CRUZ v.

CA
Davide, Jr., J. I January 30, 1996 l Mandamus
Petitioners: Victorina A. Cruz
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS; HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ARMAND V. FABELLA, Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and NORMA ABRACIA, School Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, 3rd District, Caloocan City

Summary: Victorina Cruz has been a Guidance and Counseling Coordinator if VHMS since 1978,
with an annual salary of Php 26, 388 paid by the local government. EO 189 took effect placing all
secondary school teacher under the administrative supervision and control of the DECS and
making their salaries and COLA payable by the national government. Cruzs position was
classified as Guidance counselor, R-56 in accordance with the National Compensation and
Classification Plan and her salary was reduced to Php 19, 248 per annum. She appealed her
demotion to the CSC Merit Systems Protection Board (CSC-MSPB) praying for an upgrading to R-
63. DBM, through USec Enriquez, Jr. denied the request on the ground that the MSPB has no
jurisdiction to reclassify petitioners position from Guidance Counselor III, SG-12 to Guidance
Services Specialist II, SG16. MSBP Order is unenforceable. Petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus before the CA to enforce compliance with the MSBP Decision and MSBP Order.

Doctrine: The writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an official to do anything which it is his
duty not to do or to which it is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command
to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

FACTS
1. Cruz has been Guidance and Counseling Coordinator III of Valenzuela Memorial HS.
2. EO 189 placed all secondary school teachers under administrative supervision of DECS.
Petitioners position was classified as Guidance Counselor R-56. Her salary was reduced.
3. She appealed to Civil Service Commission Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
praying for upgrading of her position to R-63.
4. Appeal was referred to Dept of Budget. The Department informed MSPB that
petitioners item was classified as Guidance Counselor R-59. The nationalized position
reduced petitioners salary.
5. 2 yrs. after the nationalization program, RA No. 6758 or Salary Standardization Law took
effect. MSPB rendered decision granting Cruz appeal.
6. DECS requested from DBM a supplemental Position Allocation List to reflect the
reclassified position of Cruz. DBM denied the request because MSPB has no jurisdiction
to reclassify petitioners position.
7. Cruz filed Motion for Execution of MSPB Decision. MSPB issued an order of execution.
Cruz found that her payroll violated MSPB ruling.
8. She filed with CA petition for mandamus praying that respondents be directed to
comply with MSPB Decision which granted her petition and reclassified petitioners
position from Guidance Counselor III, SG-12 to Guidance Services Specialist II, SG16.
9. Petition was denied by CA, as well as MR. Hence this petition.

ISSUES
1. WON mandamus was a proper remedy in this case. NO.
2. WON MSPB has jurisdiction to reclassify petitioners position and order payment of the
corresponding salary. NO.

HELD
On the first issue:
1. Petitioner has no clear legal right, which may be enforced by mandamus because her
claim of such right is based on a decision of an agency, which had no jurisdiction over
the subject thereof.
2. If MSPB had jurisdiction, DBM was bound to comply with MSPBs order and mandamus
would lie. However, pleadings fail to disclose that the order of execution was actually
served on the respondents.
3. Also, petitioner did not show that she had no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, as shown by her unreasonable delay in filing of
the mandamus suit.
4. Her petition for mandamus filed only on 28 June 1993, or after more than two years,
was, in reality, the first resort to judicial action against such refusal.
5. Although Rule 65 does not specify any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, it must, nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time. In certiorari cases,
the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within three months from the
commission of the complained act. The same rule should apply to mandamus cases.
6. The unreasonable delay in the filing of the petitioners mandamus suit unerringly
negates any claim that the application for the said extraordinary remedy was the most
expeditious and speedy available to the petitioner.
7. The CSC-MSPB, in ultimately classifying the position and compensation of the petitioner
encroached upon the authority of the DBM. Faced with the classification and
compensation issues raised by the petitioner, the CSC through the MSPB, should not
have merely requested comment but should have referred the matter to the DBM for its
determination. Mandamus did not lie to compel the public respondents to enforce the
challenged decision and order the MSPB because in Tangonan v. Pano: The writ of
mandamus will not issue to compel an official to do anything which it is his duty not to
do or to which it is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed.

On the second issue:

1. The Administrative Code grants the MSPB no jurisdiction.
2. The flaw in MSPBs view is its misconception that the basic complaint of Cruz involved a
demotion. The complaint was not the personnel action nor the violation of the merit
system contemplated in law. The personnel action or violation refers to that done
by or results from an act or omission of the appointing authority. Demotion involves
movement from a position to another with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status
or rank, with or without reduction in salary.
3. Here, the appointing authority had nothing to do with what the petitioner perceived to
be a demotion. What happened to her was done by operation of law.
4. This grievance falls within the primary jurisdiction of the DBM.