RULE 111

Section 1.

Section 2.

In light of the privileged nature of Muoz statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove malice
in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex
delictomay be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which
civil liability may arise that exists. (Co v. Munoz, G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013)

Section 3.

Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort,
whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense
charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject
to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. (Lim v. Kou Co Ping. G.R.
Nos. 175256 & 179160, August 23, 2012)

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil
action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
offended party may bring such an action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused. (Casupanan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391,
August 26, 2002)

Section 4.

We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts
 d) ...

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription. 30 (Emphases supplied)

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the
death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect our
ruling in Bayotas:

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the
independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to
enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The
heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially
provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action
the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.

Contrary to the PAO's Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,
Cueno died because of appellant's fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.
Appellant's civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant's death on 13
February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and
civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence
and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of
the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case," the
current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his
heirs, in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the
deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims
from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may
be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The separate civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence. The civil
action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is
taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims
against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted
prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause
of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate
civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the
cause of action arising from quasi-delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno's death,
his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA. (People v. Lipata, G.R.
No. 200302, April 20, 2016)

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the
same is not based on delictbut by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.1wphi1For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based, and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the
other sources of obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111. If the same act or omission
complained of arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court. (Cabugao v. People, G.R. Nos. 163879 & 165805, July 30, 2015)

Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil
liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is
based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Asilo, Jr.
v. People, G.R. Nos 159017-18&159059, March 9, 2011)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. (People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012)

Section 5.
...the Rules of Court explicitly recognizes that a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the
defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. (Madarang v. CA, G.R. No. 143044, July
14, 2005)
Section 6.
Section 7.
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the
civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets
of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages. Even if said case will be decided
against respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not
automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious
sale of corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals finding that a
prejudicial question exists.1wphi1 The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the
nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the issue is
the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation. (People v. Arambulo, Jr.
G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015)

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20
TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that
of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the
20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with
the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution
has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A
challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. (San Miguel Properties v.
Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013)

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other element or
characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.
The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the
P378,000.00 from petitioners savings account.
The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioners savings account.
Based on petitioners account, they deposited the check given to them by Fatima in their savings
account. The amount of said check was initially credited to petitioners savings account but the Fatima
check was later on dishonored because there was an alleged alteration in the name of the payee. As a
result, the bank debited the amount of the check from petitioners savings account. Now, petitioners
seek to persuade us that had it not been for the unlawful garnishment, the funds in their savings account
would have been sufficient to cover a check they issued in favor of SMC.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being
conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another
check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to its dishonor and
the eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source of the funds of petitioners savings
account is no longer SMCs concern. The matter is between petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the
other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC
for the payment of beer products. (Spouses Gabitano v. San Miguel Corp. G.R. No. 188767, July 24,
2013)

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide. Further, the
resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action. (Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010)

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus,
no prejudicial question exits. (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30,
2009)