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Trumpss America
THE election of an inexperienced, egotistical and volatile tycoon as the 45th president of the United States is as
surprising as was the victory of a black candidate eight years ago. Barack Obamas election was uplifting for
America and confirmed faith in its democracy.
Trumps triumph, secured by rhetoric reflecting racial and religious prejudice, xenophobia, strategic
incoherence and sweeping promises to make America great again, has divided the country as never before
since the American Civil War. This time the division is along racial, religious and intellectual lines between the
progressive eastern and western coastal states and the mostly white and conservative middle America.
Trumps conciliatory victory speech, promising to bind the wounds of division, the generous concession by
Clinton and President Obamas gestures of cooperation have not stilled the fear and loathing of Trumps
opponents: the minorities, millennials and progressive Democrats. If Trump pursues the policies he outlined in
the campaign, as he can with Republican control of the US Congress, social and political divisions within the
US could intensify.
Trumps policies would clearly erode the progress made on civil rights and reverse efforts to advance the
economic and social position of blacks and other disadvantaged minorities. Stop and frisk (of mainly black
youth) may be institutionalised. Police violence may be tolerated. The FBI, having helped to defeat Clinton,
would be more empowered. The US supreme court would remain conservative for the foreseeable future.
Although Trump has stepped back from his Muslim ban, immigration from Islamic countries (almost all
affected by terrorism) would slow to a trickle; Muslim Americans subjected to close monitoring for terrorist
tendencies, and discrimination against them institutionalised.
Millions of illegal immigrants could be hounded out of the country, wrenching families and livelihoods. Most
of the menial jobs they do will not be taken by white Americans. Wages would rise; the US economy contract.
The US-Mexico border wall, if constructed, would do little to stop desperate people from crossing the border.
An attempt to make Mexico pay for the wall would obviously lead to a diplomatic crisis.
Obamacare, which has provided health insurance to 20 million poor Americans, would be repealed. Its
replacement by a better system appears improbable.
Trumps declared economic policies will have domestic and global consequences.
Protectionist barriers, such as punitive duties on imports from China and Mexico, will provoke trade retaliation;
while increasing the cost of consumer goods, it will bring few jobs back to Americas uncompetitive
manufacturing industries.
Lifting restraints on coal and fossil fuels will restore some jobs in the mining and energy sectors, but at a very
high cost: environmental damage in the US; abrogation of US commitments to the Climate Change Treaty; the
treatys likely collapse; the predicted rise in the planets temperature and accompanying global environmental
disasters. Infrastructure development could generate jobs and growth. But it cannot be financed without raising
revenues and savings.
The proposed lower taxes on corporations and the rich would make this difficult; escalate inequality; expand the
US budget deficit and, if accompanied by higher interest rates, squeeze the ability to sustain the weak US
economic recovery.
Slower US growth, accompanied by protectionist policies and resultant trade conflicts, will act as a brake on the
world economy and create another global economic and financial crisis.
Trump has outlined his approach to global challenges in general, often uninformed terms. Even if his approach
does not add up to US isolationism, it is obvious that Trumps external policies will be subservient to his
domestic agenda.
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Apart from trade and energy policies, Trumps positions may be different from the present administration on
five major issues.
First, relations with Russia. Trumps expressed admiration for Putins strong leadership may open the door to
cooperation in addressing the Syrian conflict. If Trumps priority is to crush IS, he could agree to allow Syrias
Assad to survive, thus coalescing with Moscows approach.
Second, Europe. Trumps call for European allies to pull their own weight financially could result in weakening
the Nato alliance. If anti-EU and anti-immigrant right-wing parties, like the Front National in France, are
bolstered by Trumps example and secure power in the forthcoming elections, Europe could turn down the same
revanchist road as Trumpian America, with significant strategic consequences.
Third, the Iran deal. Trump and the Republican Party, both closer to Israel than Obama, have been sceptical of
the nuclear deal with Iran. They may seek to strengthen its non-proliferation elements, evoking a hostile
response from Tehran, and probable rejection by the other powers party to the agreement. An angry Iran could
complicate the conflicts in the Middle East, although it may revive US strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and
the GCC countries.
Fourth, China. Trump has excoriated Chinas trade policies and currency manipulation. However, he has been
silent on the South China Sea and human rights. He wants to lighten the burden of US alliances with Japan and
South Korea. He has criticised Obamas opposition to Chinas new development bank. It is not inconceivable
for China to strike a deal with Trump, offering concessions on trade and economic issues in exchange for
accommodation of Chinas regional and domestic priorities.
Fifth, the UN. Like previous Republican leaders, Trump has expressed disdain for the United Nations and
multilateralism. Drastic cuts in US contributions to UN organisations and multilateral processes and treaties
could lead to a decline in global cooperation, unless other powers, such as China, assume the mantle of
leadership in multilateral forums.
South Asia has not figured prominently in Trumps pronouncements. However, India has been acknowledged as
a geopolitical ally and has well-established ties with the Republicans. The further deepening of the
relationship will depend on the future direction of Sino-US relations. India could face complications with
Trumps administration on trade, immigration and outsourcing of US IT jobs to India.
Pakistan starts with the disadvantage of inherited problems with the US Afghanistan, terrorism and nuclear
issues where Republican positions are even more hostile than those of the Obama administration.
Nevertheless, the change of guard in Washington offers Pakistan an opportunity to present a clear message of
willingness to forge a constructive relationship with the US that accommodates the interests and priorities of
both countries.

America under Trump- Munir Akram

LAST week, Steve Bannon, the eminence gris in the Trump White House, blithely observed that the US will
soon be in a shooting war in the Middle East. He may be right. Donald Trumps declared determination to
eliminate Islamic terrorism implies intensification of several conflicts.
Syria: Trump announced he will fight the militant Islamic State (IS) group, rather than Bashar al-Assad, in
Syria, and may commit US ground troops to this fight. This would have aligned US policy with Russia (and
Iran). Trump has adjusted his position, endorsing the creation of safe zones in Syria. This will put the US at
odds with Russia and Iran and erode the tenuous ceasefire they imposed after defeating the rebels in Aleppo.
The Syrian war is likely to become further extended and more complex.
Iraq: Even if IS is ousted from Mosul and Raqqa, and mopped up in the Syrian-Iraq desert, it will spread
elsewhere. Iraq is likely to witness renewed internal rivalry between Shia, Sunni and Kurdish parties and a
contest between Iran and a US-GCC coalition for influence in Iraq.
Iran: A shooting war between the US and Iran is a real possibility. US Republicans and the military are hostile
to Iran. Israels Benjamin Netanyahu sees Iran as an existential threat. Americas Arab allies oppose Irans
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growing influence and interventions in the region. These constituencies are convinced Obamas nuclear deal
with Iran has allowed it to retain nuclear weapons capability and expand its aggressive regional role. New US
sanctions have now been placed on Iran after the latters missile test last week. Irans reactions will provide
grounds to ratchet up sanctions and pressure. A US-Iran confrontation even if short of a shooting war
would lead to intensification of conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Israel-Palestine: Trump appears to have backed away from unconditional support for Netanyahus settlements
expansion in occupied West Bank. The US embassy shift has also been put in slow motion. Yet, prospects for a
two-state solution are fast eroding; the likelihood is rising that Fatah, even Hamas, may be marginalised and
replaced by more extreme groups aligned with IS or Al Qaeda.
Ukraine: Fighting has recently resumed in Ukraine between government forces and the pro-Russian opposition
in the east, perhaps to ensure the crisis is not ignored as Trump and Vladimir Putin seek to normalise ties.
However, Trump has backed away from lifting anti-Russia sanctions unilaterally. The new US UN ambassador
repeated US denunciation of Russias takeover of Crimea and role in Ukraine. The reset of US-Russia ties is
likely to prove more complicated than Trump presumed.
Eastern Europe: Similarly, Nato, pressed by the Baltic states and Poland, has gone ahead with planned military
deployments and exercises along Russias borders. Trump has stepped back from dismissing Nato as obsolete.
His defence secretary staunchly supports the alliance. Thus, European concerns will have to be factored into the
US-Russia reset. The main bone of contention may not be either Ukraine or the limited Nato military
deployment in Eastern Europe but US plans to instal a strategic ballistic missile defence system in Poland.
North Korea: Trumps claim he will neutralise North Koreas nuclear and missile programmes is unlikely to be
realised. China cannot be pressured to tighten sanctions against Pyongyang to a point that threatens North
Koreas political collapse. Korean unification would bring US troops to Chinas borders. A US military strike
on North Korea would destroy prosperous South Korea. A regional crisis is, however, brewing due to planned
US deployment of the THAAD ballistic missile defence system in South Korea which China and Russia believe
would neutralise the strategic nuclear balance.
South and East China seas: From a neutral stance, the US has moved to challenge Chinas claims in the South
and East China seas. US Freedom of Navigation patrols have expanded and 70 per cent of the US navy is now
deployed in the Pacific. The US Pacific commander has said his forces are ready to fight tonight. The
incoming US secretary of state commented in Senate hearings that Chinas access to the disputed South China
Sea islands could be blocked by the US. This was casually endorsed by the White House spokesman. The
Chinese responded that to do so the US should be prepared to go to war with China. The US posture may be
moderated after sober reflection.
Taiwan: Trump has called into question US endorsement of the One China policy, the foundation of Sino-US
relations for over four decades. Some Chinese officials have privately declared the day Taiwan declares
independence is the day Chinese troops will land on its beaches. However, Taiwanese fully understand the
danger and Trumps posture is apparently designed to extract trade and other concessions from China rather
than actually discard the policy. Still, a Sino-US crisis is possible over trade, missile defence and the South
China Sea.
Pakistan-India: Blissfully, South Asia has not figured prominently in the Washington policy turmoil. The US
administration will persist in seeking to co-opt India into its strategy to contain China but is likely to be less
accommodative of Indias attempts to hedge its bets with China, Iran and Russia. India could face problems
on trade and immigration. Pakistan will be pressed for cooperation on Afghanistan and terrorism. The US
administration is likely to be more decisive in rewarding cooperation and penalising non-cooperation. Trumps
ego may propel him to attempt a mediatory role between India and Pakistan. However, in the event of a Pak-
India crisis, the US will side with India. A Sino-US confrontation could result in a knock-on crisis in Pakistan-
US ties.
The strategic environment: Today, arms expenditures are rising; military rhetoric is rampant; global and
regional cooperation is eroding. After Trumps election, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved up its
Doomsday Clock to two and half minutes to midnight. The last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev observed
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recently that it looks as if the world is preparing for war. He urged world leaders to focus on preventing war,
phasing out the arms race and reducing weapons arsenals. Unfortunately, no one seems to be listening.

US unipolar World is over

The US' strategy has been to isolate Russia internationally. Evidently, it is Washington that is becoming more
isolated on the global stage. This week in the run-up to the G20 summit in Germany, the reverse in fortunes
could not be more glaring
While North Korea was openly defying Washington with a breakthrough ballistic missile test, and US President
Donald Trump was embroiled in his usual juvenile tweeting antics, Russia and Chinas leaders were proudly
consolidating their strategic alliance for a new multipolar global order. Western media wont acknowledge as
much, but the meeting this week in Moscow between Putin and Xi Jinping was of historical importance. We are
witnessing a global transition in power. And for the common good.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping bond through an apparent deep sense
of mutual respect and wisdom about the political challenges facing todays world. The two leaders have met on
more than 20 occasions over the past four years. President Xi referred to Russia as Chinas foremost ally and
said that in a topsy-turvy world the friendship between the two was a source of countervailing stability.
On the breaking news of North Koreas successful test launch of its first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM), both Putin and Xi called for calm restraint. By contrast, US President Trump took to Twitter to taunt
Kim Jong-Un. Does this guy not have anything better to do with his life? said Trump in words that could
apply more pertinently to the American president.
Then the US and its South Korea ally also launched their ballistic missiles in a military drill aimed as a show of
strength to Pyongyang. Kim Jung-Un responded that the ICBM was a gift for the American bastards on their
Fourth of July Independence Day holiday and that there would more such gifts on the way.
Rather than escalating tensions, Putin and Xi put forward the eminently reasonable proposal that North Korea
should freeze its missile tests and the US should likewise halt its military exercises on the Korean peninsula. All
sides must convene in negotiations with a commitment to non-violence and without preconditions to strive for a
comprehensive settlement to the decades-old dispute.
The contrast in Putin and Xis dignified, intelligent response with that of Trumps petulance is clear proof of
Russia and China showing real global leadership, whereas the Americans are just part of the problem. But the
Korean drama was only one illustration this week of how American ambitions of unipolar dominance have
become redundant. The G20 summit prelude of Putin hosting Xi in Moscow was followed by the Chinese
president making a state visit to Germany on Wednesday two days before the gathering in Hamburg. Xi and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly signed new trade deals between the worlds two leading export
economies.
Relations between China and Germany are at their historic best,said Michael Clauss, Germanys ambassador
to Beijing. The economic and political dynamic from a German perspective is moving toward the east. Of
significance too was news this week the European Union is preparing to finalize a major trade pact with Japan.
It is also significant that Japans Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on China and Russia to help mediate the
Korean crisis immediately following Pyongyangs ICMB test launch.
Evidently, Japan, despite being an ally of Washington, is reaching out to a multilateral solution as proposed by
Moscow and Beijing. In so many ways, therefore, whether on matters of security or trade and economy, the
world appears to be moving inexorably toward a multipolar format as the most appropriate response to
challenges. Not so from the American point of view, especially under Donald Trumps leadership. All nations
seem to be nothing more than a footstool for the exceptional Americans who feel entitled to hector and
browbeat everyone else to get what they want.
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Americas isolation in the world was glimpsed at the G7 summit earlier this year in May when the other nations
awkwardly diverged from Trump on his decision to withdraw the US from the global climate accord. Two
months on, the isolation of Washington is even more vivid on the world stage as G20 leaders gather in Hamburg
this weekend. A Bloomberg News headline put it succinctly: Trump risks uniting Cold War allies and foes
against him.
Trumps quest for America First through trade protectionism and his narrow-minded unilateralism toward
issues of global security have put America out on a limb as far as the rest of the world is concerned. Where is
the American team player, the supposed leader of the free world? All the self proclaimed virtues are being
seen for what they always were: overblown, pretentious and vainglorious bombast. America is seen as nothing
more than a selfish, hulking giant. Its trade imbalances with the rest of the world are not because of rotten
deals, as Trump would have it, but rather because the American economy has ruined itself over many decades.
The off-shoring of jobs by American corporations and gutting of American workers with poverty wages are part
of it. When America now talks about upholding international law and security, the rest of the world just laughs
with bitter irony. The wars across the Middle East and the sponsoring of terrorism are largely US products of
criminal regime-change intrigues. Who is this deluded head-case in Washington?
The same deluded head-case that has beautiful chocolate cake with Chinas president in a Florida beach
resort, and then proceeds to slap sanctions on China and make provocative military incursions on its territory.
Its not just Trump. Its the whole American political leadership. The American ruling class has become so
blinded by hubris that it cant even see how the world it claims to dominate is collectively shutting the door on
it and walking away.
Washington has no answers for todays world challenges. Because simply put, Washington is the source of
many of todays problems. It has not even the modesty to acknowledge its responsibility. The only thing the US
seems capable of is to make current problems fiendishly worse. The Korean crisis is an object lesson. Presidents
Putin and Xi are not scheming to usurp world domination, as Washington would have us believe. Only in
Washington would a vision for a multipolar, more democratic global order be construed as something
threatening and sinister. Thats because American ambitions of unipolar full spectrum dominance are actually
threatening and sinister.
The world can be thankful it has genuine leaders in Putin and Xi who are forging ahead to create a multipolar
global order. Fortunately, the strategic alliance between Russia and China is underpinned by a formidable
military capability. Joint naval exercises this month carried out in the Baltic Sea are a vital insurance policy to
back up what Moscow and Beijing are increasingly bold enough to say to the Americans. That message, as
Putin and Xi effectively gave to Trump this week, is that American ambitions of world domination are no
longer acceptable and no longer tenable. Washingtons days of bullying the world with its moralizing hypocrisy
and military aggression are over.

US declining Power
According to Global Trends 2030, compiled by the National Intelligence Council, the US will lose its
superpower status by 2030. A recent Pew Research Centers public opinion survey has found that an increasing
number of Americans fearfully view China as the next global superpower. And some analysts predict rising
Russia as the next hegemonic power of the world.
The advocates of declining America opine that both Russia and China are fast emerging to challenge the
American economic and military dominance throughout the world. According to them, Russia has recently
broken American military preponderance in Syria, while China has steadily outweighed Uncle Sam
economically in Africa. Both these communist states are engaged in carving out special spheres of influence for
their military and economic objectives from the disputed waters of Far East Asia to eastern Europe.
This has led some analysts of world affairs to raise the pertinent question: is America on the decline at the
global level as a superpower?
The US has utterly failed to contain the simmering Syrian civil war and bring an end to the Russian strategic
incursion of Ukraine. The outgoing Obama administration is grappling with some mounting economic and
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security challenges in eastern Europe, East Asia, South Asia and in the Middle East, and seems largely unable
to resolve these threatening issues.
Is the US really a declining power on the world stage because of the rise of the rest, especially China and
Russia? The US began its journey to become the worlds superpower at the dawn of the 19th century. After the
1898 Treaty of Paris, it became a colonial power with overseas territories, including Puerto Rico, the
Philippines and the Island of Guam. At that point, some analysts of international relations viewed the US as a
great power or emerging superpower.
When the two World Wars had weakened France, Germany, Japan and Great Britain, the US and the Soviet
Union rose to power, thus creating a bipolar international system. Americas systematic military tactics during
the cold war immensely helped it inflict a crushing defeat on the erstwhile USSR in Afghanistan, hence
emerging as the worlds hegemonic power after the fateful disintegration of the USSR in the early 1990s.
American military policy on the Syrian civil war, the Russian invasion of Crimea and on Chinas steady rise in
Asia and Africa is based on the premise of cautious intervention. This is primarily calculated to avoid getting
embroiled in direct and costly wars like those of Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a
portent of American weakness; rather a sign of more military prowess and economic power by saving trillions
of dollars.
Impartial and meticulous research clearly show that the US still maintains enough military, political, economic,
cultural and scientific superiority so as to exercise global dominance till 2050.
There is no doubt that Chinas economy is growing at an impressive rate. But its not just the size of an
economy that matters its also the quality. Though China is forecast to grow at 6.7 percent as per the World
Bank report, the American economy still remains the bedrock of the global financial system. More than 80
percent of all financial transactions worldwide are conducted in dollars, as are 87 percent of foreign currency
market transactions.
On account of its growing population of retirees, prodigious environmental challenges and imminent cold war
with India and the US in certain regions China will face considerable challenged in the future. Such increasing
economic adversities will result in slowing down the level of the current economic boom.
The Americans have surpassed China in terms of per capita income. American per capita income was last
recorded at $51,486 in 2015, while China had just $6,416.18 in the same year. According to Bloomberg, for the
first time in almost a decade, China has lost ground in catching up with the US economy, when output is
measured in dollars. American GDP increased $590 billion in 2015 from a year earlier. Chinas economy, while
reporting 6.9 percent growth for the year, added $439 billion. The yuan is projected to depreciate to 6.79 against
the dollar, down more than seven percent from the average level in 2015.
On the military front, the US enjoys an unrivalled superiority in the world. According to SIPRI, the US remains
by far the worlds largest military spender with a total expenditure of $596 billion at nearly three times the
level of China, which is ranked second. Moreover, American military exports account for nearly 33 percent of
worldwide arms exports by far the top arms exporter on the planet. Though China has upped its share of
global arms exports by over 60 percent compared to the 2006-2010, it still lags behind the US in terms of
exporting sophisticated arms to developing countries.
Apart from that, the US holds around 800 military bases in some 50 countries, spending about $156 billion
annually on them. Its navy has 10 large nuclear-powered carriers, the largest carriers in the world. From the
Atlantic Ocean to the South China Sea, American battleships can be seen prepared for any unfortunate incident
against the burgeoning interests of either the US or its allies. Neither Russia nor China possesses such
ubiquitous and sophisticated aircraft carriers to challenge American naval potency at least in the near future.
The most important yardstick of a potential superpower is its continuous and growing resourcefulness and
innovation. Of the nine largest tech companies in the world, eight are based in the US. Today, American
research universities and scientific institutions are the best, thus allowing the country to produce new products
while leaving the world behind. America has come back from the financial crisis with robust technology
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innovation leading the recovery, while Chinas economy is heading down, says Niu Jun, an international
relations professor at Peking University.
At present, the US is spending about 30 percent of all research and development money to keep its comparative
advantage intact. For decades Americans worried about energy dependency, yet today the US is the worlds
number one producer of oil and natural gas largely due to its qualitative and unmatchable research in the field of
energy. Both China and Russia need approximately 30 to 40 years and investment of billions of dollars to catch
up with the Americans in the field of research and development.
Last but not the least, in todays globalised world, democratic and liberal countries make far greater progress
than undemocratic and illiberal states. Unlike China and Russia, the US has the best democratic institutions
which have immensely helped it maintain and foster military strength and economic growth. Such a system has
brought the best brains to the saddle in all government departments.
In a nutshell, due to its increasing economic, military, technological and democratic power, the US will
continue to enjoy the position of the global superpower in the near future. China and Russia can be considered
as major world powers in terms of military and economic strength. Therefore, it is imperative for Pakistan for
greater national interests to cultivate amicable relations with all these three powers, particularly China and the
US, in the days ahead.

Rising dragon, wounded eagle US-China

WHEN Chinas former vice premier, Qian Qichen, was asked 20 years ago about the future of Sino-US
relations, he reportedly responded: They [Sino-US relations] will never be as good as they should be; and
never be as bad as they can be. This prognosis holds true today for the worlds most important bilateral
relationship.
The largest and second-largest economies are now deeply intertwined and interdependent through trade, supply
chains and finance. But the fortunes of the Chinese dragon have been rising; the power of the American eagle
has been dented by long wars and economic profligacy. The Greek historian, Thucydides, postulated that when
an established power faces a rising one, a clash is almost inevitable.
In its final years, the Obama administration seemed to be rushing towards the Thucydides Trap. Obamas pivot
to Asia consisted of: an effort to build a string of US alliances around Chinas periphery from Japan to
India; the deployment of two-thirds of US naval power to the Pacific; a challenge to Chinas maritime claims in
the South China Sea; and Chinas exclusion from the Trans Pacific (trade) Partnership.
Prospects for Sino-US relations worsened with Donald Trumps campaign rhetoric against China and threats to
slap punitive tariffs on its exports and declare it a currency manipulator. In justifying his unprecedented call
with Taiwans leader, Trump threatened to discard the One China policy unless China agreed to trade
concessions. Tensions were further heightened when the incoming US secretary of state asserted that the US
could deny China access to its claims in the South China Sea.
Since then, the Trump administration has walked back, slowly, from its most extreme positions. US Defence
Secretary Mattis assured that the South China Sea disputes would have to be resolved through negotiations. In a
carefully choreographed call with the Chinese president, Trump affirmed continued US adherence to the One
China policy.
The recent Trump-Xi summit in Mar-a-Lago was expected to determine the direction of US-China relations.
Although the summit was overshadowed by the US missile strikes against Syria, there was no acrimony, and
agreement was reached on a high-level security dialogue and a 100-day plan to address trade.
However, uncertainty persists due to Trumps unpredictability. He will not declare China a currency
manipulator. But Trump has now linked the trade talks to Chinas help on North Korea.
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In his tweets, President Trump has repeatedly urged China to resolve the threat from North Korea or the US
will. The US deployment of a US carrier group towards the Korean Peninsula has escalated tensions. But the
US is unlikely to conduct a pre-emptive or punitive strike against North Korea ( la Syria) given Pyongyangs
capacity for a devastating response. And, the window for such a strike is likely to close shortly if, as expected,
the left-wing candidate wins the South Korean presidency and rules out the use of force.
China shares the US aim of denuclearising North Korea, and is deeply angered by Kim Jong-uns provocative
nuclear and missile tests and indifference to Chinas wider interests. China is likely to support intensified
Security Council sanctions against North Korea, including an embargo on oil sales, if it continues its tests. Yet,
China is unlikely to intensify pressure to the extent of triggering the collapse of the North Korean economy or
the Pyongyang regime. This could lead to war, massive refugee flows into China and possible absorption of
North Korea by the South, bringing US troops to Chinas border.
Under the circumstances, the best option may be a resumption of the five plus one (US, China, Russia, Japan
and South Korea plus North Korea) dialogue; a de facto acceptance of North Koreas nuclear capabilities; and
a freeze on its nuclear and missile development in exchange for economic aid and assurances of regime
survival. Even this outcome will be difficult to negotiate.
Given the Korean crisis, it is fortunate that, at least so far, the US has not revived the provocative challenge to
China in the South China Sea. Absent US intervention, China will probably display flexibility and offer
economic cooperation to its Southeast Asian neighbours to resolve maritime disputes. The peaceful resolution
of the South China Sea disputes would remove a major source of potential Sino-US friction and confrontation.
Apart from Korea, trade is the other headline issue for Trump in dealing with China. For its part, Beijing wants
a more balanced trade relationship with the US, and a reduction of the $300 billion bilateral trade surplus,
through trade expansion rather than restriction. To this end, it appears willing to facilitate US agricultural,
services and other exports and to stimulate domestic demand in China. But it will also urge the US to lift the
wide-ranging restrictions on the sale of advanced technological goods and services to China as one way of
correcting the trade imbalance.
Xis economic trump card may be an offer of Chinese participation in Trumps plan to restore and modernise
Americas aging infrastructure. China has the finance, expertise and recent experience to make a significant
contribution. If Trumps plans for tax breaks are stalled, he may welcome Chinas contribution.
Such cooperation on infrastructure may open the door to US participation in Chinas path-breaking One Belt,
One Road initiative which its media has dubbed as Globalisation 2.0. China has invited US participation in the
project. It could be extremely lucrative for US corporations and industry.
A first step in this direction may be active US participation in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
endeavour. The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are already financing some CPEC-related
projects in Pakistan. American companies are also involved as equipment suppliers for power plants and
financial, technical and legal consultants in various projects.
Ever since it arranged Henry Kissingers clandestine trip to China in 1971, Pakistan has had a significant stake
in the preservation of positive Sino-US relations. Today, if a great power consensus can be achieved on a
strategy for stability in Afghanistan and counterterrorism, Pakistan can become the geographical locus for
economic and strategic cooperation between the worlds two primary powers.

Shifting World Alliances

The titanic forces unleashed by the end of the Cold War and the process of globalisation have radically
transformed the world. The process of transformation continues apace posing serious challenges to policy
makers who have to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding the national security and promoting the
economic prosperity of their respective countries. While surveying the current global scene and its likely trends
in the 21st century, I offered the following comments in my book, Pakistan and a World in Disorder-A
Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century published by Palgrave Macmillan in June this year:
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Pakistan is faced with an anarchic and extremely competitive global security environment marked by the
domination of power politics over international law, diminished authority of the UN on strategic issues of war
and peace, civilisational fault-lines, primacy of economic power, importance of science and technology in
determining the power of states and its growth, the rise of new powers demanding the accommodation of their
interests in the international system, and shifting alliances. It is this world in disorder with an unpredictable
and inhospitable international environment, in which Pakistan has to operate to safeguard its security and attain
the goal of economic prosperity so that its people may realise their full potential. (Chapter 2, p. 28)
In the current global security environment, power is the ultimate arbiter of strategic issues of war and peace. It
would be a mistake to place reliance merely on international law and morality in quest of a satisfactory
settlement of such issues. For the same reason and because of the growing tendency of major powers to resort to
unilateralism in dealing with such issues (e.g. US invasion of Iraq of 2003), the capacity of the UN Security
Council to perform its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security has greatly
diminished. Of course, it would be a mistake to ignore the UN altogether because it can occasionally play a
useful role in encouraging major powers to reach an understanding on security issues. Further, in the calculus of
power, economic strength acts as a major determinant of a countrys position in the international ranking. A
country which is losing ground to its opponent in the economic field cannot hope to safeguard its national
interests effectively in the long run. It is also worth emphasising that in the modern knowledge-based world,
advancement in science and technology plays a critically important role in determining the relative strength of a
country vis--vis its opponents or competitors.
Pakistan is confronted by an extremely threatening regional security environment because of the enduring
hostility of India which entertains hegemonic designs in South Asia, the Kashmir dispute, and the continuing
armed conflict and political instability in Afghanistan. In this regional scenario, it is vitally important for
Pakistan to build up its economic and military power, strengthen its political stability, and pursue a pro-active
rather than a reactive foreign policy in order to be able to safeguard its national security and promote its
economic prosperity. Unfortunately, the situation in Pakistan is far from satisfactory, particularly in the
economic and political fields.
Economically, Pakistan is increasingly falling far behind India, which poses an existential threat to Pakistan as
an independent and a sovereign country. As against Indias current annual GDP growth rate of about 7.5%,
Pakistans GDP growth rate over the past decade or so has never exceeded 5% per annum. The situation
becomes even more alarming when one takes into account the fact that India is about seven times bigger than
Pakistan in terms of population. Ideally, Pakistan should be growing at an even faster pace than India
economically to face successfully the challenges posed by the latter. Pakistans current economic situation,
therefore, reflects a huge failure on the part of the countrys economic planners and managers. The same is true
as far as the advancement in science and technology is concerned. Pakistans literacy percentage remains
extremely low. We still do not have universal primary education coverage. There is hardly any world class
university in Pakistan. Further, there is woefully inadequate attention to the advancement of science and
technology and to vocational and technical training in our educational curricula. Unless, we take energetic steps
to accelerate our economic growth and advancement in science and technology, the countrys internal and
external problems will aggravate posing a serious threat to our national security.
Internally, Pakistans democracy is still fragile because of the history of military regimes which did not allow
the democratic institutions and practices to take root, inadequacies and the immaturity of politicians and
political parties, and the incompetence and corruption of our bureaucracy and the judiciary. We, therefore,
continue to suffer from political instability and uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, India has not missed any
opportunity to exploit our political weaknesses to its advantage. It played the key role in the dismemberment of
Pakistan in 1971. More recently, it has been engaged in sponsoring and fomenting terrorism in Pakistan. Its
secret agencies may even be involved in other schemes for spreading political instability and widening political
divisions in the country. In the management of our national affairs, our politicians and the various state
institutions must beware of Indias machinations.
A distinctive feature of the current global security environment is the trend towards the shifting of alliances
because of the radical transformation caused by the end of the Cold War, globalisation and the emergence of
new major powers which are jockeying for the accommodation of their interests in the international system. In
 10

the triangular relationship among the US, China, and Russia, the strategic cooperation between the US and
China of 1970s and 1980s has been replaced by growing strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing.
The driving force behind this trend is the pursuit of the goal of global hegemony by the US which is seen as a
serious security threat by Moscow and Beijing.
Chinas rapid rise as an economic giant and a potential super power of the future is another important factor
causing the shifting of alliances. The US, in pursuance of its policy of containment of China, is strengthening
strategic partnership with India in the hope that India would block the expansion of the Chinas influence and
power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. One should contrast this development with the situation
during the Cold War when India was non-aligned. On the other hand, the US is gradually distancing itself from
Pakistan, its erstwhile ally during the Cold War, because of the latters unwillingness to be a party to the US
policy of containment of China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which aims at strengthening
strategic and economic cooperation between the two countries, is the right answer to the rapidly developing US-
India axis.
These developments call for greater care and wisdom in the handling of our relations with India and the US than
has been exhibited so far. While working for a tension-free relationship with India, we should recognise that
friendship with India will remain an elusive goal in the foreseeable future. Consequently, SAARC must be
downgraded as a vehicle for regional cooperation. Instead, ECO must be built up by us as an organisation for
regional economic integration. We must also adopt a long-term approach to the Kashmir dispute keeping in
view the national, regional, and global ground realities. We need to lower our expectations from the US while
maintaining and, where possible, strengthening our friendly relations with it. Finally, we should develop bridges
of understanding and cooperation with Russia while deepening our strategic links with Iran.

Trump and Muslim World

ON his first foreign foray, President Donald Trump, apart from asking the 50-odd Muslim leaders assembled in
Riyadh to act against Islamist terrorism, proposed a new alliance between the US, Arab-Muslim states and
Israel to oppose Irans hegemonic expansion and support for terrorism, while simultaneously promising a
peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
In his Riyadh speech, Trump called this a struggle between good and evil. Unfortunately, the proposed
coalition would combine many members who are good with some who are evil.
Trumps new plan reflects a radical turnaround from his expressed hostility to Islam and condemnation of Saudi
Arabia and radical Islamic terrorism during the presidential campaign. However, despite the fanfare in Riyadh
and Jerusalem, there are good reasons to be sceptical about this plans success.
Trumps intensified opposition to Iran is in itself not surprising. Two main sources of his support base the
Republican right and Israel were strongly opposed to Barack Obamas engagement with Iran. They wanted
the complete dismantling of Irans nuclear programme rather than the agreement negotiated to ensure that Iran
does not have the capability to develop nuclear weapons for at least a decade.
Obamas apparent assumption was that in the wake of the nuclear bargain, Iran would use its considerable
influence to help in stabilising Iraq and Syria and the region. For its part, Iran expected the US, under Obamas
Democratic successor (Hillary Clinton), not only to legally abrogate the nuclear sanctions but also work to
eliminate the unilateral US sanctions imposed on Tehran in the context of terrorism and missile testing.
Trumps victory upended these assumptions.
Under Trump, Iran is doubtful that the nuclear sanctions will be cancelled by the US Congress and rightly fears
that other US sanctions may be intensified, as threatened by Trump and his advisers and members of the US
Congress. Consequently, while continuing to fight the militant Islamic State (IS) group and Al Qaeda in the
region, Tehran has held back its cooperation with the US and enhanced its military role in all of the regions
conflicts.
While Trump has not renounced the nuclear deal, his administration is embarked on finding ways to intensify
pressure on Iran. The aim, at the minimum, is to secure a halt to Irans missile testing, a more accommodative
 11

stance on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and termination of support to Hezbollah and Hamas. To challenge Iran,
Washington has now aligned itself completely with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, the return of its prodigal patron is heaven-sent. Angered by Obamas betrayal, and fearful of
Irans rising power, Saudi Arabia had hastily announced the formation of a 41-nation Islamic alliance last
year. Given Irans explicit exclusion, the response to the alliance was lukewarm from most Muslim countries.
The most notable development was the appointment of Pakistans respected ex-army chief to head the military
alliance.
With the revival of the traditional US-Saudi alliance, as illustrated in the $110 billion in arms deals and $350bn
in business contracts signed during Trumps trip, the Saudis have less need now for the Islamic Alliance
against Iran although it would be a useful appendage to the renewed partnership with the US.
It is safe to presume that tensions in the Levant and the Gulf are likely to escalate in the wake of the new co-
relation of forces unleashed during Trumps trip. However, it will not be easy, even for the powerful coalition
that is being formed, to reverse Irans dominant position in the region.
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadis government in Baghdad depends on the Iranian-trained Shia militias to do
most of the fighting against IS, and restrain the Sunni tribes and Kurdish ambitions. Similarly, Syrias Assad
could not survive without the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Shia militias.
In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthis have proved resilient. Hezbollah, despite its preoccupation with fighting for
Assad, possesses the missile capabilities to do serious damage to Israel from southern Lebanon and Syria. Iran
also retains influence with Hamas, the only credible Palestinian resistance to Israel.
Finally, Irans capacity for retaliation under pressure cannot be underestimated. It can, among other things:
foment trouble in the Gulf, especially Bahrain, destabilise Afghanistan and provoke sectarian strife in Pakistan.
Trump himself affirmed in Jerusalem that Arab cooperation in an anti-Iran coalition will be available only if a
political settlement can be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians. The 2002 Saudi peace plan was
mentioned as a basis for a settlement. This appears highly unlikely, given Israels virtual foreclosure of a two-
state solution. Trump has raised expectations which are unlikely to be fulfilled.
Those Arab and Muslim states which were invited to Riyadh for the Arab Islamic American summit would do
well to carefully review the pros and cons of joining the anti-Iran coalition.
As has been noted critically in the Pakistani press, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not able to speak at the
Riyadh summit, nor to meet President Trump, while the leaders of lesser countries were accorded that privilege.
This may represent a deliberate snub, probably administered by the Americans rather than the Saudis, or merely
an organisational mishap. In any case, this diplomatic snub or snafu may be a blessing in disguise since it
provides Pakistan with even greater justification to review its position on the anti-Iran coalition.
Since the early days, Pakistan has taken the consistent position that it will not take sides or participate in
conflicts between Muslim states. Thus, it adopted a neutral stance during the Iran-Iraq war and participated in a
six-nation Islamic heads of state committee to end the war. Such neutrality did not detract from Pakistans
traditional commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia and the holy places.
This practised paradigm provides a sound guide for Pakistans policy in the current context.
Of course, Pakistans neutrality should be reciprocated by Iran in the context of Pakistans challenges with
Afghanistan and India.
Finally, Pakistan should expect to be pressed by the US to fall in line with its regional strategy not only in the
Gulf but especially in Afghanistan and South Asia. This is another reason for Pakistan to determine its policies
after due consideration of the entire spectrum of its strategic interests.

Third America- Afghan War

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THE decision by the Trump administration to bolster the presence of US troops in Afghanistan raises questions
about Americas getting into the third phase of its Afghan war. The number of additional troops is likely to be
3,000 to 5,000 in addition to the 8,800 or so American soldiers already engaged in the war that is in its 16th
year.
Intriguingly, there has not been any formal Afghan policy announcement by the US president. Instead, he has
just authorised the Pentagon to take a decision on the surge figure, indicating the increasing US reliance on a
military solution to the Afghan crisis. What is described by the White House as a stopgap measure ie setting
troops levels, may push the US deeper into the Afghan quagmire in the absence of an exit plan.
This decision to send additional troops underscores a reversal of the Obama administrations policy envisioning
the complete withdrawal of US combat forces from Afghanistan; it is also a departure from Trumps own
election pledge to not get militarily involved in foreign conflicts.
Surely the troop surge was necessitated by the spreading Afghan Taliban insurgency causing an increasing
number of military and civilian casualties in the war-torn country. The most recent series of terrorist attacks in
Kabul are the deadliest since the US invasion in 2001. And the killing of more than 160 Afghan National Army
soldiers in an attack on a military garrison in Herat, believed to be a more secure region, underlines the
deteriorating security situation in the country.
Thousands of Afghan soldiers have been killed in insurgent attacks since the drawdown of US troops in
December 2014. The few thousand residual troops are largely engaged in training and providing support to the
Afghan National Army in combat. The Taliban have extended their area of influence. But can the addition of a
few thousand troops reverse the situation and achieve what more than 160,000 US and allied troops could not?
This stopgap arrangement is certainly not going to work.
More disconcerting is the failure to contain the insurgency that could lead to a demand from the military
commanders to deploy more troops, thus getting the United States into what is described by some US security
experts as potentially the third American-Afghan war. In the words of Robert Grenier, a former CIA
counterterrorism expert, America has already fought two wars in Afghanistan. The first one that started in
October 2001 ended in a quick victory for US forces with the routing of the Taliban regime.
But the triumph was short-lived. Four years later, in 2005, the US found itself involved in its second Afghan
war with thousands of coalition forces engaged in a fierce battle with revitalised and regrouped insurgents. This
phase has continued despite the winding up of the US combat mission with no victory, illusory or otherwise.
With a deteriorating security situation and a weak and divided government in Kabul unable to maintain its
control over territory, the challenges that confront the US in Afghanistan now are somewhat similar to those
faced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. In fact, the situation has worsened with the conflict extending to both
sides of the Durand Line dividing Afghanistan and Pakistan. Further exacerbating matters is the rise of the
militant Islamic State group which has claimed many of the recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that have
taken a huge civilian toll.
While the Trump administration is still in the process of reviewing its Afghan policy, there seems to be no clear
thinking in Washington on exploring the possibility of a political solution to the Afghan crisis. The use of the
mother of all bombs cannot bring an end to this bloody war. The war will be further prolonged with more
disastrous consequences for Afghanistan and the region if the surge in troops is not accompanied by
intensified political and diplomatic efforts to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. The suggestion
for reviving the Afghanistan-Pakistan-US-China quadrilateral forum sounds positive, but there is a need for a
more proactive approach.
Missing in the policy matrix is the source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan that makes prospects for
Afghan peace bleaker. Cross-border insurgent sanctuaries are a symptom and not the cause of the growing
divide. Relations between the two countries have never been cordial since 2001, but they have hit a new low
with the escalation in terrorist attacks that Kabul blames on the Haqqani network allegedly operating from
Pakistans border areas. There has been a further breakdown of relations between the two countries with the
recent measures taken by Pakistan to tighten border management.
 13

But the main reason for the increasing trust deficit is Pakistans concern at the growing Indian presence in
Afghanistan. That is also the reason for Pakistan using the Afghan Taliban as a hedge against this development.
The heightening tension between India and Pakistan has further intensified Islamabads apprehensions. Despite
its own problem of violent militancy, Islamabad is not willing to take tougher action against the Afghan
insurgent sanctuaries.
It is apparent, that no matter how intense the US administrations pressure, it cannot force Pakistan to change its
position. Even the deployment of more troops cannot help stabilise the situation in Afghanistan without
persuading Pakistan to withdraw its support to Afghan insurgents particularly the Haqqani network. But that can
only be possible with the US addressing Pakistans security concerns however exaggerated they may be.
One cannot agree more with what Stephen Hadley and Moeed Yusuf have written in their op-ed piece in New
York Times last week: United States policies towards Pakistan have long underestimated the centrality of this
regional dynamic in defining Pakistani choices. According to them an approach that links efforts to enlist
Pakistans support in Afghanistan to a strategy aimed at improving India-Pakistan ties could change this.
This is perhaps the only way for the United States to avoid getting mired in the third war in Afghanistan.

India and America Nexus

THE widely circulated picture of Indian Prime Minister Modi clinging to a visibly uncomfortable Donald
Trumps breast illustrates the nature of the emerging relationship between India and the US.

Modis eagerness to serve as Americas natural partner to contain a rising China is based on the expectation
that this will provide India multiple advantages: latest military equipment and technology; expanded US
investment; unconditional US support against Pakistan, a free hand in Kashmir and vigorous endorsement of
Indias great power ambitions in South Asia, the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The Indo-US alliance has grave security implications for Pakistan. It will exacerbate the military imbalance and
make India even more intransigent on Kashmir and belligerent towards Pakistan. Indeed, to deflect attention
from its failed oppression of the popular Kashmiri revolt, Modi may feel sufficiently emboldened to actually
attempt a cross-LoC surgical strike against Pakistan, provoking a war which is unlikely to remain limited.

However, the alliance with America will involve challenges and costs for India which Modi appears to have
discounted.

The US and India are unequal powers. As the practitioner of the Art of the Deal, Trump will not be shy to
exercise the leverage which the US will progressively acquire over India, eg, to open Indias restrictive trade
regime or curtail its traditional ties with Russia and Iran. To sustain the partnership, India will have to learn to
bend, often, to Americas will, compromising the independence of its foreign policy.

As Pakistan discovered, defence ties with the US can be a mixed blessing. The arms and technology tap can be
turned on and off by Washington to secure desired behaviour from its allies and partners. When Lockheeds F-
16 production is relocated to India, will the US, as it did with Pakistan, implant software to neutralise the
aircrafts operational capabilities in a crisis? New Delhi will never be sure that any equipment it acquires from
the US, or Israel, will not be compromised if India attempts to use this for purposes other than those endorsed
by the US.

While the US will wish to use India to strategically harass China, it may be more reluctant to support all Indias
aims against Pakistan and other smaller neighbours. As a global power, the US will want to retain direct
influence over Pakistan and other South Asian states rather than delegate this to India.
 14

Undeterred by such considerations, Modi seems to have embarked already on his assigned mission to contain
China. India is the only major country to reject Chinas Belt and Road initiative. It provoked China by inviting
the Dalai Lama to disputed Arunachal Pradesh/south Tibet. And, it has blocked Chinese road construction on
Chinese territory along the Bhutan-China border. Beijing has demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops as
soon as possible and reminded India of the lessons of history, ie Indias 1962 defeat.

In his book, Implosion: Indias Tryst with Reality, John Eliot argues that India is not well placed to confront
China. Although Indias GDP is growing annually at seven per cent and China at 6.5pc, the gap is widening
since the Chinese economy is more than four times the size of Indias.

Given that India has been unable to bully Pakistan, it is hardly in a position to confront China simultaneously.
Even the smaller South Asian states are entering into economic and defence relationships with China. The
Bangladesh government, although deeply beholden to India, is buying Chinese submarines and will exploit its
major Bay of Bengal gas field with a Chinese rather than an Indian partner.

Chinas Global Times asked: With GDP several times higher than that of India, military capabilities that can
reach the Indian Ocean and having good relations with Indias peripheral nations, coupled with the fact that
Indias turbulent northern states border China, will Beijing lose to New Delhi?

Indias vulnerabilities are extensive. Kashmir remains Indias Achilles heel (where, so far, China has urged
Pakistan to exercise restraint). India is fighting 17 active insurgencies in 119 districts (according to former
prime minister Manmohan Singh), including the Naxalite, Naga and Mizo rebellions, the latter two in areas
adjacent to China. With millions of Muslims and lower caste Hindus alienated by BJP-RSS inspired
discrimination and violence, India is also fertile ground for civil chaos.

Despite the grave implications of the Indo-US alliance, Pakistan should exercise strategic patience. India is on
the wrong side of history. It is building alliances with distant powers, the US and Israel, both of which are
disliked by the people if not all Muslim regimes. Pakistan has the opportunity of building strong ties not only
with China but also Russia, Iran, and others across Eurasia who will be part of the Belt and Road initiative,
which is likely to have a more profound impact on regional peace and prosperity than the US military
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc.

Faced with Indias growing militarisation, Pakistans primary objective is to ensure full spectrum deterrence
against India. The successful test of the short-range Nasr missile is an important step. Islamabad desperately
needs a clear, active, national Kashmir strategy to support and sustain the indigenous Kashmiri freedom
movement. There is no longer any downside to raising the Kashmir dispute formally in the UN Security Council
and other international forums, including the International Court of Justice.

Despite its imbalanced posture, there is no point in a confrontation with the US. In the immediate future,
Pakistan may need to reach tactical accommodations with the US on Afghanistan in exchange for its active
support to end Indian-inspired terrorism in Pakistan.

Over time, the correlation of forces in the region will change. Indias friendship with Russia and Iran will
erode. (Ayatollah Khamanei mentioned Kashmir twice of late). India may blunder into a conflict with China. Its
alliance with the US may erode if India proves reluctant to actually confront China, loosen its links to Iran and
Russia or to open its market to US trade and investment.

Meanwhile, Pakistan should continue to ask Washington: would not US interests in Asia be better served by
cooperation rather than confrontation with China? Do you really want to step into the Thucydides Trap?

Trump and South Asia

 15

Indian Prime Minister Modis recent US visit indicates the direction of Trumps policy towards not only India,
but South Asia as a whole. The ongoing review of the administrations Afghan policy will also complement this
strategy. This will have far-reaching implications for Pakistan.

It is not surprising that Trump reaffirmed the partnership with India which has steadily grown since the Bush
and Obama administrations. He has gone even further by accepting Indias regional hegemonic ambitions as
articulated in the Indo-US joint statement that as responsible stewards in the Indo-Pacific region the close
partnership between them is central to peace and stability in the region. The underlying purpose is to use
India to contain China in the vain hope of ensuring US global supremacy. For China, whose growth every three
years is the size of the Indian economy, India is merely an American stooge. But for Pakistan, the Indo-US
partnership poses an existential threat.

Equally ominous for Pakistan is the emerging US policy on Afghanistan, for which the US is increasingly
relying on India. Trump not only welcomed Indian contributions to Afghan stability and security, but
recognised the importance of their respective strategic partnerships with Afghanistan and agreed to continue
close consultations and cooperation in support of Afghanistans future. According to The Hindu newspaper,
there is also speculation that the US wants India to contribute 15,000 troops to fight in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, American generals continue to seek a military victory against the Taliban and have asked for 4000
more troops, even though after 15 years of fighting at full strength they have failed in this endeavour. While
rejecting Pakistans advice to pursue a political solution, the American administration, Congress, media and
think tanks, have used Pakistan as a scapegoat, blaming Washingtons failure on Islamabads alleged support to
the Taliban. To cover up for its own failures, Kabul is happy to shift the blame on to Islamabad. The Indians,
who never miss an opportunity to pillory Pakistan, have joined this chorus.

The Indo-US joint statement is consistent with earlier American allegations accusing Pakistan of supporting
terrorism against India and Afghanistan, while completely ignoring the burden of terrorism on Pakistan,
including the Indo-Afghan support for the TTP and Baloch terrorists. Trump referred to India as a victim of
terrorism in his recent speech in Saudi Arabia. During his April visit to Pakistan, National Security Adviser
McMaster asked Pakistan not to use proxies that engage in violence. In their Congressional testimonies in
May, Director for National Intelligence Coates, and Defence Intelligence Agency Stewart repeated allegations
about Pakistan-based terrorists. Most venomous of all has been Lisa Curtis, NSC Director for South and
Central Asia. In December 2014, she wrote that Pakistan continues to support terrorist proxies in the region
under the protection of its nuclear umbrella in order to keep both Afghanistan and India off balance. Recently,
she co-authored a report recommending sanctions on Islamabad if it did not end its alleged sponsorship of
terrorism.

However, such allegations will not change ground realities. In Afghanistan, the US squandered the opportunity
to win hearts and minds by exclusive reliance on use of force and patronage of corrupt, inefficient and
duplicitous Afghan leaders which has enabled the Taliban to regroup and recapture almost 50% of Afghan
territory. Meanwhile, the rampant proliferation of drugs, weapons and terrorist groups are all contributing to the
anarchy in Afghanistan.

In India, the Modi governments Hindu extremist policies of persecuting Muslims and other minorities while
brutally repressing the freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir are the real causes for mayhem, rather than
Pakistans supposed support for terrorism. Instead of restraining India, the US is actually aiding and abetting
Indian aggression and military build-up. This will inevitably breed regional instability.

Pakistan needs to adjust to this challenging environment. A stronger strategic partnership with China is crucial
to jointly respond to the Indo-US threat to our shared security interests. CPEC provides an opportunity not just
for economic gain but for strategic leverage. Given the growing convergence of interests between Pakistan and
Russia, such as over CPEC and Afghanistan, we should also further expand our relations with Moscow. With
such rebalancing, Pakistan would acquire greater flexibility in its relations with the US.
 16

While avoiding confrontation with the Americans, we should become more opportunistic and transactional, just
as they are with us. The US still needs Pakistans cooperation in counter-terrorism and in Afghanistan for which
there must be a quid pro quo. This should not only involve adequate compensation for use of our infrastructure
but active US commitment to end Indo-Afghan sponsored terrorism against Pakistan. We should also be clear
that while we remain ready to facilitate a political solution in Afghanistan, we cannot be party to any elusive
military option as this would undermine Pakistans long-term regional interests. Most importantly, we should
continue with our efforts to ensure strategic stability in South Asia by maintaining credible deterrence against
India.

While the Indo-US partnership against China will continue, Washington cannot ignore Pakistans strategic
value for its interests in South, Central and West Asia. Not only does Pakistan occupy a pivotal regional
location but it is also a nuclear weapon state with one of the strongest armed forces in this neighbourhood that is
successfully tackling terrorism while holding hostile Indian and Afghan forces at bay. It is, therefore, a critical
factor for security and stability in this vast but volatile region. We should use these assets to our advantage.

Strategy-free force- Munir Akram

IN a recent Wall Street Journal column, President Trumps national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, and senior
economic adviser, Gary Cohn, wrote: The world is not a global community but an arena where nations, non-
governmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage, and we embrace this elemental
nature of international affairs.

Under the slogan America First, and led largely by his generals, Trump seeks to reassert global primacy
through raw military and economic power. In almost every conflict where it is engaged, the US has escalated or
threatened to escalate the use of force, even in the absence of a long-term strategy.

Unfortunately, the preference for military options can be contagious. Other powers, like Russia, Iran, Turkey,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have not been reluctant to resort to force. Even mini-money states, like the UAE and
Qatar, have embarked on foreign military operations. If military force becomes the first rather than last option
for states, international relations will be transformed into a Hobbesian jungle of all against all.

The wars in Syria and Iraq reflect this dystopian reality. Latest events the US downing of a Syrian
government aircraft and the Russian demand that US aircraft not fly west of the Euphrates have confirmed
the danger of a direct US-Russia conflict in Syria. Once the militant Islamic State group is defeated, Iraqs
three-way (Shia, Sunni, Kurd) crisis will revive, with the Sunni minority turning to Saudi Arabia for support
against the Shia-led government in Baghdad.

The Kurds in Iraq and Syria will try to break away, but face Turkish and Iranian opposition and may be
ultimately betrayed by their Western sponsors (again). Even after its defeat in Mosul and Raqqa, IS will survive
in some form, perhaps merging with other Sunni extremist groups, or escaping to new locations, like
Afghanistan. Its campaign of global terror will remain potent.

The Trump summit in Riyadh virtually declared the opening of hostilities against Iran. Predictably, Iran blamed
Saudi Arabia for the subsequent terror attacks in Tehran. US Secretary of State Tillerson has upped the ante by
referring to the prospect of regime change in Iran.

The recent Iranian missile strikes against IS in Syria were an unsubtle message to the US, Israel and Saudi
Arabia that Tehran has the will and capacity to retaliate against hostile actions. Iran could inflame West Asia
and the Levant; rain Hezbollah rockets on Israel; threaten Saudi oilfields and US bases in Afghanistan; mobilise
Shia minorities to destabilise shaky rulers in the Gulf. The Saudi-UAE vendetta against Qatar reveals the fault
lines within the Sunni alliance which can be exploited by Iran in the context of the wider regional confrontation.

Afghanistan is about to endure another cycle of violence as the US digs itself deeper into the Afghan quagmire.
The new US surge (of 4,000 troops) may prevent the collapse of the US-installed Kabul regime, at enormous
 17

human and financial cost; but it will not deliver either military victory or force the Afghan Taliban to the
negotiating table. Pressure on Pakistan to eliminate the alleged safe havens may prove counterproductive. A
focus on fighting the Afghan Taliban will erode the prospects of collective action against IS and other terrorist
groups, like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, etc which are present in
Afghanistan and pose a threat to the entire region.

Kashmir could spark another India-Pakistan war. The popular Kashmiri revolt against Indian rule has persisted
for over a year despite Indian brutality, Pakistani impotence and world indifference. In the run-up to the 2019,
Indian general elections, Prime Minister Modi may try to deflect attention from Indias Kashmiri quagmire by
escalating the Line of Control ceasefire violations or even attempting a (real) cross-LOC strike. The ensuing
Pakistan-India conventional conflict will not remain limited and could easily escalate to the nuclear level.
President Trump should press Modi in Washington this week to accept his offer of mediation to avoid a
disastrous Pakistan-India war.

So far, Trump has avoided the Thucydides Trap by holding back from an overt containment of China. He has
conditioned the US position on trade on Beijings ability to restrain North Koreas nuclear and missile
programmes.

However, extreme Chinese pressure on North Korea is unlikely since this may lead to regime collapse, millions
of refugees, Korean unification and US troops on Chinas border. Beijings preference is for a freeze in North
Koreas missile and nuclear programmes and reciprocal military restraint by the US and its allies. If attempts to
evolve a deal collapse, the military option may come back to the fore and Sino-US differences on trade, the
South China Sea and other issues may revive, generating tensions across Asia.

Despite the early optimism in Moscow, Trumps campaign desire for a cooperative relationship with Russia has
been stymied by the American establishment. On the contrary, the new unilateral anti-Russia sanctions
imposed by the US Congress last week are an indication that US-Russian tensions will persist and probably
escalate. Close encounters between Russian-Nato air and naval forces are now commonplace and could lead to
a military incident.

The balance of power in Europe favours Russia. Its absorption of Crimea is a reality. Ukraines division is
unlikely to be overcome except on Moscows terms. Natos forward deployments, and/or installation of an
advanced ballistic missile defence system, will evoke strong Russian responses even as support of several
European countries, which desire cooperative relations with Russia, wavers.

To manage the several simultaneous political, economic and technological transitions under way, and meet the
existential challenges of climate change, demographic explosion, poverty, terrorism, refugees and
communicable diseases, the international community requires intense cooperation and collective action.

Such cooperation is impossible while states are allowed to have recourse to the untrammelled and unilateral use
of force. It is essential to revive unconditional adherence by states to their UN Charter commitment to refrain
from the use or threat of force in their international relations. Making this commitment a reality should be the
first priority of the UNs new secretary general.

Pakistan- US relations

THERE are significant reasons for the maintenance of close and cooperative relations between Pakistan and the
US.

Unfortunately, Washington has almost always conducted its relations with Pakistan as a function of Americas
other strategic or tactical priorities of the moment. Since US goals and priorities change periodically, at times
rapidly, Pakistan-US ties have often resembled a roller-coaster ride. One day Pakistan is Americas most-allied
ally, the next its most-sanctioned ally.
 18

After being proclaimed a non-Nato ally in the post-9/11 war on terror, during the Obama years, Pakistan
became the object of suspicion and hostility, and eventually the target of hundreds of US drone strikes, the
Abbottabad intervention and the accidental Salala attack, as Washington increasingly viewed Pakistan through
the prism of Afghanistan and India.

In Islamabad, hope was generated by the early effusive call between Donald Trump and Nawaz Sharif. That
hope has not been discarded yet; but some recent signals indicate that the US may again determine its posture
towards Pakistan in the context of its goals in Afghanistan and its ties with India, Iran and China.

During his recent visit to the region, US National Security Adviser Gen H.R. McMaster reverted to assertions
about Pakistani safe havens for the Afghan Taliban as a convenient explanation for the military impasse in
Afghanistan.

Even if a few thousand additional US-Nato troops are sent back to Afghanistan, a foreign force of under 20,000,
operating in support of a demoralised, untrained Afghan army, wont be able to simultaneously arrest the
current momentum of the 30-80,000 Taliban and defeat the growing numbers of the militant Islamic State group
and its associated terrorists, like the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

Theres now an international consensus, to which Islamabad, Beijing and Moscow subscribe: peace will be
restored in Afghanistan only through a negotiated settlement between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban, whose
objectives are limited to Afghanistan, and that the focus of military operations in Afghanistan should be to
eliminate the growing presence of IS and affiliated terrorist groups. Hopefully, the US will join this consensus.
It would help greatly to align Pakistan-US postures on Afghanistan and counterterrorism.

From reports of McMasters visit to New Delhi, it appears the US will continue Obamas endeavour to co-opt
India as a strategic partner to contain China. Yet, unlike Obama, Trump may well be more sensitive to the
impact of his India policies on China and Pakistan. The new administration may seek difficult quid pro quos
from India, eg termination of its ties to Tehran.

Trump may accord priority to economic goals, such as restricting immigration from India and opening Indias
protected market for US goods, services and investment. Or, India may have its own reservations about entering
into a junior partnership with the US, particularly the implications for its ties with Russia and Iran.

For Pakistan, the litmus test will be to see how far US defence and technology supplies to India are sensitive to
Pakistans security interests, since 70 per cent of Indias conventional and non-conventional capabilities are
deployed against Pakistan. Open-ended US military and political support under Obama emboldened the Modi
government to adopt an intransigent and belligerent position towards Pakistan.

Indias ongoing brutal repression of the popular pro-freedom Kashmiri protests, the daily violations of the LoC
ceasefire, its Cold Start forward military deployments, Pakistans full spectrum nuclear and missile response,
and the absence of dialogue between Pakistan and India, have combined to create an environment where the
danger of another Pakistan-India conflict is real and present. Such a conflict could escalate to the nuclear level.
Trumps offer of mediation has been welcomed by Pakistan but rejected by India. Hopefully, he will persist
with this mediatory initiative.

The emerging Pakistan-US relationship may also be impacted by the growing US-Iran tensions. Although
Washington is unlikely to scrap the nuclear agreement with Iran, Trump and his generals seem determined to
arrest and reverse Irans rising power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Syria, and curb the capacity of the Iran-
backed Hezbollah to threaten Israel from Lebanon or Syrias southern borders.

An informal alliance is being forged between Israel, the US and its GCC allies. The Saudi invitation to several
Muslim countries, including Pakistan, to participate in meetings with President Trump in Riyadh outlines the
ambitions of this putative alliance. The situation could become acute if a hard-liner is elected to replace
President Rouhani in the forthcoming Iranian elections.
 19

The nature and dynamics of this new configuration in the Gulf and West Asia will have profound and inverse
implications for Pakistans relations with Iran, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the US, on the other.
Pakistan can avoid damage to one or the other relationship by remaining aloof from this impending
confrontation and, if possible, promoting mediatory diplomacy to defuse the causes of the Iran-Saudi (and US)
tensions.

Pakistan-US ties will be most fundamentally affected by the evolution in the US-China relationship. The Obama
administrations proclaimed pivot to Asia was designed to contain China by deploying most of the US Navy
to the Pacific and building a string of alliances around China. India was to be built up as part of this
containment strategy. Pakistans security interests suffered collateral damage as Washington opened the
floodgates of advanced weapons and technology to India.

However, the ultimate shape of US-China ties under Trump is not yet clear. After some disturbing early
pronouncements, it appears that Trump has developed a respectful relationship with Chinas President Xi
Jinping at their Mar-a-Lago summit. The US and Chinese leaders are cooperating to contain the danger from
North Korea. There is hope, at least on Chinas side, that a trade war will be avoided and a cooperative
relationship forged on investment, commerce and other areas of common interest.

A cooperative US-China relationship would be a major positive development for Pakistan. Besides facilitating
the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, it would ease Pakistans differences with the US
on Afghanistan and India.

Dr Kissingers 1971 secret trip to Beijing, facilitated by Pakistan, led to the creation of what is now the most
important bilateral relationship in the world. Pakistan has an enormous stake in the preservation of this
relationship

Pakistans Strategy against India

INDIA is maintaining its daily shelling along the LoC in Kashmir. As advised editorially in this paper, Pakistan
must keep its nerve. Yet, Pakistans response cannot be passive. It must dissuade India from pursuing its
aggressive designs against Pakistan, now and in the future.
Pakistani officials and analysts have opined that Indias LoC firing is designed to divert attention from the
ongoing popular revolt in India-held Kashmir (IHK) and/or prevent Pakistans armed forces from acting
robustly against terrorism on our western border. These are reasonable assumptions.
However, Pakistans response should take account of Indias comprehensive strategy against it, not merely its
current LoC belligerence. India seeks to isolate Pakistan by portraying it as a terrorism sponsor while it
sponsors TTP terrorism and separatism in Balochistan; it seeks to demonise and delegitimise Pakistans nuclear
weapons; and attempts, directly or through western friends, to co-opt Pakistani politicians, businessmen and
intellectuals to accept Indian dominion over Pakistan.
Through such military, diplomatic and political avenues, and combined with the economic and diplomatic
pressure from the US and its allies, India hopes to wear down Pakistans resistance to Indian domination. The
scent of defeat reeks already within parts of Pakistans elites. If India believes that Pakistan is sufficiently
isolated and internally divided, it may feel emboldened to embark on a military adventure against it.
Pakistans response should encompass well-prepared, determined diplomatic and media campaigns to neutralise
Indias propaganda, expose the reality of its militarism and oppression in IHK and signal its determination to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the Kashmiri peoples rights.
It is regrettable that the prime ministers bold speech at the UN General Assembly in September has not been
followed by promised actions, including formally approaching the UN Security Council. Pakistan should
approach it with three clear proposals:
 20

One, a call to end Indian brutality and grave human rights violations in occupied Jammu & Kashmir and the
dispatch by the UN high commissioner for human rights of a UN fact-finding mission to India-held Jammu &
Kashmir to investigate and secure an immediate end to these violations.
Two, a proposal that the Security Council demand an end to ceasefire violations on the LoC and instal other
measures of mutual and reciprocal restraint and arms control to prevent the outbreak of a Pakistan-India
conflict.
Three, a proposal for adopting specific steps by the Security Council to implement its own resolutions on
Jammu & Kashmir, including the appointment of a special representative of the UN secretary general to update
and activate the approved arrangements for its demilitarisation and organisation of the promised plebiscite
there.
Other diplomatic moves that Pakistan can make to exert pressure on India include:
First: a proposal in the Security Councils counterterrorism committee to investigate links between TTP and the
militant Islamic State group, and the relationship between TTP and the intelligence agencies of India and
Afghanistan. These two countries are, in effect, sponsoring the IS terrorists.
Second: an approach to international human rights groups to press for the release of Kashmiri political prisoners
and repeal of Indias emergency laws, which enable Indian security forces to oppress Kashmiris with complete
impunity.
Third: an approach to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the extensively documented
evidence of Narendra Modis responsibility for the 2002 massacre of 2,000 Muslims in Gujarat.
Pakistan may be obliged to consider options beyond diplomacy. India has claimed, falsely, that it conducted
surgical strikes across the LoC. This claim provides Pakistan with a legitimate right to reciprocate. It should
refrain from doing so since this is likely to provoke a general conflict. However, if India does cross the LoC,
Pakistan should be prepared to respond decisively, for instance, by cutting off the road between the Kashmir
Valley and Jammu.
Pakistan is also well within its rights to respond to Indian and Afghan sponsorship of terrorism by attacking and
eliminating TTP safe havens in Kunar and other parts of Afghanistan. If the US-Nato forces do not eliminate
these safe havens, Pakistan will need to do so.
While Pakistan has disavowed support for the outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, Kashmiris
have an internationally recognised right to seek self-determination from alien occupation through all available
means at their disposal, including armed force. There is nothing to stop them from forming a Kashmir liberation
army.
Many Pakistanis, including some in our ruling circles, are concerned about the economic implications of
possible US sanctions and appear willing to sacrifice the Kashmiris and accept Indian diktat to avoid such
sanctions. If such fears had prevailed in the past, Pakistan would not have established its strategic relationship
with China, developed its nuclear capability, nor conducted the 1998 nuclear explosions in response to Indias
tests.
Pakistan should be prepared to face pressure from India and its Western friends. There can be no development
without security and sovereignty. Sanctions against Pakistan, if imposed, will be unjustified. Their impact will
be limited and temporary. The preservation of national dignity and Pakistans commitment to the Kashmiri
people make the possible cost worthwhile.
Some Pakistani analysts have pointed to the lack of international response to Pakistans demarches on Kashmir
and India to argue that Pakistans positions are unpalatable. In fact, other countries are unlikely to respond
positively so long as they perceive that Pakistans leadership is itself not fully committed to the objectives its
diplomats and envoys propagate.
 21

Pakistans politicians appear to be more preoccupied by their own petty squabbles over Panamagate, MQM
divisions and CPEC projects.
Instead of advocating united national action against Indian subversion and aggression, many of Pakistans
Western-oriented intellectuals argue that the fault lies with Pakistan and especially its armed forces. Pervez
Hoodbhoys recent denunciation of Pakistans so-called establishment is a case in point.
When a nation faces an existential external threat, unity is its ultimate strength and weapon. National unity can
be promoted by mobilising the people, as Churchill did to enable Britain to resist Hitler. But, at times, national
unity has to be imposed. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to form a united national front with Maos communists
against the Japanese invader only after the generalissimo was incarcerated by one of his own commanders.

Pakistan-China- CPEC
THE China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project is a win-win proposition for both countries. It can
create Double Happiness (Chairman Maos favourite cigarette brand).
For Pakistan, CPEC promises the installation of the basic infrastructure essential for rapid growth. It would
replicate a development model that enabled China to achieve double-digit growth for almost four decades.
CPEC is also important for China. It is the first stage of President Xi Jinpings Belt and Road initiative designed
to establish closer land and maritime links with 65 Eurasian countries. CPEC will help stabilise Iron Brother
Pakistan economically, counter terrorism, provide China an alternative, shorter route to markets and energy
sources in the Gulf, west Asia and beyond, and enable the efficient utilisation of some of Chinas financial
reserves and excess manufacturing capacity.
Western criticism of the CPEC project smacks of sour grapes. Yet Pakistanis would do well to not be misled by
motivated critiques.
Prior to the CPEC launch, foreign investment in Pakistan was virtually frozen. The CPEC commitment and
financial flows have helped accelerate Pakistans GDP growth rate from 3.7 to around five per cent; its stock
market is the best-performing in Asia; it has been reclassified as an emerging rather than frontier market; and
Western companies are now open to investing here.
All commercial enterprises seek to earn a profit. Chinese companies also operate on market principles. Chinas
authorities have allowed their companies to compete for various projects and thus enabled Pakistani
counterparts, if they wish, to negotiate Chinese participation (in equipment supply and construction) at the best
market prices. If monopoly control and price gouging have occurred, for example, in some power projects, it
has mostly been due to the collusion of Pakistani entities and, in some cases, of Western equipment suppliers.
Pakistans infrastructure cannot be built without capital imports. Chinese loans for government projects are
provided on concessional terms. The proportional burden for their repayment will decline as Pakistans
economy grows. For commercial projects, Chinese partners arrange loans at around 5 to 6pc with extended
repayment periods. These terms are unavailable elsewhere. (Pakistan has floated sovereign bonds in Western
markets at 8pc.) Increasingly, Chinese companies are also willing to put equity into commercial projects and
thus assume a part of the risk. Commercial loans are expected to be paid back from anticipated profits. A part of
the debt is likely to be off-loaded through share sales in public markets.
The UN-sponsored World Happiness Report 2017 ranks China at 79, Pakistan at 80 and India 122 among 155
countries. A Forbes magazine analysis attributed the Pakistani populations significantly higher happiness
than Indias to two factors: greater economic freedom and larger government expenditures. Such expenditures
have been made possible mostly by the CPEC project.
Pakistani happiness can be further enhanced if the country can efficiently execute the CPEC infrastructure
projects and extend these investments to social infrastructure and the real economy. So far, despite glitches,
CPEC implementation is proceeding well. But Pakistan must address three major issues.
 22

First, there is the provision of adequate security for CPEC projects, threatened as they are by Indian-sponsored
terrorism and sabotage. India has reportedly told China that it will never accept CPEC.
Second, equitable allocation of CPEC projects and investment to the smaller provinces is essential to ensure
national support. Hopefully, CPEC will not be allowed to become an issue in the forthcoming national
elections.
Third, there is a need for policy consistency. Sudden changes in some policies no new power plants based on
imported fuel, shifts in power tariffs, tax incentives and rates are evidently the consequence of tensions
between some of Pakistans power players. Such arbitrary policy shifts create uncertainty.
Beyond the current CPEC projects, there is need for an increasing focus on social infrastructure: clean drinking
water, healthcare, waste management, urban transportation and education. Many Chinese companies are keen to
participate in such projects, which can best be implemented through public-private partnerships with the federal,
provincial and local governments.
The real fruit of the CPEC enterprise will come from investments in the sectors that are the real generators of
production, employment and growth: industrial manufacturing, agriculture and agro-industries, consumer
goods, and housing and related supply chains and services, including their digital component. Such investment
promises high returns. Here too, Chinese companies are prepared to invest significant amounts in viable
ventures.
To encourage such investment, it is essential to actively promote more frequent and intensive exchanges
between Pakistani and Chinese economic actors and companies, especially the smaller companies that are
totally unfamiliar with each other. Sporadic efforts have been made, yet no organised mechanism is available.
Investments in infrastructure and the growth sectors in Pakistan are constrained by the paucity of local finance.
The government is poor because of inadequate and inefficient tax collection and wasteful expenditures on loss-
making state corporations and populist subsidies. Bold policy action is essential. In the private sector, apart
from a few family conglomerates, Pakistani enterprises do not possess the capacity to put up the initial equity
even for sound projects. Most cannot finance the preparation of bankable feasibility studies. Yet, it is these
smaller enterprises that can generate the most jobs. Local banks and financial institutions, including the dormant
China-Pakistan Development Company, should be incentivised to provide start-up finance to smaller
enterprises. Locally and externally generated Private Equity Funds can also play a vital role in bridging the
domestic financial shortfall.
Finally, to take full advantage of domestic demand-led growth, Pakistan must formulate a long-term Pakistan-
First trade and industrial policy. Most of Pakistans Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been concluded on the
presumption that it can expand exports if it has trade access. Yet, history proves that unless a country has the
capacity to produce goods, it cannot export them even if it has access. To build domestic manufacturing
capacity, Pakistan must selectively discourage imports of goods it can produce. Once competitive, such
products can add to exports. To implement this policy, Pakistans FTAs and World Trade Organisation tariff
schedules and commitments must be comprehensively revised, and the illegal smuggling of dumped goods from
Afghanistan and elsewhere effectively halted.
The road to double happiness is clear and visible. Pakistan and China must not be diverted.

Economy: Pakistan exports, Tariffs, Trade

ACCORDING to official sources, the recent decline of Pakistani exports is due to adverse global economic
conditions. Others attribute this, inter alia, to the appreciation of the Pakistani rupee. Both these factors may be
partially true but defy empirical evidence as single-factor explanations.

Indian exports have expanded by 62 per cent, Bangladeshi by 69pc and Sri Lankan by 21pc from 2010 to 2015.
In clothing exports, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Cambodia recorded growth rates of 10pc, 6pc and 8pc
respectively. Bangladeshs nominal exchange rate has remained unchanged and the real effective exchange rate
shows 54pc appreciation since FY2010-11. The rupee appreciation is visible in India too. In Pakistan, the
 23

nominal exchange rate remained stable from 2001 to 2008 and export receipts doubled. Despite a depreciation
of 51pc from 2008 to 2013, there was no corresponding increase in export value.

The declining trend of Pakistani exports is not recent. It began in the 1990s and, excepting the early 2000s, has
worsened. Merchandise exports have declined from 0.18pc in 1990 to 0.14pc of the world export market in
2015, while Indias share has tripled to 1.78pc and Bangladeshs has risen from 0.05pc to 0.2pc. Pakistans
exports one-third of Indias in 1990 have fallen to a tenth; Bangladesh once only one-third of
Pakistans now exceed by almost $10 billion. The reasons for this decline are structural, cyclical and
institutional.

Structurally, the world demand pattern has changed while the composition of Pakistani exports has remained
unchanged. Cotton textiles still account for almost 60pc of exports. Several tariff lines under GSP-Plus remain
unutilised as we lack the capacity to supply the required manmade fibre-cotton mix. Low technological goods
and nonparticipation in buoyant commercial services exports have constrained our capacity to respond.

Asian markets have increased their share in world markets while our exporters are still hung up on the EU and
US. Production patterns have shifted from longer vertically integrated final goods to global value chains.
Intermediate goods and components are procured from countries where the comparative advantage dictates
lower costs with acceptable quality. Asias share of global trade in intermediate inputs has risen from 14pc in
2000 to 50pc in 2012. The average journey length for Asian exports has fallen by 4.5pc with decreased
transportation costs.

Manufactured product today has a much lower cost of actual fabrication than previously, and the cost of labour
is declining per output unit. Most of the cost is incurred on manufacture-embedded services. Design,
advertising, marketing, transportation, logistics, distribution, storage, financial services and insurance, and IT
products and services make up most of the cost structure. Lean manufacturing and just-in-time inventory have
further reduced unit production costs. Countries that have liberalised services trade, reduced tariff rates,
facilitated cross-border trade and movement of skilled and expert manpower, and softened custom regulations
have benefited from the global supply chain as well as manufacture-embedded services exchange.

Pakistans score on both counts is almost nil. Despite our excellent political relations, we havent made much
effort to encourage Chinese manufacturers to relocate part of their production to Pakistan or integrate Pakistan-
made parts and intermediate goods in their final assembly line by using the FTA.

Cyclically, the drop in international oil and gas prices were not passed on to Pakistani exporters so they might
take advantage of cost saving and aggressively push products in new markets where they did not enjoy price
advantage. Exporters had firm orders to deliver, but couldnt do so due to load-shedding. Political expediency
demanded that shopkeepers and households be appeased at the expense of exporters. Naturally, those export
orders were shifted to countries with more conducive conditions. These buyers will never come back to
Pakistan; we have lost credibility in their eyes.

The decline is a typical example of coordination failure and lack of understanding of linkages and
interdependencies among various policies. Tariffs on imports are driven purely by revenue mobilisation or
protection of domestic import substituting industries. It is hardly realised that a restrictive import regime with
tariff, nontariff and regulatory barriers, and cumbersome customs clearance procedures with arbitrary powers
enjoyed by low-level officials amenable to corruption, would prevent Pakistans entry into the expanding global
supply chain.

High tax incidence on manufacturing output, especially on large-scale organised firms, has stifled transition of
medium-scale firms to acquire economies of scale and reduce production and distribution costs to become
competitive in the world market. A large segment of market demand is taken away from the organised firms by
the unorganised sector, which enjoys a cost advantage of at least 16-17pc. The withholding tax regime is
another distorting factor; it allows final settlement of income tax liability of various economic agents. Tax
refunds have also become an albatross around the necks of the exporters. Their liquidity is drained due to refund
 24

delay, forcing them to borrow from banks for working capital needs. The refunds system is flawed; we should
learn from Bangladeshs better functioning system.

As Pakistans labour force is not properly trained and mostly unskilled, its productivity is low relative to other
regional competitors. In the textile sector, an average Pakistani worker produces only 40pc of what his Chinese
counterpart produces per day. Pakistans productivity growth rate in the manufacturing sector from 2000 to
2010 was 2.3pc per annum, while Chinas was 8pc and Indias 3.4pc. The gap has only widened.

The countrys business climate needs to be improved by a cost-effective enforcement of property rights and
contracts, streamlining the granting of NOCs, permits and licences and inspections by government agencies.

Finally, the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction has found little resonance among policymakers and
industry players. Artificial respiration has kept some subsectors and firms alive when they should have ceased
to exist. These established, inefficient firms lobby for more concessions, tax exemptions and benefits, making
entry of more efficient and dynamic firms difficult.

This combination of convoluted public policy and status quo-minded behaviour of major industry players has
kept Pakistan from scaling the ladder of technological upgradation and diversifying its exports to meet the
demands of dynamic sectors. Instead of artificial crutches to protect redundant firms, the government should
invest in R&D and augment the supply of quality science, technology, engineering and mathematics graduates
to move up the scale of the production frontier.

Reviving Pakistan Exports

THE countrys declining export receipts over the past few years has been in the public spotlight. However, as I
have pointed out in a number of opinion pieces in this newspaper, the issue is much deeper and more structural
in nature, with Pakistans exports in secular decline for far longer than realised, especially when benchmarked
against a range of relevant parameters.

The global market share of Pakistans exports has been relatively miniscule, and has declined further over the
past decade. Most tellingly, Pakistan has an extremely low export orientation, with the size of the merchandise
export sector in the overall economy declining from around 14 per cent of GDP in the early 2000s to barely 7pc
now. So what can be done to revive Pakistans exports? Before suggesting any policies or measures, one has to
examine the factors that have been a hurdle in the long run to creating a vibrant and dynamic export sector in
the country.

Psychology: With the countrys export sector shrinking from an already low base (relative to the overall
economy) since the 1990s, the lack of urgency, the level of apathy and inattention shown by successive
governments speaks volumes.

While in the case of almost all developing countries that have become export powerhouses since the 1960s, the
highest leadership of the country has played a major role in guiding exports higher, in Pakistan the countrys
leaders have been preoccupied with everything other than exports. (The recent resignation statement of the
chairman Trade Development Authority of Pakistan is telling where he speaks about the prime minister not
being able to give time.)

Apathy at the highest level has been compounded by a deep-seated anti-export bias in policies as well as
attitudes. Two areas where this is showing up since 2013 is in the tax regime in place (which has viewed the
export sector as a revenue spinner for the government), and in the overvalued exchange rate (which is cross-
subsidising imports at the expense of exports). Unbelievably, since 2008, the PPP government as well as its
PML-N successor have released virtually no funds to finance the countrys Strategic Trade Policy Framework,
despite budgetary allocations each year.
 25

Politics: There are four channels via which politics domestic, regional as well as global have undermined
exports from Pakistan. First, Pakistan has borne the brunt of the fallout from post-9/11 developments, with a
diversion of foreign investment as well as export orders due to the perceived security situation within the
country. At the same time, India has made consistent efforts in a variety of ways to throttle Pakistans economy
including by squeezing its exports and undermining the made in Pakistan brand.

The last two channels are both internal. For the past few decades, capture of Pakistans trade policy
framework by a segment of low value-added exports has been a significant factor in preventing a diversification
of export products as well as markets. This state of affairs has been compounded over the past decade or so, by
a shift in the centre of gravity within the PML-N from its erstwhile constituency of manufacturers to traders
and real estate developers. Hence, the slow and anaemic response of the prime minister to the exports crisis.

Power: The continuous energy crisis in Pakistan since 2008 has also hurt the export sector. However, more than
availability of energy, what has hurt exports has been the steep increase in gas and power tariffs over this
period, which has priced out many exports from Pakistan.

Productivity: Overall, and barring a few areas, Pakistan fares poorly with regard to productivity, especially in
comparison to many of its regional competitors. (However, the generalised description usually proffered about
Pakistans private sector as rent seekers and lacking in effort or innovation is far from the truth in many cases,
and is a subject I will deal with separately).

Given this backdrop, what can be done to reverse course for Pakistans exports? In the short run, the
government should undo all of its predatory and anti-exports taxation measures of the last four years, as well
as release all blocked refunds of the export sector and provide duty drawbacks. It also needs to provide relief to
the export sector from the highest electricity tariffs in the region. The exchange rate should be made competitive
over a period of time. Pakistan should also re-negotiate its free trade agreement with China which has
surprisingly not provided the same level playing field to a strategic partner as to the Asean countries.

Beyond the immediate steps, the government can take much more potent structural as well as institutional
measures designed for the long run. The prime minister should designate himself the champion for the
countrys exports, and should chair a high-powered commission or strategic group that will provide a vision and
framework for the countrys export sector for the next 30 years, and will also oversee implementation.

This commission or group should also study and provide recommendations on how to restructure the trade
regime to make it more export-friendly, as well as how to reduce the cost of doing business in the economy. In
this regard, an ongoing strategic dialogue between policymakers and the private sector needs to be fostered.
The productivity challenge needs to be tackled also by taking stock of the gaps in the entire edifice of the
governments skills development effort which is likely going to require restructuring of the existing
institutional framework.

Finally, a more concerted effort needs to be made to leverage the opportunities under CPEC by partnering in
regional value chains with Chinese industries. By instituting these first steps, the government can begin the
arduous task of reversing Pakistans export decline. Whether it is able to do so in its current state of disarray
remains to be seen.

Pakistans new development trajectory- Ahsan Iqbal

Pakistan is on a new trajectory of growth after a decade. After remaining stuck on 3% GDP growth for almost a
decade, it achieved 5.3% GDP growth for the first time this year. The world is looking at it as a story of positive
transformation and turnaround. The Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for the fiscal year 2017-18
is a classic example of this positive transformation.
 26

The current federal PSDP has received the highest-ever allocation of funds in the countrys history: Rs1001
billion. In FY 2012-13, this amount was only Rs360 billion. This is an increase of 178 per cent. The allocation
of funds in the current PSDP are predicated on the priorities set in Vision 2025: inclusive and sustainable
development. Similarly, Rs1,112 billion have been allocated for development in provinces whereas in 2012-13
it was only Rs515 billion.

The current government is cognisant of the fact that there are regional disparities in Pakistan. Therefore, to
materialise inclusive development in Pakistan, significant funds are allocated for historically disadvantages
places. For Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) Rs22 billion are allocated in this PSDP. This is an increase of 120% as
compared to 2012-13 when AJK only received Rs10 billion. Similarly, a sum of Rs15 billion is allocated for
Gilgit-Baltistan in this PSDP as compared to Rs7 billion in 2012-13. This is an increase of 110%. The Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) has historically been ignored by governments in Islamabad, to remedy this,
we have increased Fatas budget to Rs24.5 billion. It was only Rs16 billion in 2012-13. This is an increase of
more than 50%.

The main driver behind this rise in PSDP and provincial development budgets has been the steady increase in
revenues of the federal government via better tax collection. Tax-to-GDP ratio has increased to 12.6% for FY
2016. Back in FY 2013, it was only 9.8%. This reflects the improvement in governance and institutions.

In a short span of four years, the PML-N government has literally transformed the development portfolio of
Pakistan. The most impressive thing about this PSDP is that it did not come at the expense of fiscal deficit. The
fiscal deficit for FY 2016 is 4.6 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In FY 2013 it was 8.2 per cent.
Historically, governments in Pakistan in their last year of their tenure lose fiscal discipline. But this government
has set a new trend by demonstrating fiscal responsibility and discipline and did not give into any election year
pressures.

When the PML-N government assumed office in 2013 it set three priority areas: energy, infrastructure and
education. In each area, the government has made major strides. In the energy sector, investments were only
around Rs185 billion in 2012-13. Today, they stand at Rs404 billion an increase of 118 per cent.

Road and rail networks are the backbone of any modern economy. Up to Rs411 billion have been allocated for
infrastructure development in the current year. In stark contrast, only Rs142 billion were allocated for the same
in 2012-13. This is an increase of 189%. Up to Rs180 billion have been allocated for CPEC projects. Because of
the construction of highways and motorways, Pakistan will in the coming years become a hub for trade and
commerce in the region. Moreover, efficient movement of goods will greatly improve the economys logistical
competitiveness.

In an unprecedented manner Rs35.662 billion have been allocated for the Higher Education Commission (HEC)
in the current PSDP. In FY 2012-13, HECs development budget was only Rs15 billion. Since PM Sharif
assumed office, there has been a phenomenal increase (more than 100 per cent) in the allocation of funds to
HEC within a span of four years. These investments will yield huge dividends in the long run. But even in the
short run, higher education statistics have immensely improved in the last four years. There has been an 82%
increase in merit-based scholarships in the last four years. Many new campuses have been started under the
University Campus in Every District initiative. The US-Pakistan Knowledge Corridor is offering 10,000 PhD
scholarships to the best and the brightest. A Rs1 billion Technology Innovation Fund has been set up to promote
academia-industry link. Some 100,000 youth will be trained in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) softwares.

Under the Prime Ministers Youth Initiative, Rs20 billion have been allocated in this PSDP. This includes the
youth laptop programme, youth training scheme, fee reimbursement scheme, interest free loan schemes and
skill development programme. These programmes will allow our youth to economically and digitally empower
themselves and contribute positively to the development of Pakistan.

Similarly, Rs1 billion has been allocated for the Startup Pakistan initiative to promote entrepreneurship among
youth. Startup Pakistan will address a perennial challenge of lack of risk capital within the local eco-system by
 27

setting up a publicly funded venture capital fund. This will fasten the pace of business registration and make it
friendlier. A startup window on the Pakistan Stock Exchange will also be created. These steps are the single
largest package of reforms aimed at enhancing the startup culture within the country.

In todays globalised world, it is important to promote a softer image of the country. Pakistan needs to be re-
introduced in the global arena and our youth is best placed to do this. Our millennials have fresh and creative
ideas and they are much more open towards diversity and adaptation. To concretise this, we have allocated
Rs500 million for the Global Youth Internship Programme. We will send the brightest young minds of Pakistan
to the top capitals of the world so that they can see how their political systems work. At the same time, these
bright young people would get an opportunity to break the stereotypes about Pakistan in the world.

This is the age of the fourth industrial revolution and it has amplified technological bias in the processes of
development. Therefore, it is imperative for Pakistan to avail these fourth industrial revolution technologies.
With that in mind, the government has launched a programme of establishing hybrid research and innovation
platforms in critical and emerging technology areas. Among them are national research centres for artificial
intelligence, applied mathematics and higher performance computing, cyber security, robotics and automation,
big data and cloud computing. These research centres will lay the foundation of technology-led development in
Pakistan.

One of the most influential economic thinkers of the 20th century, John M Keynes, once said: The difficulty
lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones. This is very apt in the case of Pakistan.
In the sphere of economy the old idea that haunted us for very long was of import substitution; it did not allow
us to build a competitive export-based industries.

In the political sphere, the old idea that has been most detrimental is of disrupting and dislodging elected
civilian regimes. It spurs political instability. It is an established fact that no matter how good our economic
policies are if we cannot ensure political stability, they will not yield the desired results. Therefore, it is
imperative that we maintain political stability in Pakistan. The prerequisite for maintaining political stability is
that democratic will and decisions of the people of Pakistan should prevail over everything else.

Pakistans International Rankings By Dr Hafiz A Pasha

An assessment of the level and change of Pakistan in key international indices and measures is important for
two reasons. First, it provides a, more or less, objective evaluation of the performance of the economic, social
and governance indicators of the country is relation to other countries, especially in South Asia, at a similar
stage of development. This helps to identify critical areas where there is need for greater focus and in
prioritizing the reform agenda, both for the short and the long-term. Second, the various indices influence
international perceptions of Pakistan especially of potential foreign investors.

This article covers four key international indices. These are provided on an annual basis by international
institutions like the UN agencies, World Bank and World Economic Forum. The focus is identify the relative
position of Pakistan and to study the change in the countrys ranking during the last few years, from 2010 or
2012 to the latest year for which information is available. A comparison is made of Pakistan with three South
Asian economies, viz., India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Other Asian countries included in the analysis are
Thailand, Indonesia, Turkey and Philippines.

The most commonly referred to index is the Human Development Index (HDI) prepared by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Dr Mahbub ul Haq played a major role in the development of this index. The
HDI has three components, with equal weights, relating to health status of the population, the level of education
and the per capita income of a country, adjusted for differences in purchasing power. The first ranking of the
HDI was prepared in 1990. The latest ranking is of 2015 for 185 countries.

Unfortunately, Pakistan does very poorly in terms of human development. Out of the eight countries included in
the analysis, Pakistan has the lowest ranking, at 147th. Turkey has the highest ranking at 71st followed by Sri
 28

Lanka at 73rd. Pakistan is also the lowest ranked country among all countries in the world with a medium level
of human development.

The particularly worrying aspect is the poor performance with respect to other South Asian countries, Even
Bangladesh has a better ranking of 139th while India is ranked 131st. Between 2010 and 2015, Pakistans
ranking has fallen by two places. The absolute value of the HDI has also shown little change. In fact, Pakistan
ranks much higher in terms of per capita income than in the HDI.

The worst performance by Pakistan among the three components of HDI is in education. For example, the mean
years of schooling of the population is only 5.1 years in 2015, as compared to 8.2 years in India and as high as
10.9 years in Sri Lanka. Clearly, Pakistan needs to invest more on education, especially at the secondary and
higher levels.

The next index of importance is the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the World Economic Forum, which
has twelve pillars of performance ranging from market size, infrastructure and institutions to technological
readiness and innovation. The latest ranking is of 2016-17 for 139 countries. Here again, Pakistan has the worst
ranking at 122nd, among the eight countries included in the analysis. The highest ranking among these countries
is of Thailand at 34th, followed by India at 39th. There is apparently a close correlation between a countrys
GCI ranking and the performance of its exports.

Pakistans ranking in the GCI has improved somewhat from 124th in 2012-13. The areas of relative weakness
of the country are in health and education, labor and goods market efficiency and technological readiness.
Interestingly, Pakistan performs relative better in terms of market size, innovation and in business
sophistication. The World Economic Forum in its assessment of the competitiveness of Pakistan has ranked in
descending order the following negative factors: corruption, crime and theft, tax rates and government
instability.

This takes us the next very widely used index, that is, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of the
Transparency International. As highlighted recently by the Federal Minister for Planning and Development,
there has been an extraordinary improvement in Pakistans ranking in recent years. It has gone up from 139th in
2012 to 116th in 2016, out of 174 countries. However, other countries in the sample of eight countries generally
do better. India has a ranking of 79th, Turkey of 75th and Indonesia of 90th.The only country in the sample
which performs poorly in relation to Pakistan is Bangladesh, with a ranking of 145th in 2016. Another index,
which is potentially of interest particularly to potential investors, is the Ease of Doing Business Index (EBI) of
the World Bank. In this index there has been a substantial worsening in Pakistans ranking from 105th in 2012
to 144th in 2016, out of 190 countries. Consequently, it has now the second worst ranking among the eight
countries, only better than Bangladesh. Thailand is ranked 46th. Turkey stands at 69th and India at 130th.

The critical areas identified by the EBI which require improvement in the Pakistani context are of getting
electricity, trading across borders, registering property and paying taxes. The country does well in protecting
minority investors, getting credit by an investor and resolving insolvency in the event of failure. On the whole,
Pakistan will have to do much better in facilitating business, especially the setting up of new projects by
investors. Given the big deterioration in Pakistans relative position internationally with regard to ease of doing
business there is need for establishing an independent Commission, with possibly the Federal Board of
Investment as the Secretariat. This Commission should be charged with the task of identifying ways of
eliminating red tape and facilitating transactions, especially through use of information technology, with
different Governmental and public sector agencies.

The broad conclusion from analysis of the above four more popular international rankings is that Pakistan
generally performs poorly. Also, in terms of change from 2010 to 2015, the results are mixed in character. If the
country is to attract more investment from diverse sources, a systematic effort will have to be launched by
focusing on areas where the country does poorly currently in these rankings.

The IMF: Pakistans History and Future

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LAST year marked the end of Pakistans most recent IMF Loan Programme. While many commemorate at the
thought of finally coming out of the programme and its forced macroeconomic restrictions, others remain
doubtful about our future with the Fund. Are we likely to relapse into the fold of yet another burdensome and
economically disastrous programme? In truth, our relationship with the IMF has been a long and uncomfortable
one. Loans from the Fund continue to be the gift that keeps on giving, even if at times we do not want it, and
certainly regardless of whether or not we are in the position to return it.

As of 1988, Pakistan has entered into 12 different programmes with the IMF, which by contrast, is greater than
all countries in the region combined. India till now has signed only 1 facility with the Fund, while countries
such as Nepal and Bangladesh have signed a mere 2. Pakistan, for this very reason, was classified as a
prolonged user by the IMF in 2002, ranking third in the world, higher than every low-income African nation,
but surpassed only by two countries; the Philippines and Panama. One reason for this most certainly has been
our constant and very costly effort to keep at par with India, economically and militarily, as well as our long-
standing war on terror, all of this done too in the face of exceptionally low levels of savings in the country. As a
result of such expenditures, our external accounts have typically remained under pressure, which along with
soaring costs of commercial borrowing from international markets, made the IMF was an easy solution to our
problems.

For Pakistan unfortunately, out of the programmes we have signed on, we have been unable to complete the
majority of them, thereby abandoning them halfway. It would seem, therefore, that any merriment surrounding
the completion of our latest programme is exceedingly warranted, given that we have only successfully
completed a total of 4 programmes over the last two decades.

As a result of being continuously under several IMF programmes across the last two decades, Pakistans
economy has faced many blows. No loan comes without a price, and in IMFs case, this meant we were
obligated to implement a series of poorly designed structural programmes, which left the economy in terrible
shape. Under the Fund, we saw dramatic reductions in subsidies, overall public spending on critical areas such
as health and education, as well as a wage freeze and a ban on employment in the public sector for the sake of
austerity and fiscal consolidation. In a country such as ours, where the government is the largest employer, this
undoubtedly had serious adverse effects. As a result of such policies we saw a fall in investment and growth
rates, while unemployment, poverty and inequality rose.

So the question arises, did Pakistan end up in the clutches of an egocentric lender? If so, then why do we
continue to borrow, if it does us so much harm? While it would be convenient to make the IMF the culprit for
all our troubles, that isnt entirely the case. Turning to the IMF on many occasions has certainly been the right
decision given the state of affairs at the time. The IMF is considered as a lender of last resort, meaning when a
country is on the verge of a sovereign default and is unable to obtain a loan elsewhere, it turns to the IMF.
Therefore, faced often with depleting foreign exchange reserves and balance of payment problems, our
unending relationship with the IMF is henceforth not surprising. Once part of a programme however, many at
times the reason for our failure has been the result of our own governments lack of political will to implement
policies, such as those needed to mobilize funds through domestic resources (for example through taxation) as
well as other factors such as widespread corruption, economic mismanagement or numerous exogenous shocks,
namely terrorism, unforeseen natural disasters, hike in oil prices, etc.

It is no secret that IMFs working model is seriously flawed, and has far-reaching consequences for economies.
Most programmes are self serving in nature, aimed to help the Fund retrieve their money rather than fix the
economy of the borrowing country. In fact, judged on its mission to promote high employment and sustainable
economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world, the IMF is an utter failure. The Fund has lent billions
of dollars to developing nations since its formation, but such loans have in fact hurt their clients and reduced
economic opportunities, instead of promoting growth. Loans from the Fund and other multilateral institutions
have left the citizens of borrower nations heavily burdened with enormous debts and, as a result, deprived of
meaningful economic opportunities. This anti-growth reputation is as a result of the Funds fixation with fiscal
austerity and stabilization-first policies, an approach it prescribes religiously, irrespective of individual country
circumstances.
 30

In addition to its ineffectiveness in maintaining economic stability and growth, many accuse the Fund of being a
tool of the United States foreign policy, advancing the countrys strategic and economic interests. Being the
only nation with an outright veto helps Washington sway decisions to its benefit, which are often taken not on
the basis of strong economic motives, but rather political ones. This can be plainly grasped in our own
relationship with the Fund, whose pockets are generous to us during times when Pakistans position is
favourable with the West and penny-pinching otherwise. By far the best example of this has been post 9/11,
when we were handed a very large hearted loan package as a compensation for joining Americas war on terror.

To conclude, while ending our dependency on the IMF may be far-fetched, one thing remains clear; future
programmes with the Fund, if any, must be negotiated bearing in mind the needs and interests of our own
people and economy. Furthermore, it is well time for the IMF, along with other Breton Wood Institutions, to
change their outlook on the economics of lending and abandon the damaging cookie-cutter approach to which
they cling on so dearly

Pakistan IMF- Exports- Economy

PAKISTAN has successfully completed the Extended Fund Facility arrangement with the IMF. The economy
has stabilised; inflation has been subdued and initial investment under CPEC has begun. We now stand at a
crossroads. One road leads to sustained growth and prosperity, the other to a place where our preoccupation
with election-year politics can push us back into the IMFs arms. The first road requires acting on policy at full
throttle so that there are perceptible economic dividends by 2018. What is required to tread this road? There are
many stumbling blocks but actions to remove five of these deserve priority.

Macroeconomic management has improved in the last three years but the external sector must be strengthened.
Exports used to finance 80 per cent of imports in the early 2000s, but this ratio has declined to less than 50pc in
recent years. Global commodity prices are partially responsible, but it is the loss of competitiveness because of
a penal tax regime, energy shortages, difficulties in doing business, bureaucratic hassles, high import tariffs and
lack of coordination among various government tiers and departments that hurts our exports.

Over the last decade, our exports have grown by 4pc compared to 12pc in Bangladesh and 10pc in India. As
remittances and oil imports are negatively correlated, the former would no longer be dependable if oil prices
remain low. Oil-producing countries would cut down investment projects and retrench foreign workers.
Repatriation of profits and dividends of almost $2 billion, external debt servicing on existing loans and
disappearance of Coalition Support Funds inflows would amplify. The current account deficit should be filled
by non-debt-creating flows such as FDI, failing which wed have to draw down our reserves.

Energy shortages and circular debt can be resolved not only by additional capacity expansion in generation and
transmission but also by creating a functioning power market. Producers, bulk consumers and distributors
should be able to deal directly under transparent regulations without the intervention of myriad government
agencies. End-use prices are likely to come down because of competitive forces, losses and thefts would be
minimised, billings would be accurate, recoveries timely, and full customer satisfaction achieved. It was
inconceivable a few years ago that the enterprise value of K-Electric would reach $2bn and load-shedding
become minimal.

The taxation structure, policy and administrative machinery must be re-hauled. To meet the IMF programmes
quarterly targets, tax revenue collection by any means became the primary preoccupation. This single-point
agenda distorted the investment and business climate as those in the formal sector and tax net were squeezed so
that collection targets could be met. Refunds were withheld, advance taxes recovered, surcharges imposed and
rates raised.

Expansion of currency in circulation and employment in the unorganised sector testify to the flight to
informality. Indirect taxes through presumptive and withholding taxes are not only regressive and inequitable,
they are also inefficient. Amnesty schemes to appease traders and retailers have created a perverse incentive to
resist inclusion in the tax base. Pakistans tax capacity is 22.3pc of GDP while it is collecting 11pc. The
 31

database of 3.2 million potential taxpayers should be used to bring new taxpayers into the net. The tax code
must be simplified, tax administration and audit improved and alternative dispute resolution put in place.

The planned retreat from the sale of non-strategic public enterprises has fortified the hands of those who think
they can stall the process through agitation. Privatisation has been on the agenda of every major political party.
The irony is that when one party comes to power and attempts to pursue this, opposition parties offer enormous
resistance. When the opposition party takes over, the roles are reversed.

Meanwhile, the damage to the economy worsens over time. Outstanding debts and liabilities already amount to
Rs666bn; these enterprises account for 10pc of GDP. Careful cost-benefit analyses would show that if each
employee is paid a monthly salary without turning up for work and the enterprise is managed by a strategic
investor wed be better off. Increased dividends, taxes and avoidance of losses would be more than enough to
offset these payments.

Pakistan Steel is a glaring example of dillydallying in the decision-making process with the plant shut down,
losses are being incurred and foreign exchange is spent on importing steel products.

The common citizen sees the economy from his own prism livelihood, childrens education, healthcare,
potable water, clean sewers, paved roads, inexpensive transport and cheap, speedy justice. The majority is least
concerned whether or not the macro economy has stabilised, forex reserves have increased, or the tax-to-GDP
ratio has gone up. Thus theres a disconnect between the countrys economic managers (who previously
included this writer) who proudly present these metrics as evidence of an economic rebound and the majority
who feel their actual plight has not improved.

This results in mistrust and disbelief in government pronouncements, and suspicion fuelled by the opposition
and media. The only sensible way to remove this mistrust is to devolve the delivery of all these services to the
lowest tier of government. We have taken a step backwards from the 2001 local government system. Punjab and
Sindh have concentrated all powers at the level of the provincial government after the 18th Amendment and the
seventh NFC award.

The road to prosperity requires sound macroeconomic and external-sector management, energy-sector
restructuring, revamping of tax policy and administration, transfer of non-strategic assets, export-sector revival
and empowerment and strengthening of local governments. Can our political leaders bear the pain of sacrificing
their narrow, short-term interests for the larger benefit of the majority in the medium term?

If the answer is no because of the electoral cycles political compulsions, we would be treading the other road
taking us further downhill. We have already seen the economic crisis following the 2007-08 and 2012-13
election years and should avoid the same mistakes. We are already behind Bangladesh and this road may take
us behind Nepal. New governments, whether the present ruling parties or the opposition, would face another
financial crisis and rush to the IMF for a bailout and the cycle would end up repeating itself.

Facets of Inequality
WEALTH and income inequality have risen sharply around the world in the past few decades, with data
suggesting an acceleration in the trend over the recent past. This state of affairs has occurred despite massive
economic prosperity having been generated over the same period of time, which has lifted millions around the
globe out of extreme poverty.
However, economic prosperity has not been shared equitably. According to Oxfam, since 2015, the richest one
per cent has owned more wealth than the rest of the planet. Earlier this year, Oxfam reported that eight of the
 32

richest men in the world now owned the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world (3.6 billion
people).
Between 1988 and 2011, incomes of the poorest 10pc increased by just $65 per person or less than $3
annually compared to the incomes of the richest 1pc which grew by $11,800 per person, or 182 times as
much. In the US, the situation with regards to income inequality is even more extreme. According to research
by the French economist Thomas Picketty, over the last 30 years the growth in the incomes of the bottom 50pc
has been zero, whereas incomes of the top 1pc have grown 300pc.
The situation in Pakistan appears to have followed a similar trend. While the Planning Commission has stopped
making public statistics on income inequality for the past few years, evidence suggests that the disparity
between the richest and the poorest households has increased. According to the Household Integrated Economic
Survey (HIES) 2015-16, the share of the top 20pc of households in overall income is nearly 45pc, while for the
bottom 20pc the share is slightly less than 9pc a multiple of 5 times.
Inequality has broader dimensions beyond wealth or income.
While looking at inequality through the prism of income or wealth distribution is instructive, it tells a less than
complete story. For a country like Pakistan, the inequality in society is multidimensional with deep structural
as well as institutional roots. The poor and vulnerable are discriminated against, face exclusion and
marginalisation in a structured and institutionalised manner. Hence, for a proper understanding of the issue, one
has to map the broad areas and extent of non-inclusion of citizens, not just the inequitable distribution of
wealth/income.
Some dimensions of non-inclusion and the resultant inequality include the following:
Inequitable growth: Since the early 2000s, prima facie it appears that capital has been rewarded much more than
labour in terms of distribution of returns generated from growth. With the preferred model of growth even in
Pakistan leading invariably to credit-financed expansion in asset values, owners of assets (land, equities) have
gained the most since leaving the others behind. (This also points to the extreme lack of access to finance by
a large part of the population).
Unfair taxation and spending: With around 90pc of tax revenue collected via indirect taxes and instruments, and
personal income tax accounting for barely 1pc of GDP, the burden of tax collection falls regressively on the less
affluent and poor. However, in terms of spending priorities of the government, the beneficiaries appear to be
segments of society that contribute less than their share as a cohort (such as the car-owning elite, for example,
via construction of flyovers and underpasses in urban centres).
Access to food and nutrition: An estimated 70-80 million people in Pakistan are food-insecure. The most
pernicious form of inequality and exclusion arises from the fact that, due to poverty and high food inflation, the
poor cannot afford high-protein diets for their children in the latters formative years. The resultant malnutrition
affects most of these children throughout their life as it impedes the development of their mental faculties to
their full potential.
Access to justice: Perhaps the most egregious example of institutional bias against the vast majority of the
population is in the application of the rule of law and the denial of justice. Numerous examples abound, with the
abysmal number of cases pursued by police and the courts against elite members of society in cases of
transgression of the law, on the one hand, and the near-automatic application of the iron hand of the state and
law against the poor, on the other.
The unequal and unfair structure of society is compounded by the lack of access to even decent healthcare for
the vast majority of the population, or to a quality of education that is even a fraction of what children from
more advantaged households get.
Given this dismal state of affairs, there is a lot that needs to be done to mitigate the structural and institutional
biases against the poor and vulnerable in society. The starting point would be not to exclude them from
government statistics and include the issue of poverty and inequality in any narrative of the economy.
 33

The government needs to invest in education and make good on the education for all pledge enshrined in
Article 25-A of the Constitution. More importantly, it needs to act to end the apartheid in education by
improving the quality of education afforded to the non-elite. Upgrading and developing vocational skills of
entrants to the labour force to make them more employable or to increase their income-earning potential is
another area of intervention.
However, the most potent leveller in society would come from strengthening the institutional framework and
providing improved governance. By making the government more accountable, it can be made to function for
all, especially the poorest and the most vulnerable. And by applying the rule of law more equally and
universally, the deep-rooted biases against inclusion and greater equality can be undone.

Federal Budget
WITH the finance minister due to present the federal budget for 2017-18 later today, a relevant question is:
what should the budget look like? Clearly, and ideally, the budget should reflect a higher purpose and a grand
design; it should be part of a medium-term response to the countrys macroeconomic context and its
socioeconomic challenges. However, this beautiful theory clashes with the ugly reality of a constrained resource
envelope. But since scarcity is at the heart of economic choice, managing it is precisely what policymakers have
to grapple with.
The resource constraint can be resolved in a number of ways relative to competing expenditure requirements.
The budget can be set in a medium-term framework rather than be reduced to a mere annual accounting
exercise. More importantly, budgeting needs to be complemented with other policies and measures that support
the overall objectives and outcomes set by policymakers (elaborated later). A stronger institutional framework,
such as informed and active oversight by parliament, for example, can help lead to better decisions, including in
setting expenditure priorities. In this manner, the trade-offs inherent in the budget can be better managed.
But what should the grand design be? In Pakistans case, the following interrelated goals and objectives present
themselves as priority areas:
Promote long-run growth led by private-sector investment
Improve the international competitiveness of the economy
Absorb the youth bulge into productive employment
Redress institutional weaknesses in economic governance
To achieve these ends, some key interventions will need to be made, complemented by a wider framework of
economic policies. Some of the required interventions are as follows:
Reducing the cost of doing business in the economy
Reducing the burden of taxation on businesses
Increasing productivity-enhancing investments (spending on the right type of physical infrastructure, on
skills development, on easing technology absorption by businesses, facilitating new IT start-ups etc.)
Allocating funds in the budget alone will not achieve results. A set of complementary policies and measures
will be needed to make progress towards the stated objectives. Hence, for example, a wide-ranging and
comprehensive restructuring of the Federal Board of Revenue will be required, underpinned by a
comprehensive organisational development programme. Modernising FBRs IT platform and upgrading its
related infrastructure is also essential. While both these steps will require significant budgetary allocation, there
will be other measures and steps needed outside of the budget to successfully complete the reform process.
Once these measures have been put in place, it will induce taxpayer confidence in FBR, while improving its
capacity to work in an independent, impartial, transparent, accountable and professional fashion all
fundamental building blocks of a modern, effective and efficient tax administration. This set of actions can then
lead to an increase in tax collection in a fair and equitable manner.
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Another example of necessary action outside the budget is a high-powered review of government expenditures,
and a separate, specific examination of the portfolio of projects under the public sector development
programme. The objective would be to make savings in government spending, introduce transparency and
realign development expenditure to the most efficient, long-run, growth-enhancing areas.
Broadly, this is the grand design and framework that was used to help PTI prepare its maiden shadow budget in
2015. Over a three-year period, it was envisaged that the standard national sales tax rate would be brought down
to 12.5 per cent, while the headline corporate tax rate would be slashed to 20pc aiming to be the lowest in the
region. These measures, in combination with investment incentives and import tariff reform, would cost a
sizeable amount of money (estimated at almost a trillion rupees over a three-year period).
This amount would represent a revenue loss that would be compensated from the following sources: higher tax
revenues generated from growth and investment in the economy, as well as from the restructuring of FBR; a
proper utilisation of the Nadra list of 3.2 million potential taxpayers; rationalisation of some taxes; savings from
the expenditure review and realignment; and, savings from reducing leakages in public-sector expenditure.
Despite these measures, in the first two years, it was estimated that the fiscal deficit would rise by around 0.4pc.
This was on account of the fact that many of the measures requiring structural changes or institutional reform
would have back-loaded pay-offs. However, in a well-thought-out scheme of things, a moderate rise in the
fiscal deficit owing to large-scale, fundamental reform should be perfectly acceptable.
Such a set of economic policies and medium-term budgetary measures would generate investment, growth and
jobs creation, while at the same time also yielding additional tax revenue by widening the tax net.

Budget and Development

The budget is not just an accounting exercise that brings government expenditures and revenues in line with
what is considered a prudent deficit target. For it to be meaningful, the annual budget should be part of a
medium-term economic strategy. It may be helpful, therefore, to identify some of the strategic development
goals and the associated budgetary design through which these goals can be achieved.
In Pakistan today, the majority of people are deprived of the minimum material conditions of dignified human
existence, such as high-quality education, healthcare, hygienic drinking water and sanitation. It is not surprising
that as a consequence, illness is widespread, especially among the poor. Our estimates show that 65 percent of
the poor population is suffering from ill health and chronic, though treatable, diseases: the poor are on average
sick for three months of the year.
Malnutrition is rampant, with 44 percent of children suffering from stunting due to malnutrition. The latest
official national estimate shows that in terms of one dollar per person per day, about one-third of the population
is living in poverty. But in terms of the internationally used $2 a day per person figure, about 60 percent of
Pakistans population is living below the poverty line.
Such acute economic deprivation for the majority of the population in a country where a small elite is living in
luxury violates our natural sense of justice. Such mass deprivation and inequality thus feeds militant extremism.
It also suppresses the productive and creative potential of the majority of people and thereby becomes a major
constraint to long-term economic growth.
In this context, four key strategic goals can be specified, the achievement of which is necessary for the welfare
of the people as a whole, rather than just the elite. New research shows that the pursuit of these goals is also
essential for sustained long-term economic growth.
First, the government should give a commitment to providing for all citizens in the next four years high
quality healthcare, education and social protection, including state pensions and unemployment benefits. The
forthcoming budget should take a credible first step towards this goal. New research shows that this universal
provision of basic services plays a vital role in achieving a sustained high per capita income growth. The
empirical evidence is consistent with economic logic. Clearly if people are well-educated and skilled, their
productivity will be relatively higher.
 35

Similarly, if people are healthy and lose fewer work days due to illnesses, their average productivity on an
annual basis will be higher. Less intuitively obvious are the results of recent research by Easterly and Rodrik,
respectively. They have shown that more cohesive societies achieve higher long-term growth compared to
divisive societies torn by conflict. It can be argued that the provision of these basic services help social
cohesion, and citizens in such societies are more economically secure, have a stake in the state and are hence
more motivated to contribute to the nation.
Most of the high growth achievers made this commitment of the universal provision of health, education and
social protection. For example, Germany under Bismarck in the 19th century, Japan under the Meiji dynasty in
the mid-19th century, China in the mid-20th century, the Scandinavian countries in the early 20th century,
Britain in the mid-20th century and finally Brazil and Chile in the early to mid-20th century. Now economic
orthodoxy would claim that Pakistan is too poor a country to afford the large budgetary expenditures for such a
goal. On the contrary, evidence provided in a recent UNDP Human Development Report shows that many of
the countries at the time that they gave this commitment (for example, Germany and China) had a per capita
lower than that of Pakistan today.
The second strategic development goal is to place Pakistan on a new trajectory of inclusive growth. I have
argued in my recent research that Pakistan has so far been unable to achieve sustained high economic growth
because of inequality. If opportunities for investment and high wage employment are provided to the middle
classes and the poor rather than just the elite, then a broader base would be created for investment, productivity
increase and innovation. Thus a higher and sustained growth can be achieved through equity.
Such inclusive growth requires not only budgetary provisions for providing high quality education and skill-
training for people but also access over productive resources, credit and equitable access over markets. Pakistan
will have to move out of being what I have called economic apartheid to being an economic democracy.
The third strategic goal is to make financial allocations and institutional arrangements for facing the adverse
effects of climate change. Unless we build sustainable development into our budget and policy design, the life
and livelihood of the vulnerable sections of society will be threatened by increasingly severe and more frequent
floods, droughts and shortages of fresh water. Consequently, the sustainability of economic growth as well as
the stability of society will be undermined.
The fourth strategic goal is to release the physical constraints to growth and human welfare in Pakistan: the
provision of adequate electricity, gas and irrigation water. For this, the required budgetary provisions must be
made. At the same time, organisational capacity and institutional structures for translating finance into
measurable outcomes must be built.
The challenge in designing the budget is how to address the structural constraints to development and unleash
the great human potential of Pakistan which for seven decades has remained dormant.

Growth vs Development
IS there a difference between economic growth and development? Can the size of an economy grow manifold,
without a corresponding improvement in its development indicators or in the socio-economic outcomes for the
citizens? This question has assumed relevance once again for Pakistan as it receives strong endorsements and
accolades from a wide variety of international sources for its recent economic performance and its medium-term
prospects.
The Wall Street Journal, in a recent piece, finds that Pakistans middle class has soared as stability returns.
Pakistans economy is a pleasant surprise writes Tyler Cowen for Bloomberg. Barrons, an eminent US
financial magazine, tells investors to Forget India, Its Neighbours Are the Next Big Thing. Global
professional services firm PricewaterhouseCoopers lists Pakistan as the 16th largest economy in the world by
size in 2050, from 24th currently. Several years ago, then Goldman Sachs chief economist Jim ONeill (the
originator of the term BRICs) had included Pakistan in the list of the Next-11 emerging markets to look out
for.
 36

The foregoing is a sampling of some of the recent articles on Pakistan. While many have a narrow perspective
of looking at Pakistan through the prism of potential above-average returns in the countrys stock market, others
are taking a long view with regard to the potential expansion in the size of its GDP. In this context, it will be
instructive to look at Pakistans long-term growth performance, and see what lessons can be drawn.
Despite many interruptions, and barring the sharp slowdown since 2008, Pakistans economy has delivered
fairly strong growth in the long run. True, progressively from the 1990s onwards, the growth rate has been
significantly lower, less stable, more volatile and far less sustained than the fast-growing economies on the
block: first China, then India and Vietnam, and now, potentially Bangladesh. Nonetheless, Pakistans GDP as
measured in current US dollars (used purely for the sake of convenience and ease of comparison) has more than
doubled since 2006, and expanded over seven times since 1990.

Economic growth is not a sufficient condition for development.

On the positive side, this expansion in the size of the economy has lifted millions out of poverty and created a
large middle class. But have Pakistans overall development indicators improved correspondingly? In terms of
size of economy, the countrys global rank improved from 47th in 1990 to 39th over this period (Pakistan is the
24th largest economy in the world on a purchasing power parity basis). However, its global ranking based on
the UN Human Development Index has slipped from 119th to 147th. There are an estimated 83 million people
facing multi-dimensional poverty, over 70m facing food insecurity, and an estimated 6m children out of school.
The countrys spending on education is the 172nd highest in the world, while public expenditure on health ranks
it one above the bottom (at 187th). Not surprisingly, there are 116,000 Pakistanis for every hospital bed in the
country, according to UN statistics. There have been improvements in some aspects, such as the adult literacy
rate and infant mortality, but these have been modest and generally lag far behind most fast-growing developing
countries.
In short, there is a stark and deep disconnect between Pakistans growth performance since 1990 and its
progress in terms of socio-economic development. In fact, this disconnect has persisted since much earlier, as
noted by William Easterlys seminal 2001 paper on the political economy of growth without development in
Pakistan. It is a result of an inferior quality of growth whereby economic growth does not emanate from
processes that make it more sustainable or durable, or make it as inclusive. More fundamentally, this disconnect
arises from a lack of a national development paradigm, which has resulted in an over-reliance by the countrys
policymakers on GDP growth alone to take care of most development challenges.
An interesting contrast is offered by Iran. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Irans rank in the Human
Development Index has risen from 142nd to 69th, with the adult literacy rate increasing from 36 per cent to over
84pc. Similarly, infant mortality has been brought down from over 44 per 1,000 live births in 1990, to 14.4 as of
2013. These improvements have occurred despite a crushing eight-year war imposed by the US and its allies,
followed by years of sanctions during which Irans economy suffered badly. Nonetheless, despite a lower rate
of GDP growth than Pakistans, Irans development outcomes are far superior. Whatever the drawbacks of
theocratic rule in terms of restriction of personal freedoms, purely in terms of a development focus, the Iranian
regime has done a far better job than Pakistans rapacious, westernised elite in delivering for its people.
Even in terms of their almost exclusive focus on GDP growth, Pakistans policymakers have done little over the
past 30 years to build a more solid framework for durable, sustainable, inclusive economic growth. The
countrys domestic savings and investment rates are a fraction of what is required to foster sustained growth.
Pakistans small export sector, relative both to the size of the overall economy as well as relative to its peers,
has shrunk even further. Not a single dynamic developing economy in the past 40 years has lifted itself to a
higher development level based on any other strategy than an export-led one.
Instead of building a solid foundation for long-term growth, based on improving outcomes in education and
health among other priority areas, and one that translates into economic development for all regions and all
Pakistanis, the current crop of policymakers appear to have outsourced the countrys long run development
 37

strategy exclusively to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. While CPEC is likely to deliver a growth
impulse, if done right, without focus and effort on improving Pakistans development outcomes, the country is
likely to repeat history by recording higher rates of economic growth (for short periods) simultaneous to a
broken public education and health system. Without fixing the pre-requisites of economic development, higher,
sustained and inclusive growth is also likely to remain elusive.

Population Bomb
An acute shortage of capital, energy, water, skilled and educated manpower, healthcare facilities, housing and
transport facilities have come together to keep the national economy in a perpetual state of under development.
On the other hand the countrys galloping population continues to render these shortages even more acute
seemingly making it impossible for Pakistans economy to arrest its free fall.
The ever-increasing population is a matter of great concern as being a developing country whose economy
Pakistan cannot afford the prevailing population growth rate. In fact high population rate is extremely
detrimental to Pakistan because it nullifies all efforts towards socio-economic development and puts a tight
break on economic growth.
According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, our population was 188.2 million in 2014, representing 2.56
percent of the worlds total population which means that one person in every 39 people on the planet is a
resident of Pakistan. With an overwhelming growth rate of three percent plus (3% +) until 1990s (Economic
Survey of Pakistan 1995-96) Pakistan within a span of just 30 years reached the 7th position on the list of
worlds most populous countries.
Around the time Zarb-e-Azb was being launched the population of North Waziristan was officially estimated at
no more than 700,000. But the number of displaced persons that arrived at the Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) camps had exceeded one million by the second week of the military campaign. This is an abnormally
large margin of error between the official estimate of the population in this miniscule part of the country and the
actual number that is yet to be estimated with any degree of accuracy.
Just imagine the horrendous possibilities that we would be facing if it were to transpire at some future date that
a similar stupendous of error had already rendered the official estimates of the countrys population of 182
million inaccurate by say more than 20 million. If true, this would in turn render inaccurate by the same vast
degree every important official statistics based on which our officials are making plans for meeting our current
and future demands of our basic and not so basic needs.
So, the immediate challenge facing the government is to hold the much delayed census at the earliest. This will
enable the government to calculate with a degree of accuracy the population growth rate (which currently is
officially estimated at around 2.1 percent) and the fertility rate (officially estimated to be 4.1 births per woman)
both of which are currently lagging behind the data for the same in all the South Asian countries except
Afghanistan.
Indeed, the possibility of under-estimation of both the official population growth and fertility rates cannot be
ruled out in view of the presumed under-estimation of the countrys population by the government. That is
perhaps why it is becoming increasingly difficult for Pakistan to make the most of its available economic
resources. As a consequence, the very fabric of our society is facing a serious threat with the writ of the state
seemingly vanishing rapidly.
With dwindling water resources, a yawning energy deficit, and an expanding population with higher
expectations and an acute security problem to boot Pakistan needs a fresh census to give planners the
essential tools for future projections. Without the census data, they would be operating in a vacuum.
Consider the important issues that are built around the availability of census data: the NFC Award, delimitation
of electoral constituencies, seat shares in parliament, local bodies polls, targeted subsidies, and all other policy
matters that rest on population data.
 38

With the census data from 1998 practically obsolete, it is fair to suppose that all of these important matters
today are actually based on suppositions that have no grounding in reality. Without a census, we dont really
know the real face of the country that we are trying to run and govern.
While attempts are being made to gather the accurate number of heads that need to be fed, clothed and housed
within the resources available to the nation, it is also as much important at the same time to simultaneously
mount a nation-wide campaign to improve the quality of life of each of our citizens.
Education and health are considered to be the two most important ingredients for enriching the quality of an
individuals life. That is why developed societies spend so much on health and education. And these two social
instruments also contribute decisively towards spreading awareness about affordable size of the family and how
to use healthcare to keep it within the limits of the resources available to maintain an acceptable quality of life.
Population planning is the only way to avoid the social, economic and large scale psychological hazards of
over-population. The benefits of population planning touch all levels individual, family, and community,
national and even global. It enhances the quality of life by reducing infant mortality, improving maternal health
and alleviating pressures on governments to meet social and economic needs. In addition, access to family
planning can be seen as a human right and as a means to enlarge womens life options.
The Population Council of Pakistan has estimated that only 35.4% of women in the country are currently
practicing contraception and that more than 20 percent of married women want to practice contraception to
space or limit their family size but are unable to do so. This is mainly because of wide-spread illiteracy, cultural
taboos and inaccessibility to high quality family planning/birth spacing services. Also, there appears to be some
kind of aversion or a strong disinclination on the part of the successive governments since General Zias days
towards the matter of population planning.
This needs to be reversed with the current government and its successors making a commitment to treat this
matter as number one priority of the nation, following up with setting in place a strong family planning
programme and increasing contraceptive prevalence rates. Due consideration should also be given to the
sensible suggestion that the population planning department should be merged with the health ministry. But the
government alone would not be able to do the needful with any degree of success. The civil society, the private
sector and the media, especially the broadcast media, also need to join in the effort wholeheartedly.
All private maternity homes and clinics as well as all big and small private hospitals should set up population
planning units on their premises as it is the duty of all private commercial enterprises, under what is called the
corporate social responsibility principle, to protect the interest of society at large. And the private broadcast
media too under the same principle should broadcast regular programmes promoting population planning as a
public service.
In some parts of Pakistan, misperceptions prevail regarding the permissibility of using contraception to space or
limit births in Islam. The past two years have seen Pakistans most eminent religious leaders and scholars come
together to endorse the concept of birth spacing, and the use of contraceptive methods to enable healthy timing
and spacing of pregnancies, thereby improving the health and wellbeing of families.

Foreign Policy
A SERIES of developments have made it necessary for Pakistan to review some of the basic assumptions on
which its foreign policy has traditionally been based. Unfortunately, matters are coming to a head while a lame-
duck government is only concerned with its own survival.

Take the threat the Indian prime ministers visit to Israel poses to Pakistans policy of treating its association
with Middle Eastern Muslim countries as a sheet anchor of its foreign policy.
 39

India has since long been developing its relations with Israel but it had so far been low-key on this, out of fear
of antagonising the Muslim world, especially the rich Arab nations. For that reason, Indias leaders avoided
hobnobbing with Israeli rulers in public. Modi decided to add another feather to his cap, after being warmly
embraced by President Trump, telling his people that he could free himself from emotional hangovers in the
area of external relations.

He could do so because the danger of causing irritation to the Muslim world seems to have subsided. The
present leaders of the Arab camp have been steadily warming up to Israel and have gone to the extent of seeking
its support in their feuds with other Muslim states.

This situation poses two problems for Pakistan. It might get worried about the possibility of the hawks in India
and Israel ganging up to hatch some mischief against this country; and the answer lies in constant vigilance.
Secondly, the absence of an adverse reaction in Muslim countries to Modis trip to Israel and the prospect of
increased cooperation between the two countries reveals a shift in the Muslim states attitude towards the
Zionist state and casts doubts on the raison dtre of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Regardless of the state of frustration our policymakers may be going through, they must work with their OIC
partners to redefine the organisations goals. They should not be shy of examining the tenability of blocs of
states formed on the basis of common belief. Pakistan must still maintain close relations with all Muslim states
but if they are guided by what they perceive to be their national interest, Islamabad will have to rethink its
priorities.

The Muslim countries decision to maintain good relations with India regardless of its attitude towards what
have generally been viewed as the ummahs critical issues should not unduly upset Pakistan. Even if India is
getting more benefit for its political and economic weight than it deserves, Pakistan need not fret. While most
Muslim states may continue to value their ties with Pakistan, and some of them may even support it on
Kashmir, none of them is likely to give up its advantages in having good relations with India for Pakistans
sake.

A proper course for Pakistan would be to watch the situation with quiet dignity and concentrate on improving
its stock with the comity of nations through better management of its affairs and constructive diplomacy in
support of humankinds pressing concerns.

It is also perhaps time to examine as to what extent Islamabad has respected the Quaid-i-Azams ideal of
friendship with all and malice towards none. Students of external relations have been considerably worried over
Islamabads apparent silence on the signs of malice towards Iran, a brother Muslim country and among
Pakistans closest neighbours, in the recent Arab rhetoric. Except for countries with which normal friendship is
not possible in view of serious disputes with them, Pakistans policy must be free not only of malice towards
any people but also of indifference to the genuine interests of friendly nations.

Another assumption that now needs to be reviewed is that the United States so badly needs Pakistans help in
getting out of the Afghanistan quagmire that it will go on giving aid to Pakistan without any quid pro quo.
Perhaps it is necessary to not only heed the warning given by Senator John McCain, considered to be Pakistans
best friend in the Republican party, but also to keep in mind the temper of the Trump administration. Since
Pakistan has not prepared itself for life without Washingtons patronage, it should avoid straining the already
shaky relationship any further.

The issues that are casting a shadow across Pakistan-US relations are no secret but whether they are born of
differences over the future of Afghanistan or Pakistans growing relations with Central Asia or China they can
be resolved through honest and frank negotiations.

As regards the US policy of deepening its strategic ties with India, here too Pakistan ought to rethink its
response. The US always considered India as its preferred partner in Asia and often used Pakistan to achieve a
breakthrough in its relations with New Delhi. That objective was realised somewhat unexpectedly after the
 40

needless Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. From that point to Nixons declaration regarding Indias place in the US
policy about a decade later was only a small hop. Instead of cavilling at the Indo-American romance, Islamabad
should let the Indians discover by themselves the cost of their flight from non-alignment to total alignment, if
they do not wish to learn from the experience of the US allies who preceded them.

Finally, who should chart the way to meeting the foreign policy challenges? Much can be said for restoring the
Foreign Office to its due status and helping it to think beyond the superseded wisdom of the past ages. It is also
necessary to determine the security establishments contribution to our external policy and the mechanics of its
assistance to the Foreign Office. Ultimately, it is parliament that must fulfil its responsibility to guide the state
towards a well-defined and as independent a foreign policy as possible that can serve the nations best interests.

Pakistan at 70th Birthday

As Pakistan turns 70, it finds itself politically half drowned in the Panama leaks. Confrontation between the
PML-N and the PTI is soaring by the day and the polity remains sharply divided over issues. It seems as
though political leadership is locked in an existential battle. The JITs damning report exposes the bankruptcy
of the ruling political class. The economic picture is no brighter with the rupee recently taking a sharp fall to
cater to the growing deficit in the external account.

Whats more worrying is that the economy fundamentally remains dependent on foreign transfusion. And our
mandarins give the assurance of CPEC as though it is the panacea for all our economic and financia l ills. This
is not to belittle the contribution it can make in strengthening our economy provided it is implemented with
the same vigour and efficiency, as is being displayed by the Chinese side.

Indeed Pakistan can take great satisfaction in having a strong political, economic and strategic partnership
with China. But to optimise the benefits Pakistan has to focus on developing self-reliance and assimilating the
positives of this relationship.

A major national weakness that persists is that our major state institutions fail to work in unison and are
mostly working at cross-purposes. There is no unified direction and the civilian leadership does not give the
impression of being in full control. A major reason for this state of affairs is the imbalance in ci vil-military
relations. The armys historical dominant position has not changed and casts a strong imprint on foreign,
defence and security policies. The only way this can change if the PM would rely on holding regular cabinet
meetings, attend parliament religiously and lead the debate on major national and foreign policy issues. Even
this will not alter the situation overnight but will at least initiate a process whereby civil authority could be
restored over a period of time.

Over-reliance on a single institution is neither in the interest of the institution nor the state. Militaries of
democratic countries whether it be the US, Britain, Germany or India that are subservient to civil authority
are held in high esteem both at home and abroad. No doubt, our armed forces are also highly respected for its
professional competence but only when it gets involved in a political role that controversies take root. We
need to remind ourselves that every time the military was forced to relinquish political power from G en Ayub
to Gen Musharraf the country went through a mega crisis of transition. Moreover, for balanced development
of all major state institutions it is crucial that space is provided and an environment conducive to their
development is created. This can only be achieved if institutions remain within their constitutional
boundaries.

Given a chance democracy is expected to provide institutional strength. It is encouraging that despite heavy
odds our parliament is functioning, albeit below the optimum. If the ruling and opposition partys would use
the forum of parliament for addressing national issues more frequently instead through media it would do
Pakistan great service.
 41

Although India and Pakistan became independent at the same time, our problems were far more complex.
India had a distinct advantage of having a well-established political party in the Congress that had a history of
leading the freedom movement. The Muslim League was in its infancy and most of its leaders and followers
came from those places that formed part of India. In terms of education, too, Pakistan was lagging behind.
And the physical infrastructure was scant and mostly in a state of disrepair.

Geo-politics too played a major role in shaping Pakistans internal institutional power structure. Its impact
has been mostly negative as the US and the West was more interested in building the military and less
concerned with Pakistans civil institutions. This trend was most pronounced during the Cold War and after
9/11.

If we look at South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore they are counted among developed countries although they
got their independence about the same time or even later than us. Granted they had a distinct advantage that
their population was more educated and societies relatively more homogenous.

Pakistan cannot continue to carry the burden of having highly adversarial relations with two of its neighbours,
India and Afghanistan. True, it may not be realistic to expect any forward movement with India, much that
Nawaz Sharif and most of the political parties would have desired. At this time Prime Minister Narendra
Modi is flying too high and engaged in diplomatic embrace with major powers. His belligerent mood towards
Pakistan has brought the relationship at a precipice.

But Pakistan should make every possible move to win back the confidence of Afghanistan. This would not be
easy considering the current level of hostility and Indian influence on Kabul. However, there are compelling
factors for both countries to move away from their self-righteous positions. Without a cooperative effort,
peace in the region would be a mirage.

Rapprochement with Afghanistan is crucial to win back the trust and confidence of the US. If Washington
sees Pakistan cooperating with Kabul then relations with it in all probability would improve. Because for the
US, Afghanistan remains its greatest foreign policy dilemma and any move by Pakistan that helps bring peace
would be widely welcome.

Iran is a brotherly Muslim country, which shares about 1,000-kilometre border with us. It blames Pakistan
that anti-state elements use its territory for launching attacks in Irans Baluchistan. Relations with Tehran
have further soured since Pakistan joined the Saudi-led military alliance and General Raheel Sharif assumed
its command. Improving relations with Iran and restoring mutual confidence is crucial for stabilising the
western border and for internal sectarian harmony.

No doubt, Pakistan at 70 is beset with innumerable problems that appear grave and debilitating. What gives
hope is the incredible resilience and great talent of our ordinary people. A better future awaits us provided we
are able to harness the social, economic and technological potential of our people through education and good
governance.

Crisis of Governance

In the discipline of international relations (IR), good governance and efficient leadership are regarded very
significant intangible sources of national power. Since its inception as an independent state, Pakistan has been
plagued by lingering and insidious bad governance. Presumably, all of the existing political and socio-economic
issues of the country can be attributed to the deeply-seated ineffective leadership.
Good governance is a prerequisite to the democratic continuity and uninterrupted prosperity of a country. There
is a range of examples that clearly show that even resource-strapped nations have become economically
 42

prosperous and militarily powerful only with the help of good governance. In Far East Asia, even though Japan,
Taiwan and Singapore are devoid of natural resources, they have still made strides on all fronts only because of
competent leadership heading them. On the other hand, Pakistan is replete with precious natural resources, but
the country is still lagging far behind owing to entrenched bad governance and brewing leadership crisis.
To impartially assess the level of good governance in Pakistan, it is imperative to take into consideration some
pre-determined parameters of quality governance identified by the World Bank (WB). According to the WB,
maximum participation in governance is the first and foremost precondition of good governance. Arguably,
Pakistans politics is quite exclusionary. Dynastic and hereditary politicians have largely monopolised the
power corridors since the 1950s. Such powerful and influential politicians heavily rely on immense wealth to
readily purchase votes from the poor and uneducated people. Thus, the politically educated youth barely ever
get to reach parliament, and the country is deprived of the competence of the youth required to expedite the
development process.
Competence, effectiveness and efficacy are also some ingredients of good governance. These qualities mean
that the leadership possesses the capacity and capability to create result-oriented policies meant to attain
maximum delivery of public services. The incumbent government seems to be lacking in all of these qualities.
All of the legislative assemblies in the country are oblivious of needed legislation. Most of the acts passed by
the government dismally fail to meet the required demands of the ever-increasing population. Many policies
crafted by the government result in further misuse and misapplication of dwindling cash.
Impartial accountability and responsibility also play a central role in good governance. Almost all public
institutions and office-bearers are largely unaccountable to competent authorities regarding their discharge of
constitutional responsibility. Against the principle of parliamentary democracy, the ministers of the executive
departments are not responsible to the legislative body. The national investigative agencies and accountability
bureaus are toothless to look into the corrupt practices and irregularities committed by the potent and wealthy
politicians and bureaucrats.
Transparency and openness ensure good governance. Both lay stress on the uninterrupted but necessary public
access to information on decisions and transactions made by the government. In Pakistan, since corruption and
unconstitutional measures are the order of the day, the public is systematically kept in dark about the activities
of MNAs and MPAs. For example, the people are hardly provided with any information about the substantial
funds afforded to the irresponsible ministers.
Last but not the least, rule of law is of paramount importance for the sustainability of effectual leadership. The
concept of rule of law means that all and sundry are regulated by the same law of the country, and the
officialdom is not treated with special laws. Moreover, whenever anybody violates the law, he is promptly
punished by the same law. In our country, influential politicians and powerful criminals are above the law.
The aforementioned yardsticks make it abundantly clear that good governance is still a distant dream in the
country. As a result, some wealthy and mighty families have had an unchallengeable hold over government and
the dwindling resources of the country long enough. The ordinary people of the country, more than 90 percent
of the population, are purposely deprived of their due political, socio-economic and educational rights granted
to them by the constitution. The country, as a consequence, lags behind other developing South Asian states in
terms of economic prosperity.
It is never too late to bring in the required reforms in governance. The proposed steps should include full
participation of the educated youth in the government, implementation of rule of law and transparency in all
matters of the government. If the incumbent government shies away from reforming the ineffective and rotten
system, the country will continue to suffer.

Problem of Political Discourse

Democracy does not simply mean the holding of elections and establishment of democratic infrastructure. The
people who manage democratic institutions and processes must imbibe its principles and norms so that these are
fully reflected in the political system.
 43

One way to judge the quality of democracy is to review the disposition and conduct of the key players, ie,
political parties and leaders. How far they internalise the norms and values of democracy and practise them in
managing political and societal affairs. Therefore, political idiom and discourse of the political leaders must
reflect democratic norms of mutual respect, decency and deference towards divergent viewpoints. The
differences are resolved through dialogue and accommodation rather than turning these into personal or group
enmity.
A good number of political leaders and parliamentarians use non-democratic and un-parliamentary idiom to
address their political adversaries. Others, who may not indulge in such rude and ill-mannered interaction, are
unable or unwilling to stop their party colleagues from adopting such a disposition that brings a bad name to
democratic institutions and processes.
Several factors explain the decline in the quality of political discourse and the use of outrageous remarks by
parliamentarians. First, parliamentary elections have become such an expensive exercise that only sufficiently
wealthy people can take part in it. Certain professions in Pakistan have thrown up a large number of wealthy
people during the last two decades, who are convinced that their economic clout gives them a licence to pursue
their agendas any way they wish. These people hardly care about democratic values and norms except when
these serve their personal interest and inflated ego.
Second, political partisanship has intensified so much that most leaders equate their party interest with the
national interest and do not hesitate a moment in rejecting the viewpoint of their rival political party. There is
very little, if any, regard for consensus-building, merit and professionalism. The partisan interest rides supreme.
Third, major political parties encourage their activists to adopt a tough and insulting disposition towards the
activists of the rival political parties. The major confrontation is between the PML-N and the PTI as the latter is
attempting to challenge the formers monopoly of power in Punjab. Their members are often engaged in mud-
slinging against each other which has lowered the quality of political discourse.
Fourth, political talk shows on the private sector TV have also contributed to degrading political interaction
among the competing political parties. Many anchors and producers invite political leaders to their programmes
who have the reputation of engaging in verbal fights with their rival party leaders. A leader is likely to get more
invitations for TV talk shows if he/she develops the reputation of making controversial remarks or heckles the
political rivals. Most political parties have loose and rude talkers who are praised by the party top leaders for
neutralising the arguments of the political rival. The PML-N has excelled in preparing a team of party activists
whose only task is to praise Nawaz Sharif and condemn Imran Khan on the media. Such TV shows have
contributed to diminishing decency in political exchanges.
Fifth, the party top leaders do not reprimand their parliamentarians or other activists for their indecent and un-
parliamentary disposition. The top leaders like Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan do not regularly attend
parliamentary sessions and that gives their respective party members an opportunity to make free-for-all
speeches in the house. The absence of top leader from the house also causes the quorum problem. A good
number of members do not turn up for the session or stay there briefly.
The overall governance pattern negates the principles and spirit of democracy. Instead of creating viable
democratic institutions and processes the focus is on building personalised political fiefdom. Professionalism,
administrative nonpartisanship and judicious handling of state resources and socio-economic development are
replaced with unconditional loyalty to the chief. All development work for the people is projected as personal
favours of the ruler. As the distribution of state patronage and development fund are done by the ruler at the
personalised level, there is a race in the political party for showing allegiance to the chief. One way of proving
the loyalty is to praise the chief all the time and adopt a derogatory disposition towards political adversaries.
Such a political culture is the major obstacle to democratic consolidation.
The above statement on the poverty of democracy in Pakistan is not meant to make a case for discarding it. The
deficiencies in Pakistani democracy are correctable provided the top political leaders of the major political
parties agree to mend their ways. They need to work towards implementing the norms of democracy in the
management of day-to-day politics and turn their political parties into self-sustaining political machines with
internal democracy. The culture of sycophancy needs to be replaced with professionalism and experience. The
 44

top leaders must attend the assembly sessions with greater frequency. They must make sure that the members
attend the sessions regularly, take part in the proceedings and maintain the decorum inside and outside the
house. The sooner they make such a beginning the better.

Short-term gains are long-term losses- Hassan Askari

Policy-making and implementation are complex processes in any state. On the one hand, the state has to cope
with external diplomatic environment and military pressures because complete isolation is not a viable option.
On the other hand, there are domestic demands caused by regional and ethnic discontinuities against the
backdrop of participatory demands and pressures for socio-economic justice, good governance and
transparency. Most states find it difficult to balance the imperatives of these two sets of issues.
A large number of states find it difficult to identify long-term goals for state institutions and processes. There is
hardly any well-articulated strategy for moving the political, social and economic systems in a particular
direction. Rather, policy-making deals only with immediate issues or opts for temporary arrangements to deal
with the current situation rather than thinking in terms of a long-term strategy to cope with the problems. This is
described as the morning-to-evening approach to governance and political management.
Most developing countries, including Pakistan, adopt this kind of tactical approach to issues and problems. The
immediate questions are temporarily addressed and there is no effort to find permanent solutions to the
diplomatic and governance problems. This approach may enable a regime to stay afloat. However, the political
system moves from crisis to crisis with a lot of uncertainty about the future. It is extremely difficult to predict
about the endurance of such a political system beyond a couple of months. Every new political challenge
appears to threaten the political process.
Another tendency is to delay decision-making and let the issue fester as along as possible. The issues are
decided keeping in view the immediate exigencies rather than on the basis of long-term considerations arising
out of the national goals and agendas.
The highest level political decision-making in Pakistan is often made on transient considerations. The primary
considerations are immediate gains on partisan considerations and the people are judged for key political and
administrative positions on loyalty rather than professionalism and an independent outlook. The more loyal a
person is to the political leader the greater are his chances of being selected for government positions. A person
holding such a position is expected to demonstrate loyalty in his decision-making and in his disposition towards
politics. It was not surprising that on April 6th the Sindh Governor, Muhammad Zubair Omar, attributed all
credit for the successful security operation in Karachi to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Before assuming office,
he was known as an energetic defender of Sharifs policies.
Instead of devising the long-term socio-economic and diplomatic strategies, the focus of the federal government
has so far been on its political survival in view of the political onslaught by the PTI. The PPP, led by Asif Ali
Zardari, has been tamed by Sharif, although its leadership periodically engages in criticism of the PML-N
government to deny the perception of subtle cooperation between Zardari and Sharif. Imran Khans PTI is
persistent in its challenge to the ruling PML-N. The Pakistan Awami Tehreek of Tahirul Qadri also gets into
anti-Sharif disposition from time to time. However, as long as Qadri stays abroad his party does not have much
chance in Pakistan.
Other policies to deal with the immediate challenges include how to cope with the diplomatic pressures
generated by India as a reaction to the death sentence to Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav. The civilian
government appeared to be taken by surprise by this judgment and took time to publicly defend it. Other
important issues include the relations with Afghanistan; Indias periodic firing across the LoC in Kashmir;
internal terrorism and especially their networks and hideouts in Punjab.
These are long-term issues that require a well-thought out strategy to keep the political initiative with the
federal government. However, the federal government pursues a reactive policy to deflect the political and
diplomatic pressures. There is a need to reflect comprehensively for developing concrete proposals for
cultivating stable and friendly relations with the neighbours. And the problem of how to ensure that a two-front
 45

situation does not arise due to close cooperation between India and Afghanistan, needs a carefully managed
policy of wooing Afghanistan rather than viewing its government as a puppet of India.
The PML-N government at the federal level and in Punjab is not forthcoming on controlling urban-based
terrorism, out of fear of losing the votes of political far-right and Islamists. Similarly, the civilian government is
reluctant to fully implement the National Action Plan, especially the management of religious seminaries to
avoid alienating them.
The policy of short-term gains has focused attention on building the personality cult of the leader through
advertisement campaigns in print and broadcast media. All welfare work is undertaken in a selective manner,
targeting the support base of the PML-N in Punjab. Such welfare projects are labelled as the personal favour by
the leader.
This can be described as the shortsighted governance and political management because it creates the leaders
personality oriented political system, characterised by highly partisan use of state patronage and resources. It
also tolerates corruption and other money making activities by all those riding on the ruling partys bandwagon.
Such policy measures can neither strengthen democratic institutions and processes nor offer the long-term
solutions to Pakistans festering socio-economic and political problems.

Strategic directions of policy

Adhocism and short-term thinking have played a predominant role in the official policy formulation in Pakistan.
Long-term planning, on the other hand, has been generally conspicuous by its absence in our governmental
decision making process. Consequently, our leaders and senior officials are constantly preoccupied by
responses to day-to-day developments instead of setting and pursuing strategic or long-term directions of policy
in the best interest of the country. This preoccupation with the short-term or tactical adjustments as against the
long-term or strategic directions of policies in various fields has been one of the major causes of the problems
and crises that confronted the country in the past. Pakistans Kashmir and the Afghanistan policies of 1990s are
prime examples of policies made for short-term gains at the expense of the long-term interests of the country.
Both policies brought us to the brink of disaster forcing us to change course radically at tremendous cost to the
nation. Our policies have also generally focused on the demands of short-term security to the detriment of the
nations long-term security. Unfortunately, despite the past unhappy experience, we remain preoccupied by
short-term thinking in the formulation of governmental policies in economic, security, and foreign policy fields.
Focus on long-term planning and on strategic directions of policies, generally speaking, is still not our forte.
The point made above about the tension between the demands of short-term and long-term security needs to be
elaborated. It is generally recognised that in the long-run it is a nations economic and technological strength
that provides the foundation for its military strength. An economically weak and technologically backward
country cannot hope to safeguard its security in the long run in the face of serious threats. Ideally, a country, at
the initial stages, should concentrate on building up its economic strength and technological prowess before it
goes after the development of its military power. But in this anarchic world where power rather than the rule of
law plays the decisive role, it is not safe to neglect the military sector totally for the sake of strengthening a
country economically. The reality is that countries do need a certain minimum level of military power to act as a
deterrent against potential aggressors, while strengthening themselves economically and technologically. It is
the familiar question of butter versus guns that leaders and policy makers face in all countries, that is to say,
how much of a nations resources a government should allocate for defense and how much should be directed
towards the task of economic and technological development, and social welfare.
If a government over-provides for defense, it may strengthen the countrys military security in the immediate
future but at the grave risk of slowing down its economic strength, enabling its competitors to pull far ahead in
the race for economic growth and thereby endangering its security in the long run. In this scenario, the country
winning the economic race in the long run may use its economic strength not only to dominate the losing side
economically but also militarily by using its greater economic and technological resources to build up a
formidable military machine. On the other hand, the country losing the economic race in the long run may find
itself increasingly at the mercy of the winning side both economically and militarily, thus exposing itself to a
serious security threat. In short, the requirements of security in the near future call for an adequate level of
 46

forces and armaments now to deter aggression and preserve national security while the demands of long-term
security necessitate economic and technological superiority in the interest of safeguarding it. Further, it is not
enough for a country to grow economically. It must grow at a higher rate than its opponents and competitors if
it wishes to safeguard its long-term security. Otherwise, as pointed out above, the danger is that as it is left
behind in the race for economic development, its opponents would gain an overwhelming advantage both
economically and militarily.
A telling example of the short-term approach overriding the long-term interests in the formulation of Pakistans
security policies is the allocation of the lions share of its resources to the defense sector while neglecting the
requirements of economic development. This tendency has had a negative impact on the countrys long-term
security by slowing its economic growth. For instance, in the budget for the current financial year, the total
allocation for defense was estimated to be Rs.1228 billion (Rs.860 billion for defense affairs and services,
Rs.178 billion for military pensions, and Rs.190 billion for contingent liabilities). This would be about 44.17%
of the estimated net revenue receipts of the federal government amounting to Rs.2780 billion. The total
expenditure on debt servicing and defense (Rs.3031 billion) would exceed the net revenues of the federal
government by Rs.251 billion forcing the government to meet this shortfall and the requirements of the
remaining current expenditure (Rs.812 billion) and development expenditure (Rs.1051 billion) through loans
and deficit financing.
This state of affairs is a recipe for a debt trap and a national disaster in the long run unless necessary corrective
steps are taken right away. Little wonder that Pakistans GDP is projected to grow at the rate of about 5% in
2016-17 as against Indias expected GDP growth rate of 7.5% in 2017. Pakistans current high rate of the
defense expenditure is unsustainable for its weak economy. The high ratio of the defense expenditure in the net
federal revenues needs to be brought down by rapidly raising the tax-to-GDP ratio and controlling the defense
expenditure through innovative military strategies. A programme of radical tax reforms is a must for the
countrys long-term survival and economic progress.
It seems that Pakistans policy makers have not adequately taken into account the lessons of modern history.
The USSR suffered the defeat in the Cold War and disintegrated not because of the shortage of conventional
and nuclear weaponry. Its defeat took place because its weak economy failed to provide a solid foundation for
its heavy military superstructure. It appears that Pakistan in the absence of a well-thought-out grand strategy is
in the process of repeating the same cardinal mistake as was done by the Soviet Union with predictable
disastrous results. It also does not appear to have learned anything from the success of China after the reforms
introduced by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978 and of the post-World War II Germany in building up national
power and attaining a high position in the comity of nations (and, in the case of Germany, national
reunification) primarily by achieving high rates of economic growth in the first instance. Pakistan is in dire need
of far-reaching economic reforms to raise the efficiency and the productivity of its economy.
Pakistans long-term security and economic well-being demand that it should assign the top priority to the goal
of rapid economic growth and subordinate everything else to the realisation of this supreme national objective.
This would require maximum possible allocation of resources to the urgent and massive task of economic
development. We would be able to do so only if we have peace in our neighbourhood and avoid a major armed
conflict allowing us to allocate the lions share of our resources to economic development while maintaining a
credible security deterrent at the lowest level of forces and armaments. The goal of peace in our neighbourhood
in turn would require us to pursue a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy.

Constitutional capture
The Constitution of Pakistan is a living and dynamic document based on sacred and internationally accepted
democratic ideals designed to promote indiscriminate well-being of citizens, orderly conduct of the state,
peoples participation at all levels of governance and equitable distribution of resources.
 47

Constitutional capture that can reverse these objectives remains the worst nightmare of those seeking
constitutions supremacy. The landmark Panama Papers verdict in general and the minority view on it in
particular aptly highlights this constitutional capture by a family in the most bizarre sense of the term. The
practical manifestation of the famous saying, all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, has
been articulately documented in the judgement by Honourable Justice Asif Saeed Khosa.
It all began when a scion of a trading family was inducted as a nominee Punjab Minister by a military regime in
1982. Political power was ruthlessly employed to gain control of state institutions. Huge loans were obtained
from nationalised banks setting up industry after industry. Heads of key institutions were appointed in defiance
of merit and based entirely on personal loyalty. All dirty tricks were set loose: issuance of time-bound
favourable SROs to gain quick trading dividends; subsidies to boost targeted businesses; evasion of taxes;
prevention, manipulation or curbs on hostile legal actions and cases; bestowing of state resources in the shape of
plots, permits and licenses to win over political adversaries and promote friends; receiving commissions and
kick-backs on mega-projects; purchase of real estate and trading in stock exchange through inside privileged
information; and money laundering in and out of the country.
Equality before the law and indiscrimination and enforcement of fundamental rights were effectively made
selective. Mighty and powerful were exempted. Party tickets were awarded purely on personal loyalty. If
elected, one must vote, speak, and act as per party heads directions. Otherwise, you stand disqualified. Any
independent rational voice and sagacity was disallowed. Either toe the line or leave the system. Bureaucracy
was personalised. Those who worked for institutions, law and the state were parked to sideline assignments and
made to face inquiries, wait for promotions and get frequent abrupt transfers and suspensions.
The option of forced military interventions to fix our institutional problems has not yielded any positive results
PPP and to a lesser extent smaller parties in the countrys politics have ascribed to similar norms. Consequently,
the country has been left with a bleeding economy, shattered institutions, personalised bureaucracy, immense
poverty, rising inequality, worse exploitation, public mistrust and an insensitive nation without hope and
resilience. The mood is that everything is fixed, pre-settled, for sale and compromised. Those who remain
committed to honesty, morality, rule of law, fair practices, and halal living in all facets of life are either wiped
out or cut to size. The old political culture of patronage and personalised service to friends coupled with
revenge and punishment for foes is replaced with new paradigm: spend money to win tickets and elections and
then use political power to plunder and accumulate money. This vicious circle continues to dominate with
ferocious manifestations.
The vital question remains that if a state is trapped in a constitutional capture of this kind, how can it be set
free? How can a political system fairly and equally open up to all citizens of the state to attract best leadership
at all levels of electorate system? How can a policy be made in the best public interest free from extraneous and
corrupt considerations? How can development agenda be set and achieved in a transparent and efficacious
manner? How can institutions start realising objectives of their creation? How can the democratic ideals and
spirit of the constitution be rightfully enforced?
The first option is forced interventions through the military. The experiment did not yield any positive result.
The second option is to wait for divine intervention the natural path of rise and fall of nations, individuals
and families. This does not require any action on our part. The third option is judicial intervention for
affirmative action. This option has never been employed in a comprehensive and over-arching manner.
The judiciary does not have a glorious history. With isolated cases of triumph and glory, the overall public trust
in judiciary and the provision of justice have always remained questionable. Notwithstanding, the judiciary has
the capacity, duty and responsibility to come forward with a comprehensive plan to direct, monitor and oversee
political and institutional reforms aimed at cleansing political and state institutions as ordained by the
Constitution. To do so, it would require public support. PTI chief Imran Khan has been credited for having
remained un-purchasable and steadfast in his struggle to break this constitutional capture. More factions of civil
society should join.
The Panama Papers verdict may prove to be the start of the greater role that the Apex court may choose to play.
This role if employed rapidly and effectively can go a long way to demolish constitutional and institutional
 48

capture that has stagnated Pakistan. The direction of the state must be set right to allow Pakistan to realise its
full potential. The Supreme Court has taken upon itself the duty to take the verdict to a logical end. It must act
swiftly to break the shackles of constitutional capture and it should not allow its activism to get lost in a blind
alley. Public pressure coupled with judicial activism is the only way forward.

Morality in Politics
The use of abusive language, the hurling of baseless and damaging accusations, and the mocking of opponents
have already been accepted as political norms in Pakistan. Ironically, all this is done in the name of upholding
morality. While such practices are more or less part of the political culture of all South Asian nations, Pakistan
in particular, the morality tool is used by the powers that be to legitimise or delegitimise certain political actors.
Interestingly, in the local diction of politics, the antonym of morality is not immorality, but corruption. Politics
and politicians are deemed immoral because they are corrupt, and loot and misuse public money. Veteran
politician Javed Hashmi is spot-on when he criticises the selective, opaque and subjective accountability of
politicians. Corruption is a disease and a crime and whoever commits it must be brought to justice. Yet
employing a selective morality approach entails the risk of not only blurring the political and legal domains, but
also providing political space to the apolitical.
The morality issue including imposing ones idea of morality on others is complex and widespread in
Pakistan, and not confined to politics alone. While its varying shades reflect in our behaviours, different
institutions use it in multiple contexts. Morality is a social value, which can extract legitimacy from religion,
social contract or cultural norms, but it cannot be an alternative to the rule of law. Academically, the rule of law
is distinguished from democracy, human rights, and social justice. The rule of law does not challenge morality
and neither does it intervene in political or democratic processes. But power elites confuse the rule of law with
morality, believing that authoritarian structures can be sustained only on moral grounds.
Where does the public stand in the debate over the rule of law and morality? The PML-N leadership is using the
argument that it is the right of the people to decide the fate of the government through the electoral process.
However, public support cannot be an alternative to the supremacy of the law, as people choose a government
to govern under the Constitution and the rule of law. Secondly, electoral accountability applies to government
performance, not to an individuals conduct in violating the rule of law.
Different groups and institutions seek power and legitimacy through developing their own moral orders.
Religious segments consider themselves the custodians of morality, mainly in the social and religious domains.
Security circles and now the judiciary, too feel an obligation to establish a political moral order. Neither
challenges the other; rather they have developed a compatibility with each others moral orders.
It is well known that religious-political parties have political stakes as well, and differ with the establishment on
certain issues. Yet their differences remain confined to a manageable domain where both try to avoid breaking
up the system. The consensus on the Legal Framework Order between the military regime and the religious
parties alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), in 2002, which allowed Gen Musharraf to continue
ruling in military uniform, is an example. In return, the MMA not only saved its provincial governments in the
then NWFP (KP) and Balochistan, but also saved from disqualification those of its members of parliament
whose madressah degrees were not compatible with university graduation degrees.
In the NWFP, the MMA government tried to expand the outreach of its moral order through the introduction of
the Hasba bill (Sharia implementation bill) in 2003, but this was challenged and nullified by the Supreme Court.
It was an attempt to codify their moral order into a legal framework, but it was a breach of their determined role
and power elites stopped the party from doing so. In subsequent years, religious parties stuck to their main role
in the social and religious domains, and the power elites hardly disturbed them when they demonstrated their
moral order on the streets.
Political parties, however, do not fit into this equation of partnership with the security establishment. They are
reminded time and again that they must be subservient to the security establishment, particularly when they try
 49

to assert themselves at times even in the areas the Constitution puts them in charge of. The MMAs attempt
to legalise its moral order was foiled, but the establishment had already succeeded in codifying its moral order
through introducing amendments in Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution in 1985.
There does exist a body that can become a bridge between institutions parliament. Ironically, the ruling party
has remained indifferent to parliament, which has also provided space to apolitical forces to outclass the
government using the morality argument.
The moral question becomes more dangerous when parliament is not given sovereign status by the power elites,
including political forces. This, however, does not harm anyone more than the political parties themselves, the
political process and above all, the ruling party. When parliament does not take the lead in shaping the
narratives and managing conflicts, it creates grey areas that anyone can exploit. The political leadership should
have the ability to identify the grey areas, rather than operating in this murky space.
The current political crisis also presents an opportunity to the political leadership to review their actions. The
ruling parties in particular should amend their approach of undermining parliament. This is the parliament that
can review Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution and establish parity among institutions while strengthening
the rule of law, accountability, and transparency.
On paper, the supremacy of parliament seems attractive; but in practice, political parties avoid making it their
source of strength and prefer to play on the morally high political ground. Perhaps, it is easier to challenge
opponents than the status quo.

Continuity of Democracy
Since the dawn of the modern age, the democratic process has been an essential ingredient of the onward march
of human history. Countries that adopted the democratic form of government and stuck to it despite the
vicissitudes of time were, by and large, able to move ahead in the race for human progress. Those which chose
to practice various forms of dictatorial rule or the absolute rule of monarchy were left far behind in this race.
One main reason why the West was able to pull ahead of the rest of the world was its adoption of the
democratic form of government in which the people elected their rulers who were accountable to them and who
could be changed if their performance was not satisfactory. Popular sanction and the threat of periodic
accountability through elections generally ensured that democratically elected governments would work in the
best interest of the people. This is, of course, not to deny the important role of the quest for knowledge and the
spirit of enquiry in the dawn of the modern era.
Even a cursory glance at the world around us is sufficient to bring home these truths. By and large, one common
factor which distinguishes the developed countries from the less developed ones is the existence of a mature
democratic system which provides the people with the opportunity to elect and, if necessary, change their rulers
through periodic elections. These countries have witnessed ups and downs. On occasions, their democratically
governments were not able to perform well causing a great deal of disappointment and anger among the people.
Still, they stuck to democracy because of its unique advantages. On the other hand, dictatorship or its variants
sometimes create the illusion of fast decision making and quick results. But in the long run, dictatorship is a far
inferior system of government than democracy because it suffers from three inherent flaws. Firstly, since the
people do not play any significant role in the choice of the dictator, it is highly unlikely that his policies will
reflect their wishes and preferences. Secondly, there is no system of checks and balances to ensure that the
dictator is prevented from pursuing flawed policies. Thirdly, most dictatorships fail to provide a generally
accepted rule of succession. Consequently, the country has to go through political instability with its attendant
adverse consequences every time a new ruler has to be selected to assume the reins of the government.
Unfortunately, Pakistan soon after its birth became the victim of military dictatorship despite the clear advice of
the Quaid-e-Azam to the senior army officers to steer clear of politics and let the politicians do their job. A
succession of army generals starting with General Ayub Khan imposed military dictatorship on the people of
Pakistan in disregard of the teachings of the Quaid-e-Azam, the provisions of the constitution, and their oath of
honour. These ambitious and unscrupulous generals prevented the democratic system of government from
taking root in the country. In the absence of a system of checks and balances, their policy blunders led to
disastrous results for the country, the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 being the most important example of
 50

their misrule. Repeated violations of the constitution with impunity bred lawlessness in the country and
corruption in different sectors of the society. The muzzling of the voice of the people created a gulf between
them and the rulers, enabled the ruling elite to exploit the resources of the nation for their personal benefit,
widened inequalities of income and wealth, encouraged favouritism at the expense of the principle of merit, and
aggravated poverty and a sense of deprivation among the masses.
Of course, politicians, bureaucrats and the judiciary must bear their own share of the blame for the repeated
military take-overs. The politicians through their inability to provide good governance created the vacuum
which the ambitious army generals readily filled up. The judiciary, whose job was to safeguard the constitution,
became a willing partner in the shenanigans to justify the military rule. Senior bureaucrats extended support to
the generals dictatorial rule for the sake of their personal benefits. In the process, the country and the masses
suffered.
One would assume that after four experiments with the military rule and after witnessing their adverse
consequences for the country, there would be a national consensus in favour of democracy and against
dictatorship. Unfortunately, that is not the case. There are still some in the country who have not drawn the right
lessons from our past experience. Pervez Musharraf, for instance, still continues to propagate the point of view
that the army chief has no option but to take over the reins of the government if the choice is between the state
and the constitution. This is, of course, an open invitation to the COAS to topple democratically governments at
will since he would be the prosecutor, the jury and the judge.
There is also a group of retired senior army officers and civilian bureaucrats, which has been carrying on a
campaign over the past several years to replace the democratically elected government by a government of
technocrats to be selected by the army top brass. This is a veiled attempt to re-impose military rule in Pakistan.
Only in this case the military would try to run the government from behind the scene while the so-called
technocrats would be in charge for public consumption. This proposal, which is in direct violation of article 6
of the constitution, is apparently based on the misplaced belief that somehow the technocrats under the
supervision of the army would be able to deliver where the democratic governments have failed. Considering
the blatant and massive corruption of which these technocrats have been accused and considering the day-to-
day examples of misuse of power by them for personal gains, one wonders how they would be able to perform
in the best interest of the country, particularly in the absence of any accountability to the public or their elected
representatives. Above all, they cannot pretend to be better aware of the wishes and preferences of the people
than their elected representatives.
Imran Khans support, voiced in 2014, to the proposal for a government of technocrats to replace a duly elected
government, which had completed just one year of its five-year term, was shocking. It was a thinly veiled
attempt to take the country back to military rule. Luckily for the country, that attempt failed thanks mainly to
the united front formed by all the other political parties and the admirable conduct of the Chief of the Army
Staff, General Raheel Sharif.
The Panama leaks issue has provided Imran Khan and some other disgruntled elements another opportunity to
destabilize the current democratically elected government at the Centre irrespective of its consequences for the
democratic process or the country which is facing a serious security threat on its eastern border. It is imperative
that PTI is clearly told that whereas it has the legal and constitutional right to agitate peacefully to propagate its
views, the law does not allow it to stop through use of force the business of state and normal business activities,
or disturb the normal day-to-day life of the citizens of Islamabad. Imran Khan needs to learn that democratic
continuity is non-negotiable and no issue can justify endangering the democratic process in the country. At the
same time, those accused of corruption, irrespective of their position, must be taken to task through due process
of law.

India-Israel Nexus
Since the contemporary international system is largely anarchic, it is not astonishing to watch two oppressive
and ultra-right wing governments overtly embracing each other despite their gross human rights violations in
Kashmir and Palestine.
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Indian Prime Minster Narendra Modi has become the first premier of his country to pay a three-day visit to
Israel, an oppressive state that has colonised and suppressed the Palestinians since 1948. Though India and
Israel have lately increased their cooperation in the fields of agriculture and information technology, it is the
burgeoning military and intelligence coordination between both the countries that made Modi revisit Indias
foreign policy by embracing Israel at the cost of the long-suffering Palestinians.
Such a dramatic shift in Indian policy towards the Jewish state does not bode well for the legitimate freedom
struggles of the disgruntled Palestinians and the Kashmiris. India has historically backed the Palestinian cause
for full autonomy. Modi warmly welcomed the Palestinian National Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas in New
Delhi last year while reiterating Indian support for a two-state solution.
Modis visit to Israel has arguably provided a platform for both countries to share their brutal policies and
strategies on how to quell and suppress the indigenous struggles of the Kashmiris and the Palestinians for their
right to self-determination.
Even though India officially recognised Israel in 1950, the formers political support for Palestinian
independence and its proclivity to maintain amicable relations with the oil-rich Arab world forestalled New
Delhi from cultivating diplomatic relations with Israel until the end of the cold war in the early 1990s.
Despite the establishment of formal diplomatic ties, Israel secretively funnelled military hardware into India
during the short Sino-Indian war in 1962. Moreover, Tel Aviv militarily helped New Delhi during the 1965 and
1971 Indo-Pak wars and covertly supplied artillery shells to India during the Kargil War in 1999 when India
faced a dearth of such weapons. According to a recent report, India reciprocated by providing spare parts of
aircraft and tanks to Israel during the six-day-long Israel-Arab war in 1967.
During the visit, Modi signed a total of seven accords with Israel in sectors ranging from agriculture to water
conservation and space technology. According to the Israeli media, both countries signed defence deals
averaging over $1 billion a year. Both countries have also agreed to create a bilateral technology innovation
fund worth $40 million to boost research development within India and Israel and increase the current level of
trade, which stands at around $5 billion.
The paradigm shift in Indian policy towards Israel apparently stems from the growing Chinese economic and
military footprints in South, East and West Asia. Indias paranoid strategic thinkers are highly frightened that
the militarily-rising China is set to encircle and contain India through its string of pearls and the One Belt and
One Road (OBOR) projects. The ongoing skirmishes near the Sino-Indian border in Sikkim seem to have
further accentuated Indian apprehension about Chinas rapid rise as a potential hegemon in Asia.
Since India itself aspires to become the sole hegemonic power in Asia through all-out American military
backing, New Delhi has decided to cultivate robust relations with all major economic and military powers in
East, South and West Asia. Indias growing strategic and commercial ties with Japan, Saudi Arabia and now
with Israel demonstrably reflect this Indian mindset to dominate South Asia in the foreseeable future.
Indias strategic policymakers are cognisant of the established fact that New Delhi will not be able to compete
militarily with Beijing in Asia without modernising and expanding its defence sector. In this regard, Israel
seems to be the only potent military power that can potentially provide advanced and sophisticated military
hardware to India with relatively cheaper rates. As a result, Israel has already become Indias third largest
source of arms, with a 7.2 percent share of imports between 2012 and 2016, next to Russia (68 percent) and the
US (14 percent).
In todays highly mechanised warfare, the application and importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
cannot be denied. Interestingly, Israel is the only country that supplies advanced UAVs to India. The Indian Air
Force is presently operating 108 Searcher UAVs and 68 Heron UAVs, which have been imported from Israel.
To further cement defence collaboration, the Modi government signed a $2.6 billion deal with Israel in April for
Israeli missile and air defence system. According to experts, this is the largest arms order in Israels entire
history.
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Although Indias cut-throat competition for regional hegemony is mostly with China, the major policy circles in
New Delhi are also perturbed over Pakistans slow but steady economic growth and military rise in South Asia.
Islamabads tactical nuclear weapons in response to Indias operationally flawed Cold Start doctrine have
already dashed the forlorn hope of Indian strategic thinkers to acquire a hedge in the South Asian nuclear
equation.
India is heavily engaged in a continuous arms race with Pakistan to counter Islamabads increasing military
capability and prowess in the region. In this regard, Tel Aviv helped India successfully test Israeli-made
SPYDER, a quick reaction surface-to-air missile, in May. According to a recent report in India Today, the
Indian Air Force has planned to deploy this system close to the highly militarised Indo-Pak border. During his
meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Modi may have asked for more Israeli military
technology that is primarily calculated to counter Pakistan on the defence front.
Indias hectic efforts to enhance its military ties with Israel will probably make Pakistan and China foster their
economic and defence cooperation in the region. Both Pakistan and China have recently come so close to each
other that it appears rather elusive for India to pursue its hegemonic designs in the Indian Ocean regions. The
more India militarily partners with other countries, the more Sino-Pak partnership becomes stronger to block
Indian disruptive objectives in South Asia.
Indias sudden decision to embrace Israel is also likely to turn the growing Indo-Iranian relations hostile.
Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has sternly reacted to such Indian diplomatic move towards
Israel by calling upon the Muslim states to support the legitimate cause of the Kashmiris struggle for self-
determination. If the Modi government continues to further cement military ties with Israel, Iran will probably
hand over the strategically-important Chabahar Port to China and thereby shatter Indias dreams to access the
energy-rich Central Asia.
Pakistan should capitalise on the Indo-Israel bonhomie to bolster its relations with Iran and coordinate with
Tehran to highlight the gross human rights violations that are being committed in Kashmir and Palestine.

History of Accountability
Public spectacles of humiliation for rulers have always had an appeal in the popular imagination. It is a moment
in which the world seems to have been turned upside down, rules of the world inverted, the powerful appearing
meek and the wretched of the earth vindicated, at least momentarily.
The JITs report has created such a frenzied spectacle in sections of the electronic and social media, with many
equating the damning condemnations of the PML-N government, particularly the prime minister and his family.
And one can understand where such euphoria stems from. After almost ten consecutive years of rule in Punjab,
and the announcement of one spectacular project after another, there still remains little for the government to
show in terms of improving the living standards for a vast majority of ordinary people. A few facts illustrate the
abysmal situation.
Today, the number of Pakistanis unable to access drinking water has increased to a shocking 84 percent, with 40
percent of the population dying of waterborne, preventable diseases. The housing shortage for ordinary people
has reached an almost staggering 10 million, with no social housing policy in sight. On top of that, almost four
million youth are entering the job market annually, with the need to create an additional 1.5 million jobs just to
keep up. The recent tragedy in Bahawalpur, where the entire region lacked a burn unit, exposed how the social
infrastructure has all but crumbled outside the glittering neighbourhoods of Lahore.
On the local level, the nexus of patronage and police high-handedness has made meaningful opposition from
ordinary people all but impossible. Consider the case of Ghulam Dastgir, a trade union leader who was arrested
and imprisoned by an anti-terrorist court for merely siding with peasants at Dera Saigol resisting dispossession
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against a landlord connected with the N-league. He was acquitted by courts two days ago after five years in jail,
with his health in shambles, and more importantly, after the complete ruin of the peasant movement in the area.
Such poor souls, of course, cannot be judged if they lack enthusiasm for this democratic rule.
Yet, despite the obvious failures of the current regimes development policies, and their brazen misuse of
authority, one cannot but feel sceptical about the current celebratory atmosphere. And the one big irritant
interrupting our sense of victory is nothing but the history of accountability drives in our unfortunate land.
It is disingenuous to claim that prime ministers, or even popular leaders, have not been held accountable. Other
than Liaquat Ali Khan, it is difficult to think of any significant prime ministerial figure in our history who was
not dismissed over abuse of authority/corruption, and was not jailed, exiled or, in Z A Bhuttos case, hanged. If
punishing prime ministers was a criterion, one could compare Pakistan to established democracies and claim
that we have more accountability for elected officials than any other country, making us one of the most pro-
people systems in the world!
This would, however, be a statement that not even the most enthusiastic nationalists would like to make. For
Pakistans record of holding elected officials is intertwined with a peculiar trajectory; that of the complete
impunity of unelected officials, in particular the military and the judiciary. For example, it would be quite
unthinkable to look into the financial affairs of the army and merely a book written on the subject can invite a of
antagonism.
Not only financial corruption, but even alleged abuses of human rights of citizens in far-flung areas such as
Fata and Balochistan (and previously East Pakistan) remain taboo topics that journalists, let alone courts, cannot
touch. Add to that the secrecy surrounding the conduct of the war on terror, recently amplified by Raymond
Davis book, and we realise that the quest for even transparency, let alone widespread accountability, remains a
distant dream.
We can now resolve this paradox. Despite repeatedly undergoing the ritual of deposing prime ministers, we
cannot claim that we have moved closer to a culture of across-the-board accountability, since the deep state
remains outside the ambit of any such process. The political ramifications of such accountability have been
even more dubious. In a society where abuse of public authority is a norm, and industrial development is linked
to cronyism, it is not hard to indict large sections of the elite (and upper middle classes) of bending the law for
personal benefits.
This reality is compounded by the fact that the deep state not only enjoys impunity for itself, but also has the
power to offer a clean chit to anyone among this class who chooses to function under its ambit. In the 1960s,
General Ayub Khan was able to set up his own faction of the Muslim League by enticing political bigwigs with
lucrative offers of patronage, all in the name of fighting corruption. General Ziaul Haq also pardoned and
consequently included a number of political heavyweights in his government by offering access to government
resources. Incidentally, the Sharif family was one such (Punjabi) household that obtained immense financial
benefits for its closeness to the Zia regime.
The latest round of good governance was of course witnessed under the Musharraf regime, where NAB was
used to fulfil the unfinished task of cleaning Pakistan from the corruption of the two major parties. The process,
however, turned into a farce when Musharraf needed political allies to stabilise his government. Thus, a large
number of PML-N, and later PPP, members were cajoled into a pro-Musharraf coalition, with not only
corruption cases against them dropped, but by also being offered high posts in the cabinet.
In all these instances, this entanglement between accountability and impunity is extended or withdrawn to
different actors as part of a political calculation. It implies that rather than being an attempt to eradicate
corruption, accountability in Pakistan has been, and remains, a technique of governance. It is a method through
which threats, selective action and conditional pardons are put into effect. All the while, it is ensured the
vigilant gaze of the media and the courts will not stray enough to include national institutions in the
accountability process, since past precedents for those who dared have made them wiser.
Over the past 70 years, each phase of accountability has come with proclamations suggesting that at least the
process has begun and will eventually deepen. Yet, instead of a beginning, it ends up being part of a repetition,
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in which an even greater, well-entrenched and sacred elite continues to reproduce its own privilege. The
demands for accountability, and the egalitarian impulse such demands express, can be realised only when
applied across the board without exceptions for any sacred cows. For the destinies of nations cannot be changed
without such principled, but uncomfortable decisions.

Tame Tiger : Munir Akram

IN the midst of major global transitions, Pakistan confronts multiple challenges: domestic discord, terrorism,
Indian hostility and subversion, Afghan chaos and American pressure. The low energy response of Pakistans
ruling classes to these challenges displays an absence of self-confidence and an assumption that Pakistans
destiny will be determined by forces and factors other than ourselves.
Such attitudes are ill-suited to the worlds fifth largest country by population; one defended by the sixth largest,
nuclear equipped, armed forces; with an economy growing at 5pc annually despite terrorist violence, political
turmoil and dysfunctional governance.
It is universally acknowledged that Pakistanis are a resilient and resourceful people. Yet Pakistan has become a
soft state because its elites have embraced selfish goals nationally and a subservient posture internationally.
Over the decades, our ruling classes have become inured to the patronage of our Cold War ally, the United
States, and other rich benefactors. They cannot contemplate the consequences of cutting the umbilical cord of
external dependency. For most of Pakistans common people, who do not benefit from this largesse, the
impact of the oft-threatened termination of external financial or political support would be marginal and
bearable.
If the interests of the elite are set aside and national interest guides policy exclusively, Pakistan has the intrinsic
capacity to withstand external pressure, overcome most of its present challenges and exploit the vast
opportunities offered by the current strategic transition in world affairs.
In Pakistan today, domestic terrorism and violent extremism can be eliminated if the National Action Plan is
implemented without regard to the political umbrellas that protect some of these violent elements.
Action against the TTP safe havens in Afghanistan is held back by concern about Americas reaction. Yet,
unless the US-Nato forces themselves eliminate these safe havens, Pakistan will have to do so if it is to stop
Indias subversion from Afghan territory.
The Kabul government can surely be persuaded to stop its constant abuse and perfidious collaboration with
India against Pakistan if Islamabad utilises its considerable leverage. Once Kabul is cooperative, the Afghan
Taliban, including the Haqqanis, should be either convinced to join a peace dialogue or ejected totally from
Pakistans territory. Pakistan does not need strategic depth; it has nuclear weapons.
India is a hegemonist power. If it is to preserve the rationale for its creation, Pakistan cannot accept Indian
domination. It must maintain credible nuclear and conventional deterrence but avoid war with India. However,
until the Kashmir dispute is resolved, a conflict could be triggered by a popular Kashmiri revolt like the present
one. If India imposes a war on Pakistan, the latter should not rely entirely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.
India could also be defeated conventionally with the help of our people.
Somewhere in our foreign ministrys archives is the record of a conversation between the then foreign minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Chinas premier Chou En-lai soon after the 1965 war. When Bhutto explained that
Pakistans offensive on Akhoor had to be halted and its forces redeployed to protect Lahore after India attacked
across the border, the Chinese premier opined that Pakistan should not have redeployed. Pakistani forces, he
said, would have been welcomed in Kashmir; on the other hand, the people of Lahore would have fought Indian
occupation on the streets and, with this peoples struggle, you would have made your nation. There is a lesson
here for our strategists.
There is considerable anxiety in Islamabad about US policy under Trump. Despite the prime ministers effusive
phone conversation with Trump, Pakistan is likely to suffer collateral damage from the growing US rivalry with
China and its strategic partnership with India. However, unless the US seeks Pakistans submission to Indian
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domination or attempts to neutralise its nuclear deterrence, a cooperative or at least non-hostile relationship can
be established with Washington. If appropriately negotiated, common ground can be found in combating
terrorism, on Afghanistan, reciprocal nuclear restraint with India and mutually beneficial investment and
economic cooperation.
Chinas emergence as a global economic and military power offers a historic opportunity for Pakistan. It must
be grasped with both hands. The CPEC project is critical, economically and strategically, for Pakistan. If
pursued with vision, the opportunity can encompass: investment in all sectors of the Pakistan economy; rapid
modernisation of Pakistans defence capabilities; stabilisation of Afghanistan; and creation of an economic
network under the One Belt, One Road initiative integrating Pakistan with Iran, the GCC, Central Asia and
Russia, apart from China.
Yet Pakistan should not rely on China or any other country for its development. The Pakistani state has to play a
central role. Some important goals that Islamabad can secure are:
One, achieve financial independence. Tax revenues can be doubled, from the present 9pc of GDP to the global
norm of 18pc. Savings of 1-2pc of the federal budget can be realised by divesting major loss-making
government corporations. Pakistans capital markets can be enlarged to provide local development finance. The
additional fiscal capacity can be used to eliminate extreme poverty, expand education and health programmes,
support small farmers and small and medium enterprises.
Two, adopt a Pakistan first industrial policy and reverse the unilateral disarmament of the countrys trade
regime. Nascent industries need to be nurtured through higher tariffs and a clampdown on smuggling. They can
meet the high domestic demand for consumer and durable goods, which is the main driver of Pakistans growth
and, once competitive, contribute to expanding Pakistans dismally small exports.
Three, support agriculture. This sector still supports 60pc of Pakistans population. Our crop yields are one-
eighth of those in industrial countries. With adequate financial and technical support, especially to smaller
farmers, Pakistan can emerge as a regional breadbasket.
Improved governance is essential. In todays globalised world, no country can progress without an efficient
bureaucracy. Pakistans administrators should be functionally competent, competitively chosen, handsomely
remunerated and fully accountable.
None of these goals can be adequately achieved without decisive national leadership. Our electoral democracy,
chained to feudal and industrial power structures, requires to be reformed to enable clean and competent leaders
to secure office. Only then will the Pakistani tiger be able to leave the cage in which it has been confined.

Middle East Crisis- Qatar and Pakistans role

The decision by Saudi Arabia and its allies to boycott Qatar was in the making for some time, although it was
not expected to be that harsh. There is a strong feeling that it was the Trump factor that emboldened Saudi
Arabia to take the tough stand.
While on the one hand President Trump continues to support the policy of isolating Qatar and on the other,
wants to play the role of a mediator. Perhaps, President Trump was initially unaware, until reminded by his staff
that Qatar is home to CENTCOM, US biggest military base in the region with 8,000 troops stationed there. Not
surprising that US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson took the opposite position that sanctions against Qatar be
eased as it is causing unintended humanitarian consequences and hindering military action in the region and
affecting the fight against the Islamic State. German Chancellor Merkel has echoed similar support for lifting
sanctions on Qatar.
Secretary Tillerson has sought the cooperation of Turkey in defusing the crisis. It is, however, not clear whether
the different positions taken by the president and the secretary of state are by design or reflect the state of
confusion in US policy.
In a region where free speech is considered criminal activity Al Jazeera has become highly contentious. Its more
vocal and independent reporting of events is unacceptable to insecure and authoritarian regimes of the Middle
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East. Qatars political and moral support and providing asylum to Muslim Brotherhood leaders is another bone
of contention. What is troubling the Arab regimes is also Qatars relation with Iran and support of Hamas.
By adopting an independent and balanced policy Qatar aims at increasing its leverage. Moreover, its policies are
dictated by economic considerations. A demonstration of this is sharing a gas field with Iran. But Saudi Arabia
and its allies find Qatars independent stance quite unacceptable.
This is not to overlook the ambitious designs of Iran in the Middle East conundrum. Its support for Bashar
Assads regime in Syria, despite its flagrant violation of human rights, unwavering support of Hezbollah and
military and political dominance of Iraq give rise to a clash of interests and invite a response from Arab
countries.
The latest decision by Turkey to support Qatar gives a new twist to how regional countries are positioning
themselves to protect and advance their interests. Ankara may be seeing it as an opportunity to establish its
foothold in an Arab country to enhance its influence in the Middle East. Sending its troops is a clear signal that
Turkey will defend the territorial integrity of Qatar. By supporting Qatar, Turkey also aims to moderate the
influence of Iran and act as check against the growing footprint of Israel in the region.
What makes Qatar vulnerable is its heavy dependence on imports. Eighty per cent of food necessities come
from Saudi Arabia. And the main land route connects Qatar with Saudi Arabia. That should normally restrict
taking independent positions. But with Iran flying over 450 tons of food necessities and Turkey equally keen to
win over Qatar the blockade is unlikely to make an impact. This measure would also hurt Saudi businessmen, as
they would lose the attractive Qatar market. Despite external support Qatar would eventually have to extend
some concessions and Saudi Arabia and its allies will have to soften their position. Prudence demands national
decisions should be compatible with national power. Apparently, Hamas leadership is relocating itself either in
Sudan or Iran.
It is truly an irony that the rivalry of the Sunni regimes against Iran is so intense that there are no qualms in
accepting Israel as an ally. Indeed, Tel Aviv is one of the main beneficiaries of this confrontation.
All these ominous developments reinforce the deep and expanding crisis in the Muslim world. It makes a
mockery of the stated objective of the Islamic military alliance to forge a united front to fight terrorism and
extremism. Differences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar are not between its people as much as these are
between the ruling families. In fact, the people of both the countries have so much in common and are like one
society with different rulers.
The Arab divide places Pakistan in a delicate and challenging situation. Saudi Arabia is Pakistans staunch
strategic ally. It has stood steadfast with Pakistan in crises and extended financial and diplomatic support.
Nearly 1.8 million Pakistani expatriates are working in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia is home to Makkah and
Madina, the holiest places for Muslims. Nawaz Sharif personally owes a lot to the Saudi monarchy and enjoys a
strong personal relationship.
With Qatar Pakistan enjoys close fraternal relations. It is the primary source of supply of gas. About 80,000
Pakistani expatriates are in Qatar. The prospect of nearly an additional 100,000 Pakistanis being hired before
the World Olympics is an added attraction.
There have been voices raised for calling back General Raheel Sharif. I do not foresee any immediate role for
him in the Saudi-Qatar confrontation. The Saudi alliance is not planning any military action against Qatar; the
thrust is in persuading it to change policies and if possible force the present ruler to quit through diplomatic
isolation and economic coercion. In any case it would take a year or two before the military force that is
planned by Prince Mohammed would be operational.
Historically, Pakistan has never taken sides in intra-Arab feuds. In the Yemen conflict too Pakistan took a
neutral position. It realises confrontation among Arab countries has consequences for Muslims worldwide. It
will undermine the fight against Islamic State and further weaken the voice of Arab countries at international
forums. However, the recent visit of a Qatari delegation to Lahore and its meeting with Shahbaz Sharif and
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Nawaz Sharifs visit to Saudi Arabia this week suggest Pakistans efforts at defusing the crisis. If Pakistan,
along with Turkey, can contribute in bringing peace to the region it would be a great achievement.

Muslim World in Disarray

Even a cursory glance at the current state of affairs shows that the Muslim world from Morocco to Indonesia is
in disarray. Many Muslim countries suffer from political instability and economic backwardness because of
autocratic governments which do not represent the aspirations of their people and which have done little for the
social emancipation and economic development of the masses. Sectarian differences and perceived clashes of
strategic interests of Muslim countries have not only given rise to regional conflicts but also aggravated internal
political instability in some of them. The inability of the elites and the intellectuals in Muslim countries to come
to grips with the challenges of modernisation have given rise to confused thinking and a wave of religious
extremism which, at least partly, is responsible for the monster of terrorism tearing apart the Muslim world. As
a result of all these factors, the Middle East is virtually in a maelstrom as evidenced by the conflicts in Syria,
Yemen and Iraq which have been aggravated by Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The dream of Muslim unity has just
turned into a dream with little prospect of its realisation in the foreseeable future unless the governments of the
Muslim world rise above their narrow national interests and adopt an enlightened approach, instead of their
current short-sighted and counter-productive policies, in the interest of peace, stability, unity, and progress in
the Muslim world.
Internal and regional conflicts in the world of Islam have been exacerbated by overt and covert interference of
non-regional world powers in pursuit of their own national interests. These powers have often acted upon the
well-known imperial principle of divide and rule in dealing with Muslim countries, especially those in the
Middle East with the objective of establishing their political hegemony in the region and controlling its oil and
gas resources. Syria and Iraq are prime examples of such interference by non-regional powers. The foundations
for the Palestinian and the Arab-Israel disputes were also laid down by the hegemonic policies of the Western
powers. These disputes and the exploitative policies of the US-led West constitute the root cause of the problem
of global terrorism. The international community has rightly given top priority to the eradication of this menace.
But, unfortunately, the Western powers show scant signs of seriousness in bringing about the peaceful
settlement of the Palestinian and the Arab-Israel disputes or to desist from pursuing their hegemonic designs in
the region. Ironically, the United States, especially under President Trump, appears to be pursuing policies
which can only aggravate these issues, thus, providing more fuel to the fire of terrorism while, at the same time,
issuing calls for its eradication.
It is against this background that one should look at the Arab-Islamic-US summit which was held at Riyadh
about two weeks ago. The summit was organised with the ostensible purpose of combating terrorism. But the
statements made by President Trump and King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud at the summit as well as the
Riyadh Declaration issued by the Saudi government at its conclusion left no doubt that its real purpose was to
establish a Saudi-led anti-Iran alliance with anti-Shia sectarian overtones. Even Adviser to the Prime Minister
on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz had to concede while briefing the Senate that the Riyadh summit had widened
the sectarian divide in the Muslim world. A few quotations from the statements made at the summit would serve
to drive home these points. President Trump accused Iran of fueling the fires of sectarian conflict and terror
and called for isolating it. King Salman called Iran the spearhead of global terrorism and called for containing
it. The Riyadh Declaration, issued by the Saudi government without formal approval by the participants of the
summit, affirmed the absolute rejection of the practices of the Iranian regime designed to destabilise the
security and stability of the region and the world at large and for its continuing support for terrorism and
extremism. Thus, the Riyadh summit instead of serving the cause of Muslim unity, had the opposite effect of
accentuating the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and widening sectarian differences in the Muslim world.
Significantly, the Riyadh Declaration claimed that the participating Muslim countries had expressed their
readiness to contribute 34,000 troops for the Islamic Military Coalition force, presumably to be headed by
General Raheel Sharif, to support operations against terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria when needed.
Such intervention would be in direct contravention of Pakistans traditional policy to avoid involvement in
intra-Arab disputes or disputes between Muslim countries. It is not a secret that Iran and Saudi Arabia are
supporting opposing sides in both Syria and Iraq. Our active involvement in Saudi-led military operations in
either of these two countries, besides overstretching Pakistans military resources, would bring us in direct
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confrontation with the Iranians operating in those two countries. Our fundamental aim should be to work for
peace and unity in the Muslim world and to bring about understanding and reconciliation between Saudi Arabia
and Iran rather than taking sides in their disputes.
Normally, the participants of a multilateral conference like the Riyadh summit can dissociate themselves from
those paragraphs or sections of its Declaration with which they do not agree by recording formally their
reservations on them. Pakistan has not taken such action in the case of the Riyadh Declaration. However, our
Foreign Office has a point when it stresses that since the summit never formally adopted the Declaration, there
is no need for us to dissociate ourselves from its objectionable provisions. Nevertheless it is important for us,
keeping in view our critically important national interests, the resolution of our Parliament of April 2015 and
our traditional policy of neutrality in disputes between Muslim countries, to reaffirm our policy of maintaining
balanced relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign
Affairs Sartaj Aziz was able to do so while briefing the Senate last week on the Riyadh summit and its
ramifications. We should maintain this posture of balance in relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia in the future
negotiations to finalise the structure and operating procedures of the proposed Islamic Military Coalition. Under
no circumstances should we agree to the deployment of Pakistani troops in any military adventure outside Saudi
Arabia or to the involvement of General Sharif in such a military operation.
From the point of view of our national security, it is vitally important that we maintain and strengthen further
our friendly relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Our friendship with one should not be at the cost of our
friendship with the other. In view of the enduring threat to Pakistans security posed by India, our friendship
with Iran is critically important. For the same reason, India would not miss any opportunity to create strains in
Pakistan-Iran relations even by spreading baseless rumours. One such rumour, which Indian intelligence
agencies have been spreading for some time as part of a disinformation campaign, claims that there is a Defence
Pact of 2003 between India and Iran which would allow India to use Iranian bases and ports against Pakistan in
the event of an Indo-Pakistan war. This rumour was initially given currency by New Delhi on purpose in 2003
when I was serving as the Pakistan ambassador to Iran. The report was thoroughly investigated by the Pakistan
Embassy Tehran and its various attached departments and was found to be totally baseless. The moral is that we
should not allow India to drive a wedge in Pakistan-Iran relations by circulating such baseless reports.

Education Priority
EVERY year we celebrate the fact that the allocation for education by federal as well as provincial governments
goes up by 10 to 15 per cent. This has been happening for quite a few years now. All provinces feel the pressure
to raise their education budgets, and they do.
Indeed, some of the increases are substantial this year, the Higher Education Commission is going to get
about Rs5 billion more, while for Punjab the 10pc to 15pc increase means an additional Rs30bn for the
education sector.
Even allowing for the fact that the increases mentioned above are in nominal terms, the educational budgets of
the provinces have increased by 50pc to 80pc over the last five to seven years. Though we are still only
spending about 2.3pc of GDP on education, it is a significant percentage of the provincial budgets.
The governments own statistics acknowledge that some 21 million-plus five- to 16-year-olds are still out of
school.
We have not achieved universal enrolment even at the primary level. In fact, if it were not for the increase in
enrolment of children in private-sector schools, the overall enrolment rates would be showing a declining trend.
Our high dropout rates mean that out of 100 children enrolling in grade 1 in Pakistan, only five to six make it to
college level. Our transition rates, from primary to middle and high school are pathetic.
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But, despite these increases in the private sector, there are too many two-room primary schools where basic
infrastructure facilities are missing, and we do not have enough middle and high schools to offer a higher
transition rate from primary to middle schools.
We do not have enough teachers to ensure that every primary school has as many teachers as classes: multi-
grade teaching is quite common. Punjab is promising to recruit some 77,000 teachers this year to ensure that
there are at least four in every school. The situation in other provinces is no better.
Meanwhile, examination results at all levels grade 5 or the civil service exams show that the quality of
education that most of our children, barring the minority that go to high-fee private or elite government schools
or universities, receive is quite poor.
Grade 5 children, on average, are one or two grades behind where they should be, and only 2pc or so of the
candidates who take the civil service examinations even pass the written test.
Given this situation, what will an increase of 10pc to 15pc in the budgets achieve on the education front? What
is there to celebrate in such increases? Will these increases allow us to fulfil our constitutional obligation of
providing every child in Pakistan with 10 years of quality education?
Will these allow us to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals that we are a signatory to? Will these
increases be able to address the tremendous inequities in our education system and allow every child to explore
his or her potential fully?
It is not just about the money. All provinces have, consistently, shown a low use of development funds within
the education sector: of the money that is budgeted for the sector at the beginning of the year, only 50pc to 70pc
is actually spent. The rest of it lapses.
Non-development expenditures are usually utilised well: these are mostly spent on salary budgets. Teachers
salaries are indeed the main expense in the education sector so it is not a surprise that most of the money is
spent on these. But the poor utilisation of funds for non-salary heads tells us about the kind of priority we attach
to development or quality-enhancing expenditures.
It is also about how the money that we actually spend is utilised.
In Punjab, laptop distributions come out of the education budget. Where is the evidence that giving laptops will
improve the quality of education in the country? It might be a popular move and an attempt to get votes, but
how is it about educational quality or outcomes? Daanish school expenditures are also educational expenses.
The spending of billions on a few schools when 50,000-plus schools are still lacking teachers as well as some
basic infrastructure facilities needs to be justified.
We have never seen any sound evaluation of the contribution that the Daanish schools are making. All
provinces are moving towards distributing laptops, tablets and LED televisions to teachers and schools: do we
have any evidence that these are going to enhance quality and improve learning among children?
Do provincial governments see public education as a priority? If we go by the increases in the provincial
budgets, we might say yes and this is how many have been interpreting the increases over the last few years.
But there is another way of thinking. The increased expenditures are definitely not going to address the issues in
education as a) the increases are small and the problems very large, b) a significant portion of the increased
budget is not going to be spent, c) and even if it is, spending priorities have not been thought through and are
not going to address the access or quality issues that we face.
Clearly, governments are according low priority to education issues: the increased funding is just for the
political appeasement of concerned lobbies. If education was indeed an area of high priority and governments
wanted to accomplish something, there would be a lot more debate on educational issues in political parties and
government circles the best of political leaders would be made education ministers, there would be a lot
more innovative thinking on how to achieve our educational goals and there would be political consequences
for not delivering. We do not see any of the above.
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Regime of Zia- 40 years ago

Forty years ago General Ziaul Haq seized power and put the country under its third and longest martial law.
Over the next decade, he decisively transformed what was left of Jinnahs dream of a secular democratic
Pakistan into an almost completely theocratic polity. His handiwork has survived more than three decades and
appears unlikely to be replaced with another political structure in the foreseeable future.
In order to understand Ziaul Haqs success in redefining Pakistan and the survival of his scheme we have to
examine the genesis of the Pakistan idea because he drew upon the tussle between two groups of people over
what Pakistan was meant to be.
The Lahore Resolution of 1940 offered a constitutional scheme as an alternative to the one embodied in the
Government of India Act of 1935. In his address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947,
the Quaid-i-Azam also described the creation of Pakistan and Partition as the only solution of Indias
constitutional problem. This would imply that the movement for Pakistan was a purely political struggle
unrelated to any religious objective.
However, the new constitutional scheme advanced for two parts of the British Indian territory was based on the
fact that these were Muslim-majority areas and, after the failure of the Muslim leaders to secure adequate
safeguards to which they were entitled as a large minority, the All-India Muslim League had won considerable
support for the Two Nation Theory. This theory defined the Muslims of India as a nation completely different
from the majority (Hindu) community and one entitled to a state of its own.
The grounding of the Pakistan demand in the religious identity of the people for whom a state was being
demanded gave rise to the idea that Pakistan could be an Islamic state. Jinnah did not advocate a religious polity
but he did not completely disown the religious motivation either. He ignored Gandhis offer of persuading
Congress to concede Pakistan if it was not demanded on the basis of religion. Jinnah often maintained that he
was asking for a democratic state and that was what Islam stood for. The only people who believed Pakistan
was not going to be an Islamic state were the ulema, with rare exceptions.
The elections of 1945-1946 revealed a significant division in the ranks of Pakistans supporters. While the
League leadership continued demanding Pakistan without disclosing in detail what Pakistan was going to be
(like, religious slogans were raised especially in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Although the slogan
Pakistan ka matlab kia, La Ilaha il-Allah was not the battle cry, it was frequently raised at some places. Other
religious slogans, such as Muslim hai tau Muslim League mein aa [If you are a Muslim join the Muslim
League] and Pakistan mein Musalmaanon ki hukumat hogi [Pakistan will be ruled by Muslims] were freely
used.
That religion did play a role in the movement for Pakistan was confirmed by the request made by Congress
campaign organisers in Punjab to their high command to send some Muslim scholars to help them. Thus the
Pakistan supporters were divided into two camps; one may be loosely defined as the group that swore by
democracy while the other was vaguely attached to the concept of a religious state. The roots of Zias Pakistan
lay in this division.
With the creation of Pakistan there was a reshuffling of posture by both groups. The Quaid-i-Azam realized he
no longer needed the religious card. Three days before Pakistans emergence as a new state he said goodbye to
the Two Nation Theory and called for the formation of a new nation on the basis of peoples citizenship of
Pakistan. The religious parties that had opposed the Pakistan demand did a complete volte-face and called for
making Pakistan an Islamic state.
Two factors guided them: They had opposed Pakistan because they had no hope of its becoming an Islamic
state; in the Pakistan the League had demanded, the Muslims were going to be in a nominal majority and
declaring it as an Islamic state would have been almost impossible. The partition of Punjab and Bengal changed
the situation. In the new Pakistans population of 65 million, non-Muslims were only around 20 million, and
most of them were in the eastern wing. The ongoing riots could further reduce the non-Muslim population.
Besides, the religious parties had seen in the elections the strength of the religious slogans. These two factors
had brightened the prospect of declaring Pakistan an Islamic state.
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Maulana Maududi was among the first ulema who decided to benefit from this situation. He migrated to
Pakistan, deleted the anti-Pakistan thesis from his major publication Musalman aur Siyasi Kashmakash
[Muslims and Political Struggle], accepted the Punjab governments invitation to lecture the bureaucrats on
Islamic values and broadcast similar messages on the radio. However, he soon lost the governments goodwill
when he declared that Pakistans involvement in Kashmir was not jihad as the state was not Islamic.
Within a few months of Pakistans creation, in February 1948, the ulema of various shades of opinion presented
the government with a charter of demands containing steps required to establish a religious state. They were put
off with promises of favourable consideration of their demands. But the government was rattled by East
Bengals demands for acceptance of its cultural rights and tried to face these demands by raising the standard of
Islamic solidarity. Eventually, it took refuge under the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, which displayed a
variety of wares to suit different sections of the population. The most important feature of the resolution was a
declaration that sovereignty belonged to Allah. The ulema were jubilant. The slogan-walas had defeated the
Jinnah lobby. The Jamaat-i-Islami now declared Pakistan an Islamic state. The most telling observation on the
Objectives Resolution came from a Congress member of the assembly who warned the house that the resolution
had cleared the way for the emergence of an adventurer who could claim to be Gods appointee. And General
Zia behaved exactly like that.
Thus we find that between 1947 and 1953 the religious slogan group acquired a toehold in the political arena,
thanks to the failure of the democratic ideals group to honour Jinnahs advice to keep religion out of politics
and also its failure to promote democratic norms. Further, it made the grave mistake of resisting democratic
demands by seeking refuge under a religious canopy. The religious slogan group took an exaggerated view of
its strength and challenged the government by launching the anti-Ahmadi agitation in 1953. It lost because the
state services, especially the army, had not abandoned the colonial policy of denying religious/sectarian
elements any accommodation at the cost of law and order. But this was the only victory the democratic ideals
group was able to achieve against the religious slogan group.
Between 1953 and 1958 the democratic ideals group had to contend with a new challenger a civil and
military bureaucratic combine that had scant respect for the democratic facade that had hitherto been sustained
to a certain degree. Neither party paid much attention to the religious slogan group that was left to lick the
wounds it sustained in 1953. However, while preparing the countrys first constitution, the civil bureaucracy
gave considerable concession to the religious parties by calling the state the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
reserving the presidentship for Muslims and creating an Islamic board to advise the government on its religious
duties, including the task of Islamisation of laws. These provisions were later to be used as the foundations of
a theocratic state.
The Ayub regime tried to crush both the democratic ideals and religious slogan groups. The former were
Ebdo-ed out of the political arena (Ebdo was the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order which threatened
prosecution of politicians for misconduct unless they promised not to participate in politics for seven years).
The latter were controlled by putting mosques under the Auqaf department. Further, Jamaat-i-Islami was
subjected to a propaganda campaign in addition to the detention of its leader. When the regime brought in its
constitution in 1962, it dropped the word Islamic from the states title. (It also dropped the chapter on
fundamental rights.)
However, the Ayub regime was responsible for strengthening the religious parties place in national politics.
After most of the politicians had been sent into the wilderness, mosques were the only platforms left for any
agitation. When the opposition parties got together to set up their candidates to contest the 1965 presidential
election, the alliance had as many religious parties as the quasi-democratic ones and they gained in terms of
popular support while campaigning in favour of Fatima Jinnah.
The anti-Ayub agitation was a secular, democratic movement and therefore Yahya Khan concentrated on
removing the peoples political grievances by accepting the one-man, one-vote principle, and undoing the one-
unit. He did not think of pandering to the religious lobby till his attempt to issue a new constitution on the night
of surrender at Dhaka but these parties support to this draft constitution was of help neither to Yahya nor to
themselves.
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The religious parties benefitted a great deal from Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos attempts to win them over to his side.
The constitution of 1973 declared Islam as the state religion and invested the Council of Islamic Ideology with
wide powers. In February 1974, Bhutto joined King Faisals efforts to counter the forces of Arab nationalism
with Islamic nationalism and organised the Islamic Summit. About six months later, his government had the
Ahmadis declared non-Muslims. All this did not help him. And after the mishandling of the 1977 election by his
advisers, the religious parties spearheaded a movement for his ouster under the slogan of Nizam-i-Mustafa,
which called for Islamic laws to be implemented in the country. Further concessions to the clergy such as
imposing of a ban on the sale and consumption of liquor and declaring Friday as the weekly holiday did not
help Bhutto because Zia had already decided to overthrow him. Now it can be said that the Bhutto government
of 1971-1977 provided Zia with a broad enough platform to launch his plan to redefine Pakistan. And he went
about this task with the zeal and confidence of a neo-convert.
Between 1978 and 1985, Zia took a number of steps to complete Pakistans transformation into a theocracy of
the medieval variety. A Federal Shariat Court was created for enforcing religious laws, striking down laws it
found repugnant to Islam, and with some power to make laws. The state assumed the power to collect zakat and
ushr. Ahmadis were barred from calling their prayer houses mosques, from possessing and reading the Quran or
using the Muslim ways of greeting one another, using Islamic epithets or naming their daughters after women
belonging to the Holy Prophets (PBUH) family.
The Penal Code was amended to provide for punishment for desecration of the Holy Quran and for punishing
blasphemy with death or life imprisonment (later on the the Shariat Court made death for blasphemy
mandatory). The parliament was designated as the Majlis-e-Shura, and an arbitrarily amended Objectives
Resolution used hitherto as a preamble to the constitution was made its substantive part. Furthermore, an
attempt was made to subvert the system of democratic elections by holding party-less polls.
In addition, Zia amended the constitutional provisions relating to qualifications for membership of assemblies
and disqualification of members to make them suggestive of respect for religious criteria. He also subverted the
education system, firstly by facilitating the growth of religious seminaries (while extension and improvement of
general education were neglected and books on rights and democracy were burnt) and increased religion-related
lessons in textbooks at all grade levels. Further he tried to consolidate his measures through a constitutional
amendment (the ninth amendment) but it was not adopted. He was also unable in his attempts to create morality
brigades to enforce the system of prayers and puritanical regulations.
Many factors helped Zia to impose his belief on the people including measures that lacked Islamic sanction. He
fully exploited the political advantages the religious parties had won from poorly performing quasi-democratic
governments. And the conflict in Afghanistan yielded him enormous dividends. He was able to convince a large
body of people that through his Afghan policy he had brought glory to Islam.
That Pakistan today is what Gen Zia made it into cannot be denied and the reasons are not far to seek.
First, it has not been possible to undo the changes made by Zia in the constitution and the laws. Every bit of
change made by him is treated by the religious lobby as divinely ordained. Some of the parties that are not
included among religious outfits are unabashedly loyal to Zias legacy those that are not are afraid of taking
on the religious mobs. The secular elements lost the streets to the hordes controlled by the clergy, especially by
the madressah authorities, long ago. The judiciary, never keen to rule against religious extremists, has often
declined to touch Zias amendments on the grounds of their having been endorsed by elected governments
through acquiescence.
The difficulty in interfering with Zias disruption of the Pakistan structure can be judged from the fact that his
name could not be removed from Article 270-A of the constitution until April 2010 that is, 22 years and five
elections after his death.
Secondly, the religious landscape is dominated by arch-conservative elements who do not allow any intra-
religious discourse and those who can challenge them dare not stay in the country. Further, the ouster of left-of-
centre parties from the councils of influence and power has made the so-called mainstream parties hostages to
the orthodoxy.
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In this situation, there is little hope of relief from exploitation of belief in the interest of an unjust and
oppressive status quo. The curse of the Zia legacy will continue to bedevil the state and the people for quite
some time till ordinary citizens realize it has nothing to offer them except for unmitigated misery.

Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy

GIVEN the growing conventional arms imbalance with India, Pakistans security is now critically dependent on
nuclear deterrence. In the long, difficult struggle to develop this capability, in the face of determined Western
opposition, Pakistans scientists, almost all its political leaders, and several of its soldiers, played vital roles. No
less important was the part played by Pakistans diplomats.
It was the foresight of diplomats like Agha Shahi and Iqbal Akhund which held back Pakistans leaders from
accepting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Pakistan warned the world even before the NPT was adopted that India would use the non-safeguarded facilities
and fuel provided by Canada and the US to build N-weapons.
After Indias 1974 explosion, Pakistans proposal to create a South Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone put India
on the diplomatic defensive and politically retarded its N-weapons plans.
Through active diplomacy, Pakistan secured the agreement for the French sale of a nuclear reprocessing plant.
This was disrupted by the US; but not before Pakistan had acquired the plant designs and technological
knowhow.
During the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan was engaged in a diplomatic battle to avoid Western demands for
restrictions on nuclear enrichment at Kahuta and termination of its nascent missile development.
An agreement was concluded for peaceful nuclear cooperation with China before it acceded to NPT (as an N-
weapon state). It included a clause that has enabled (grandfathered) Chinas supply of nuclear reactors to
Pakistan.
In 1994, Pakistan rejected a US offer to release of 72 F16 aircraft Pakistan had purchased, and Washington
had blocked unilaterally, in exchange for a temporary freeze on nuclear enrichment. Stopping the Kahuta
centrifuges would have destroyed half of them.
In May 1998, on the Foreign Offices advice, Pakistan turned down US offers of billions in aid not to
reciprocate Indias nuclear tests. Not to do so would have raised doubts about Pakistans nuclear capabilities
and destabilised deterrence.
Following the 1998 tests, Pakistan ensured the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 recognised that India had
tested first, maintained parity in the restraints asked of the two countries and included a call for resolution of the
Kashmir dispute. In the parallel dialogue which the US initiated with Pakistan and India, Pakistan insisted on an
identical agenda covering nuclear and missile restraint as well as the Kashmir dispute.
In the wake of the A.Q. Khan proliferation affair, Pakistan avoided penalties and succeeded in defanging
provisions in the US-sponsored UNSC Resolution 1540 aimed specifically at Pakistan.
However, this affair, and Pakistans unequal alliance with US in the war on terror, provided the US with the
excuse and diplomatic leverage it needed to de-hyphenate Pakistan and India and offer the latter an
exception for civilian nuclear cooperation as a means of securing its strategic support against China.
At a critical point in 2008, when the Indo-US Safeguards Agreement came up for approval to the IAEA board
Pakistans representatives were instructed by a new Islamabad leadership, beholden to Washington, not to force
a vote. If Pakistan had asked for a vote in the board, several NPT members would have been obliged to oppose
or abstain. Thereafter, they would have been unable to support the clearance of the Indo-US exception in the
subsequent meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), denying it the consensus required for approval.
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The consequences of this diplomatic default have been strategically significant. It broke the political parity
between Pakistan and Indias nuclear status. More importantly, the external nuclear fuel and nuclear reactors
acquired by India under the exception, will enable it to utilise all its indigenous fissile material stocks for
weapons production.
Since this reversal, while Pakistan has intensified its fissile material production and blocked the so-called Fissile
Materials Cut-Off Treaty, its nuclear diplomacy has been mostly reactive and defensive.
To prove its non-proliferation credentials, Pakistan has engaged in nuclear consultations with the US and
adopted various export guidelines and nuclear safety and security measures, often with US help. No doubt,
the US has gained closer insights into Pakistans programmes and plans. Worse, Islamabad has embarked on the
fools errand of seeking a US nuclear exception similar to Indias.
Even in the unlikely event this is granted, Pakistan will not be sold nuclear reactors by the US or its allies. Nor
can Pakistan afford them. But the plea for this exception has opened Pakistan to new demands from
Washington: to halt fissile material production and development and deployment of tactical and long-range
missiles and sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India. In exchange, the US would consider
making a positive recommendation of Pakistans case. It is folly to go further down this path.
Pakistans diplomacy must break out of its defensive mode and utilise all the leverage it can muster to reverse
the discriminatory restrictions; impede Indias strategic build-up and preserve the credibility of Pakistans
nuclear deterrence.
To this end, here are some of the actions Pakistan could initiate: one, an active diplomatic campaign at the UN,
in major capitals and media, to expose the false premises for the discriminatory restrictions against Pakistan and
the Wests double and triple standards on disarmament and non-proliferation.
Two, proposals to India for reciprocal arms control and strategic restraint, such as non-use of force; low force
zones; non-deployment of destabilising weapons. At the very least, this would put India on the diplomatic
defensive and help to resist US pressure on Pakistan to accept unilateral restraints.
Three, offers of peaceful nuclear cooperation, under IAEA safeguards, to Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim
and developing countries. This may motivate NSG to invite Pakistan to join the group.
Four, proposals, initiated with China and other developing countries, for genuine disarmament, including
treaties to halt the current multi-billion dollar upgrade and miniaturisation of US and Russian nuclear weapons
and bans on the development and deployment of laser, anti-satellite and other space weapons.
To enable Pakistan to revive active nuclear diplomacy, the disarmament department in the Foreign Office must
be strengthened and staffed with the best and brightest diplomats. This would be a cost-effective investment in
preserving the credibility of Pakistans nuclear deterrence.

CPEC
During his stay in Beijing, the prime minister had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime
Minister Li Keqiang. The three men discussed and reached many agreements, especially regarding the
international airport for Gwadar. This, once again proved that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is not
only beneficial for both countries but for the entire region and many international companies.
An oped, Highway to sell: how $55b trade corridor rekindled China-Pakistan love affair by Tom Hussain
published in South China Morning Post says: A US$55 billion programme to link the routes of Chinas Belt
and Road plan through Pakistan has revived a relationship that began with the Karakoram Highway. While
highlighting the significance of Chinas One-belt, One-Road (OBOR) initiative, Hussain mentions that most
Pakistani political opposition was silenced in December 2016 when Beijing agreed to include projects proposed
by opposition-controlled provincial governments, boosting the scale of CPEC to US$55 billion from the
original US$46 billion.
 65

Like many others, Hussain cautions: The success of CPEC may depend less on politics and more on Pakistans
ability to balance the expense of the project against its impact on economic growth a matter particularly
pertinent given Pakistans weak finances. Amid stagnant exports and falling remittances, surging imports of
Chinese machinery for CPEC projects contributed heavily to a 135 percent jump in Pakistans current account
deficit between July last year and March, according to figures released by the Central Bank in April.
Since 1947, Pakistan has been struggling to become a self-reliant economy that can end its dependence on
foreign donors that will inevitably also end its political subjugation. The challenges on the economic front
include huge fiscal and current account deficits, burgeoning debts, perpetuation of an elitist economy, a growing
gulf between the rich and poor, economic disparities, an uneven development model, an oppressive tax system,
sluggish economic growth, lack of investment to accelerate growth and create new jobs, dearth of skilled
labour, dwindling exports, rising imports, inadequate infrastructure development just to mention the major
ones.
Hopes are now pinned on CPEC, which official quarters claim would be a game changer and turn Pakistan
into one of the largest economies in the coming years. After taking into account the size of CPEC-related
projects, all credit rating agencies made positive remarks. They stated that energy projects throughout the
country would ultimately reduce the cost of power generation, lowering the need for electricity subsidies a
key burden on the federal budget and improving economic growth, which would in turn increase tax
revenues for the government. Obviously these two factors can substantially reduce the budget deficit and
resultantly ever-increasing debt servicing.
It is true that many of the key benefits of energy projects under CPEC would not materialise until 2018 but
some will start accruing during 2017. CPEC envisages 21 agreements for energy (gas, coal and solar) and 14
out of these will be providing up to 10,400 megawatts (MW) of energy by March 2018 to make up for the 2015
energy shortfall of 4,500MW. According to China Daily, these projects should generate up to 16,400MW of
energy altogether. This is what we need to induce local and foreign investors to establish new businesses.
It is time we came out of economic despair and utilised CPEC as an opportunity to reform our outdated elitist
structures that are the main impediments to our robust economic growth. A new era of economic development is
at our doorstep. We need to upgrade all our delivery systems to make this historic opportunity a success. Much-
needed foreign investment and development of infrastructure is coming from China this is a reality and not an
illusion as many sceptics portray. We need to make the best use of it.
Execution of all CPEC projects including those that will be conceived after the infrastructure is completed
can bring prosperity to Pakistan. The corridor will make the country one of the largest economies of the world.
The challenge of removing inefficiencies from our administrative structures that are change-resistant is
formidable but not impossible. There is a realisation that we should move towards modern and efficient delivery
systems. CPEC, being a multi-faceted project, will essentially pull public and private sectors onto a fast track
development mode. And so it will prove to be a blessing for Pakistanis who are otherwise suffering on account
of lethargy and indifferent attitudes.
The fruits of CPEC connectivity would be enormous for the entire region without which the huge potential of
trade within South Asia cannot be achieved. Imagine hundreds of service stations along the roads giving
employment to our youth, acceleration of trade between different parts of Pakistan, boost to tourism, peace and
prosperity as Afghanistan, India and Iran transit trade through CPEC. There is no doubt that this would bring
prosperity to the millions inhabiting South Asia. It is thus imperative for the government of Pakistan and all
stakeholders to highlight the advantages of CPEC and create an atmosphere of love and fraternity among all the
beneficiaries.
The new dawn of economic wellbeing for Pakistanis is still a dream but it can be turned into a reality the only
thing we need is to ensure that all citizens get adequate opportunities to prosper and benefit equally from
economic growth. We must move fast to end economic apartheid that is presently inbuilt in our elitist structure.
Without removing these distortions, the real benefits of even mega projects like CPEC could be concentrated in
just a few hands the rich and mighty having control over resources.
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Equitable growth can come through great initiatives like CPEC if we implement the Chinese model suggested
by the former general secretary of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao. He said: A harmonious society
should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality.

CPEC- Financing burden

The ongoing debate on the impact of CPEC projects on future external payments obligations is welcome, but
should be informed by analysis based on facts rather than opinion.
The total committed amount under CPEC of $50 billion is divided into two broad categories: $35bn is allocated
for energy projects while $15bn is for infrastructure, Gwadar development, industrial zones and mass transit
schemes. The entire portfolio is to be completed by 2030. Therefore, the implementation schedule would
determine the payments stream. Energy projects are planned for completion by 2020, but given the usual
bureaucratic delays, it wont be before 2023 that all projects are fully operational. Under the early harvest
programme, 10,000 MW would be added to the national grid by 2018. Therefore, the disbursement schedule of
energy projects is eight years (2015-2023). Infrastructure projects such as roads, highways, and port and airport
development, amounting to $10bn, can reasonably be expected to be concluded by 2025, while the remaining
projects worth $ 5bn would spill over into the 2025-30 period.
Given the above picture, it is possible to prepare a broad estimate of the additional burden on Pakistans
external payment capacity in the coming years. As the details of each project become available, the aggregate
picture can be refined further. The margin of error would not cause significant deviation.
The entire energy portfolio will be executed in the IPP mode as applied to all private power producers in the
country. Foreign investors financing comes under foreign direct investment; they are guaranteed a 17pc rate of
return in dollar terms on their equity (only the equity portion, and not the entire project cost). The loans would
be taken by Chinese companies, mainly from the China Development Bank and China Exim Bank, against their
own balance sheets. They would service the debt from their own earnings without any obligation on the part of
the Pakistani government.
Import of equipment and services from China for the projects would be shown under the current account, while
the corresponding financing item would be FDI brought in by the Chinese under the capital and finance
account. Therefore, where the balance of payments is concerned, there will not be any future liabilities for
Pakistan.
To the extent that local material and services are used, a portion of free foreign exchange from the FDI inflows
would become available. (Project sponsors would get the equivalent in rupees). For example, a highly
conservative estimate is that only one-fourth of the total project cost would be spent locally and the country
would benefit from an inflow of $9bn over an eight-year period, augmenting the aggregate FDI by more than
$1bn annually. This amount can be used to either finance the current account deficit or reduce external
borrowing requirements. Inflows for infrastructure projects for local spending would be another $4bn over 15
years.
Taking a highly generous capital structure of 60:40 debt-to-equity ratio for energy projects, the total equity
investment would be $14bn. Further, assuming the extreme case that the entire equity would be financed by
Chinese companies (although this is not true in the case of Hubco and Engro projects, where equity and loans
are being shared by both Pakistani and Chinese partner companies) the 17pc guaranteed return on these projects
would entail annual payments of $2.4bn from the current account.
CPECs second component, ie infrastructure, is to be financed through government-to-government loans
amounting to $15bn. As announced, these loans would be concessional with 2pc interest to be repaid over a 20-
to 25-year period. This amounts debt servicing would be the Pakistan governments obligation. Debt-servicing
payments would rise by $910 million annually on account of CPEC loans (assuming a 20-year tenor). Going by
these calculations, we can surmise that the additional burden on the external account should not exceed $3.5bn
annually on a staggered basis depending on the project completion schedule.
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As a proportion of our total foreign exchange earnings of 2016, this amounts to 7pc. These calculations do not
take into account the incremental gains from GDP growth that will rise because of investment in energy and
infrastructure. As the loan amounts would be disbursed in the next 15 years and repayments would be
staggered, the adding of the entire $15bn to the existing stock of external debt and liabilities is not an accurate
representation. The more realistic approach would be a tapered schedule, with $2bn to $3bn getting disbursed in
the earlier years and slowing down in the second half.
The question is: how do we find the extra non-debt-creating resources of $3.5bn to offset this additional
burden? If the export slowdown was due to energy shortages, the availability of increased supplies should boost
exports fetching higher foreign exchange revenues. Exports have to grow by 14pc annually in dollar terms to
compensate for these outflows if all other sources remain unchanged. This is not unprecedented as Pakistan has
previously recorded this growth rate. Further, the substitution of imported fuels with domestic ones such as
hydro, coal, wind and solar should be able to result in savings of at least $1bn annually. These measures will
need concerted action.
To make this happen, Pakistan has to take some policy actions on a priority basis: (a) make coordinated efforts
to increase the volume of exports by diversifying product mix, penetrating new markets, revising free trade
agreements, reducing transaction costs; (b) attract foreign investment in manufacturing and export sectors and
set up joint ventures in the industrial zones; (c) channel workers remittances though the banking system by
reducing the differential between the open and inter-bank market rates; (d) accelerate training of skilled,
technical and professional manpower who can take over jobs from the Chinese, thus bringing cost savings and
reduced outflows; (e) reform the power sector by privatising DISCOs, mandating Nepra to develop competitive
power markets and power exchanges by providing open access to producers for transmission and distribution,
setting tariffs through open and transparent bidding, and introducing smart technologies. These measures would
certainly help in easing the pressure on external accounts.

CPEC- III
OVER the past few months, greater transparency has led to more details emerging regarding some important
aspects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The transparency is much more institutionalised
now, with at least two official and quasi-official websites dedicated to CPEC up and running, detailing the
projects and their status. However, a lot of the required data and information is still available in a less structured
fashion than desirable, with sketchy bits which are sometimes contradictory coming from the media.
Nonetheless, what is available has allowed analysts and commentators to make more informed assessments of at
least two areas that have previously been flagged as being of concern: the impact of CPECs foreign exchange
liabilities on Pakistans balance of payments, and the tariff of the power projects being set up.
Balance of payments: An estimate of the potential foreign exchange outflows on account of CPEC projects has
already been worked out by Dr Ishrat Husain and appeared in this newspaper. According to Dr Husains
estimates, the total outflow on account of debt servicing and profit repatriation (dividends etc) would amount to
an incremental $3.5 billion annually. This would be in addition to the other, non-CPEC related foreign
exchange outflows and liabilities that Pakistan will have to service or pay in the normal course of things.
My own estimates are broadly in line with Dr Husains, with the difference being that I have included the
impact of imported fuel needed to run the power plants. According to official projections, a total of 8,910MW
of electricity is to be added under the CPEC projects in the Early Harvest phase by 2022. (This total excludes
non-CPEC projects such as the Resgasified Liquefied Natural Gas-based projects at Balloki and Bhikki, and the
Neelum-Jhelum and Tarbela IV additions. Also excluded are the Gwadar and Rahim Yar Khan power projects
for which no status or expected dates of completion are available). Of these, 6,240MW will be coal-fired out of
which 2,640MW (the two Thar coal projects) is expected to be reliant on indigenous coal, while the rest will be
based on imported fuel.
In addition, to arrive at estimates of the net outflow, I have also adjusted for savings on the import of furnace oil
that will not be required once the more fuel-efficient coal-fired power plants come on stream and displace
generation from the older, less efficient plants run on residual fuel oil (RFO). According to estimates from the
Ministry of Water and Power, as well as the Planning Commission, up to 3,000MW could potentially be
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switched from power plants using RFO to the newer, coal-fired plants. However, I have conservatively used
2,000MW as the quantum of substitution.
Making assumptions on the plant factor (60 per cent), the international price of coal ($80 per short tonne) and
oil ($50 per barrel of Brent), a capital structure of 75pc debt and 25pc equity, commercial debt in US dollars
carrying all-in financial charges of 8.5pc with a seven-year tenor, and a guaranteed return on equity of 17pc in
US dollars, the foreign exchange outflows generated by the CPEC projects are expected to be as follows:
Debt servicing will step up to an estimated $2.5bn a year by 2022 (including on the concessional government-
to-government loans of $11bn for non-power infrastructure). Fuel imports will total approx. $200 million a year
to run the plants, and if the savings on RFO import is incorporated, net fuel imports will be lower by over $1bn
a year. Profit repatriation and other outflows (such as for operations and maintenance contracts and political risk
insurance) are expected to total around $1bn per annum.
Put together, the overall impact of the CPEC projects on the balance of payments is expected to be an additional
$2.2bn per annum. Even after making two key assumptions more adverse ie, increasing debt in the capital
structure to 80pc, and raising the guaranteed return on equity to 27pc, the impact on overall outflows is not
significantly higher, which rise by an additional estimated $200-300m.
It is important to recognise that this is the gross impact on the external account, without taking into
consideration any positive effect on Pakistans exports or foreign direct investment inflows. Both these
variables are expected to witness improvement, though the magnitude of the same can be a matter of debate.
The bottom line is that Pakistans balance of payments is not likely to come under substantial stress due to
CPEC projects. What is likely to put the external account under strain is the quantum of non-CPEC related
energy imports, mainly on account of import of LNG. This could run into several billion US dollars a year as
Pakistans exploited natural gas reserves deplete sharply.
Electricity tariffs: Another concern widely expressed with regard to the power projects under CPEC is that they
will produce expensive electricity. This perception has gained ground due to a lack of awareness regarding the
exact terms of the power purchase agreements with the independent power producers being set up under CPEC.
Details regarding the final tariff, the guaranteed rate of return on equity built into the tariff, and whether any
explicit or implicit sovereign guarantees have been extended, are somewhat opaque and hard to locate.
However, according to the Ministry of Water and Power, the average electricity tariff is likely to fall from 9.6
cents to around 9.1 cents as a result of the CPEC power projects. This should be a matter of relief to industry,
especially the export sector.
Despite the positive news on two key areas of concern, there are other lingering concerns with the way the
CPEC portfolio is structured and the way it has been negotiated. These will be addressed subsequently.

CPEC- Policy Imperatives

MOST of the discussion about CPEC has so far focused on financing and future indebtedness but the success of
this initiative lies in successful interaction between investment, institutions and policy. What policies are needed
to maximise benefits and minimise costs to the country? There are several, but at least six areas need careful
design and execution.
Energy policy: The addition of 10,000MW of electricity to the national grid by 2018 would overcome energy
shortages. However, it may create unintended adverse consequences for public finances and the liquidity of
companies involved in the energy supply chain if other components of the energy policy are not put right. The
circular debt would get worse if the gap between the purchase price of power paid by the distribution companies
(DISCOs) and the sale revenues collected by them is not bridged. The uniform tariff rate, transmission and
distribution losses and energy thefts, discrepancy in the amounts billed and recovered, and the growing account
receivables underpin this problem.
Unless DISCOs are either privatised or restructured as commercial organisations free from political
interference, this growing circular debt would end up widening the fiscal deficit. The cost of generation to the
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end users can be reduced if competitive energy markets and energy exchanges are set up, auctions are held for
tariff determination and multiple buyers are introduced instead of the present single buyer model. The National
Transmission and Despatch Company would recover only the wheeling charges for the use of their transmission
infrastructure.
Industrial policy: The Special Economic Zones (SEZs), industrial parks, etc to be set up along CPEC should be
open to Pakistani firms on the same terms as to the Chinese. Land should be allotted on long-term lease rather
than outright purchase and the leases auctioned only to genuine, prequalified bidders to eliminate land grabbers
and speculators. In Balochistan, some portion should be reserved for local investors wherever feasible. The
lease should incorporate a provision that the allotment would be cancelled if the project is not operational
within three years. All infrastructure works power, gas, water, roads, effluent plants, amenities should be
in place before the possession is passed on.
Pre-feasibility studies should be carried out by SEZ authorities through expert consultancy firms or universities,
to provide baseline data and information about the kind of projects that can be established in different zones.
Trade policy: External payments on account of repatriation of profits and debt servicing of CPEC projects
would put pressure on the current account. Exports must grow at least 15 per cent annually to meet these new
obligations, and remittances have to increase at their historical level. The exchange rate has to be managed
deftly to stimulate new export products, new firms and penetration into new markets, while ensuring that prices
of imports of capital goods, machinery and equipment are not hiked up, which would make new investments
unattractive. Pakistani and other foreign companies winning competitive bidding should have a level playing
field.
Free trade Agreements have to be renegotiated to preserve the comparative advantage of Pakistani exports and
tariff quotas introduced to safeguard against material injury to Pakistani manufacturers. Import tariff rates must
be gradually reduced to enable Pakistani companies to participate in the global supply chain.
Foreign exchange regime: The current foreign exchange regime is becoming too restrictive for making timely
payments to suppliers, vendors and financiers. Further restrictions would only divert inflows towards informal
channels, resulting in a vicious cycle. As inflows through official channels recede, and demand for outflows
through banking channels at interbank rates rises, the State Bank would have to further tighten external
payments, prolong the timing and disallow certain genuine payments to conserve their reserves.
As more payments are pushed to the kerb market, the differential between the official and open market rates
would widen. Exporters and remitters would channel their earnings at the higher open market rate, reducing the
supply in the interbank market. The increased demand by importers and other consumers of foreign exchange at
the lower official rate would lead to a demand-supply disequilibrium.
Market sentiment plays an important role in determining the exchange rate; any hint that outflows on account of
payments to the Chinese would lead to further restriction in the foreign exchange regime would erode market
players confidence.
Financial policy: Commercial banks should finance Pakistani companies, either stand alone or in joint ventures
with the Chinese companies in collaboration with the infrastructure development fund. This would carefully
scrutinise proposals from potential investors, calculate future cash flows, and carry out scenario analysis for risk
mitigation. For small and medium enterprises working as sub-contractors to large firms or providing goods and
services for CPEC projects, or to establish start-up businesses, existing funds by DFID, USAID, etc should meet
this demand.
In Balochistan, southern KP and Gilgit-Baltistan, urban and rural infrastructure projects that link the main
highways and motorways under CPEC with the communities should be given priority by their respective set-ups
in allocation of development budgets.
Skill development policy: One of CPECs benefits would be the training and development of skilled manpower.
Plans have to be made to assess long-term manpower requirements, both for construction as well as the
operational phases of CPEC projects.
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Various categories and levels of training programmes have to thus be designed and then assigned to credible,
prequalified providers. Particular attention should be given to train youth from backward areas, starting with
Gwadar all the way to the Karakoram Highway.
A number of private and non-profit organisations are actively engaged in quality vocational and technical
training, mainly in Karachi and Punjab. These organisations should be invited to set up similar facilities in other
parts of the country where CPEC projects are being executed.
In addition to this formal training, internships and attachments with Chinese companies working on the projects
should be made an integral part of the curriculum. If there is one lasting legacy for which CPEC should be
remembered, it is investment in producing skilled and trained technical manpower with different levels of
expertise.
The other missing link in which Pakistan is weak is the institutional capacity, for which a separate analysis
would be required.

One Belt- One Road

CHINA recently hosted 29 heads of state and government at the Belt and Road Forum, reinforcing the countrys
claim to leadership of an emerging geopolitical and economic world order. The summit conference that also
attracted representatives of more than 40 other countries and multilateral financial agencies was the clearest
expression yet of China breaking out of its old foreign policy mould that had restrained it from attempting a
global role.
Chinas multibillion-dollar One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure development project linking the old Silk
Road with Europe, is a manifestation of Chinas growing geopolitical ambitions. A brainchild of President Xi
Jinping, perhaps, the most powerful Chinese leader after Mao Zedong, OBOR has now been under development
for four years, spanning 68 countries and accounting for up to 40 per cent of global GDP.
President Xis ambition of propelling China to centre stage of the global power game represents a sharp
departure from the approach of previous Chinese leaders who strictly adhered to Deng Xiaopings tenet to hide
our capabilities and bide our time, never try to take the lead. Thus over the past two decades, China has
avoided being drawn into global conflicts and has completely focused its energies on development that helped it
to become an economic superpower.
Chinas push to take the world leadership has come at a time when a strong anti-globalisation wave is sweeping
the Western world that is showing a growing tendency of returning to more protectionist regimes. The United
States under the Trump administration with its inward-looking approach has virtually abandoned the mantle of
globalisation thus ceding greater space to Beijings assertion.
It is not surprising that the OBOR initiative is being embraced by a wide range of countries from Asia and
Africa to Europe and even South America, notwithstanding some serious concerns about the cost and benefits
of the enormously ambitious project. Surely fewer European countries showed up at the Beijing summit because
of their reservations over Chinas reluctance to open doors to foreign companies.
While addressing the forum, President Xi tried to alleviate concerns about Chinas dominance, inviting other
countries to take part in the project. China is spending roughly $150bn a year in the 68 countries that have so far
signed on to the plan. According to Chinese government figures, around $1 trillion have already been invested
in OBOR, with several more trillions due to be invested over the next decade. This way Beijing hopes to find a
more profitable avenue for the countrys vast foreign exchange reserves, mostly invested in low-interest-bearing
US government securities.
It is evident that OBOR is not just about infrastructure development; one of the major objectives of the initiative
is to turn Eurasia into an economic and trading centre, breaking the domination of the American-led
transatlantic regime. It is also a manifestation of the changing geopolitics and the realignment of forces,
reflecting a move to shift the centre of gravity of trade to the East and establish Chinas predominance in global
politics.
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Indeed, Russia has lent active support to the Chinese initiative indicating a growing strategic partnership
between the two countries. Moscows major interest is to consolidate its primacy in Central Asia through
regional security and a trade bloc.
However, it is willing to accommodate Chinas economic and geopolitical interests more than ever because of
Western sanctions following the Ukraine crisis. Since 2014, the two countries have reached several high-profile
multibillion-dollar economic and trade deals signalling their close, evolving economic ties. Unsurprisingly,
Russian President Vladimir Putin used the forum to lash out at the US and other Western countries over their
increasingly protectionist policies.
Surely China considers the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) a flagship project in the whole
scheme of OBOR. This multibillion-dollar investment programme has added a new dimension to the friendship
between Pakistan and China. From purely strategic and security cooperation spanning more than five decades,
the relationship has now evolved into a dynamic economic and commercial partnership.
This growing bilateral cooperation comes at a time when Chinas rising geopolitical ambition also underscores
its concerns about Pakistans security and its fledgling economy. Given its geostrategic position, Pakistan has
the potential to serve as a nexus for the two routes the continental Eurasian Silk Road Economic Belt and a
Southeast Asian Maritime Silk Road
Although Beijing downplays geostrategic motivations, CPEC represents an international extension of Chinas
effort to deliver security through economic development. Notwithstanding their growing strategic cooperation,
terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan have remained a major source of worry for the Chinese government. Chinas
security concerns, especially those that arise from its restive region of Xinjiang, and the Islamist militancy
threatening Pakistans stability have also been a strong factor in Beijings new approach to achieving security
through economic development.
This growing Pakistan-China strategic alliance has also exposed the regional geopolitical fault lines.
Predictably, India boycotted the Beijing forum citing serious reservations about the project, particularly
regarding China-funded development in Gilgit-Baltistan that is linked to the Kashmir dispute. Yet another
excuse given by the Indian authorities was that a trans-regional project of this magnitude required wider
consultation.
Despite their geopolitical rivalry and long-standing border dispute, trade between India and China has grown
significantly crossing $100bn. But there have been some visible signs of tension between the two most
populous nations in the past few years with the strengthening of ties between Washington and New Delhi. India
has openly sided with the US and Japan against China over the South China Sea issue.
Indeed, the success of the summit has provoked a strong reaction from Delhi. So much so that some leading
commentators have called for tougher action to obstruct the OBOR project. Far from this, CPEC (the life and
soul of OBOR) threatens Indias territorial integrity in a manner unseen since 1962, Samir Saran, a leading
Indian commentator wrote in an op-ed piece.
Notwithstanding the scepticism, OBOR is a new geo-economic reality representing an emerging world order.
The process cannot be reversed.

A better Multilateralism
THE world appears to be engulfed by the politics and economics of anger. Much of the ire stems from the
fallout of globalisation freer trade and large-scale migration of people and is concentrated in the
advanced economies. Results from a 2014 survey by Pew Research Centre are illustrative. Fifty per cent of
respondents in the US believed trade destroys jobs; 59pc of Italians and 49pc of the French held the same view,
compared with a global median of 19pc.
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With the world in flux, and the tectonic plates of multilateralism holding the world order in its place since the
Second World War shifting so dramatically, one would expect the IMF and World Bank to be spending more
intellectual capital on analysing the historic undercurrents. And yet, at the annual meeting(s) of the IMF and
World Bank which concluded last week, the emergent threat to the Western-crafted multilateralism put in place
since the Second World War only came up as a sub-text to the main theme of how to revive global growth and
generate jobs.
While only one session was explicitly devoted to a shifting world order and its associated uncertainties, tucked
away on the last day of the programme, the undercurrent of inherent global unease and instability was
unmistakable. A near-unipolar world with its constructed global financial, economic and political architecture
that has held sway for 72 years, is facing the threat of being deconstructed and replaced with multipolar
geopolitical challengers and, potentially, a parallel international economic system.
Given the changes under way in the global economic system, how relevant are the IMF and World Bank in the
emerging scheme of things, and for how long will they continue to remain so? There is little doubt that given
the size of their balance sheet, their near-universal shareholding and global buy-in to their mission, and the
depth of their collective knowledge and expertise garnered from decades of experience in virtually all parts of
the world, it is unlikely that any set of parallel global or regional financial institutions such as Chinas newly
created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, will be able to fully replace the two Bretton Woods Institutions
(BWIs) in the immediate future.
However, irrespective of the seismic global changes under way in the international economic order, the IMF
and the World Bank have, for a long time, been in need of an overhaul and fundamental reform to better deliver
on their founding promise: stability in the global financial and monetary system, and a world free of poverty.
Decades of experience of poor developing countries, and through numerous large-scale crises such as the debt
crisis in Latin America in the 1980s and the East Asian crisis in the 1990s, have time and again revealed the
shortcomings in approach and advice of the IMF and World Bank. The peddling of a rigid neo-liberal
orthodoxy, unnecessary and excessive conditionality, undermining national sovereignty of borrowing countries,
marginalising the poor, non-engagement with civil society, premature liberalisation of the financial system or
capital account etc. are some of the graver charges that have been laid at the door of the two BWIs.
Perhaps the single allegation that has most undermined the credibility of the two institutions is that they have
acted, on many occasions in the past, in concert with US foreign policy in effect, as a veritable instrument or
extension of US policy objectives. Evidence for this charge comes from two eminent sources: the Meltzer
Commission report of 2000, commissioned by the US Congress, and the IMF Independent Evaluation Offices
first report released in 2001 (which found Pakistans programmes to be geo-political in nature).
To their credit, both the IMF and the World Bank have responded to these criticisms over a period of time with
far-reaching reform. In the wake of the East Asian crisis, the IMF began mandating minimum public
expenditure under social safety nets as part of conditionality (largely under Dominique Strauss-Kahns
leadership). Perhaps most fundamentally, the Fund sought to become more open and representative by aligning
its archaic governance structure more closely with the changing share of developing countries in the world
economy. Hence, China, India, Brazil and a handful of other large developing economies from the G-20 now
have significantly higher voting rights than in the past.
Another welcome change that has been effected over the past few years is a deeper engagement by both the
institutions with civil society. At the annual as well as spring meetings, civil society from around the world is
represented, both in the form of civil society organisations as well as media and observers. The World Bank
conducts a civil society policy forum during the meetings and arranges interface of senior management of both
IMF as well as the Bank with representatives from civil society. This interface is usually replicated at the
country office or mission level.
Both the institutions have responded, albeit slowly, to newer challenges facing the world economy:
governance, corruption, and above all, climate change. However welcome these reforms have been, there is
much that is being missed and much more that needs to be done. Engagement with civil society needs to be
broader and deeper and a more formalised structure to achieve this enacted. The duopoly of the US and Europe
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on the leadership of the IMF and World Bank needs to be dispensed with, with developing countries getting a
shot at the top slots.
More resources need to be devoted to analysing and responding to the non-traditional areas of work. Design of
Fund programmes needs to improve with a greater emphasis on institutional reform features. IMF programmes
need to be underpinned by more rigorous and mandatory burden of adjustment studies that better model
the distributional effects of conditionality, especially on the middle class. Finally, the incentives framework
under which staff and management of the two institutions operate, which is currently less than optimally
designed, needs to be evaluated and re-modeled.

Corruption and Rule of Law

The rule of law, which distinguishes a civilised society from an uncivilised one, is indispensable but not a
sufficient condition for the elimination of corruption. In an uncivilised society, the law of the jungle or the right
of might prevails. In such a society there is no security for the weak and the poor who live at the mercy of the
powerful and the rich. On the other hand, in a civilised society, dealings between the individuals as well as
between the individual and the state are governed by laws which establish the rights and the obligations of each
side. Corruption, when it takes the form of misuse of state authority and resources for personal gains, generally
implies a violation of the law of the land. Its antidote, therefore, is the rule of law which dictates equality of
citizens before law and their entitlement to a fair trial and due process in case of any criminal charges or
determination of their civil rights and obligations.
But for the sake of justice and social harmony, laws must also be fair and equitable reflecting the moral values
of the society. Corruption can also take place under the cover of unfair laws which allow the elite to rob the
resources of the country for their personal benefits. A glaring example of such legalised corruption is the
practice in Pakistan of the allotment of residential and commercial plots, and agricultural land by the
government to civilian bureaucrats and armed forces officers at throwaway prices. This amounts to taking the
money out of the pockets of the masses, who are the real owners of the states resources, and giving it to the
rich and the powerful. A modern welfare state is supposed to bring about redistribution of wealth in favour of
the poor. Ironically, in Pakistan, the state apparatus and laws are being exploited by the powerful sections of the
society to further enrich themselves at the expense of the poor. So eradication of corruption also requires the
promulgation of fair laws in the interest of social and economic justice.
Corruption thrives in an environment in which the rich and the powerful are treated differently from the way in
which the law is applied to the poor and the weak. Unfortunately, in Pakistan we are still far from the ideal of
the rule of law in practice despite the constitutional provisions enjoining equality of citizens before law and
equal protection of law. Consequently, the rich and the powerful are able to get away with serious violations of
law whereas the downtrodden suffer at the hands of the police and the judiciary. This deplorable state of affairs
calls for a radical reform of our police and judiciary so that the rule of law is established in practice and the
masses have access to easy and quick justice.
Unfortunately, our leaders have done little to introduce the required judicial and police reforms and to ensure
the rule of law in the country. The objectives of equality of citizens before law and their right to a fair trial have
become the casualty of distortions prevalent in our legal and judicial systems. Daily reports bring to light
instances in which those belonging to the elite of our society, whether feudal landlords, politicians, rich
businessmen, civilian bureaucrats or armed forces officers, are able to flout the law with impunity because of
their wealth and influence. This has notably happened in recent times when people charged with serious
violations of law or even high treason were allowed to flee from the country on one pretext or the other. Those
giving protection or support to such people are on a weak wicket when they clamour for the eradication of
corruption despite the desirability of this goal.
The past record of even our judiciary has been far from perfect. We are all painfully aware of the way in which
superior judiciary validated military takeovers in the country on flimsy grounds in the past. Hopefully,
following the movement for the restoration of judiciary during and after General Pervez Musharrafs military
dictatorship, the superior judiciary will safeguard its independent character and take decisions on constitutional
and legal issues on merit irrespective of influence of and pressures from powerful circles in the country. The
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superior judiciary must be cognisant of the fact that their decisions on important constitutional and legal issues
would be carefully evaluated by the legal community and other sections of the society to determine whether the
demands of law and justice were respected or not in their judgments.
The condition of the lower echelons of the judiciary, with which the common man comes into direct contact
frequently in search of justice, is particularly deplorable. Corruption is rife at these levels allowing the powerful
and the rich to take advantage of the weak and the poor in the society. There are unpardonable delays, on one
pretext or the other, in the disposal of cases to favour the guilty parties. As the famous dictum goes, justice
delayed is justice denied. One wonders why there are not strict time limits for the disposal of different types of
judicial cases. The judges of the superior judiciary have failed so far to introduce reforms to make the working
of our judicial system at the lower levels fair and to ensure that justice is available to the common man easily
and in a timely manner. The situation has been further aggravated by the unprofessional conduct of some black
sheep within the community of lawyers who, instead of upholding the sanctity of law, resort to physical
violence and disorderly conduct in dealing with legal issues. It should be the responsibility of the Bar
Associations to ensure that their members remain within the limits of law.
The reform of our police, whose high-handedness is proverbial, is as urgent as it is in the case of our judiciary.
Our police system ideally should be independent of the influence of the elite and should function strictly in
accordance with the provisions of law and the demands of justice. It should provide the protection of law to the
poor and the weak in the society against the excesses on the part of the elite. A police station should be a place
where a common man or a victim should feel the protective hand of the state and the law, and not a place to
dread going to. The governments at provincial levels have generally failed to bring about reforms necessary for
bringing our police system in line with the demands of justice and the requirements of modern times.
Corruption cannot be eradicated in Pakistan or anywhere else without establishing the rule of law. It is equally
important that our laws should be fair and just in accordance with the principles of social and economic justice.
Legalised corruption or corruption under the cover of unfair laws must end. Further, we must strengthen the
moral foundations of the society through an educational system which promotes values of justice and fair play.
Finally, all citizens irrespective of their position in the society must be held accountable for their part in
violations of law. The institutions responsible for accountability should be independent and must carry out
accountability across the board. Selective accountability, sometimes encouraged by anti-democratic forces or
even by foreign enemy powers, in which some are punished while others belonging to powerful institutions are
able to get away with serious cases of corruption or violations of law is a recipe for increased corruption and
political instability in the country

Golden Opportunity- Ishrat hussain

INFRASTRUCTURE projects all over the world have a tendency towards cost overruns and schedule delays.
Pakistans implementation record has been relatively worse, irrespective of the form of government or party in
power. It is characterised by sluggishness, frequent change of managers, passing on the buck and not accepting
responsibility. The recent increase in load-shedding epitomises this trend as the planned addition to generation
could not be achieved on time.
To be successful, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor requires an entirely different approach, ie clear
delineation of responsibilities, specific goals and targets, a defined set of indicators along with incentives and
penalties for performance and non-performance and finally, transparent accountability. If a beginning is made
with CPEC under the sharp scrutiny of the Chinese as well as our own political leaders both in government
and in the opposition this new paradigm might gradually permeate our bureaucratic nervous system.
At present we have the too much too little accountability syndrome. Honest and competent officers have given
up doing their best because of the constant fear of their names and reputations being unnecessarily tarnished by
the FIA, NAB, Public Accounts Committee and media, particularly the free-for-all social media. Taking
cognisance of these allegations and accusations suo motu, the courts step in and drag the officers into the fray.
For such officers, the sensible choice is do not commit and do not take any decision.
On the other hand, those who are complicit in corruption go scot-free with the help of their political godfathers.
The National Reconciliation Ordinance, various implicit or explicit compacts, open or secret deals between
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major political parties, etc have impaired the credibility and the deterrent effect of the accountability process. In
the ultimate analysis, the officers belonging to the group of actor officers may in the short run suffer some
temporary inconvenience or dislocation but in the long run, they are better off having amassed so much wealth
that they and their next generations can live comfortably in Canada, Dubai and London, etc.
In the event their political godfathers are back in power, they can return and resume their activities. The country
hence suffers both ways: firstly, competent and honest officers shy away from doing their jobs leading to a
paralysis in decision-making and suboptimal results, and secondly, public resources are utilised for personal
gain rather than the public good. Implementation is thus either paralysed or attained at a huge cost to the public
exchequer.
What needs to be done is well known and documented but no action has been taken by successive political
leaderships. Short-sighted leaders with an eye to the next electoral cycle do not find it in their interest to
undertake unpopular reforms. Only a visionary leader, whose aim is to lift Pakistan into the upper tiers of
economic ascendency and make it competitive in the global economy, is capable of bringing about these
changes.
Unfortunately, external pressures from the US, World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and IMF have not
made much of a dent on our institutions of governance. CPEC provides such an opportunity. Whether it is the
ministries, provincial departments or executing agencies, they have to deliver within the time-bound, resource-
specified plan agreed with the Chinese government. To meet this goal officials responsible for planning,
coordination, regulation and execution of CPEC projects should be:
Selected on merit, technical and/or managerial competence, and integrity rather than on loyalty and
connections.
Assured security of tenure until the projects completion and not at risk of being transferred on the whims of the
competent authority while the project is being implemented.
Provided requisite resources, autonomy to operate without too much interference, monitored regularly and their
performance evaluated against pre-agreed indicators.
Given full support and protection against frivolous accusations and character assassinations.
Held accountable for results and outcomes.
As institutional reforms across the board have been stymied by lack of political will, a more selective approach
may be adopted, targeting the ministries, provincial departments and executing agencies involved in the
planning, coordination, regulation, supervision and implementation of CPEC projects.
For example, it is a gigantic undertaking to lay the track, and rehabilitate, upgrade and construct the double
track extending several thousand kilometres on BOT (build, operate, transfer) basis. This undertaking exceeds
Pakistan Railways present capacity. Until it is completely restructured and reorganised, and the reforms
outlined here put in place, the risks of non-completion, shoddy work and cost and time overruns would remain
elevated.
It is useful to remind the political parties that CPEC timelines extend over 15-20 years, and the impact of these
reforms may be felt when any of these parties is in power. The consensus reached on them now can benefit
almost all the political parties in the form of efficient and expeditious completion of projects without much
effort on their part when they assume power. As they say in Urdu: Paki pakai kheer khanay ko mil jae gee
(we will get ready-made pudding to consume). These reforms have to be institutionalised and given broad
political support and approved by parliament to ensure their continuity even when there is a regime change.
They will take an extended period of time to get rooted and any attempt to derail them prematurely would have
highly pernicious effects. CPEC projects in the absence of these reforms may cost the nation way beyond
current estimates with much lower benefits.
It is important to recognise that the risks are quite high. The reforms will meet obstruction, resistance and may
be accepted in principle and on paper, but their substance may be deformed and obfuscated in actual practice.
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Those glib talkers who are going to be the losers in this game may find all kinds of flaws and loopholes in them.
They may try to convince the decision-makers that they are being taken for a ride as their powers and authority
are being curtailed, that the people of Pakistan have given them the mandate to do whatever they wish and these
reforms are in fact an abridgement of that mandate. But my hope against hope is that our leaders will be able to
see through this game.

Major dilemmas of countering terrorism

The terrorist incidents in different parts of Pakistan in rapid succession in February this year have brought
Pakistans policy of countering terrorism in sharp focus. How and why terrorist activity escalated when there
was a noticeable decline in such activity in 2016? What should now be done to totally eliminate extremist and
terrorist activity in Pakistan?
There is a widely shared consensus in Pakistan that terrorist activity declined because of the Zarb-e-Azb
security operation in North Waziristan and other tribal agencies and the security operation in Karachi. Some
people turned optimistic to argue that Pakistan had overcome the menace of terrorism. The independent
observers also recognised the military successes in coping with terrorism but they argued that more sustained
efforts were needed, especially in the non-military domains, to completely root out extremism and terrorism.
Terrorism is based on a narrow political and ideological agenda that provides a basis for use of violence in a
sustained manner. The people are not born extremist or terrorist. They are socialised into it through a conscious
effort by a state or by self-motivated politicised leadership that uses an ideological framework derived from a
religious or worldly philosophy.
Pakistani societys tolerant disposition was converted into what it is today through the efforts of Pakistani state
system by socialising at least more than one generation into religious orthodoxy and militancy. The orthodox
and hardline religious circles were pampered by the Pakistani state in cooperation with friendly foreign
countries that had their own overlapping agendas to pursue. The conflict developed between the Pakistani state
and the hardline religious groups when the Pakistani state decided to abandon militancy as the major state
policy in September 2001. It was easy for the Pakistani state to do that because it viewed militancy as a matter
of policy which it could change. However, the religion-oriented groups pursued orthodoxy and militancy as an
article of faith which could not be changed easily. Furthermore, the changed official Pakistani policy threatened
the privileged position of these groups. Some of them decided to challenge the Pakistani state.
However, history cannot be used to sidestep the problems of the present. One lesson can be drawn from history.
As orthodoxy and militancy were inculcated in society by a conscious effort over time, their reversal is possible
through a sustained effort on the part of the Pakistani state and society.
The elected civilian governments and leaders are not convinced that they need to work towards moderating the
socio-cultural and religious profile of the society. A good number of them are the product of the era when the
state was socialising people into religious orthodoxy and militancy. As they have not experienced the pre-
orthodoxy period, they do not see anything wrong in their disposition. Some of them are likely to be critical of
the use of violence by the Taliban and other groups but they are not opposed to their ideological agenda. The
civilian governments are too weak to take a firm stand for reformulating the societal profile by revising school
education in view of the opposition by Islamic and militant groups. Furthermore, as the relations between the
government and the mainstream opposition political parties are marked by distrust and hostility, the government
fears that the opposition will exploit any confrontation between the government and the religious groups.
There are several other dilemmas in the non-military civilian domains for countering terrorism. With the
exception of the PPP, the ANP and the MQM, the political parties maintain an ambiguous disposition on
militancy. These political parties condemn terrorism and violence at the level of abstraction or in principle.
Terrorism is bad, wrong, inhuman and un-Islamic, they argue. However, they rarely apply these theoretical
formulations to concrete situations of violence.
This is true that Islamic teachings and principles reject the use of violence against people or killing them but the
militant groups invoke Islam in support of their activities. Furthermore, Islamic militancy is linked to some
schools of Islamic thought based in Saudi Arabia and the Indo-Pak subcontinent, although this does not
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necessarily mean that all followers of these religious denominations support violence by these groups. Other
schools of Islamic thought avoid linking with the Taliban and other militant groups. These groups publicly
criticise the militant groups that resort to suicide bombings or other violent methods that cause loss of human
life and property.
The groups that escaped from North Waziristan in the course of Zarb-e-Azb operation to Afghanistan and
mainland Pakistan, regrouped to resort to violence to make their presence felt. They will repeat this from time to
time rather than engage in violence in a sustained manner over a long period of time because their human and
material resources are limited as compared to the pre-Zarb-e-Azb period.
Another dilemma is the reluctance of the Punjab and federal governments to assign an autonomous role to the
Rangers for countering terrorism in the province because this challenges the PML-Ns monopoly of power in
Punjab. The PML-N leaders want the Rangers and the military to operate in Punjab under their instructions.
The new security operation, Radd-ul-Fasaad, initiated by the Army in the urban areas on February 22, is
expected to dismantle the militant networks and support systems in the urban areas of Punjab and elsewhere.
However, the active support of the civilian government will still be needed to cope with the non-military and
societal aspects of terrorism. It is here that uncertainty exists because the political and electoral considerations
dominate the dispositions of the political leadership ruling at the federal and provincial levels.
These dilemmas will have to be addressed in order to permanently eliminate violent groups throughout
Pakistan. This calls for an earnest effort to moderate Pakistans socio-cultural profile by reformulating
education and other agents of socialisation. The greater focus of this effort should be on Punjab where over 50
per cent of Pakistan lives.

Pakistans Big Threat Isnt TerrorismIts Climate Change

For decades, Pakistan has struggled to manage urgent crises, ranging from infrastructure woes to terrorism.
While its policies focus on short-term conventional threats, a potentially devastating danger lurks in the
shadows: climate change. As the impact of global warming continues to grow, the political and economic
instability it brings will threaten Pakistans security. The Pakistani government must prioritize its response to
climate change in order to mitigate environmental threats and prevent future calamities.
Much like the government, the Pakistani public finds it difficult to prioritize climate change when the average
citizen is deprived of lifes most basic necessities. For the population, immediate and clear hazards to their
livelihood trump long-term, still largely invisible threats. In 2007-2008, a Gallup poll found that only 34 percent
of Pakistanis were aware of climate change, and only 24 percent considered it a serious threat.
However, this perception is changing as global warming starts to impact everyday life. Over the past several
years, Pakistanis have witnessed, firsthand, the devastating effects of climate change. Catastrophic floods
displaced millions, and severe droughts in Thar and Balochistan portend the damage global warming can cause.
The frequency of those floods hasincreased over the last five years, due to melting glaciers and heavy rainfall.
Karachi, Pakistans most populous metropolitan city, suffered a heat wave so severe it claimed the lives of
almost 1,200 people. These recent disasters could account for the change in public opinion from the 2007-2008
Gallup poll to the situation in 2015, when Pakistan joined the list of 19 countrieswhere the majority of the
population now considers climate change a top global threat.
Perhaps the biggest security threat facing Pakistan today is the possibility of climate change and environmental
factors destabilizing Karachi, which is regarded as the countrys economic backbone. With a population of
approximately 17 million people, the city attracts almost a million migrants every year due to its vast pool of
employment opportunities, per a report byExpress Tribune. It is also Pakistans main port city, and accounts for
42 percent of its total GDP. It generates about half of Pakistans tax revenue, and houses its stock exchange,
central bank, and the priciest real estate in the country, according to the CEO of real estate portal Zameen.com.
Karachi is also close to the Indus River Delta, where the Indus flows into the Arabian Sea. Due to rising sea
levels, the delta is now almost at-level with the Arabian Sea. This threatens the stability of the ecosystem
because it leads to land erosion and increases the salinity of creeks flowing from the Indus, creating an
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inhospitable environment for aquatic creatures and mangrove trees that depend on fresh water. Sea intrusion can
cause temporary and permanent flooding to large land areas, negatively impacting local ecosystems and fresh
water supplies that villagers rely on for food security and drinking water.
The repercussions of climate change are exacerbated when combined with man-made modifications that have a
drastic effect on the overall ecosystem. It not only upsets the balance of the environment, but also increases
susceptibility to natural disasters like cyclones and tsunamis. Alarmingly, the area of Pakistan that is covered by
mangrove forests has decreased from400,000 hectares in 1945 to 70,000 hectares today due to land grabbing,
rising sea levels, and the decreasing flow of fresh water into the sea.According to the World Wildlife Federation
(WWF), the mangrove trees play a critical role in buffering the coastline from erosion caused by waves and
storms.
In an interview with me in January, Dr. Asif Inam of the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) said,
Mangrove trees cannot stop cyclones and tsunamis. Instead, they act as the first line of defense against these
natural calamities, minimizing their damage. Once home to a dense mangrove forest essential to the sustenance
of the delta, 205 acres have been razed to make way for several coal-fired power plants. With the mangroves
gone, the Karachi coastline is now more prone to natural disasters such as cyclones and tsunamis.
Last year, the United Nations conducted a drill simulating a major earthquake in the Indian Ocean. The exercise
was based on a hypothetical 9.0 magnitude quake in the Makran Trench, where the Arabian and Eurasian
tectonic plates meet off the coast of Pakistan, which could trigger a catastrophic tsunami. Tauseef Alam, the
chief meteorologist who supervised the tests, warned that the disastrous tsunami waves could reach Karachi in
one and a half hours and wipe out the entire city. As the sea line creeps closer to the city limits because of
land erosion resulting from Mangrove tree deforestation, the danger to Karachis population increases.
In 2014, the United Nations released an assessment of what would happen to Karachi if it faced another
Tsunami like the one it faced in 1945 that claimed the lives of almost 4,000 people. So far, no tangible
evacuation plan exists, despite efforts to implement an early warning system to prepare the citys residents in
case of an emergency.
An additional strain to Karachis stability is the Port Qasim Power Project, part of the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor program, currently in development along the coastline of the Arabian Sea. Though created to alleviate
Pakistans energy crisis, the project has wreaked havoc on the lives of people in close proximity to it, and
damaged one of Pakistans most critical ecosystems. Many Pakistanis living along the coastal belt rely on the
ecosystems stability for their livelihood, to farm and fish. Changes in the ecosystem, caused both by manmade
developments and climate change, have displaced as many as 80 percent of the five million Pakistanis who once
lived along the banks of the Delta. Climate-induced migration has spread across much of Pakistan, as droughts,
floods, and sea intrusion disrupt local communities.
With sea levels rising, there is also an increased chance of trans-boundary migration. According to a report by
Dawn, sea level rise is expected to produce 35-40 million climate refugees. These Pakistani refugees will have
no place to go: migration to India will not be possible because of the tense political history between the nations,
and Bangladesh will not be able to absorb the vast number of refugees as it suffers from its own low-lying
coastal belt.
Dr. Inam of the NIO agrees that the danger is imminent unless drastic actions are taken. Time for Karachi is
quickly running out, he said. Some parts of Karachis Malir have already gone under water. And with the
current rate of climate change, the economic hub of Pakistan has 35 to 45 years before it completely submerges
into the Arabian Sea.
Karachis stability is critical to Pakistans security. As climate change increases the intensity of natural disasters
and threatens economic stability, the fate of the metropolis could shape that of the entire country.
Pakistan runs on an agrarian economy. From 1949 to 1950, Pakistans agriculture sector was responsible for 53
percent of the total GDP. By 1980 to 1981, this number had dropped to 31 percent; in recent years, it has fallen
even further to 21.4 percent. Among other factors, experts blame the drop on increased floods and droughts.
The decrease in agricultural contributions to national GDP have stunted the economic growth of the country.
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According to leading economist Ishrat Husain, the economy grew by 2.9 percent per annum in the last five
years, but it could have exceeded a projected rate of 6.5 percent if flooding had not caused economic and human
losses.
According to a report published by the U.S. Department of Defense, climate change will exacerbate global
instability, posing an immediate threat to national security. Among other factors, the report identified strained
water supplies due to melting glaciers as a factor that could trigger instability. Pakistan ranks as the sixth-most
populous country in the world, and is already unable to meet the growing water demand. The flooding and
droughts destroy billions of dollars worth of crops every year, increasing the rates of inflation and
unemployment. In addition to the water shortage, the long-term damage to fields and crops will lead to food
scarcity. If this trend continues, Pakistan will be unable to meet the demands of its population, which is growing
by nearly 2 percent each year.
It is imperative that Pakistan makes climate change a priority. Failure to do so would jeopardize the countrys
national security. Where water and food shortage catalyzes civil unrest and conflicts, it will also hinder the
governments ability to properly manage its resources.
Currently, Pakistan has allocated 58.8 million rupees to combat climate change, a commitment that must be
increased. Since Pakistan is not financially secure enough to afford climate change implementation programs on
its own, it needs assistance from foreign entities as well as climate change experts who can design
comprehensive programs, bearing in mind the governments limitations.
The historic Paris Agreement in 2015 provides hope for a global response to the threat of climate change. The
agreement made it clear that the responsibility for climate change lies with all nations. The government of
Pakistan, much like all the member countries, has an obligation to follow strict guidelines and adopt more
intense and frequent reporting of their progress. Only by assessing the vulnerabilities and needs of the state and
strengthening its adaptation at the local level can Pakistan fully pursue opportunities offered, especially climate
financing opportunities, through the Paris Climate Summit.

Civil-Military
The following issues need attention for promoting a responsible civil-military relationship within a democratic
constitutional framework: (1) A decision on the part of the top brass of the military to restrain their political
ambition and stay within their professional domain. The civilian leaders must also respect internal service
autonomy of the military. (2) The civilian political leaders, especially those in power, must create a credible
civilian alternative to military rule by ensuring good governance and a judicious political management. (3)
Strengthen the civilian institution and processes in a genuinely democratic framework rather than pursuing
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personalised and patrimonial governance. The democratic institutions must ensure conflict management and
these should become the pivot of power and authority. (4) The democratic institutions and processes must
ensure delivery of basic services and facilities to its citizens. (5) Only the policies based on genuine political
participation and socio-economic justice promote strong attachment among the people for the political system
which strengthens the role of civilian institutions and processes. (6) A consensus among the key political
players not to cultivate the military for pursuing their individual political agenda. (7) A minimum reliance on
the military for undertaking purely civilian tasks. The calls to the military in aid of civil should be as
minimum as possible. (8) The militarys political clout will increase in the countries that face acute external
military threats and internal security issues, including terrorism. (9) Appointment of highly professional
political leaders to foreign policy, defence and internal security portfolios.

Nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons figure prominently in the security and diplomatic competition between India and Pakistan.
The policymakers and security analysts in Pakistan view nuclear weapons as a protection for Pakistans security
and foreign policy options against Indias superiority in conventional security, its flourishing nuclear weapons
and the delivery system.
The competition between Pakistan and India is now taking a new turn. Of late, some of the BJP hardliners and
the champions of ultra-nationalism belonging to the Sangh Parivar are talking of abandoning Indias No First
Use nuclear policy. They want that India should not hesitate from a pre-emptive nuclear strike, if and when
needed. Some of them have also toyed with the idea of reviving the Cold Start strategy against Pakistan.
Pakistans policymakers never took Indias No First Use policy as a credible declaration. However, the attempt
by religious extremists in India to influence its nuclear policy is a matter of grave concern.
Pakistans nuclear programme has a limited agenda focusing on India. However, Indias official and non-
official circles and some Western security analysts have traditionally attributed extended political agenda to
Pakistans nuclear programme that went beyond India. Pakistan was accused of working on an Islamic Bomb
that would be made available to some Middle Eastern states, jeopardising the security of Israel. In the mid-
1980s, there were media reports of a possible India-Israel joint air raid on Pakistans nuclear installations to
destroy Pakistans capacity to produce a bomb. The clandestine nature of Pakistans nuclear programme was
also targeted for criticism. In post-September 2001 period, there was a persistent propaganda that Pakistans
nuclear installations could be penetrated by religious extremists or al Qaeda fighters get hold of Pakistani
nuclear weapons, fissile and radioactive material or take over some nuclear installation.
Pakistans diplomatic and academic response to this propaganda could be divided in two phases. The First
Wave of Pakistani response pertained to the pre-explosion (pre-1998) period. The response in this period was
weak and slow, comprising articles published in journals/magazines and edited volumes. Two books by Akhtar
Ali dealt with the dimensions of nuclear power rather than responding to international criticism of Pakistans
nuclear programme.
The second wave of academic work on Pakistans nuclear weapons programme began to take shape soon after
the explosions in May 1998. The initial articles focused on justifying Pakistans decision to go for nuclear
explosions, including the debate on who deserved to claim greater credit for this achievement. Some concern
was also expressed that India and Pakistan might get into bitter competition in the nuclear domain, complicating
the management of strategic stability and diplomatic normalcy in the region.
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a good number of young scholars, based mostly in Islamabad,
cropped up and published research papers, newspaper articles and political commentaries addressing different
aspects of Pakistans nuclear programme as well as provided a spirited defence of the countrys nuclear and
missile delivery system. Most of these writings were characterised by homogeneity of arguments.
Several books and monographs were published by Pakistani analysts. However, only three books deserve a
special mention because these make a valuable attempt not only to provide a historical overview of Pakistans
journey on road to nuclearisation but also link their studies with the diversified theoretical formulations and
global discourse on nuclear weapons. Feroz Hassan Khans book entitled Eating Grass: The Making of the
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Pakistani Bomb (2012) is a remarkable contribution to the study of Pakistans nuclear programme. Two books
have been published by Dr Naeem Salik. These are Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistans
Perspective (2009) and Learning to Live with the Bomb: Pakistan: 1998-2016 (2017).
Saliks latest book Learning to Live with the Bomb makes a singular contribution by undertaking a critical
and comprehensive review of how Pakistan learnt over the years the handling of different aspects of nuclear
weapons capability. Pakistan has demonstrated strong learning from others experience as well as from
undertaking the actual task of building nuclear weapons. This learning process was not a uni-linear process and
Pakistan acquired the skills to address the dimensions of nuclearisation in a graduate manner.
The areas for learning and moving ahead with its own policies included nuclear doctrine and policies, the
command and control issues and mechanisms, safety and security of the nuclear programme, nuclear export
laws and administrative measures, and the making of the nuclear regulatory arrangements. The strides in these
areas have helped to project Pakistan as a responsible nuclear power.
Pakistan can confidently claim that its external security has been strengthened by learning to address all aspects
of its nuclear programme. However, nuclear weapons by them do not necessarily ensure the resolution of
entrenched political problems. As war is no longer an option for India and Pakistan, there is now a stalemate
like situation with reference to the major problems between India and Pakistan. A low level of conflict now
characterises India-Pakistan relations since Narrendra Modi became Indias prime minister in May 2014.
Therefore, the new third wave of the literature on Pakistans nuclear programme and national security must
focus on two inter-related issues. First, how Pakistan can strengthen its diplomacy and build a soft image at the
global level in order to generate enough diplomatic pressure for resolving the major problems between India
and Pakistan. The role of positive and active diplomacy increases after the assumption of nuclear weapons.
Second, the policymakers and security analysts need to recognise that nuclear weapons are not relevant to
addressing some internal security issues, ie, extremism and terrorism, internal political disharmony and socio-
economic inequities. Nuclear weapons alone do not address these two sets of issues. The third wave of nuclear
and security scholarship must also emphasise articulating solutions to these internal problems so as to
strengthen societal resilience. This will contribute to increasing Pakistans confidence as a nuclear weapons
state.

Legitimising NSG Membership

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created under the auspices of United Nations to contain the
negative use of technology provided for peaceful purposes and many countries around the world including India
gained civilian nuclear technology and benefited. But this positive process got severely damaged for the first
time by India when the so-called Smiling Budha test was conducted in 1974 by India misusing the Atoms for
Peace. India diverted the civilian nuclear technology provided for peaceful uses by Canada to acquire nuclear
weapon technology which not only undermined the Atoms for Peace like initiatives for future but also ushered
a series of new frameworks to strengthen non-proliferation and led to the creation of London Suppliers Group,
currently known as Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Therefore, one can say that the NSG was actually Fathered due to Indias negative misuse of nuclear
technology provided for positive purposes. It is therefore, India can be attributed as Premier Architect of
Proliferation (PAP). The irony is that despite being the PAP as the foundational actor in creation of NSG, same
India was again given an opportunity to dent the smoothly running NSG framework through provision of
state-specific waiver in 2008, marking discrimination on the face of NSG.
As part of the India-US strategic partnership, India is aspiring to make foothold in nuclear non-proliferation
regime with the US support and therefore was able to procure discriminatory state-specific waivers from IAEA
and NSG, while despite having fought at front line for the US endeavors throughout the Cold War as well as in
the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Pakistan has not been considered for the Civilian Nuclear Cooperation like
that of India-US Nuclear Deal. In this scenario, Pakistan launched its own efforts to obtain membership in these
regimes with the credential of non-discriminatory IAEA safeguards on its all civilian nuclear facilities with an
excellent record regarding implementation of safeguard arrangements in the country.
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Dedicated civilian nuclear facilities are also one of the significant credentials Pakistan owes to its credit.
Pakistan needs not to design a Separation Plan for nuclear cooperation agreements because its all civilian
facilities are dedicated only for civilian purposes; while India had to provide an Ambiguous Separation Plan
for such cooperation, which itself is an evidence that all the Indian nuclear facilities have been contributing to
the Indian nuclear Weapon Program; therefore, one can infer that India has a better capacity to produce larger
quantity of fissile material. Since the IAEA safeguards are the corner-stone of nuclear cooperation with NSG
countries, Pakistan has better track record as compared to India. Pakistan applies non-discriminatory IAEA
safeguards while India enjoys discrimination through India-specific agreement with IAEA which in itself is
manifestation of Indian intentions to clandestinely divert dual-use technologies towards military purposes.
Reference history of nuclear program, Pakistans nuclear programme was started after the creation of major
non-proliferation regime like NPT while Indian nuclear programme dates back before the creation of non-
proliferation regime, therefore the later was able to obtain unhindered nuclear technology and clandestinely
divert it into nuclear weapon technology while Pakistan had to face strict international scrutiny for development
of its nuclear programme either civilian or military because it started only after its dismemberment by India in
1971. It can, therefore, be inferred that Pakistans nuclear programme is based on indigenous efforts while
Indian nuclear programme is the beneficiary of foreign technologies. Taking these facts into account, one can
argue that Pakistan has better credentials for NSG membership as compared to India.
It is a basic principle of international law that all states are equally sovereign and entitled to avail equal
treatment when it comes to the application of international rules and regulations. There is no place for
discrimination under the charter of UNO as well. Therefore, Pakistan has decided to convince the participating
governments for equal treatment with all the states in conferring international obligations as well as privileges.
Since the IAEA works under the auspices of UNO, it is Pakistans legitimate right to urge the IAEA for equal
treatment with all the states in conclusion and application of its safeguards agreements. Providing opportunities
for a country-specific safeguard agreement to any state is not only damaging the original spirit of the IAEA but
also a violation of the principle of equality under the UN Charter as well as of International Law.
In the same way, Pakistans request for NSG membership also requires equal treatment when the cartel
evaluates the Indian and Pakistani applications. Based on this principled stance, Pakistan is now looking
towards NSG and seeking a criteria-based approach from the regime. Although Pakistan is pursuing its
membership of NSG to obtain civilian nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in her national interest but it is
following the principle of equality. Pakistan has never sought any discriminatory treatment from any country or
even any organisation, which is manifestation of Pakistans commitment to the principles of international laws
and obligations.
Pakistans request of consideration for membership of NSG is need-based while Indias request is status-driven
which aims at obtaining the great power status. Since India enjoys the country-specific waiver from NSG and
IAEA, it is not facing a significant hurdle regarding its fissile material necessities, its efforts to obtain NSG
membership has greater objective of gaining supremacy and power-bench in the regime that may enable India to
exert her influence around the world in nuclear market contributing to the political strength of India. It is well
known that such aspirations of India gained momentum after the India-US strategic partnership that enabled
India to enjoy preferential treatment in various endeavors, yet it is not too late for the international community
to understand Pakistans perspective and let Pakistan to join the nuclear regimes on equal footing. Equitable
mainstreaming of Pakistan in the nuclear realm is the only choice that fulfils justice requirements.

Pakistan Resolution implications

The Pakistan Resolution of 23 March, 1940 was undoubtedly a landmark event in the struggle of the Muslims
of South Asia for an independent and sovereign homeland where they could lead their lives in accordance with
the enlightened principles of Islam, free from the fear of persecution by a narrow-minded and oppressive Hindu
majority. The preoccupation with the safeguarding of the political, economic, religious, cultural, and
administrative rights of the Muslims of the sub-continent had been a prominent feature of their political struggle
within the British India since the 19th century. Prior to 1940, this concern was voiced from time to time by
prominent Muslim leaders in different shapes and forms in response to the evolving circumstances. Allama
Iqbals call for the separation of a Muslim homeland in his presidential address at the Muslim Leagues annual
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session at Allahabad in 1930 was an important milestone in this evolutionary process. The bigotry exhibited by
such extremist Hindu organizations as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the unhappy experience of the
Muslims under the Congress governments in various provinces, formed after the promulgation of the 1935
Government of India Act, provided further impetus for the demand for a separate and independent Muslim
homeland.
Allama Iqbals dream was given a concrete shape by the Pakistan Resolution adopted at the Muslim Leagues
annual session in Lahore in March, 1940. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnahs presidential address on the
occasion made an irrefutable case for a separate Muslim nationhood and for dividing India into Muslim and
Hindu majority states by stressing that The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies,
social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two
different civilisations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life
are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history.
They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the
other.Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands,
their territory, and their state.
The Pakistan Resolution and its historical background carry important implications for the country. It needs to
be reiterated that the Pakistan Movement was based on the premise that the Hindus and the Muslims belonged
to two different civilisations with conflicting ideas and conceptions on life and of life. Each is an anti-thesis of
the other. For instance, while Islam teaches human equality and brotherhood, Hinduism is based on the
impregnable division of the society into castes barring vertical mobility. The first and the foremost duty of the
federal and provincial governments in Pakistan, therefore, is to create conditions in which the Muslims can give
effect to Islams enlightened principles of human brotherhood, egalitarianism, social and economic justice,
moderation, tolerance, and dynamism in their individual and collective lives. At the same time, in accordance
with the demands of the Pakistan Resolution and the Islamic principle of non-coercion in matters of religion, we
should take all possible steps for safeguarding the religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative, and
other rights and interests of the minorities.
Unfortunately, the prevailing conditions in Pakistan are far from demands of the Pakistan Resolution or the
Islamic principles relevant to the organization of our polity. To begin with, it is ironical that in a country which
came into existence through the exercise of the right of vote, democracy was derailed repeatedly by adventurist
generals. Now that the country is again on the democratic path, it is our collective responsibility to strengthen
the democratic process. Secondly, it is incumbent upon federal and provincial governments to ensure social and
economic justice for all. In a marked contrast with the egalitarian and social welfare principles of Islam, there
are vast inequalities of income and wealth in Pakistan. Side by side with a few pockets of affluence, most of the
people are the victims of grinding poverty. Justice has become inaccessible for the poor and the weak.
While Islam in essence is a dynamic religion of progress and enlightenment inspired by the principle of Ijtihad,
our religious and political thought suffers from obscurantism and stagnation. In the race for economic progress,
we are falling behind other nations of the world. For instance, we recorded the GDP growth rate of 4.7% in the
year 2015-16 as against the corresponding growth rate of over 7% on the part of India. In view of the emphasis
on education in Islam, one would assume that our governments would assign the top priority to this sector. The
reality is far from it. It is pathetic that whereas UNESCO calls for the allocation of at least 4% of GDP to
education, we have never in our history exceeded the figure of 2% of GDP in the allocation of resources to
education at the national level. Little wonder that we are turning into a nation of illiterates or semi-literates. It is
a pity that there is not a single world class university in Pakistan. In general, instead of moderation and
tolerance, preached by Islam, our conduct is marked by extremism and intolerance. To some extent, the monster
of terrorism which stalks the country from one end to the other is the by-product of both ignorance and religious
extremism. For overcoming this menace, we would have to revamp our educational system besides using force
where necessary and adopting other measures.
The Pakistan Resolution also carries important implications for the schemes of regional economic integration
relevant to us. Pakistan is geographically in South Asia, but, as noted by the leaders of the Pakistan movement,
its history, culture, political orientation, and the worldview set it apart from a Hindu-majority India, the biggest
and the dominant country in the subcontinent. In fact, Pakistan for historical, cultural, political, strategic, and
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economic reasons is closely linked to countries in West Asia or the ECO region including Iran, Afghanistan,
Turkey, Central Asian Republics, and Azerbaijan. In contrast with the SAARC, the countries in the ECO region
enjoy almost all the prerequisites of intensified regional cooperation leading to regional economic integration.
The Economic Cooperation Organization should, therefore, be our organization of choice for regional economic
integration.
Finally, Pakistan must break the begging bowl and learn to stand on its own feet if it wishes to acquire a place
of respect and dignity in the comity of nations. Excessive dependence on loans and aid from foreign countries
cannot go together with an independent foreign policy calculated to serve the best interests of the country. Our
excessive reliance on foreign loans is also harmful for the economic health of the country and for our self-
respect. However, this policy of self-reliance would be possible only if we adopt austerity as a way of life
individually and collectively while mobilising our own energies and resources for coming to grips with the
challenges confronting us.
Pakistan has a promising future provided we abide by the principles of egalitarianism, human brotherhood,
justice, tolerance, moderation and dynamism enjoined by Islam. Instead of obscurantism and ignorance, our
policies should be informed by a forward looking and enlightened approach inspired by the dynamic Islamic
principle of Ijtihad. Education must receive the top priority from our governments and the elite of the society.
Self-reliance should be our motto. Instead of extravagance, our life-style individually and collectively should be
marked by austerity. If we succeed in doing so, a bright future would await us. Our failure to practice these
principles would have extremely adverse consequences for the countrys future.