G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991 On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable presenting his evidence.
easonable presenting his evidence. The following documents
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as
Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE
CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA.
MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the local executive to protect the community
from pollution is the center of this controversy.
The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals as follows:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged
in the manufacture and export of charcoal
briquette, received a letter dated February 16,
1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo
N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the petitioner's plant located at
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr.
Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of
the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a)
Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-
Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources
Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
At the requested conference on February 20,
1989, petitioner, through its representative,
undertook to comply with respondent's request for
the production of the required documents. In
compliance with said undertaking, petitioner
commenced to secure "Region III-Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-
Pollution Permit," although among the permits
previously secured prior to the operation of
petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to
Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the
then National Pollution Control Commission (now
Environmental Management Bureau) and is now
at a stage where the Environmental Management
Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of
anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of
petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack
of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure the same but were
not entertained.
notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor
ordered the Municipality's station commander to
padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injunction against private respondent
with the court a quo which is presided by the
respondent judge. In its prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it
alleged therein that the closure order was issued
in grave abuse of discretion.
During the hearing of the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April
14, 1989, herein parties adduced their respective
evidences. The respondent judge, April 19, 1989,
found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
hence, it ordered as follows:
In view of the foregoing, upon
petitioner's posting of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 to answer for
such damages that respondents may
sustain should petitioner eventually be
found not entitled to the injunctive relief
hereby issued, let a PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION issue
ordering the respondent Hon. Pablo N.
Cruz, and other person acting in his
behalf and stead to immediately revoke
his closure order dated April 6, 1989,
and allow petitioner to resume its normal
business operations until after the
instant case shall have been
adjudicated on the merits without
prejudice to the inherent power of the
court to alter, modify or even revoke this
order at any given time.
SO ORDERED.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
issued on April 28, 1989, upon petitioner's posting
a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed his motion for
reconsideration dated May 3, 1989. Said motion
for reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989.
Petitioner's counsel failed to appear and the
hearing proceeded with the Provincial Prosecutor
were submitted:
a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the
Technology Developers Inc., prepared by one
Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and
recommendation read:
Due to the manufacturing process and
nature of raw materials used, the fumes
coming from the factory may contain
particulate matters which are hazardous
to the health of the people. As such, the
company should cease operating until
such a time that the proper air pollution
device is installed and operational.
b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of
coupon bond containing signatures of residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon.
Roberto Pagdanganan Governor of the Province
of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988,
complaining about the smoke coming out of the
chimney of the company while in operation.
Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower
court, on June 14, 1989, issued an order (a)
setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, which
granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, and (b) dissolving the writ consequently
issued.
A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989
was filed by petitioner. Said motion drew an
opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private
respondent.
Resolving the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the respondent judge issued an
order dated August 9, 1989, denying said motion
for reconsideration.1
Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction was filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul and set aside (a) the order issued by the
trial court on June 14, 1989, setting aside the order dated
April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of August 9, 1989, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of June
14, 1989. In due course the petition was denied for lack of
merit by the appellate court in a decision dated January 26,
1990. 2 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by
petitioner was denied on August 10, 1990.
Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this
Court. Six errors are alleged to have been committed by the
appellate court which may be synthesized into the singular
issue of whether or not the appellate court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in rendering its question decision
and resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial
discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in
grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court
that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve
the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate
against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is
true that the matter of determining whether there is
a pollution of the environment that requires control
if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National
Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of
Human Settlements, now the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virture of his police power, he
may deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emissions in the operation of
the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16,
1989, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose
offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders and it was required to
bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against
Environment and Natural Resources petitioner.
Anti-Pollution permit. 3
SO ORDERED.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response
to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels.4 The
alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in
the four-page petition were written by one
person, 5 appears to be true in some instances,
(particularly as among members of the same
family), but on the whole the many signatures
appear to be written by different persons. The
certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that
he has not received any complaint on the
matter 6 must be because the complaint was sent
directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was
issued only after an investigation was made by
Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8,
1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant
of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has
been installed.7
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit
from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead
presented a building permit issued by an official of
Makati on March 6,1987.8
6. While petitioner was able to present a
temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15,
1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,
1988.9 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to
extend or validate its permit much less to install
any device to control the pollution and prevent any
hazard to the health of the residents of the
community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellate
court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its
huge investment in this dollar-earning industry.1wphi1 It
must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to
promote investment and contribute to the growth of the
economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the
health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious
effect of the pollution of the environment.
G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011 Visitacion took over the store when her mother died provided that a new contract is executed granting to us the
sometime in 1984.9 From then on up to January 1993, same space or lot and the same area. I believe that our
Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits.10 proposal is most reasonable and fair under the
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,
circumstance. If you are not amenable to the said proposal, I
vs.
concur with the position taken by the Council for you to file
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of
the appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to enable
VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents. Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for inspection on 15
our court to finally thresh out our differences.141avvphi1
May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer
Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and
G.R. No. 159059
Highways,11 Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying
REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T. Nagcarlan. within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court
COMENDADOR,Petitioner, action will be filed against her.
vs.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C.
until 15 October 1993. On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
BOMBASI, Respondents.
Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from
DECISION Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the
Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store
Resolution reads:
within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were
PEREZ, J.: copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 15613dated 30
August 1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang
1 2 Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna. IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg.
At bench are appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the
Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na
T. Comendador3 (Mayor Comendador) and Paulino S. Asilo, The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:
pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.15
Jr.4 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved
accused Alberto S. Angeles;5 (3) ordering the defendants On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S.
to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to enforce and
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter16 to Visitacion informing
order the Coronados to demolish the building constructed
and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now her of the impending demolition of her store the next day.
on the space previously rented to them in order to give way
respondents Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo,
for the construction of a new municipal market building.
Bombasi damages; and (4) dismissing the cases against the alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in
spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza6 and Benita and Isagani the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions did not
Coronado.7 RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an
Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further
Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate
The factual antecedents of the case are: administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against
incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if
the Coronados continuously resists the order. Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part
On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions late in the demolition.
mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado)
On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to
and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by
Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the lease contract was On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the
the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and
still existing and legally binding; (2) she was willing to vacate
into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and
the store as long as same place and area would be given to
use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a
her in the new public market; and (3) in case her proposals Angeles supervising the work.
store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez
are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the latter to
Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the
just file an unlawful detainer case against her pursuant to
respondents mother for a period of twenty (20) years Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156. Pertinent portions
beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished property
of the letter read:
for another 20 years.8 as amounting to P437,900.0018

x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband
Council and the opinion rendered by the Laguna Asst.
could build a firewall on her rented property which must be at Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional
Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered view, however,
least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case19 for
arrived at after consultation with my legal counsel, that our
public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality
existing lease contract is still legally binding and in full force
rights. of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador,
and effect. Lest I appear to be defiant, let me reiterate to you
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint
and the council that we are willing to vacate the said building
was soon after amended to include the Spouses Benita and
Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as
formal defendants because they were then the occupants of
the contested area.
The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant
Municipality and defendant Municipal Mayor from
leasing the premises subject of lease Annex "A"
hereof, part of which is now occupied by PNP
Outpost and by the Municipal Collectors Office,
and the equivalent adjacent area thereof, and to
cause the removal of said stalls;
2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the
equivalent corner area of the leased areas being
now assigned to other persons by defendants
Municipality and/or by defendant Municipal Mayor,
and to allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls
thereon;
3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;
4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the following
(a) P437,900.00 for loss of
building/store and other items therein;
(b) P200,000.00 for exemplary
damages;
(c) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) P30,.00 for attorneys fees
and P700.00 for every attendance of
counsel in court.
5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as
justice and equity may warrant in the premises.20
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal
complaint21 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before
the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an
Information22 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles
was filed, which reads:
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers,
accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal
Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the
Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles
being then the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in
the performance and taking advantage of their official
functions, conspiring and confederating with each other, and
with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, criminally cause the demolition of a public market
stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one
Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable
ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter in
the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN
THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (P437,900.00).
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their
separate pleas of "Not Guilty."
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-
4064 (94)23 with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before
the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree
No. 1606, which pertinently reads:
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts,
the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately
but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may
be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal
action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned.24
During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on
16 November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles
filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On 22 September
1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan issued an
Order25 DISMISSING the case against Angeles. The
germane portion of the Order reads:
In view of the submission of the death certificate of
accused/defendant Alberto S. Angeles, and there being no
objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor, cases against
deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby
DISMISSED.
The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September
2002. As a result, the counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3
March 2003 a Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan
informing the court of the fact of Mayor Comendadors death.
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused
Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of
Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months
imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as
maximum.
the cases against the accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died
on November 16, 1997 is hereby reiterated.
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino
S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the destruction
of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for
exemplary damages is denied as the court found no
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.
In view of this courts finding that the defendant spouses
Alida and Teddy Coroza are lawful occupants of the subject
market stalls from which they cannot be validly ejected
without just cause, the complaint against them is dismissed.
The complaint against defendant spouses Benita and
Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it appearing that
they are similarly situated as the spouses Coroza.
Meanwhile, plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to
accept market space being given to her by the municipality,
subject to her payment of the appropriate rental and permit
fees.
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having
become moot and academic.
The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is
likewise denied for lack of merit.26
Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration27 of the Decision alleging that
there was only an error of judgment when he complied with
and implemented the order of his superior, Mayor
Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no liability
when a public officer commits in good faith an error of
judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution28 dated 21
July 2003 denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that good faith cannot be argued to support his
cause in the face of the courts finding that bad faith
attended the commission of the offense charged. The Court
further explained that the invocation of compliance with an
order of a superior is of no moment for the "demolition
[order] cannot be described as having the semblance of
legality inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and
therefore the same was patently illegal."29
The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for
Reconsideration30 on 12 May 2003 alleging that the death of
the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and
civil liability. The Sandiganbayan on its Resolution31 granted
the Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability is
concerned and denied the extinction of the civil liability
holding that the civil action is an independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.32
Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction
under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act," the public officer must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
negligence. He also contended that he and his co-accused
acted in good faith in the demolition of the market and,
thereby, no liability was incurred.
On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death
of Mayor Comendador prior to the promulgation of the
decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor Comendadors
criminal liability but also his civil liability. She also asserted
good faith on the part of the accused public officials when
they performed the demolition of the market stall. Lastly, she
contended that assuming arguendo that there was indeed
liability on the part of the accused public officials, the actual
amount of damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi
has no basis and was not duly substantiated.
Liability of the accused public officials
under Republic Act No. 3019
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions throughmanifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the
accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties
or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused
undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other
party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faithor gross inexcusable
negligence.33
We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and
civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor
Comendador as here represented by his widow Victoria
Bueta.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that
the first two requisites of the criminal offense were present at
the time of the commission of the complained acts and that,
as to the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of
evidence to establish that there was an undue injury suffered
on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public
officials concerned acted with evident bad faith when they
performed the demolition of the market stall.
Causing undue injury to any party, including the government,
could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence.34
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as
"actual." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary,
not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage
done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or
property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected
interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these
definitions, is akin to that in civil law.35
It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador as
accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage
caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition.
We affirm the finding that:
xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out
without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order
which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was
done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was
attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2)
resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to
demolish plaintiffs store.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will.36 [It] contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.37
It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public
officials committed bad faith in performing the demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that
respondents structure is a public nuisance. The abatement
of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is
nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance
at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of
location and surroundings.39 In this case, the market stall
cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as
found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected
by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising
Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District
Engineer Office.40 To quote:
An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial
establishment) cited above and found out the following:
1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is
attached.
2. It is located within the market site.
3. The building has not been affected by the
recent fire.
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs
of being exposed to fire.41
Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough
to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor law,42the present
Local Government Code43 does not expressly provide for the
abatement of nuisance.44 And even assuming that the power
to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the
accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still
devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at
the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador
was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case
of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building
using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without
legal order in this case was not among those provided by the
resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision.
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as
represented by the then Mayor Comendador, was placed in
estoppel after it granted yearly business permits45 in favor of
the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code
provides that, through estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon. The representation made by the
municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right to
continuously operate its store binds the municipality. It is
utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the benefits of
the store operation and later on claim the illegality of the
business.
The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of
the criminal offense of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. The same bad faith serves as the source of the
civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.
It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November
1997, a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his
counsel with no objection on the part of the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and issued an
Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the
other hand, when Mayor Comendador died and an adverse
decision was rendered against him which resulted in the
filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor
Comendadors counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion
specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise from
delict, hence, survived the death of the accused. The
Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the prosecution
which disposition was not appealed.
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor
Comendador during the pendency of the case extinguished
their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability
of Mayor Comendador survived his death; and that of
Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been for the
fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death
extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed
into finality.
46
We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)
Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an
action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action47 and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil
Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.48
The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human
Relations, were cited by the prosecution to substantiate its
argument that the civil action based therein is an
independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the
accused during the pendency of the case.
On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8249, in support of its argument that the civil action was
dependent upon the criminal action, thus, was extinguished
upon the death of the accused. The law provides that:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such
action shall be recognized. (Emphasis ours)
We agree with the prosecution.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the
case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same
arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this
case, the civil liability is based on another source of
obligation, the law on human relations.49 The pertinent
articles follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
xxxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not
the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
As held in Aberca v. Ver:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision
[Art. 32 of the New Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to
violate those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.50
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the
applicability of the law on human relations. First, the
complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the
information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for
damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor
Comendadors violation of plaintiffs right to due process.
Thus:
xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in
question, the individual natural defendants did not only act
with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which
belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done
with malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the
property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
xxxx
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a
violation of the right to private property of the Spouses
Bombasi. The accused public officials should have accorded
the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the
Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan
Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already
shown, justify demolition of the store without court order.
This Court in a number of decisions51 held that even if there
is already a writ of execution, there must still be a need for a
special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the
court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or
remove improvements over the contested property.52 The
pertinent provisions are the following:
Before the removal of an improvement must take place,
there must be a special order, hearing and reasonable notice
to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy,
demolish or remove said improvements except upon special
order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment
obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If
demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the
motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the
issuance of a special order of demolition.53
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case
has successfully been litigated, underscores the
independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no
case was even filed by the municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on
the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon
arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an
otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision
of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.54
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based
on due process violations was filed even ahead of the
criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the
deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his
widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition
that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above
captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in
Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not
applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it
maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal
cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously
based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which
deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."
We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded
to the Spouses Bombasi.
To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove
the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable.55 In this case, the Court finds that the
only evidence presented to prove the actual damages
incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost
items56 prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer
commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the
costs.
As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport
Corporation v. People of the Philippines,57
x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that
respondents failed to prove that the damages to the terrace
caused by the incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only
evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages
claimed by private respondent were the summary
computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr.
amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent
for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works,
masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents failed
to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page
decision, the trial court awardedP150,000.00 as actual
damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual
basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared
in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum
of P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by
plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court, for
its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount
of P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the
appellate court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they
contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely
demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of
the damages sustained as a result of the accident.
Consequently, appellants continue, the award
of P150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-
appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable
amount.
Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the amount
claimed by the respondent-claimants witness as to the
actual amount of damages "should be admitted with extreme
caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it
should be supported by independent evidence." The Court
further said that whatever claim the respondent witness
would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his
particular self-interest.59 There must still be a need for the
examination of the documentary evidence presented by the
claimants to support its claim with regard to the actual
amount of damages.
The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented
as an exhibit60 partakes of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the person who issued them was not
presented as a witness.61 Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based
on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness
stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule.62 Further, exhibits do not fall under any of the
exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual
damages claimed, this Court grants temperate damages
for P200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by the Spouses
Bombasi. Temperate damages are awarded in accordance
with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty.
The amount of temperate or moderated damages is usually
left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be
reasonable, bearing in mind that the temperate damages
should be more than nominal but less than
compensatory.63 Without a doubt, the Spouses Bombasi
suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the impairment of
their store. Based on the record of the case, 64 the
demolished store was housed on a two-story building
located at the markets commercial area and its concrete
walls remained strong and not affected by the fire. However,
due to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the exact
amount of damage in accordance with the Rules of
Evidence,65 this court finds that P200,000.00 is the amount
just and reasonable under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly,

the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court
affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.
and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the
dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto
S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In view of the
death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial, his criminal
liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T.
Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De
Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the
Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in the amount
of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00.

Costs against the petitioners-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131512 January 20, 2000
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE [LTO], represented
by Assistant Secretary Manuel F. Bruan, LTO Regional
Office, Region X represented by its Regional Director,
Timoteo A. Garcia; and LTO Butuan represented by
Rosita G. Sadiaga, its Registrar, petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, represented in this case by
Democrito D. Plaza II, City Mayor, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution enunciates the policy that the
territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.1 In obedience to that mandate of the fundamental
law, Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code,2 expresses that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy in order to enable them to attain
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals, and that it is a basic aim of the State to
provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
While the Constitution seeks to strengthen local units and
ensure their viability, clearly, however, it has never been the
intention of that organic law to create an imperuim in
imperio and install an infra sovereign political subdivision
independent of a single sovereign state.
The Court is asked in this instance to resolve the issue of
whether under the present set up the power of the Land
Registration Office ("LTO") to register, tricycles in particular,
as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has
likewise devolved to local government units.
The Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City held3 that
the authority to register tricycles, the grant of the
corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers'
license, and the collection of fees therefor had all been
vested in the Local Government Units ("LGUs"). Accordingly,
it decreed the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction
against LTO, prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its
employees and other persons acting in its behalf, from (a)
registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses to drivers of
tricycles. The Court of Appeals, on appeal to it, sustained the
trial court.1wphi1.nt
The adverse rulings of both the court a quo and the
appellate court prompted the LTO to file the instant petition
for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the
decision,4 dated 17 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise
affirming the permanent injunctive writ order of the Regional fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees
Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City. for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance
of a permit for the driving thereof.
Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the salient
provisions introduced by the Local Government Code is in Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the
the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to collect national government that, indeed, has been transferred to
registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the local government units is the franchising authority over
corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and
the driving of tricycles. Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the
authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to
qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.
The 1987 Constitution provides:
In order to settle the variant positions of the parties, the City
Each local government unit shall have the power
of Butuan, represented by its City Mayor Democrito D.
to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
Plaza, filed on 28 June 1994 with the trial court a petition for
taxes, fees, and charges subject to such
"prohibition, mandamus, injunction with a prayer for
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
preliminary restraining order ex-parte" seeking the
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
declaration of the validity of SP Ordinance No. 962-93 and
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
the prohibition of the registration of tricycles-for-hire and the
accrue exclusively to the local governments.5
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof by the LTO.
Sec. 129 and Section 133 of the Local
LTO opposed the prayer in the petition.
Government Code read:
On 20 March 1995, the trial court rendered a resolution; the
Sec. 129. Power to Create Sources or Revenue.
dispositive portion read:
Each local government unit shall exercise its
power to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to the In view of the foregoing, let a permanent injunctive
provisions herein, consistent with the basic policy writ be issued against the respondent Land
of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges Transportation Office and the other respondents,
shall accrue exclusively to the local government prohibiting and enjoining them, their employees,
units. officers, attorney's or other persons acting in their
behalf from forcing or compelling Tricycles to be
registered with, and drivers to secure their
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing
licenses from respondent LTO or secure franchise
Powers of Local Government Units. Unless
from LTFRB and from collecting fees thereon. It
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the
should be understood that the registration,
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities,
franchise of tricycles and driver's license/permit
and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
granted or issued by the City of Butuan are valid
following:
only within the territorial limits of Butuan City.
xxx xxx xxx
No pronouncement as to costs.6
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of
Petitioners timely moved for a reconsideration of the above
motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of
resolution but it was to no avail. Petitioners then appealed to
licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except
the Court of Appeals. In its now assailed decision, the
tricycles.
appellate court, on 17 November 1997, sustained the trial
court. It ruled:
Relying on the foregoing provisions of the law, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP") of Butuan, on 16 August
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
1992, passed SP Ordinance No. 916-92 entitled "An
and the questioned permanent injunctive writ
Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire,
issued by the court a quo dated March 20, 1995
providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise,
AFFIRMED.7
Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties for
Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance
Coming up to this Court, petitioners raise this sole
assignment of error, to wit:
The Court of Appeals [has] erred in sustaining the
validity of the writ of injunction issued by the trial
court which enjoined LTO from (1) registering
tricycles-for-hire and (2) issuing licenses for the
driving thereof since the Local Government Code
devolved only the franchising authority of the
LTFRB. Functions of the LTO were not devolved
to the LGU's.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Department of Transportation and
Communications9 ("DOTC"), through the LTO and the
LTFRB, has since been tasked with implementing laws
pertaining to land transportation. The LTO is a line agency
under the DOTC whose powers and functions, pursuant to
Article III, Section 4 (d) [1],10 of R.A. No. 4136, otherwise
known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as
amended, deal primarily with the registration of all motor
vehicles and the licensing of drivers thereof. The LTFRB,
upon the other hand, is the governing body tasked by E.O.
No. 202, dated 19 June 1987, to regulate the operation of
public utility or "for hire" vehicles and to grant franchises or
certificates of public convenience ("CPC").11 Finely put,
registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO
while franchising and regulatory responsibilities had been
vested in the LTFRB.
Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the
DOTC were transferred to the LGUs, thusly:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this
Code, enact ordinances granting franchises and
authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses,
upon such conditions and for such purposes
intended to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the city and pursuant to this
legislative authority shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(VI) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the
Department of Transportation and
Communications,regulate the operation of tricycles
and grant franchises for the operation thereof
within the territorial jurisdiction of the city. 40 KPH. However, the SB/SP may
(Emphasis supplied). provide exceptions if there is no
alternative route.
LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the
operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the 2. Zones must be within the boundaries
operation thereof. "To regulate" means to fix, establish, or of the municipality/city. However,
control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to existing zones within more than one
direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing municipality/city shall be maintained,
principles or laws.12 A franchise is defined to be a special provided that operators serving said
privilege to do certain things conferred by government on an zone shall secure MTOP's from each of
individual or corporation, and which does not belong to the municipalities/cities having
citizens generally of common right.13 On the other hand, "to jurisdiction over the areas covered by
register" means to record formally and exactly, to enroll, or to the zone.
enter precisely in a list or the like,14 and a "driver's license" is
the certificate or license issued by the government which
3. A common color for tricycles-for-hire
authorizes a person to operate a motor vehicle.15 The
operating in the same zone may be
devolution of the functions of the DOTC, performed by the
imposed. Each unit shall be assigned
LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the Solicitor
and bear an identification number, aside
General, is aimed at curbing the alarming increase of
from its LTO license plate number.
accidents in national highways involving tricycles. It has
been the perception that local governments are in good
position to achieve the end desired by the law-making body 4. An operator wishing to stop service
because of their proximity to the situation that can enable completely, or to suspend service for
them to address that serious concern better than the national more than one month, should report in
government. writing such termination or suspension
to the SB/SP which originally granted
the MTOP prior thereto. Transfer to
It may not be amiss to state, nevertheless, that under Article
another zone may be permitted upon
458 (a)[3-VI] of the Local Government Code, the power of
application.
LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant
franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the
guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. In compliance therewith, 5. The MTOP shall be valid for three (3)
the Department of Transportation and Communications years, renewable for the same period.
("DOTC") issued "Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of Transfer to another zone, change of
LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to ownership of unit or transfer of MTOP
Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government shall be construed as an amendment to
Code." Pertinent provisions of the guidelines state: an MTOP and shall require appropriate
approval of the SB/SP.
In lieu of the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) in the DOTC, the 6. Operators shall employ only drivers
Sangguniang Bayan/Sangguniang Panglungsod duly licensed by LTO for tricycles-for-
(SB/SP) shall perform the following: hire.
(a) Issue, amend, revise, renew, 7. No tricycle-for-hire shall be allowed to
suspend, or cancel MTOP and prescribe carry more passengers and/or goods
the appropriate terms and conditions than it is designed for.
therefor;
8. A tricycle-for-hire shall be allowed to
xxx xxx xxx operate like a taxi service, i.e., service is
rendered upon demand and without a
fixed route within a zone.16
Operating Conditions:
Such as can be gleaned from the explicit language of the
1. For safety reasons, no tricycles
statute, as well as the corresponding guidelines issued by
should operate on national highways
DOTC, the newly delegated powers pertain to the
utilized by 4 wheel vehicles greater than
franchising and regulatory powers theretofore exercised by
4 tons and where normal speed exceed
the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the
registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for
the driving thereof. Clearly unaffected by the Local
Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.
4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles
"used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the
country. Thus
Sec. 5. All motor vehicles and other vehicles must
be registered. (a) No motor vehicle shall be
used or operated on or upon any public highway of
the Philippines unless the same is properly
registered for the current year in accordance with
the provisions of this Act (Article 1, Chapter II,
R.A. No. 4136).
The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his
deputies are empowered at anytime to examine
and inspect such motor vehicles to determine
whether said vehicles are registered, or are
unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped,
or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of
possible excessive damage to highways, bridges
and other infrastructures.17 The LTO is additionally
charged with being the central repository and
custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.18
The Court shares the apprehension of the Solicitor
General if the above functions were to likewise
devolve to local government units; he states:
If the tricycle registration function of
respondent LTO is decentralized, the
incidence of theft of tricycles will most
certainly go up, and stolen tricycles
registered in one local government
could be registered in another with
ease. The determination of ownership
thereof will also become very difficult.
Fake driver's licenses will likewise
proliferate. This likely scenario unfolds
where a tricycle driver, not qualified by
petitioner LTO's testing, could secure a
license from one municipality, and when
the same is confiscated, could just go
another municipality to secure another
license.
Devolution will entail the hiring of
additional personnel charged with
inspecting tricycles for road worthiness,
testing drivers, and documentation.
Revenues raised from tricycle
registration may not be enough to meet
salaries of additional personnel and
incidental costs for tools and
equipment.19
The reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing
power of local government units, specifically under Section
133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential. Police
power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent
powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local
government units by delegation given under a constitutional
or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public
purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just
about end there. The basic aim of police power is public
good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses an the
power of government to raise revenue in order to support its
existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although
correlative to each other in many respects, the grant of one
does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The
two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and
distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts,
character, scopes and limitations. To construe the tax
provisions of Section 133(1) indistinctively would result in the
repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which
evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law
could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of
the Local Government Code in the same manner that the
specific devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of
tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not
favored.20 The power over tricycles granted under Section
458(8)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the
power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for
the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in
the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government
Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing
the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all
motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving
thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially
regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power
of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road
safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R.A.
4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be
construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the
extant body of laws.21
The Court cannot end this decision without expressing its
own serious concern over the seeming laxity in the grant of
franchises for the operation of tricycles-for-hire and in
allowing the indiscriminate use by such vehicles on public
highways and principal thoroughfares. Senator Aquilino C.
Pimentel, Jr., the principal author and sponsor of the bill that
eventually has become to be known as the Local
Government Code, has aptly remarked:
Tricycles are a popular means of transportation,
specially in the countryside. They are,
unfortunately, being allowed to drive along
highways and principal thoroughfares where they
pose hazards to their passengers arising from
potential collisions with buses, cars and jeepneys.
The operation of tricycles within a municipality
may be regulated by the Sangguniang Bayan. In
this connection, the Sangguniang concerned
would do well to consider prohibiting the operation
of tricycles along or across highways invite
collisions with faster and bigger vehicles and
impede the flow of traffic.22
The need for ensuring public safety and
convenience to commuters and pedestrians alike
is paramount. It might be well, indeed, for public
officials concerned to pay heed to a number of
provisions in our laws that can warrant in
appropriate cases an incurrence of criminal and
civil liabilities. Thus
The Revised Penal Code
Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and
tolerance. The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period and suspension shall be
imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the
law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office,
shall maliciously refrain from instituting
prosecution for the punishment of violators of the
law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.
The Civil Code
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee refuses
or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.1wphi1.nt
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life
or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of
any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
 condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.

The Local Government Code

Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. Local

government units and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision which enjoins the Land

Transportation Office from requiring the due registration of
tricycles and a license for the driving thereof is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncements on costs.

Let copies of this decision be likewise furnished the

Department of Interior and Local Governments, the
Department of Public Works and Highways and the
Department of Transportation and Communication.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP
Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic
Command, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, METRO MANILA,
PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR
SERVICE,respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of
preliminary injunction applied for by respondents Municipality
of Paraaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service
(Palanyag for brevity) against petitioner herein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed
Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the
closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia
Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea
market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the
municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city
and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within
Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending
areas, under certain terms and conditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority
approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council
of respondent municipality subject to the following
conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not
used for vehicular traffic, and that the
majority of the residents do not oppose
the establishment of the flea
market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be
used as flea market/vending area shall
be marked distinctly, and that the 2
meters on both sides of the road shall
be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the
vending area is to be used shall be
clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas
shall be temporary and shall be closed
once the reclaimed areas are developed
and donated by the Public Estate
Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque
issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N.
Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for
the establishment, operation, maintenance and management
of flea markets and/or vending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent
Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the
flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation
to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by
respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano,
PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G.
Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later
returned to respondent Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano
wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten
(10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the
market stalls shall be dismantled.
Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and
Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for
prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-
order of October 16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion
for writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order
upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the
Municipality' of Paraaque and enjoining petitioner Brig.
Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against
respondent Palanyag.
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office
of the Solicitor General alleging grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial judge in issuing the assailed order.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of
Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that
municipal roads are used for public service and are therefore
public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to
private appropriation or private contract by any person, even
by the respondent Municipality of Paraaque. Petitioner
submits that a property already dedicated to public use
cannot be used for another public purpose and that absent a
clear showing that the Municipality of Paraaque has been
granted by the legislature specific authority to convert a
property already in public use to another public use,
respondent municipality is, therefore, bereft of any authority
to close municipal roads for the establishment of a flea
market. Petitioner also submits that assuming that the
respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, it
failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of the
ordinance providing for the establishment of flea markets on
public streets. Lastly, petitioner contends that by allowing the
municipal streets to be used by market vendors the
municipal council of respondent municipality violated its duty
under the Local Government Code to promote the general
welfare of the residents of the municipality.
In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial
court ruled:
. . . that Chanter II Section 10 of the
Local Government Code is a statutory
grant of power given to local
government units, the Municipality of
Paraaque as such, is empowered
under that law to close its roads, streets
or alley subject to limitations stated
therein (i.e., that it is in accordance with
existing laws and the provisions of this
code).
xxx xxx xxx
The actuation of the respondent Brig.
Gen. Levi Macasiano, though apparently
within its power is in fact an
encroachment of power legally vested to
the municipality, precisely because
when the municipality enacted the
 ordinance in question the authority of
the respondent as Police
Superintendent ceases to be operative
on the ground that the streets covered
by the ordinance ceases to be a public
thoroughfare. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of
whether the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the
flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to
examine the laws in force during the time the said ordinance
was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as Local Government Code, in connection with
established principles embodied in the Civil Code an
property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided
into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art.
423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public
use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the
provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city
streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special
laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for
public service and are therefore considered public properties
of respondent municipality. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress
(Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L-
24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local
governments have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority
is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this
authority given by Congress to the local governments is the
power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of
the Local Government Code, which states:
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local
government unit may likewise, through
its head acting pursuant to a resolution
of its sangguniang and in accordance
with existing law and the provisions of
this Code, close any barangay,
municipal, city or provincial road, street,
alley, park or square. No such way or
place or any part of thereof shall be
close without indemnifying any person
prejudiced thereby. A property thus
withdrawn from public use may be used
or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed. (Emphasis ours).
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives
authority to local government units to close roads and other
similar public places should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law.
These basic principles have the effect of limiting such
authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public
street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays
down the basic principle that properties of public dominion
devoted to public use and made available to the public in
general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which
should be complied with before closing a road, street or
park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use
when circumstances show that such property is no longer
intended or necessary for public use or public service. When
it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al.
v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66
SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent municipality
can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the local unit concerned might be
lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last
sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as
Local Government Code. In one case, the City Council of
Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal road of M.
Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road,
the same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Thereafter, the City Council passes another resolution
authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road through
public bidding. We held therein that the City of Cebu is
empowered to close a city street and to vacate or withdraw
the same from public use. Such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles,
et al., G.R. No.
L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those
roads and streets which are available to the public in general
and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered
public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose or to
dispose of or lease it to private persons. This limitation on
the authority of the local government over public properties
has been discussed and settled by this Court en banc in
"Francisco V. Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio,
Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654, May 6, 1992." This
Court ruled:
There is no doubt that the disputed
areas from which the private
respondents' market stalls are sought to
be evicted are public streets, as found
by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-
12921. A public street is property for
public use hence outside the commerce
of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code).
Being outside the commerce of man, it
may not be the subject of lease or
others contract (Villanueva, et al. v.
Castaeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142
citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas,
30 SCRA 602; Espiritu v. Municipal
Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869;
And Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G.
4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the City
Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been
leasing portions of the streets to them.
Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The right
of the public to use the city streets may
not be bargained away through contract.
The interests of a few should not prevail
over the good of the greater number in
the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare,
the respondent city officials are under
legal obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by acting
Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area
for stallholders who were granted
licenses by the city government
contravenes the general law that
reserves city streets and roads for public
use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order
may not infringe upon the vested right of
the public to use city streets for the
purpose they were intended to
serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for
vehicles and pedestrians.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent
municipality has the authority to pass the disputed
ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because
it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality
of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of
the ordinance, to wit:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not
used for vehicular traffic, and that the
majority of the residents do(es) not
oppose the establishment of the flea
market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be
used as flea market/vending area shall
be marked distinctly, and that the 2
meters on both sides of the road shall
be used by pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the
vending area is to be used shall be
clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas
shall be temporary and shall be closed
once the reclaimed areas are developed
and donated by the Public Estate
Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof
that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent
to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations of
respondent municipality that the closed streets were not
used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the
residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market
on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will
show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the
designation by respondents of a time schedule during which
the flea market shall operate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran
area are congested with people, houses and traffic brought
about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets.
To license and allow the establishment of a flea market
along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension
and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the
problem of congestion. We take note of the other
observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many instances of
emergencies and fires where
ambulances and fire engines, instead of
using the roads for a more direct access
to the fire area, have to maneuver and
look for other streets which are not
occupied by stalls and vendors thereby
losing valuable time which could,
otherwise, have been spent in saving The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an
properties and lives. ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and
authority in laws applicable during its time. However, at this
point, We find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the
337, known as Local Government Lode, has already been
St. Rita Hospital. However, its
repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local
ambulances and the people rushing
Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1,
their patients to the hospital cannot pass
1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and
through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls
obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code
and the vendors. One can only imagine
and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation
the tragedy of losing a life just because
involving a local government unit shall be governed by the
of a few seconds delay brought about by
original terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law
the inaccessibility of the streets leading
in force at the time such rights were vested.
to the hospital.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision
The children, too, suffer. In view of the
of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated December 17,
occupancy of the roads by stalls and
1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction
vendors, normal transportation flow is
enjoining petitioner as PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan
disrupted and school children have to
Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market
get off at a distance still far from their
stalls along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia
schools and walk, rain or shine.
Extension and Opena streets is hereby RESERVED and
SET ASIDE.
Indeed one can only imagine the
garbage and litter left by vendors on the
SO ORDERED.
streets at the end of the day. Needless
to say, these cause further pollution,
sickness and deterioration of health of
the residents therein. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings
and observations of petitioners. Instead, respondents want
this Court to focus its attention solely on the argument that
the use of public spaces for the establishment of a flea
market is well within the powers granted by law to a local
government which should not be interfered with by the
courts.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not
absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe
Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover,
the exercise of such powers should be subservient to
paramount considerations of health and well-being of the
members of the community. Every local government unit has
the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the
public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and
order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants
of the local units. Based on this objective, the local
government should refrain from acting towards that which
might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general
public have a legal right to demand the demolition of the
illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the
officials of respondent municipality have the corresponding
duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and
restore them to their specific public purpose.

G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and
NELSON ALCANTARA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and
SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
For the Courts consideration in this Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition is the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 20111 which provides a P21 Billion budget
allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program
(CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare &
Development (DSWD). Petitioners seek to enjoin
respondents Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa and
DSWD Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman from
implementing the said program on the ground that it
amounts to a "recentralization" of government functions that
have already been devolved from the national government to
the local government units.
The Facts
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction
strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries.2 Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it was pre-
pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in
Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of Lopez Jaena and
Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the
cities of Pasay and Caloocan3 upon the release of the
amount of P50 Million Pesos under a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget
and Management.4
On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order
No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O. No. 16, s. 2008),5 setting the
implementing guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid
Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps), upon the following stated
objectives, to wit:
1. To improve preventive health care of pregnant
women and young children
2. To increase enrollment/attendance of children
at elementary level
3. To reduce incidence of child labor
4. To raise consumption of poor households on
nutrient dense foods
5. To encourage parents to invest in their
children's (and their own) future
6. To encourage parent's participation in the
growth and development of young children, as well
as involvement in the community.6
This government intervention scheme, also conveniently
referred to as CCTP, "provides cash grant to extreme poor
households to allow the members of the families to meet
certain human development goals."7
Eligible households that are selected from priority target
areas consisting of the poorest provinces classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board (NCSB)8 are granted
a health assistance of P500.00/month, or P6,000.00/year,
and an educational assistance of P300.00/month for 10
months, or a total of P3,000.00/year, for each child but up to
a maximum of three children per family.9 Thus, after an
assessment on the appropriate assistance package, a
household beneficiary could receive from the government an
annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of
P15,000.00, under the following conditionalities:
a) Pregnant women must get pre natal care
starting from the 1st trimester, child birth is
attended by skilled/trained professional, get post
natal care thereafter
b) Parents/guardians must attend family planning
sessions/mother's class, Parent Effectiveness
Service and others
c) Children 0-5 years of age get regular preventive
health check-ups and vaccines
d) Children 3-5 years old must attend day care
program/pre-school
e) Children 6-14 years of age are enrolled in
schools and attend at least 85% of the time10
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also institutionalized
a coordinated inter-agency network among the Department
of Education (DepEd), Department of Health (DOH),
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the
National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and the local
government units (LGUs), identifying specific roles and
functions in order to ensure effective and efficient
implementation of the CCTP. As the DSWD takes on the role
of lead implementing agency that must "oversee and
coordinate the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
the program," the concerned LGU as partner agency is
particularly tasked to
a. Ensure availability of the supply side on health
and education in the target areas.
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for
Program implementation
c. Coordinate the
implementation/operationalization of sectoral
activities at the City/Municipal level to better
execute Program objectives and functions
d. Coordinate with various concerned government
agencies at the local level, sectoral
representatives and NGO to ensure effective
Program implementation
e. Prepare reports on issues and concerns
regarding Program implementation and submit to
the Regional Advisory Committee, and
f. Hold monthly committee meetings11
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)12 executed by the
DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in detail the
obligation of both parties during the intended five-year
implementation of the CCTP.
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the
CCTP by providing it with funding under the GAA of 2008 in
the amount of Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Million Five
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P298,550,000.00). This
budget allocation increased tremendously to P5 Billion
Pesos in 2009, with the amount doubling to P10 Billion
Pesos in 2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP
was in the GAA of 2011 at Twenty One Billion One Hundred
Ninety-Four Million One Hundred Seventeen Thousand
Pesos (P21,194,117,000.00).131wphi1
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by
Sergio Tadeo, incumbent President of the Association of
Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and
Nelson Alcantara, incumbent Barangay Captain of Barangay
Sta. Monica, Quezon City, challenges before the Court the
disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the
CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local
autonomy of the LGUs.
The Issue
THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER
THE DSWD IN THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II, SEC.
25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN
RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE
RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY
DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.
Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as a
poverty reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the
legislature. They take exception, however, to the manner by
which it is being implemented, that is, primarily through a
national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the
responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare,
agriculture and health care services have been devolved
pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, in relation to
Section 25, Article II & Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over the
identification of beneficiaries and the manner by which
services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be
complied with, instead of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP
Budget directly to the LGUs that would have enhanced its
delivery of basic services, results in the "recentralization" of
basic government functions, which is contrary to the
precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of
decentralization.
Our Ruling
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure
the autonomy of local governments14 and even devotes a full
article on the subject of local governance15 which includes
the following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies composed of
local government officials, regional heads of departments
and other government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the regions for purposes
of administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in
the region. (Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and
meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-
reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment
of national goals,16 Section 17 of the Local Government
Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions
pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as
follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be
self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but
are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the
LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities
that have already been devolved upon them from
the national agencies on the aspect of providing
for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects
and other facilities, programs and services funded
by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or
partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases
where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services.
(Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery
of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals 17 that while it
is through a system of decentralization that the State shall
promote a more responsive and accountable local
government structure, the concept of local autonomy does
not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini-
states."18 We explained that, with local autonomy, the
Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of the
local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units."19 In
Pimentel v. Aguirre,20 the Court defined the extent of the
local government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with
the national government in the pursuit of common national
goals, referring to such key concepts as integration and
coordination. Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers
over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at
the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the
local government unit as to preclude any and all involvement
by the national government in programs implemented in the
local level would be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to
the other extreme, which would amount to a decentralization SO ORDERED.
of power explicated in Limbona v. Mangelin21 as beyond our
constitutional concept of autonomy, thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power.1wphi1 There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments more responsive and
accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress.
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an

abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local
governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.22

Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government

powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code
itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not
precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially
where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.23 Petitioners have failed to
discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the
provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21
billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the
national government itself but implemented in partnership
with the local government units to achieve the common
national goal development and social progress can by no
means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local
governments.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-24661 February 28, 1974
BENJAMIN RABUCO, VENANCIO G. GUIRNALDA,
LEODEGARIO ALOBA, ELEUTERIO IBAES, ROGELIO
ARAGONES, ASENCIO ABANCO, BENEDICTO
BAUTISTA, MAXIMO AQUINO, PAULINA DALUMIAS,
NENITA RAMOS, GUILLERMO VARIAS, EMELDA
ARELLANO, PEDRO BILBAO, ERNESTO BONBALES,
ROSITA OCA BAUTISTA, TERESITA ESTEBAN, JOSE
BENJAMIN, LORENZO BELDEVER, LEODEGARIO
TUMLOS, PATRICIO MALATE, ANSELMO CORTEJOS,
ANACLETA ADUCA, SALOME BARCELONA, ENRICO
CELSO, IRENE CAMBA, MARIA COLLADO, RUFINO
CANTIL, ANANIAS CANILLO, MAXIMO DE CASTRO,
CEFERINO SALAZAR, PATRIA ANAYA, FELISA
VELASCO, IGNACIO SARASPI, FLAVIO DINAGUIT,
REMEDIOS BAROMETRO, PEDRO GEBANIA, RUBEN
GEGABALEN, EMETRIO EDAO, LUCIANO ARAGONES,
ADRIANO ESTRELLADO, BONIFACIO EVARISTO,
ISIDORO EDORIA, TIMOTEA ECARUAN, BIENVENIDO
COLLADO, CENON DAJUYA, RAFAELA FERNANDEZ,
ALFONSO FAUSTINO, AVELINO GARCIA, RICARDO
GUIRNALDA, FRANCISCO HENERAL, CARMEN
KIONESALA, FELICIANO LUMACTOD, DOLORES
VILLACAMPA, NARCISO LIM, EUFEMIO LEGASPI,
MATILDE MABAQUIAO, EULOGIO VIA, MACARIO
ANTONIO, JEREMIAS DE LA CRUZ, MARTIN
MANGABAN, SIMEON MANGABA T., CARIDAD MER
MILLA, FELIX MAHINAY, NAPOLEON MARZAN, ISAIAS
MANALASTAS, JOSEFA CORVERA, JOSE APRUEDO,
ARSENIO REYES, EUGENIA A. ONO, CORNELIO
OPOLENCIA, SEDECIAS PASCUA, ABUNDIO
PAGUNTALAN, ESPERANZA DE QUIROS, CRESENCIO
SALEM, MOISES FERNANDEZ, FORTUNATO
GONZALES, SOCORRO R. VALEN, RODOLFO
COLLADO, VENERIO CELSO, GREGORIO DE LA CRUZ,
CELSO ALCERA, NICOLAS ARAGONES, JOSEFINA
MANANSALA, ADELAIDA CALASIN , JOSE AGUSTIN,
TOMAS JOSEPH, MANUEL DADOR, SERGIO LIPATON,
ERNESTO SUMAYDING, MARCELINO DIOSO, MIGUEL
ALCERA, CRISANTA ENAMER, JUAN VIADO HILARION
CHIOCO, EUROPIA CABAHUG, VICTORIA DUERO,
CONSORCIO ENOC, MAMERTO GAMONIDO,
BONIFACIO SABADO, MARIA INTROLIZO, HENRY
ENOLBA, REYNALDO LIM, FORTUNATO LIPON,
ERNESTO MALLOS, FLORENTINA PATRICIO,
MAMERTO PALAPALA, RAMON DE PERALTA, JOSE
PARRAS, APOLINARIO YAP, JUAN ROQUE, FELIX
ROQUE, GLICERIA SALAZAR, MIGUELA SABIO,
AGAPITO SAYAS, PAULINO SARROZA, PACIFICO
JUANICO, LIBERADO TULAWAN, LIGAYA LAUS,
ERNESTO VERZOSA, LEOPOLDO BERNALES, JAIME
VISTA, ISAIAS AMURAO, BENITA M. BARENG, and
BRIGIDA SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON.
RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON.
LADISLAO J. TOLENTINO, City Engineer of Manila, their
agents, employees, assistants and all persons acting instance dismissing their petition for injunction
under them; HON. BENJAMIN GOZON, Administrator, and mandamus to enjoin the demolition of their houses and
Land Reform Authority substituted by HON CONRADO the ejectment from the public lots in question and to direct
ESTRELLA as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian respondent administrator of the Land Authority (now
Reforms and his agents, employees, assistants and all Secretary of Agrarian Reform) to implement the provisions of
persons acting under his orders, respondent. 1 Republic Act 3120 for the subdivision and sale on installment
basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants and bona
fide occupants thereof, and instead ordering their ejectment.
G.R. No. L-24915 February 28, 1974
Case L-24915 involves petitioners' independent petition for
BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al., (the same co-petitioners in
injunction filed directly with the Court of Appeals January 29,
L-24661), petitioners,
1965 5 to forestall the demolition overnight of their houses
vs.
pursuant to the order of demolition set for January 30, 1965
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON.
at 8 a.m. issued by respondents city officials pending the
RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, et al.,
elevation of their appeal. The appellate court gave due
(the same co-respondents in L-24661), respondents.
course thereto and issued the writ of preliminary injunction
as prayed for.
G.R. No. L-24916 February 28, 1974
The two cases were ordered "consolidated into one" since
BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al. (the same co-petitioners in L- they were "unavoidably interlaced." The appellate court,
24661), petitioners-appellants, finding that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was
vs. "the dominant and inextricable issue in the appeal" over
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by HON. which it had no jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly
RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, et al., "sidetracked" the issue, thereafter certified the said cases to
(the same co-respondents in L-24661), respondents- this Court, as follows:
appellees.
The validity of Republic Act 3120 which
TEEHANKEE, J.:p was seasonably posed in issue in the
court below was sidetracked by the trial
court, thus:
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic
Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine that the
subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in The constitutionality
the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of of Republic Act No.
the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis 3120 need not be
to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization and passed upon as the
disposition does not constitute infringements of the due principal question in
process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the issue is whether the
Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the houses of the
legislature's right of control and power to deal with State petitioners are
property. public nuisances,
which the court
resolved in the
The origin and background of the cases at bar which deal
affirmative. As a
with the decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act matter of fact even
3120 enacted on June 17, 1961, as raised by respondent
if the petitioners
mayor of Manila in resisting petitioners' pleas that
were already the
respondent mayor not only lacks the authority to demolish owners of the land
their houses or eject them as tenants and bona fide
on which their
occupants of a parcel of land in San Andres, Malate 2 but is
respected houses
also expressly prohibited from doing so by section 2 of the are erected, the
Act, may be summarized from the Court of
respondent city
Appeals' 3 certification of resolution of May 31, 1965 as
officials could cause
follows: the removal thereof
as they were
Case L-24916 involves petitioners' appeal to the Court of constructed in
Appeals 4 from the decision of the Manila court of first violation of city
 ordinances and and mandamus, injunction as prayed for enjoining respondents "from
constitute public being vested with demolishing and/or continuing to demolish the houses of
nuisance. lawful possession herein petitioners situated in Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610 of
over Lot 21-B, the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, or from
Block 610, granted performing any act constituting an interference in or
It is significant to note, however, that
by law, Republic disturbance of their present possession."
what is sought by the respondent City
Act No. 3120.
Mayor and City Engineer of Manila is
not only the demolition of the petitioners' The records of two cases certified by the appellate court, L-
houses in the premises in controversy, 2. Civil Case No. 24915 and L-24916, were eventually forwarded to this Court
but their ejectment as well. Moreover, 56092 has not been which per its resolution of August 24, 1965 ordered that they
Republic Act 3120 does intend not only barred by any prior be docketed and be considered together with case L-24661.
the dismissal of the ejectment judgment, as
proceedings against the petitioners from wrongly claimed by
In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of
the land in controversy upon their respondents-
undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including the lot
motion, but as well that any demolition appellees.
on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings.
order issued against them shall also
Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept
have to be dismissed. The law says:
3. Ejectment and petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned
demolition against dwellings. At petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June
Upon approval of petitioners- 17, 1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining
this Act no appellants are respondents city officials "from performing any act
ejectment unlawful and clearly constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein
proceedings against prohibited by petitioners' possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the
any tenants or bona Republic Act No. Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as safeguarded them
fide occupant shall 3120. under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August
be instituted and 17, 1965.
any proceedings
The defense of the respondents Mayor
against any such
and City Engineer of Manila to The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as correctly
tenant or bona
arguments 2 and 3 is the invalidity of the perceived by the appellate court is the constitutionality of
fideoccupant shall
said Republic Act 3120 for being in Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in
be dismissed upon
violation of the Constitutional prohibition question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate
motion of the
against the deprivation of property "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable
defendant. Provided
without due process of law and without or alienable lands of the State to be placed under the
, That any
just compensation. So that even if administration and disposal of the Land Tenure
demolition order
argument 2 interposed by the Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding
directed against any
petitioners-appellants should be 120 square meters per lot for sale on installment basis to the
tenant or bona
rejected, still they may claim a right, by tenants or bona fide occupants thereof 6and expressly
fide occupant
virtue of the aforesaid provisions of prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes
thereof, shall be
Republic Act 3120, to continue under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's
dismissed. (Sec. 2,
possession and occupation of the certification resolution, supra.
R. A. 3120).
premises and the lifting of the order of
demolition issued against them. The
The incidental issue seized upon by the trial court as a main
Indeed, the petitioners-appellants, who constitutionality of the said Republic Act
issue for "sidetracking" the decisive issue of constitutionality,
contended in the court below that it was 3120, therefore, becomes the dominant
to wit, that petitioners' houses as they stood at the time of its
not necessary to decide on the validity and inextricable issue of the appeal.
judgment in 1965 "were constructed in violation of city
or constitutionality of the law, now
ordinances and constituted public nuisances" whose removal
asseverate that 'Republic Act No. 3120
Case L-24661 for the continuation and maintenance of the could be ordered "even if petitioners were already the
expressly prohibits ejectment and
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court owners of the land on which their respective houses are
demolition of petitioners' home.' The
of Appeals for preservation of the status quo was filed by erected" has become moot with the burning down of the
petitioners' argument in their appeal to
petitioners directly with this Court on June 21, 1965, pending petitioners' houses in the fire of April 19, 1970.
this Court runs as follows:
transmittal of the records of Cases L-24915 and L-24916 to
this Court as certified by the Court of Appeals which
If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting
1. Petitioners- declared itself without jurisdiction over the principal and
deprivation of property without due process of law and
appellants are decisive issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120.
without just compensation as contended by respondents city
entitled to the
officials, then the trial court's refusal to enjoin ejectment and
remedies of
The Court gave due course thereto and on August 17, 1965 demolition of petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise,
injunction
issued upon a P1,000 bond the writ of preliminary petitioners' right under the Act to continue possession and
occupation of the premises and to the lifting and dismissal of There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question
the order of demolition issued against them must be (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and Republic Act 3120 in the
enforced and the trial court's judgment must be set aside. case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice
policy of the Constitution and the government program of
land for the landless and that they were not "intended to
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be
expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its
stricken down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of
character as communal land of the State and to make it
Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in
available for disposition by the National Government: ... The
subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants
subdivision of the land and conveyane of the resulting
without payment of just compensation is untenable and
subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional
without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly
authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power
owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity
of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of
and are therefore public property over which Congress had
Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, 11 but
absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property
simply as a manifestationof its right and power to deal
owned by it in its private or proprietarycapacity of which it
with state property." 12
could not be deprived without due process and without just
compensation. 7
Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 must fail as the City
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the
was not deprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition
properties were "reserved as communal property" and
with its private or corporate funds either under the due
ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands
process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of
of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants
the Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be enforced
thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying
and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for
State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary
implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment
legislative power which will not be interfered with by the
and demolition of their houses.
courts.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court (in

The case of Salas vs. Jarencio 8 wherein the Court upheld
Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside, and the preliminary
the constitutionality of Republic Act 4118 whereby Congress
injunction heretofore issued on August 17, 1965 is hereby
in identical terms as in Republic Act 3120 likewise converted
made permanent. The respondent Secretary of Agrarian
another city lot (Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral
Reform as successor agency of the Land Tenure
survey of Manila also in Malate) which was reserved as
Administration may now proceed with the due
communal property into disposable land of the State for
implementation of Republic Act 3120 in accordance with its
resale in small lots by the Land Tenure, Administration to the
terms and provisions. No costs.
bona fide occupants is controlling in the case at bar.

The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule

that "regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with
its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount
power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a
part of its public work, the municipality being but a
subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same
as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a
different use" 9 and stressed that "the property, as has been
previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila
with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That
it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this
title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the
land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of
Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation." 10
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV.
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA
as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines
Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO
SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN,respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San
Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court
is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural
lands by local government units is subject, to the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the
implementator of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines
Sur has adopted a five-year
Comprehensive Development plan,
some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and
pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops, soil testing
and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15
small scale technology soap making,
small scale products of plaster of paris,
marine biological and sea farming
research center,and other progressive
feasibility concepts objective of which is
to provide the necessary scientific and
technology know-how to farmers and
fishermen in Camarines Sur and to
establish a housing project for provincial
government employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need
additional land to be acquired either by
purchase or expropriation to implement
the above program component;
WHEREAS, there are
contiguous/adjacent properties to be
(sic) present Provincial Capitol Site
ideally suitable to establish the same
pilot development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur,
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil
Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court,
Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V.
Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for
the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed
to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the
ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.
In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the
deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00,
the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event
that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court
issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18,
1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of their property and a motion to admit an
amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in
the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San
Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void;
(b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and
(c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the
motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of
the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990,
denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss,
be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to
restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession,
and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur
claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation
proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a
public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of
the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for the approval by the Office of the President of the
exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of
eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed
the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of
the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a
housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents' lands and the order denying the
admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered
the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until
after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert the classification of the property of the private
respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San
Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for
expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the
compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification
of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the
questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints.
However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the
suspension of the proceedings until the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification
of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to
non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid
and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which
the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old
concept was that the condemned property must actually be
used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public
plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience
or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare
and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho
Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to
the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center
would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is
a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the
general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its
exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be
restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof,
which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur
must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure
the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220,
petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine
Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the
"Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex.
There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be
expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less
than one hectare was affected by the land reform program
and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no
need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the
public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or
engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld
the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to
overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square
meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and
reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed
the power of expropriation as superior to the power to
distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by
the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that
local government units exercise such power only by
delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power
of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly
authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l
US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in
delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may
retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684).
While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the
exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed,
either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its
head and acting pursuant to a resolution
of its sanggunian exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public
use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that
local government, units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute
the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural
lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law
that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention
of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation
matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After
the lapse of five (5) years from its
award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for,
agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of
the beneficiary or the landowner, with
due notice to the affected parties, and
subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the
land and its disposition: Provided, That
the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals
that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian
reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years
from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in
Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series
of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of
a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would
be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules
vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant
beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E.
2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use
of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether the use of the property
sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an
expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to
the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715;
State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no
matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as
subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister
of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The
Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political
subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers,
cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general
term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the

basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their
property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as
unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just
compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to
the condemned property either by the owners or the
assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held
in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990],
the rules for determining just compensation are those laid
down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private
respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall
be the just compensation for their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned

decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a)
nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents'
property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar

as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the
amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138896 June 20, 2000
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO
SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO
SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG,
LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA
S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD
SYLIANCO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
March 29, 1999 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City (Branch 58) in Civil Case No. CEB-21978, in
which it dismissed a Complaint for eminent domain. It ruled
as follows:
Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby
granted on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the case. Accordingly, the Orders dated February 19, 1999
and February 26, 1999, as well as the Writ of Possession
issued by virtue of the latter Order are hereby recalled for
being without force and effect.2
Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of the
RTC denying reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1)3 a Complaint to expropriate a
property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997,
the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise
of the power to take private property for public use after
payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the
exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for
eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this
Court."4
Assailed RTC Ruling
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to
real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be
filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action
should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the
subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC
ratiocinated in this wise:
The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the
current Tax Declaration of the land involved that its
assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty
Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of
Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or
possession of, real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved is located.
The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of
real property is a real action affecting title to or possession of
real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property
involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That
the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real,
property is included in a real action affecting title to or
possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice
Jose Y. Feria, thus, "Real actions are those affecting title to
or possession of real property. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosures of mortgage on, real
property. . . ."5
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising
a pure question of law.6 In a Resolution dated July 28, 1999,
the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted
out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999,
as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied
in the resolution of July 14, 1999."7 In a subsequent
Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the
Petition.8
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the
consideration of this Court:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for
eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value
of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos?9
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit
In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP
129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It
argues that the present action involves the exercise of the
right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint
for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of real
property. Thus, they argue that the case should have been
brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by
Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law provides that MTCs shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions that
involve title to or possession of real property, the assessed
value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to determine
whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court
indicates that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second
class cases, besides the determination of
damages, demand an inquiry into other factors
which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance, which were
the lowest courts of record at the time that the first
 organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted
allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine
Commission of June 11, 1901). 10
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve
the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take
private property for public use. 11 In National Power
Corporation v. Jocson, 12 the Court ruled that expropriation
proceedings have two phases:
The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint." An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,
of course, since it finally disposes of the action
and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the
Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof)
shall be filed or heard."
determine the just compensation for it.1avvphi1 This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is
satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines
v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of
the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during
the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129
in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation." 15 The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court
were not intended to change these jurisprudential
precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the
present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel
of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y.
Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that
condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of
real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of
land. 16
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to
distinguish between real and personal actions. His
discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions,
not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar
lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent
domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the
concerned with the determination by the court of
government may expropriate private property under the
"the just compensation for the property sought to
given set of circumstances. The government does not
be taken." This is done by the Court with the
dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same.
assistance of not more than three (3)
Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right,
commissioners. The order fixing the just
for the government does not even claim that it has a title to
compensation on the basis of the evidence before,
the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power
and findings of, the commissioners would be final,
to "appropriate and control individual property for the public
too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of
benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may
the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the
demand." 17
Court regarding the issue. . . .

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the
taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the SO ORDERED.
expropriation, and the observance of due process. 1 In the
main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is

estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
G.R. No. 142971 May 7, 2002 they have partially settled the case and in consideration
to be meters thereof they agreed:
expropriated
THE CITY OF CEBU, petitioner,
vs. Tax 03450 1. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms to
SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA Declaration the intention to [sic] the FIRST PARTY in
DEDAMO, respondents. - expropriating their parcels of land in the above-
cited case as for public purpose and for the benefit
Title No. 31832 of the general public;
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Market P1,666,530.00 2. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part with

In its petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the value for the the ownership of the subject parcels of land in
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner City of Cebu whole lot favor of the FIRST PARTY provided the latter will
assails the decision of 11 October 1999 of the Court of
pay just compensation for the same in the amount
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 592041 affirming the judgment of
Market P100,380.00 determined by the court after due notice and
7 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu
value of the hearing;
City, in Civil Case No. CEB-14632, a case for eminent
domain, which fixed the valuation of the land subject thereof Area to be
on the basis of the recommendation of the commissioners expropriated 3. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY
appointed by it. agrees to receive the amount of ONE MILLION
Assessed P49,960.00 SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND
Value FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (1,786,400.00) as
The material operation facts are not disputed.
provisional payment for the subject parcels of
land, without prejudice to the final valuation as
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road maybe determined by the court;
Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo
against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the
back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. 4. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the
The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the following
The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose. The total issuance of the Writ of Possession Order dated
parcels of land of respondents, to wit:
area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with September 21, 1994 issued by the Honorable
an assessed value of P1,786.400. Petitioner deposited with Court, agreed to take possession over that portion
the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 of the lot sought to be expropriated where the
Lot No. house of the SECOND PARTY was located only
1527 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to
enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the after fifteen (15) days upon the receipt of the
property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.2 SECOND PARTY of the amount of P1,786,400.00;
Area- 1,146 square
meters
Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 5. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of the
Tax 03472 because the purpose for which their property was to be aforesaid provisional amount, shall turn over to the
Declaration- expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a FIRST PARTY the title of the lot and within the
single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could lapse of the fifteen (15) days grace period will
simply buy directly from them the property at its fair market voluntarily demolish their house and the other
Title No 31833
value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the neighboring structure that may be located thereon at their own
lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the expense;
Market P240,660.00
value consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less,
which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Finally, 6. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND
respondents alleged that they have no other land in Cebu PARTY jointly petition the Honorable Court to
Assessed P72,200.00
City. render judgment in said Civil Case No. CEB-
Value
14632 in accordance with this AGREEMENT;
A pre-trial was thereafter had.
7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under
Lot No. On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance this agreement shall be followed by a
1528 of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. supplemental judgment fixing the just
7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 compensation for the property of the SECOND
Area- 793 square September 1994.3 PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by this
meters Honorable Court to determine the same shall have
rendered their report and approved by the court.
On 14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted
Area sought 478 square
to the trial court an Agreement4 wherein they declared that
Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three
commissioners to determine the just compensation of the
lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioners were
Palermo M. Lugo, who was nominated by petitioner and who
was designated as Chairman; Alfredo Cisneros, who was
nominated by respondents; and Herbert E. Buot, who was
designated by the trial court. The parties agreed to their
appointment.
Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which
contained their respective assessments of and
recommendation as to the valuation of the
property.1wphi1.nt
On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due
deliberation thereon, the trial court rendered its decision on 7
May 1996,5 the decretal portion o which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered in accordance with the report
of the commissioners.
Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio S.
Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of pesos:
TWENTY FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY (P24,865.930.00) representing the
compensation mentioned in the Complaint.
Plaintiff and defendants are directed to pay the
following commissioner's fee;
1. To Palermo Lugo - P21,000.00
2. To Herbert Buot - P19,000.00
3. To Alfredo - P19,000.00
Cisneros
Without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the commissioners' report was inaccurate since it
included an area which was not subject to expropriation.
More specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains
793 square meters but the actual area to be expropriated is
only 478 square meters. The remaining 315 square meters
is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil
Case No. CEB-8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an
amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No.
1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the
amount of P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved
as the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its
Order of 27 December 1996.6 Accordingly, the dispositive
portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new
valuation.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 59204. Petitioner
alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation
should be based on the prevailing market price of the
property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals. In its
decision of 11 October 1999,7 the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition for review
in the case at bar. It raises the sole issue of whether just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. It asserts that it should be, which in
this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time
the property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the
decision in "National Power Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals."8
In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of
Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court
because (1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of
the agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be
fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner
did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners'
report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the
1,624-square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was
estopped from attacking the report on which the decision
was based; and (3) the determined just compensation fixed
is even lower than the actual value of the property at the
time of the actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose.9 However, the
Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation
as consideration therefor.
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of
reckoning for the determination of just compensation is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that
just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local
government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession
of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the
fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to
be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in
that case that just compensation should be determined as of
the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that
although the general rule in determining just compensation
in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date
of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings."
Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural
law on the matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, which provided as follows:
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon
the entry of the order of condemnation, the court
shall appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.
The order of appointment shall designate the time
and place of the first session of the hearing to be
held by the commissioners and specify the time
within which their report is to be filed with the
court.
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document
freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be
bound by the report of the commission and approved by the
trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties.
It has the force of law between them and should be complied
with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides:

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have

the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere

consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996,

petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.11 It is
therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now
without violating the principle of equitable estoppel.
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when
he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist
and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so
that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts.12 Records show that petitioner
consented to conform with the valuation recommended by
the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now
and assail correctness of the commissioners'
assessment.1wphi1.nt

Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court

provides that just compensation shall be determined at the
time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation,13 such law
cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed

judgment on the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204,
the petition in this case is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL
OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on
October 18, 20021 and resolution promulgated on January
17, 2003,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and
set aside the order issued in their favor on February 19,
2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in
Mandaluyong City (RTC).3 Thereby, the CA upheld
Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, adopted by the City of
Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its then City Mayor to take
the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the parcel
of land registered in the names of the petitioners.
We affirm the CA.
Antecedents
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044
square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street
and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong
City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the
rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land
was their only property and only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of
1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the
land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low
cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city
inhabitants. The resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. 552, S-19974
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HON. BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS FOR
THE EXPROPRIATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND
SITUATED ALONG DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ STREET,
BARANGAY MAUWAY, CITY OF MANDALUYONG,
OWNED BY MR. ANTONIO YUSAY
WHEREAS, there is a parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose
Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong,
owned and registered in the name of MR. ANTONIO
YUSAY;
WHEREAS, this piece of land have been occupied for about
ten (10) years by many financially hard-up families which the
City Government of Mandaluyong desires, among other
things, to provide modest and decent dwelling;
WHEREAS, the said families have already negotiated to
acquire this land but was refused by the above-named
owner in total disregard to the City Governments effort of
providing land for the landless;
WHEREAS, the expropriation of said land would certainly
benefit public interest, let alone, a step towards the
implementation of social justice and urban land reform in this
City;
WHEREAS, under the present situation, the City Council
deems it necessary to authorize Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS to institute expropriation proceedings to achieve
the noble purpose of the City Government of Mandaluyong.
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion duly seconded, the City
Council of Mandaluyong, in session assembled,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to authorize, as it is
hereby authorizing, Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, to
institute expropriation proceedings against the above-named
registered owner of that parcel of land situated along Dr.
Jose Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of
Mandaluyong, (f)or the purpose of developing it to a low-cost
housing project for the less privileged but deserving
constituents of this City.
ADOPTED on this 2nd day of October 1997 at the City of
Mandaluyong.
Sgd. Adventor R. Delos Santos
Acting Sanggunian Secretary
Attested: Approved:
Sgd. Roberto J. Francisco Sgd. Benjamin
City Councilor & Acting City S. Abalos
Mayor PresidingOfficer
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552
was but the initial step in the Citys exercise of its power of
eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed,
and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC,
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its
being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without
force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere
authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal
steps towards expropriation, which included making a
definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners;
hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari
did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government,
because the special civil action of certiorari was only
available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special
civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the
circumstances considering that the act of passing the
resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial
act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution No.
552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment,
excess, or usurpation, or had yet to act without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the
petitioners motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision
and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The
RTC held that the petition was not premature because the
passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way
for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their
only property; that there was no due process in the passage
of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been
invited to the subsequent hearings on the resolution to
enable them to ventilate their opposition; and that the
purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the
expropriation would not benefit the greater number of
inhabitants.
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA
concluded that the reversal of the January 31, 2001 decision
by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552
deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of
regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to the
contrary; that notice to the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of
the succeeding hearings conducted by the City was not a
part of due process, for it was enough that their views had
been consulted and that they had been given the full
opportunity to voice their protest; that to rule otherwise would
be to give every affected resident effective veto powers in
law-making by a local government unit; and that a public
hearing, although necessary at times, was not indispensable
and merely aided in law-making.
The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City
dated February 19, 2002 in SCA Case No. 15-MD, which
declared Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997 of the City of
Mandaluyong null and void, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied their motion. Thus, they appeal to the Court, posing
the following issues, namely:
1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be
assailed even before its implementation?
2. Must a citizen await the takeover and
possession of his property by the local
government before he can go to court to nullify an
unjust expropriation?
Before resolving these issues, however, the Court considers
it necessary to first determine whether or not the action for
certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in
the RTC was a proper recourse of the petitioners.
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, and find that certiorari and
prohibition were not available to the petitioners under the
circumstances. Thus, we sustain, albeit upon different
grounds, the result announced by the CA, and declare that
the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
1.
Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod
The special civil action for certiorari is governed by Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whose Section 1
provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx
For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege
and establish the concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.6
It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks
solely to correct defects in jurisdiction,7 and does not correct
just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless
such court, board, or officer thereby acts without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.8
The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or
officer must be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Judicial function, according to Bouvier,9 is the exercise of the
judicial faculty or office; it also means the capacity to act in a
specific way which appertains to the judicial power, as one of
the powers of government. "The term," Bouvier
continues,10 "is used to describe generally those modes of
action which appertain to the judiciary as a department of
organized government, and through and by means of which
it accomplishes its purpose and exercises its peculiar
powers."
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the
Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally
demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted
Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body
declaring its sentiment or opinion.
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion
in adopting Resolution No. 552. To demonstrate the absence
of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a
resolution and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific
matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that is
permanent in character.11 No rights can be conferred by and
be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an
embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the
light of attendant circumstances. In simply expressing its
sentiment or opinion through the resolution, therefore, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion,
least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion
was a constitutionally protected right.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code) required the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a
resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding. In this regard, Section 19 of The Local
Government Code clearly provides, viz:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses
the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not
sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding. Indeed, in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M.
Realty Corporation,12 a case in which the Municipality of
Paraaque based its complaint for expropriation on a
resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so:
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch of government, which may delegate the exercise
thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latters control and restraints, imposed "through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case,
Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power
of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its
exercise. It provides as follows:
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before
an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9 Article III of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines
Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may
suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an
LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the
applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous Local
Government Code, which had provided that a mere
resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent
domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government
Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for
this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the
terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the
previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would
be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice."
In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this
rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all
impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves
a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.
Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language
from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA
7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of
property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is
guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than
the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtful interpretation."
xxx
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues
that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on
October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35,
Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding
the subject expropriation.
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner
merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but it did
not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second
place, petitioner did not raise this point before this Court. In
fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in
passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure the
inherent defect of petitioners Complaint for expropriation
filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that:
" x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question
submitted before the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether
those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their
truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue
rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint?"
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the
face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on
a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing
the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in affirming the trial courts Decision which dismissed
the expropriation suit.13 (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance
authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the petition
for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of
cause of action.
2.
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The special civil action for prohibition is governed also by
Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings
of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for,
considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the
oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a
petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the
fair and orderly administration of justice.14 The writ of
prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only
discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 For grave court.22 Before the City as the expropriating authority filed
abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could
petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal, be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners
corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising could not also be deprived of their property under the power
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised of eminent domain.23
its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason
of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on
gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal
October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618.
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law.16 On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction
signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over Costs to be paid by the petitioners.
a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted
without any authority.17
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner must further allege in the petition and

establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not
speedy or adequate.18 A remedy is plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal
or inferior court.191avvphi1

The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition

was not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the
adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its
collective sentiment or opinion.

Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure

whereby the immediate possession of the land under
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always
that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication
and payment of just compensation to the owner. 20 This bar
against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of
eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use,21 and the interest of the affected
landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the
State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of
eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes
limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the
affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not
given their just compensation for the taking of their property
or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just
compensation may the remedy of prohibition become
available.
G.R. No. 187604 June 25, 2012
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALEGAR CORPORATION, TEROCEL REALTY
CORPORATION, and FILOMENA VDA. DE
LEGARDA,Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the issues that a local government unit
has to cope with when expropriating private property for
socialized housing.
The Facts and the Case
On March 1, 2001 the City Council of Manila passed
Ordinance 8012 that authorized the City Mayor to acquire
certain lots1 belonging to respondents Alegar Corporation,
Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda,
for use in the socialized housing project of petitioner City of
Manila. The City offered to buy the lots atP1,500.00 per
square meter (sq m) but the owners rejected this as too low
with the result that on December 2, 2003 the City filed a
complaint for expropriation against them before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.2
The City alleged in its complaint that it wanted to acquire the
lots for its land-for-the-landless and on-site development
programs involving the residents occupying them.3 The City
offered to acquire the lots for P1,500.00 per sq m4 but the
owners rejected the offer. The total aggregate value of the
lots for taxation purpose wasP809,280.00 but the City
deposited P1,500,000.00 with the Land Bank of the
Philippines to enable it to immediately occupy the same
pending hearing of the case.
Both Alegar and Terocel questioned the legitimacy of the
Citys taking of their lots solely for the benefit of a few long-
time occupants. Alegar also pointed out that, while it
declined the Citys initial offer, it did not foreclose the
possibility of selling the lots for the right price. 5 The filing of
the suit was premature because the City made no effort in
good faith to negotiate the purchase.
Meantime, on June 9, 2004 the trial court issued a writ of
possession in the Citys favor. On December 19, 2006, upon
the joint motion of the parties, the RTC released
the P1,500,000.00 deposit to the defendant owners.
On October 15, 2007 the parties agreed to forego with the
pre-trial, opting instead to simultaneously submit their
memoranda on the issue of whether or not there is necessity
for the City to expropriate the subject properties for public
use. The owners of the lots submitted their memorandum but
the City did not.
On February 12, 2008 the RTC dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the City did not comply with Section 9 of
Republic Act (R.A.) 72796 which set the order of priority in
the acquisition of properties for socialized housing. Private
properties ranked last in the order of priorities for such
acquisition and the City failed to show that no other
properties were available for the project. The City also failed
to comply with Section 10 which authorized expropriation
only when resort to other modes (such as community
mortgage, land swapping, and negotiated purchase) had
been exhausted.
The trial court pointed out that the City also failed to show
that it exhausted all reasonable efforts to acquire the lots
through a negotiated sale. Article 35 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
provides that when property owners are willing to sell but for
a higher price than that offered, the local chief executive
must confer with them for the possibility of coming to an
agreement on the price. Here, after the owners refused to
sell the lots for P1,500.00 per sq m offer, the City did not
exert any effort to renegotiate or revise its offer. The RTC
also ruled that the City submitted the issue of genuine
necessity to acquire the properties for public purpose or
benefit without presenting evidence on the same.
The City moved for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal but before the RTC could act on it, the City
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).7
On February 27, 20098 the CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal
of the Citys action, mainly for the reason that the City failed
to comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A.
7279 which ranked privately-owned lands last in the order of
priority in acquiring lots for socialized housing and which
preferred modes other than expropriation for acquiring them.
The CA rejected the Citys claim that the RTC denied it its
right to due process, given that the City agreed to forego
with pre-trial and to just submit a memorandum on the
threshold issues raised by the owners answer regarding the
propriety of expropriation.9 The City simply did not submit a
memorandum. Although it moved for the reconsideration of
the order of dismissal, the City filed a notice of appeal before
the RTC could resolve the motion.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule
that the RTC denied the City its right to due
process when it dismissed the case without
hearing the Citys side;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
RTCs ruling that the City failed to comply with the
requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 in
trying to acquire the subject lots by expropriation;
3. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to set
aside the RTCs ruling that the City failed to
establish the existence of genuine necessity in
expropriating the subject lots for public use or
purpose; and
4. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule
that the owners withdrawal of its P1.5 million
deposit constituted implied consent to the
expropriation of their lots.
The Rulings of the Court
One. The RTC did not deny the City its right to be heard on
its action when that court dismissed the same. An
expropriation proceeding of private lands has two
stages: first, the determination of plaintiffs authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain in the context of the
facts of the case and, second, if there be such authority, the
determination of just compensation. The first phase ends
with either an order of dismissal or a determination that the
property is to be acquired for a public purpose.10
Here, the Citys action was still in the first stage when the
RTC called the parties to a pre-trial conference where,
essentially, their task was to determine how the court may
resolve the issue involved in the first stage: the Citys
authority to acquire by expropriation the particular lots for its
intended purpose. As it happened, the parties opted to
simultaneously submit their memoranda on that issue. There
was nothing infirm in this agreement since it may be
assumed that the parties knew what they were doing and
since such agreement would facilitate early disposal of the
case.11
Unfortunately, the agreement implied that the City was
waiving its right to present evidence that it was acquiring the
subject lots by expropriation for a proper public purpose.
Counsel for the City may have been confident that its
allegations in the complaint can stand on their own, ignoring
the owners challenge to its right to expropriate their lots for
the stated purpose. Parenthetically, the City moved for the
reconsideration of the RTCs order of dismissal but withdrew
this remedy by filing a notice of appeal from that order to the
CA. Evidently, the City cannot claim that it had been denied
the opportunity of a hearing.
Two. The CA correctly ruled that the City failed to show that
it complied with the requirements of Section 9 of R.A. 7279
which lays down the order of priority in the acquisition
through expropriation of lands for socialized housing. This
section provides:
Section 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land.Lands for
socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority
Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in
this section shall not apply. The local government units shall
give budgetary priority to on-site development of government
lands. (Emphasis supplied)
The City of course argues that it did not have to observe the
order of priority provided above in acquiring lots for
socialized housing since it found on-site development to be
more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries who
were these lots long-time occupants. But the problem
remains. The City did not adduce evidence that this was so.
Besides, Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the acquisition
of private property by "negotiated sale" over the filing of an
expropriation suit. It provides that such suit may be resorted
to only when the other modes of acquisitions have been
exhausted. Thus:
Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of
acquiring land for purposes of this Act shall include, among
others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly
or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government,
joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted; Provided, further, That where expropriation is
resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners
shall be exempted for purposes of this Act. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
with its Ordinance 8012. But the City misses the point. The
There is a sensible reason for the above. Litigation is costly
and protracted. The government should also lead in avoiding
litigations and overburdening its courts.
Indeed, the Court has held that when the property owner
rejects the offer but hints for a better price, the government
should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a
conference.12 The government must exhaust all reasonable
efforts to obtain by agreement the land it desires. Its failure
to comply will warrant the dismissal of the complaint. Article
35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code provides for this procedure. Thus:
Article 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale(a) The offer
to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in
writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired,
the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.
xxxx
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but
at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief
executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of
reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of
the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or
in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen
as its representative, shall participate in the conference.
When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of
sale shall be drawn and executed.
Here, the City of Manila initially offered P1,500.00 per sq m
to the owners for their lots. But after the latter rejected the
offer, claiming that the offered price was even lower than
their current zonal value, the City did not bother to
renegotiate or improve its offer. The intent of the law is for
the State or the local government to make a reasonable offer
in good faith, not merely a pro forma offer to acquire the
property.13
The Court cannot treat the requirements of Sections 9 and
10 of R.A. 7279 lightly.1wphi1 It held in Estate or Heirs of
the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. City of Manila,14 that
these requirements are strict limitations on the local
governments exercise of the power of eminent domain.
They are the only safeguards of property owners against the
exercise of that power. The burden is on the local
government to prove that it satisfied the requirements
mentioned or that they do not apply in the particular case.15
Three. Admittedly, the City alleged in its amended complaint
that it wanted to acquire the subject lots in connection with
its land-for-the-landless program and that this was in accord
owners directly challenged the validity of the objective of its
action. They alleged that the taking in this particular case of
their lots is not for public use or purpose since its action
would benefit only a few. Whether this is the case or not, the
owners answer tendered a factual issue that called for
evidence on the Citys part to prove the affirmative of its
allegations. As already stated, the City submitted the issue
for the RTCs resolution without presenting evidence.
Four. The City insists that it made a deposit of P1.5 million
with the RTC by way of advance payment on the lots it
sought to expropriate. By withdrawing this deposit,
respondents may be assumed to have given their consent to
the expropriation.
But the advance deposit required under Section 19 of the
Local Government Code constitutes an advance payment
only in the event the expropriation prospers. Such deposit
also has a dual purpose: as pre-payment if the expropriation
succeeds and as indemnity for damages if it is dismissed.
This advance payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of a
writ of possession, should not be confused with payment of
just compensation for the taking of property even if it could
be a factor in eventually determining just compensation. 16 If
the proceedings fail, the money could be used to indemnify
the owner for damages.17
Here, therefore, the owners withdrawal of the deposit that
the City made does not amount to a waiver of the defenses
they raised against the expropriation. With the dismissal of
the complaint, the amount or a portion of it could be awarded
to the owners as indemnity to cover the expenses they
incurred in defending their right.
Notably, the owners neither filed a counterclaim for damages
against the City nor did they seek indemnity for their
expenses after the RTC dismissed its action. Consequently,
the City government is entitled to the return of the advance
deposit it made and that the owners withdrew. But,
considering the expenses that the owners needed to incur in
defending themselves in the appeals that the City instituted
before the CA and this Court, an award ofP50,000.00 in
attorneys fees against the City is in order. The owners must
return the rest of the P1,500,000.00 that they withdrew.
Lastly, the Court must point out that the ruling in this case is
without prejudice to the right of the City to re-file the action
after it has complied with the relevant mandatory provisions
of R.A. 7279 and Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS

the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 27,
2009 in CA-G.R. CV 90530 subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1. Petitioner City of Manila is ordered to indemnify

respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty
Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda in the
amount of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;

2. Respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel

Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De
Legarda are in turn ordered to return the advance
deposit of P1,500,000.00 that they withdrew
incident to the expropriation case; and

3. This decision is without prejudice to the right of

the City of Manila to re-file their action for
expropriation after complying with what the law
requires.

SO ORDERED.