8/31/2015 G. R. No.

187478

ENBANC

REPRESENTATIVEDANILO G.R.No.187478
RAMONS.FERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO,C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIOMORALES,
VELASCO,JR.,
versus NACHURA,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,
ABAD,and
VILLARAMA,JR.,JJ.
HOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES Promulgated:
ELECTORALTRIBUNALAND
JESUSL.VICENTE, December21,2009
Respondents.
xx

DECISION

LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:

ThispetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionfiledunderRule65oftheRulesofCourtstems
[1]
from the Decision in HRET CASE No. 07034 for quo warranto entitled Jesus L.
Vicente v. Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez promulgated by the House of Representatives
ElectoralTribunal(HRET)onDecember16,2008aswellasMinuteResolutionNo.09080
promulgated on April 30, 2009, likewise issued by the HRET, denying petitioners Motion
forReconsideration.
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ThedispositiveportionofthequestionedDecisionreadsasfollows:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DECLARES respondent Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez
ineligible for the Office of Representative of [the] First District of Laguna for lack of
residenceinthedistrictand[ORDERS]himtovacatehisoffice.

As soon as this Resolution becomes final and executory, let notices be sent to the
President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker, and the
Commission on Audit through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the
HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal.

Nopronouncementastocosts.

[2]
SOORDERED.

On December 22, 2008, petitioner Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez (petitioner) filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the abovequoted Decision. The HRET, in the questioned
Resolution, found petitioners Motion to be bereft of new issues/ arguments that [had] not
[3]
beenappropriatelyresolved intheDecision.

PetitionerthusappliedforrelieftothisCourt,claimingthatthequestionedDecision
and Resolution should be declared null and void for having been respectively issued with
graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackoforinexcessofjurisdiction,andprayingfor
theissuanceofawritofprohibitiontoenjoinandprohibittheHRETfromimplementingthe
[4]
questionedDecisionandResolution.

Theantecedentfactsareclearandundisputed.

PetitionerfiledforcandidacyasRepresentativeoftheFirstLegislativeDistrictofthe
ProvinceofLagunaintheMay14,2007elections.InhisCertificateofCandidacy(COC),he
indicated his complete/exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision,
[5]
BarangayBalibago,Sta.RosaCity,Laguna(allegedSta.Rosaresidence).

PrivaterespondentJesusL.Vicente(privaterespondent)filedaPetitiontoDenyDue

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Coursetoand/orCancelCertificateofCandidacyandPetitionforDisqualificationbeforethe
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07046 (PES).
PrivaterespondentsoughtthecancellationofpetitionersCOCandthelattersdisqualification
asacandidateonthegroundofanallegedmaterialmisrepresentationinhisCOCregarding
hisplaceofresidence,becauseduringpastelections,hehaddeclaredPagsanjan,Lagunaas
hisaddress,andPagsanjanwaslocatedintheFourthLegislativeDistrictoftheProvinceof
Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in
[6]
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First
[7]
Division)dismissedsaidpetitionforlackofmerit.

Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
LagunaonJune27,2007,havinggarneredatotalof95,927votes,winningbyamarginof
[8]
35,000votesoverthenearestcandidate.

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET,docketedasHRETCASENo.07034,prayingthatpetitionerbedeclaredineligible
toholdofficeasaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesrepresentingtheFirstLegislative
District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and proclamation be
[9]
annulledanddeclarednullandvoid.

Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner
lackedtherequiredoneyearresidencyrequirementprovidedunderArticleVI,Section6of
the 1987 Constitution. In support of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner
falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence (2) the period of his
residenceinthelegislativedistrictbeforeMay14,2007,whichheindicatedasoneyearand
twomonthsand(3)hiseligibilityfortheofficewherehewasseekingtobeelected.Private
respondent presented the testimony of a certain Atty. Noel T. Tiampong, who stated that
petitioner is not from the alleged Sta. Rosa residence but a resident of Barangay Pulo,
Cabuyao, Laguna as well as the respective testimonies of Barangay Balibago Health
Workerswhoattestedthattheyrarely,ifever,sawrespondentintheleasedpremisesatthe

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alleged Sta. Rosa residence and other witnesses who testified that contrary to the
misrepresentations of petitioner, he is not a resident of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence. A
witness testified that petitioner attempted to coerce some of the other witnesses to recant
their declarations and change their affidavits. Finally, private respondent presented as
witness the lawyer who notarized the Contract of Lease dated March 8, 2007 between
[10]
petitioneraslesseeandBienvenidoG.Asuncionaslessor.

Petitioner, as respondent in HRET Case No. 07034, presented as his witnesses
residents of Villa de Toledo who testified that they had seen respondent and his family
residingintheirlocality,aswellasBienvenidoG.Asuncionwhotestifiedthatpetitioneris
thelesseeinUnitNo.13Block1LotI,MaharlikaSt.,VilladeToledoSubdivision,Brgy.
Balibago,Sta.RosaCity,Laguna.PetitionerlikewisepresentedMr.JosephWade,President
of South Point Homeowners Association of Cabuyao, Laguna, as well as Engr. Larry E.
Castro(Castro),whotestifiedthatsinceFebruary2006uptothepresent,petitionerhadno
longerbeenresidinginhispropertylocatedatBlock28,Lot18,SouthPointSubdivision,
Cabuyao,Laguna,andthatsaidpropertywasbeingofferedforsaleandtemporarilybeing
used by Castro, together with some security men of petitioner and employees of Rafters
[11]
Music Lounge owned by petitioner. Petitioner testified that he had been a resident of
Sta. Rosa even before February 2006 that he owned property in another Sta. Rosa
subdivision (BelAir) that he and his wife had put up a business therein, the RAFTERS
restaurant/barandthathehadpriorresidenceinanotherplacealsoatSta.Rosaasearlyas
[12]
2001.

SincetheHRETruledinfavorofprivaterespondent,thispetitionwasfiledbeforeus.

In petitioners assignment of errors, he alleges that the HRET grievously erred and
committedgraveabuseofdiscretion:

1. InnotplacingonthequowarrantopetitionerJesusL.Vicentetheburdenof
proving that then respondent (now petitioner) Fernandez is not a qualified
candidateforRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictoftheProvinceofLaguna

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2.WhenitdisregardedtherulingofacoequaltribunalinSPANo.07046

3.WhenitaddedapropertyqualificationtoaMemberofCongress

4. Whenitdeterminedthatthepetitionerfailedtocomplywiththeone(1)year
residencyrequirementbasedonthecontractoflease

5.Whenitcompletelydisregardedthetestimoniesofmaterialwitnesses

6.Whenitfailedtoconsidertheintentofthepetitionertotransferdomicilebased
onthetotalityoftheevidenceadducedand

7.WhenitfailedtofindthepetitionerinHRETCaseNo.07034guiltyofforum
[13]
shopping.

Onthefirstassignmentoferror,petitionerquestionsthefollowingpronouncementof
theHRETinitsdecision:

Inthecasebeforeus,petitionerhasclearlyasserted,andrespondentdoesnotdeny,
thathisdomicileoforiginisPagsanjanintheFourthDistrictofLaguna.Hence,theburdenis
nowonrespondenttoprovethathehasabandonedhisdomicileoforigin,orsincehisbirth,
whereheformerlyranforprovincialBoardMemberofLagunain1998,forViceGovernor
ofLagunain2001andforGovernorofLagunain2004.InallhisCertificatesofCandidacy
when he ran for these positions, he indicated under oath that his domicile or permanent
residencewasinPagsanjanintheFourthDistrictofLaguna,notintheFirstDistrictwherehe
[14]
laterraninthelastelections.

Petitionercontendsthatitisabasicevidentiaryrulethattheburdenofproofisonhe
whoalleges,andhewhoreliesonsuchanallegationashiscauseofactionshouldprovethe
[15]
same. Sinceprivaterespondentisthepartyallegingthatpetitionerisnoteligibleforhis
position,itisthereforeincumbentontheformer,whofiledthequowarrantocasebeforethe
HRET,toprovesuchallegation.HecitesinsupportofhiscontentionSec.1,Rule131ofthe
RulesofCourt,towit:

SECTION 1. Burden of proof . Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
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evidenceonthefactsinissuenecessarytoestablishhisclaimordefensebytheamountof
evidencerequiredbylaw.

Petitioner avers that private respondent failed to establish his claim and to adduce
evidencesufficienttoovercomepetitionerseligibilitytobeacandidateforRepresentativeof
theFirstDistrictofLaguna.

On the second assignment of error, petitioner submits that the HRET should have been
guided and/or cautioned by the COMELECs dispositions in SPA No. 07046, wherein he
was adjudged as qualified to run for the position of Congressman of the First District of
Laguna by an agency tasked by law and the Constitution to ascertain the qualifications of
candidates before election. Petitioner claims that the HRET should have respected the
findingsoftheCOMELECandshouldhavediscreetlydeniedthepetition.

On the third assignment of error, petitioner argues that under Article V, Section 1, of the
1987Constitution,anycitizenofthePhilippineswhoisaqualifiedvotermaylikewise,ifso
qualifiedundertheappertaininglawandtheconstitution,beabletorunandbevotedforasa
candidateforpublicoffice.Saidprovisionreads:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
residedinthePhilippinesforatleastoneyearandintheplacewhereintheyproposetovote
foratleastsixmonthsimmediatelyprecedingtheelection.Noliteracy,property,orother
substantiverequirementshallbeimposedontheexerciseofsuffrage.

PetitionerallegesthatinthequestionedDecision,theHRETaddedanewqualification
requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners in the legislative district
wheretheyseekelection.

On the fourth assignment of error, petitioner addresses private respondents arguments
againstthecontractofleasethathepresentedaspartoftheproofofhiscompliancewiththe
residencyrequirement.Petitionerassertsthatthenomenclatureusedbycontractingpartiesto
describeacontractdoesnotdetermineitsnature,butthedecisivefactoristheintentionof
thepartiestoacontractasshownbytheirconduct,words,actions,anddeedspriorto,during

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[16]
andafterexecutingtheagreement. Petitionerclaimsthathehaspresentedampleproofof
hisresidencyintermsofevidencemorenumerousandbearingmoreweightandcredibility
thanthoseofprivaterespondent.Heproceedstohighlightsomeoftheevidenceheofferedin
the quo warranto case that allegedly prove that his transfer of residence and intention to
resideinSta.RosawereprovenbyhisstayinVilladeToledo,towit:(1)evenearlierthan
2006,hehadpurchasedahouseandlotinBelAirSubdivisioninSta.Rosawhichherented
outbecausehewasnotyetstayingthereatthattime(2)hesenthischildrentoschoolsin
Sta.Rosaasearlyas2002and(3)heandhiswifeestablishedarestaurantbusinesstherein
2003.PetitionercontendsthatwhenheandhisfamilymovedtoSta.Rosabyinitiallyrenting
a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, it cannot be said that he did this only in order to run for
[17]
electionintheFirstLegislativeDistrict.

As regards the alleged infirmities characterizing the execution of the contract of lease and
therenewalofsaidcontractoflease,petitionercontendsthatthesearenotmaterialsincethe
lessor, Bienvenido Asuncion, affirmed his stay in his townhouse the neighbors and other
barangay personalities confirmed his and his familys stay in their area and petitioner has
continuedactualresidenceinSta.Rosafromearly2006tothepresent.Petitionerclaimsthat
all these prove that he had effectively changed his residence and could therefore likewise
transferhisvotersregistrationfromPagsanjantoSta.RosaunderSec.12ofR.A.No.8189.
[18]
Petitioneralsoallegesthathehadbecomequalifiedtoseekelectiveofficeinhisnew
placeofresidenceandregistrationasavoter.

TofurtherprovethathehasmadeSta.Rosahisdomicileofchoicefromearly2006tothe
present,petitionerpointsoutthatheandhiswifehadpurchasedalotinthesamearea,Villa
de Toledo, on April 21, 2007, built a house thereon, and moved in said house with their
family.

Regarding the nonnotarization of the contract of lease raised by private respondent,
petitioneraversthatthisdoesnotnecessarilynullifynorrenderthepartiestransactionvoid
[19]
abinitio.

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On the fifth assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the HRET relied on private
respondentswitnessesinnegatingpetitionersclaimthathehadvalidlyresidedatthealleged
Sta. Rosa residence for more than one year and two months prior to the May 14, 2007
elections, and did not touch on the testimonies of his witnesses. The questioned Decision
pointed out petitioners alleged nonappearance in the daytoday activities of the
HomeownersAssociationandconsideredthisasfailuretoprovethatheisaresidentofVilla
deToledo,withoutconsideringthefactthatprivaterespondentfailedtodischargetheburden
ofproofinsupportofhisindictmentagainstpetitioner.

Onthesixthassignmentoferror,petitionerclaimsthatthequestionedDecisionwasarrived
atbasedontheperceivedweaknessofhisevidenceandargumentsasrespondent,insteadof
the strength of private respondents own evidence and arguments in his quo warranto
petition.

On the seventh and last assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the matters raised in
HRETCaseNo.07034werenodifferentfromtheonesraisedbyprivaterespondentbefore
the COMELEC in SPA No. 07046 (PES) thus, private respondents petition should have
beendismissedbytheHRETforforumshopping.

In his Comment dated June 22, 2009, private respondent summarized the issues raised in
petitioners assignment of errors into two: (1) those that involve the issue of conflict of
jurisdictionbetweentheHRETandtheCOMELECrespectingtheeligibility,qualification/s
or disqualification of elective public officials and (2) those that involve factual and
[20]
evidentiarymattersdesignedassupposederrors.

Regarding the first issue, private respondent contends that the 1987 Constitution is most
equivocalindeclaringthattheHRETisthesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,
returnsandqualificationsofMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,underthefollowing
provision:

Art.VI,SECTION17.TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshalleachhave
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectiveMembers.

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Privaterespondentallegesthattheaboveconstitutionalprovisionwasadoptedbythe
HRETinitsRules,whichread:

THE1998RULESOFTHEHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVESELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal hereby adopts and

promulgates the following Rules governing its proceedings as the sole judge of all
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofMembersoftheHouse
ofRepresentatives,pursuanttoSection17,ArticleVIoftheConstitution.

xxxxxxxxx

RULE17
QuoWarranto

AverifiedpetitionforquowarrantocontestingtheelectionofaMemberofthe
House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
RepublicofthePhilippinesshallbefiledbyanyvoterwithinten(10)daysafterthe
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the
petitionerwhiletheadversepartyshallbeknownastherespondent.
TheruleonverificationprovidedinSection16hereofshallapplytopetitions
forquowarranto.

xxxxxxxxx

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of
Representatives is concerned, is coequal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot
disregardanyrulingofCOMELECrespectingthematterofeligibilityandqualificationofa
member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the
COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the
eligibilityand/orqualificationofaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Apetitionfor
quowarrantoiswithintheexclusivejurisdictionoftheHRETassolejudge,andcannotbe
consideredforumshoppingevenifanotherbodymayhavepasseduponinadministrativeor
quasijudicialproceedingstheissueoftheMembersqualificationwhiletheMemberwasstill

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acandidate.Thereisforumshoppingonlywheretwocasesinvolvethesamepartiesandthe
same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and
character.

Anent the second issue, private respondent contends that petitioner raised errors of
judgment,mistakesinthefactualfindings,and/orflawsintheevidenceappreciation,which
areappropriateonappeal,butnotinapetitionforcertiorariwhichisaspecialcivilaction,
wheretheonlyallowablegroundinordertoprosperisgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackorinexcessofjurisdiction.

Foritspart,publicrespondentHRET,throughtheSolicitorGeneral,filedaCommentdated
July14,2009,arguingthatitdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excess of jurisdiction when it held that petitioner failed to comply with the one year
[21]
residencyrequirementunderSection6,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitution.

TheHRETaversthatthequestionedDecisionissupportedbyfactualandlegalbasis,forit
foundthattheoriginalandextendedcontractsofleasepresentedbypetitionerweredefective
andfabricated,asitcontainedseveralapparent,ifnotvisible,deficienciesastoform,i.e.[,]
itbeingnotnotarizedtheabsenceofwitnesses,theintercalationsthereatespeciallyonthe
term/periodoftheallegedleasetheabsenceofrespondentsparticipationthereinandsome
[22]
otherspointedoutinthepetition. TheDecisionstatesthatevenifthecontractoflease
wasvalidandlegitimate,afixedperiodofoneyearnegatestheconceptofpermanencythat
would suffice to prove abandonment of respondents previous residence or domicile at
Pagsanjan.TheDecisionfurtherreadsasfollows:

RespondentsconnectiontotheFirstDistrictofLagunaisanallegedleaseagreementof
atownhouseunitinthearea.Theintentionnottoestablishapermanenthome in the First
District of Laguna is evident in his leasing a townhouse unit instead of buying one. The
shortlengthoftimeheclaimstobearesidentoftheFirstDistrictofLaguna(andthefact
thathisdomicileoforiginisPagsanjan,LagunaisnotwithintheFirstDistrictofLaguna)
indicatethathissolepurposeintransferringhisphysicalresidenceisnottoacquireanew
residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the First
[23]
DistrictofLaguna.

xxxxxxxxx

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Exhibit3istheverydocumentthatwasproducedandpresentedbyrespondenttoattest
that while the original contract, replete with infirmities, as only for one year expiring even
beforetheMay14,2007elections,herenowcomestherenewedContractofLease,signedby
respondent himself, no longer his wife, immaculately perfect on its face, now notarized and
properly witnessed, and even the terms and conditions thereof undeniably clear and explicit,
withtheaddedfeatureofaprolonged2yearperiodofleasethatwillgowellbeyondtheMay
14,2007elections.

We cannot however, simply accept the renewed Contract of Lease (Exhibit 3) on its
face.Infact,assuccinctlypointedoutbypetitioner,therenewedContractofLeasesuffersfrom
amoregrievousinfirmity.

x x x As respondents brotherinlaw, Atty. Macalalag is prohibited from notarizing a
[24]
documentthatinvolvestherespondent.

xxxxxxxxx

But the lack of notarial authentication does not even constitute the main defect of
[Exhibit3].The surfacing of Exhibit 3 very late in the day cannot but lead to the conclusion
[25]
thatthesamewasamereafterthought.xxx

xxxxxxxxx

We have to emphasize that the initial oneyear lease contract expired on February 27,
2007, and as such, standing alone, the same cannot prove and will not establish the declared
oneyear and two months prior residence eligibility requirement of respondent, unless it is
shown that the expired lease agreement was extended or renewed beyond the May 14, 2007
elections,and,moreimportantly,accompaniedbyacopyoftheclaimedexistingrenewedlease
[26]
agreement.xxx

xxxxxxxxx

BytheunexplaineddelayintheproductionandpresentationofExhibit3,respondents
residencequalificationssufferedafatalblow.Foritcannolongerbedeniedthatrespondents
claimedresidenceattheallegedtownhouseunitinSta.Rosaforoneyearandtwomonthsprior
to the May 14, 2007 election is not only most doubtful, but also negates the concept of
permanency that would suffice to prove abandonment of respondents previous residence or
[27]
domicileatPagsanjan.
Furthermore, the HRET alleges that, as it found in the questioned Decision, the
witnessespresentedwhowereresidentsofSta.Rosa,Lagunawereconsistentandcrediblein
disputingpetitionersallegedphysicalpresenceatanygiventimeinsaidplace.Amongthese
witnesseswerethreeBarangayHealthWorkers,oneofwhom,RowenaDineros,submitted
anaffidavitthatherjobrequiredhertofrequentlygoaroundVilladeToledo,knockingon
everyhouseholddoortoinquireaboutitsoccupants,andnotoncedidsheseepetitionerat
theallegedSta.Rosaresidence.TheHRETclaimsthatthistestimonywascorroboratedby
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anotherBarangayHealthWorker(BHW),JeanetCabingas,whostatedinheraffidavitthat
everytimesheaccompaniedherniece,whowaspetitionersgoddaughter,torequestafavor
frompetitioner,thelatterwouldaskthemtoreturntohishouseinCabuyao,Laguna,evenif
[28]
shewasaresidentofSta.Rosa. TheSolicitorGeneralquotesthefollowingportionfrom
thequestionedDecision:

What appears very evident from this is that respondent has absolutely not the slightest
intentiontoresideinSta.Rosapermanently.

This ineluctably confirms that respondent has not developed animus manendi over the
latterplace,Sta.Rosa[,]andthathehasnotactuallyabandonedhisolddomicileoforiginin
[29]
Pagsanjan.

As for the third BHW witness, Flocerfina Torres, the HRET gives credence to her
testimonythatsheconductedahouseholdcensusinVilladeToledoeverythreemonths,but
notoncehadsheseenpetitionerintheallegedSta.Rosaresidence,andthatshewasadvised
bypetitionertoproceedtohishouseinCabuyao,Lagunawhenshehadattemptedtosolicit
frompetitionerathisRaftersestablishmentbecauseitwasnearherresidenceinSta.Rosa.
Fromtheforegoingtestimonies,theHRETfoundinthequestionedDecisionthat:

The uniform testimony of our 3 BHW witnesses disputing the physical presence of the
respondentathisclaimedToledoaddressduringallthetimethattheywereperformingtheir
routinedutiesatthatcommunity,andwhichencompassedtheperiodof1yearand2months
[30]
beforetheMay14,2007election,revealedthathewasnotstayinginSta.Rosa.

TheHRETlikewisecontendsthatthefactthatpetitionerregisteredasavoterinSta.Rosa
does not prove that he is a resident thereat, given that a voter is required to reside in the
placewhereinheproposestovoteonlyforsixmonthsprecedingtheelection.

The HRET avers that this Court had explained the importance of property ownership in
[31]
Aquinov.COMELEC,etal. andfindsnomeritinpetitionersinsistencethatthewillof
the electorate attests to his residence in Sta. Rosa because, the HRET further avers, [a]
[32]
disqualifiedcandidatecannotassumeoffice.

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The HRET likewise contends that the purpose of the residency requirement is to
ensurethatthepersonelectedisfamiliarwiththeneedsandproblemsofhisconstituency.

Theissuesfordeterminationare:(1)whethertheHREThadjurisdictionoverthecaseand
(2)whetherpetitionersufficientlycompliedwiththeoneyearresidencyrequirementtobea
MemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,asprovidedinthe1987Constitution.

The first issue is procedural and involves the jurisdiction of the HRET visvis that of the
COMELEC in cases involving the qualification of Members of the House of
Representatives.PetitionersuggeststhatthemattersraisedinHRETCaseNo.07034were
alreadypasseduponbytheCOMELECinSPANo.07046(PES),thustheHRETshould
havedismissedthecaseforforumshopping.

We do not agree. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17
thereofthattheHRETandtheSenateElectoralTribunal(SET)shallbethesolejudgesofall
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheirrespectivemembers.The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
[33]
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is
conferredupontheHRETandtheSETafterelectionsandtheproclamationofthewinning
candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of
[34]
officecannotbesaidtobeamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives.

Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping
evenif,asinthiscase,theCOMELEChadalreadypasseduponinadministrativeorquasi
judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representativeswhilethelatterwasstillacandidate.

Anentthesecondissuepertainingtopetitionerscompliancewiththeresidencyrequirement
forMembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,afterstudyingtheevidencesubmittedbythe
[35]
parties,wefindforpetitioner,takingintoaccountourrulinginFrivaldov.COMELEC,
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whichreadsinpart:

ThisCourthastimeandagainliberallyandequitablyconstruedtheelectorallawsof
ourcountrytogivefullesteffecttothemanifestwillofourpeople,forincaseofdoubt,
politicallawsmustbeinterpretedtogivelifeandspirittothepopularmandatefreely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
standinthewayofthesovereignwill.xxx(Emphasissupplied)

For the foregoing reason, the Court must exercise utmost caution before disqualifying a
winning candidate, shown to be the clear choice of the constituents that he wishes to
representinCongress.

The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI,
Section6oftheConstitution,whichprovides:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
naturalborncitizenofthePhilippinesand,onthedayoftheelection,isatleasttwentyfive
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the partylist representatives, a registered
voterinthedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,andaresidentthereofforaperiodofnot
lessthanoneyearimmediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection.(Emphasissupplied)

WefindtheinterpretationoftheHREToftheresidencyrequirementundertheConstitution
tobeoverlyrestrictiveandunwarrantedunderthefactualcircumstancesofthiscase.

TheevidencepresentedbyprivaterespondentbeforetheHREThardlysufficestoprovethat
petitionerfailedtocomplywiththeoneyearresidencyrequirementundertheConstitution.
Private respondents documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a)
petitioners certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004,
which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said
province(b)hisapplicationforadriverslicenseinAugust2005thatindicatedPagsanjan,
Laguna as his residence and (c) the statement in his COCs including his 2007 COC for
CongressmanfortheFirstDistrictofLagunathathisplaceofbirthwasPagsanjan,Laguna.

The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioners domicile of
originwasPagsanjan,Lagunaanditremainedhisdomicileupto2005,atthelatest.Onthe
otherhand,whatpetitionerassertedinhis2007COCisthathehadbeenaresidentofSta.
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Rosa,LagunaintheFirstDistrictofLagunaasofFebruary2006andrespondentsevidence
failedcontradictthatclaim.

IfitistruethatpetitionerandhisfamilyhadbeenlivinginSta.Rosa,LagunaasofFebruary
2006 with the intent to reside therein permanently, that would more than fulfill the
requirementthatpetitionerbearesidentofthedistrictwherehewasacandidateforatleast
oneyearbeforeelectionday,whichinthiscasewasMay14,2007.

In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
beginning at least in February 2006, petitioners evidence included, among others: (a)
original and extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay
Balibago,Sta.Rosa,Laguna(b)certificationissuedbythePresidentoftheVilladeToledo
HomeownersAssociation,Inc,thatpetitionerhasbeenaresidentofsaidSubdivisionsince
February 2006 (c) affidavits of petitioners neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that
petitionerhasbeenaresidentofsaidsubdivisionsinceFebruary2006(d)certificationofthe
barangaychairmanofBarangayBalibago,Sta.Rosa,Lagunathatpetitionerisaresidentof
VilladeToledowithinthesaidbarangay(e)certificatesofattendanceofpetitionerschildren
in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005 and (f) DTI certificates of business
issuedinthenameofpetitionerandhiswifetoshowthattheyownandoperatebusinessesin
Sta.Rosa,Lagunasince2003.

The fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner
whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially
considering that there were witnesses (including petitioners neighbors in Villa de Toledo)
thatwereinturnpresentedbypetitionertoprovethathewasactuallyaresidentofVillade
Toledo,intheaddresshestatedinhisCOC.Thelawdoesnotrequireapersontobeinhis
home twentyfour (24) hours a day, seven days a week, in order to fulfill the residency
requirement.Itmaybethatwheneverthesehealthworkersdotheirroundspetitionerwasout
ofthehousetoattendtohisownemploymentorbusiness.Itisnotamisstonotethateven
thesebarangayhealthworkers,withtheexceptionofone,confirmseeingpetitionerswifeat
theaddressstatedinpetitioners2007COC.Indeed,thesehealthworkerstestimoniesdonot
conclusively prove that petitioner did not in fact reside in Villa de Toledo for at least the
yearbeforeelectionday.

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Neitherdowefindanythingwrongifpetitionersometimestransactedbusinessorreceived
visitorsinhisCabuyaohouse,insteadoftheallegedSta.Rosaresidence,asthereisnothing
in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning property and
exercisingtheirrightsofownershiptheretoinotherplacesasidefromtheaddresstheyhad
indicatedastheirplaceofresidenceintheirCOC.

Asregardstheweighttobegiventhecontractofleasevisvispetitioners previous COCs,
[36]
we find Perez v. COMELEC to be instructive in this case, and quote the pertinent
portionsofthedecisionbelow:

In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence
from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the
following:(1)theaffidavitofEngineerAlfredoAblaza,theowneroftheresidentialapartment
at13EMagallanesSt.,Tuguegarao,Cagayan,whereprivaterespondenthadlivedin1990(2)
thecontractofleasebetweenprivaterespondent,aslessee,andTomasT.Decena,aslessor,of
a residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1,
1995toJune30,1996(3)themarriagecertificate,datedJanuary18,1998,betweenprivate
respondentandLermaDumaguit(4)thecertificateoflivebirthofprivaterespondent'ssecond
daughter and (5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all
showthatprivaterespondentwasaresidentofTuguegarao,Cagayanforatleastone(1)year
immediatelyprecedingtheelectionsonMay11,1998.

Thereisthussubstantialevidencesupportingthefindingthatprivaterespondenthadbeen
aresidentoftheThirdDistrictofCagayanandthereisnothingintherecordtodetractfrom
themeritofthisfactualfinding.

Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at
least until June 22, 1997,isshown bythefollowing documentary evidence intherecord,to
wit: (1) his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995
elections(2)hisvoter'sregistrationrecords,thelatestofwhichwasmadeonJune22,1997
and(3)thefactthatprivaterespondentvotedinGattaran,Cagayan,intheelectionsof1987,
1988,1992and1995.

The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one
districtisnotproofthatheisnotdomiciledinanotherdistrict.Thus,inFayponv.Quirino,this
Courtheldthattheregistrationofavoterinaplaceotherthanhisresidenceoforiginisnot
sufficienttoconsiderhimtohaveabandonedorlosthisresidence.

Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for provincial
governorintheelectionsof1988,1992,and1995,privaterespondentstatedthathewasa
resident of Gattaran. Under the law, what is required for the election of governor is
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residency in the province, not in any district or municipality, one year before the
election.

Moreover,asthisCourtsaidinRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC:

Itisthefactofresidence,notastatementinacertificateofcandidacy,whichought
tobedecisiveindeterminingwhetherornotanindividualhassatisfiedtheconstitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
thereisorappearstobeadeliberateattempttomislead,misinform,orhideafactwhich
wouldotherwiserenderacandidateineligible.

Inthiscase,althoughprivaterespondentdeclaredinhiscertificatesofcandidacypriorto
theMay11,1998electionsthathewasaresidentofGattaran,Cagayan,thefactisthathewas
actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998
elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a
resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor
from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his
residenceinTuguegarao,whichisthecapitaloftheprovinceofCagayan.

Asalways,thepolestarofadjudicationincasesofthisnatureisGallegov.Vera,inwhich
this Court held: "[W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is
weakorinconclusiveanditclearlyappears,asintheinstantcase,thatthepurposeofthe
lawwouldnotbethwartedbyupholdingtherighttotheoffice,thewilloftheelectorate
shouldberespected."Inthiscase,consideringthepurposeoftheresidencyrequirement,i.e.,
toensurethatthepersonelectedisfamiliarwiththeneedsandproblemsofhisconstituency,
therecanbenodoubtthatprivaterespondentisqualified,havingbeengovernoroftheentire
province of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of that
[37]
province'sThirdDistrict.
Thus,inthecaseabove,theCourtfoundthattheaffidavitofthelessorandthecontract
ofleaseweresufficientproofthatprivaterespondentthereinhadchangedhisresidence. In
the case now before us, although private respondent raised alleged formal defects in the
contract of lease, the lessor himself testified that as far as he was concerned, he and
petitioner had a valid contract and he confirmed that petitioner and his family are the
occupantsoftheleasedpremises.

Petitionercorrectlypointedoutthatthelackofpropernotarizationdoesnotnecessarily
nullify nor render the parties transaction void ab initio. In Mallari v. Alsol, we found a
contractofleasetobevaliddespitethenonappearanceofoneofthepartiesbeforeanotary
public,andruledinthiswise:

Notarization converts a private document into a public document. However, the non
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appearance of the parties before the notary public who notarized the document does not
necessarilynullifynorrendertheparties'transactionvoidabinitio.Thus:
. . . Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a public
document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. Failure to
followtheproperformdoesnotinvalidateacontract.Whereacontractisnotinthe
formprescribedbylaw,thepartiescanmerelycompeleachothertoobservethat
form, once the contract has been perfected. This is consistent with the basic
principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been
enteredinto,providedallessentialrequisitesarepresent.

Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez's failure to appear
[38]
beforethenotarypublic.

The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in
Sta.RosawhileheownshousesinPagsanjanandCabuyao.Hisownershipofpropertiesin
other places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his
permanentresidenceorthathehadnotabandonedhisdomicileoforigin.

Althoughitistruethatthelatestacquiredabodeisnotnecessarilythedomicileofchoiceofa
candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a
congressionalcandidatetosellapreviouslyacquiredhomeinonedistrictandbuyanewone
intheplacewhereheseekstoruninordertoqualifyforacongressionalseatinthatother
district.NeitherdoweseethefactthatpetitionerwasonlyleasingaresidenceinSta.Rosaat
the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the
Constitutiondoesnotrequireacongressionalcandidatetobeapropertyownerinthedistrict
where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to
electionday.To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanenceofdomicileorresidenceimpliesthatonlythelandedcanestablishcompliance
with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
unconstitutional.

[39]
ThiscasemustbedistinguishedfromAquinov.COMELEC andDominov.COMELEC,
[40]
where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in the
placewherehesoughttorunforoffice.InAquinoandDomino,thereappearedtobenoother
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materialreasonforthecandidatetoleaseresidentialpropertyintheplacewherehefiledhis
COC,excepttofulfilltheresidencyrequirementunderelectionlaws.

Inthecaseatbar,therearerealandsubstantialreasonsforpetitionertoestablishSta.Rosa
as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous
domicile.Tobeginwith,petitionerandhiswifehaveownedandoperatedbusinessesinSta.
Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005.
Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any
candidacy,petitionerhadsufficientlyconfirmedhisintentiontopermanentlyresideinSta.
RosabypurchasingresidentialpropertiesinthatcityevenpriortotheMay2007election,as
evidencedbycertificatesoftitleissuedinthenameofpetitionerandhiswife.Oneofthese
properties is a residence in BelAir, Sta. Rosa which petitioner acquired even before 2006
butwhichpetitionerhadbeenleasingout.Heclaimsthatherentedoutthispropertybecause
priorto2006hehadnotdecidedtopermanentlyresideinSta.Rosa.Thiscouldexplainwhy
inearly2006petitionerhadtorentatownhouseinVilladeToledohisBelAirresidencewas
occupiedbyatenant.Therelativelyshortperiodoftheleasewasalsoadequatelyexplained
bypetitionertheyrentedatownhousewhiletheywereintheprocessofbuildingtheirown
houseinSta.Rosa.Trueenough,petitionerandhisspousesubsequentlypurchasedalotalso
in Villa de Toledo in April 2007, about a month before election day, where they have
constructed a home for their familys use as a residence. In all, petitioner had adequately
shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not merely for
complyingwiththeresidencyrequirementunderelectionlaws.

It was incumbent upon private respondent to prove his assertion that petitioner is indeed
disqualified from holding his congressional seat. Private respondents burden of proof was
notonlytoestablishthatpetitionersdomicileoforiginisdifferentfromSta.Rosabutalso
that petitioners domicile for the one year prior to election day continued to be Pagsanjan,
Laguna which was petitioners domicile of origin or that petitioner had chosen a domicile
other than Sta. Rosa, Laguna for that same period. In other words, to prove petitioners
disqualification,therelevantperiodistheoneyearperiodpriortoelectionday.Itwouldbe
absurd to rule that the petitioner in a quo warranto suit only needs to prove that the
candidatehadsomeotherpreviousdomicile,regardlessofhowremoteintimefromelection
daythatpreviousdomicilewasestablished,andthenthecandidatewouldalreadyhavethe

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burdentoproveabandonmentofthatpreviousdomicile.Itistheburdenofthepetitionerina
quowarrantocasetofirstprovetheveryfactofdisqualificationbeforethecandidateshould
evenbecalledupontodefendhimselfwithcountervailingevidence.

In our considered view, private respondent failed to discharge his burden of proof.
PetitionersCOCsforpreviouselectionsandhis2005applicationforadriverslicenseonly
proved that his domicile of origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained to be so up to
2005. Affidavits/testimonies of respondents witnesses, at most, tended to prove that
petitionerwasonseveralinstancesfoundinhishouseinCabuyao,Laguna,whichwasnot
even his domicile of origin. Cabuyao, Laguna is in the Second District of Laguna while
petitioners domicile of origin, Pagsanjan, is in the Fourth District of Laguna. Based on
private respondents own documentary submissions, Cabuyao was never even stated as a
domicile or residence in any of the petitioners COCs. Moreover, owning an abode in
Cabuyao where petitioner is occasionally found did not prove that Cabuyao is petitioners
realdomicile.Indeed,disregardingCabuyaoaspetitionersdomicilewouldbeconsistentwith
the established principle that physical presence in a place sans the intent to permanently
reside therein is insufficient to establish domicile. Neither did private respondents
submissionsrefutepetitionersevidencethatsinceFebruary2006petitionerhaschosenSta.
Rosaashisdomicile.

To summarize, private respondents own evidence did not categorically establish where
petitionersdomicileisnordidsaidevidenceconclusivelyprovethatfortheyearpriortothe
May14,2007petitionerhadadomicileotherthanwhereheactuallyresided,i.e.Sta.Rosa,
[41]
Laguna.Tobesure,Gallegov.Vera decreedthat:

We might add that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
excludeastrangerornewcomer,unacquaintedwiththeconditionsandneedsofacommunity
andnotidentifiedwiththelatter,fromanelectiveofficetoservethatcommunityandwhen
theevidenceontheallegedlackofresidencequalificationisweakorinconclusiveandit
clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected.xxxxxxxxx(Emphasissupplied)

[42]
Frivaldo likewiseprescribedthat:

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xxx xxx xxx To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutionalandlegalprinciplesthatoverridingsuchineligibilityandtherebygiving
effecttotheapparentwillofthepeople,wouldultimatelycreategreaterprejudicetothe
verydemocraticinstitutionsandjuristictraditionsthatourConstitutionandlawssozealously
protectandpromote.xxxxxxxxx(Emphasissupplied)

[43]
InTorayno, theCourthadtheoccasiontosaythat:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding
elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of
their constituencies likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers'
qualificationsandfitnessforthejobtheyaspirefor.xxxxxxxxx

[44] [45]
Recently,inJapzonv.COMELEC, theCourt,citingPapandayan,Jr.v.COMELEC,
said:

InPapandayan,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,theCourtprovidedasummationofthe
different principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for
electivelocalofficials.PertinentportionsoftheratioinPapandayanarereproducedbelow:

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of
whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective
positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a
candidatehasan"intentiontoreturn"totheplacewhereheseekstobeelected.Corollary
to this is a determination whether there has been an "abandonment" of his former
residencewhichsignifiesanintentiontodeparttherefrom.InCaasiv.CourtofAppeals,
thisCourtsetasidetheappealedordersoftheCOMELECandtheCourtofAppealsand
annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on
the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonmentofhisdomicileandresidenceinthePhilippines.Beingagreencardholder,
whichwasproofthathewasapermanentresidentorimmigrantoftheUnitedStates,and
intheabsenceofanywaiverofhisstatusassuchbeforeheranforelectiononJanuary
18,1988,respondentwasheldtobedisqualifiedunder68oftheOmnibusElectionCode
ofthePhilippines(BatasPambansaBlg.881).

InCov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives,respondentJoseOng,
Jr.wasproclaimedthedulyelectedrepresentativeofthe2ndDistrictofNorthernSamar.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against
claimsthathewasnotanaturalbornFilipinocitizenandaresidentofLaoang,Northern
Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,
applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent to return", stating that his absence
from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified
publicaccountantinManilaorhisregistrationasavoterotherthanintheplacewherehe
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waselecteddidnotconstitutelossofresidence.Thefactthatrespondentmadeperiodical
journeystohishomeprovinceinLaoagrevealedthathealwayshadanimusrevertendi.

InAbellav.CommissiononElectionsandLarrazabalv.CommissiononElections,
itwasexplainedthatthedeterminationofaperson'slegalresidenceordomicilelargely
dependsupontheintentionthatmaybeinferredfromhisacts,activities,andutterances.
Inthatcase,petitionerAdelinaLarrazabal,whohadobtainedthehighestnumberofvotes
inthelocalelectionsofFebruary1,1988andwhohadthusbeenproclaimedastheduly
elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and
registrationqualifications,notbeingaresidentnoraregisteredvoterofKananga,Leyte.
The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence
oneyearbeforetheelectionbyregisteringatKananga,Leytetoqualifyhertorunforthe
position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a
residentofOrmocCity.ThisCourtaffirmedtherulingoftheCOMELECandheldthat
petitionerLarrazabalhadestablishedherresidenceinOrmocCity,notinKananga,Leyte,
from1975uptothetimethatsheranforthepositionofProvincialGovernorofLeyteon
February1,1988.Therewasnoevidencetoshowthatsheandherhusbandmaintained
separateresidences,i.e.,sheatKananga,LeyteandherhusbandatOrmocCity.Thefact
that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an
intentiontocontinueherresidenceafterleavingthatplace.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and
"residence"aresynonymous.Theterm"residence",asusedintheelectionlaw,imports
notonlyanintentiontoresideinafixedplacebutalsopersonalpresenceinthatplace,
coupledwithconductindicativeofsuchintention."Domicile"denotesafixedpermanent
residencetowhichwhenabsentforbusinessorpleasure,orforlikereasons,oneintends
toreturn.Inthatcase,petitionerPhilipG.Romualdezestablishedhisresidenceduringthe
early 1980's in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure
fromthecountryofpetitioner,becauseoftheEDSAPeople'sPowerRevolutionof1986,
togointoselfexileintheUnitedStatesuntilfavorableconditionshadbeenestablished,
wasnotvoluntarysoastoconstituteanabandonmentofresidence.TheCourtexplained
that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodilypresenceinthenewlocality,(2)anintentiontoremainthere,and(3)anintention
to abandon the old domicile. There must be animusmanendi coupled with animus non
revertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthedomicileofchoicemustbeforanindefinite
periodoftimethechangeofresidencemustbevoluntaryandtheresidenceattheplace
chosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.

Ultimately,theCourtrecapitulatesinPapandayan,Jr.thatitisthefactofresidencethat
is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency
qualificationrequirement.

We do not doubt that the residency requirement is a means to prevent a stranger or
newcomerfromholdingofficeontheassumptionthatsuchstrangerornewcomerwouldbe
insufficiently acquainted with the needs of his prospective constituents. However, it is
appropriatetopointoutatthisjuncturethatasidefrompetitionersactual,physicalpresence
in Sta. Rosa for more than a year prior to election day, he has demonstrated that he has

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substantialtiestoSta.RosaandtheFirstDistrictofLagunaforanevenlongerperiodthan
that.PetitionerhasbusinessinterestsinSta.Rosacomprisedofrestaurantsandaresidential
property for lease. Petitioner has two children studying in Sta. Rosa schools even before
2006.Thesecircumstancesprovidedpetitionerwithmaterialreasonstofrequentlyvisitthe
areaandeventuallytakeupresidenceinthesaiddistrict.Significantly,petitionerpreviously
servedasBoardMemberandViceGovernorfortheProvinceofLaguna,ofwhichtheFirst
District and Sta. Rosa are a part. It stands to reason that in his previous elected positions
petitionerhasacquiredknowledgeoftheneedsandaspirationsoftheresidentsoftheFirst
Districtwhowereamonghisconstituents.

Simplyput,petitionercouldnotbeconsideredastrangertothecommunitywhichhesought
to represent and that evil that the residency requirement was designed to prevent is not
presentinthiscase.

[46]
WetakethisoccasiontoreiterateourrulinginSinacav.Mula, towit:

[When] a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly
expressed,allpossibledoubtsshouldberesolvedinfavorofthecandidate'seligibilityforto
ruleotherwiseistodefeatthewillofthepeople.Aboveandbeyondall,thedeterminationof
thetruewilloftheelectorateshouldbeparamount.Itistheirvoice,notoursorofanyoneelse,
thatmustprevail.This,inessence,isthedemocracywecontinuetoholdsacred.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
theHRETinHRETCASENo.07034promulgatedonDecember16,2008,anditsMinute
Resolution No. 09080 promulgated on April 30, 2009 in the same case, are hereby
REVERSEDANDSETASIDE.
SOORDERED.



TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:



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REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice




ANTONIOT.CARPIO RENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice






CONCHITACARPIOMORALES PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice




ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice




DIOSDADOM.PERALTA LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice




MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO ROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice




MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

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CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo,pp.64111.
[2]
Id.at107.
[3]
Id.at112.
[4]
Id.at5960.
[5]
Id.at156.
[6]
Id.at2526.
[7]
Id.at31.
[8]
Id.at13.
[9]
Id.at166.
[10]
Id.at67.
[11]
Id.at71.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id.at1718.
[14]
Id.at89.
[15]
Id.at19.
[16]
Alvarov.Ternida,G.R.No.166183,January20,2006,479SCRA288.
[17]
Rollo,pp.3435.
[18]
Otherwiseknownas"TheVoter'sRegistrationActof1996."SECTION12.ChangeofResidencetoAnotherCityor
Municipality.AnyregisteredvoterwhohastransferredresidencetoanothercityormunicipalitymayapplywiththeElection
Officerofhisnewresidenceforthetransferofhisregistrationrecords.
[19]
Mallariv.Alsol,G.R.No.150866,March6,2006,484SCRA148.
[20]
Rollo,p.212.
[21]
Id.at267291.
[22]
Id.at272.
[23]
Id.at273.Emphasisours.
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[24]
Id.at274.
[25]
Id.at275.
[26]
Id.at277.
[27]
Id.at278.
[28]
Id.at281.
[29]
Id.at282.
[30]
Id.at283.
[31]
G.R.No.120265,September18,1995,248SCRA400.
[32]
Rollo,p.287.
[33]
Cov.ElectoralTribunaloftheHouseOfRepresentatives,G.R.Nos.9219192,July30,1991,199SCRA692,699.
[34]
Supranote31at417418.
[35]
G.R.Nos.120295&123755,June28,1996,257SCRA727,770771.
[36]
G.R.No.133944,October28,1999,317SCRA641.
[37]
Id.at649651.

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