4TH SET OF CASES
group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over
Legitime (In General)
Raymundo v. Vda De Suarez
G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008
[compulsory succession defined]
Facts:
Spouses Marcelo and Teofista Suarez had five
children namely Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr, Evelyn
and Reggineo. Spouses acquired several properties
including a parcel of land in Pasig, a property in
Pinagbuhatan Pasig and Lots 5,6 and 7. When Marcelo
Sr. died, Teofista, together with the other respondents,
and Elpidio Suarez executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate. Despite the said partition, the
properties remained under the name of the spouses.
Teofista continued to administer and manage said
properties.
In a case against Valente Raymundo and
others, the court ordered Teofista and Rizal Realty
Coporation to pay Raymundo P70,000.00 for damages.
The subject properties were levied to satisfy the
judgment. Before the expiration of the redemption
period, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action
against Valente fof the annulment of the auction sale.
Meanwhile, RTC ordered Teofista to vacate the
premises and leave Valente in peaceful possession
thereof.
Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. They then filed a
patition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which also dismissed the said petition.
In another litigation, a writ of preliminary
injuction was issued by the RTC of Pasig enjoining
petitioner Valente from transferring to third persons
the levied properties based on its preliminary findings
that the auctioned properties are co-owned by Teofista
and the respondents.
Valente now contends that the respondents
must first be declared as heirs before they can file an
action to annul the judicial sale.
Issue:
Whether the properties in question can be
subject of levy.
Held:
No, the properties in question cannot be
subject of levy to satisfy the judgment against Teofista
Suarez.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia
and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject
properties only by virtue of an execution sale to
recover Teofistas judgment obligation. This judgment
obligation is solely Teofistas, and payment therefor
cannot be made through an execution sale of
properties not absolutely owned by her. These
properties were evidently conjugal properties and were,
in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married
to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s death, by virtue
of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.s share in the
conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of
law to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of
succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article
778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net
estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or
all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved
is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines
legitime as that part of the testators property which
he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory
heirs. Herein respondents are primary compulsory
heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and
preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the
distribution of the decedents estate.
Compulsory Heir
Lapuz v. Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
[when legal separation is pending]
Facts:
On August 1953, Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a
petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio on the ground that she found out that her
husband abandoned her and cohabitated with a
Chinese woman Go Hiok. The spouses do not have a
child.
In his amended answer, Eufemio alleged
affirmative and special defenses. He also filed a
counter-claim for the declaration of nullity ab initio of
his marriage with Carmen on the ground of his prior
and subsisting marriage with Go Hiol alias Ngo Hiok in
accordance with Chinese law and cutoms.
Before the trial can be completed, Carmen
died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio then mobbed to
dismiss the petition fro legal separation saying that the
petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided
in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Counsel of Carmen moved to substitute the
deceased by her father Macario Lapuz. Eufemio
opposed the motion. The lower court dismissed the
case stating that the motion to dismiss and the motion
for substitution had to be resolved on the question of
whether the plaintiffs cause of action has survived
which was ruled in the negative.
Petitioners then filed a review by certiorari
before the Supreme Court. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final
decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
Held:
Yes, the death of the plaintiff before the final
decree in an action for legal separation abate the
action.
An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
This also applied if the action involved
property rights.
A review of the resulting changes in property
relations between spouses shows that they are solely
the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they
can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs
prior to the decree.
The loss of right by the offending spouse to
any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all
rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons
of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as
assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said
rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished"
after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action
through a substitute of the deceased party.
Baritua v. CA
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
[estrangement not a legal ground for
disqualification]
Facts:
A tricycle driven by Bienvenido Nacario
collided with a JB Bus driven by Edgar Bitancor and
owned and operated by Jose Baritua. As a result of the
accident, Bienvenido and his passenger died.
An extra-judicial settlement was executed by
herein petitioners and Philippine First Insurance
Company, Inc. and Alicia Nacario, Bienvenidos widow.
In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia
executed a release of claim in favor of petitioners and
PFICI. She also executed an affidavit of desistance.
About a year after the accident, the parents
of Bienvenido filed a complaint for damages against
the petitioners. They alleged that in accordance with
the extra-judicial settlement that they executed, the
petitioners promised to indemnify them for the death
of there son, for the funeral expenses they incurred
and for the damage of the tricycle, the purchase price
of which was loaned by them in favor of their son.
However, instead of indemnifying them, the petitioners
negotiated with the long-estranged wife of their late
son.
The lower court dismissed the complaint
saying that the payment by the petitioners to the
widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and
successors-in-interest of the deceased extinguished
any claims against the petitioners. The Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. It
said that the release executed by Alicia did not
discharge the liability of the petitioners because the
case was instituted by the respondents in their own
capacity as heirs, representatives, successors and
assigns of Alicia and that Alicia could not have validly
waived the damages prayed for since she was not the
one who suffered these damages.
Issue:
Whether the release executed by Alicia
discharged the liability of the petitioners.
Held:
Yes, the petitioners are discharged from the
liability by virtue of the release executed by Alicia.
Obligations are extinguished by various
modes among them being by payment. There is no
denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation
petition arising from the accident. The only question
now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one
who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
There can be no question that Alicia and her
son with the deceased are the successors in interest
referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive
payment.
It is patently clear that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the
surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it
has been established that Bienvenido was married to
Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of
Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and
as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so
even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido.
Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.
Raymundo v. Vda De Suarez,
G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008
[primary compulsory heirs and secondary
compulsory heirs]
Issue:
What are the rights of a primary compulsory
heir and a secondary compulsory heir?
Held:
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of
succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article
778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net
estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or
group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over
all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved
is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines
legitime as that part of the testators property which
he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory
heirs. Herein respondents are primary compulsory
heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and
preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the
distribution of the decedents estate.
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.s estate in 1957, it must be
stressed that herein respondents rights to the
succession vested from the moment of their fathers
death. Herein respondents ownership of the subject
properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute
upon Marcelos death, although their respective shares
therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time
the subject properties were sold on execution sale to
answer for Teofistas judgment obligation, the
inclusion of herein respondents share therein was null
and void.
In fine, Teofistas ownership over the subject
properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner
Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal
nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns
only a portion of the subject properties, only that
portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon
and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal.
Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein
respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale
of their share in the subject properties.
Reyes v. CA
G.R. No. L- 39537, March 19, 1985
[natural and spurious children]
Facts:
Placida Delgado, together with the other
private respondents, filed a complaint before the CFI of
Batangas praying that Irene Delgado (alias Irene Reyes
and Irene Ramero) be ordered to execute a deed of
reconveyance in favor of Placido, Domingo and Paula,
all surnamed Delgado respondents over five parcels of
land in Quezon and another deed of reconveyance in
favor of Maximo Delgado over three parcels of land in
Batangas.
Herein respondents alleged that Irene was
able to register the lands under her name by lying that
she was the sole child of Francisco Delgado and thus
entitled to inherit the parcels of land.
Irene filed an answer saying that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Genoveva Ramero and
deceased Francisco Delgado. After her mother and
Justino Reyes separated, her mother cohabitated with
Francisco Delgado. Irene also filed a counter-claim
averring that as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco,
she has the right to represent her father to the
inheritance left by her grandmother, Benigna Castillo.
The CFI of Batangas dismissed the action for
reconveyance and declared Irene Delgado as the lawful
owner of the parcels of land. However, the
counterclaim of Irene was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence. Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of
the lower court. It said that the self-adjudication
executed by Irene is null and void. The transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Irene were
cancelled and the titles covering the parcels of land
were reinstated in the name of Francisco. The Court of
Appeals said that although Irene was the spurious
daughter of Francisco, she cannot inherit because she
was not recognized wither voluntarily or by court
action. Furthermore, the titles of the lots cannot be
executed in favor of herein respondents because in
doing so it will be in effect a recognition by the court
that herein respondents are the only heirs of Francisco
to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors of
the deceased.
Issue:
Whether Irene Delgado could inherit the lot.
Held:
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child
other than natural to inherit must be first recognized
voluntarily or by court action is well settled in our
jurisprudence. There is no reason to overturn this
doctrine.
Though the Civil Code is silent with respect
to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court,
in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to
natural children, to said spurious children, declared
that the considerations of fairness and justice that
underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil
Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment
of natural children are fully applicable, if not more, to
actions to investigate and declare the paternity of
illegitimate children that are not natural.
There are two (2) general classifications of
illegitimate children or those who are conceived and
born out of wedlock. They may be either natural
(actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous,
adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as
those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the
time of conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269,
New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children
are those born of parents, who at the time of their
conception, are disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain impediment. Because of this basic
distinction between these children, it is not legally
possible to classify unrecognized natural children
under the class of spurious children. Besides,
commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate
children other than natural" as excluding from the
grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil
Code those children who are natural child proper by
birth and who have not secured voluntary or
compulsory recognition. They fag within the scope of
the definition of natural children enumerated in Article
269, New Civil Code Lastly, to follow petitioners'
contention win not be in accordance with the
consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an
elementary and basic principle under the old and new
Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no
rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His
rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the
child's acknowledgment by the natural parent.
Reserva Troncal
Padura v. Baldovino
G.R. No. L-11960, December 1958
FACTS
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages
during his lifetime. With his first wife Gervacia Landig,
he had one child, Manuel Padura. With the second
wife, Benita Garing, he had two children, Fortunato
and Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on Apr 26, 1908,
leaving a last will and testament, duly probated,
wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three
children and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing.
Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He
died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having
executed a will; and not having any issue, the parcels
of land were inherited exclusively by his mother
Benita. Benita was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title
in her name, subject to the condition that the
properties were reservable in favor of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came.
On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as
her heirs her four legitimate children: Cristeta,
Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-
appellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also died,
survived by his legitimate children Dionisia, Felisa,
Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino
Padura (Petitioners-appellees) Upon the death of
Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took
possession of the reservable properties. CFI Laguna
declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be
the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the
reservable properties (the original reservees,
Candelaria and Manuel, having predeceased the
reservista)
The Baldovino heirs filed a petition seeking to
have the properties partitioned, such that one-half be
adjudicated to them, and the other half to the
appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherited by
right of representation from their respective parents,
the original reservees.
Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they
should all be deemed as inheriting in their own right,
under which, they claim, each should have an equal
share.
(In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood
relatives of the reservista, were contending that they
should get more than their half-blood relatives, the
Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006
and 1008 of the Civil Code)
RTC RULING Declared all the reservees, without
distinction, co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of
the parcels of land.
ISSUE WON the reserved properties should, as the
trial court held, be apportioned among the heirs
equally.
HELD NO. The nephews of the whole blood should
take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood. The reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
Article 891 of the Code provides:
ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from
his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
who belong to the line from which said property came.
The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished
once the property has devolved to the specified
relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the
relations between one reservatario and another of the
same degree, there is no call for applying Art 891 any
longer; the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
interstate succession.
Florentino v Florentino (as restated in the
case): upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all the
reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those
reservatarios of more remote degree... And within the
third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in
favor of nephews.
Proximity of degree and right of representation are
basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to share double that of brothers and nephews
of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the
reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right
of representation of nephews are made to aply, the
rule of double share for immedaite collaterals of the
whole blood should likewise be operative.
In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the
group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the
individual right to the property should be decided by
the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession,
since Art 891 does not specify otherwise. The reserva
being an exceptional case, its application should be
limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law.
Even during the reservistas lifetime, the
reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the
reservista from doing anything that might frustrate
their reversionary right: and for this purpose they can
compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of
Property even while the reservista is alive. This right is
incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is
also clear that the reservable property is not part of
the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of
them by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservista.
Gonzales v. CFI Manila
G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981
[purpose]
Facts:
Benito D. Legarda (II) predeceased his father
Benito T. Legarda (I). Benito (II) was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda (I), and their
seven children namely Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Filomena (II), Benito (III), Alejandro and Jose.
When Benito T. Legarda (I) died, his real
properties were divided in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito (II) who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda (III).
Filomena R. Legarda (II), died intestate and
without issue. Her sole heir was her mother, Filomena
Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed an
affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda (II). As a result of the
affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races (I) succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda (II) as co-
owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other
six children.
In 1953, Mrs. Legarda executed two
handwritten identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties which she inherited from
her daughter in favor of her sixteen grandchildren, the
children of her three sons, Benito (III), Alejandro and
Jose. From July 1958 to February 1959, Mrs. Legarda
and her six surviving children partitioned the
properties consisting of the 1/3 share in the estate of
Benito T. Legarda (I) which the children inherited in
representation of their father, Benito D. Legarda (II).
Mrs. Legarda died in 1967 and left a
holographic will. The said will was admitted to probate.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a
daughter of Mrs. Legarda filed a motion to exclude
from the inventory of her mothers estate the
properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena (II), on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be
inherited by Filomenas (II) three sisters and three
brother and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro
and Jose. The motion was opposed by the
administrator Benito F. Legarda (III).
Before the court could issue a resolution,
Beatriz Gonzales filed an ordinary civil action against
her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mothers estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties.
The lower court dismissed the action of
Beatriz Gonzales. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
What is the purpose of reverva troncal?
Held:
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid
"the risk that assets possessed by a family pass for
centuries suddenly gratuitously to foreign hands by
random links and premature deaths or impeder that
for a random strange people vide a family to acquire
property without that would have been therein.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited
or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same
property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve
the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendant
(prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the
said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a
first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the
deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from
the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in
favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista,
which two transmissions precede the reservation, and
(3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to
the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the
third degree from the deceased descendant belonging
to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of
the deceased descendant.
In the instant case, the properties in question
were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her
death the reservees or relatives within the third degree
of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they
survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether
Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees
within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to
the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree,
her three daughters and three sons.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey
in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her
daughter Filomena because the reservable properties
did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the
reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the
prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom
the reservable property should be given and deprive
the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a
testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed
Edroso v. Sablan
GR No. 6878, September 13, 1913
[Purpose Reserva Troncal]
Facts:
Victoriano Sablan and Marcelina Edroso were
married and had a son, Pedro Sablan. Upon the death
of his father, Pedro inherited two parcels of land in
Laguna. These parcels of land were acquired by
Victoriano by inheritance from his ascendants,
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they
having been adjudicated to him in the partition of
hereditary property between him and his brothers. On
July 1902, Pedro died unmarried and without any
child. The two parcels of land passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.
Marcelina then applied for the registration and
issuance of title of the two lots.
Pablo and Basilio Sablan, the legitimate
brother of Victoriano, opposed the registration of the
lots. They claimed that wither the registration be
denied or if granted to Marcelina, the right reserved by
law to them be recorded in the registration of each
parcel.
The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration holding that the land in question partake
of the nature of property required by law to be reserved
and that in such a case application could only be
presented jointly in the names of Marcelina Edroso
and Pablo and Basilio Sablan.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the two parcels of land is in the
nature of a reservable property.
Held:
Yes, the parcels of land are reservable
properties.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the
hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
(gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article
968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he
receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles are within the third degree of blood
relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from
his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another
descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line where the property
proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro
Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them
by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within
the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of
Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial
courts ruling that they partake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in
accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by
Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has,
moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under
a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an
express provision of the law the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate,
although under a condition. He has the right to
recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a
limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in
him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a
genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the
third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no
way, either actually or constructively or formally, in
their possession; and moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when
the person who must reserve the right should die
before them will they acquire it.
Gonzales v. CFI Manila
G.R. No. L-34395, May 1981
[persons involved]
Issue:
Who are the persons involved in reserva
troncal?
Held:
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1)
the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative
or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus
(prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and
(4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line
o tronco) from which the property came and for whom
the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and
sisters. Fourth degree relatives are not included.
The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom
the property last revolved by descent. He is called the
prepositus.
The reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed
during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed
no more than a than interest in the reservable
property.
Florentino v. Florentino
40 Phill 480
(4th civil degree excluded; cannot inherit the
reserved property)
Facts:
Apolonio Isabelo Floretino II married Antonia
Faz de Leon. They had nine children namely Jose,
Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel,
Pedro and Magdalena. When Antonia died, Apolonio
married Severina Faz de Leon. They had two children
namely Mercedes and Apolonio III. When Apolonio II
died, he was survived by his second wife Severina and
his ten children. His youngest son, Apolonio III was
born a month after he died.
Apolonios children, Juan, Maria and Isabel
died single without any ascendants or descendants.
Jose, one of Apolonios children had three sons named
Ramon, Miguel and Victorino and a daughter named
Rosario. Espirita married Eugenio Singson and was
blessed with five children namely Emilia, Jesus,
Lourdes, Caridad and Dolores. Pedro had two children
named Jose and Asuncion.
Before Apolonio II died, he executed a will
before the notary public instituting as his universal
heirs his ten children, his to be born son Apolinio III,
and Severina. He also said that his property should be
divided among all of his children in both marriages.
Apolonio III predeceased his mother Severina.
Severina then succeeded to all his property. When
Severina died, he left a will instituting as her universal
heir his only living daughter Mercedes. Mercedes then
took possession of all the property including the
property which Severina inherited from her son
Apolonio III. The subject property is said to be a
reservable property held by Severina in favor of her
son Apolonio III.
Encarnacion Florentino, daughter of Apolinio
II from the first marriage, together with the herein
petitioners, asked Mercedes to deliver their
corresponding part of the reservable property. However
despite several demands, Mercedes refuse to deliver
the property or pay its value to Encarnacion. Thus,
Encarnacion together with the other petitioners filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
They prayed that the subject property be declared as a
reservable property and Mercedes and her husband be
ordered to deliver to them their share of the property
in question.
Mercedes contended that she inherited the
property inherited by Severina from her son Apolonio
III. This being the case, the property did not pass into
the hands of strangers. She also contended that Article
811 of the Civil Code is not applicable in this case
because when she, by operation of law, entered into
and succeeded to the possession of the property, said
property had, while in the possession of her mother,
lost the character of reservable property there being
a legitimate daughter of Severina with the right to
succeed her in all her rights, property and actions.
Mercedes alleged that there is no property reserved for
Encarnacion and others since there is a forced heiress
entitled to the property left by the death of Severina.
The CFI of Ilocos Sur dismissed the complaint
and ordered herein petitioners to pay the costs. The
judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Issue:
Who has the right to inherit the property?
Held:
Any ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property acquired by the latter
gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the
property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
Following the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property
which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the
one more remote. The right of representation cannot
be alleged when the one claiming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among
the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are the relatives, within the
third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
There are then seven reservatarios who are
entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first
marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three
children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented
by their own twelve children respectively; and
Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second
marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the
deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III,
within the third degree (four of whom being his half-
brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews
as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As
the first four are his relatives within the third degree in
their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as
reservatarios to the property which came from the
common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio
Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and
in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
The property inherited by Severina from her
son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property.
Encarnacion, et al. being relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-
sevenths of said reservable property. Mercedes is
entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof.
Nieva v. Alcala
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
[reserva troncal applies only to legitimate family]
Facts:
Francisco Deocampo married Juliana Nieva.
They had a child named Alfeo Deocampo. Juliana is
the alleged natural mother of Segunda Maria Nieva. In
1889, Juliana died intestate and Alfeo inherited two
parcels of land. In 1890, Alfeo Deocampo also died
intestate and without issue. The two parcels of land
which Alfeo inherited from his mother passed to his
father Francisco by intestate succession.
Francisco later married Manuela Alcala. They
had a child named Jose Deocampo. Francisco died in
1914. Manuela and Jose Deocampo took possession of
the parcels of land in question.
A year after, Segunda Maria Nieva, claiming
to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana
Nieva, filed an action to recover the parcels of land
before the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. The CFI
held that, even granting, that Segunda was an
acknowledged daughter if Juliana, she was not entitled
to the property because an illegitimate relative has no
right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of
Article 811 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether Segunda Maria Nieva has a right
over the parcels of land.
Held:
No, Segunda does not have a right over the
parcels of land in question. Reserva troncal applies
only to legitimate family.
According to Manresa, persons in whose
favor the reservation is established is one of the most
delicate points in the interpretation of Article 811.
According to the said article, the reservation is
established in favor of parents who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which the
properties came.
Reserva troncal treats of blood, relationship.
It could not be otherwise, because relationship by
affinity is established between each spouse and the
family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would
be to favor the transmission of the properties of the
family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just
what this article intends to prevent.
Reserva troncal also treats of legitimate
relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a
legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant
property which proceeds from the same legitimate
family, and this being true, there can be no question,
because the line from which the properties proceed
must be the line of that family and only in favor of that
line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we
have already said, the object is to protect the
patrimony of the legitimate family, following the
precedents of the foral law. And it could not be
otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the
right to succeed the natural child and viceversa, from
which it must be deduced that natural parents neither
have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law
in the article cited established a barrier between the
two families; properties of the legitimate family shall
never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
Sumaya v. IAC
G.R. Nos. 68843-44, September 2, 1991
[upon the death of the reservista]
Facts:
Jose Balantakbo Sr. married Consuelo
Joaquin. They were blessed with seven children
namely Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Jose,
Jr. and Raul.
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different
ascendants two sets of properties. He inherited 1/3
interest over a parcel of land in Liliw Laguna from his
father, Jose Sr. He also inherited a 1/7 interest over
ten parcels of land from his maternal grandmother,
Luisa Bautista.
Raul died intestate, single, without any issue.
He was survived by his mother Consuelo. Consuelo
adjudicated unto herself the subject properties. She
then sold the property which Raul inherited from his
father to Mariquita Sumaya. Sumaya then sold the
property to Villa Honorio Development Corporation,
Inc. Villa Honorio Development Corporation
transferred and assigned its rights over the property in
favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
Consuelo sold the other property to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter then
transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties
to Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
Both certificate of titles covering the subject properties
do not contain any annotation of its reservable
character.
When Consuelo died, Amadeo and his
brothers together with Luisa, Jose and Dolores,
children of their deceased brother Jose Jr., filed a
complaint before the CFI of Laguna to recover the
properties claiming that such were subject to a reserva
troncal in their favor.
The CFI of Laguna ordered Laguna Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative to convey the
properties to Amadeo et al. The Court of Appeals
affirmed said decision.
Issue:
Whether the property in question should be
returned to herein respondents.
Held:
Yes, the property should be returned to the
respondents as it is subject to reserva troncal.
Moreover, herein petitioners cannot be considered as
innocent purchasers for value.
Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo caused the
registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the
estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the
properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose,
Sr., and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista. The said affidavit was, in its form,
declaration and substance, a recording with the
Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the
properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly
stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-
ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who
died leaving properties previously inherited from other
ascendants and which properties were inventoried in
the said affidavit.
However, the Supreme Court did not agree
with the disposition of the appellate court that there is
no need to register the reservable character of the
property, if only for the protection of the reservees,
against innocent third persons. In one of the cases
decided by the Supreme Court, it ruled that the
reservable character of a property may be lost to
innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was
ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character
of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to
reserva troncal.
But herein petitioners cannot be considered
as innocent purchasers for value. This is evidenced by
the affidavit executed by Consuelo and by other proofs
showing that petitioners knew of the reservable
character of the properties.
Carillo v. De Paz
G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966
[prescriptive period]
Facts:
Spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia
owned Lot No. 221 located in Tarlac. They mortgaged
the said property for the sum of P 1,200.00 to spouses
Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva. Said mortgage was
registered. Later on, spouses Magat assigned their
mortgaged rights to Honaria Salak for P 1,632.00 with
the consent of the surviving debtor, Severino.
In 1943, Severino transferred of his
interest in the property to Honaria Salak for P 162.00.
This transaction and assignment of the mortgage
credit were not registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds nor annotated in the title.
An intestate proceedung was instituted for
the settlement of the estate of Severino Salak and
Petra Garcia. The said proceeding included Lot No.
221. Said lot was adjudicated to Ernesto Bautista,
Aurea Sahagun, Rita Sahagun and Francisca Salak.
Francisca Salak then acquired the shares of the other
heirs by virtue of which TCT No. 970 covering Lot No.
221 was issued in her name. Meanwhile, Honaria
Salak died single living as sole heir Agustina de
Guzman.
A lease was executed by Francisca in favor of
Gabino de Leon and Asuncion Reyes covering Lot No.
221. A mortgage was also executed thereon by the
lessees in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation.
Agustina de Guzman then filed an action
against Francisca in the CFI of Tarlac seeking the
reconveyance to Agustina of portion of Lot No. 221.
The lower court dismissed the complaint saying that
the court has no jurisdiction to entertain any collateral
attack in the present action against the proceedings
taken in the probate proceedings covering Lot No. 221.
Issue:
Whether the action had already prescribed.

Held:
No, the action had not yet prescribed. The
lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.
While the Court admits that the sale made by
Severino Salak of his undivided interest in the
property to Honoria Salak, predecessor in interest of
the plaintiff, has not been registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds, nor annotated on the Torrens Title
covering it, such technical deficiency does not render
the transaction ineffective, nor does it convert it into a
mere monetary obligation. But it simply renders the
transaction not binding against a third person
because, being a registered land, the operative act to
bind the land is the act of registration. Said
transaction however is valid and binding between the
parties and can serve as basis to compel the register of
deeds to make the necessary registration. Such being
the case, it is error to say that plaintiff should have
filed her claim in the intestate proceedings of the late
Severino Salak if she wanted to protect her interest in
the land for, the transaction being binding between the
parties, the same can be invoked against them or their
privies. This means that plaintiff can still press her
claim against the heirs of the deceased Severino Salak
who were made parties-defendants in this case. These
heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of this
transaction because they have inherited the property
subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. The fact that Francisca Salak bought the
shares of her co-heirs in said property is of no moment
because in so far as the portion of the land acquired
by Honoria Salak is concerned, Francisca Salak can
recoup what she has parted with from her co-heirs
when the time for read judgment comes. This matter
can be threshed out when the case is decided on the
merits. For the present suffice it to state that the lower
court erred in dismissing the complaint for the reasons
set forth in its order subject of the present appeal.
Computation of Legitime
Pagkatipunan v. IAC
G.R. No. 70722, July 3, 1991
[manner of computation]
Facts:
Jose Velasquez, Sr. was married to Victorina
Real. They had five children. When Victorina died, no
dissolution of conjugal property was made. Jose Sr.
enjoyed full possession, use, usufruct and
administration of the whole conjugal property. Jose Sr.
then married his second wife, Canuta Pagkatipunan
with whom he had 13 children.
Jose Sr. died intestate and was survived by
his second wife Canuta Pagkatipunan and their 13
children and his two children Jose Jr. and Lourdes
from his first marriage. His other three children were
Amelia, Guillermo and Lutgarda. Amelia died without
ant issue. Guillermo was survived by his five children
and Lutgarda was survived by her six children.
Herein private respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioners for accion reinvindicatoria,
annulment of deeds of sale, partition and damages.
`The trial court appointed two sets of commissions
one for the purpose of making an inventory of the
estate of Jose Velasquez, Sr., and the other, to
determine which of the parcels of land listed in such
inventory submitted by the first set of commissioners
belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage
or to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage.
It was found out that after the death of Jose
Sr., Canuta Pagkatipunan acquired full possession of
two parcels of land in Bagumbayan, Laguna among
other properties. The said parcels of land were sold by
Canuta to Spouses Moises Santos and Magdalena. The
spouses later resold the same property to Canuta
Pagkatipunan. During the pendency of this suit, the
subject property was subdivided and assigned by
Canta in favor of her 13 children. The 13 children
caused the issuance of separate free patent titles in
their favor covering the subdivided lots.
Another property, which is the West Avenue
property is a residential lot purchased on installments
by spouses Jose Sr. and Canuta. When Jose Sr. died
Canuta shouldered the payment of the remaining
installment until the property was paid in full. A deed
of absolute sale conveying the house was issued in
favor of Canuta.
The lower court ruled in favor of herein
respondents. It declared the sale of the lots in Laguna
in favor of Moises and Magdalena null and void. The
deeds of assignments executed by Canuta in favor of
her children were also declared null and void. The
house and lot in West Avenue was also ordered to be
divided among Canuta and her children and Jose Sr.s
heirs from his first marriage. The ruling was appealed
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The IAC
affirmed the decision of the trial court with the
modification that the entire house and lot in West
Avenue be divided into two value to Canuta and
the 13 children to the extent of their respective
proportional contributions and the other half value to
the second conjugal partnership of Jose Velasquez, Sr.
and Canuta Pagkatipunan to be partitioned one-fourth
to the wife and the other one-fourth appertaining to
the deceased Jose Sr. to be divided equally among his
heirs.
Issue:
How should legitime be computed?
Held:
It is a basic rule that before any conclusion
about the legal share due to the heirs may be reached,
it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. In the
assailed decision, the respondent court affirmed the
trial court's ruling, that Jose Velasquez, Sr. had
already disposed of and exhausted his corresponding
share in the conjugal partnership owned by him and
Victorina Real, so that his heirs have nothing more to
inherit from him, and that accordingly, whatever
remaining portion of the conjugal property must
necessarily appertain only to the private respondents
as heirs of the deceased Victorina Real. The pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value
of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts and charges, which
shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall
be added the value of all donations by the testator that
are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition.
It is undeniable that numerous donations
inter vivos were made by Jose Velasquez, Sr. in favor of
some of his compulsory heirs.
It appears that there was no determination
whatsoever of the gross value of the conjugal
properties of Jose Velasquez, Sr. and Victorina Real.
Obviously it is impossible to determine the conjugal
share of Jose Velasquez, Sr. from the said property
relationship. Likewise, no collation of the donations he
executed during his lifetime was undertaken by the
trial court. Thus, it would be extremely difficult to
ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on
the heirs' legitime so that the same may be considered
subject to reduction for being inofficious.
Article 909 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be
charged to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be
charged to that part of the estate of which the testator
could have disposed by his last will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may
exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced
according to the rules established by this Code.
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato
Doronio,
G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007
[manner of computation]
Facts:
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante
were the registered owners of a parcel of land in
Pangasinan. They had several children, two of which
were Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio.
In 1919, a private deed of donation propter
nuptias was executed by Simeon and Cornelia in favor
of Marcelino and his wife Veronica Pico. One of the
properties subject of said deed of donation is a
residential lot in Cabalitian. The lot was described in
the deed of donation as bound in the east by
Fortunato Doronio.
However, it appears that the property
described was previously covered by OCT No. 352.
According to the OCT the adjacent lot in the east was
owned by Zacarias and Alejandro Najorda but
according to the deed of donation, the property was
owned by Fortunato Doronio.
The heirs of Marcelino and the heirs of
Fortunato have been occupying the subject land for
several decades. Herein petitioners, the heirs of
Marcelino, contend that they are the owners of the
entire property in view of the private deed of donation
propter nuptias in favor of Marcelino and Veronica. On
the other hand, herein respondents, the heirs of
Fortunato claim that only half of the property was
actually incorporated in the said deed of donation
because it said that Fortunato, instead of Zacarias and
Alejandro, is the owner of the adjacent property at the
eastern side.
The heirs of Marcelino then filed before the
RTC of Pangasinan a petition for the Registration of a
Private Deed of Donation. No respondents were
named in the said petition. During the hearing, no one
interposed an objection. The petition was granted. The
OCT was cancelled and a TCT covering the entire
property was issued in the name of Marcelino and
Veronica.
The heirs of Fortunato then filed a petition for
the reconsideration of the ruling issued by the RTC
ordering the registration of the subject deed of
donation. The petition was dismissed. The heirs of
Fortunato then filed an action for reconveyance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the heirs of Marcelino.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of
Marcelino Doronio. It concluded that the parties
admitted the identity of the land which they all
occupy; that a title once registered under the torrens
system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and
notorious possession or by prescription and that the
deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of
the parents of petitioners is valid.
The case was brought before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the lower court. It ruled that the intention to donate
half of the disputed property to appellees predecessors
can be gleaned from the disparity of technical
descriptions appearing in the title. It likewise ruled
that the donation of the entire property in favor of
petitioners predecessors is invalid on the ground that
it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor,
Fortunato Doronio.
Issue:
Whether the legitime of Fortunato Doronio
was impaired.
Held:
No, the legitime of Fortunato was not
impaired.
Before any conclusion about the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the
time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate
thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir
or heirs can be established; and only then can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes.