You are on page 1of 22

MANUEL LARA ET AL.

, plaintiffs-appellants
VS
PERTONILO ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appelle
G.R. NO. L-6339

Facts:

Manuel Lara et al were former taxi drivers of Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr. In September
1950, Del Rosario sold some of his vehicles which led to Lara et al not being needed anymore.
Eventually, their services were terminated. Because their employer did not give them their one
months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, Lara et al
sued Del Rosario.

However, Del Rosario contended that the Code of Commerce was already repealed hence
Lara et al have no legal basis. Del Rosario contends that the New Civil Code took effect in
August 1950 or a year after release for publication.

ISSUE: When did the New Civil Code took effect?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Lara et al has no legal basis for their claims since the
provision of the Code of Commerce they are relying on was already repealed by the New Civil
Code. Their alleged dismissal from service without notice took place in September 1950 after the
New Civil Code took effect.

The Supreme Court also clarified that, in an obiter dictum, that the new Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official
Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made on
August 30, 1949.
Lorenzo Taada vs Juan Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986

FACTS:

With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official
Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and
clarification.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long
as the people were sufficiently informed.

HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it
finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature.
The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with prescribed
procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause unless otherwise provided pertains to the date of
publication and not the requirement of publication.
Felisa De Roy vs Court of Appeals
G.R NO.80718
January 29, 1988

FACTS:

The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the
death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she
was ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the
case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or
for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.

HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.
Grace Garcia vs Rederick Recio
G.R. NO.138322
October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on
March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the
Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently,
Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October
22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of
divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia. The trial court
rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both
parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso factocapacitated him to
remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records,
the court cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally
capacitated to marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare her marriage
null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was
really capacitated to marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the
following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
, G. R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001

FACTS:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he was
then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal
or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
and platform but without a safety lock. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the
State Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from
the company anymore an civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the
Labor Code.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and
compensatory damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the
Civil Code after recovering from damages provided for under the Labor Code.

Held: The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under
the Workers Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that
an injured worker has a choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some exceptions.
In the case at bar, the CA ruled that the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil
actions because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights and courses of action.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies,
the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy,
in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in
nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both
parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices.
The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a
waiver by election.
However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with
an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must
be illustratedon the record or by the evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver
when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an
intelligent decision.

In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to
claim from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the
petitioner-company. Petitioners argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that
Ignorance of the law excuses no one cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that
the application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced
from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not
excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a
choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar
G.R. No. L-19650
September 29, 1966

FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. The mechanics
of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However,
then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the
contest is a violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines
through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be
delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot
be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for
declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is
missing. Said element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything theres
no consideration on the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was
merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts
to call for a construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said
contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift
enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper.
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.
HELD:
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Blacks Law
Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No.
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is
lacking (no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under
prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries,
there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the
term gift enterprise was used in association with the term lottery. As such, the principle
of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a
sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term gift
enterprise be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is
neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal
service.
People vs. Jabinal
55 SCRA 607
February 27, 1974

FACTS:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding
the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of
the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People
vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964,
he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without
the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed
by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted
him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer.
Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the
accused sought for his acquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided
otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and
subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

ISSUE:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

RULING:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.
Perfecto Floresca vs Philex Mining Corporation
G.R. No. L-30642
April 30, 1985

FACTS:
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate
civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits
under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular
courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from
claiming benefits under the WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount
given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth
life.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting


No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already
liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage
suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly
removed by the legislature NOT the SC.
National Marketing Corporation, plaintiff-appellant vs.
Miguel Tecson, defendant-appellee

G.R.NO.L-20131
August27, 1969

FACTS:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil
case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the
same defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation vs.
Tecson). Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action.

More than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot
that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two
days too late.

The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues, the issue thus confined to the date on which
ten years from December 21, 1955 had expired.

However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same is erroneous because a year
means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to
December 21 of the following year is one year. The case reached its conclusion with the
appellants theory that contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.

RULING: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the
policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process
and not by judicial decree.
Pastor Tenchavez vs Vicenta Escao
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965

FACTS:
In February 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao secretly married each other and
of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The
marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they
insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a re-celebration because
she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their
relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of
absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an
American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents
dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and caused her to be estranged from him hence hes asking
for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation
being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the
Escaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to
public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the
marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was
dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents
dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be
awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of
Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry,
the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by
Escao and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded
and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly
established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper
conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00
to P5,000.00 only.
Maria Cristina Bellis vs Edward Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
20 SCRA 358 Civil Law Application of Laws Nationality Principle

Succession Nationality of the Decedent Legitimes

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom
he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate children
in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing
of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the
ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights
of the illegitimate children.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled
to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no
legitimes.
RCPI vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-44748
August 29, 1986

143 SCRA 657 Civil Law Torts and Damages Human Relations Article 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code Negligence

FACTS:

Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. (RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following:

SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO


KAHIT BULBUL MO

The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages
based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the attached
message was an insider joke between RCPI an employee which was not meant to be attached.
RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libellous acts of its
employees.

Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it affected greatly
his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is
predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of
action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as
respondents breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for
its subsidiary liability.

RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any
safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well
of its concern for their clienteles interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is
imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its
employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its employees. It
cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public
availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.
Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals

160 SCRA 449 (1988)

FACTS:

A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because the president,
herein petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College neglected his duty to inform the
student on the result of a case against the student which has, as its punishment, the removal of
awards or citations of the student. Said case was the extension of loans to students, which the
president contends to be against the school rules and regulations, and which the student
innocently performed in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club and in
accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said constitution was
presented and approved by the president. The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of
Public Schools after being denied for reconsideration by the president, where upon investigation,
it was found out that the student acted in good faith and that her awards be reinstituted. The
president, upon receiving said decision, delayed action and even e-mailed the director to reverse
his decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain student and without honors and her
award as Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after the receipt
by the president of the decision and after the graduation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes. The presidents failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard of the
students rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty without just
cause, rendering him liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the
student and the students parents went through a painful ordeal brought about by such neglect.
Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 are but proper.
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
G.R NO.116192
November 16, 1995

Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions
Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

FACTS:
Sarmiento purchased a parcel of land. The adjacent lot was owned by the family of Atty. Naguid
and was occupied by Cruz. Sarmiento found out that Cruz is occupying about 71 meters of her
lot. She informed Cruz that she would like to remove the old fence so that she could construct a
new one that will cover the true area of her property but Cruz refused.

Sarmiento filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, which ruled in
favor of Sarmiento. Cruz appealed to the Regional Trial Court and assailed the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, which ruled in favor of Cruz. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated that of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

HELD:
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals
that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership
over the disputed 71 square meters involved.
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entity, the possession is illegal from the beginning and
the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in
such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is
forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became
illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of
the last demand.
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry into the
land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon
the land and constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's
possession became legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence.
The complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person,
not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence which private respondent claims is
an encroachment on the adjacent lot belonging to her.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should
either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court ruling that the Municipal Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over
the case.
Patricio Bello vs Eugenia Ubo et al
G.R. No. L-30353
September 30, 1982

FACTS:
Civil Procedure Service of Summons by a Police Officer
A land dispute arose between Bello and Ubo. Bello is claiming ownership over the
property that Ubo and her son have been occupying for years even paying taxes therefor. Ubo
and her son (Porferio Regis) claimed that they inherited said land.
Bello then filed a civil suit against Ubo and Regis. Summons were issued by the court.
A certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia served the summons. What he did was go to where Ubo and
her son was residing. Ubo and Regis initially refused to accept the same. But Yobia explained
the nature of the Summons; that there is a civil case filed against them; that they need to find a
lawyer to assist them. Ubo and Regis then reluctantly signed the summons. Thereafter, he
detached the copy of the complaint and handed it to Ubo and Regis. He however took back the
same afterwards; he also held on to the copy of the summons and afterwards returned to his
police station.
Despite signing the summons, Ubo and Regis did not file any responsive pleadings nor did they
appear in court. Eventually, the trial court declared them in default and decided in favor of Bello.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a proper service of summons in the case at bar.
HELD: No. A police officer is not one of those enumerated as a person authorized to serve
summons. The list provided in the Rules of Court is exclusive. Yobia was not a sheriff or a court
officer of the province where service was made; and neither was he a person who, for special
reasons, was specially authorized to serve the summons by the judge who issued the same.
Furthermore, even assuming that Yobia could be considered as a proper person to serve the
summons, still there was no valid and effective service since he brought back the summons with
him together with the copy of the complaint. Since there is no valid service of summons, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ubo and Regis. Therefore, the ex parte
proceedings that took place as well as the decision favoring Bello is null and void.
Bello vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.NO.L-38161
March 29,1974

FACTS:

On August 25, 1970, spouses Bello were charged with estafa for allegedly having
misappropriated a ladys ring with a value of P1, 000.00 received from them from Atty.
Prudencio De Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and
sentenced. They then filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance and after that to the
respondent city court which was also dismissed and ordered for execution of judgment for
having been erroneously addressed to this court. Petitioner spouses then filed for prohibition
and mandamus against the People and respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court
of Appeals which was again dismissed after finding that the city courts judgment was directly
appealable to it. Still, the couple moved for reconsideration and stressing the merits of their
appeal and of their defense but was again denied for lack of sufficient merit.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case due to
wrong procedure.

Whether or not the execution of judgment will be issued a mandamus

RULING: Decision of CA to dismiss petition is set aside. Mandamus is issued for the
execution of its judgment of conviction. And, said city court is commanded to elevate
petitioners appeal from its judgment to the Court of Appeals for the disposition on the merits.

The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the appeal but should have certified
the case to the proper court. It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid
such deplorable result of injustice and absurdity and that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if
it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

Posted

You might also like