion of household income does your family spend on food? Less than half—23% in November (28% in October; 28% in
June)…About half—40% (39%; 37%)…Two thirds—21% (19%; 21%)…Almost all of it—9% (7%; 7%)…

How would you evaluate the situation regarding payment of pensions, salaries, stipends, and benefits in your city/town/rayon—
better, worse, or no change? Better—7% in November (9% in October)…Worse—38% (32%)…No change—49% (51%)…
Hard to answer—5% (8%)…


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-will-not-object-assad-ouster-after-syrian-war-ends/553211.html

Russia has no objections to Syrian President Bashar Assad's ouster after the peace process starts in the country, Western diplomats say, the
Reuters news agency reported Friday.
Russia had been repeatedly voicing its support to the Syrian president, but since Western powers, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have agreed that
Assad can stay in power during the transition period, Kremlin has changed its mind, a western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
"And the Russians have got to the point privately where they accept that Assad will have gone by the end of this transition, they're just not
prepared to say that publicly," diplomat said.
Russia has changed its position on the eve of the third round of ministerial talks on the Syrian crisis. The meeting will take place in New York on
Friday. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with the ministers from 16 other countries will
participate.
Here’s more: http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/12/18/russia-calling-shots-nations-lock-down-syria-plan/77548834/
WASHINGTON — As the U.S. and world powers gather again in an attempt to end Syria's civil war, Russia appears to be calling the shots.
Nations meeting Friday in New York and the U.N. will essentially be negotiating a Russian plan for a "political transition," based on the Syrian
government's consent and with no clear reference to President Bashar Assad's departure.
And as they look for a way to secure and enforce a peace that has proved all too elusive since 2011, Russia's recent military intervention appears to
be providing the key leverage. As President Obama said earlier this month, rebels who join the process could enjoy "pockets of cease-fire" where
they no longer face Syrian or Russian bombs. The implication was that those who refuse could still be targeted.
In any event, diplomats from East and West say the chances of ending the conflict between Assad's military and moderate rebel forces are better
now than they've been for a long while. All speak of seizing the momentum of several groundbreaking meetings in recent months.
For the first time, the rise of the Islamic State group has the U.S., Russia and even sworn enemies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran committed to a
blueprint for peace negotiations and a set of principles for Syria's future. These are expected to be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council on Friday,
following meetings among foreign ministers in New York. The body has passed no such resolution previously.
There are other signs of progress. The opposition is finalizing the makeup of its delegation for talks with the government that are supposed to start
next month. Jordan is close to completing a list of militant groups that could join a unity government, and which, like the Islamic State group and al-
Qaida, would be declared terrorists and enemies of all.
Still, "very real" gaps remain, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters this week.
For one, the Russian division of "terrorist" vs. legitimate rebel forces differs significantly from that of U.S. and Arab governments, diplomats say.
And no agreement can be reached if Russia isn't satisfied.
An even bigger divide concerns Assad himself, with Washington desperate to secure a guarantee that he will eventually leave office in a transition,
having abandoned Obama's previous demand that the Syrian leader step down immediately. Russia has spent the past five years blocking any
international strategy or U.N. resolution that would show Assad the door.
Matthew Rycroft, Britain's U.N. ambassador, said these issues and the mechanics of a cease-fire will all be on the table Friday. A Security Council
resolution on the Syrian peace process, he said, would be a "very rare showing of unity" for world powers who've been bitterly divided even as
death tolls have soared past 300,000 and migrant crises and violent attacks have engulfed Europe and beyond.
To this day, the U.S. and its European and Arab allies are supporting anti-Assad rebels with training, equipment and funds. Russia is providing not
only diplomatic and financial cover to Syria's government, but targeting Assad's moderate opponents in airstrikes, according to Western
governments. Meanwhile, Iranian soldiers and proxy Hezbollah forces are dying on the battlefield alongside Assad's troops.
Nevertheless, top diplomats such as Secretary of State John Kerry have found cause for optimism in declarations that all are now interested in
securing a broad peace that would allow the world to concentrate on defeating Islamic State extremists. The group has exploited the war's chaos to
seize large parts of Syria and Iraq for its self-proclaimed caliphate.
The shared commitment against IS has governments believing they can sidestep their disagreements on Assad and other matters to end the killing.
For the U.S., that has meant increasingly vague statements on when Assad might have to relinquish authority and even declaring the opposition's
demand for his immediate ouster — long America's own stance — a "non-starting position."
In many ways, the parameters of the international mediation were framed early on in Syria's war by disagreements between Washington and
Moscow. Russia prevailed in many of these disputes.
When diplomats gathered in Geneva in June 2012 to hash out a strategy, U.N. peace envoy Kofi Annan wanted a transitional government that
would exclude "those whose continued presence and participation would undermine the credibility of the transition and jeopardize stability and
reconciliation."
"That was code for excluding Assad," former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who backed such language, noted in her book "Hard Choices."
But the Russians balked, and also prevented the inclusion of any penalties for noncompliance.
As a compromise, Clinton said she herself put forward the idea of a new Syrian government comprised of individuals chosen by "mutual consent,"
believing that an accord along such lines would leave "Assad and his cronies ... stripped of their authority." The Russians took it as providing the
Syrian leader a veto over any proposal for a would-be replacement.
The plan never went anywhere. After Kerry replaced Clinton as secretary of state, the talk went from "changing Assad's calculus" to something
closer to Russia's position: an acknowledgement that he wouldn't have to give up the presidency on "Day One" of a transition.
When direct talks between the Syrian parties finally occurred in 2014, they never even got to questions of leadership. Yet as the world community
now tries again, the so-called "Geneva communique" is still accepted as the basis for diplomacy.
The U.S. has a lot riding on engineering a cease-fire and jump-starting Syria's transition.
Obama, who has ruled out any significant deployment of U.S. ground forces, has failed to build an American-trained, local fighting force or cajole
Arab partners into sending their forces into Syria to defeat the Islamic State group. While Kurdish Peshmerga and Arab militants have fought
effectively, no one sees their numbers or strength as sufficient to achieve the mission.
The U.S. may have greater luck if peace between Syria's government and mainstream rebel groups holds. American officials hope each would then
cooperate and turn their guns on IS, with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia filling the remaining needs for a ground force.
It's unclear if everyone would be on board, or if Russia would view such developments in its interests.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/black-box-of-downed-su-24-damaged--russian-defense-
ministry/553201.html
The black box from the Russian Su-24 fighter-bomber downed by Turkey has been damaged, said Nikolai Primak, head of the Defense Ministry
incident investigation group, at a briefing where the box was opened, the Interfax news agency reported Friday.
“We can see that on the upper plate, three of the eight microchips have clearly been damaged. That tells us, as one can see, that the flight
information in them is missing,” Primak said.
Ministry officials explained the damages by saying that the black box was stored in the jet's rear part, where the Turkish rocket hit, the RIA Novosti
news agency reported.
All memory blocks from the black box will be sent to the laboratory for fluoroscopy studies to check if they have been damaged too, the agency
said.
Experts from China and India were present when the box was opened. Ministry official Sergey Dronov told Interfax that experts from 14 countries
had been invited, but most of them refused to participate.
Experts from China, United States and Britain will observe the black box data decryption process, Dronov said, RIA Novosti reported.
The final results of the decryption are scheduled to be published on Dec. 21, Defense Ministry officials said at the briefing.
In late November, a Russian Su-24 military plane was downed by an air-to-air missile from a Turkish F-16 interceptor near the Turkish-Syrian border.
While the plane's two pilots ejected, one was reportedly killed by local rebels during his descent. The other pilot was rescued by Russian and
Syrian military.



This is Peskov from a Rossiya-24 TV interview prior to Putin’s press conference (See yesterday’s notes)…There was nothing new
in the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) investigation, which was done on order. We saw similar charges in the summer, coming
from other people. Anyway, the claims were about Chayka’s grown sons, not about the Prosecutor General and his grown sons
are of no interest to us. There are other, more important problems to deal with—the economy, social problems, foreign policy.
The real agenda is quite different… Meanwhile, a Kremlin source is saying vlast has developed a strategy for dealing with the
Chayka affair: for the near term, Chayka is immune. There will be a minimal official reaction to the scandal and no inquiry into the
charges made in the FBK film. The story will have no impact on whether Chayka gets reappointed as Prosecutor General
(Comment: His term is up next June). Officially, the FBK investigation will be cast as an “order” by the West. The campaign
against FBK founder Navalniy will be intensified.

Navalniy ponders the scandal and the Kremlin’s likely response (as outlined above): http://navalny.com/p/4619/ And the likelihood
that it is him and his family who will be targeted…Chayka will remain in his post because it was Navalniy who attacked him—in
the case of the “stupid,” thieving Yakunin, it took two years before he was dismissed after Navalniy exposed his corruption.
Navalniy says that if he were in Putin’s place, he would call in the head of the FSB and hand him over a dossier on Chayka, then
instruct the FSB to conduct a hunt for traitors within the Prosecutor’s office. The FSB would orchestrate a series of media leaks
on the investigation. The Chaykas and their cronies would be arrested, the president’s VTsIOM poll ratings would soar,
newspapers would write about Navalniy using the FSB for leaks…Keeping Chayka as Prosecutor General means taking
responsibility for the protection of the Tsapkov criminal gang. Every deputy and senator should demand a parliamentary
investigation. And anyone not on board with that will be faced by candidates in the 2016 Duma elections backed by the anti-
corruption foundation spreading the fact that they gave immunity to the protectors of the Tsapkov gang…


http://www.novayagazeta.ru/columns/71189.html

It’s because a US federal prosecutor has brought suit against a Russian businessman, Denis Katsyv, in a New York court.
Katsyv’s accounts and real estate holdings in the US have been frozen—his name is on the “Magnitskiy list” of Russians, officials
and others, Magnitisky claimed were making off with state funds under the guise of tax rebates. Magnitskiy, of course, was
charged with that crime himself and died in a Russian jail. Katsyv has been connected to a number of key figures in the Magnitskiy
affair, including Dmitriy Klyuyev and former head of Russian Tax Inspectorate 28, Olga Stepanova (Comment: From what I
gather, Katsyev was laundering the funds siphoned off by the group involved in the tax rebate scam, shifting the
money to overseas accounts and buying assets). But it appears that Chayka’s office will argue that it was Browder and his
group—which included Magnitskiy—who made off with state funds, then accused Russian officials of that.

Comment: Here’s some material from the 8 August 2011 notes that helps fill out the picture—I’ve had to re-edit it to
keep from going off on the various related threads of the story, but I think it will be helpful to those not familiar with
the Magnitskiy affair. I used different fonts then and the style was a bit different, but I think it holds up:

[WP on Magnitskiy

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-us-sanctions-can-promote-human-rights-in-russia/2011/08/04/gIQAunDC1I_story.html

LAST MONTH the Obama administration disclosed it had taken a significant step toward balancing its policy toward Russia, which has focused
heavily on striking deals with the authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev while mostly ignoring issues of corruption and
human rights. In a letter to Congress, the State Department disclosed that several dozen Russian officials implicated in a notorious corruption case
that led to the persecution and death of a Russian lawyer had been banned from traveling to the United States.
That the administration was right to act — and that measures such as visa bans matter to foreign elites — has been seen in Russia’s reaction. At
first, Russian spokesmen issued vague, empty threats of retaliation. Then authorities announced that two prison doctors implicated in the death of
the lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, would be prosecuted. Finally, government prosecutors said last week that they had reopened the case brought
against Mr. Magnitsky that led to his imprisonment, mistreatment and death in 2009.*
Most likely, the new investigation represents another cynical maneuver by the Russian Interior Ministry, which has managed to protect the police
officials responsible for Mr. Magnitsky’s death for two years despite public promises of justice by Mr. Medvedev. The scale of the crimes and the
blatancy of the coverup are deeply revealing of the nature of the Russian regime. Mr. Magnitsky was targeted after he disclosed that a group of tax
and police officials had embezzled $230 million in government funds. The same officials who stole the money charged him with the embezzlement,
imprisoned him in increasingly harsh conditions and denied him medical treatment.
As it happens, Mr. Magnitsky’s employers were an American law firm and a London-based investor; they have since posted voluminous evidence
on the Internet showing how police and tax officials channeled tens of millions of dollars into foreign real estate and bank accounts following the
embezzlement. A special human rights council reported to Mr. Medvedev last month that the case had been mishandled and singled out a senior
police official it said was responsible. Yet the Interior Ministry continues to maintain that there was no wrongdoing — and Mr. Medvedev appears
powerless to act against the corrupt cabal.
Pressure from the United States and the European Union — which is also considering sanctions in the Magnitsky case — could help those in
Russia who want to combat the culture of criminality that has spread throughout government in the Putin era. But the Obama administration’s
action was reluctant; it moved under pressure from Congress, where pending legislation would require a freeze on assets as well as a ban on visas
for officials involved in the Magnitsky case and other major human rights cases. The State Department’s letter disclosing the travel ban urged
Congress to drop the bill, arguing it could cause Moscow to cease cooperating on sanctions against Iran or in transporting materiel to
Afghanistan.
Accepting that argument would mean agreeing with the proposition that the “reset” of relations with Russia means that officials guilty of crimes
such as theft, torture and murder must be allowed to travel to the United States and deposit stolen funds here. In fact, the Kremlin will act
according to its perceived interests in Iran and Afghanistan, regardless of such decisions. Russia will never be a reliable U.S. partner until cases
such as that of Sergei Magnitsky are subject to the rule of law.

Press Release
For Immediate Distribution

Sergei Magnitsky’s Mother Reacts to the Russian Interior Ministry’s Plan to Prosecute Her Dead Son

5 August 2011 – Yesterday, the Russian Interior Ministry announced that they plan to prosecute Sergei Magnitsky for alleged tax evasion. Sergei
Magnitsky has been dead since November 16, 2009. He had been arrested and tortured to death in police custody after he had accused a number of
Interior Ministry officers of perpetrating the largest tax fraud in the Russian history. He repeatedly stated from custody that the case against him
was fabricated by the officers he had testified against. No one has been prosecuted for his torture and death in the 20 months since his death.

"To put a man on trial after he was killed, when he can no longer defend himself, is an evil and base act. It goes against all human morals, and
laws," said Sergei’s mother, Natalia Magnitskaya.

"I demand justice for my son and that everyone who is responsible for his death are named and prosecuted," added Mrs. Magnitskaya.

“Never in modern history has a government been so desperate to cover their tracks that after they torture and kill a man, they prosecute his
corpse two years later. This goes to show what absolute impunity allows corrupt governments to do. There is a special place in hell for these
type of people,” said William Browder, CEO of Hermitage Capital.

Last month, following an independent investigation, the Russian President’s Human Rights Council concluded that 1) the arrest of Sergei
Magnitsky was carried out illegally in contravention of the European Human Rights Convention, 2) the case against him was fabricated and
pursued by the same Interior Ministry officials he had named in his testimonies for the $230 million theft from the Russian Treasury, and 3) he was
beaten immediately before his death in custody.

Shortly after the Human Rights Council’s findings were released, on 14 July 2011, the Russian Interior Ministry rejected the Council’s conclusions
stating that no wrongdoing was found in the actions of the Interior Ministry officials in the Magnitsky case.

For additional information please contact:

Hermitage Capital
+ 44 207 440 1777
info@lawandorderinrussia.org
http://lawandorderinrussia.org


http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/code/799758-echo/

As Latynina relates the Magnitskiy case, Hermitage Capital’s Browder, a green mailer, naturally attracted the attention of law enforcement when
he pressured state companies, blackmailing the state (Though the blackmail did improve accounting is state companies in some instances). His
offices were raided and the documentation needed to trade the shares of three firms associated with Browder’s company was taken. (The three
companies—Parfenen, Makhaon, and Riland themselves were shells used strictly for trading Russian shares) These documents wound up in the
hands of a criminal named Markelov, who figured in one of the cases (kidnapping/murder) of an investigator whose name would come up in the
Magnitskiy affair, Kuznetsov. Markelov arranged for a court to declare that these firms were suffering operational losses. These firms then
approached Tax Inspectorate #28, headed by Olga Stepanova, whose husband owned property in Dubai, among other things…So Stepanova
signed the documents authorizing a tax rebate to these companies of $5.4 billion. The money was placed in certain banks, the main one being
the Universal Savings Bank that belongs to a certain Klyuyev, who had figured in a case involving the theft of company shares in a deal with
Metallinvest. Latynina believes that Klyuyev was the main organizer of the affair. But she also thinks that all of the figures she named were
connected in some way with Renessans Kapital. Klyuyev used to work there…[Comment: What Latynina seems to be saying is that the
swindlers used connections in Renessans Kapital to pull off their operation and that the RK management was simply indifferent to the affair
since it was not their money that was being stolen. That does not seem credible to me—if it was involved in something like this, Renessans
would want a kickback…]Heritage knew what was up and had already lodged a complaint in October ’07. [Comment: What I’ve never quite
understood was what was going on with the three companies—according to Latynina’s version of the story, the law enforcement people who
eventually prosecuted Magnitskiy raided Browder’s office, obtained documents that effectively gave them control of those companies, I think,
and then they used those companies as Latynina described above. Didn’t Heritage know that the documents—whatever they were, exactly—
were gone and that they could be used in such a way? Is that how they caught on to the tax scheme?...] The transactions and actual theft did
not take place until December—and the thieves knew that Heritage had lodged a complaint. But they could call on gigantic administrative
resources and were very confident.

Meanwhile, the three companies used for the theft transactions were re-sold to a certain Rimma Starova, born in Chita in 1938. [Comment: OK,
so she’s a front, a cover] Why? Because Browder had already said he was robbed, that $250 million had been stolen from the budget. Starova
then says he had bought the companies and that she found out that they had been used to steal, not $250 million, but $5.4 billion and that she
wanted an investigation. And the investigation determined that Browder had stolen the money. The investigation covered for Tax Inspector
Stepanova and charged Browder and Magnitskiy. In August of ’08, two men went a to a DHL office in London and sent off a package (to a
lawyer named Khayretdinov) containing all the original documentation on the companies used in the tax fraud scam, and when it got to Russia,
there was a raid on the lawyer’s office and the documents were confiscated. [Comment: I don’t quite understand the lawyer’s role, but this was
evidently a set up by the crooked law enforcement officers to claim they had evidence of Browder/Magnitskiy scamming the tax refunds] So
the assets being put to use in this operation include, if not foreign intelligence itself, at least some of its resources. All of this took place before
the arrest of Magnitskiy.

It was obvious that the investigators and Stepanova were being protected by someone. Who? Browder has said that “ministers” are behind
this. We know that Stepanova worked in the tax service when the head of that was the current Defense Minister, Serdyukov. And she went to
work at Rosoboronpostavka when Serdyukov went over the defense ministry. Vlast is out to protect these people—Surkov got in on the act when
he threatened an end to reset if the “Magnitskiy list” was adopted. ]


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/khodorkovsky-calls-for-regime-change-new-constitution/553048.html
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos CEO and Vladimir Putin's bete noire, who now leads the pro-democracy Open Russia initiative, has
published an article on the organization's official website in which he calls for a redrafting of the Russian constitution - arguing that the authorities'
disregard for its provisions has plunged the country into a “constitutional crisis.”
“Today, the constitution is just a piece of paper — a supposed symbol of federal values, freedom and democracy. In practice, Vladimir Putin and his
circle use and abuse it as they see fit,” he wrote, quoting as examples the extension of the presidential term from four to six years in 2008 and the
abolition of direct gubernatorial elections in 2004.
He went on to argue that the constitution needed to be amended “immediately” to explicitly mention the Russian people's “right to rebel against
usurpers.”
It should then be replaced with a completely new draft once Russia has seen the introduction of parliamentary democracy, with the cabinet chosen
by lawmakers, and decentralization (with regional authorities managing their own budgets), the article said.
The Open Russia initiative was working on both amendment proposals and a draft of a new constitution, the Meduza.io news site reported
Wednesday.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/naval-blockade-of-crimea-to-start-shortly--crimean-tatar-leaders/553046.html
A naval blockade of the Kerch Strait, separating Russia-annexed Crimea from the Krasnodar region in the Russian mainland, could begin “at the end
of 2015 or the beginning of 2016,” according to Lenur Islyamov, one of the leaders of the Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar representative body, the Lenta.ru
website wrote Wednesday quoting an interview given by Islyamov to the 112 Ukraine TV channel.
“I can't give any details, but I would like to say that we have been preparing for [launching the blockade] using all the strength and resources we
have. The soonest possible date is the end of 2015, or early 2016,” he was quoted as saying.
According to Lenta.ru, Islyamov had mentioned the possibility of launching a naval blockade repeatedly since the start of December.
Ukraine's Foreign Ministry published on Wednesday a statement accusing Russia of “large-scale appropriation of property and natural resources”
in the Black Sea region, referring to two oil rigs worth $353.7 million stationed off the Ukrainian coast near Odessa being towed into Russian
territorial waters.
The accusations came amid uncertainty over the fate of the Chernomorneftegaz oil and gas drilling company, an affiliate of Ukraine's oil giant
Naftogaz seized by the Crimean regional parliament following the peninsula's annexation by Russia in March 2014.
Ukraine declared that it would call on international courts to order the seizure of Chernomorneftegaz assets, to which Russia allegedly responded
by dispatching its navy to help tow away the platforms, the Meduza.io news site reported Wednesday.

See the notes from 14 December.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/angry-russian-businessmen-turn-on-kremlin/553051.html

When Russian entrepreneur Dmitry Potapenko exploded in rage at the Moscow Economic Forum he could not have known he would become
an Internet sensation.
And yet he is not surprised.
"I did what everyone dreams of doing themselves," he said.
Three businessmen — Potapenko, his neighbor at the forum roundtable, farm boss Pavel Grudinin, and Crimean zoo director Oleg Zubkov —
together gathered more than 2 million hits on YouTube with videos of speeches lambasting the authorities. The three work in different branches
of business, but are united in their complaints of red tape, corruption and the deaf ear of the political elite to demands for reform.
They also say they are at the end of their tethers.
"Some take up a gun to shoot officials, as happened recently in Krasnogorsk; some grab a bottle of vodka and go drink; some pack their suitcases
and leave; some sit quietly in prison; and some come out and loudly and say — 'What's going on here? We're fed up!'" Grudinin, head of the Lenin
State Farm, told The Moscow Times.
In his speech, Potapenko, the owner of a carpet factory and several supermarkets in Russia and Europe, slammed the abundance of levies and taxes
and "criminal" import bans on Western produce, introduced in retaliation of sanctions over Russia's role in the Ukraine crisis.
Officials and media have often blamed Russia's recession on external factors and anti-Russian policies by the West. But, "It's not [U.S. President]
Barack Obama who is responsible for our prohibitively high interest rates," Potapenko said at the forum.
The outburst was a rare instance of public rebellion from an unexpected source that exposed the cracks in Russian society behind the sky-high
ratings of President Vladimir Putin and patriotic fervor stirred up by Russian military actions in Ukraine and Syria.
Antagonism between authorities and the business sector is not new, but media headlines have mostly focused on statements from exiled tycoons
and heads of major companies.
Potapenko, Grudinin and Zubkov are no bigwigs. They represent the average entrepreneur squeezed by bureaucracy — a cause that ordinary
Russians can relate to.
With the economy hit by low oil prices and sanctions, Russians' real incomes have fallen sharply over the past year.
At the forum, Potapenko also referred to Platon — a new tax collection system for truckers that has led to the most visible anti-government protest
in years. The company collecting the tax is owned by the son of Arkady Rotenberg, a billionaire and Putin's former judo sparring partner.
For Potapenko, it represents the state's willingness to dig into entrepreneurs pockets even as they struggle to survive an economic slump.
Potapenko has made similar public statements before, and Grudinin told The Moscow Times he had openly complained of bureaucracy and red tape
"for years."
But the overwhelming popularity of the videos of their speeches is unprecedented— proof that their words have found new resonance in society,
Grudinin said.
"Suddenly it's become top news, but earlier no one was talking about it," he said.
"There is a lot of negative energy building up among Russian businessmen," Grudinin, who is also deputy chairman of the Agriculture
Development Committee at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told The Moscow Times. "I'm trying to prevent a revolt."
Though frustrated by red tape, much of the businessmen's true anger is targeted at the continued practice among Russian officials of bending
the rules to their own advantage.
At the forum, Potanpenko said that the officials conducting checks on business were now "significantly worse" than the "exceptional bastards"
of the chaotic 1990s.
Oleg Zubkov, the founder and director of the Skazka and Taigan zoos in Crimea — the Black Sea peninsula annexed by Russia from Ukraine last
year — is facing a three-year jail term for the deaths of three rare Bengal tiger cubs at his zoo after the peninsula suffered a blackout.
Local prosecutors accuse him of neglecting the cubs and say — before the trial has begun — that he'll go to jail. Zubkov denies the accusations
and says it is part of a slander campaign against him to take away his business.
Zubkov told The Moscow Times his troubles began when "unprepared" people were given positions of power in the chaos that ensued following
the annexation of Crimea into Russia. Running a business became a matter of "whether they like you or not," he said.
"[They] aren't thinking about Crimea, about the [business] climate, whatever losses they are causing investors, but only their personal ambitions,"
he said.
Zubkov said his business, one of the first private zoos to be set up following the fall of the Soviet Union, had contributed millions of rubles in tax
money but had been plagued by checks and fabricated accusations.
He is now using his blog, YouTube and social media to draw attention to what he considers is a state of lawlessness on the peninsula since
the annexation — an event that is a source of national pride to Russians.
"Today something absolutely incredible is going on," he said. "They want to put me in prison, take away the parks, I don't even see any prospects
of how to get out of this situation," he said.
"Why would you want to destroy a person who is paying taxes?" Zubkov asked.
The accusations of corruption and pocket lining come in the direct aftermath of a report by opposition leader Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption
Fund that incriminated colleagues of Russia's General Prosecutor Yury Chaika in dirty business dealings with notorious gangsters.
When Grudinin at the Moscow Economic Forum said that many of the top state officials sitting in the audience during a recent speech by Putin,
"should definitely be serving time, as we all know," many thought he was referring to the Chaika case.
Grudinin said he did not know about Chaika specifically, but was sure about the dirty consciences of many other high-ranking officials sitting in the
audience.
"There are people whom I know personally, and have known for many years and used to call me their friend. And I know they take huge bribes.
They are now members of different federal agencies. I know how much they've stolen," he said.
Exasperation with rampant corruption was a major contributing factor in a wave of anti-Kremlin protests that followed supposed rigging
of parliamentary elections in late 2011.
The popularity of Potapenko and Grudinin's protests, right after Navalny's allegations, suggest that sentiments are again running high.
But Grudinin denied they were looking to trigger a mass protest.
"We aren't office plankton that go to Bolotnaya Square and stand there waving white ribbons," Grudinin said, referring to the most famous venue
and symbol of the protest movement.
Official reactions to Potapenko's speech have been mixed.
"Potapenko hit the nail on the head," Sergei Firsikov, a local Duma deputy from the ruling United Russia party in the Kaliningrad region, said at a
forum, the Novy Kaliningrad news website reported.
Alexander Brechalov, a vice-president of the Opora Rossii business association, described Potapenko's speech as "outrageous" and said
Potapenko was an attention seeker with "very little understanding of economics."
During his speech, Potapenko clashed with Vladimir Gutyonov, another Duma deputy from United Russia and deputy chairman of the Duma's
Committee on Industry, who was sat at the forum's roundtable. Mirroring an atmosphere in which criticizing the Kremlin is increasingly perceived as
treason, Gutyonov told The Moscow Times that Potapenko was abusing economic arguments to serve unspecified political aims.
At the forum, Potapenko used a metaphor comparing the relationship between business and authorities to that of a cow and a butcher, who,
"holding a knife at its throat, asks: 'What do we have today, beef or milk?'"
Speaking to the Moscow Times, Gutyonov retaliated and said: "If the cow is not able to distinguish the butcher from the farmer that is a sign
of mental disease."
"The farmer feeds the cow, but if he sees too little milk he is bound to ask the question: Are you going to start producing some milk or are you just
going to shit all over the place?"

http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-ukraine-says-it-wont-repay-russian-debt-due-by-weekend-2015-12

Ukraine won't make a $3 billion debt repayment due to Russia this weekend because of Moscow's refusal to accept terms already offered to other
international creditors, its prime minister said Friday.
The "moratorium" on outstanding debt repayments to Russia announced by Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk effectively means that
Ukraine is defaulting on the debt due Sunday.
It could also jeopardize crucial loans that Ukraine has been receiving from a $17.5 billion bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund.
It's the latest spat between the two neighbors following a run of gas supply disputes, Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula and support for
separatists in eastern Ukraine.
"After Russia refused to accept our offer despite our attempts to reach a restructuring deal, the government is imposing a moratorium on the
repayment of the $3 billion debt to Russia," Yatsenyuk said at a televised government session. "We are ready for court proceedings with Russia."
He did not indicate when Ukraine would be ready to repay the debt. Moscow has previously said it will take Ukraine to court if it fails to pay on
time.
Alongside the sovereign debt, the government has decided to put on hold the repayment of a combined debt of $507 million that two Ukrainian
state-owned enterprises owe to Russian banks.
It is unclear at this point how Ukraine's imminent default will affect the four-year IMF bailout as the Fund recently said it can continue to lend to
countries behind with debt payments as long as the country is trying "in good faith" to reach a deal.
Still, William Jackson, a senior emerging markets economist at London-based Capital Economists consultancy, said Friday's announcement "does
feed into broader concerns that the country's IMF program is now at risk."
He said the IMF's recent concerns about the Ukrainian parliament's decision to reject a proposed budget for the next year and a new tax code could
indicate a "growing risk that the country's bailout could be put on hold."
Ukraine's economy has struggled over the past few years and the country has negotiated repayment terms with creditors, but not with Russia.
In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a debt restructuring, saying Moscow would be willing to agree to payments of $1 billion a
year between 2016 and 2018.
Ukraine turned down the offer, saying it cannot legally offer Russia a better deal than the one it has negotiated with other debt holders.
That deal has seen countries accept a 20 percent write-down of their Ukrainian bond holdings, a move which has cut Ukraine's sovereign debt from
$19 billion to $15.5 billion.
Relations between the two neighbors soured after Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and threw its backing behind separatist
rebels in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian leaders have accused Moscow of sending troops and weapons to the east, a claim the Kremlin has vehemently
denied.
Kiev has sought to give a political dimension to the debt, hinting that Russia bought Ukrainian bonds in December 2013 in an act of clandestine
bribery of then President Viktor Yanukovych who was facing massive anti-government protests at the time.
Kiev-based analyst Vadim Karasyov is confident that the default on the Ukrainian bonds will not mean a certain ruin for Ukraine.
"Yatsenyuk has clearly run the idea of the moratorium by the main creditors and received their guarantees," Karasyov told The Associated Press.
Foreign investors in Ukraine are not likely to be affected, according to Karasyov, "because you can count them on one hand as it is."

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Solovey: Reaching the limits of propaganda and stability (Trust in TV news declines)
Labor unrest
More on Chayka
Frolov on Russia and the war in Syria
Moscow suspends free trade agreement with Kiev
Siluanov says state will sell Rosneft stake next year


http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_13674%2Fall

According to a recent evaluation, levels of loyalty in society are high, but showing a tendency to decline. The conclusion: Stability
can be maintained in the country for a year to a year and a half (Comment: Solovey has been saying that—this study he
refers to is apparently the source of his year-year and a half claim he has repeated). But a week ago, a confidential
sociological report noted a sharp rise in dissatisfaction in a number of Russian regions. The propaganda machine is having a
tougher time with growing socio-economic problems. The “external threat” theme is growing less effective as a distraction…

Here’s a slon.ru report on a Levada poll (not yet on the Levada site: OK, here it is: http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/16/novostnye-
istochniki-i-doverie-k-nim/print/) showing that trust in TV is declining below 50%: http://slon.ru/posts/61321 The number of
respondents saying they trust the TV news is down from 50% in March, 2014 to 41% this month. In 2009, that figure was
79%...85% of respondents use TV as a source of information (5% less than in March 2014)…21% say they use Internet sources,
13% use social networks, newspapers, and radio…24% say they learn about the news from friends…The segment of the
population that less often uses TV as a source of information includes people who are critical of vlast, those who have higher
educations, those who are more prosperous, and people who use the Internet—but even among them, the number who do use TV
as one source of information is no lower than 75%...The number of those who read newspaper has declined from 19% to 13%.
Radio listeners are down from 18% to 13% and only 2% (down from 5%) read journals…Levada’s Aleksey Levinson says that
the decline in trusting TV is a result of a decline in “post-Crimea euphoria.”

Labor unrest

http://www.newsru.com/russia/16dec2015/kochegary.html

School teachers are on strike in the Baykal region over unpaid salaries…They are being joined by 50 stokers (kochegary; they
stoke the town’s furnaces with coal) in Domna (32 kilometers from Chita) protesting unpaid wages…On 16 November, the
stokers threatened to “freeze Domna” and actually lowered the temperatures for a building located at a military post in the town…

More on Chayka

http://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/12/2015/567044e39a7947052ccd32e3#xtor=AL-[internal_traffic]--[rss.rbc.ru]-
[top_stories_brief_news]

RBC says vlast has adopted a three pronged reaction to the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) report on Chayka—there will be
no investigation; a decision on extending—or not—Chayka’s tenure as Prosecutor General (Comment: His present term will be
up in June of next year) will be decided without taking the scandal into account; and vlast will attempt to discredit Navalniy and
the FBK (Navalniy and the FBK are being cast as Western agents; there are also avenues in the legal system that can be used to
attack both)…RBC claims that’s what its sources (described as close to the Kremlin administration and the Duma and Federation
Council leadership, as well as business sources who are acquainted with the “president’s mood”)… “Surrendering” Chayka is out
of the question after the FBK investigation…

Recall Latynina’s take on vlast’s reaction to the FBK Chayka investigation. From the 14 December notes:

[Latynina on the reaction to the FBK Chayka investigation
http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1675290-echo/
Latynina notes that the number of those defending Chayka has been minimal—only four Duma deputies, for instance, signed a declaration in
support of the Prosecutor general… Medvedev (See below) commented that only law enforcement can make formal accusations—and he said the
FBK claims were part of the political struggle and that it’s not the 1930s. Medvedev did not say a word in defense of Chayka, however. Karpov’s
accusations were a “gift” to the FBK, claims coming from a corrupt former investigator on the “Magnitskiy list”…Regarding the less than
impressive list of deputies and Karpov, these are not the kind of people the Kremlin would assign to defend Chayka—so Latynina (like Solovey—
see the 11 December notes) says that Chayka will be removed, but not just now, so as not to make it look like a reaction to the FBK investigation.
The regime cannot react to what the public says, much less the opposition. That’s even though some 3 million people watched the FBK video,
probably including people from Putin’s “nuclear electorate.” And she thinks the main reason for Chayka’s departure won’t be the connections to
Tspakov, but Chayka’s son Artyom receiving Swiss citizenship—this after Crimea became “nash.”]
The RBC piece notes that in Medvedev’s recent TV interview (See the 14 December notes), the premier said that the FBK
investigation was about Chayka’s grown sons, not Chayka himself, and what was vlast supposed to do? Investigate officials’
grown children, even when they are not in contact with one another or live abroad?*…A number of officials state that the FBK
investigation was about the Chayka sons and did not prove anything about the father. Anyway, Navalniy is not an investigator or a
journalist—where does he get off publishing “investigations?”

*But this Moskovskiy Komsomolets piece http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/12/09/tonkosti-chaykovedeniya-skandal-vokrug-
genprokurora-raskolol-vlast.html interpreted Medvedev’s comments as implying that maybe vlast should, in fact, do that.
Unlike Peskov, who initially said that the FBK report did not spark any interest whatsoever in the Kremlin, Medvedev did
seem interested.

Comment: I don’t know—in Russian politics, you have to play the interpretation game. But Medvedev didn’t seem
like he was taking aim at Chayka to me, but defending him—but that’s just from reading his words, I didn’t watch the
interview. One data point to consider—Chayka at one time was considered one of the “liberal siloviky” who
supported Medvedev. Of course, that was prior to Medvedev being weakened by Putin and all that has happened
since.

…RBC thinks the president may express an opinion on Chayka at his annual big press conference, which will take place
tomorrow…On attacking Navalniy: There is a draft law in the Duma on banning the use of representatives of Duma candidates in
debates—the bill is aimed at Navalniy, who cannot be a candidate himself. Also, last weekend, NTV broadcast a documentary on
Ehko Moskvy Chief Editor Aleksey Venediktov aide Lesa Ryabtseva. A significant part of the program was Ryabtseva attacking
Navalniy. She claimed that Navalniy’s investigations were done “by order”—and Venediktov has not refuted her claim (Comment:
Recall the controversy over Ryabtseva. A number of liberal opposition figures have denounced her alleged pro-vlast
influence on Venediktov. See, for instance, the 16 June notes).

Who has called for Chayka’s resignation? ER’s Iosif Kobzon has—and he also called on the Investigative Committee (SK) to
investigate one of the murders the FBK investigation pinned on one of the Chayka sons, but the SK said it had already done that at
the time. Dmitriy Gudkov and KPRF Deputy Vladimir Bessonov sent similar appeals to the SK.

Meanwhile, a court has rejected a Lopatina lawsuit against Navalniy: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/court-rejects-
lawsuit-against-navalny-by-chaikas-ex-deputys-wife/553084.html
A Moscow district court has rejected a slander lawsuit against Alexei Navalny filed by Olga Lopatina, the former wife of one of Prosecutor General
Yury Chaika's deputies, the Interfax news agency reported Wednesday.
"By the court's decision, the lawsuit was given back to the applicant because of its imperfections", court spokeswoman Lidmila Morozova said,
Interfax reported.
The lawsuit against Navalny, his Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) employees and, surprisingly, the company Google, had been filed to the court
on Tuesday, Lopatina's lawyer told Interfax at the time.
Lopatina demanded an investigative film made by FBK called "Chaika" to be removed from public access, claiming it was a hoax. She had also
asked for 5 million rubles ($70,900) as compensation for moral damages.
The film accuses Prosecutor General Yury Chaika's family members, including his two sons and some colleagues, of being involved in shady
business deals and various illegal activities including a murder.
According to the film, Olga Lopatina co-owned a five-star hotel in Greece with Chaika's son Artyom. In addition, her ex-husband, former Chaika
deputy Gennady Lopatin, was linked to the Tsapok gang, responsible for a series of murders in the southern Russian town of Kushchevskaya.


http://slon.ru/posts/61203
Moscow has not got everything it wanted from the Syria gambit—the complete normalization of relations with the West, for
example—but Kerry’s visit to Moscow (See yesterday’s notes) indicates that the Kremlin has managed to break out of diplomatic
isolation…But there are new disagreements regarding Syria—Moscow is blocking a meeting of the Syria Contact Group set for
18 December until a list of Syrian opposition groups that will take part in negotiations can be agreed on. Moscow also continues
to demand a list of “terrorist organizations” that both coalitions can attack, while backing opposition figures that Damascus would
approve of…Frolov goes on to say that Damascus and Moscow are prepared to cooperate with the Kurds, but Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and the US oppose cooperating with them since the Kurds are practically at war with other insurgent groups in Syria
(when Putin recently stated that Moscow would arm the Free Syrian Army, he had the Kurds in mind). In Moscow’s view, the
fact that the Kurds did not participate in the recent opposition conference in Saudi Arabia de-legitimized that event, but the Saudis
have organized the opposition with the intent of forming a group that will negotiate with Damascus…The opposition is insisting that
Assad leave office immediately following the completion of negotiations. A ceasefire would follow the formation of a transitional
government. Moscow is upset that certain groups it says are terrorist organizations are taking part in the Saudi project…

The Russian plan to help the Syrian army and the Iranians liberate territory has not been fully realized (though the front has been
stabilized and the opposition is on the defensive) and Russian intervention is dragging on. The Americans assume that Russia wants
to get the operation over with as soon as possible—but that may not be the case now. The Kremlin is talking about the war going
on for a while. The war is useful—it’s being waged against a well known enemy, broadens the scope for Moscow to maneuver
diplomatically, and pushes the West to revive a strategic partnership with Russia without any concessions from the Kremlin. The
war raises the military’s profile, gives the generals a chance to test new weapons, increases the loyalty of the military and opens up
the possibility of new military spending. Domestically, the Syria operation increases patriotic support for the Kremlin. Public
support for the operation has increased, though 71% still say they oppose Russian forces being involved in ground operations…
Putin plans on fighting on to victory in Syria—he is now fighting “global terrorism,” not just supporting Assad. Russia is gradually
expanding its military presence—more airbases, more antiaircraft weapons systems, artillery support for the Syrian army, new
Russian tanks are showing up there…

Meanwhile, the Americans have dropped demands for Assad to leave and it makes sense for Moscow to prolong a pause in
negotiations, opening up possibilities for bringing in Ukraine…Moscow wants Washington to pressure Kiev to accept the Russian
interpretation of Minsk-2—the re-integration of the DNR/LNR, but with their own armies in the form of regional militias equipped
with tanks. Then, Moscow can formally hand over control of the border to Kiev, but in fact the regional administrations (backed
by Moscow) will be in charge…But it appears, judging by Biden’s visit to Kiev, that Washington is not prepared to accept such a
scenario…If Kiev breaks off Minsk-2, Moscow will be left in charge of the DNR/LNR in another “frozen conflict” –and that
means Kiev’s moves toward NATO and the EU won’t come off.


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-suspends-free-trade-agreement-with-ukraine/553074.html
President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree suspending an agreement for a free trade zone between Russia and Ukraine beginning Jan.1, according
to a document published on the government's legal information website Wednesday.
Ukraine benefited from the duty-free trade with Russia since 2011, when it became a member of the of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or
CIS, free trade pact.
The suspension of the pact was triggered by “exceptional circumstances affecting the interests and economic security of Russia and requiring
immediate action,” the decree said.
The move comes as the agreement between Ukraine and the European Union on free trade zone enters into force on Jan.1, 2016 .
Russian repeatedly said Ukraine can't simultaneously be a part of the free-trade zone with the European Union and within the CIS.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/government-mulls-selling-stake-in-rosneft-in-2016--finance-ministry/553073.html
The Russian government is preparing to sell a 19.5 percent stake in Rosneft, the country's largest publicly traded oil company, in 2016,
the Vedomosti newspaper reported Wednesday quoting Finance Minister Anton Siluanov.
According to Siluanov, the minimum price was likely to be set at 500 billion rubles ($7.1 billion); the Moscow stock exchange valued the shares
a 520.8 billion rubles ($7.4 billion) at 5 p.m. local time on Wednesday, Vedomosti wrote.
According to the report, the finance minister did not name any potential buyers, only hinting that proposals from Chinese investors would be
considered.
The Russian Ministry for Economic Development was "actively working on the deal," he added.
In 2014, the government considered privatizing a stake in Rosneft in 2014, as long as the shares did not trade below their IPO price of $7.55.
Rosneft is now 69.5 percent owned by the state company Rosneftegaz, with 19.75 percent controlled by Britain's BP. Consequently, the government
will retain control of the venture, regardless of whether the deal comes to fruition.
Sent time: 12/16/2015 03:52:03 PM


Labor unrest
More on Chayka



According to a recent evaluation, levels of loyalty in society are high, but showing a tendency to decline. The conclusion: Stability
can be maintained in the country for a year to a year and a half (Comment: Solovey has been saying that—this study he
refers to is apparently the source of his year-year and a half claim he has repeated). But a week ago, a confidential
sociological report noted a sharp rise in dissatisfaction in a number of Russian regions. The propaganda machine is having a
tougher time with growing socio-economic problems. The “external threat” theme is growing less effective as a distraction…

Here’s a slon.ru report on a Levada poll (not yet on the Levada site: OK, here it is: http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/16/novostnye-
istochniki-i-doverie-k-nim/print/) showing that trust in TV is declining below 50%: http://slon.ru/posts/61321 The number of
respondents saying they trust the TV news is down from 50% in March, 2014 to 41% this month. In 2009, that figure was
79%...85% of respondents use TV as a source of information (5% less than in March 2014)…21% say they use Internet sources,
13% use social networks, newspapers, and radio…24% say they learn about the news from friends…The segment of the
population that less often uses TV as a source of information includes people who are critical of vlast, those who have higher
educations, those who are more prosperous, and people who use the Internet—but even among them, the number who do use TV
as one source of information is no lower than 75%...The number of those who read newspaper has declined from 19% to 13%.
Radio listeners are down from 18% to 13% and only 2% (down from 5%) read journals…Levada’s Aleksey Levinson says that
the decline in trusting TV is a result of a decline in “post-Crimea euphoria.”

Labor unrest

http://www.newsru.com/russia/16dec2015/kochegary.html

School teachers are on strike in the Baykal region over unpaid salaries…They are being joined by 50 stokers (kochegary; they
stoke the town’s furnaces with coal) in Domna (32 kilometers from Chita) protesting unpaid wages…On 16 November, the
stokers threatened to “freeze Domna” and actually lowered the temperatures for a building located at a military post in the town…

More on Chayka

http://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/12/2015/567044e39a7947052ccd32e3#xtor=AL-[internal_traffic]--[rss.rbc.ru]-
[top_stories_brief_news]

RBC says vlast has adopted a three pronged reaction to the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) report on Chayka—there will be
no investigation; a decision on extending—or not—Chayka’s tenure as Prosecutor General (Comment: His present term will be
up in June of next year) will be decided without taking the scandal into account; and vlast will attempt to discredit Navalniy and
the FBK (Navalniy and the FBK are being cast as Western agents; there are also avenues in the legal system that can be used to
attack both)…RBC claims that’s what its sources (described as close to the Kremlin administration and the Duma and Federation
Council leadership, as well as business sources who are acquainted with the “president’s mood”)… “Surrendering” Chayka is out
of the question after the FBK investigation…

Recall Latynina’s take on vlast’s reaction to the FBK Chayka investigation. From the 14 December notes:

[Latynina on the reaction to the FBK Chayka investigation
Latynina notes that the number of those defending Chayka has been minimal—only four Duma deputies, for instance, signed a declaration in
support of the Prosecutor general… Medvedev (See below) commented that only law enforcement can make formal accusations—and he said the
FBK claims were part of the political struggle and that it’s not the 1930s. Medvedev did not say a word in defense of Chayka, however. Karpov’s
accusations were a “gift” to the FBK, claims coming from a corrupt former investigator on the “Magnitskiy list”…Regarding the less than
impressive list of deputies and Karpov, these are not the kind of people the Kremlin would assign to defend Chayka—so Latynina (like Solovey—
see the 11 December notes) says that Chayka will be removed, but not just now, so as not to make it look like a reaction to the FBK investigation.
The regime cannot react to what the public says, much less the opposition. That’s even though some 3 million people watched the FBK video,
probably including people from Putin’s “nuclear electorate.” And she thinks the main reason for Chayka’s departure won’t be the connections to
Tspakov, but Chayka’s son Artyom receiving Swiss citizenship—this after Crimea became “nash.”]
The RBC piece notes that in Medvedev’s recent TV interview (See the 14 December notes), the premier said that the FBK
investigation was about Chayka’s grown sons, not Chayka himself, and what was vlast supposed to do? Investigate officials’
grown children, even when they are not in contact with one another or live abroad?*…A number of officials state that the FBK
investigation was about the Chayka sons and did not prove anything about the father. Anyway, Navalniy is not an investigator or a
journalist—where does he get off publishing “investigations?”

*But this Moskovskiy Komsomolets piece http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/12/09/tonkosti-chaykovedeniya-skandal-vokrug-
genprokurora-raskolol-vlast.html interpreted Medvedev’s comments as implying that maybe vlast should, in fact, do that.
Unlike Peskov, who initially said that the FBK report did not spark any interest whatsoever in the Kremlin, Medvedev did
seem interested.

Comment: I don’t know—in Russian politics, you have to play the interpretation game. But Medvedev didn’t seem
like he was taking aim at Chayka to me, but defending him—but that’s just from reading his words, I didn’t watch the
interview. One data point to consider—Chayka at one time was considered one of the “liberal siloviky” who
supported Medvedev. Of course, that was prior to Medvedev being weakened by Putin and all that has happened
since.

…RBC thinks the president may express an opinion on Chayka at his annual big press conference, which will take place
tomorrow…On attacking Navalniy: There is a draft law in the Duma on banning the use of representatives of Duma candidates in
debates—the bill is aimed at Navalniy, who cannot be a candidate himself. Also, last weekend, NTV broadcast a documentary on
Ehko Moskvy Chief Editor Aleksey Venediktov aide Lesa Ryabtseva. A significant part of the program was Ryabtseva attacking
Navalniy. She claimed that Navalniy’s investigations were done “by order”—and Venediktov has not refuted her claim (Comment:
Recall the controversy over Ryabtseva. A number of liberal opposition figures have denounced her alleged pro-vlast
influence on Venediktov. See, for instance, the 16 June notes).

Who has called for Chayka’s resignation? ER’s Iosif Kobzon has—and he also called on the Investigative Committee (SK) to
investigate one of the murders the FBK investigation pinned on one of the Chayka sons, but the SK said it had already done that at
the time. Dmitriy Gudkov and KPRF Deputy Vladimir Bessonov sent similar appeals to the SK.

Meanwhile, a court has rejected a Lopatina lawsuit against Navalniy: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/court-rejects-
lawsuit-against-navalny-by-chaikas-ex-deputys-wife/553084.html
A Moscow district court has rejected a slander lawsuit against Alexei Navalny filed by Olga Lopatina, the former wife of one of Prosecutor General
Yury Chaika's deputies, the Interfax news agency reported Wednesday.
"By the court's decision, the lawsuit was given back to the applicant because of its imperfections", court spokeswoman Lidmila Morozova said,
Interfax reported.
The lawsuit against Navalny, his Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) employees and, surprisingly, the company Google, had been filed to the court
on Tuesday, Lopatina's lawyer told Interfax at the time.
Lopatina demanded an investigative film made by FBK called "Chaika" to be removed from public access, claiming it was a hoax. She had also
asked for 5 million rubles ($70,900) as compensation for moral damages.
The film accuses Prosecutor General Yury Chaika's family members, including his two sons and some colleagues, of being involved in shady
business deals and various illegal activities including a murder.
According to the film, Olga Lopatina co-owned a five-star hotel in Greece with Chaika's son Artyom. In addition, her ex-husband, former Chaika
deputy Gennady Lopatin, was linked to the Tsapok gang, responsible for a series of murders in the southern Russian town of Kushchevskaya.


http://slon.ru/posts/61203
Moscow has not got everything it wanted from the Syria gambit—the complete normalization of relations with the West, for
example—but Kerry’s visit to Moscow (See yesterday’s notes) indicates that the Kremlin has managed to break out of diplomatic
isolation…But there are new disagreements regarding Syria—Moscow is blocking a meeting of the Syria Contact Group set for
18 December until a list of Syrian opposition groups that will take part in negotiations can be agreed on. Moscow also continues
to demand a list of “terrorist organizations” that both coalitions can attack, while backing opposition figures that Damascus would
approve of…Frolov goes on to say that Damascus and Moscow are prepared to cooperate with the Kurds, but Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and the US oppose cooperating with them since the Kurds are practically at war with other insurgent groups in Syria
(when Putin recently stated that Moscow would arm the Free Syrian Army, he had the Kurds in mind). In Moscow’s view, the
fact that the Kurds did not participate in the recent opposition conference in Saudi Arabia de-legitimized that event, but the Saudis
have organized the opposition with the intent of forming a group that will negotiate with Damascus…The opposition is insisting that
Assad leave office immediately following the completion of negotiations. A ceasefire would follow the formation of a transitional
government. Moscow is upset that certain groups it says are terrorist organizations are taking part in the Saudi project…

The Russian plan to help the Syrian army and the Iranians liberate territory has not been fully realized (though the front has been
stabilized and the opposition is on the defensive) and Russian intervention is dragging on. The Americans assume that Russia wants
to get the operation over with as soon as possible—but that may not be the case now. The Kremlin is talking about the war going
on for a while. The war is useful—it’s being waged against a well known enemy, broadens the scope for Moscow to maneuver
diplomatically, and pushes the West to revive a strategic partnership with Russia without any concessions from the Kremlin. The
war raises the military’s profile, gives the generals a chance to test new weapons, increases the loyalty of the military and opens up
the possibility of new military spending. Domestically, the Syria operation increases patriotic support for the Kremlin. Public
support for the operation has increased, though 71% still say they oppose Russian forces being involved in ground operations…
Putin plans on fighting on to victory in Syria—he is now fighting “global terrorism,” not just supporting Assad. Russia is gradually
expanding its military presence—more airbases, more antiaircraft weapons systems, artillery support for the Syrian army, new
Russian tanks are showing up there…

Meanwhile, the Americans have dropped demands for Assad to leave and it makes sense for Moscow to prolong a pause in
negotiations, opening up possibilities for bringing in Ukraine…Moscow wants Washington to pressure Kiev to accept the Russian
interpretation of Minsk-2—the re-integration of the DNR/LNR, but with their own armies in the form of regional militias equipped
with tanks. Then, Moscow can formally hand over control of the border to Kiev, but in fact the regional administrations (backed
by Moscow) will be in charge…But it appears, judging by Biden’s visit to Kiev, that Washington is not prepared to accept such a
scenario…If Kiev breaks off Minsk-2, Moscow will be left in charge of the DNR/LNR in another “frozen conflict” –and that
means Kiev’s moves toward NATO and the EU won’t come off.


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-suspends-free-trade-agreement-with-ukraine/553074.html
President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree suspending an agreement for a free trade zone between Russia and Ukraine beginning Jan.1, according
to a document published on the government's legal information website Wednesday.
Ukraine benefited from the duty-free trade with Russia since 2011, when it became a member of the of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or
CIS, free trade pact.
The suspension of the pact was triggered by “exceptional circumstances affecting the interests and economic security of Russia and requiring
immediate action,” the decree said.
The move comes as the agreement between Ukraine and the European Union on free trade zone enters into force on Jan.1, 2016 .
Russian repeatedly said Ukraine can't simultaneously be a part of the free-trade zone with the European Union and within the CIS.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/government-mulls-selling-stake-in-rosneft-in-2016--finance-ministry/553073.html
The Russian government is preparing to sell a 19.5 percent stake in Rosneft, the country's largest publicly traded oil company, in 2016,
the Vedomosti newspaper reported Wednesday quoting Finance Minister Anton Siluanov.
According to Siluanov, the minimum price was likely to be set at 500 billion rubles ($7.1 billion); the Moscow stock exchange valued the shares
a 520.8 billion rubles ($7.4 billion) at 5 p.m. local time on Wednesday, Vedomosti wrote.
According to the report, the finance minister did not name any potential buyers, only hinting that proposals from Chinese investors would be
considered.
The Russian Ministry for Economic Development was "actively working on the deal," he added.
In 2014, the government considered privatizing a stake in Rosneft in 2014, as long as the shares did not trade below their IPO price of $7.55.
Rosneft is now 69.5 percent owned by the state company Rosneftegaz, with 19.75 percent controlled by Britain's BP. Consequently, the government
will retain control of the venture, regardless of whether the deal comes to fruition.
Sent time: 12/18/2015 09:20:06 AM


WP on Magnitskiy


The polls were conducted in October and November…

http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/17/ekonomicheskij-krizis-i-potreblenie/
57% say they are buying cheaper versions of bigger ticket items (38% in December 2014; 63% in September 2010)…58% say
they are economizing on everyday food items (37%; 70%)…36% say they are spending less on entertainment and vacations or
simply not taking them (22%; 34%)…18% say they have decided not to buy a car, or housing, or land plots (11%; 12%)…9%
are spending savings (7%; 12%)…13% are cutting spending on education or medical treatment (4%; 19%)…6% aren’t doing any
of these things (17%; 1%)…

Is there an economic crisis underway or not? Definitely yes—36% (38% in September; 28% in March; 38% in December 2014)
…Probably—44% (39%; 46%; 41%)…Definitely not—13% (14%; 15%; 10%)…Probably not—2% (3%; 3%; 2%)…Hard to
answer—6% (7%; 7%; 9%)…

How long do you think the crisis will last? (From among those who said there was a crisis underway) 2-3 months--<1% in
October (1% in September; 3% in March; 4% in December 2014)…6 months—5% (4%; 5%; 8%)…A year or a year and a half
—19% (23%; 19%; 19%)…Not less than two years—22% (24%; 22%; 21%)…The crisis will be a long one and the
consequences will last for years—21% (23%; 17%; 16%)…Right now, it’s hard to say how long it will last or how deep the crisis
will be—23% (16%; 24%; 21%)…

What portion of household income does your family spend on food? Less than half—23% in November (28% in October; 28% in
June)…About half—40% (39%; 37%)…Two thirds—21% (19%; 21%)…Almost all of it—9% (7%; 7%)…

How would you evaluate the situation regarding payment of pensions, salaries, stipends, and benefits in your city/town/rayon—
better, worse, or no change? Better—7% in November (9% in October)…Worse—38% (32%)…No change—49% (51%)…
Hard to answer—5% (8%)…


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-will-not-object-assad-ouster-after-syrian-war-ends/553211.html

Russia has no objections to Syrian President Bashar Assad's ouster after the peace process starts in the country, Western diplomats say, the
Reuters news agency reported Friday.
Russia had been repeatedly voicing its support to the Syrian president, but since Western powers, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have agreed that
Assad can stay in power during the transition period, Kremlin has changed its mind, a western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
"And the Russians have got to the point privately where they accept that Assad will have gone by the end of this transition, they're just not
prepared to say that publicly," diplomat said.
Russia has changed its position on the eve of the third round of ministerial talks on the Syrian crisis. The meeting will take place in New York on
Friday. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with the ministers from 16 other countries will
participate.
Here’s more: http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/12/18/russia-calling-shots-nations-lock-down-syria-plan/77548834/
WASHINGTON — As the U.S. and world powers gather again in an attempt to end Syria's civil war, Russia appears to be calling the shots.
Nations meeting Friday in New York and the U.N. will essentially be negotiating a Russian plan for a "political transition," based on the Syrian
government's consent and with no clear reference to President Bashar Assad's departure.
And as they look for a way to secure and enforce a peace that has proved all too elusive since 2011, Russia's recent military intervention appears to
be providing the key leverage. As President Obama said earlier this month, rebels who join the process could enjoy "pockets of cease-fire" where
they no longer face Syrian or Russian bombs. The implication was that those who refuse could still be targeted.
In any event, diplomats from East and West say the chances of ending the conflict between Assad's military and moderate rebel forces are better
now than they've been for a long while. All speak of seizing the momentum of several groundbreaking meetings in recent months.
For the first time, the rise of the Islamic State group has the U.S., Russia and even sworn enemies such as Saudi Arabia and Iran committed to a
blueprint for peace negotiations and a set of principles for Syria's future. These are expected to be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council on Friday,
following meetings among foreign ministers in New York. The body has passed no such resolution previously.
There are other signs of progress. The opposition is finalizing the makeup of its delegation for talks with the government that are supposed to start
next month. Jordan is close to completing a list of militant groups that could join a unity government, and which, like the Islamic State group and al-
Qaida, would be declared terrorists and enemies of all.
Still, "very real" gaps remain, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told reporters this week.
For one, the Russian division of "terrorist" vs. legitimate rebel forces differs significantly from that of U.S. and Arab governments, diplomats say.
And no agreement can be reached if Russia isn't satisfied.
An even bigger divide concerns Assad himself, with Washington desperate to secure a guarantee that he will eventually leave office in a transition,
having abandoned Obama's previous demand that the Syrian leader step down immediately. Russia has spent the past five years blocking any
international strategy or U.N. resolution that would show Assad the door.
Matthew Rycroft, Britain's U.N. ambassador, said these issues and the mechanics of a cease-fire will all be on the table Friday. A Security Council
resolution on the Syrian peace process, he said, would be a "very rare showing of unity" for world powers who've been bitterly divided even as
death tolls have soared past 300,000 and migrant crises and violent attacks have engulfed Europe and beyond.
To this day, the U.S. and its European and Arab allies are supporting anti-Assad rebels with training, equipment and funds. Russia is providing not
only diplomatic and financial cover to Syria's government, but targeting Assad's moderate opponents in airstrikes, according to Western
governments. Meanwhile, Iranian soldiers and proxy Hezbollah forces are dying on the battlefield alongside Assad's troops.
Nevertheless, top diplomats such as Secretary of State John Kerry have found cause for optimism in declarations that all are now interested in
securing a broad peace that would allow the world to concentrate on defeating Islamic State extremists. The group has exploited the war's chaos to
seize large parts of Syria and Iraq for its self-proclaimed caliphate.
The shared commitment against IS has governments believing they can sidestep their disagreements on Assad and other matters to end the killing.
For the U.S., that has meant increasingly vague statements on when Assad might have to relinquish authority and even declaring the opposition's
demand for his immediate ouster — long America's own stance — a "non-starting position."
In many ways, the parameters of the international mediation were framed early on in Syria's war by disagreements between Washington and
Moscow. Russia prevailed in many of these disputes.
When diplomats gathered in Geneva in June 2012 to hash out a strategy, U.N. peace envoy Kofi Annan wanted a transitional government that
would exclude "those whose continued presence and participation would undermine the credibility of the transition and jeopardize stability and
reconciliation."
"That was code for excluding Assad," former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who backed such language, noted in her book "Hard Choices."
But the Russians balked, and also prevented the inclusion of any penalties for noncompliance.
As a compromise, Clinton said she herself put forward the idea of a new Syrian government comprised of individuals chosen by "mutual consent,"
believing that an accord along such lines would leave "Assad and his cronies ... stripped of their authority." The Russians took it as providing the
Syrian leader a veto over any proposal for a would-be replacement.
The plan never went anywhere. After Kerry replaced Clinton as secretary of state, the talk went from "changing Assad's calculus" to something
closer to Russia's position: an acknowledgement that he wouldn't have to give up the presidency on "Day One" of a transition.
When direct talks between the Syrian parties finally occurred in 2014, they never even got to questions of leadership. Yet as the world community
now tries again, the so-called "Geneva communique" is still accepted as the basis for diplomacy.
The U.S. has a lot riding on engineering a cease-fire and jump-starting Syria's transition.
Obama, who has ruled out any significant deployment of U.S. ground forces, has failed to build an American-trained, local fighting force or cajole
Arab partners into sending their forces into Syria to defeat the Islamic State group. While Kurdish Peshmerga and Arab militants have fought
effectively, no one sees their numbers or strength as sufficient to achieve the mission.
The U.S. may have greater luck if peace between Syria's government and mainstream rebel groups holds. American officials hope each would then
cooperate and turn their guns on IS, with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia filling the remaining needs for a ground force.
It's unclear if everyone would be on board, or if Russia would view such developments in its interests.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/black-box-of-downed-su-24-damaged--russian-defense-
ministry/553201.html
The black box from the Russian Su-24 fighter-bomber downed by Turkey has been damaged, said Nikolai Primak, head of the Defense Ministry
incident investigation group, at a briefing where the box was opened, the Interfax news agency reported Friday.
“We can see that on the upper plate, three of the eight microchips have clearly been damaged. That tells us, as one can see, that the flight
information in them is missing,” Primak said.
Ministry officials explained the damages by saying that the black box was stored in the jet's rear part, where the Turkish rocket hit, the RIA Novosti
news agency reported.
All memory blocks from the black box will be sent to the laboratory for fluoroscopy studies to check if they have been damaged too, the agency
said.
Experts from China and India were present when the box was opened. Ministry official Sergey Dronov told Interfax that experts from 14 countries
had been invited, but most of them refused to participate.
Experts from China, United States and Britain will observe the black box data decryption process, Dronov said, RIA Novosti reported.
The final results of the decryption are scheduled to be published on Dec. 21, Defense Ministry officials said at the briefing.
In late November, a Russian Su-24 military plane was downed by an air-to-air missile from a Turkish F-16 interceptor near the Turkish-Syrian border.
While the plane's two pilots ejected, one was reportedly killed by local rebels during his descent. The other pilot was rescued by Russian and
Syrian military.



This is Peskov from a Rossiya-24 TV interview prior to Putin’s press conference (See yesterday’s notes)…There was nothing new
in the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) investigation, which was done on order. We saw similar charges in the summer, coming
from other people. Anyway, the claims were about Chayka’s grown sons, not about the Prosecutor General and his grown sons
are of no interest to us. There are other, more important problems to deal with—the economy, social problems, foreign policy.
The real agenda is quite different… Meanwhile, a Kremlin source is saying vlast has developed a strategy for dealing with the
Chayka affair: for the near term, Chayka is immune. There will be a minimal official reaction to the scandal and no inquiry into the
charges made in the FBK film. The story will have no impact on whether Chayka gets reappointed as Prosecutor General
(Comment: His term is up next June). Officially, the FBK investigation will be cast as an “order” by the West. The campaign
against FBK founder Navalniy will be intensified.

Navalniy ponders the scandal and the Kremlin’s likely response (as outlined above): http://navalny.com/p/4619/ And the likelihood
that it is him and his family who will be targeted…Chayka will remain in his post because it was Navalniy who attacked him—in
the case of the “stupid,” thieving Yakunin, it took two years before he was dismissed after Navalniy exposed his corruption.
Navalniy says that if he were in Putin’s place, he would call in the head of the FSB and hand him over a dossier on Chayka, then
instruct the FSB to conduct a hunt for traitors within the Prosecutor’s office. The FSB would orchestrate a series of media leaks
on the investigation. The Chaykas and their cronies would be arrested, the president’s VTsIOM poll ratings would soar,
newspapers would write about Navalniy using the FSB for leaks…Keeping Chayka as Prosecutor General means taking
responsibility for the protection of the Tsapkov criminal gang. Every deputy and senator should demand a parliamentary
investigation. And anyone not on board with that will be faced by candidates in the 2016 Duma elections backed by the anti-
corruption foundation spreading the fact that they gave immunity to the protectors of the Tsapkov gang…


http://www.novayagazeta.ru/columns/71189.html

It’s because a US federal prosecutor has brought suit against a Russian businessman, Denis Katsyv, in a New York court.
Katsyv’s accounts and real estate holdings in the US have been frozen—his name is on the “Magnitskiy list” of Russians, officials
and others, Magnitisky claimed were making off with state funds under the guise of tax rebates. Magnitskiy, of course, was
charged with that crime himself and died in a Russian jail. Katsyv has been connected to a number of key figures in the Magnitskiy
affair, including Dmitriy Klyuyev and former head of Russian Tax Inspectorate 28, Olga Stepanova (Comment: From what I
gather, Katsyev was laundering the funds siphoned off by the group involved in the tax rebate scam, shifting the
money to overseas accounts and buying assets). But it appears that Chayka’s office will argue that it was Browder and his
group—which included Magnitskiy—who made off with state funds, then accused Russian officials of that.

Comment: Here’s some material from the 8 August 2011 notes that helps fill out the picture—I’ve had to re-edit it to
keep from going off on the various related threads of the story, but I think it will be helpful to those not familiar with
the Magnitskiy affair. I used different fonts then and the style was a bit different, but I think it holds up:

[WP on Magnitskiy

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-us-sanctions-can-promote-human-rights-in-russia/2011/08/04/gIQAunDC1I_story.html

LAST MONTH the Obama administration disclosed it had taken a significant step toward balancing its policy toward Russia, which has focused
heavily on striking deals with the authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev while mostly ignoring issues of corruption and
human rights. In a letter to Congress, the State Department disclosed that several dozen Russian officials implicated in a notorious corruption case
that led to the persecution and death of a Russian lawyer had been banned from traveling to the United States.
That the administration was right to act — and that measures such as visa bans matter to foreign elites — has been seen in Russia’s reaction. At
first, Russian spokesmen issued vague, empty threats of retaliation. Then authorities announced that two prison doctors implicated in the death of
the lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, would be prosecuted. Finally, government prosecutors said last week that they had reopened the case brought
against Mr. Magnitsky that led to his imprisonment, mistreatment and death in 2009.*
Most likely, the new investigation represents another cynical maneuver by the Russian Interior Ministry, which has managed to protect the police
officials responsible for Mr. Magnitsky’s death for two years despite public promises of justice by Mr. Medvedev. The scale of the crimes and the
blatancy of the coverup are deeply revealing of the nature of the Russian regime. Mr. Magnitsky was targeted after he disclosed that a group of tax
and police officials had embezzled $230 million in government funds. The same officials who stole the money charged him with the embezzlement,
imprisoned him in increasingly harsh conditions and denied him medical treatment.
As it happens, Mr. Magnitsky’s employers were an American law firm and a London-based investor; they have since posted voluminous evidence
on the Internet showing how police and tax officials channeled tens of millions of dollars into foreign real estate and bank accounts following the
embezzlement. A special human rights council reported to Mr. Medvedev last month that the case had been mishandled and singled out a senior
police official it said was responsible. Yet the Interior Ministry continues to maintain that there was no wrongdoing — and Mr. Medvedev appears
powerless to act against the corrupt cabal.
Pressure from the United States and the European Union — which is also considering sanctions in the Magnitsky case — could help those in
Russia who want to combat the culture of criminality that has spread throughout government in the Putin era. But the Obama administration’s
action was reluctant; it moved under pressure from Congress, where pending legislation would require a freeze on assets as well as a ban on visas
for officials involved in the Magnitsky case and other major human rights cases. The State Department’s letter disclosing the travel ban urged
Congress to drop the bill, arguing it could cause Moscow to cease cooperating on sanctions against Iran or in transporting materiel to
Afghanistan.
Accepting that argument would mean agreeing with the proposition that the “reset” of relations with Russia means that officials guilty of crimes
such as theft, torture and murder must be allowed to travel to the United States and deposit stolen funds here. In fact, the Kremlin will act
according to its perceived interests in Iran and Afghanistan, regardless of such decisions. Russia will never be a reliable U.S. partner until cases
such as that of Sergei Magnitsky are subject to the rule of law.

Press Release
For Immediate Distribution

Sergei Magnitsky’s Mother Reacts to the Russian Interior Ministry’s Plan to Prosecute Her Dead Son

5 August 2011 – Yesterday, the Russian Interior Ministry announced that they plan to prosecute Sergei Magnitsky for alleged tax evasion. Sergei
Magnitsky has been dead since November 16, 2009. He had been arrested and tortured to death in police custody after he had accused a number of
Interior Ministry officers of perpetrating the largest tax fraud in the Russian history. He repeatedly stated from custody that the case against him
was fabricated by the officers he had testified against. No one has been prosecuted for his torture and death in the 20 months since his death.

"To put a man on trial after he was killed, when he can no longer defend himself, is an evil and base act. It goes against all human morals, and
laws," said Sergei’s mother, Natalia Magnitskaya.

"I demand justice for my son and that everyone who is responsible for his death are named and prosecuted," added Mrs. Magnitskaya.

“Never in modern history has a government been so desperate to cover their tracks that after they torture and kill a man, they prosecute his
corpse two years later. This goes to show what absolute impunity allows corrupt governments to do. There is a special place in hell for these
type of people,” said William Browder, CEO of Hermitage Capital.

Last month, following an independent investigation, the Russian President’s Human Rights Council concluded that 1) the arrest of Sergei
Magnitsky was carried out illegally in contravention of the European Human Rights Convention, 2) the case against him was fabricated and
pursued by the same Interior Ministry officials he had named in his testimonies for the $230 million theft from the Russian Treasury, and 3) he was
beaten immediately before his death in custody.

Shortly after the Human Rights Council’s findings were released, on 14 July 2011, the Russian Interior Ministry rejected the Council’s conclusions
stating that no wrongdoing was found in the actions of the Interior Ministry officials in the Magnitsky case.

For additional information please contact:

Hermitage Capital
+ 44 207 440 1777
info@lawandorderinrussia.org
http://lawandorderinrussia.org


http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/code/799758-echo/

As Latynina relates the Magnitskiy case, Hermitage Capital’s Browder, a green mailer, naturally attracted the attention of law enforcement when
he pressured state companies, blackmailing the state (Though the blackmail did improve accounting is state companies in some instances). His
offices were raided and the documentation needed to trade the shares of three firms associated with Browder’s company was taken. (The three
companies—Parfenen, Makhaon, and Riland themselves were shells used strictly for trading Russian shares) These documents wound up in the
hands of a criminal named Markelov, who figured in one of the cases (kidnapping/murder) of an investigator whose name would come up in the
Magnitskiy affair, Kuznetsov. Markelov arranged for a court to declare that these firms were suffering operational losses. These firms then
approached Tax Inspectorate #28, headed by Olga Stepanova, whose husband owned property in Dubai, among other things…So Stepanova
signed the documents authorizing a tax rebate to these companies of $5.4 billion. The money was placed in certain banks, the main one being
the Universal Savings Bank that belongs to a certain Klyuyev, who had figured in a case involving the theft of company shares in a deal with
Metallinvest. Latynina believes that Klyuyev was the main organizer of the affair. But she also thinks that all of the figures she named were
connected in some way with Renessans Kapital. Klyuyev used to work there…[Comment: What Latynina seems to be saying is that the
swindlers used connections in Renessans Kapital to pull off their operation and that the RK management was simply indifferent to the affair
since it was not their money that was being stolen. That does not seem credible to me—if it was involved in something like this, Renessans
would want a kickback…]Heritage knew what was up and had already lodged a complaint in October ’07. [Comment: What I’ve never quite
understood was what was going on with the three companies—according to Latynina’s version of the story, the law enforcement people who
eventually prosecuted Magnitskiy raided Browder’s office, obtained documents that effectively gave them control of those companies, I think,
and then they used those companies as Latynina described above. Didn’t Heritage know that the documents—whatever they were, exactly—
were gone and that they could be used in such a way? Is that how they caught on to the tax scheme?...] The transactions and actual theft did
not take place until December—and the thieves knew that Heritage had lodged a complaint. But they could call on gigantic administrative
resources and were very confident.

Meanwhile, the three companies used for the theft transactions were re-sold to a certain Rimma Starova, born in Chita in 1938. [Comment: OK,
so she’s a front, a cover] Why? Because Browder had already said he was robbed, that $250 million had been stolen from the budget. Starova
then says he had bought the companies and that she found out that they had been used to steal, not $250 million, but $5.4 billion and that she
wanted an investigation. And the investigation determined that Browder had stolen the money. The investigation covered for Tax Inspector
Stepanova and charged Browder and Magnitskiy. In August of ’08, two men went a to a DHL office in London and sent off a package (to a
lawyer named Khayretdinov) containing all the original documentation on the companies used in the tax fraud scam, and when it got to Russia,
there was a raid on the lawyer’s office and the documents were confiscated. [Comment: I don’t quite understand the lawyer’s role, but this was
evidently a set up by the crooked law enforcement officers to claim they had evidence of Browder/Magnitskiy scamming the tax refunds] So
the assets being put to use in this operation include, if not foreign intelligence itself, at least some of its resources. All of this took place before
the arrest of Magnitskiy.

It was obvious that the investigators and Stepanova were being protected by someone. Who? Browder has said that “ministers” are behind
this. We know that Stepanova worked in the tax service when the head of that was the current Defense Minister, Serdyukov. And she went to
work at Rosoboronpostavka when Serdyukov went over the defense ministry. Vlast is out to protect these people—Surkov got in on the act when
he threatened an end to reset if the “Magnitskiy list” was adopted. ]


http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/khodorkovsky-calls-for-regime-change-new-constitution/553048.html
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos CEO and Vladimir Putin's bete noire, who now leads the pro-democracy Open Russia initiative, has
published an article on the organization's official website in which he calls for a redrafting of the Russian constitution - arguing that the authorities'
disregard for its provisions has plunged the country into a “constitutional crisis.”
“Today, the constitution is just a piece of paper — a supposed symbol of federal values, freedom and democracy. In practice, Vladimir Putin and his
circle use and abuse it as they see fit,” he wrote, quoting as examples the extension of the presidential term from four to six years in 2008 and the
abolition of direct gubernatorial elections in 2004.
He went on to argue that the constitution needed to be amended “immediately” to explicitly mention the Russian people's “right to rebel against
usurpers.”
It should then be replaced with a completely new draft once Russia has seen the introduction of parliamentary democracy, with the cabinet chosen
by lawmakers, and decentralization (with regional authorities managing their own budgets), the article said.
The Open Russia initiative was working on both amendment proposals and a draft of a new constitution, the Meduza.io news site reported
Wednesday.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/naval-blockade-of-crimea-to-start-shortly--crimean-tatar-leaders/553046.html
A naval blockade of the Kerch Strait, separating Russia-annexed Crimea from the Krasnodar region in the Russian mainland, could begin “at the end
of 2015 or the beginning of 2016,” according to Lenur Islyamov, one of the leaders of the Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar representative body, the Lenta.ru
website wrote Wednesday quoting an interview given by Islyamov to the 112 Ukraine TV channel.
“I can't give any details, but I would like to say that we have been preparing for [launching the blockade] using all the strength and resources we
have. The soonest possible date is the end of 2015, or early 2016,” he was quoted as saying.
According to Lenta.ru, Islyamov had mentioned the possibility of launching a naval blockade repeatedly since the start of December.
Ukraine's Foreign Ministry published on Wednesday a statement accusing Russia of “large-scale appropriation of property and natural resources”
in the Black Sea region, referring to two oil rigs worth $353.7 million stationed off the Ukrainian coast near Odessa being towed into Russian
territorial waters.
The accusations came amid uncertainty over the fate of the Chernomorneftegaz oil and gas drilling company, an affiliate of Ukraine's oil giant
Naftogaz seized by the Crimean regional parliament following the peninsula's annexation by Russia in March 2014.
Ukraine declared that it would call on international courts to order the seizure of Chernomorneftegaz assets, to which Russia allegedly responded
by dispatching its navy to help tow away the platforms, the Meduza.io news site reported Wednesday.

See the notes from 14 December.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/angry-russian-businessmen-turn-on-kremlin/553051.html

When Russian entrepreneur Dmitry Potapenko exploded in rage at the Moscow Economic Forum he could not have known he would become
an Internet sensation.
And yet he is not surprised.
"I did what everyone dreams of doing themselves," he said.
Three businessmen — Potapenko, his neighbor at the forum roundtable, farm boss Pavel Grudinin, and Crimean zoo director Oleg Zubkov —
together gathered more than 2 million hits on YouTube with videos of speeches lambasting the authorities. The three work in different branches
of business, but are united in their complaints of red tape, corruption and the deaf ear of the political elite to demands for reform.
They also say they are at the end of their tethers.
"Some take up a gun to shoot officials, as happened recently in Krasnogorsk; some grab a bottle of vodka and go drink; some pack their suitcases
and leave; some sit quietly in prison; and some come out and loudly and say — 'What's going on here? We're fed up!'" Grudinin, head of the Lenin
State Farm, told The Moscow Times.
In his speech, Potapenko, the owner of a carpet factory and several supermarkets in Russia and Europe, slammed the abundance of levies and taxes
and "criminal" import bans on Western produce, introduced in retaliation of sanctions over Russia's role in the Ukraine crisis.
Officials and media have often blamed Russia's recession on external factors and anti-Russian policies by the West. But, "It's not [U.S. President]
Barack Obama who is responsible for our prohibitively high interest rates," Potapenko said at the forum.
The outburst was a rare instance of public rebellion from an unexpected source that exposed the cracks in Russian society behind the sky-high
ratings of President Vladimir Putin and patriotic fervor stirred up by Russian military actions in Ukraine and Syria.
Antagonism between authorities and the business sector is not new, but media headlines have mostly focused on statements from exiled tycoons
and heads of major companies.
Potapenko, Grudinin and Zubkov are no bigwigs. They represent the average entrepreneur squeezed by bureaucracy — a cause that ordinary
Russians can relate to.
With the economy hit by low oil prices and sanctions, Russians' real incomes have fallen sharply over the past year.
At the forum, Potapenko also referred to Platon — a new tax collection system for truckers that has led to the most visible anti-government protest
in years. The company collecting the tax is owned by the son of Arkady Rotenberg, a billionaire and Putin's former judo sparring partner.
For Potapenko, it represents the state's willingness to dig into entrepreneurs pockets even as they struggle to survive an economic slump.
Potapenko has made similar public statements before, and Grudinin told The Moscow Times he had openly complained of bureaucracy and red tape
"for years."
But the overwhelming popularity of the videos of their speeches is unprecedented— proof that their words have found new resonance in society,
Grudinin said.
"Suddenly it's become top news, but earlier no one was talking about it," he said.
"There is a lot of negative energy building up among Russian businessmen," Grudinin, who is also deputy chairman of the Agriculture
Development Committee at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told The Moscow Times. "I'm trying to prevent a revolt."
Though frustrated by red tape, much of the businessmen's true anger is targeted at the continued practice among Russian officials of bending
the rules to their own advantage.
At the forum, Potanpenko said that the officials conducting checks on business were now "significantly worse" than the "exceptional bastards"
of the chaotic 1990s.
Oleg Zubkov, the founder and director of the Skazka and Taigan zoos in Crimea — the Black Sea peninsula annexed by Russia from Ukraine last
year — is facing a three-year jail term for the deaths of three rare Bengal tiger cubs at his zoo after the peninsula suffered a blackout.
Local prosecutors accuse him of neglecting the cubs and say — before the trial has begun — that he'll go to jail. Zubkov denies the accusations
and says it is part of a slander campaign against him to take away his business.
Zubkov told The Moscow Times his troubles began when "unprepared" people were given positions of power in the chaos that ensued following
the annexation of Crimea into Russia. Running a business became a matter of "whether they like you or not," he said.
"[They] aren't thinking about Crimea, about the [business] climate, whatever losses they are causing investors, but only their personal ambitions,"
he said.
Zubkov said his business, one of the first private zoos to be set up following the fall of the Soviet Union, had contributed millions of rubles in tax
money but had been plagued by checks and fabricated accusations.
He is now using his blog, YouTube and social media to draw attention to what he considers is a state of lawlessness on the peninsula since
the annexation — an event that is a source of national pride to Russians.
"Today something absolutely incredible is going on," he said. "They want to put me in prison, take away the parks, I don't even see any prospects
of how to get out of this situation," he said.
"Why would you want to destroy a person who is paying taxes?" Zubkov asked.
The accusations of corruption and pocket lining come in the direct aftermath of a report by opposition leader Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption
Fund that incriminated colleagues of Russia's General Prosecutor Yury Chaika in dirty business dealings with notorious gangsters.
When Grudinin at the Moscow Economic Forum said that many of the top state officials sitting in the audience during a recent speech by Putin,
"should definitely be serving time, as we all know," many thought he was referring to the Chaika case.
Grudinin said he did not know about Chaika specifically, but was sure about the dirty consciences of many other high-ranking officials sitting in the
audience.
"There are people whom I know personally, and have known for many years and used to call me their friend. And I know they take huge bribes.
They are now members of different federal agencies. I know how much they've stolen," he said.
Exasperation with rampant corruption was a major contributing factor in a wave of anti-Kremlin protests that followed supposed rigging
of parliamentary elections in late 2011.
The popularity of Potapenko and Grudinin's protests, right after Navalny's allegations, suggest that sentiments are again running high.
But Grudinin denied they were looking to trigger a mass protest.
"We aren't office plankton that go to Bolotnaya Square and stand there waving white ribbons," Grudinin said, referring to the most famous venue
and symbol of the protest movement.
Official reactions to Potapenko's speech have been mixed.
"Potapenko hit the nail on the head," Sergei Firsikov, a local Duma deputy from the ruling United Russia party in the Kaliningrad region, said at a
forum, the Novy Kaliningrad news website reported.
Alexander Brechalov, a vice-president of the Opora Rossii business association, described Potapenko's speech as "outrageous" and said
Potapenko was an attention seeker with "very little understanding of economics."
During his speech, Potapenko clashed with Vladimir Gutyonov, another Duma deputy from United Russia and deputy chairman of the Duma's
Committee on Industry, who was sat at the forum's roundtable. Mirroring an atmosphere in which criticizing the Kremlin is increasingly perceived as
treason, Gutyonov told The Moscow Times that Potapenko was abusing economic arguments to serve unspecified political aims.
At the forum, Potapenko used a metaphor comparing the relationship between business and authorities to that of a cow and a butcher, who,
"holding a knife at its throat, asks: 'What do we have today, beef or milk?'"
Speaking to the Moscow Times, Gutyonov retaliated and said: "If the cow is not able to distinguish the butcher from the farmer that is a sign
of mental disease."
"The farmer feeds the cow, but if he sees too little milk he is bound to ask the question: Are you going to start producing some milk or are you just
going to shit all over the place?"

http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-ukraine-says-it-wont-repay-russian-debt-due-by-weekend-2015-12

Ukraine won't make a $3 billion debt repayment due to Russia this weekend because of Moscow's refusal to accept terms already offered to other
international creditors, its prime minister said Friday.
The "moratorium" on outstanding debt repayments to Russia announced by Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk effectively means that
Ukraine is defaulting on the debt due Sunday.
It could also jeopardize crucial loans that Ukraine has been receiving from a $17.5 billion bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund.
It's the latest spat between the two neighbors following a run of gas supply disputes, Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula and support for
separatists in eastern Ukraine.
"After Russia refused to accept our offer despite our attempts to reach a restructuring deal, the government is imposing a moratorium on the
repayment of the $3 billion debt to Russia," Yatsenyuk said at a televised government session. "We are ready for court proceedings with Russia."
He did not indicate when Ukraine would be ready to repay the debt. Moscow has previously said it will take Ukraine to court if it fails to pay on
time.
Alongside the sovereign debt, the government has decided to put on hold the repayment of a combined debt of $507 million that two Ukrainian
state-owned enterprises owe to Russian banks.
It is unclear at this point how Ukraine's imminent default will affect the four-year IMF bailout as the Fund recently said it can continue to lend to
countries behind with debt payments as long as the country is trying "in good faith" to reach a deal.
Still, William Jackson, a senior emerging markets economist at London-based Capital Economists consultancy, said Friday's announcement "does
feed into broader concerns that the country's IMF program is now at risk."
He said the IMF's recent concerns about the Ukrainian parliament's decision to reject a proposed budget for the next year and a new tax code could
indicate a "growing risk that the country's bailout could be put on hold."
Ukraine's economy has struggled over the past few years and the country has negotiated repayment terms with creditors, but not with Russia.
In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a debt restructuring, saying Moscow would be willing to agree to payments of $1 billion a
year between 2016 and 2018.
Ukraine turned down the offer, saying it cannot legally offer Russia a better deal than the one it has negotiated with other debt holders.
That deal has seen countries accept a 20 percent write-down of their Ukrainian bond holdings, a move which has cut Ukraine's sovereign debt from
$19 billion to $15.5 billion.
Relations between the two neighbors soured after Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and threw its backing behind separatist
rebels in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian leaders have accused Moscow of sending troops and weapons to the east, a claim the Kremlin has vehemently
denied.
Kiev has sought to give a political dimension to the debt, hinting that Russia bought Ukrainian bonds in December 2013 in an act of clandestine
bribery of then President Viktor Yanukovych who was facing massive anti-government protests at the time.
Kiev-based analyst Vadim Karasyov is confident that the default on the Ukrainian bonds will not mean a certain ruin for Ukraine.
"Yatsenyuk has clearly run the idea of the moratorium by the main creditors and received their guarantees," Karasyov told The Associated Press.
Foreign investors in Ukraine are not likely to be affected, according to Karasyov, "because you can count them on one hand as it is."

Sent time: 12/14/2015 03:20:44 PM


Notes on Notes (Browder and the Navalniy/FBK investigation; Levada on the truckers’ protests; The truckers say
they want a referendum)
Truckers protest near Presidential Administration
Latynina on the reaction to the FBK Chayka investigation
Russian court refuses slander lawsuit against Chayka
Businessman Dmitriy Potapenko on the government’s “knockout blows” to the economy
Stanovaya on Medvedev’s recent interview (Getting ready for next Duma elections)
Putin at the expanded Defense Ministry Collegium meeting
Turkey says its patience with Russia has limits (Russian ship fires warning shots at a Turkish vessel)
Putin-Erdogan summit planned for tomorrow now officially cancelled
Russian artillery in Syria
Kerry to Moscow
Egypt claims A321 was not a terrorist attack
Solovey: Control over the Eastern Ukraine border will go back to Kiev (The Syrian intervention is long term)


From the 11 December notes:

[“Magnitskiy list’s” Karpov accuses of Navalniy of collaborating with Browder on
Chayka investigation

<http://newsru.com/russia/11dec2015/chayka.html>
http://newsru.com/russia/11dec2015/chayka.html

Former MVD Investigator Pavel Karpov, whose name appeared on the “Magnitskiy list,”
has directed an appeal to law enforcement claiming that Navalniy’s Anti-Corruption
Foundation (FBK) collaborates with Hermitage Capital’s William Browder, now on a
wanted list. Karpov claims that the FBK piece on Chayka was prepared after the
Russian MVD and Cyprus police carried out joint searches related to charges that
Gazprom shares (R5.4 billion worth) were illegally moved out of Russia. Karpov says
that FBK’s investigation was meant to discredit Russian officials, not fight
corruption. Karpov notes that Navalniy actively participated in “advertising and
distributing” the video “A Caste of Untouchables” produced by Browder.

Browder’s Hermitage Capital is charged in a criminal case opened by the MVD with
using a front company., “Dalnyaya Step” (founded in 1998), to get around a ban on
foreign acquisitions of Gazprom shares that lasted until 2006. Using the front
company, Hermitage allegedly acquired over 37 million Gazprom shares. The front
company was declared bankrupt and closed, the shares moved to a Cyprus offshore
firm.

Karpov’s appeal could prompt an official inquiry (proverka) into Navalniy’s and
FBK’s relationship with Browder. ]

Now Chayka is saying the same thing—Browder was behind the FBK investigation:

http://newsru.com/russia/14dec2015/specbrauder.html
Chayka made the charge in a letter published in Kommersant: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2876887 Chayka says that
Browder knows that the investigation into the machinations with Gazprom shares will eventually end badly for him, thus the attack
on the Prosecutor General…Browder and his controllers in the US special services decided to use the Magnitskiy affair to
discredit Russia and the Prosecutor’s office. As a result of Browder’s PR campaign, the US adopted the so-called “Magintskiy
law”…

Kommersant also published Navalniy’s reply to Chayka’s claims: Navalniy says that following Berezovksiy’s death, vlast needed
someone to blame for everything and they now have Browder as the all-purpose bad guy. Anyway, says Navalniy, Browder is not
interested in us (Comment: I think he means the FBK)—why does Browder come up in a case involving connections to the
Tsapkov gang? Navalniy goes on to say that he believes Chayka acted a krysha for his sons and their associates and their criminal
activities…

There’s been a reply to Chayka’s letter from Browder as well: http://lawandorderinrussia.org/2015/russian-prosecutor-chaika-
makes-unhinged-allegations-against-bill-browder-offering-no-explanation-on-murder-and-abuse-of-office-allegations-involving-
his-two-sons/

“I’m very impressed with the investigation which went into making this movie and applaud Alexei Navalny and his colleagues for their bravery
in exposing the shocking allegations against Chaika and his family, but I had nothing to do with the investigation, financing or production of
this film,” said Bill Browder, author and Head of the Magnitsky Justice Campaign.
“Chaika’s 7 pages of unhinged allegations that I am a CIA agent who was running a special operation designed to destroy Russia looks like the
emotional ranting of someone who has been caught red-handed and is desperately looking for an escape route,” continued Mr. Browder.
Levada polls Muscovites on the truckers (See the 10 and 11 December notes):

http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/09/moskvichi-o-protestah-dalnobojshhikov/

71% of those who say they have heard about the truckers’ protests say they definitely or probably support those protests…12%
say they are not interested and 13% say they definitely or probably do not support the protests…

The truckers say they want a referendum: http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/activism/m.246892.html They appealed to Putin asking for
a referendum on whether “Platon” should stay in operation or not. The truckers pledged to accept the results of a vote, whatever
they may be. The proposal was linked to Constitution Day in Russia…The truckers’ appeal noted that Article 3 says that only the
Russian people are the “source of power” in the Russian Federation…


Truck drivers gathered next to the building of Russia's presidential administration to protest the Platon tax system, Dozhd television channel
reported Monday.
Approximately 70 drivers participated in the demonstration, along with two Communist Party parliament members, Dozhd reported.
Truckers are protesting a new tax system that levies additional fees on heavy trucks for the use of federal highways. Truck drivers say the system
would erode their earnings.
On Saturday a group of truck drivers published online a video addressing Russian President Vladimir Putin. The truckers demanded that a
nationwide referendum on Platon's cancellation be organized.
There’s a video of the truckers’ appeal to Putin at the MT link.

Latynina notes that the number of those defending Chayka has been minimal—only four Duma deputies, for instance, signed a
declaration in support of the Prosecutor general… Medvedev (See below) commented that only law enforcement can make formal
accusations—and he said the FBK claims were part of the political struggle and that it’s not the 1930s. Medvedev did not say a
word in defense of Chayka, however. Karpov’s accusations were a “gift” to the FBK, claims coming from a corrupt former
investigator on the “Magnitskiy list”…Regarding the less than impressive list of deputies and Karpov, these are not the kind of
people the Kremlin would assign to defend Chayka—so Latynina (like Solovey—see the 11 December notes) says that Chayka
will be removed, but not just now, so as not to make it look like a reaction to the FBK investigation. The regime cannot react to
what the public says, much less the opposition. That’s even though some 3 million people watched the FBK video, probably
including people from Putin’s “nuclear electorate.” And she thinks the main reason for Chayka’s departure won’t be the
connections to Tspakov, but Chayka’s son Artyom receiving Swiss citizenship—this after Crimea became “nash.”
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/moscow-court-refuses-to-consider-slander-lawsuit-against-
chaika/552775.html
Moscow's Presnensky district court has refused to consider a slander lawsuit against Prosecutor General Yury Chaika filed by Alexei Navalny's
Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK), the RIA Novosti news agency reported.
“The lawsuit was given back to the applicant due to the Presnensky court's lack of jurisdiction,” court spokeswoman Nina Yurkova said, RIA
Novosti reported.
The defendant Chaika does not reside in the district subordinate to the Presnensky court, Yurkova said, the RBC newspaper reported Monday.
In response, Navalny wrote on his blog — citing Chaika's tax report that says he owns a flat in the Presnensky district — that Presnensky court is
legally where the lawsuit has to be filed.
“If Chaika lives elsewhere — he is lying in his tax report. If he does not lie in his tax report — the court is lying to us,” Navalny said.
The FBK filed a slander lawsuit against Chaika after the prosecutor general claimed the film detailing his sons' illegal activities made by FBK was
''commissioned.”
On Dec. 1, FBK published an investigation incriminating Yury Chaika, as well as his sons Artyom and Igor, in a range of shady business deals, the
illegal seizure of a state-owned enterprise and murder — as well as a listing of foreign assets allegedly owned by the family.

http://medialeaks.ru/news/0912dalex_potap
Dmitriy Potapenko

Potapenko, known for being blunt, was speaking at the 8 December Moscow Economic Forum. He had angry words for the
government during a discussion of “challenges” facing the Russian economy with Duma Deputy Gutenyov. Potapenko said he
didn’t understand the talk of “external challenges” to the economy—the Russian economy’s problems were all domestic—the
“knockout blows” to the economy were delivered, said Potapenko, by Russian officials. Potapenko had in mind the Russian
counter sanctions (which he called a “criminal embargo” done for the benefit of certain companies close to the state, an embargo
that killed competition and drove up prices), the destruction of contraband (under the sanctions) food imports, high interest rates,
and the “Rotenberg tax,” things Potapenko noted that “Obama did not do.” On the last item, Potapenko’s voice rose in anger as
he noted this “tax” was the third such fee imposed on Russian roadways—there was a gasoline excise tax and road tax as well.
Potapenko went on about the number of administrative check ups on business after the official line was that there would be fewer
(and he noted how much less often such check ups occur in other countries where he had done business), and the line was that
business owners should not be placed under arrest prior to court hearings. Yet the number of arrests had actually gone up.
Potapenko called the “friendship” with China “mythical”—how could the world’ 30th place economy have such a relationship with
the top economy? He added that pressure on business from the bureaucracy was worse than that of the “bandits” of the 90’s. The
article notes that business owners have to deal with 36 official organs that oversee business operations…The discussion between
Potapenko and Gutenyov quickly turned into a shouting match… Gutenyov sarcastically noted that Russian business was, of
course, as “pure as the driven snow,” but spent an awful lot of effort and time dodging regulations…

There’s video of the Potapenko-Gutenyov exchange at the link.

Milov comments:
http://www.facebook.com/milov.vladimir/posts/970296949708647
Good for him!, says Milov, but it’s interesting to note that Potapenko says he is not a member of the opposition. OK, turn it off,
no use watching. And the truckers say something similar—“We are not ‘white ribbon’ people. And our protests are not political,
but economic.” But those words about not being an opposition came from the lips of one who has been part of “Anti-Maydan”
and was on the Rodina electoral list (Comment: He’s referring to Aleksandr Kotov, who was reportedly offered a Duma
seat in return for accepting a compromise on “Platon.” See the notes from 28 and 29 November and 7 December)…


http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=19374
On 11 December, Medvedev gave an interview to NTV, Channel 1, Rossiya TV, Dozhd, and RBK—and Stanovaya notes that
regarding the economic situation, Putin and Medvedev seemed to have switched places. Stanovaya says that the interview did not
appear in influential print media—Kommersant and Vedomosti, for instance—and Medvedev is no longer playing the role he did
previously, when he wrote about combating the crisis and came across as more concerned about the crisis than Putin, who played
up positive indicators. Now Medvedev is the advocate for decisions already made in the Kremlin—there was little content to the
interview. Medvedev claimed that the banking system is working normally [this in spite of a predication by Gref that the crisis
would sink 10% of Russia’s banks] and the necessary anti-crisis programs have been adopted and will continue. Things aren’t so
bad, according to the premier. Putin’s remarks on the economy in his speech to the Federal Assembly were more critical than
Medvedev’s. Stanovaya explains this as a result of Medvedev’s likely heading the ER party list for the 2016 Duma elections. As
“political locomotives,” Medvedev and the ER list have to sustain Putin’s rating. So Medvedev’s task in the interview was to refute
bad news. He said that the government would not cut social spending, that military spending would not seriously expand, that the
economy would grow next year, that Russia would adapt to ruble volatility, that no decision had yet been made on the pension age,
and that there would be no inflation increase as a result of sanctions on Turkey. He also seemed to say that not too much attention
should be paid to alarming remarks by Finance Minister Siluanov—after all, he’s forced to dramatize the situation.

Stanovaya says that Medvedev did not seem to take any position, either liberal or conservative, in the interview. Medvedev
disappeared as a politician and an administrator…Medvedev was on (Putin’s) message regarding Ukraine, saying that the energy
blockade of Crimea was “genocide” and criticized Kiev regarding payment of its $3 billion debt. He said the Platon payments
system would not be cancelled and that the truckers who were protesting were part of the “gray sector.” On the Navalniy/FBK
investigation of Chayka, Medvedev said that accusations were the business of law enforcement—but like Chayka, Medvedev said
the FBK investigation was done on “order” and was political. This isn’t the 1930’s, after all…

We were discussing Medvedev’s “rehabilitation” at one point (See, for instance, the 15 October notes), notes Stanovaya, but it’s
too early to talk about him re-emerging as a political figure or administrator. In his present guise, there is no real place for him as an
independent figure. That’s why there was so little interest in the interview. That does not mean Medvedev has no position, it’s just
that the right conditions for him have not so far been created…


The English version of his remarks:
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50913

A big part of his 11 December speech was on Syria:

I would like to begin today’s annual expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board with an issue that is at the focus of the entire world, our
society, and of course, our Armed Forces. I’ll start with the events in Syria.
You know what prompted our decision to provide military assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic and begin active efforts in that country against
international terrorism. Militants, including citizens of Russia and CIS countries, gained a strong foothold in Syria. Their plans were clear:
to consolidate their position and expand into new regions.
The actions of our Armed Forces were synchronised with the efforts of our law enforcement agencies and special services operating in Russia. You
have seen that the FSB bodies have been uncovering virtually throughout the country secret cells of various terrorist organisations, including
the notorious ISIS. Russian nationals, and not only from the North Caucasus, but also from other regions, representatives of various ethnic groups,
not only actively take part in open combat, but also flaunt their participation in punitive actions. All this is a direct threat to Russia, and our troops
in Syria are first and foremost defending their country.
Our actions were not dictated by some incomprehensible abstract geopolitical interests, by the desire to test new weapons systems, which in itself
is also important. But that is beside the point. The main objective is to prevent a threat to the Russian Federation itself.
Over the course of two and a half months, the aviation taskforce and Caspian Flotilla ships made massive strikes against the terrorists. In addition,
starting on November 17, the operation involved long-range aircraft as well, and a few days ago, as you know, the Rostov-on-Don submarine,
which is in the Mediterranean Sea, also struck a blow against terrorist infrastructure.
I will not name specific figures now; the Defence Minister will tell us about them. I’ll say what’s most important: the comprehensive application
of force by our aircraft and Navy, as well as the use of high-precision weapons systems, has allowed us to do serious damage to terrorist
infrastructure, thereby allowing us to qualitatively change the situation in Syria.
I will particularly note that the work by our aviation group helps unite the efforts of Syrian government forces and the Free Syrian Army. Currently,
its different units have over 5,000 people, and just like the regular forces, they are conducting offensive operations against terrorists
in the provinces of Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Raqqa. In addition, we support them from the air, same as we do with the Syrian army, assisting them
with weapons, ammunition and materials.
Overall, the actions of the Russian forces in Syria deserve a highly positive assessment. This is the result of work by experts in the Defence
Ministry, General Staff officers, pilots and the Navy.
I want to once again thank participants in the operation for their bravery and professionalism. We will always remember our comrades in arms who
died while fulfilling their duties in the fight against terror.
I want to warn those who will try to organise any sort of provocations against our service members in the future. We have already taken additional
measures to provide security to Russian service members and air bases. They are reinforced through new air units and means of air defence. All
actions by strike aircraft are conducted under fighter cover. My order is to act harshly. Any targets threatening the Russian group or our
infrastructure on the ground should be destroyed immediately.
At the same time, it is important to develop cooperation with all states that are truly interested in eliminating terrorists. I am referring to contacts
on ensuring safety for flights with the Israeli Air Force control centre and the coalition forces headed by the United States.

On re-armament and strategic forces:

Second, it is imperative to continue the technical re-equipment of the army and navy, building on the positive trends that have been achieved
in implementing the state armament programme. I am asking you to thoroughly monitor spending allocated within the framework of the state
defence order and effectively use the new financial monitoring system to achieve this.
I have already said this many times and want to repeat it again: we have no excess funding, and everything that has been planned must be
implemented according to the deadlines indicated in our plans and within the framework of the budgetary funding allocated earlier. Naturally,
regular, high-quality work must be organised among the troops for military training with the use of the latest equipment.
Third, key attention should be given to strengthening the combat potential of our strategic nuclear forces and implementing space defence
programmes. In accordance with our plans, we need to equip all the components of our nuclear triad with new arms, increase the efficacy of missile
attack warning systems and air and space defence. In addition, it is imperative to develop infrastructure for equipping our strategic nuclear forces.
I am referring to the positional areas of the Strategic Missile Forces, stationing sites for strategic subsurface launch platforms and long-range
aviation airfields.

http://news.yahoo.com/turkey-says-patience-russia-limit-newspaper-083822885.html

.
View photo
Russia's diesel-electric submarine Rostov-on-Don is escorted by a Turkish Navy Coast Guard boat as …
ROME (Reuters) - Turkey's foreign minister said Ankara's patience with Russia "has a limit" after Moscow's "exaggerated" reaction to a weekend
naval incident between the two countries, an Italian newspaper reported on Monday.
A Russian destroyer fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel in the Aegean on Sunday to avoid a collision and summoned the Turkish military
attache over the incident.
"Ours was only a fishing boat, it seems to me that the reaction of the Russian naval ship was exaggerated," Mevlut Cavusoglu told Italian daily
Corriere della Sera in an interview.
"Russia and Turkey certainly have to re-establish the relations of trust that we have always had, but our patience has a limit," Cavusoglu said.
The incident is likely to heighten tensions between the two nations who are at odds over Syria and Turkey's downing of a Russian warplane last
month.
Cavusoglu said Russia had already "put itself in a ridiculous position" with accusations by its President Vladimir Putin that Turkey had shot down
the jet to protect oil supplies from Islamic State.
"No-one believed it" he said.
He also criticized Russia's military intervention in Syria, saying it was aimed at propping up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, not combating
Islamic State.
"Unfortunately Russia is not in Syria to fight terrorists," he said, adding that only 8 percent of its air strikes had been aimed at Islamic State while 92
percent were against other groups hostile to Assad.
Cavusoglu also said air strikes were not sufficient to defeat Islamic State and soldiers on the ground were necessary, according to the interview.

http://news.yahoo.com/planned-putin-erdogan-summit-russia-canceled-says-kremlin-105053104.html
A bilateral summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Tayyip Erdogan planned for Dec. 15 in St. Petersburg will
not now happen, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday.
The summit was agreed upon during a meeting between the two men in Turkey on the sidelines of a G-20 summit last month which predated
Ankara's shooting down of a Russian military jet near the Syrian-Turkish border.
"It won't happen, it's not planned," Peskov said of the summit when asked about it by reporters on Monday…


http://theweek.com/articles/593126/russia-bringing-big-guns-syria-literally

The Russian army is literally bringing its big guns to the war in Syria. U.S. military analysts said the decision to add artillery to the battlefield
indicates a number of key developments, including the Kremlin's growing influence in planning and executing Syrian military operations.
It could be a sign that Russia is dedicated to a conventional ground war — not just air strikes — in support of Syrian leader Bashar Al Assad, a
staunch ally long supported by Moscow.
Since at least October, Russia fielded heavy artillery units near the cities of Homs and Hama, pounding targets there, according to a top U.S. State
Department official. However, most of Russia's firepower was at Latakia air base in western Syria until recently.
The Russian decision to move artillery to the front lines is a newer development. Officially, Moscow denies that it has ground forces engaged in
military operations in Syria.
There's certainly Russian influence within the Syrian army … and lots of guns.
Gen. Ali Ayoub, the Syrian army's chief of staff, made a brief televised statement last month declaring the launch of a broad ground offensive that
would be coordinated with Russia's air campaign. He said the attack would include newly formed ground units including a "4th Assault Corps."
In an article in OE Watch, a magazine published by the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, analysts noted that pro-Assad media quickly
hailed the new strategy.
The article quoted the pro-Hezbollah Al Hadath News. "The (Syrian) forward forces are supported by mortar cover and artillery regiments behind
the support lines, as well as aerial cover from the Russian Sukhois," Al Hadath stated.
"The Syrian army surge is proof of a new tactical military model, spiced with Russian flavors and led by the Sukhois from above, and which also
includes greater use of artillery batteries," the article continued.
According to OE Watch, there is conflicting information about the composition and manpower of the 4th Assault Corps. But its formation could
herald a new direction for the Syrian military and its battle against anti-Assad rebels, including a shift toward reliance on conventional forces and
artillery.
Russian military doctrine places far more emphasis on artillery than Western armies. In Ukraine, both Kiev and Kremlin-backed separatists make
liberal use of artillery owing in part to their shared Soviet lineage.
Before the war in Syria, Assad's howitzer arsenal was universally Soviet and Russian in origin. The Syrian army could depend on thousands of
static and self-propelled guns. Since the conflict, Moscow has further beefed up Assad's artillery with more advanced 152-millimeter MTSA-B
guns, BM-27 Uragan and BM-30 Smerch rocket launchers.
"Due to the Syrian army's strong reliance upon artillery, it is unsurprisingly that providing artillery assets is one way that Russia is attempting to
bolster the Assad regime," OE Watch noted. "Perhaps what is surprising is the types of artillery systems that are being provided."
The deadliest of all may be the TOS-1A Solnitsa rocket launcher, which was spotted on video launching its warheads in Latakia. Mounted on a T-72
tank chassis, the TOS-1A can fire 30 220-millimeter thermobaric or incendiary rockets in a single salvo.
"The resultant explosion — which is usually much larger than an equivalent weight of conventional ordnance — creates a massive high
temperature blast and a high-pressure shock wave," Dave Majumdar wrote at The National Interest. "Those who are in the affected area — who are
not immediately incinerated — die when the overpressure destroys their lungs."
In Syria, the increased use of artillery could also indicate a shift away from military operations organized around insurgent forces recruited by Iran
to a different military model that relies on Russian organization.
"Moscow is convinced of the need to strengthen conventional Syrian military forces and institutions and decrease the role of militias and the
regime's dependence on Iran," journalist Ibahim Hamidi wrote in Al Hayat, one of the mostly widely read Arab newspapers in the region.
One Russian military analyst believes the renewed emphasis on artillery made a major difference in the fight against anti-Assad rebels.
In a recent interview on a Russian news program, Konstantin Syvkov said more than 300 artillery pieces concentrated on a half-mile line outside of
Hama produced a so-called "fire wave" that greatly aided the Syrian offensive at first. "This method consumes a lot of ammunition, but it is very
effective in getting through fortifications," Syvkov said. "This allowed the breakthrough via the enemy defenses."
The biggest problem was the Syrians ran out of ammunition, including artillery shells supplied by the Russians, he said.
Reuters also recently reported that Russia might have at least one artillery brigade armed with howitzers operating in an area between the cities of
Homs and Damascus.
Russian state television footage of a briefing at the defense ministry headquarters on Nov. 18 for Pres. Vladimir Putin briefly showed a map that
revealed the position of the Russian army's 120th Artillery Brigade, according to a sharp-eyed military affairs blogger who spotted the position
pinpointed on the chart.
In response to the claim, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, "In Syria there is a technical contingent linked with carrying out the Russian air
force operation. There are no ground forces there and Russian soldiers are not carrying out a ground operation. The president has said that many
times."
Russia has conducted air strikes in Syria since Sept. 30, including hundreds of attacks by fighter-bombers and missiles. Moscow insists it is hitting
Islamic State targets as part of its anti-terrorism operation.
However, U.S. officials say that up to 90 percent of Russia's targets are so-called moderate rebel groups that oppose the Assad government,
including some that have been trained and supplied with arms by the United States.
Human rights groups say targets including marketplaces and mosques have been hit by Russian firepower, producing mounting civilian casualties.
Kerry to Moscow

http://news.yahoo.com/kerry-explore-assads-future-syria-peace-process-kremlin-175547825.html

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will use talks in Moscow on Tuesday to try to narrow differences with Russian leader Vladimir Putin over the role
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any political transition, a senior State Department official said on Monday.
He will seek to prepare the ground for a third round of talks of world powers on Syria amid doubts over whether a meeting pencilled in for Friday in
New York will go ahead.
Russia's foreign ministry said late on Monday that Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had agreed in a phone call on the need for
specific preconditions to be met before any new meeting, throwing its timing into doubt.
Russia is one of Assad's staunchest allies and launched a campaign of air strikes to support his forces against insurgents on Sept. 30. It says only
the Syrian people and not external powers should decide his political fate.
Speaking in Paris before Kerry visits Moscow on Tuesday, the State Department official said Kerry would raise concerns about Russia's continued
bombing of Syrian opposition forces instead of Islamic State militants, an approach likely to anger Moscow.
Ahead of the talks, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement criticising U.S. policy on Syria, complaining that Washington was not ready to
fully cooperate in the struggle against Islamic State militants and needed to rethink its policy of "dividing terrorists into good and bad ones".
Kerry's meeting with Putin follows a meeting last week in Riyadh which agreed to unite a number of opposition groups excluding Islamic State to
negotiate with Damascus in Syrian peace talks.
While Kerry said there were still "kinks" that needed to be worked out on the plan to unite the opposition groups, the Kremlin rejected the outcome
of the Riyadh meeting, saying it had no right to speak on behalf of the entire Syrian opposition.
Assad himself appeared to cast doubt on the very idea of peace talks last Friday, saying he would not negotiate with armed groups that he said
were backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The opposition groups said Assad should leave power at the start of a transitional period.
NO DEALS ON UKRAINE
"We don't have a full meeting of the minds yet (on Assad), we will talk about some of the details of a transition...in the hopes of narrowing the
differences between us," a senior State Department official told reporters.
While in Paris on Monday, Kerry met with counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan as he prepared for the Moscow talks.
His talks with Putin, and a lengthier meeting in the morning with Lavrov, will delve deeper into details of a planned Jan. 1 ceasefire in Syria, as well
as recent statements by Russia on supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which has been fighting Russian- and Iranian-backed government
forces.
"We'll be interested to hear what the Russians have in mind there, given the Free Syrian Army's concern about how Assad has been treating his
own people," the official added.
Russia has given mixed messages on the FSA with news agencies on Monday quoting Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian army's general
staff, as saying his country was providing it with weapons, ammunition and material support, and a top Kremlin aide later saying there was no such
arrangement.
FSA rebels fighting Assad's forces in western Syria denied receiving any support from the Russian air force, saying on the contrary it continued to
bomb them.
White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Kerry will encourage continued efforts by Russia to de-escalate tensions with Turkey after it shot down
a Russian military plane near the Syria border on Nov. 24.
"We haven't seen any tangible escalation at this point," Earnest said at a news briefing. "So that's, you know, a glimmer of optimism in that
situation."
Kerry, during his meetings, will also underscore the importance of implementing the Minsk peace accords on Ukraine and plans for free and fair
elections in eastern Ukraine.
Despite cooperation with Russia on a political transition in Syria, the United States maintains economic sanctions against Moscow for its
annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.
"We have made absolutely clear all the way through this at every level that we are not playing 'lets make a deal here' trading Ukraine for Syria, that
these are distinct issues with distinct paths forward," the official added.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-plane-crash-was-not-a-terror-attack--egypt/552752.html
Egypt's Civil Aviation Ministry has completed a preliminary report and found no evidence that the downing of a Russian passenger plane over the
Sinai Peninsula was the result of a terror attack, media reported Monday.
"The technical investigative committee has so far not found anything indicating any illegal intervention or terrorist action," the ministry said in a
statement.
A Russian Airbus A321 was downed over Egypt while en route to St. Petersburg — all 224 people on board were killed.
Speculation on the cause of the crash began soon after the catastrophe, with international media, politicians and law enforcement agency
representatives declaring the plane downing a terrorist act.
Two weeks after the crash, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that a terror attack had caused the plane crash.

http://vk.com/id244477574

Solovey says that control over the border will gradually be returned to Kiev as stipulated by the Minsk agreements. Russia will
concentrate resources on Syria—the intervention there is serious and for a long time. TV has been effective in diverting the
attention of the people away from Ukraine to Syria…
Sent time: 12/14/2015 10:35:09 AM
Subject: Chayka vs Browder (magnitskiy)

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2876887
Юрий Чайка рассказал, кто стоит за скандальным фильмом
ФБК
В День юриста, 3 декабря, генеральный прокурор Юрий Чайка назвал расследование Фонда борьбы с коррупцией (ФБК) заказным, заявив,
что изложенные в нем сведения "носят заведомо лживый характер и не имеют под собой никакой почвы". Тогда же он сообщил, что знает,
кто и что стоит за фильмом ФБК, пообещав вскоре это обнародовать. "Коммерсантъ" обратился по этому поводу с запросом в
Генпрокуратуру и, получив от Юрия Чайки ответ, решил опубликовать его в оригинале.
"В ответ на ваше обращение хотел бы поделиться следующими соображениями:
Фильм, якобы снятый фондом А. Навального, не произвел на меня сильного впечатления. Хочу заметить, что я не являюсь действующим лицом ни одного
из его сюжетов. Думаю, в этом и состоял расчет заказчиков (уверен, что заказчиком фильма является не сам А. Навальный) — очернить меня и
прокуратуру, не указав никаких фактов, касающихся моих действий и решений.
Я уже обещал назвать этих заказчиков, и я это сделаю. Итак, я убежден, что сам А. Навальный играл весьма скромную роль в этой истории. Все
создатели настоящего фильма известны. Но они лишь исполнители щедро оплаченного заказа на его подготовку. Съемки, монтаж, командировки, в том
числе за границу, озвучка фильма, безусловно, потребовали много времени и денег. Поэтому круг заказчиков сужается. Их стоит искать среди людей,
обладающих большими финансовыми возможностями и при этом ненавидящих нашу страну в целом и российскую прокуратуру в частности,
стремящихся любой ценой остановить проводимые нами совместно с другими правоохранительными органами проверки и расследования. Если бы на
посту генерального прокурора я ничего не делал и никому не мешал, уверен, не нашлось бы желающих раскошелиться на его создание.
Именно усилиями Генеральной прокуратуры вскрыты уголовные схемы финансирования структурами Ходорковского российских организаций и
физических лиц, действующих вопреки интересам нашей страны, ее правоохранительной и судебной системе.
Мы стояли у истоков проверок НКО, выявили те из них, которые десятки лет не проверялись. Некоторые некоммерческие организации, финансируемые
из-за рубежа, работали в полном смысле как разведывательные, антироссийские структуры. Стоило нам недавно добиться запрета деятельности в России
организаций, чьи "уши торчат" за каждой "цветной революцией" в мире, как тут же посыпались гневные комментарии высокопоставленных чиновников
США. Я представляю, что там говорят "в кулуарах".
Разумеется, есть много недовольных нашей работой. Однако заказчиком этого конкретного фильма я считаю конкретного человека и стоящие за ним
мощные структуры. Этот человек знает о наших расследованиях и опасается их.
С 2004 года правоохранительными органами Российской Федерации расследуются преступные схемы хищений в период с 1996 по 2006 год из России
огромных денежных средств. Их идеологами являются спецслужбы США, а организатором выступил гражданин США, ныне подданный Великобритании
У. Браудер.
В результате задуманной спецоперации, последующих действий Браудера и подконтрольных ему лиц в указанный период в нашей стране были
зарегистрированы десятки фиктивных фирм с целью преодоления установленного указом президента РФ запрета на приобретение нерезидентами акций
российских предприятий и незаконной скупки акций ОАО "Газпром".
Сформировав семипроцентный пакет акций (133 млн штук) этого общества, Браудер через подконтрольных ему лиц пытался шантажировать руководящие
органы ОАО "Газпром", требовал изменения устава общества, проведения досрочного созыва собрания акционеров, включения в руководство общества
его представителей, блокировал принятие решений. Я думаю, вы представляете, что могло бы произойти, если бы спецоперация достигла цели. Все
документы, в том числе конфиденциального характера, о деятельности самой крупной корпорации страны через участие в совете директоров стали бы
доступны спецслужбам иностранного государства, американским корпорациям — конкурентам "Газпрома" в сырьевой отрасли. Это создавало реальную
угрозу безопасности государства, его экономическим устоям. К счастью, все эти планы не воплотились в жизнь по не зависящим от Браудера
обстоятельствам.
Все указанные события сопровождались выводом преступно полученных дивидендов на миллиарды рублей в офшоры, неуплатой налогов и
преднамеренным банкротством предприятий.
Криминальным апогеем деятельности группировки У. Браудера стала реализация схемы хищения более 5 млрд рублей из российского бюджета,
ответственность за которую он всячески пытается переложить на российских чиновников.
Российским судом У. Браудер признан виновным в совершении налоговых преступлений и заочно приговорен к девяти годам лишения свободы.
Расследование иных совершенных им и его соучастниками преступлений продолжается. По делу была образована мощная следственная группа, ее работа
заметно активизирована. Следствие проводится сразу в нескольких странах. Его результаты однозначно будут иметь для У. Браудера крайне нежелательные
последствия — и не только для него.
Понимая это, Браудер предпринимает все возможные меры по нейтрализации возникающих угроз. Средства и способы достижения данной цели для него
привычные — угрозы, шантаж, дискредитация лиц, проводящих расследование. Как раз с этим мы сейчас и столкнулись, но обо всем по порядку.
Первое. Вся криминальная деятельность Браудера в России сопровождалась чередой загадочных смертей людей из его окружения, происшедших после
начала расследования в нашей стране совершенных им преступлений. Так, в течение непродолжительного времени скоропостижно скончались
представитель кипрских компаний Браудера Гасанов и номинальный директор одного из вовлеченных в преступную схему обществ Курочкин. Вслед за
этим при странных обстоятельствах при падении с 16-го этажа новостройки погибает Коробейников — владелец банка, использовавшегося в хищении
средств. Именно уход из жизни нескольких людей, чьи показания о деятельности Браудера могли быть интересны следствию, вынудил еще двоих его
соучастников, опасавшихся за свою жизнь, выехать из Украины, где они скрывались, явиться с повинной в российские правоохранительные органы и
дать признательные показания, в том числе об участии Браудера в совершении преступлений. По каждому из случаев смерти вышеназванных лиц в
настоящее время возбуждены уголовные дела об убийствах.
Второе. На определенной стадии расследования в России преступлений Браудера последний понимает, что все для него может закончиться очень плохо. И
в этот момент в следственном изоляторе от заболевания умирает Магнитский. Браудер и его руководители из спецслужб США решают использовать эту
смерть по максимуму. Для Браудера она явилась спасательным кругом, а спецслужбы США воспользовались трагедией для старта своей очередной
спецоперации по дискредитации России в глазах мирового сообщества.
В ход пошли заказные публикации в СМИ и другие, самые разные способы воздействия на общественное мнение. Манипулируя им, используя присущее
людям чувство сострадания, Браудер преподносит смерть С. Магнитского в качестве расправы над его адвокатом за проведенное расследование
коррупции в российских органах власти.
Я очень сожалею, что умер человек. Однако следует отметить, что Магнитский никогда адвокатом не был, юридического образования не имел. Каких-
либо расследований не проводил и проводить не мог: он в качестве бухгалтера занимался реализацией созданных Браудером преступных схем по
уклонению от уплаты налогов, за что и был арестован судом. А когда он уже содержался под стражей, адвокаты Браудера, определенные им для работы с
Магнитским, путем шантажа пытались заставить Магнитского подписать документы об участии в событиях, ему неизвестных, что приводило его в
состояние сильной эмоциональной подавленности.
Результатом срежиссированной Браудером невиданной по масштабам лживой пиар-кампании стало принятие в США так называемого "закона
Магнитского".
Третье. Все же понимая, что "закон Магнитского" принят на эмоциях, антироссийских настроениях и в нем нет ни одного факта, подтверждающего
судебными решениями, иными объективными доказательствами вывод о хищениях денежных средств из бюджета России гражданами именно нашей
страны, Браудер и его кураторы решили подкрепить эти уязвимые положения путем обращения в суд на территории США. Был обвинен российский
бизнесмен.
И сейчас мы со стороны с интересом наблюдаем за этим процессом.
Нет сомнения, что расчет был на то, что под мощным юридическим давлением государственной машины США будет заключено мировое соглашение с
ответчиком. Тем самым состоится юридически значимое решение, причем без исследования судом доказательств. И таким решением, во-первых, будет
легализована версия Браудера о том, что бюджетные деньги похитил не он, а российские чиновники, а во-вторых, подкреплен судом способ хищения этих
средств, якобы вскрытый Магнитским и положенный в обоснование необходимости принятия закона, впоследствии названного его именем. Кроме того,
судебное решение бесспорно имело бы прецедентное значение во многих странах мира.
Однако в этом случае У. Браудер совершил стратегическую ошибку.
Суд принял иное решение, а именно исследовать в полном объеме все доказательства (отдельно по пунктам) того, что при рассмотрении так называемого
"закона Магнитского" в Конгрессе США было изложено в версии Браудера.
Возникает уникальный шанс в рамках судебных процедур, легитимность которых явно не будет кем-либо оспорена, получить доказательства того, что за
принятым в США оскорбительным для нашей страны "законом Магнитского" нет ничего, кроме лживого пиара Браудера и его стремления перевернуть все
с ног на голову, заменить "дело Браудера" "делом Магнитского" и избежать наказания.
Как я уже сказал, мы следим за процессом, и считаю важным осветить только один, но очень примечательный момент, характеризующий судебные
слушания. У. Браудер, который явился инициатором процесса, всячески уклоняется от дачи правдивых показаний, понимая, что сказать ему просто
нечего. Четырежды он вызывался на допрос и трижды не являлся по вызовам суда. Есть даже видеозапись в интернете, на которой видно, как Браудер
удирает от судебных приставов, пытающихся вручить ему повестку. Казалось бы, от чего скрываться, если ты сам обратился в этот суд?
Одну из причин такого своего поведения У. Браудер лично озвучил в ходе своей пресс-конференции в Лондоне. На вопрос журналистов, почему,
выступая в качестве истца, он тем не менее не является в суд, Браудер ответил, что в этом случае он будет вынужден раскрыть всю свою агентскую
работу за 20 лет. Получается, что он не желает давать показания суду США, чтобы не засветить своих агентов в России. Хотя я убежден, что именно через
них Браудер сейчас и проводит против нас свою кампанию.
А в целом, по моему мнению, все эти поступки Браудера убедительно демонстрируют его страх. Он явно напуган. Причем боится не только за себя, но и
за очень влиятельных людей, стоящих за ним.
Приведенные мною сведения о преступной деятельности Браудера далеко не полный перечень тех, которыми располагают российские правоохранительные
органы. Пока что в интересах следствия всего мы раскрывать не будем.
Резюмируя все изложенное, я хотел бы еще раз подчеркнуть, что у меня нет никаких сомнений в том, что заказчиками этого лживого фильма являются
У. Браудер и стоящие за ним спецслужбы. Как весомое подтверждение этому следом за вбросом фильма в России на меня и членов моей семьи
совершена мощнейшая беспрецедентная, оскорбительная атака в газетах, на телевидении, в интернете сразу в нескольких европейских странах (Германия,
Швейцария, Греция и другие).
То, что дважды судимому Навальному не по зубам снять этот дорогой и полный лжи фильм про генерального прокурора России, было понятно сразу
(это, кстати, не только мое мнение). Но вот осуществить интернациональную атаку такого размаха, я извиняюсь, не под силу даже правительствам многих
стран.
И тем важнее сказать о целях всего этого черного пиара.
Цель N1. Дискредитировать Генеральную прокуратуру Российской Федерации — орган, уполномоченный осуществлять международное сотрудничество в
сфере уголовного судопроизводства, чтобы мы лишились помощи наших коллег, без которой мы не сможем отследить конечные точки всех финансовых
схем Браудера, уходящих за рубеж. Дискредитировать сам факт расследования, чтобы мы не смогли показать истинное лицо Браудера —
международного мошенника, афериста, преступника.
Цель N2. Максимально загасить происходящую сейчас активную фазу расследования, выведя из строя ее инициатора, а лучше вообще похоронить дело.
Ну и наконец, есть глобальная цель — скомпрометировать генерального прокурора России, его подчиненных региональных руководителей, вновь заявить
о нашей стране как о партнере, с которым лучше не иметь дело, стране, достойной экономических и прочих санкций.
С этой точки зрения я могу сказать о своей уверенности, что на этом заказчики фильма не остановятся.
Но я верю в справедливость. Я убежден, что проводимые нами расследования будут завершены и виновные будут привлечены к ответственности".
Юрий Чайка
Алексей Навальный ответил на обвинения Генпрокурора
Руководитель Фонда борьбы с коррупцией Алексей Навальный прокомментировал корреспонденту "Ъ" Илье Барабанову обвинения в адрес
Уильяма Браудера, изложенные в письме Юрия Чайки.
"Я очень разочарован. Понятно, что после смерти Березовского российские власти в затруднении, так как не могут объявлять его заказчиком всего, что
им не нравится. Но Браудер? С какого бока возник именно Уильям Браудер? Мы ожидали, что в Генпрокуратуре будут отвлекать внимание и придумывать
заказчика, но я удивлен, что выбрали именно его. Могу сказать, что нас Браудер не интересует, и мы не понимаем, почему при обсуждении связей
родственников руководства Генпрокуратуры и банды Цапков возникает он.
В нашем расследовании есть эпизоды преступлений, которые совершены в том числе сыновьями Юрия Чайки, эти преступления были возможны только
благодаря покровительству самого генпрокурора. У нас нет никаких сомнений, что криминальный бизнес, который вели жены бандитов Цапка и Цеповяза
с женами заместителей генпрокурора Лопатина и Староверова, не мог вестись без такого крышевания. Роль Юрия Чайки совершенно ясна для нас, мы
по–прежнему требуем содержательного ответа по каждому пункту нашего расследования, требуем его отставки и объективного разбирательства".
Sent time: 12/11/2015 08:12:13 AM


Notes on Notes (Solovey on MoD preparing to defend official buildings; Putin/Erdogan; Chayka; The truckers; Putin
and the elite)
Solovey on stability
Blocking web sites that incite “civil unrest”
“Magnitskiy list’s” Karpov accuses of Navalniy of collaborating with Browder on Chayka investigation
Khodorkovskiy charged with two murders
Putin orders the military to get tough in Syria

Notes on Notes (Solovey on MoD preparing to defend official buildings; Putin/Erdogan; Chayka; The truckers; Putin
and the elite)

Recall this bit from the 4 December notes:

[Solovey on stability


Solovey writes that there’s something we need to know about “stability”—in the last six-eight months, the Defense Ministry has been bringing
military units to buildings housing state departments in order to familiarize personnel with places they may have to defend in a crisis…But among
themselves, the rank-and-file say to one another “I’m not defending them…Let the ‘menty’ do it…”]

Comment: A reader pointed out to me that the VK post had been taken down.

Solovey, however, does mention the MoD story in this interview: http://obzor.press/intervyu/12719

He also touches on some other points…

On Putin and Erdogan: Putin took the Su-24 incident as a personal insult. Solovey further claims that in discussions on sanctions
against Turkey, Putin proposed harsher steps than those that were finally taken by Moscow.

On Chayka: Solovey thinks it likely that Chayka will be forced out of his job, but not just now, since Putin does not like to react to
pressure. As far as who might be interested in spreading kompromat on Chayka, Solovey points out that Chayka has powerful
enemies in the Investigative Committee (SK) and the FSB. He also mentions Sechin as a Chayka enemy. The Navalniy film
unloaded a wave of compromising material on one of the most influential people in Russia. What we have to think about, says
Solovey, is whether the material is reliable. As far as its reliability, Solovey points out that Chayka has not bothered to take
Navalniy’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) to court. That tells us something.

On the protests by the truckers over the “Platon” fee collections, Solovey says that vlast apparently takes the protests quite
seriously, as officials and law enforcement have done a lot to block the protests and prevent the unification of the truckers. Solovey
goes further, saying that the protest of the truckers might be the first wave in future protests. Maybe the “Putin consensus” is
beginning to come apart. But he thinks serious mass protests are still a year to a year-and-a-half away. The regime still has
reserves to sustain itself and society is afraid of “cataclysms.”

As far as his claim that the MoD was preparing to defend official buildings—there is a lot of fear, a number of “paranoid
characteristics” in the behavior of Russian vlast.

On Putin and the elite—Solovey says that Russian elites restrained Putin in his reaction to the Su-24. Elites (not only the
economists, but in the “power block”) think that Putin overestimates Russian capabilities and that the country’s economy cannot
support the Kremlin’s geo-political ambitions. But the power system in Russia is arranged in such a way that all the key decisions
are made by the president. Elites can influence him, but there are limits. There is no split in the elite just now and there won’t be in
the foreseeable future. But there is fear among Russian elites, a fear for their own future because of the unpredictability and
irrational actions of the president (Comment: I do not think Putin is “unpredictable.” He is usually cautious, but will take
incautious steps if he thinks he is being challenged personally or is being forced into a corner. Solovey says that the
elite was able to restrain Putin following the Su-24 shoot down, an event he did take as a personal betrayal, so, if that’s
true, they are not wholly subject to his “irrational” actions and VVP does not take such steps without reference to
them. I think it’s true that in theory, VVP makes all the major decisions—but we have seen instances when Kremlin
directives have been ignored or in which one or more of the “Kremlin towers” appeared to act on its own and Putin
had to intervene to try and settle things down, such as in the case of the Nemtsov murder. There is something to what
Solovey is saying, but I think he may be overstating his case a bit). Though elites feel they are Putin’s hostages (Comment:
We have also read that Putin is a hostage to the system, and there is something to that as well), there is also a
“Stockholm syndrome” regarding Putin. So it’s a bit naïve to believe they will move against him. A split in the elite could, however,
take place in the event of mass protests (Comment: That’s my position as well—it would take mass protests to bring about
the kind of split I think we saw happening during the “protest wave”—but the split at that time was not wide enough to
bring about Putin’s departure. I don’t think a “palace coup” is likely without mass protests and the sense that Putin no
longer provides cover for the elite).

On that note…

Blocking web sites that incite “civil unrest”

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/websites-stirring-up-social-strife-to-be-blocked-within-5-days-in-
russia/552570.html
The Russian Prosecutor General's Office is set to block websites inciting ‛“large-scale civil unrest,” “extremist activities” and participation in mass
gatherings deemed to “undermine social order” within five days of their being reported, the Kommersant newspaper wrote Thursday citing a draft
decree by Prosecutor General Yury Chaika on the prosecution service's website.
The decree is set to replace temporary regulations from June 2014, which stated that the office and state media watchdog Roskomnadzor would act
on complaints related to incendiary online content “immediately,” but did not give a specific timeframe.
This has now been set at five days if a case is found “urgent,” and 30 days otherwise.
The author of the proposed amendments, deputy head of Russia's parliamentary committee on state security Andrei Lugovoi, said that the change
was not related to ongoing protests by truck drivers against a new road toll collection system, as the situation “was unlikely to prove critical,”
according to Kommersant.
“Magnitskiy list’s” Karpov accuses of Navalniy of collaborating with Browder on Chayka investigation


Former MVD Investigator Pavel Karpov, whose name appeared on the “Magnitskiy list,” has directed an appeal to law
enforcement claiming that Navalniy’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) collaborates with Hermitage Capital’s William Browder,
now on a wanted list. Karpov claims that the FBK piece on Chayka was prepared after the Russian MVD and Cyprus police
carried out joint searches related to charges that Gazprom shares (R5.4 billion worth) were illegally moved out of Russia. Karpov
says that FBK’s investigation was meant to discredit Russian officials, not fight corruption. Karpov notes that Navalniy actively
participated in “advertising and distributing” the video “A Caste of Untouchables” produced by Browder.

Browder’s Hermitage Capital is charged in a criminal case opened by the MVD with using a front company., “Dalnyaya Step”
(founded in 1998), to get around a ban on foreign acquisitions of Gazprom shares that lasted until 2006. Using the front company,
Hermitage allegedly acquired over 37 million Gazprom shares. The front company was declared bankrupt and closed, the shares
moved to a Cyprus offshore firm.

Karpov’s appeal could prompt an official inquiry (proverka) into Navalniy’s and FBK’s relationship with Browder.

Khodorkovskiy charged with two murders

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/former-russian-oligarch-khodorkovsky-charged-with-2-murders/552563.html
Exiled former Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been charged with masterminding two murders in the 1990s, the Interfax news agency
reported Friday.
The former Yukos CEO stands accused of organizing the 1998 murder of the mayor of oil town Nefteyugansk, Vladimir Petukhov, and the attempted
murder of his bodyguard, Vyacheslav Kokoshkin, the report said, citing Investigative Committee spokesperson Vladimir Markin.
Khodorkovsky has also been charged with plotting an attack on businessman Yevgeny Rybin, in which Rybin's bodyguard was killed and two
other people were injured.
Khodorkovsky, who formally resides in Switzerland, was earlier summoned for questioning on the case.
Since he failed to show up for questioning, a warrant for Khodorkovsky's arrest would be put out soon, the report said.
Spokeswoman for Khodorkovsky, Kulle Pispanen, said Khodorkovsky considered the accusations to be unfounded and would not change his
plans over the warrant.
“He is a free person and is not going to limit himself on any front,” she told Interfax.
Khodorkovsky spent more than a decade behind bars after being stripped of his Yukos assets in what was widely seen as politically motivated
case. He was pardoned by Russia's President Vladimir Putin in December 2013.
Since his release, Khodorkovsky has been a vocal critic of the Kremlin, saying on Wednesday that a “revolution” in Russia was inevitable and
could happen as soon as 2018.
Putin orders the military to get tough in Syria

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-orders-russian-military-to-act-tough-in-syria/552592.html

President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military in Syria to destroy any threatening targets, the Interfax news agency reported Friday.
"I order you to act as tough as possible. Any target that poses a threat to Russian [military] grouping or ground infrastructure has to be destroyed
immediately," Putin said at a Defense Ministry meeting.
He said that his order was a warning to anyone who would try to provoke the Russian military.
Putin's order was given amid media reports of an expanding Russian military presence in Syria. See yesterday’s notes.
On Thursday, the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the Russian air force was preparing to use two Syrian airbases
near Homs to strike targets in the Islamic State-controlled city of Palmyra.
Russian Defense Ministry officials have been repeatedly denying such reports, saying there is no "operational logic" in using additional airbases
in Syria.
Since Russia's air campaign began on Sept. 30, Russia has also been using an airbase in Latakia, in the northwest, to strike targets in northern Syria.
In response to Turkey's downing of a Russian Su-24 fighter-bomber on the Turkish-Syrian border, Moscow had increased its air defenses in Syria,
including the deployment of S-400 systems to the Latakia airbase.
Islamic State is a terrorist group banned in Russia.
Sent time: 12/10/2015 11:39:00 PM
To: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>; Chris Bort <chris.bort@gmail.com>
BCc: acrotto@us-state.osis.gov
Subject: "Magnitskiy's" Karpov Surfaces to Accuse Navalnyy of Collaborating with Browder on the Chayka Investigation (the fabled Gazprom shares)

Следователь из "списка Магнитского" из-за
фильма о семье Чайки обвинил Навального в
связи с Браудером
Оппозиционера Алексея Навального могут проверить на связь с находящимся в розыске главой фонда Hermitage
Capital Уильямом Браудером после публикации Фондом борьбы с коррупцией (ФБК) фильма-расследования о бизнесе
сыновей генерального прокурора Юрия Чайки, сообщает газета "Коммерсант".
По данным издания, бывший следователь МВД Павел Карпов, фигурирующий в так называемом "списке
Магнитского", подготовил заявление в правоохранительные органы, в котором говорится о возможной связи между
действиями Браудера и ФБК. По словам Карпова, расследование, посвященное семье Чайки, фонд Навального решил
опубликовать вскоре после того, как следователи МВД и полиция Кипра провели совместные обыски по делу о
незаконном выводе из РФ акций "Газпрома", оцениваемых в 5,4 млрд рублей.
Карпов считает, что действия Алексея Навального, фонд которого опубликовал расследование о бизнесе Артема и
Игоря Чаек, "не направлены на установление объективных обстоятельств и борьбу с коррупцией", а вместо этого
"воздействуют на сознание и волю людей с целью дискредитации представителей власти".
Вывод о связи разоблачений Hermitage Capital и ФБК бывший следователь сделал из "активного участия Навального"
в "рекламе и распространении" роликов "Каста неприкасаемых", ранее подготовленных Браудером.
По данным "Коммерсанта", речь идет о возбужденном летом следственным департаментом МВД уголовном деле о
преднамеренном банкротстве ООО "Дальняя степь". Расследование по нему активизировалось после того, как
Генпрокуратура добилась содействия в этом от властей Кипра. "Дальняя степь", созданная в 1998 году в Элисте,
контролировалась Hermitage Capital - ее гендиректорами являлись Браудер и его ближайший компаньон Иван
Черкасов.
По версии следствия, эта структура использовалась Браудером для приобретения 37,5 млн акций "Газпрома" в обход
указа президента РФ, запрещающего подобные сделки иностранцам до 2006 года. Однако когда "Дальняя степь" была
обанкрочена, пакета акций газового монополиста у нее на балансе не оказалось - как выяснилось во время
расследования, он был раздроблен и продан. После этого вырученные от продажи акций деньги под видом
дивидендов, считает следствие, ушли на счета владельца "Дальней степи" - кипрской офшорной компаний Serasus
Investments Limited. В рамках расследования был арестован бывший конкурсный управляющий "Дальней степи"
Александр Долженко.
Обыски в Никосии прошли 25 ноября. Напомним, что фильм о семье Чайки был опубликован 1 декабря. Ранее в ФБК
сообщили, что расследование проводилось примерно полтора года. Пресс-секретарь ФБК Кира Ярмыш заявила
"Коммерсанту", что Браудер не заказывал фильм о генпрокуроре "и не передавал сведения, которые в нем
прозвучали".
Павел Карпов ранее занимался расследованием дела в отношении аудитора фонда Hermitage Capital Сергея
Магнитского, который скончался в следственном изоляторе в Москве в 2009 году. Через три года в США был принят
"список Магнитского". В него вошли граждане России, которые, по мнению американских властей, были причастны
к смерти юриста. После этого Карпов потребовал c Hermitage Capital более 6 млрд рублей компенсации морального
вреда за обвинения в причастности к смерти Магнитского.
Ссылки по теме:
Мединский обвинил "АртДокФест" в попытке отпиариться за счет ситуации с фильмом
"Чайки"
// NEWSru.com // Культура // 10 декабря 2015 г.
В Латвии проверят причастность местных банков к "отмывочной схеме" сына Чайки, которую
описал ФБК
// NEWSru.com // В мире // 9 декабря 2015 г.
Медведев "отмахнулся" от вопроса про расследование ФБК о сыновьях генпрокурора РФ
Чайки
// NEWSru.com // В России // 9 декабря 2015 г.
В Совфеде получили письмо ФБК по поводу бизнеса сыновей Чайки и обещают его рассмотреть
// NEWSru.com // В России // 9 декабря 2015 г.
Каталог NEWSru.com:
Информационные интернет-ресурсы
Досье NEWSru.com:
Прокуратура России // Чайка, Юрий // Скандал
Sent time: 12/14/2015 03:20:44 PM


Kerry to Moscow


From the 11 December notes:

[“Magnitskiy list’s” Karpov accuses of Navalniy of collaborating with Browder on
Chayka investigation

<http://newsru.com/russia/11dec2015/chayka.html>

Former MVD Investigator Pavel Karpov, whose name appeared on the “Magnitskiy list,”
has directed an appeal to law enforcement claiming that Navalniy’s Anti-Corruption
Foundation (FBK) collaborates with Hermitage Capital’s William Browder, now on a
wanted list. Karpov claims that the FBK piece on Chayka was prepared after the
Russian MVD and Cyprus police carried out joint searches related to charges that
Gazprom shares (R5.4 billion worth) were illegally moved out of Russia. Karpov says
that FBK’s investigation was meant to discredit Russian officials, not fight
corruption. Karpov notes that Navalniy actively participated in “advertising and
distributing” the video “A Caste of Untouchables” produced by Browder.

Browder’s Hermitage Capital is charged in a criminal case opened by the MVD with
using a front company., “Dalnyaya Step” (founded in 1998), to get around a ban on
foreign acquisitions of Gazprom shares that lasted until 2006. Using the front
company, Hermitage allegedly acquired over 37 million Gazprom shares. The front
company was declared bankrupt and closed, the shares moved to a Cyprus offshore
firm.

Karpov’s appeal could prompt an official inquiry (proverka) into Navalniy’s and
FBK’s relationship with Browder. ]

Now Chayka is saying the same thing—Browder was behind the FBK investigation:

http://newsru.com/russia/14dec2015/specbrauder.html
Chayka made the charge in a letter published in Kommersant: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2876887 Chayka says that
Browder knows that the investigation into the machinations with Gazprom shares will eventually end badly for him, thus the attack
on the Prosecutor General…Browder and his controllers in the US special services decided to use the Magnitskiy affair to
discredit Russia and the Prosecutor’s office. As a result of Browder’s PR campaign, the US adopted the so-called “Magintskiy
law”…

Kommersant also published Navalniy’s reply to Chayka’s claims: Navalniy says that following Berezovksiy’s death, vlast needed
someone to blame for everything and they now have Browder as the all-purpose bad guy. Anyway, says Navalniy, Browder is not
interested in us (Comment: I think he means the FBK)—why does Browder come up in a case involving connections to the
Tsapkov gang? Navalniy goes on to say that he believes Chayka acted a krysha for his sons and their associates and their criminal
activities…

There’s been a reply to Chayka’s letter from Browder as well: http://lawandorderinrussia.org/2015/russian-prosecutor-chaika-
makes-unhinged-allegations-against-bill-browder-offering-no-explanation-on-murder-and-abuse-of-office-allegations-involving-
his-two-sons/

“I’m very impressed with the investigation which went into making this movie and applaud Alexei Navalny and his colleagues for their bravery
in exposing the shocking allegations against Chaika and his family, but I had nothing to do with the investigation, financing or production of
this film,” said Bill Browder, author and Head of the Magnitsky Justice Campaign.
“Chaika’s 7 pages of unhinged allegations that I am a CIA agent who was running a special operation designed to destroy Russia looks like the
emotional ranting of someone who has been caught red-handed and is desperately looking for an escape route,” continued Mr. Browder.
Levada polls Muscovites on the truckers (See the 10 and 11 December notes):

http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/09/moskvichi-o-protestah-dalnobojshhikov/

71% of those who say they have heard about the truckers’ protests say they definitely or probably support those protests…12%
say they are not interested and 13% say they definitely or probably do not support the protests…

The truckers say they want a referendum: http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/activism/m.246892.html They appealed to Putin asking for
a referendum on whether “Platon” should stay in operation or not. The truckers pledged to accept the results of a vote, whatever
they may be. The proposal was linked to Constitution Day in Russia…The truckers’ appeal noted that Article 3 says that only the
Russian people are the “source of power” in the Russian Federation…


Truck drivers gathered next to the building of Russia's presidential administration to protest the Platon tax system, Dozhd television channel
reported Monday.
Approximately 70 drivers participated in the demonstration, along with two Communist Party parliament members, Dozhd reported.
Truckers are protesting a new tax system that levies additional fees on heavy trucks for the use of federal highways. Truck drivers say the system
would erode their earnings.
On Saturday a group of truck drivers published online a video addressing Russian President Vladimir Putin. The truckers demanded that a
nationwide referendum on Platon's cancellation be organized.
There’s a video of the truckers’ appeal to Putin at the MT link.

Latynina notes that the number of those defending Chayka has been minimal—only four Duma deputies, for instance, signed a
declaration in support of the Prosecutor general… Medvedev (See below) commented that only law enforcement can make formal
accusations—and he said the FBK claims were part of the political struggle and that it’s not the 1930s. Medvedev did not say a
word in defense of Chayka, however. Karpov’s accusations were a “gift” to the FBK, claims coming from a corrupt former
investigator on the “Magnitskiy list”…Regarding the less than impressive list of deputies and Karpov, these are not the kind of
people the Kremlin would assign to defend Chayka—so Latynina (like Solovey—see the 11 December notes) says that Chayka
will be removed, but not just now, so as not to make it look like a reaction to the FBK investigation. The regime cannot react to
what the public says, much less the opposition. That’s even though some 3 million people watched the FBK video, probably
including people from Putin’s “nuclear electorate.” And she thinks the main reason for Chayka’s departure won’t be the
connections to Tspakov, but Chayka’s son Artyom receiving Swiss citizenship—this after Crimea became “nash.”
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/moscow-court-refuses-to-consider-slander-lawsuit-against-
chaika/552775.html
Moscow's Presnensky district court has refused to consider a slander lawsuit against Prosecutor General Yury Chaika filed by Alexei Navalny's
Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK), the RIA Novosti news agency reported.
“The lawsuit was given back to the applicant due to the Presnensky court's lack of jurisdiction,” court spokeswoman Nina Yurkova said, RIA
Novosti reported.
The defendant Chaika does not reside in the district subordinate to the Presnensky court, Yurkova said, the RBC newspaper reported Monday.
In response, Navalny wrote on his blog — citing Chaika's tax report that says he owns a flat in the Presnensky district — that Presnensky court is
legally where the lawsuit has to be filed.
“If Chaika lives elsewhere — he is lying in his tax report. If he does not lie in his tax report — the court is lying to us,” Navalny said.
The FBK filed a slander lawsuit against Chaika after the prosecutor general claimed the film detailing his sons' illegal activities made by FBK was
''commissioned.”
On Dec. 1, FBK published an investigation incriminating Yury Chaika, as well as his sons Artyom and Igor, in a range of shady business deals, the
illegal seizure of a state-owned enterprise and murder — as well as a listing of foreign assets allegedly owned by the family.

http://medialeaks.ru/news/0912dalex_potap
Dmitriy Potapenko

Potapenko, known for being blunt, was speaking at the 8 December Moscow Economic Forum. He had angry words for the
government during a discussion of “challenges” facing the Russian economy with Duma Deputy Gutenyov. Potapenko said he
didn’t understand the talk of “external challenges” to the economy—the Russian economy’s problems were all domestic—the
“knockout blows” to the economy were delivered, said Potapenko, by Russian officials. Potapenko had in mind the Russian
counter sanctions (which he called a “criminal embargo” done for the benefit of certain companies close to the state, an embargo
that killed competition and drove up prices), the destruction of contraband (under the sanctions) food imports, high interest rates,
and the “Rotenberg tax,” things Potapenko noted that “Obama did not do.” On the last item, Potapenko’s voice rose in anger as
he noted this “tax” was the third such fee imposed on Russian roadways—there was a gasoline excise tax and road tax as well.
Potapenko went on about the number of administrative check ups on business after the official line was that there would be fewer
(and he noted how much less often such check ups occur in other countries where he had done business), and the line was that
business owners should not be placed under arrest prior to court hearings. Yet the number of arrests had actually gone up.
Potapenko called the “friendship” with China “mythical”—how could the world’ 30th place economy have such a relationship with
the top economy? He added that pressure on business from the bureaucracy was worse than that of the “bandits” of the 90’s. The
article notes that business owners have to deal with 36 official organs that oversee business operations…The discussion between
Potapenko and Gutenyov quickly turned into a shouting match… Gutenyov sarcastically noted that Russian business was, of
course, as “pure as the driven snow,” but spent an awful lot of effort and time dodging regulations…

There’s video of the Potapenko-Gutenyov exchange at the link.

Milov comments:
http://www.facebook.com/milov.vladimir/posts/970296949708647
Good for him!, says Milov, but it’s interesting to note that Potapenko says he is not a member of the opposition. OK, turn it off,
no use watching. And the truckers say something similar—“We are not ‘white ribbon’ people. And our protests are not political,
but economic.” But those words about not being an opposition came from the lips of one who has been part of “Anti-Maydan”
and was on the Rodina electoral list (Comment: He’s referring to Aleksandr Kotov, who was reportedly offered a Duma
seat in return for accepting a compromise on “Platon.” See the notes from 28 and 29 November and 7 December)…


http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=19374
On 11 December, Medvedev gave an interview to NTV, Channel 1, Rossiya TV, Dozhd, and RBK—and Stanovaya notes that
regarding the economic situation, Putin and Medvedev seemed to have switched places. Stanovaya says that the interview did not
appear in influential print media—Kommersant and Vedomosti, for instance—and Medvedev is no longer playing the role he did
previously, when he wrote about combating the crisis and came across as more concerned about the crisis than Putin, who played
up positive indicators. Now Medvedev is the advocate for decisions already made in the Kremlin—there was little content to the
interview. Medvedev claimed that the banking system is working normally [this in spite of a predication by Gref that the crisis
would sink 10% of Russia’s banks] and the necessary anti-crisis programs have been adopted and will continue. Things aren’t so
bad, according to the premier. Putin’s remarks on the economy in his speech to the Federal Assembly were more critical than
Medvedev’s. Stanovaya explains this as a result of Medvedev’s likely heading the ER party list for the 2016 Duma elections. As
“political locomotives,” Medvedev and the ER list have to sustain Putin’s rating. So Medvedev’s task in the interview was to refute
bad news. He said that the government would not cut social spending, that military spending would not seriously expand, that the
economy would grow next year, that Russia would adapt to ruble volatility, that no decision had yet been made on the pension age,
and that there would be no inflation increase as a result of sanctions on Turkey. He also seemed to say that not too much attention
should be paid to alarming remarks by Finance Minister Siluanov—after all, he’s forced to dramatize the situation.

Stanovaya says that Medvedev did not seem to take any position, either liberal or conservative, in the interview. Medvedev
disappeared as a politician and an administrator…Medvedev was on (Putin’s) message regarding Ukraine, saying that the energy
blockade of Crimea was “genocide” and criticized Kiev regarding payment of its $3 billion debt. He said the Platon payments
system would not be cancelled and that the truckers who were protesting were part of the “gray sector.” On the Navalniy/FBK
investigation of Chayka, Medvedev said that accusations were the business of law enforcement—but like Chayka, Medvedev said
the FBK investigation was done on “order” and was political. This isn’t the 1930’s, after all…

We were discussing Medvedev’s “rehabilitation” at one point (See, for instance, the 15 October notes), notes Stanovaya, but it’s
too early to talk about him re-emerging as a political figure or administrator. In his present guise, there is no real place for him as an
independent figure. That’s why there was so little interest in the interview. That does not mean Medvedev has no position, it’s just
that the right conditions for him have not so far been created…


The English version of his remarks:
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50913

A big part of his 11 December speech was on Syria:

I would like to begin today’s annual expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board with an issue that is at the focus of the entire world, our
society, and of course, our Armed Forces. I’ll start with the events in Syria.
You know what prompted our decision to provide military assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic and begin active efforts in that country against
international terrorism. Militants, including citizens of Russia and CIS countries, gained a strong foothold in Syria. Their plans were clear:
to consolidate their position and expand into new regions.
The actions of our Armed Forces were synchronised with the efforts of our law enforcement agencies and special services operating in Russia. You
have seen that the FSB bodies have been uncovering virtually throughout the country secret cells of various terrorist organisations, including
the notorious ISIS. Russian nationals, and not only from the North Caucasus, but also from other regions, representatives of various ethnic groups,
not only actively take part in open combat, but also flaunt their participation in punitive actions. All this is a direct threat to Russia, and our troops
in Syria are first and foremost defending their country.
Our actions were not dictated by some incomprehensible abstract geopolitical interests, by the desire to test new weapons systems, which in itself
is also important. But that is beside the point. The main objective is to prevent a threat to the Russian Federation itself.
Over the course of two and a half months, the aviation taskforce and Caspian Flotilla ships made massive strikes against the terrorists. In addition,
starting on November 17, the operation involved long-range aircraft as well, and a few days ago, as you know, the Rostov-on-Don submarine,
which is in the Mediterranean Sea, also struck a blow against terrorist infrastructure.
I will not name specific figures now; the Defence Minister will tell us about them. I’ll say what’s most important: the comprehensive application
of force by our aircraft and Navy, as well as the use of high-precision weapons systems, has allowed us to do serious damage to terrorist
infrastructure, thereby allowing us to qualitatively change the situation in Syria.
I will particularly note that the work by our aviation group helps unite the efforts of Syrian government forces and the Free Syrian Army. Currently,
its different units have over 5,000 people, and just like the regular forces, they are conducting offensive operations against terrorists
in the provinces of Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Raqqa. In addition, we support them from the air, same as we do with the Syrian army, assisting them
with weapons, ammunition and materials.
Overall, the actions of the Russian forces in Syria deserve a highly positive assessment. This is the result of work by experts in the Defence
Ministry, General Staff officers, pilots and the Navy.
I want to once again thank participants in the operation for their bravery and professionalism. We will always remember our comrades in arms who
died while fulfilling their duties in the fight against terror.
I want to warn those who will try to organise any sort of provocations against our service members in the future. We have already taken additional
measures to provide security to Russian service members and air bases. They are reinforced through new air units and means of air defence. All
actions by strike aircraft are conducted under fighter cover. My order is to act harshly. Any targets threatening the Russian group or our
infrastructure on the ground should be destroyed immediately.
At the same time, it is important to develop cooperation with all states that are truly interested in eliminating terrorists. I am referring to contacts
on ensuring safety for flights with the Israeli Air Force control centre and the coalition forces headed by the United States.

On re-armament and strategic forces:

Second, it is imperative to continue the technical re-equipment of the army and navy, building on the positive trends that have been achieved
in implementing the state armament programme. I am asking you to thoroughly monitor spending allocated within the framework of the state
defence order and effectively use the new financial monitoring system to achieve this.
I have already said this many times and want to repeat it again: we have no excess funding, and everything that has been planned must be
implemented according to the deadlines indicated in our plans and within the framework of the budgetary funding allocated earlier. Naturally,
regular, high-quality work must be organised among the troops for military training with the use of the latest equipment.
Third, key attention should be given to strengthening the combat potential of our strategic nuclear forces and implementing space defence
programmes. In accordance with our plans, we need to equip all the components of our nuclear triad with new arms, increase the efficacy of missile
attack warning systems and air and space defence. In addition, it is imperative to develop infrastructure for equipping our strategic nuclear forces.
I am referring to the positional areas of the Strategic Missile Forces, stationing sites for strategic subsurface launch platforms and long-range
aviation airfields.

http://news.yahoo.com/turkey-says-patience-russia-limit-newspaper-083822885.html

.
View photo
Russia's diesel-electric submarine Rostov-on-Don is escorted by a Turkish Navy Coast Guard boat as …
ROME (Reuters) - Turkey's foreign minister said Ankara's patience with Russia "has a limit" after Moscow's "exaggerated" reaction to a weekend
naval incident between the two countries, an Italian newspaper reported on Monday.
A Russian destroyer fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel in the Aegean on Sunday to avoid a collision and summoned the Turkish military
attache over the incident.
"Ours was only a fishing boat, it seems to me that the reaction of the Russian naval ship was exaggerated," Mevlut Cavusoglu told Italian daily
Corriere della Sera in an interview.
"Russia and Turkey certainly have to re-establish the relations of trust that we have always had, but our patience has a limit," Cavusoglu said.
The incident is likely to heighten tensions between the two nations who are at odds over Syria and Turkey's downing of a Russian warplane last
month.
Cavusoglu said Russia had already "put itself in a ridiculous position" with accusations by its President Vladimir Putin that Turkey had shot down
the jet to protect oil supplies from Islamic State.
"No-one believed it" he said.
He also criticized Russia's military intervention in Syria, saying it was aimed at propping up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, not combating
Islamic State.
"Unfortunately Russia is not in Syria to fight terrorists," he said, adding that only 8 percent of its air strikes had been aimed at Islamic State while 92
percent were against other groups hostile to Assad.
Cavusoglu also said air strikes were not sufficient to defeat Islamic State and soldiers on the ground were necessary, according to the interview.

http://news.yahoo.com/planned-putin-erdogan-summit-russia-canceled-says-kremlin-105053104.html
A bilateral summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Tayyip Erdogan planned for Dec. 15 in St. Petersburg will
not now happen, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday.
The summit was agreed upon during a meeting between the two men in Turkey on the sidelines of a G-20 summit last month which predated
Ankara's shooting down of a Russian military jet near the Syrian-Turkish border.
"It won't happen, it's not planned," Peskov said of the summit when asked about it by reporters on Monday…


http://theweek.com/articles/593126/russia-bringing-big-guns-syria-literally

The Russian army is literally bringing its big guns to the war in Syria. U.S. military analysts said the decision to add artillery to the battlefield
indicates a number of key developments, including the Kremlin's growing influence in planning and executing Syrian military operations.
It could be a sign that Russia is dedicated to a conventional ground war — not just air strikes — in support of Syrian leader Bashar Al Assad, a
staunch ally long supported by Moscow.
Since at least October, Russia fielded heavy artillery units near the cities of Homs and Hama, pounding targets there, according to a top U.S. State
Department official. However, most of Russia's firepower was at Latakia air base in western Syria until recently.
The Russian decision to move artillery to the front lines is a newer development. Officially, Moscow denies that it has ground forces engaged in
military operations in Syria.
There's certainly Russian influence within the Syrian army … and lots of guns.
Gen. Ali Ayoub, the Syrian army's chief of staff, made a brief televised statement last month declaring the launch of a broad ground offensive that
would be coordinated with Russia's air campaign. He said the attack would include newly formed ground units including a "4th Assault Corps."
In an article in OE Watch, a magazine published by the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, analysts noted that pro-Assad media quickly
hailed the new strategy.
The article quoted the pro-Hezbollah Al Hadath News. "The (Syrian) forward forces are supported by mortar cover and artillery regiments behind
the support lines, as well as aerial cover from the Russian Sukhois," Al Hadath stated.
"The Syrian army surge is proof of a new tactical military model, spiced with Russian flavors and led by the Sukhois from above, and which also
includes greater use of artillery batteries," the article continued.
According to OE Watch, there is conflicting information about the composition and manpower of the 4th Assault Corps. But its formation could
herald a new direction for the Syrian military and its battle against anti-Assad rebels, including a shift toward reliance on conventional forces and
artillery.
Russian military doctrine places far more emphasis on artillery than Western armies. In Ukraine, both Kiev and Kremlin-backed separatists make
liberal use of artillery owing in part to their shared Soviet lineage.
Before the war in Syria, Assad's howitzer arsenal was universally Soviet and Russian in origin. The Syrian army could depend on thousands of
static and self-propelled guns. Since the conflict, Moscow has further beefed up Assad's artillery with more advanced 152-millimeter MTSA-B
guns, BM-27 Uragan and BM-30 Smerch rocket launchers.
"Due to the Syrian army's strong reliance upon artillery, it is unsurprisingly that providing artillery assets is one way that Russia is attempting to
bolster the Assad regime," OE Watch noted. "Perhaps what is surprising is the types of artillery systems that are being provided."
The deadliest of all may be the TOS-1A Solnitsa rocket launcher, which was spotted on video launching its warheads in Latakia. Mounted on a T-72
tank chassis, the TOS-1A can fire 30 220-millimeter thermobaric or incendiary rockets in a single salvo.
"The resultant explosion — which is usually much larger than an equivalent weight of conventional ordnance — creates a massive high
temperature blast and a high-pressure shock wave," Dave Majumdar wrote at The National Interest. "Those who are in the affected area — who are
not immediately incinerated — die when the overpressure destroys their lungs."
In Syria, the increased use of artillery could also indicate a shift away from military operations organized around insurgent forces recruited by Iran
to a different military model that relies on Russian organization.
"Moscow is convinced of the need to strengthen conventional Syrian military forces and institutions and decrease the role of militias and the
regime's dependence on Iran," journalist Ibahim Hamidi wrote in Al Hayat, one of the mostly widely read Arab newspapers in the region.
One Russian military analyst believes the renewed emphasis on artillery made a major difference in the fight against anti-Assad rebels.
In a recent interview on a Russian news program, Konstantin Syvkov said more than 300 artillery pieces concentrated on a half-mile line outside of
Hama produced a so-called "fire wave" that greatly aided the Syrian offensive at first. "This method consumes a lot of ammunition, but it is very
effective in getting through fortifications," Syvkov said. "This allowed the breakthrough via the enemy defenses."
The biggest problem was the Syrians ran out of ammunition, including artillery shells supplied by the Russians, he said.
Reuters also recently reported that Russia might have at least one artillery brigade armed with howitzers operating in an area between the cities of
Homs and Damascus.
Russian state television footage of a briefing at the defense ministry headquarters on Nov. 18 for Pres. Vladimir Putin briefly showed a map that
revealed the position of the Russian army's 120th Artillery Brigade, according to a sharp-eyed military affairs blogger who spotted the position
pinpointed on the chart.
In response to the claim, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, "In Syria there is a technical contingent linked with carrying out the Russian air
force operation. There are no ground forces there and Russian soldiers are not carrying out a ground operation. The president has said that many
times."
Russia has conducted air strikes in Syria since Sept. 30, including hundreds of attacks by fighter-bombers and missiles. Moscow insists it is hitting
Islamic State targets as part of its anti-terrorism operation.
However, U.S. officials say that up to 90 percent of Russia's targets are so-called moderate rebel groups that oppose the Assad government,
including some that have been trained and supplied with arms by the United States.
Human rights groups say targets including marketplaces and mosques have been hit by Russian firepower, producing mounting civilian casualties.
Kerry to Moscow

http://news.yahoo.com/kerry-explore-assads-future-syria-peace-process-kremlin-175547825.html

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will use talks in Moscow on Tuesday to try to narrow differences with Russian leader Vladimir Putin over the role
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any political transition, a senior State Department official said on Monday.
He will seek to prepare the ground for a third round of talks of world powers on Syria amid doubts over whether a meeting pencilled in for Friday in
New York will go ahead.
Russia's foreign ministry said late on Monday that Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had agreed in a phone call on the need for
specific preconditions to be met before any new meeting, throwing its timing into doubt.
Russia is one of Assad's staunchest allies and launched a campaign of air strikes to support his forces against insurgents on Sept. 30. It says only
the Syrian people and not external powers should decide his political fate.
Speaking in Paris before Kerry visits Moscow on Tuesday, the State Department official said Kerry would raise concerns about Russia's continued
bombing of Syrian opposition forces instead of Islamic State militants, an approach likely to anger Moscow.
Ahead of the talks, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement criticising U.S. policy on Syria, complaining that Washington was not ready to
fully cooperate in the struggle against Islamic State militants and needed to rethink its policy of "dividing terrorists into good and bad ones".
Kerry's meeting with Putin follows a meeting last week in Riyadh which agreed to unite a number of opposition groups excluding Islamic State to
negotiate with Damascus in Syrian peace talks.
While Kerry said there were still "kinks" that needed to be worked out on the plan to unite the opposition groups, the Kremlin rejected the outcome
of the Riyadh meeting, saying it had no right to speak on behalf of the entire Syrian opposition.
Assad himself appeared to cast doubt on the very idea of peace talks last Friday, saying he would not negotiate with armed groups that he said
were backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The opposition groups said Assad should leave power at the start of a transitional period.
NO DEALS ON UKRAINE
"We don't have a full meeting of the minds yet (on Assad), we will talk about some of the details of a transition...in the hopes of narrowing the
differences between us," a senior State Department official told reporters.
While in Paris on Monday, Kerry met with counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan as he prepared for the Moscow talks.
His talks with Putin, and a lengthier meeting in the morning with Lavrov, will delve deeper into details of a planned Jan. 1 ceasefire in Syria, as well
as recent statements by Russia on supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which has been fighting Russian- and Iranian-backed government
forces.
"We'll be interested to hear what the Russians have in mind there, given the Free Syrian Army's concern about how Assad has been treating his
own people," the official added.
Russia has given mixed messages on the FSA with news agencies on Monday quoting Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian army's general
staff, as saying his country was providing it with weapons, ammunition and material support, and a top Kremlin aide later saying there was no such
arrangement.
FSA rebels fighting Assad's forces in western Syria denied receiving any support from the Russian air force, saying on the contrary it continued to
bomb them.
White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Kerry will encourage continued efforts by Russia to de-escalate tensions with Turkey after it shot down
a Russian military plane near the Syria border on Nov. 24.
"We haven't seen any tangible escalation at this point," Earnest said at a news briefing. "So that's, you know, a glimmer of optimism in that
situation."
Kerry, during his meetings, will also underscore the importance of implementing the Minsk peace accords on Ukraine and plans for free and fair
elections in eastern Ukraine.
Despite cooperation with Russia on a political transition in Syria, the United States maintains economic sanctions against Moscow for its
annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.
"We have made absolutely clear all the way through this at every level that we are not playing 'lets make a deal here' trading Ukraine for Syria, that
these are distinct issues with distinct paths forward," the official added.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-plane-crash-was-not-a-terror-attack--egypt/552752.html
Egypt's Civil Aviation Ministry has completed a preliminary report and found no evidence that the downing of a Russian passenger plane over the
Sinai Peninsula was the result of a terror attack, media reported Monday.
"The technical investigative committee has so far not found anything indicating any illegal intervention or terrorist action," the ministry said in a
statement.
A Russian Airbus A321 was downed over Egypt while en route to St. Petersburg — all 224 people on board were killed.
Speculation on the cause of the crash began soon after the catastrophe, with international media, politicians and law enforcement agency
representatives declaring the plane downing a terrorist act.
Two weeks after the crash, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that a terror attack had caused the plane crash.

http://vk.com/id244477574

Solovey says that control over the border will gradually be returned to Kiev as stipulated by the Minsk agreements. Russia will
concentrate resources on Syria—the intervention there is serious and for a long time. TV has been effective in diverting the
attention of the people away from Ukraine to Syria…
From: Brian D Taylor <bdtaylor@maxwell.syr.edu>
Sent time: 12/07/2015 09:40:26 AM
Subject: RE: from the poslanie II...

Yes, I found that passage quite interesting also. And I don’t see much chance for Kudrin’s recommended reforms of the law
enforcement organs.

From: Robert Otto [mailto:robertotto25@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2015 2:33 AM
To: Brian D Taylor <bdtaylor@maxwell.syr.edu>
Subject: from the poslanie II...

This goes to what I was getting at in my remarks, using the Magnitskiy affair as an example. How many of these expropriation
networks/clans exist to produce results like below?

http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864

Хотел бы также привести цифры, которые подготовило одно из наших деловых объединений. За 2014 год
следственными органами возбуждено почти 200 тысяч уголовных дел по так называемым экономическим составам.
До суда дошли 46 тысяч из 200 тысяч, ещё 15 тысяч дел развалилось в суде. Получается, если посчитать, что
приговором закончились лишь 15 процентов дел. При этом абсолютное большинство, около 80 процентов, 83
процента предпринимателей, на которых были заведены уголовные дела, полностью или частично потеряли бизнес.
То есть их попрессовали, обобрали и отпустили. И это, конечно, не то, что нам нужно с точки зрения делового
климата. Это прямое разрушение делового климата. Я прошу следственные органы и прокуратуру обратить на это
особое внимание.
Sent time: 12/04/2015 11:32:52 PM
To: Brian D Taylor <bdtaylor@maxwell.syr.edu>
BCc: acrotto@us-state.osis.gov
Subject: from the poslanie II...

This goes to what I was getting at in my remarks, using the Magnitskiy affair as an example. How many of these expropriation
networks/clans exist to produce results like below?
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864
Хотел бы также привести цифры, которые подготовило одно из наших деловых объединений. За 2014 год
следственными органами возбуждено почти 200 тысяч уголовных дел по так называемым экономическим составам.
До суда дошли 46 тысяч из 200 тысяч, ещё 15 тысяч дел развалилось в суде. Получается, если посчитать, что
приговором закончились лишь 15 процентов дел. При этом абсолютное большинство, около 80 процентов, 83
процента предпринимателей, на которых были заведены уголовные дела, полностью или частично потеряли бизнес.
То есть их попрессовали, обобрали и отпустили. И это, конечно, не то, что нам нужно с точки зрения делового
климата. Это прямое разрушение делового климата. Я прошу следственные органы и прокуратуру обратить на это
особое внимание.

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4. Служба экономической безопасности (СЭБ) - Юрий Яковлев, бывший первый заместитель, глава

A Georgian diplomat called Lavrov’s comments lopsided.

A Georgian diplomat called Lavrov’s comments lopsided.

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