Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007

MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip" to the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel
S. Isips conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite
City, and its Amended Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under
the following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (mens
ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds
of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in
possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use
and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the
delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo
A. Jose in the abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.3

Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of the information in
Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672
in the amount of P562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which
check upon presentation with the drawee bank for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, accused
refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-
stated amount of P562,000.00, Philippine Currency.4

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense was committed, the number
and amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check

 147-84 17 March 1984 518644 P50,000.00

148-84 30 March 1984 518645 P50,000.00

149-84 12 March 1984 0300865 P150,000.00

155-84 25 March 1984 518674 P95,000.00

156-84 29 March 1984 518646 P90,000.00

157-84 1 April 1984 518669 P25,000.00

The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of Estafa. The cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case
No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings
valued at P120,000.00, with the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the
sale thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of
the said jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their own personal use
and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984,
respectively, in the amount of P90,000 and P25,000, respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in the abovestated amount
of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.6

Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and agreed date of return, and
the number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly
worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date Check No./Date Amount
Jewelry Receipt of Return
257-84 030086/03-12-84 P150,000
P150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84
260-84 518647/03-25-84 P95,000
P95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
261-84 518672/03-27-84 P562,000
P562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
378-84 518644/03-17-84 P50,000
P200,000 02-03-84 -
518645/03-30-84 P50,000

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There being only one complainant in
all the cases, joint trial of the cases followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the parties respective briefs,
are the following:

i) Prosecution Version.

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose. The introduction was made by complainants father, Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and
the Isips were then engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitus
(pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be their capitalist, a
proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainants residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses received from
complainant a 6 carat mens ring valued at P200,000.00 with the condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x
x on commission basis for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if sold
on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2)
personal checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry.
The receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular mens ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 and
518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84
and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainants residence in Caridad, Cavite City
where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond
worth P150,000.00. The condition was that the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before March 30, 1984
(pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the Choker Pearl,
Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for P150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and Criminal Case No. 149-84 for
violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainants residence in Cavite City and got from the
latter a mens ring (7 carats) worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring or
deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension
which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The
above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1) Dome shaped ring with
matching earring with diamonds valued at P120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be
returned or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following morning,
however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984
for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84
and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of complainant and got from him one (1)
collar heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon,
Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant
on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27,
1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the Isip couple and
Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant informing him that Balikbayan doctors
are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries.
Assorted pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit O)
acknowledging the value thereof to the tune of P562,000.00.

Exhibit O contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of
the promise contained in Exhibit O, Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in
the amount of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84
against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them
bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).

ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence at Room 411, 4th
Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral
home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since
1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip
(Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4)
and engaged in various business undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan
(Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business; while appellant Marietta,
in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started when she
was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started
obtaining jewelry from losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for financing she
obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about
a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with
address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19).
Beginning early 1983, at complainants residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta,
accompanied by her husband who participated only as a witness, started having transactions with complainant who,
on different dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta
pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold on commission and to turn
over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions,
appellant Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry
which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by
way of payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga,
Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be registered in the names of his son,
Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the
obligations of appellants to complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-
39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which were initially dishonored have already
been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed
against appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by
appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta
incurred some default in payment and complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or
pay for the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr.,
3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document
acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later,
appellants learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein
before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7

On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion thereof reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-
84 and she is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each case;
and of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.
However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount of P200,000.00
value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs.8

In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were sufficiently shown to have
taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Joses ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of
absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its
allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that complainant
is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with which the
complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City
further refuted the defenses claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the
defenses contention, that the obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to complainant of personal
and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to human nature to demand payment when the same had
already been made and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably and subsequently
dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutors Office at the instance of the complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the
checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to
petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding
him to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a 7-carat diamond mens ring which he secured from the
complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as errors:

-I-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST
APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.

- II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING
THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT
MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE
ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN
INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY
HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.

- IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT
THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL.9

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby extinguishing her criminal and
civil liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII)

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed on accused-
appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear
interest at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid;

2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is REVERSED and accused-
appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged; and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel
S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose,
jointly and severally, the sums of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P562,000.00 and P200,000.00
representing the amounts involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the information
until fully paid.10

The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the venue was properly laid and that the checks were
delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired at complainants ancestral home in Cavite City,
and that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the
ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a
criminal liability pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled
that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was no
payment to speak of. It also found the defenses claim of redemption/dacion en pago that real and personal
properties were conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some
of the cases to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court. In these five cases, it ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted the checks
issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,11 but held them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling
of conviction. It found petitioners claims that he did not receive the jewelry worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the
information; that the receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon him to
sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant,
to be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial
Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly
liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.12

On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation
of its decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of the dispositive portion
thereof which shall now read as follows:

"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13

Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He raises the following issues:

First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO
PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;

Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT
OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and

Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS
EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in Criminal Case No.
136-84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that
any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he
states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues
that it is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite,
complainant actually lived there and had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual
residents of Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila. He adds that the
source of the fund used to finance the transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item
was delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue where
Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not follow that because complainant
may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered into during that
leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he
stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering
roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.14 The place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.15 It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.16

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue was properly laid in the
RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-
84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence17 from the Bureau of
Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is
his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges
must prove his allegations applies.18
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction happened
in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far
from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not
prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a
living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not
once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late wife in all the transactions with
complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that
the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and
manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial
evidence.19 It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is
sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.

On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No.
136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the
receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with
complainant, the fact remains that there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists
there is no competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or
delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt21 executed by
petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring in question. Petitioners claim that he did not receive any
ring and merely executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant
consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation of what he executed and
signed. The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That
private transactions have been fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed 22 Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he
executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so.
Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is
no competent evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant in Cavite City.

Petitioners argument that he did not receive the subject ring23 is further belied by the testimony of his wife when the
latter testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the
transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.

Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by
petitioner respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was
effectively extinguished by novation. The personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more
than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that
complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains
that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the
same under threat of prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have
denied the application of the rule of novation on said case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive
the ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was but an alternative defense and its
rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of
petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that
the properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some
as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason
that the properties conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his
deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in settlement of cases other than the
cases being tried herein.26 In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases which were
subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as payment.27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal cases herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it
rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court of
Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to
take place, four essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all
parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new
obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation,
was that there were checks issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry involved.
In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the
subject ring that could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was charged with
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender
misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or property; (3) the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the
offender return the money or property.28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner received from complainant a
seven-carat diamond (mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis
and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or
converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands from
complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to
complainant in the amount of P200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October
2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the
Philippines (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision1 and the July 28, 2004
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096.

The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8) parcels of lot located in
Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.

The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) under the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228).
Consequently, private respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said agricultural lands.

It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only P227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11 November 2002, filed a Petition for
Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for
Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.

On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the fallo of which reads:

Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby preliminarily fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 (P2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land Bank
of the Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules
and guidelines, minus the sum already remitted per Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually issued an Order
dated 8 October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the valuation claim of petitioner herein with respect
to her due share in the above lots to the tune of Two Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven
and 58/100 (P2,540,211.58) Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount
pursuant to existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already paid per Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at
the same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.

The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed Order dated 12 November
2003 "for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure
does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the
instances when a court may dismiss a case on its motion."

As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November 2003, petitioner LBP
elevated the case before the Tribunal through the present Petition for Review, theorizing:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND
OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE
APPLY TO CASES FILED AND PENDING BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS
EFFECTIVITY AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.3

On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.

The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the
adjudicator's resolution shall be filed before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the case
before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation was filed in
the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8,
2003, and under its transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its
effectivity; and, since an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the DARAB, the RTC,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING
THAT THE LBP DID NOT VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES"
WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB
RULES OF PROCEDURE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, 2002.4

Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation was filed with the DARAB-
Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of
Procedure; that under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the
adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of
their filing; that clear from the transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the
2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its
adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with
the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought
directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner brought the adjudicator's
decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.

In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original action and, since the case
was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules
before resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.

Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.

The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a party
can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

The court rules in the negative.

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. x x x

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days
from submission of the case for decision.

Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the
courts.

In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony
with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for
violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a
reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and
Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function
which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scotys Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a
law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial
Peace Act.6

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all
petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for
determination of just compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings was held before the
DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just
compensation without waiting for the completion of DARABs re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding, the
Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over
determination of just compensation, thus

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction
of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in
compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus,
although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special
Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs
into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct resort to the
SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid.

In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos complaint for determination
of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the
DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to
Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.8 x x x

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank questioned the alleged failure of private
respondents to seek reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with
the RTC, the Court said:

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial
proceedings. 1avvphi1

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such
determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the courts of justice.10

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction
over respondent's petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative
proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated that:

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just compensation.12

The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of
Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring the matter to the Board by
filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied,
the aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the resolution of the
Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with
the land valuation, hence said valuation shall become final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party who disagrees
with the decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court
(SAC) having jurisdiction over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for
reconsideration.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is
a power vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that
the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change
the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the
determination of just compensation.14 In accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition
before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law.15 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure
cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the
Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear
without delay petitioner's petition for the determination of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349 July 12, 2001

BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City Branch 1, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

RESOLUTION

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban,
MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave
misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar
and Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent judge issued a "hold
departure order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides
that "hold departure orders" shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be heard before issuing the
questioned order.

When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order because he was not
aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished a copy of the circular and
managed to secure a copy only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and setting aside the
hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge
averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said
date.

The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed "hold departure order,"
recommended that he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be
issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." Clearly then, criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on
the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence." The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been
remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the development in
law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of
which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be
excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they
could discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor. 1wphi1.nt

In recent cases,1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence,
the same penalty should be imposed on respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a repetition of the same
and similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution2dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny
G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court,
both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar
Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July
5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to
wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. Especially if they
are employed by a company to serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, SMC employees are
fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in
looking after the health problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad
tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo
for consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum
myoma and must undergo an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally,
where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a
surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks after. Later,
however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the
hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and the patient herself
who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera
to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease
was already on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the company physician.

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all
healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-
enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where
physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are
equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called
charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and
mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy
practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many times cheaper and
more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days,
conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing
milk. Kadiri to death!

My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the
Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility
expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and
malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name,
character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.

On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of
Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing
aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days
of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision
Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.7

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order8 dated February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE "LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE
MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO
WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE
ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when
petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched
himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who
sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the
columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not
entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public
good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no
malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the
bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was
an opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and
publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of
libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of
malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing
anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming
those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight
which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may
alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of
evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an
issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging
them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had
jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged
only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred
upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an
exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be
barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the
departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.11
The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People12 that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the
venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:

Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published,
and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.15

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the
alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was
printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to
wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court,
both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar
Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July
5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."

The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of
Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a
portion of the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat]
conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation
of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring
and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously
cause to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity
as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge
in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is utilized in the precise context
of noting that the defendants "cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila."
The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in
Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where
the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not
necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national
dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean
that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu. 1avv phi 1

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is
in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where
Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would
allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these
newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to
avoid.18

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager
of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous
article was "published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and
the entire Philippines," the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue
of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in
the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information
filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar
Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate
that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo
was actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged that the "offended party was the Acting
General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community," the Court did
not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court
explained its ruling in this wise:

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required.
However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a
transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create
a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place,
combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually
residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes
were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a
resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning
of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.21

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.22 Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a
libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its
decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time
pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount
of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she
obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor
Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash
advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17,
1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the
recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be
filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of
an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating
Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA
AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in
the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which
she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by
law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said
cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the
government in aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a
MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating
that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an
incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected
balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers
were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying
a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan
shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the
cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not
in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the
said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any
distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.

The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION
TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN
CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's
appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section
(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first,
enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but
his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned
statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that
the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a
decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished
by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.1avvphi1
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to
(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their
commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had
thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No.
1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x

Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took
effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission
of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was
on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or
employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was
instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No.
1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
 A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a),
the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction
over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade
26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:

x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code
only because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when
they are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration,
jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or
4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must
belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office
is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines
which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the
case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve
a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore,
in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section
4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general
qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before
this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26,
then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 1avv phi1

Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the
Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a)
to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379,
or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in
the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with
Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
over the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in
Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses
or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as
the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there
being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus,
in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court
ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein
it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing"
and that "accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant
might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante
for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there
would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an
element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough
that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In
expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused]
had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x20

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO**
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government
funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan,
Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a
state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on
December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of
student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother
Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under
Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
 SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government
by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested
the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D.
Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused
to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over
the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the
RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was
not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions
in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student
regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with
the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions
or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR,
she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems
definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is
erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been
interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.15 It
ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
 offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is
no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in
relation to his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over
all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because
the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and
functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such
sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own
government and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation
of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other
provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and
hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or
board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the
governing body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of
public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that
she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from
former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
 Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule
that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners
to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20Remedial
measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed
in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of
filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of
proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of
Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction
over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from
further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue,
this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of
the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment,
this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
 In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash
based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in
the criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set
aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A.
No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the
said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner
repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No.
1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
 " Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with
the Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but
with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with
the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to
intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-
tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at
the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of
the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct
opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na
bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay
ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

 B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of
P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality.
The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January
14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order
No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974
(E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of
Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No.
39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of
the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under
the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to
NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple
reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability
of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru
falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc.
These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred,
a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP
student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer.
In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39The
1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in
different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or
an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
 for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office
or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying
student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed,
a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public
officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a
legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts,
and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was
no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts
were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity
and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a
motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of
U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the
latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land
Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense
that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote
or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name
Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by
using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned
that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the
court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers
do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 137237 September 17, 2002

ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus1 with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution2 dated June 15, 1998
finding prima facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the order3 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Further, in their supplemental petition,4 petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without
or beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and the People of the Philippines as additional parties in this
case.1wphi1.nt

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen,
Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police Regional Office 3,
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits,5 filed before the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel,6municipal
mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with
alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also included in the
charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo
and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen
Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.

The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2
Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when
petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied
them. Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol, which was covered by a
Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board petitioners vehicle and
brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.

PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use
of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo,
papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an
accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony
"Eboy" Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill
him, saying "Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a
report.)

At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but
Mayor Esquivel likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen
Police Station to file charges against PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape
with a handgun, while Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost
consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his release,
however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.

PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and threatened because
of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in
Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with
connections to the mayor.7

In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered
and other documentary evidence.8

After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.9

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary investigation and required petitioners and
their companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,10 petitioners and their
companions denied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with
an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo
was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm complaint.

On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution11 recommending that both
Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious
physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below
were dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.

On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution.

Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 2477712 for less serious physical injuries against
Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 2477813 for grave threats against
petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation14 with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied
by the OSP in the assailed order15 dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the Ombudsman approved the
OSPs order of denial.

On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.

With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of
their motion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondents in rendering the resolution and the order.

On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners motion16 reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO
directing public respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.17

Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN

DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL
CONDITION WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;

2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHEN PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE
ARREST OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION
OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and
 3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES
FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS.

Petitioners formulation of the issues may be reduced to the following:

(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the informations against
petitioners?

(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos.
24777 and 24778?

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to consider the
exculpatory evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good physical condition
when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.18 With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from
claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him and need not be proven in any other
proceeding.19

Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a
factual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate that this is the very same
defense advanced by petitioners in the charges against them and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only
be threshed out in a full-blown trial.20

We find the present petition without merit.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts.21 Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to
indicate otherwise.22 Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate23 and the courts will not
interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,25 we held that:

This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion.

In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the disputed resolution and order.

There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2
Eduardos admission that he was in good physical condition when he was released from the police
headquarters.26 Such admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records show that
no such averment was made in petitioners counter-affidavit27 nor was there any document purporting to be the
exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
reconsideration.28 In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to the effect that he
was in good physical condition when he left the police station. However, the admission merely applied to the
execution of said document and not to the truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the admission that petitioners
brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best addressed to the public respondents appreciation. It is
evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing:
 . . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all
evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or
order.29

Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos.
24777-78. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in
Republic Act No. 7975.30 As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein,
they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.31

Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,32 Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,33 and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan,34 we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he
is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,35 provides that it is only in
cases where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
27 or higher"36 that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."37 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor
Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.38 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777
of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both
of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners favor.

For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.

First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim.39 As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over Criminal
Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.

Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies
provided by law are adequate and available.40 Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or
sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or
otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ.41 In this case, petitioners were not
devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash the informations at the
first instance but they did not. They have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown
any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion to
quash the informations, during their much delayed arraignment,42 but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorari
or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory order.43

Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.44 The foundation
of this rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary
litigation;45 it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were
properly presented to it.46 The records show that petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by
the Sandiganbayan before this Court. 1w phi 1.nt

Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.47 The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.48 Hence, this Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his
discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been reached in a
matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it
may be.49 Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary course of law.
Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.50

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149311 February 11, 2005

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III,
MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
PANFILO M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.

The facts are as follows:

Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001
before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-
ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases
involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case
Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the
complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file
their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits
and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.

Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI,
alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman.1 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for
the following alleged crimes:

a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam
Chong;

b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and

c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.2

In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was made after taking the sworn
statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet.
The sworn statements of these witnesses were attached to the letter.3

On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons
named in the witnesses sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The
subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson
and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors
should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the
Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore, they claimed that according
to the Courts ruling in gr_ Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as private respondents.5

The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the
cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:

It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[;]

It appearing further that respondents rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the determination of
jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents discharge of their official duties;

It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of
Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable
by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall
rule thereon with finality;6

On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition
for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for
prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on
the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They argued that by conducting a preliminary
investigation, the DOJ was violating the Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster
their claim.

On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the Department of Justice from
conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise
issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other
persons acting in their behalf, individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No.
2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in
said case until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses
subject matter of the investigations before it, or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being
committed by the petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.

Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as there is no showing
whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the
writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED. 7

Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI,
through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL

CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE FACT
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE
THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE NBI

COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES, RESPONDENTS AND
ALLEGED VICTIMS.

IV

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING RELIEF TO

RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE DOJ.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR
PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.8

A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central question to be resolved:
whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in
the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against the respondents
herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They
maintain that it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice and that this is
all the more compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the
crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention.

Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be the safety of
witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of the respondents,
who may need to clear their names and reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted
not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of procedure are not to be
applied when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.9

Now, to the merits.

The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative
Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law
agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .

Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and
functions:

...

(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system;

...

Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978, provides:

Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice.
There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the
Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such
number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter provided,
which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal
laws.

Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against
them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence.
They rely on the doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government,
the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials. They likewise claim that it
should be deemed that the Ombudsman has already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that
there are already pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts and circumstances.

Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; .10

The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or cases in
question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition,
RTC Judge Liwag gave the following rationale:

Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the
matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on
the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the
matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other
investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsmans
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to
make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the
Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation of
similar cases being investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane than the source of their
powers with respect to such cases. This is, of course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be
making recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman in matters being handled by such
Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a situation must
thus be disallowed.
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any
investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and
military officials such as the petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that
provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary
investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the
Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage
of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary
common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from
interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are
deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the
powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers
must be remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.11

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to
investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or employees.12 To discharge its duty
effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it a
notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it extended independence to
the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for
stringent qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be
natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election.13 The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and
salary equal to that of the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a
prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of office.14 They were given a fixed term of seven years,
without reappointment.15 Upon their cessation from office, they are prohibited from running for any elective office in
the immediately succeeding election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office
of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and
primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For
this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to
investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged
before it.18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on reports in the media and
those which come to his attention through sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the
Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient
information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly
dependent on public agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office
of the Ombudsman. Vis--vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public
officials is given preference over other bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it
enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other
investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can
delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.

Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and
primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public
officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman.

Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.20 Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case
before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the
investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has
the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.

None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar to that of the present case.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special
authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order
No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that the
power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared
authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that
the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten
wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it
doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of
sequestration orders against petitioners assets.

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against
petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors
conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were
filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to
conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the
authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman
but a shared authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case
was filed solely with the DOJ.

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding
Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said
Information without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its
ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that the
complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.

The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix25 and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were brought alone to the
DOJ prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate
bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a
complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled
substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases
filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary
investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.27When one is hailed before an
investigative body on specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation immediately
exposes the respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be
filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It
would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position
before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss
as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising
jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of
valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's
disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September 18, 2000, recommending
dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-
Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and
penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of
the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner
Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able
to convert his CDF into cash.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) issued a Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14)
counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said Resolution was
approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to
26114 were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000. It recommended
the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a
Memorandum4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the
OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman
adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering
the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that:

 I.

THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
HIS JURISDICTION.

II.

THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS,

SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5

Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's
Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases
against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a
separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority
over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP
an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the checks were issued to petitioner
Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to
ensure the immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the provisions
of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office
have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had
been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6

Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution
as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other functions or duties
as may be provided by law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:

x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the
Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature
could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally
approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

xxxx

Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we
quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: "to exercise such
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him
with powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.

MR. MONSOD:

Yes.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
provided by law."

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.

MR. RODRIGO:

So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:

And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by the Ombudsman are
"such functions or duties as may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on
might remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.

MR. COLAYCO:

Madam President, that is correct.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which has neither punitive
nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much
and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the legislature,
why not leave this to the legislature?

xxxx
 MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):

xxxx

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in
its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided
by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we
should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate
what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
1aw phi 1

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.7

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman,
was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:

x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among the offices under
the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.

The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x

xxxx

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The
underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory
legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under
P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as
may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers
granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the
Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress
did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the
OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control,
and upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it
the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional
powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be
revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant consideration.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are
established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow
the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.14 1avv phi 1

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,15 the Court
expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating
to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided
by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof
must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is
expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override
the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in
setting aside the same.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that the doctrine
of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be
grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and
supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.

The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP Resolution
recommending dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to
support a finding of probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be stressed
that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been
emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial
review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative
value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only
by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.19
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause would necessitate an
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP
Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given due course.

Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,20 imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the
Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long
as his rulings are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver
of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention
from the three branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside
pressure and improper influence.21

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to
clearly prove that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the
Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control and
supervision over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division;
hence, it should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* RENATO C. CORONA**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. NO. 135687 July 24, 2007

(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO, WENCESLAO PASCUAL, GAUDENCIO VIDUYA, JULIA M.
MACUJA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE TEVES, ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, RECIO M. GARCIA, DBP BOARD OF
DIRECTORS LORENZA N. SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S. GARCIA, STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R. GARCIA & SONS
DEVELOPMENT and INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(Re: OMB-0-96-2644)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
PLACIDO MAPA - Board of Director/Chairman DBP,
RECIO GARCIA - Member,
JOSE TENGCO, JR. - Member,
RAFAEL SISON - Chairman,
JOSE R. TENGCO - Member,
ALICE L. REYES - Member,
CESAR SALAMEA - Chairman,
DON PERRY - Vice Chairman,
ROLANDO M. SOZA - Member,RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.,RICARDO SILVERIO, JR. RICARDO S. TANGCO,
Stockholders/Directors of Golden River Mining Corp., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

(Re: OMB-0-96-2645)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner,
vs.
PANFILO O. DOMINGO - Former PNB President,
CONRADO S. REYES - Former NIDC General
Manager,
CONRADO T. CALALANG, ANTONIO M. GONZALES, NORBERTO L. VILLARAMA, SENEN B. DE LA COSTA,
ANTONIO O. MENDOZA, JR., IGNACIO C. BERTUMEN, Stockholders/Officers of Filipino Carbon and Mining
Corporation, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Order1 of the Ombudsman
dated July 6, 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and
OMB-0-96-2645, and its Order2 of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, which created herein
petitioner Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee).

On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador (Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG consultant,
executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts referred by the Assets
Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report and recommendation are those of the following
corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining
Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).

With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that the said corporation obtained from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of P26,726,774.72 and a straight industrial
loan amounting to P29,226,774.72 on October 26, 1967 for the purpose of redeeming mortgaged properties,
rehabilitating buildings and equipment and defraying its operational expenses.

Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that the corporation obtained loan accommodations from
DBP beginning from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it had a total obligation of P43,193,000.00;
that out of its five loan accounts, only the first two loans of Golden River obtained in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently
collateralized, leaving three other loans without any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in 1980 for
the amount of P14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13, 1982 for the amount of P5,551,000.00; and
refinancing loan obtained on December 1, 1982 for the amount of P7,118,656.52.

As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the said corporation applied with the National Investment
Development Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on January 17, 1977; that the loan application
was favorably recommended by the President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the application was
subsequently approved by PNB's Board of Directors on August 17, 1977.

Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three corporations did not have
sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975
and 1977. Salvador also alleged that the above-mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not
only the viability of their operations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found
the loan accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as behest loans.

The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman
and members of the Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together with
the respective stockholders/officers of the three corporations.

Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used by the Committee as its bases in filing separate
complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged violation of the
provisions of Sections 3 (e)3 and (g)4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and Josephine S. Garcia, stockholders of PRGS; and
Wenceslao Pascual, Gaudencio Viduya, Julia D. Macuja, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose Teves, Alejandro Melchor,
Recio Garcia, Rafael Sison, Cesar Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Rolando Soza, then officers and members of the
Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2643.

The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco, stockholders of Golden
River; and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr., Rafael Sison, Jose de Ocampo, Jose
R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Don Perry and Rolando M. Soza, then officers and members of the
Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2644.

The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB President; Conrado S. Reyes, then NIDC General Manager;
and Conrado Calalang, Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto L. Villarama, Sene B. dela Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza, Jr.
and Ignacio C. Bertumen, officers and stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2645.
Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were consolidated by the Office of the Ombudsman.

In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein respondents. The Ombudsman ruled that, except
with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the
Committee as having been committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that, contrary to the
claims of herein petitioner, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Ombudsman denied it in its Order dated August 31, 1998.

Hence, herein petition.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu proprio, the three complaints without first
requiring respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such dismissal,
petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that
petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman should have first required petitioner to clarify said evidence or
to adduce additional evidence, in accordance with due process.

Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that it was filed out of time as evidence shows that the said motion was timely filed.

Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three complaints and the subsequent issuance of a single Order
dismissing them is erroneous. Petitioner argues that the three complaints cannot be lumped together and a single
order issued for their resolution as these complaints involve different sets of facts and are based on different loan
transactions.

Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted as part of the complaints were not considered by the
Ombudsman when it issued the assailed Orders; that the findings of the Committee that the subject loans are
behest loans prevail; and, that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is not barred by
prescription.

In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission as authority,
contends that the provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution, which provides for the imprescriptibility of
the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil actions and not to criminal cases. The
Ombudsman further avers that prior to its amendment, Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for the
prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was ten years.
Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982 increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. Applying
the Constitution and the law to the present case, the Ombudsman argues that, except with respect to the two loan
transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the other alleged criminal acts of herein private respondents in
connection with the loan transactions they entered into in the years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995.
Hence, private respondents can no longer be prosecuted with respect to these transactions.

The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is authorized to dismiss, motu proprio, a complaint even without
requiring the respondents to file their counter-affidavits and even without conducting a preliminary investigation.

As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982, the Ombusman
contends that based on pieces of evidence presented by the complainant, the said loans had more than sufficient
collateral.

The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his application of pertinent laws as well as rules of evidence
deserve great weight and respect and even accorded full faith and credit in the absence of any showing of any error
or grave abuse of discretion.

Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Placido L. Mapa, Jr.,
Conrado T. Calalang, Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C. Silverio filed their respective Comments. While the present
petition is pending in this Court, respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose Teves died.5 In a Resolution6issued by this
Court dated February 22, 2006, respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo Salcedo and Antonio
Mendoza were dropped as respondents for an earlier resolution of the case after all efforts of petitioner to ascertain
their correct and present addresses proved to be in vain.

With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their respective comments, the Court dispenses with the
comments in order that the present petition may be resolved.

The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this was the main basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing
petitioner's complaints.

Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto7 , the Court held that the imprescriptibility of the right of the State
to recover ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. In
other words, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution may be barred by prescription.8

Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on March
16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said Act was increased from ten to fifteen years.

As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein respondents had already prescribed, the Court's
disquisition on an identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto9 is instructive, to wit:

The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code are
found in Articles 90 and 91 of the same Code. For those penalized by special laws, Act No. 3326, as amended,
applies. Here, since R.A. 3019, the law alleged to have been violated, is a special law, the applicable law in the
computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not
be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."

The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee vs. Hon. Desierto*, we
held:

x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or
conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of
the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.

The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase if the same not be known in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not
mean lack of knowledge but that the crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable, as it provides an
interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language
and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application."

We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto**thus:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the
violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19,
2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee
on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of
those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the
offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.10

The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the exact dates when the alleged offenses were
discovered. However, it is not disputed that it was the Committee that discovered the same. As such, the discovery
could not have been made earlier than October 13, 1992, the date when the Committee was created. It is clear,
therefore, that the alleged criminal offenses against herein respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaints
were filed in 1996. Thus, the Ombudsman seriously erred in dismissing the three complaints filed by petitioner on
the ground of prescription.

As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the Ombudsman to deny petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
on the ground that the same was filed out of time:

The Ombudsman is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty in the determination of whether or not the
said Motion was really filed beyond the reglementary period as provided under the pertinent rules of the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, this presumption is disputable. In the present case, petitioner contends that the subject
Motion was sent by registered mail on July 29, 1998, which was the last day allowed for filing of the same. As proof
of such mailing, petitioner presented a Certification11 issued by the Central Post Office in Manila stating therein that
Registered Letter No. 74220 was sent by the PCGG on July 29, 1998, addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman in
Manila, and that said letter was duly delivered to and received on August 5, 1998 by an authorized representative of
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman failed to controvert petitioner's submission in any of the pleadings
filed in the present petition. A simple referral to the date that appears on the front page of the Motion for
Reconsideration, indicating the date when the Office of the Ombudsman received the Motion, would have easily
disputed the allegation of petitioners. In the absence thereof, the Court finds that the presumption of regularity of the
Ombudsman's performance of his official duties must yield to the evidence presented by petitioner. As such,
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be considered as
timely filed.

Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31, 1998 of the Ombudsman shows that there are
grounds other than late filing upon which the Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, to wit:

xxxx

All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of this case, particularly the fact
that the subject loans are now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans, the same remains to be bare
allegations with no new evidence tendered to thwart the Order in question.

The complaints herein are plain and simple. There is no allegation even that the questioned loans were granted "at
the behest" of respondent officials in these cases x x x.

x x x x12

It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing the complaints was not merely the prescription of the
complaints, but also the lack of any allegation therein that the questioned loans are behest loans.

However, while there was no specific or particular mention that the questioned loan accounts were "behest loans,"
the complaints contain allegations consistent with the criteria laid down by Memorandum Order No. 61 issued by
President Ramos on November 9, 1992.

The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame of reference in determining whether a loan, which is
under scrutiny, is behest:
 (a) It is under-collateralized;

(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

(c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, like the presence of marginal notes;

(d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;

(e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;

(f) Use of corporate layering;

(g) Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and

(h) Extraordinary speed with which the loan release was made.13 (Emphasis supplied).

In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon. Desierto,14 the Ombudsman adopted the position that to
qualify as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria enumerated in Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present.

It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in the present case that the complaints against PRGS and
Filcarbon were bereft of any allegations that their questioned loans are behest, considering that said complaints
explicitly alleged the presence of two of the criteria: that the subject loans are "under-collateralized" and that the
borrower corporations are "undercapitalized."

Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, provides:

SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit, but a sense of
justice and fairness demands that the Ombudsman must set forth in a Resolution the reasons for such dismissal.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.15 This Court has held that the
constitutional and statutory mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based applies as well to dispositions by quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies.16 In fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, makes the Rules of Court applicable, in a suppletory manner, to its own rules of procedure. One of the
requirements provided under Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court is that a judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case should state the facts and the law on which it is based.

A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman shows that there is no express finding that the
complaints filed by petitioner were manifestly without merit. There is no explanation or discussion, whatsoever, as to
how it reached its conclusion that the disputed loans are not behest insofar as PRGS and Filcarbon are concerned.
Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon, the Court finds it necessary to refer
them back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on their merits.

As to Golden River, the Ombudsman did not err in dismissing the complaint against it with respect to its loan
transactions obtained on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982. The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from
the findings of the Ombudsman, to wit:

Discussing these two loans, we find that in 1980, Golden River Corporation was granted a refinance in the amount
of P14,724,430 pesos. Such grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less than 50% of the said P14,724,430 pesos,
hence, this cannot be said to be granted with insufficient collateral, taking the same as reference point alone without
the previous collaterals and assets which were admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in paragraph b, p. 2
of the Sworn Statement of Orlando L. Salvador (p. 10, Records, OMB-0-96-2644)

xxx

Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on December 1, 1982 is not more than 50% of the additional assets alone
which is the money equivalent of the two refinanced loans of P14,724,430.00 and P5,551,000.00 the total of which
is P20,275,430.00 pesos. Considering that the refinancing ratio has a maximum of 70% of the total
assets/collaterals, even the last two loans which were within the prescriptive period are not without sufficient
collaterals.

In other words, collaterals were sufficient in accordance with Sec. 78, R.A. 337, as amended (General Banking Act)
x x x17

This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its
facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should
he find it to be insufficient in form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he
may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite
relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman18 and reiterated in the case of The Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto,19 to wit:

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the
1avv phi 1

Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention.
This court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public service.20

As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.21 The basis for
this rule was provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman22 where the Court held as follows:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.23

While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in case of clear
abuse of discretion,24 the Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against Golden
River insofar as the two 1982 loan transactions are concerned.

However, the complaint against Golden River had not been completely disposed of by the Ombudsman as it failed
to discuss the refinancing loan obtained by the said corporation in 1980 for the amount of P14,724,430.00. Hence,
the complaint against Golden River should also be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its
merits with respect to the aforementioned loan.
Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaints without requiring respondents to file
their counter-affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further require petitioner to clarify its evidence or adduce
additional evidence.

It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may
dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a
preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint.25 Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of
merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal.26 The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a
preliminary investigation is proper.27 It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for
lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit
and petitioner, its reply.

Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act of consolidating the three complaints and of
issuing a single order for their dismissal considering that, with the exception of the complaint regarding the two 1982
loan accounts of Golden River which was separately discussed by the Ombudsman on their merits, the dismissal of
all the other complaints was based on a common ground, which is prescription.

However, in the remand of the complaints against respondents, orderly administration of justice behooves the
Ombudsman not to consolidate the three complaints, as the respective respondents therein would inevitably raise
different defenses which would require separate presentation of evidence by the parties involved.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Except with respect to the complaints relative to the
loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982, the assailed Orders of the
Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 and August 31, 1998 in OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645
are SET ASIDE.

The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation on the respective merits of the
complaints against herein respondents pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule II of its Rules of Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-Region
VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to
assail the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the
March 26, 2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65,
Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Buenavista,
Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a
public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such,
was in the custody and possession of public funds in the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing
the value of her collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her
office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take,
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and
despite notice and demands made upon her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the
Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing
Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case
filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor,
and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the
offense charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that
in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and
issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the
Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner
pleaded not guilty under the Information.8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.10

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under
review.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.

Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation of Public
Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Courts
ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001 in the
Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the
constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.13

Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to
the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence
was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and
prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999
Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001
Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time
the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.

The petition lacks merit.

The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the
August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed
against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the
Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only
graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains
to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official"
is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the
Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by
other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature
to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal
liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel
of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA
6770.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to
385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive
and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is
SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision
in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the
RTC, for, "given the Courts Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial courts assailed Orders x x x
are, in hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in
cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August 9,
1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.

Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for
otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed."17

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of the date of its
original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts
light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court
in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7,
1989.

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the
Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the
validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective
application.19 But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be
deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.20

In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor
did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous
pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its
effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes
conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.

With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ*

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

DANTE O. TINGA*
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 144492 December 18, 2008

LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUEZ, AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, JUDGE
ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G. NALANGAN, ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, JULIO C. DIAZ and AGAPITO
BORINAGA, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former
Congresswoman Luwalhati R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South Cotabato which
includes General Santos City (city), assailing that portion of the Resolution2 dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing the case against private respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T.
Nuez (Mayor Nuez), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director for
Region XI Augustus L. Momongan (Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O. Adre (Judge
Adre), former City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra
(Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of
South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional Technical Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga
(Borinaga) (respondents).

The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:

Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal on October 3, 1963
(Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which states that:

do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health resort site purposes,
under the administration of the municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be, a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the said municipality and more particularly described
as follows:

Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation

The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park

A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of Dadiangas, Municipality of General
Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an area of 52,678 square meters.

On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26), known as the "Charter of the City of
General Santos" was enacted creating the City of General Santos where it is provided that "The National
Government hereby cedes to the City of General Santos the ownership and possession to all lands of the
public domain within the city." Later, said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August 16, 1971
(Record, pp. 27-28) wherein it read that "The disposition of all lands of the public domain within the city shall
be in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended:
Provided, That all incomes and receipts derived from such disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as
provided in this Act."

On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was thereafter subdivided into
three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters
and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or a total of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent to the
original area.

However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273
amending Proclamation No. 168 (Record, pp. 29-31), which provides that:

do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168 dated October 3, 1963, which
established the recreational and health resort reservation situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao, certain portions of the land embraced therein
and declare the same open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which parcels
of land are more particularly described as follows:

Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D

(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE METERS. x x x

Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D

(Magsaysay Park)

A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x containing an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE METERS. x x x

Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore reserved for
recreational and health resort site purposes.

As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with the District Land Office
and consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in 1983. In 1984, two cases were filed by the
local government of General Santos City against the said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles
and, on the other hand, the Heirs of Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction and
Damages. The said three cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 22, presided by respondent Judge Abednego Adre.

On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed Resolution No. 87, Series of
1991, entitled "Resolution Approving the Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and between the City
Government of General Santos represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re:
Magsaysay Park" (Record, pp. 1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said Compromise Agreement
(Record, pp. 33-39) state that:

1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D and Y-2, MR-1160-D with
combined area of THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (37,658) SQUARE
METERS, and from this the HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES shall receive a total net area of TWENTY
THOUSAND (20,000) SQUARE METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658) SQUARE METERS which if
added to Lot X, MR-1160-D, previously donated to the CITY as stated in par. 7 of the WHEREAS
clause, with an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE METERS (located
in between Lots Y-1 and Y-2), the CITY shall retain a total area of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT (32,678) SQUARE METERS.

Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuez, assisted by respondent
Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.
As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent Judge Abednego Adre issued an Order
(Record, pp. 40-52), covering the three pending cases, on May 6, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
states:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in conformity with Article 6 in

correlation with Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the same is hereby APPROVED
and ADOPTED as judgment in these cases. The parties are enjoined to faithfully comply therewith.

A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.

However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an Extraneous Subject from the
Coverage of the Judgment thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory Order" submitted by the
Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer and Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively,
respondent Judge issued another Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited three
cases, stating that:

ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and jurisprudence, the motion for exclusion of Lot X,
MR-1160-D comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS is GRANTED. The movants heirs of Kusop
are, however, enjoined to donate to the City of General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of
the compromise agreement.

On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of
Lot X, to be divided as follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75):

Applicants Area applied

1. Mad Guaybar
2. Oliver Guaybar
3. Jonathan Guaybar
4. Alex Guaybar
5. Jack Guiwan
6. Nicolas Ynot
7. Carlito Flaviano III
8. Jolito Poralan
9. Miguela Cabi-ao
10. Jose Rommel Saludar
11. Joel Teves
12. Rico Altizo
13. Johnny Medillo
14. Martin Saycon
15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr.
16. Jose Bomez
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 999 sq. m.;
- 510 sq. m.; and,
- 524 sq. m.

The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land Management Inspector,
recommended for the approval of the survey authority requested by the above-named private respondents
for Lot X (Record, p. 418).

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private respondents by public respondent CENR
Officer Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots (refer to
subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).

On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez, assisted by respondent City Legal Officer
Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to application documents, Record, pp. 421-500)
addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X applied by private respondents and stated therein that
"this office interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on application
covering portions thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X,
MR-1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said courts order dated
July 22, 1997."

Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor Leonardo Dinopol, together with
recommendation for approval from respondent Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16 stating
therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square meter and existing improvements of residential light
house per lot with an appraised value ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers,
Record, pp. 421-500).

Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the
Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the private
sale of the subject lots to the above-named applicants-respondents, without public auction (refer to sample
letter-report of recommendation in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, Renato
Rivera, also issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants addressed to the PENR
Officer for the approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and of the private sale (please refer to sample
recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o], Record, p. 78).

A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same date stating therein that on
September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold (Record, p. 79).

On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra, which titles were also signed by respondent Augustus
Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to wit:

Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No. Record Page No.

1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;
9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;
13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;
16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.

Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the above-named
registered owners sold their lots, through their attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the AFP-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred
Ninety-Seven Thousand Pesos (P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were issued in the name of the vendee on September 25, 1997
(Record, pp. 151-173).

On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange with
AFP-RSBS, represented by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of lots X-6 and X-7
with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter two lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-
 178). While lots X-15 and X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to
respondent Nilo Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).3

Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit4 before the Ombudsman against the
respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan
Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose
Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez
(Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and
Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019,5 as amended, and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.

The Ombudsman's Ruling

In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman held that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan, among
others, entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and pursuant to the authority granted to them
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor
Nuez and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the validity
of the Compromise Agreement had been settled when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the RTC found
it to be in order. The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of
the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly performed their official
functions. Accordingly, the charges against the respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following crimes were
committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:

1. CESAR JONILLO sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document to the sixteen (16)
recommendation reports submitted;

2. RENATO RIVERA sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document relative to the sixteen (16)
reports submitted, all dated August 4, 1997;

3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN,
CARLITO FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL
SALUDAR, JOEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON, ARSENIO DE LOS
REYES, and JOSE BOMEZ in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR JONILLO and RENATO
RIVERA one (1) count each for private respondents and sixteen (16) counts each for public respondents
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019;

4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO as conspirators for twelve (12) counts
of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;

5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN,
JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO,
JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each as conspirator in the falsification of public
document relative to the corresponding unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;

6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of
section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government inn the correct amount of taxes due for the sale
of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and

7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN,
JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO,
JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as
conspirator in short-changing the government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS.
 Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned respondents be filed with the proper courts.

Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUEZ, AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE,

ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of criminal cases against private respondents, for
offenses committed not in conspiracy with the herein public respondents, by the proper parties-in-
interest.

SO RESOLVED.6

On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied by the Ombudsman
in his Order7 dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already filed
against the aforementioned indicted and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular
courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.

The Sole Issue

Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:

THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING
THE CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X
OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER.8

Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among
all the respondents and those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay
Park. To prove her claim of a grand conspiracy, petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and
involvement of each respondent, as follows:

1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997 was part of the grand scheme and was
made the basis for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions.
The same Order was likewise used by Mayor Nuez and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no
objection to the said applications. The assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years
after his Judgment based on the Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre, therefore, violated Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019.

2. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by reason of their respective offices and as
administrators of the properties of the city, that Lot X of the Magsaysay Park is owned by the city and
reserved as health and recreation site. Yet, Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the
assailed RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was no existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo
Kusop to the city. Likewise, in their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing the
applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor Nuez and Nalangan endorsed the same and
interposed no objection thereto. Said Indorsement was part of the grand conspiracy and was utilized as a
front for the resale of the said property to AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner submits that Mayor
Nuez and Nalangan also violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

3. After Mayor Nuez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo
submitted his falsified report on August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same date, scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad
Guaybar and his companions on September 5, 1997. Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided
lots of Lot X on September 5, 1997 without public auction and at the disadvantageous price recommended
by Rivera. Therefore, Diaz, as a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification of public documents.
 4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the Motion for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order
before Judge Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the assailed RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera
likewise represented to the RTC that upon verification, they did not find in the records any deed of donation
executed by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a grand
scheme to defraud the city.

5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not disposable and alienable and is, therefore,
not a proper subject of a sales patent application. Despite such knowledge and based on the falsified reports
of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan allowed Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his
companions by approving their miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original Certificates of Title
(OCTs) covering the subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false reports, and
granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar and his companions, to the injury of the city.

6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents and titles may be considered as
ministerial, the circumstances under which the titles were issued in the names of Mad Guaybar and his
companions and eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS, indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of
the grand conspiracy to defraud the city. Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was transcribed and signed by
Cruzabra on September 22, 1997. On the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners'
copies of the OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing Atty. Flaviano to be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of selling their respective lots; and
Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA in their respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty.
Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the same day the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax due
thereon. On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in lieu thereof, twelve (12) Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were transferred and
registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the
registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that Cruzabra could not have been unaware of
the restrictions; instead, she allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFP-RSBS so swiftly,
that it could only be interpreted as part of the scheme to defraud the city.9

In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory functions, by completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of substantial evidence which clearly
establish the existence of a common design among the respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and
disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.

On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective defenses against petitioner's claims, as follows:

1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), contends that, in effect, petitioner
is asking this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the Ombudsman during the preliminary
investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman10 and Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman,11 this Court accorded highest respect for the factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a
clear case of grave abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse
of discretion because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits, have valid and legal justifications,
sufficient for the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.12

2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists between her and other respondents
charged before the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to Cruzabra refer to recorded
transactions which are legal acts. Such allegations did not discuss how the alleged conspiracy was
committed; they are merely conjectures and bare allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed,
and there is no convincing evidence to support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain any restriction to transfer
the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As such, Cruzabra submits that it would be most unfair if she would be
made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply because she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of
Deeds.13

3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive Director of the DENR, he is duly
authorized to sign patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard procedure and processes were
complied with, Momongan simply relied on his subordinates and on their good faith. He argues that he acted
 in accordance with law, department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to require him to scrutinize
every phase of a report of a subordinate is a very tall order.14

4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution15 of the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and Security, dated December 23, 1998, not
one of the respondents was recommended for prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the
Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre claims that he acted properly, and even sought the opinion of the OSG before
the Compromise Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre narrated that due to the vagaries of
politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no motion for execution was filed by then Mayor Adelbert Antonino,
husband of petitioner, after Mayor Nuez lost in the elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the
Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not execute any deed of donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC
did not lose jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for Clarification and Exclusion were filed; thus, the
issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X and enjoining the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop from donating
the same to the city in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise agreement, was proper.16

5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not be disturbed, as they are not attended by
grave abuse of discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance with law; that as the Regional Technical
Director is not required to go to the premises of the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he may
rely on the data submitted by the CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.17 Moreover, Borinaga argues that
the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of
time.18 The Certification19 dated October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records Officer IV of the Office
of the Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served with a copy of the assailed Resolution on
February 24, 1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo, Process Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only
on February 4, 2000.

6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he participated in a grand scheme to
unlawfully dispose of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he issued the notice of sale, he did so
on the basis of the requisite documents submitted to his office.20

7. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuez did not violate the Charter of the City, because
when she entered into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, she was authorized by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of
committee and public hearings. The same was also referred to the OSG, which recommended its approval.
When the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but to tell
the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of donation made in favor of the city. While they admit to have
issued Indorsements, they made it clear that the DENR shall undertake only what is legally feasible. Mayor
Nuez and Nalangan asseverate that they had no intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as
they even filed a case against Mad Guaybar and his companions.21

Our Ruling

The instant Petition lacks merit.

Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)22 provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion
for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she received through counsel the
assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish that her Motion for
Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the
aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24,
1999. There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in
this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration. After the
respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no
justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant Petition ought to be dismissed. And on the
substantive issue raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit.

Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has
the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.23 Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A
contrary rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way
that courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.24

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,25where we
laid down the following exceptions to the rule:

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;

4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;

10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.26

The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court
finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing
the charges against respondents, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, thus:
 Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is constrained to limit its evaluation of the issue
on the participation of each respondent in the titling of Lot X, whether the same would constitute a violation
of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.

1. Respondent Abednego Adre His participation extends only to his issuance of an Order excluding Lot-X
from the coverage of the Compromise Agreement.

A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise Agreement confirms the Order of the
respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The Order of respondent judge was made in accordance with
the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that respondent judge assisted in preserving the claim of the
government of General Santos City over Lot X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private
respondents.

2. Respondents Nuez and Nalangan Said respondents participation in the titling of Lot-X was when they
issued or caused the issuance of Indorsements stating therein that "this office (Office of the Mayor)
interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your (CENRO) office may pursue on the application
covering portions thereof (Lot-X)."

The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be construed as a waiver on the part of General
Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to take the necessary
legal proceedings relative to the titling of the property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR
has the responsibility, authority and the power to grant alienable and disposable lands to deserving
claimants.

Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that respondents Nuez and Nalangan gave
unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing said Indorsements. In fact, they protected the interest of the
government over Lot-X by immediately filing a case for nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances
thereof.

xxxx

[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan, Asteria E. Cruzabra
Based on the evidences on record, these respondents were in the regular performance of their official
functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X was due to the fact that the documents for titling were
submitted to their respective offices as a matter of course, and there is nothing that they can do but to follow
the established procedure upon finding that all the documents for titling were submitted.27

Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute,
nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the
Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails.28

Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No.
3019, are as follows:

(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;

(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties, or
in relation to his or her public functions;

(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;

(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;
and

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.29
Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the accused that caused undue
injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. Bad faith per se is not
enough for one to be held liable under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for
ulterior purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other
persons may be affected.30

As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident bad faith and/or gross
negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is good faith, not bad faith, which is
presumed, as the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good
faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.31

Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted. However, as found by the
Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample evidence. At best, the evidence
adduced was not clear as to respondents' participation in the acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi- the
burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the prosecution. The inherent weakness of complainant's case is not a
ground for the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation.32 For it is fundamental that conspiracy cannot be
presumed. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design.33This, the petitioner sadly
failed to establish.

All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581 February 28, 2005

PETER L. SESBREO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE GLORIA B. AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

Peter L. Sesbreo filed a Verified Complaint1 dated March 2, 2004 against respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B.
Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service relative to Criminal Case No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.

It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuez
(Nuez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the Traffic Management Unit of
San Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned
to respondent judges branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition.

After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued a Consolidated Resolution2 dated May 6, 2003,
dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting for arraignment the
case for Usurpation of Authority. Except for Marcelino who failed to appear during the arraignment, all of the
accused were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a warrant for Marcelinos arrest.

Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants Urgent Manifestation3 dated February 6, 2004 alleging that
the accused were also charged with violation of Republic Act No. 104 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of arrest
be likewise issued against all of the accused.

Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order5 dated February 12, 2004 stating that a charge for
violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to
oversight. However, since the statute only applies to members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive
activities pursuant to People v. Lidres,6 and considering that the complaint failed to allege this element, respondent
judge found no probable cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied complainants prayer for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office
(PPO) for review.1a\^/phi 1.net

Thereafter, complainants counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreo (Atty. Sesbreo), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-Appearing
Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not act on these motions allegedly because the court had already lost
jurisdiction over the case by then.

The PPO affirmed respondents order and remanded the case to the court for further proceedings on the charge of
Usurpation of Authority.

During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuez did not appear. Atty.
Sesbreo, however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the
cancellation of the scheduled hearing.

The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant administrative complaint.
Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules when she refused to issue
warrants of arrest against the accused. Complainant also faults respondent judge for allegedly motu
proprio reconsidering her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the Office
of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.

In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint7 dated March 26, 2004, respondent judge
counters that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge. Since she found no indication that
the accused would abscond, she found it unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman
Prosecutor. The PPO can take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus, she acted in
accordance with law when she forwarded the records of the case to the PPO for review and not to the Office of the
Ombudsman as complainant insists.

Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreo of falsification, and the latter of violation of Rule
1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, the affidavit which was attached to the
instant verified complaint was not notarized by Atty. Raul Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty. Sesbreo was
allegedly convicted of Homicide and may have been suspended from the practice of law.

Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainants Reply To Respondents Comment Dated March 26,
20048 dated May 11, 2004. He further contends that there is no provision in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically
deputizing the PPO to be the "Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor" as respondent judge contends. He adds that
respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 8 since she has yet to forward her resolution to the
Deputy Ombudsman.

Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to his complaint was notarized by Atty. Corro as certified
by a member of the latters staff. Complainant also disproves respondent judges allegation that Atty. Sesbreo is in
the habit of filing administrative complaints against judges, explaining that the latter merely acted as counsel for
litigants who filed administrative complaints against certain judges.

In another Verified Complaint9 filed on March 18, 2004, complainant further charges respondent with violating Sec.
9(b), Rule 112 of the Rules.

Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint10 dated May 7, 2004
clarifying that contrary to complainants allegation, she did not conduct a preliminary investigation in the case for
Usurpation of Authority. What was submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge for violation of R.A. 10. It
was her resolution dismissing the charge for violation of R.A. 10 which was transmitted to the PPO for appropriate
action. However, since the charges for violation of R.A. 10 and Usurpation of Authority were contained in a single
complaint, respondent judge deemed it proper to forward the entire records to the PPO.

Complainant filed a Complainants Reply To Respondents Comment Dated May 7, 200411 dated May 20, 2004
substantially reiterating his allegations.

The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a supplemental complaint per the notation in
the Memorandum12 dated June 25, 2004.

In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to appear during trial; in issuing
her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the records
of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman. 1awphi1.nt

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit but that
respondent judge should be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties.13 It made the
following findings:

A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules reveals that there is nothing in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of the accused
during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the
private prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.

As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who, with or without pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully
entitled to do so, shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years.
Violation thereof is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court but subject to preliminary investigation.

Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she conducted the preliminary examination of the
complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found no probable cause and ordered the
dismissal of the case. Therefore, when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause, she was acting in accordance with the procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office on
review. Sec. 5 of Rule 112 provides that the resolution of the Investigating Judge is subject to review by the
provincial or city prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.

It is respondent Judges contention that the resolution shall be reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She explained
that pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
charge of Violation of R.A. No. 10.

However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" provides that prosecutors can (be)
deputized by the Ombudsman to act as special investigator or prosecutor only on certain cases. Such provision is
not applicable to the issue at hand. Therefore, respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to
the Provincial Prosecutors Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that respondent Judge was motivated by
bad faith when she issued the assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error for which she could not be held
administratively accountable absent any proof of fraud or other evil motive.14

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.15Thus, a
preliminary investigation is not required nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised
Penal Code which is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.16

This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said section provides:

Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court.If the complaint or information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be
observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause
after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however,
require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of
probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10)
days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall
l^vvphi1.net

issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial.
However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest.

Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the
procedure laid down in Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold the latter for trial. However, the
judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary
to place the accused under custody.
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions for the determination of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judges sound judgment.17

Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the case to the prosecutor for review.

In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, found probable cause to hold the accused for trial
for the charge of Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set their arraignment and the pre-trial. There is nothing
irregular in the course of action taken by respondent judge.

Neither is there merit in complainants contention that respondent judge should have issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused for their failure to appear during the initial presentation of evidence for the prosecution for the
charge of Usurpation of Authority. The issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial
is discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, there is nothing in the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of
arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial.

Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she failed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10
in her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003. Nonetheless, she asserts in her Comment With Motion To
Dismiss Administrative Complaint18 dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary investigation for the charge
of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence
presented. Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation was conducted for this
charge.19 Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correct
an oversight.

Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it was the dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A.
10 that was elevated to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge to transmit the entire
records of the case to the PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the records of
the case. Respondent judge should have ensured that at least one complete set of the records remained in
her sala so that the prosecution for Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her actuation
was, we do not agree with complainant that respondent judge was motivated by an evil intent to delay the case.

This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004
dismissing the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the PPO. Complainant
asserts that since the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the
Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.

This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 820 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure
of the Ombudsman, which provides "that all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover,
"[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases21 against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistant
prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to
the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy
Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court
or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not
more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
shall be forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman."

Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law when she forwarded the
case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the court for further
proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is
quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in
order to preclude delay in the disposition of the case.

In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established
that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent judges actuations are hardly
indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay the case which characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the
law.22
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Judge Gloria B.
Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 158543 July 21, 2004

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER PUNZALAN, petitioners,

vs.
DENCIO DELA PEA and ROBERT CAGARA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the June 6, 2002 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of
August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the
group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others
arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?"2 Dela Pea replied,
"Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako."3 Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Pea while
Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody
shouted, "Yariin na yan!"4 Thereafter, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a balisong but
missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.

While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed
the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby,
intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier
Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latters house and locked
themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo dyan,
putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!"5 Dela Pea, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and
proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted
Homicide6 and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Pea filed
several counter-charges7 for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical
injuries against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall
Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Pea against Alex "Toto"
Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).

In their counter-affidavit,8 the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade
them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against
Plata and Cagara, respectively.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522,
against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert,
magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho."9In her
defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan,10 holding that Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory
statements would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by
Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not actionable.11 The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier,
Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peas claim that
he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously
filed by Rainier against the latter.12

Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice
Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City
Prosecutor by ordering, among others (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan
be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14
others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be
downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to
file information for three (3) counts of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two
(2) counts [of] other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda,
Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information for
malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo,
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and
John Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed separate motions for
reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should
be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a
state of shock and anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier, the Secretary
held that the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case
filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Pea failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his
companions intended to kill him. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23,
2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the separate
informations for slight oral defamation, other light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft
against all respondents and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.14

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated October 11, 2000.15

On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying that the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of
Attempted Homicide against Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex
"Toto" Ofrin.16

On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned Resolutions of public
respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the
respondents Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la
Cruz, Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente "Joven"
Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.

The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it directed the
withdrawal of information for two (2) counts of other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.18 Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignment of
errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE
6, 2000 AND OCTOBER 11, 2000.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION
HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF
RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN MUST BE
PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.19

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable
cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against petitioners Randall and Rainier
Punzalan for Attempted Homicide.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is
in the judges findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact, appeal is the remedy.20

Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he
does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his
jurisdiction.21 In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan,22 it was held that grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient
that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.23

We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June
6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and
control" includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate
officials or units.24

In the case of People v. Peralta,25 we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
variety of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of
Appeals,26 we declared that:

A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no
clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been
presented by the petitioner.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum
of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute
when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient
to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with
the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.

Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor
and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the other respondents other than
Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated
the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper
officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the
parties and their witnesses and determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made
within the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed.
The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary
of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of
Justice in a Resolution dated June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Pea be likewise investigated for
the charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making
him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the
complaint of herein respondent Dencio Dela Pea should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the
shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan.

In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding
of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not
interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to
review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 6, 2002 and the
Resolution dated May 23, 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
attempted homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171175 October 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARTURO F. DUCA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set
aside and annul the Decision1 dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
28312.

The CA decision reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal
Case No. 2003-0194-D3 which affirmed an earlier decision4 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San
Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:

It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of the crime of Falsification of
Official Document defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code in an Information which reads:

"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused confederating together and mutually abiding each other,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of a
Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-
116131 of the Municipal Assessors Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature
appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not because the
latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, and it was accused
Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private
complainant Pedro Calanayan."

Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty. Then trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter "Calanayan"), private
complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F.
Duca and Vangie F. Duca before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no
appeal interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the said decision became final and executory. On November 22,
1999, a writ of execution was issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money
judgment was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca covered by TCT No.
233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the
auction sale.

On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with
prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers
Roberto Vical, Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the
ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she presented Property Index No. 013-32-
027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the back of the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair
market value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on top of the typewritten
name Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San
Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of
Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who
was out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That because of the
misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against
Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.

Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in
the execution as she was in Manila at that time.

On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his. However, he intersposed
the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax declaration.

On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said
accused a prison term of two years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of
P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of evidence.

The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the amount of
P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.

SO ORDERED."

Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44,
rendered a decision, disposing the case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one
day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining
witness actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.

x x x.

SO ORDERED."5

Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. On November 23,
2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC
decision. The CA held:

However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by Aldrin in procuring the
tax declaration. On the contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his
brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the house erected on the land registered under their mothers name.

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the Tax Declaration of Real
Property under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit "B") by making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his
brother, participated in the accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of
the latter. It must be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally,
to register the house in the latters name as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of Arturo
was confirmed by the latters execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 confirming the procurement of the
said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power of attorney executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7").
Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning had already been cured so much so that the said document
became valid and binding as an official act of Arturo.

If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this deficiency was cured by Aldrins
subsequent execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".

The RTCs conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere afterthought designed to
extricate Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since from the very start, it has been duly established by the
defense that Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering
his house constructed on his mothers lot for taxation purposes.6

Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCAS APPEAL
WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.7

Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondents appeal
without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and
without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the
CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People.
Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without affording the prosecution
the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void
for being violative of due process.

In his Comment,8 respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because the prosecution was properly
represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of
evidence under the control and supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred
on the private prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim
that the prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he should not
be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutors failure to inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely
vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(emphasis supplied)

Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cario v. De Castro,9 it was held:
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the
People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and
functions of the OSG was to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book
IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in
all criminal cases.10

Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,11 the Court made the following pronouncement:

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit
trial courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or
this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal.12

And in Labaro v. Panay,13 the Court held:

The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government or the People of the
Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body,
or commission in any matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare
of the people as the ends of justice may require.14

Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People.
The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Ducas petition. A copy
of the CA Resolution15 dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime
Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge
Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said
Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.

Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.16 ruled as follows:

When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433
[Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17
SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the States right to due process raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78;
Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).17

The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to
present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision
rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack
of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.18

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his
comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said
petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,19 we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict
of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly
to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.20

Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his
petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent
failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City.21 The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would
be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in
appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondents failure to have a copy of his petition served on the
People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in
Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However,
the CA, instead of dismissing respondents petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even acquitted
respondent without the Solicitor Generals comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed decision.

On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without
filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.22 This rule, however, is not without
exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals,23 we held:

However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that while generally a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to
rectify its errors, this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when the issue
raised is purely one of law, or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on
certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.24(emphasis
supplied)

The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No.
28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings. The CA is ordered to
decide the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.** ARTURO D. BRION***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice