INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251 Inner

ASIA
brill.com/inas

Whose Land is it Anyway?

Balancing the Expectations and Demands of Different Trusting
Partnerships in Mongolia

Rebecca Empson
University College, London, UK
r.empson@ucl.ac.uk

Tristan Webb
Korea Foundation, Seoul, Republic of Korea
tristan.webb@cantab.net

Abstract

This paper looks at the roles and interests that motivate different kinds of trusting
partnerships in Mongolia. Such partnerships are not only in marketing slogans
that herald new private investment agreements, they also underlie the relationship
between the Mongolian government and other governments (in the form of strategic
partnerships) and even between the Mongolian State and its people. The concept
serves as a framework for partners to achieve mutual ambitions, but is ambiguous and
its content evolves through negotiation and cumulative articulation. We offer certain
observations about the form of relationship between the Mongolian State and its peo-
ple, drawing from fieldwork in 2012 on how loans are used and perceived, and suggest
that this relationship is a fruitful lens through which we can observe vernacular atti-
tudes to the economy and the State, and to the different kinds of relationships the
Mongolian State maintains with outsiders. We conclude with an observation on the
inter-related and at times conflicting trusting partnerships to which the Mongolia
government is party.

Keywords

mining loans debt ownership investment trust inflation land

constitution partnerships

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 4|doi 10.1163/22105018-12340017

232 Empson and Webb

The phrase trusting partnership is an evocative if somewhat ambiguous term.

Our attention was drawn to it on two different occasions. On arrival at Chinggis
Khaan International Airport and driving along the road to Ulaanbaatar,
Mongolias capital city, large posters lined the roadside depicting smiling
men with hard hats shaking hands in front of heavy machinery and slogans
proclaiming: A Trusting Partnership or A Mine for Mongolians. In interna-
tional usage, the term Strategic Partnership is often used, but again, it is not
clear what the content of such a partnership implies. The phrase appears as a
marketing or political slogan, but it also applies to the concerns of many of
the relationships that the Mongolian government finds itself in, with its
own people, international private investors and other governments. In each
instance, parties come to the relationship with their own interests, but also
their own understandings about the terms of that relationship: what each side
should commit to that relationship and why, and what they can expect from it.
In this paper we examine Mongolias mineral economy from the perspec-
tive of two very different understandings of what might amount to a trust-
ing partnership. From one perspective the Mongolian government needs to
establish various kinds of partnerships with foreign investors, including other
governments. As a country landlocked between two powerful and often com-
peting states, Mongolia has had to establish a very nuanced relationship with
its neighbours and align itself carefully with different foreign entities. In these
alignments it makes use of a range of different kinds of partnerships for stra-
tegic political, military, and now especially economic purposes. These foreign
partnerships are important at this juncture because they underpin increased
capital investment in the country, allowing for the diversification of secondary
and tertiary industries and perhaps astonishing wealth. Such external trusting
partnerships relate to another kind of, what we may call an internal trusting
partnership: that between the Mongolian State and its people. To examine this
particular understanding of a trusting partnership, we will look at how items
purchased through bank loans are used by domestic borrowers along the lines
of temporary possession rather than outright ownership of wealth.
The idea of trusting partnerships can refer to that relationship between
the Mongolian State and foreign investors, as well as in certain ways to that
relationship between the State and the Mongolian people.1 In both instances,
we suggest, that caution or doubt underlies peoples activities. This points to
the general idea that, although these partnerships may be seen as evocative,
in that they may bring about predicted economic growth, they are being inter-

1 By State we mean the Constitution and all the rules and actions of public services that flow
from it.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 233

preted and shaped in very different ways, thereby influencing the form that
the economy takes.2 Taken together, these perspectives offer different views of
what counts as a trusting partnership and reveal insights into the way in which
ideas about risk and trust play an integral part in shaping the economy. In this
sense, they may be taken as examples through which we can explore the wider
theoretical idea of the performativity of economics (Callon 2007; MacKenzie
2007). By looking at the role of language (and other technological devices, such
as banking and policy implementation, etc.) we see that these models come
to articulate and facilitate, as well as bring into being, the economic realities
they seek to influence. Here, prediction is not simply flat description; it comes
to have an effect on that which it seeks to describe, shaping the economy in
its own image.

Vernacular Economics

The first half of this paper looks at the way in which trusting partnerships
shape economic behaviour within Mongolia. In highlighting this we suggest
a correlation between the Mongolian idea of temporary access to pastoral
resources found in the herding economy and the idea of temporary ownership
of wealth, granted to people through: a) loans awarded to people by banks,
or b) mining licences granted to foreign companies by the Mongolian govern-
ment. Ideas about ownership based on temporary access/possession rest on
a particular kind of trusting partnership that we call a master-custodianship
relationship. This relationship (between herders and the State or the invis-
ible stewards of the land) grants access to resources in the landscape and puts
herders in a relationship of debt to others.3 Understanding ideas about debt

2 Mongolias mineral boom peaked in 2011 with 17.3% growth, which slowed to 12.3% in 2012
because of decreasing exports to China and foreign investor concerns about restrictive tight-
ening of its mining regulatory regime. Nevertheless, the Economists The World in 2013 pre-
dicted that the countrys economy would grow 18.1% that year. The World Bank estimates
that Mongolias 2013 GDP would rise by 13% in 2014 (Kohn 2013).
3 Of course, it is not just usufruct rights to land and resources that are relevant here, but also
leased access to animals. For further distinctions between associateship ownership (where
the herder receives animals from the owner and manages them independently) and assis-
tantship ownership (where the herder operates under the direct supervision of the owner,
becoming, in effect, part of the owners household), see Sneath (2000). Sneath discusses the
different dynamics of these two forms of ownership in Inner Mongolia, relative to ideas of
patronage and mastery (ezen) and temporary possession (ezemshil), where he notes that,

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

234 Empson and Webb

and ownership through the master and custodian relationship may be a useful
way of comprehending concerns about the kinds of relationships at play in the
emerging mineral-export economy. This kind of comparison builds on a sub-
stantial body of academic work that looks at how economic theory plays out in
practice, varying at times as it is adapted to lived realities (Sahlins 1972; Campi
1996; Miller 2002; Sneath 2006).4
As Sneath (2004) has pointed out, a custodial and temporary notion of
ownership based on temporary possession and access to shared resources
differs from market-driven notions of ownership based on the idea of indi-
vidual private property. It can be found on many different levels in Mongolia,
from the relationship between herders and the spiritual owners or stewards
of the land to people and their relationship to the nation or state. The dis-
tinction between temporary possession of land (ezemshil) and private land
ownership (mchll/khrng) may be a crucial factor that is determin-
ing peoples unease about granting outright ownership to others over the
nations resources and deciding who can have access to them. In short, we
may ask, what kind of trusting partnership is at play when outright ownership
is granted, what kind of indebtedness is maintained and who, in fact, is the
master of whom?
At present the Mongolian government is attempting to diversify the econ-
omy through a series of practices. One of these includes the widespread
availability of bank loans allowing people to start businesses and trade. In
the following paragraphs, we focus on the use and reception of bank loans
to explore how predicted economic growth is being interpreted and realised
locally through different notions of ownership. It is our suggestion that ideas
of ownership based on temporary possession (of land as pasture and access to
resources by herders) provides a kind of template through which to apprehend
local ways of managing money and the items that are purchased through such
loans. Here bank loans (based on a trusting partnership between people and
banks) provide money that allows for the temporary possession of items that
have to be repaid.

under the collective herding system, associateship was the dominant relationship of herders
to the ultimate owner of most of the animalsthe collective.
4 Campi (1996: 101), for example, explains that, on foreign advice, the Mongolian government
let milk prices float in 199192, leading to the price of milk increasing nine times, and the
amount of available milk reduced by half. This could not be accounted for in terms of eco-
nomic prediction/theory, but related to the breakdown of the transportation and distribu-
tion of dairy produce across the country to cities, and to the fact that herders had little use
for the money they gained from its sale.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 235

Our example is drawn from a small administrative district in north Mongolia

where re conducted fieldwork in 2012, focusing on the way people use money
gained through bank-loans in different kinds of business investments. We will
see that, in their use, people do not necessarily always follow a logic that cor-
responds to rising economic optimism and national buoyancy. Instead, this
money is often used according to local understandings of temporary posses-
sion rather than outright ownership. Here we are talking not so much about
the money gained through loans, but refer to the items purchased through
bank loans (such as motor vehicles or bits of machinery). In instances where
bank loans have to be repaid within a year, and are granted with high inter-
est rates, people never really own the items they purchase through loans, but
are content to enjoy their limited and temporary use until they have to re-sell
them to pay back their loans. While much is no doubt being determined by
the way the loans themselves are structured by the banks, we suggest that the
customary institution practice of temporary possession, rather than outright
ownership, illuminates differing attitudes towards the temporality of owner-
ship and debt. This affords insight into the emergence, reception and shaping
of new economic forms, providing a window through which we can observe
the way in which the economy and its trusting partnerships are materialising
in Mongolia.
When discussing the prediction of economic growth in Mongolia in the
summer of 2012, some commented that they felt that the government had
done the wrong thing in establishing contracts with foreign mining compa-
nies. This, they lamented, would result in Mongolia becoming an empty con-
tainer (khooson sav). In spite of these fears, however, the influx of cash into the
general economy through different kinds of bank loans generated the poten-
tial for people to purchase a range of different things and start businesses of
their own. Far from being an empty container, then, the Mongolian country-
side was steadily being filled with shining new motorbikes and trucks, televi-
sions and refrigerators, double-glazed windows and electric stoves which were
being purchased through different kinds of loans and repayment schemes. For
many, these items were the material manifestations of economic growth and
development.
Talking with people who had taken out loanssome being on their third
business loan with decreasing interest ratesI found that many of the
items purchased through these sources were not fully owned by the people
involved. Indeed, ownership, in the sense that we know it, was only granted
to the two banks in the district, and a handful of wealthy big men who con-
trolled the actual economy and gave private loans. While loans are granted on
the condition that they are used for particular purposes, these endeavours are

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

236 Empson and Webb

rarely successful in financial terms. They rarely make a substantial profit. In

fact, most people may be said to temporarily own a series of items that they
purchase to start a business, such as a saw to make planks for sale, a large oven
to make bread, or a truck to transport raw materials to the city to sell. When it
comes to paying back their loan (usually within a year) and they have not been
able to accumulate enough profit, they sell or exchange these items to make
the money needed to pay back their loans. This virtual or temporary owner-
ship often amounts to increased debt and further loans from different sources,
including friends and family.
For people located at some distance from the centre of mining operations,
then, the economy is changing, but in a rather slanted way. On the one hand
money is increasingly available in the economy at large, and new kinds of com-
modities are becoming available to a wide range of people. However, most of
these items are not really owned by the people currently using them. There
is also a sense that the money now gained from bank loans (zeelnii mng) is
different from money gained through loans from family and friends. Money
gained through family and friends often puts borrowers in a different posi-
tion of indebtedness, which can last for several years and be repaid in other
forms. These multiple monies exist alongside each other but circulate in
specific and sometimes quite restricted ways. For example, large loans may
only occur within families while bartering goods, such as bread for cream,
may occur among complete strangers. These different forms of exchange fol-
low special modes of allocation (Bohannan 1959) to designated trusted users,
and sometimes genders (Zelizer 1989). While money gained from loans may
be used in a range of different ways that appears risky and haphazard, other
non-market money may be spent in a different way. Money gained through
different sources, thus, attracts different feelings which dictate the character
of spending (Douglas 1967). Attending to these different kinds of money chal-
lenges the notion of market money as strictly utilitarian. Different sentiments
and emotions are attached to different kinds of money that determine their
future use and circulation. The widespread availability of bank loans and dif-
ferent kinds of repayment schemes (lizingiin zeel) mean that, while loaned
money does circulate, it is not being retained, nor is it generating any great
profits in any sphere (not even the banks).5

5 This may seem contradictory according to formal economic theory, which holds, for instance,
that when money is circulating then it can be said to be injected into the economy fairly
well. The more it circulates the better, as each transaction increases the countrys GDP by the
same amount. If it just sits in a bank account then it does not do as much, but is still used by
the bank as a deposit against which it can lend. Currently, the uk government is aiming to get

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 237

Indeed, money attributed with uncertain ownership and prone to rapid

inflation (an average of over 12 per cent a year since 2007, peaking at over
30 per cent in 2008see Barnett et al. 2012) is still not the choice of currency
for everyday goods and services such as cream, milk and bread, which continue
to circulate very much through barter in the countryside. In this instance, one
could imagine that the persistence of barter in rural areas for daily foodstuffs
is an indicator of a large proportion of the population still not having access to
any form of surplus money (although one may note that food inflation is the
largest contribution to general overall inflation). One could also see it as a sign,
perhaps, of a general feeling of mistrust with the Mongolian government and
the economy at large. Partly, I think, this mistrust is generated by rapid infla-
tion, where money loses much of its purchasing power. In this instance it is
safe to stick with known and trusted variables through barter than risk squan-
dering savings on general foodstuffs. In fact, loaned money is often relegated
by people in the Mongolian countryside to spheres that are considered risky
and insecure, to spheres that might not always bring rewards. This, then, could
be seen as an indicator of the suspicion people have as to actual growth in the
economy. Indeed, Finke (2003) has noted that in rural Mongolia certain goods
are less commoditised than others: livestock and agricultural products often
continue to be exchanged through barter within local networks, he argues,
because of their importance in domestic consumption and because their value
might not be reflected in market prices. Here we see that, while it may well
be that on a national level the economy does well, it is unclear that this will
actually materialise in the local economy. A major factor is the lack of trust
people have in the value of money as it is tarnished with inflation and gener-
ated through the cultivation of economies of favour which privilege some and
exclude others.
It appears, then, that taking part in the trusting partnerships of Mongolias
mineral economy involves, for many people, initiating businesses made pos-
sible through bank loans. Knowing that the profits are small and that most of
the things one buys through these loans may never be fully owned by oneself,
could we see this as an appropriation of national wealth on local terms? Such
a view parallels the moral of a Mongolian folk tale, entitled Whose Homeland
Is It?. During an annual Mongolian sports meeting in Inner Mongolia, many

the first effect (people circulating money) through quantitative easing (i.e. printing money),
but we seem stuck in the second effect: banks hoarding money so that the loans they have
already made are better protected by beefier deposits, and this is still described as injecting
money into the economy.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

238 Empson and Webb

traders came from Inner parts of China. Shagdar (a Mongolian) often went
to these traders tents and made a stove using their stones and wood. Then,
using their water, he would cook something. The traders cursed Shagdar.
But Shagdar would reply, speaking in a mixture of Chinese and Mongolian:
Shagdar drinks the water of his motherland and burns his mountains wood.
Im not using the wood and water you brought from Shandong you know. You
come here to devour and exploit people, you bastards. Try and restrain your-
self (Nassenbayer et al. 1995).6
While it may be that people are appropriating national wealth on local
terms, it is also important to highlight that, for many, taking part in the emerg-
ing economy through bank loans marks a hopeful attempt to generate a
different kind of position for oneself, and an idea that, if everyone takes part,
it will actually come to affect the economy and transform the market (see
Shimamura, this volume, for a similar idea). Here participation in the emerg-
ing economy is less about accommodating a national (or foreign) power within
indigenous cultural orders (Ferguson 2002) and more about making claims to
new and emerging forms of subjectivity, literally bringing forth an imagined
economy through participation in its prediction by fostering different kinds of
relationships and alliances.
In the above example we can identify different temporalities of indebted-
ness. These amount to a complex chain of relations, leaving people entangled
in what Han (2004: 177), in her work on debt in Chile, calls forms of monetary
and affective indebtedness. In illuminating the way that people shape the
economy as much as the economy shapes people through different temporali-
ties of indebtedness, I hope to have highlighted that we cannot assume that
we know the form that the economy takes, in spite of widespread economic
predictions. For example, alongside the hope of increased standards of living
through the Wolf Economy,7 there is also the real danger of rapid inflation
putting everyday goods and services beyond peoples means. This Resource
Curse (a term that mobilises certain sentiments and practices) generates
increased suspicion about who is able to gain wealth and contributes to a gen-

6 As for who owns resources such as water, wood, and minerals, the Constitution of Mongolia
states that the Mongolian people own all the land, subsoil and livestock and that it falls under
the protection of the State. It singles out livestock as a national asset to be protected.
7 Mongolias ex-Vice Minister of Finance, Mr Ganhuyag Hutagt, coined the term The Wolf
Economy to describe how Mongolia could potentially leap-frog a Western development
model, drawing lessons from the Middle East, and be inspired by stories of Asian Tigers
to build [their] own model. www.ganhuyagchh.blogspot.com/2010/10/wolf-economy.html
(accessed 8 July 2014).

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 239

eral sense of mistrust in the value of money and the economy at large. Here,
recourse to modes of temporary possession or barter may be seen as just such
a way to shape things on local terms.

A Trusting Partnership between the Mongolian State

and Its People?

The trusting partnership between the Mongolian government and its people
is reflected in Mongolias constitution. The constitution requires a partner-
ship between the State and the people for due care of the countrys environ-
ment and resources. For example, the State is required to protect the national
wealth of, inter alia, livestock (Article 5(5)), land, water, subsoil and natural
resources (Article 16(1)). In turn, it is the sacred duty of citizens to protect
nature and the environment (Article 17(2)), and citizens have the correspond-
ing right to be protected against environmental pollution and ecological
imbalance (Article 16(2)).
The notion of granting a share or portion of wealth (or resources) to a large
group of people who may be benefactors resonates with Mongolian pasto-
ral ideas of ownership briefly mentioned above. As mentioned, within the
pastoral economy, we find ideas about the ownership of land and resources
that pivot around the notion of a master-custodian relationship. This model
differs from outright individual ownership. Here access to resources, such as
pasture, water, etc., is not granted as individual ownership, but rather alter-
nates through an idea of temporary possession (ezemshil). The notion of tem-
porary possession requires on-going connections that put people in relations
of debt to each other, be it between the Mongolian people and its government,
between monastic orders and their subjects or between herding households
and the spirits or masters of local places (gazaryn ezed).
Prevalence of master-custodian relations is not to be viewed as something
negative, and can be extended through other forms of exchange. Indeed, people
are always in a position of temporary custodianship (or precarious ownership)
to these various kinds of higher orders, or masters. Given this idea of tempo-
rary possession, not as something that undervalues property, but rather as an
asset that facilitates further growth and wealth, one could imagine a situation
where access to Mongolias vast mineral wealth is granted, mostly to foreign
investors, only on the condition that it does not actually destroy or damage the
source of those resources (i.e. the land itself). This is the underlying idea of
the legal term usufruct, meaning use of the fruit (i.e. one has a right to enjoy the
profit from land or capital, without legal title to the land or capital itself).

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

240 Empson and Webb

The need for trusting partnerships based on a master-custodian rela-

tion echoes on another level. It could be seen as a major factor that needs
to be strengthened between the Mongolian government and future genera-
tions within Mongolia, between the people and the State or the nation. The
Mongolian people are currently in the process of scrutinising every move that
the government makes in relation to the emerging mineral economy. Suspicion
circulates in daily media regarding who exactly is poised to benefit from
small- and large-scale mining contracts. The material manifestation of this
wealth appears to be accessible only to a few and yet annual hand-outs to
selective groups (students, children, pensioners, reindeer herders etc.) are one
attempt by the government to show that they are serious about distribution.8
But it is not just distribution of the immediate wealth that is of concern. There
is a sense that secondary and tertiary industries need to be developed for the
health of the nation, alongside other means of diversifying the economy.
A move away from what is locally referred to the Wolf Economy (based
solely on mining) toward the Rainbow Economy (based on a range of dif-
ferent economic activities) is thought to prevent rapid inflation, secure the
financial independence of the nation and provide work and employment for
generations to come.9 Plans are in place for developing a large-scale indus-
trial zone outside Sainshand (despite lack of water resources in the area),
talks are under way for developing a copper wire factory, and some even speak
of Mongolia becoming the world exporter of organic meat produce (see the
World Economic Forums Scenarios for Mongolia, 2014). How far the govern-
ment manages to see through these ideas and projects and diversify its econ-
omy remains to be seen. A crucial factor in its materialisation is how far they
can create a context in which foreign investors might be happy to develop such
projects in Mongolia. Inviting such investment is, thus, dependent on creating
an environment that people feel they can trust the conditions under which
such invitations are made.
Representatives of the Mongolian government and those involved in devel-
opment of the economy often refer to Mongolias youthfulness as a democracy

8 The Minister for Population Development and Social Security, S. Erdene, will be responsible
for allocating the monthly money for the reindeer people. Beginning on 1 June, reindeer fam-
ily children under the age of 18 will receive money equivalent to 50 per cent of the mini-
mum cost of living in the Khangai region, while adults will receive the full sum each month.
(at: http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/?p=4200, accessed 14 May 2013).
9 It is also a constitutional requirement of the State: under Article 5 (4) it must regulate
the economy of the country with a view to ensure [...] the development of all modes of
production.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 241

as an explanation for the relative lack of experience Mongolia has of operat-

ing in a market economy (especially with regard to the weight of contractual
agreements, the raising of private finance and its position within economic
planning generally). For example, Prime Minister Rinchinnyam Amarjargal
has said: We are just 22 years old in terms of having a market economyyou
cant compare us to Hong Kong or Singapore (Sanchata 2012). This argument
promotes the idea, not so much of resource nationalism, but more of an image
of an innocent newcomer that is learning the practice of contemporary inter-
national political economy: the importance of private contractual agreements
and the detached, yet supportive role of the State in underpinning that envi-
ronment; the raising of private finance and financial governance requirements;
and macro economic planning generally. Such an argument has been criticised
as an attempt to distract attention from what are quite deliberate decisions.
The account offered here does not seek to refute the impact of experience on
decision-making. Instead it seeks to add to an understanding of the complexity
of the Mongolian economic situation from the inside as well as the outside, by
looking at the nature of those relationships that facilitate it and to the different
expectations that these relationships demand.

Mongolias Trusting Partnerships and International Investment

We now turn, in this second half of our chapter, to look at other economic
partnerships into which the Mongolian government has entered. Each of
its relationships serves different and particular purposes, and each contains
within it unique tensions which sometimes cut across Mongolias other part-
nerships. It is our suggestion that considering these broader dynamics can
give us a fuller appreciation of the context for political decision-making in
Mongolia and, in particular, the phenomenon which has been simplified into
the, rather superficial, two-word accusation of resource nationalism by some
commentators.
The economic plan of Mongolias government requires foreign investment
from private international investors for three main reasons: firstly, to develop
the countrys export-earning potential; secondly, to bring in world-class tech-
nology and know-how that will allow development of an indigenous capability
in this field; and finally, to advance Mongolias economic and political inde-
pendence from Russia and China. The country has defined all of these areas
as important for the countrys national security. The amount of money the
Mongolian government needs to attract in the near future has been estimated
at approximately $68 billion (Jargalsaikhan 2013). The development road map

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

242 Empson and Webb

(as of Spring 2013) seems fairly clear: sell mining concessions to attract a seed
phase of foreign investment, and use the money raised to further develop
the countrys mines and mineral exports. The rise in exports is anticipated
to improve the countrys balance of payments, leading to a surplus of export
earnings which can be reinvested in the economy, and a growing GDP against
which the government can borrow to supplement investment in strategic
areas. This process, which is a form of export-led industrialisation, should lead
to an increase in primary industry capacity (such as coal-washing facilities), as
well as encouraging secondary industries (such as processing of raw minerals
into copper wire and other consumables) and the development of the tertiary
sector (already including tourism, but biomedical research and nanotechnol-
ogy have also been marked for development). The anticipated outcome is an
economy that fosters indigenous capabilities in the latest technologies across a
diversified economy. Such an economy would not only bring a bounty of pros-
perity to the current generation of Mongolians but would also better ensure
economic, political and even national security for future generations by having
multiple export markets and regions. The road is not clear-cut, however, and
there are still various models for how it could be travelled.10 Mongolia can-
not achieve economic prosperity and realise its conceptualisation of national
security alone, because it does not have the necessary investment to get
started, nor the world-class expertise in the industries from which it hopes to
apply. Paradoxically in one sense, therefore, Mongolia finds itself forced to rely
on a partnership of trust with powerful external actors the better to secure its
own autonomy. There are several potential partners, but the key questions are,
what are those external actors capable of providing? and what are the terms of
the relationship?
In the past Mongolia could turn to a trusting partnership of sorts with the
Soviet Union, which for its own political and economic interests was willing
to provide economic assistance for delivering Mongolias economic strategic

10 The uk and Norway, for example, took different approaches in realising their shares of
North Sea hydrocarbons: the uk encouraged an open door approach to oil exploration
granting favourable tax regimes for companies willing to start immediate exploration,
thereby encouraging development of world-leading technology, passing a certain amount
of risk onto private investors and stimulating immediate economic growth in supporting
industries. Norway took a slower approach, retaining a higher level of State direction into
how oil fields were developed and retaining higher tax receipts, which did not provide
such immediate stimulation and development but which allowed for growth of a consid-
erable sovereign wealth fund over time. Time will tell how Mongolia chooses to develop
its own resources and the method still seems open to negotiation.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 243

direction as a sort of elder brother (Oros akh).11 For a time international finan-
cial organisations and donor countries were willing to provide considerable
investment. But those relationships are changing now (Japan, for instance,
now wants to emphasise the commercial aspect of their relationship, rather
than aid donor/recipient), and in any case the scale of investment deemed
necessary dwarfs the amounts that can be provided by aid. Realistically, there-
fore, there are only two sources for the levels of foreign investment required:
private investors on the one hand, and state-owned-enterprise investment (i.e.
China) on the other. Mongolias 2010 update to its National Security Concept
shows that it cannot rely on Chinese investment and is reliant on diversify-
ing its investment sources, which means international private investment and
the government bond market. These are the needs and the context which the
Mongolian government carries as it approaches overseas investors seeking
to engage in a new form of trusting partnership. It is relevant to note here
that increased foreign investment in Mongolia also, in the short-term, leads
to more deposits in Mongolian banks, which encourages the availability of
domestic loans mentioned in the first half of this paper. It does this directly
and indirectly.12
But international private investors have their own set of interests and
requirements from a trusting partnership with Mongolia. In many ways those
interests coincide with that of the Mongolian government: both sides want
a skilled workforce, a developed infrastructure, and an investment climate
that is open to private investors. A few years ago the international media
were very upbeat on the investment climate. Mongolia was seen as politically
safe for investments with a booming economy. In 2011, Hilary Clinton praised
Mongolias democracy as thriving and inspirational, and the economy
achieved one of the highest levels of economic growth in the world, praised
by unctad for having an open fdi regime. However, since the election of
2012, investor confidence in the partnership has been shaken by calls within
the Mongolian administration for a review of concession agreements and

11 Indeed, as highlighted by one of our reviewers, many Mongolians hold that Soviet invest-
ment was better for Mongolia (i.e. they prefer Erdenet over Oyu Tolgoi), while foreign
investors sometimes presume the opposite (i.e. that market-based investment is better for
Mongolia, e.g. Oyu Tolgoi).
12 Directly, because foreign investment is spent on local employment, procurement, and
assembly, which increases the local money supply and thus the amount held in deposit by
banks: indirectly, because by increasing exports, for example by increasing the extraction
rate of a mine or freight capacity of a railway, the investment leads to a rise in Mongolian
export earnings, which are then deposited in banks and made ready for domestic loans.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

244 Empson and Webb

a revision of laws regarding strategic sectors, such as mining. A changeable

investment climate such as this, apparently steered by party-political pressures,
puts off investors who seek to minimise risk. There have consequently been
reports of a slowdown of investor interest in Mongolia (which peaked at $4.7
billion in 2011, falling to $3.9 billion in 2012, and further to $2.3 billion in 2013),
and Moodys, a global credit rating agency, have downgraded the Mongolian
governments debt servicing rating. It is a country that has had to receive assis-
tance from the International Monetary Fund five times in 22 years. The more
unstable the investment environment, the higher the risk, and the higher the
risk, the higher the anticipated costs are, and therefore the lower the overall
level of investment. In this way the investors key concern should also become
a primary concern of the Mongolian government which seeks to attract that
investment.
The Mongolian government has gone some way to address these structural
issues, for example by passing last year the Fiscal Stability Law which is aimed
at ensuring the governments purse does not run out of money. However, the
World Bank has recently issued a report which casts some doubt about whether
the government will be able to stick to that laws fiscal requirements this year
(i.e. 2014). So plans for the fiscal stability of the country seem to be improving
but are still in development. It has also (re)granted several small-scale mining
licences (to the dismay of grassroots environmental organisations) in the hope
of kick-starting investment again. But, to the frustration of the Mongolian gov-
ernment, this is having little effect and doubt and mistrust is building inter-
nally as to the actual effects of foreign fiscal advice.

Mongolias Trusting Partnerships with Other Governments

Mongolia has also entered into very particular types of economic partnership,
not only with the Mongolian people and international private investors, but
also with other governments. These partnerships are usual in international
affairs and provide an opportunity for all parties involved to better protect and
serve their national interests through economic, political and sometimes mili-
tary relationships that are negotiated and developed by both sides over time.
In recent years the trend has been to describe such relationships as strategic
partnerships, similar in essence to the aforementioned trusting partnerships
insofar as it suggests a relationship of cooperation, friendship, and impor-
tance, whilst being vague as to the specifics of what it may actually cover. In
March and April 2013, both Japans Prime Minister Abe and Chinas President
Xi separately spoke of the importance of developing their bilateral strategic

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 245

partnerships with Mongolia. The uk government also has a strategic partner-

ship with Mongolia, and Russia signed their declaration of strategic partner-
ship with Mongolia in 2009.
Mongolias approach to these relationships and how it expects them to
operate may be informed by the experience of 70 years of extremely close
political, diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union: a relation-
ship which bears little similarity with those available today in the international
order, but perhaps serves as benchmark against which to judge other relation-
ships. In fact Mongolias relationship with the Soviet Union may be viewed as
a model against which all current trusting partnerships are measured. In other
words, the half-remembered ideal of relations with the Oros akh [Russian elder
brother] is the model against which actually experienced other partnerships
are measured.13 However, most of the nuances of Mongolias requirements
from, and approaches to, these international governmental partnerships are
strategic.
The particular circumstances which must be born in mind by those seeking
to better understand the Mongolian governments context, desires, and inse-
curities are primarily twofold: political and economic considerations from its
isolated geography, and political and economic considerations of its mineral
wealth. Regarding the geo-strategic considerations, the dominant factors are
the potential for political influence from Russia or China, who at various points
throughout its history have sought to exert undesired levels of influence within
and over Mongolia (in April 2013 Chinese President Xi called for greater stra-
tegic trust on sovereignty, safety, and territory as part of the bilateral strategic
partnership). Politically, therefore, Mongolia needs to achieve autonomy from
its relationship with these two powers, and we can see this need being met by
its desire to create partnerships with so called third neighbours other than
Russia and China, that it may diversify its relations in the world and thereby
strengthen its independence. An economic aspect of Mongolias geographic
isolation is its dependence on the territories of Russia and China to export
its mineral wealth. Recent economic planning by the Mongolian government
has attempted to mitigate this geographic vulnerability, for example the deci-
sion to adopt a probably more expensive and inefficient rail gauge and track
network in order to diversify its primary export channels away from China.
(In 2014, Mongolia has allowed a China-style narrow-gauge line to be built
from Oyu Tolgoi to China, but it is short and only port-to-port. Meanwhile,

13 Our reviewer noted that it is precisely because of this that the lack of an anthropolog-
ically-informed account of the Mongolian-Soviet relationship and development is so
sorely felt in Mongolian anthropology today.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

246 Empson and Webb

the Russian-style broad gauge is being expanded, even though it means coal
exports are $3 per tonne more expensive.)
The need to diversify the economy through strategic partnerships with
other international countries is to prevent the susceptibility of the economy
to fluctuations in mineral prices and to prevent structural damage that may be
done to other sectors of the economy through overreliance on mineral exports
(so called Dutch Disease). Furthermore, Mongolian planners recognise that,
to develop a resilient and prosperous economy across the country, it will need
to invest in areas other than mineral extraction (not least the development of
secondary industries around those mines, but also advanced tertiary sectors),
and so pursues fields such as biotechnology in order to maintain productivity
advances in future decades.
In trying to achieve national and strategic aims through these various part-
nerships, the Mongolian government has found that some aims and partner-
ships can cut across others. For example, the Mongolian government needs to
allow certain levels of water supply and land degradation in order to receive
mining investment from overseas, but doing so impacts on its responsibili-
ties as a national custodian of Mongolias land.14 And in seeking to diversify
Mongolias export routes away from an economic dependency on China, by
agreeing to a rail infrastructure plan that balanced towards Russia, Mongolias
export earnings were damaged by Chinas reaction of temporarily shutting
down the MongoliaChina mineral export road. These examples show that the
Mongolian government is not always able simultaneously to satisfy its partner-
ships with its people, other countries and international investors. At several
junctures it finds itself forced to balance which of its interests it must priori-
tise, and by what strategies it can best realise its aims across several of those
partnerships without losing unacceptable ground in others. The situation is
thus a delicate balancing act; a perfect crucible for the contestation of influ-
ence, interests and politics.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have considered how the Mongolian government and peo-
ple are responding to renewed international interest in Mongolias mineral
resources. We have shown how the Mongolian government is having to pursue

14 This tension is something being played out politically in relation to the Mongolians
governments tough stance toward grassroots environmentalists in Mongolia, several of
whom have been labelled terrorists and have received 20-year prison sentences.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 247

its main objectives (independence, security, prosperity), not on its own, but by
balancing changeable and at times competing partnerships, such as with its
own people and with international investors over resources. This is because
the strategic considerations that lie behind each of its partnerships force the
government to pursue options which cannot serve all of its relationships all of
the time. Balancing demands and expectations from all of these partnerships
means putting some on hold while attending to others. By drawing on perspec-
tives from anthropology, law, economics and international relations, we suggest
that the concept of a trusting partnership can be used to explore these rela-
tionships: in each case (Statepeople, governmentgovernment, government
private investors) both sides are clear that there needs to be trust and coop-
eration of some sort, but the responsibilities within that relationship are not
always clear nor necessarily comprehended in the same way by both sides, and
the articulation of the relationship is under negotiation.
This suggests that the charge of resource nationalism of Mongolia is per-
haps an oversimplification of the drivers behind macro-economic and political
decision-making in Mongolia. An alternative view of the resource national-
ism accusation would be not, perhaps, a nationalist intent per se, but rather
the outcome of the Governments having to balance competing responsibili-
ties across a spectrum of partnerships. In this case, these involve a response to
accusations of failing to live up to its responsibilities to the Mongolian people;
strategic necessity from a reluctance to accept unrestricted Chinese invest-
ment; and yet a concern that it must obtain as much investment finance as
possible if it is to diversify its economy and realise national security.

Postscript, August 2014

Since we initially presented these ideas in May 2013, Mongolias situation has
changed somewhat. Private Western investors became increasingly concerned
that Mongolia was making it harder for them to operate in Mongolia and the
rate of investment in Mongolia slowed drastically. Accusations of resource
nationalism were levelled at Mongolia. The State Great Hural tried to reassure
investors that its actions were really only aimed at Chinese state-owned enter-
prises (for example by loosening restrictions in the controversial 2012 Strategic
Entities Foreign Investment Law), but investors remain cautious.
This vindicates our earlier analysis, which identified the tensions cutting
across Mongolias somewhat ambiguous trusting partnerships: the difficulty it
faces in trying to deliver benevolence to its people, independence from China
and Russia, and a good but quick deal from foreign investors. We correctly saw

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

248 Empson and Webb

Mongolias actions not simply as a knee-jerk one of resource nationalism but

as a complicated balancing act between competing political, economic and
strategic tensions.
But where does it leave the concept of trusting partnership as a tool for
understanding Mongolias perspective? To what extent is the trusting partner-
ship between the Mongolian State and its people driving Mongolias behaviour
with international investors and with neighbouring States? The Mongolian
government had raised domestic expectations of the bounty from a Wolf
Economy and encouraged cheap credit as a means to ease domestic tensions.
But the stalled partnership with international investorswhich was a foun-
dation stone of its plan for a Wolf Economyhas meant the government is
facing huge economic problems, having borrowed large amounts of money in
anticipation of future export earnings which have not materialised. Now China
appears to be the only investor capable of keeping Mongolias development
plans reasonably on track and on time. This was never meant to happen, as it
weakens Mongolias geopolitical and strategic independence, itself a constitu-
tional obligation of the State.
More than before, therefore, the complex and idiosyncratic conceptuali-
sation of a trusting partnership between Mongolia and its people is driving
the Mongolian governments agenda and behaviour in its partnerships with
international investors and other governments. Two ways in which this domes-
tic relationship will have such repercussions are likely to be the reaction of
the Mongolian people to increased Chinese involvement in and control of
resources (which Constitutionally belong to the people but which fall under
the protection to the State), and the peoples reaction to reduced government
spending (which is in danger of being unsustainable). And framing the reac-
tion of the Mongolian people will be the ongoing articulation of the master-
custodian economic relationship of livestock and of land between the people
and the State, and new evocations of vernacular economics. With rapid infla-
tion, for example, there is increasingly not enough money available in the
general economy for certain transactions and people are beginning to look
afresh at competing parties for new forms of leadership. A fuller comprehen-
sion of this relationship, and the environmental fall-out of these actions, as
well as the expectations of each side, will be important in better understand-
ing the Mongolian governments motivations and behaviours in its trusting
partnerships with private investors and other governments in the future.
This does not mean to imply that the Mongolian government is a free and
independent actor in choosing its international relationships, needing merely
to accommodate the wishes of the Mongolian people. On the contrary, the
Mongolian government may be feeling forced to accept a firmer economic

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 249

embrace from China in order to drum up the export earnings it needs to repay
the public debts it took on from 2012: if it does not repay those debts, it might
default, and that could be very messy for the entire economyit could involve,
for example, seeking another (the sixth since the end of the Cold War) imf
bailout.
There are therefore at least three plausible scenarios for Mongolia in the
next five years, all of which involve putting strain between the Mongolian
people and the Mongolian State (for the purposes of this exercise we have
assumed that Western international investors remain jittery for a couple more
years). 1. Continued Chinese expansion in the economy jeopardises Mongolias
political and economic independence and causes local resentment (see the
story of Shagdar in this article). 2. Mongolia is not able to earn enough export
income and thereby fears default on its international debts, which would prob-
ably result in unpopular austerity government spending for several years (fur-
ther increasing the attraction of granting economic concessions to China in
return for much-needed foreign currency). 3. Mongolia accepts Chinese invest-
ment but hedges. It hedges, by developing in a most serious way links which
are already strong with the Republic of Korea and Japan. This would involve
exporting minerals or manufactured goods by rail through Russia (thereby
avoiding northeast China), either to Vladivostock or dropping a few miles into
the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to access port facilities in Rason
Special Economic Zone, and from there, direct shipping routes to some of the
worlds most welcoming markets. Mongolia, Russia and Japan have already
cooperated in doing a trial run through Vladivostock, and Mongolia has held
formal discussions with DPRK about leasing a pier at Rason. The Republic of
Korea is keen to expand train lines to Central Asia (thereby tapping into natu-
ral resources but also a Korean diaspora resettled after the Korean War), which
will involve cooperating with Mongolia. It would take time to develop, though,
and in the meantime export earnings must be obtained to repay debts and
maintain spending, and so increased Chinese investment and influence would
probably still be felt a necessity, albeit with the accompanying social pressures.
It might also slightly strain Mongolias relationship with us State Department,
were Mongolia to cooperate so closely with Putins Russia and possibly also
dprk. Time will tell which path Mongolia takes and the consequences that
materialise as a result of embarking on such a journey.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

250 Empson and Webb

Acknowledgements

We thank Uradyn Bulag for putting together this volume and for gathering
such a diverse group of people at such a crucial moment for the conference
Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Mongolias Natural Resource Strategy at the
University of Cambridge in 2013. We also thank Libby Peachey for her organisa-
tional role at the conference and with this volume. We thank the anonymous
reviewers insightful comments, as well as Alan Sanders for his useful com-
ments on an earlier draft.
This paper was developed while re held an erc Grant (erc-2013-CoG,
615785, Emerging Subjects) and while tw was a Senior Research Analyst at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (any views expressed in the article are
entirely personal and in no manner should be taken as the fcos). Our thanks
extend to those institutions for their support.

References

Barnett, Bersch, and Ojima. 2012. Inflation Dynamics in Mongolia: Understanding the
Roller Coaster. International Monetary Fund Working Paper. July 2012. www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12192.pdf (accessed 1 May 2013).
Bohannan, P. 1959. The impact of money on an African subsistence economy. The
Journal of Economic History 19(4): 491503.
Callon, M. 2007. What does it mean to say that economics is performative?, in
D. MacKenzie, F. Muniesa & L. Siu (eds.), Do Economists Make Markets? On the
Performativity of Economics: 31157. Princeton (nj): Princeton University Press.
Campi, A. 1996. Nomadic cultural values and their influence on modernization, in
O. Bruun & O. Odgaard (eds.), Mongolia in Transition: Old Patterns, New Challenges:
90102. Abingdon: Routledge.
Douglas, M. 1967. Primitive Rationing, in Raymond Firth (ed.), Themes in Economic
Anthropology: 119145. London: Tavistock.
Ferguson, J. 2002. Of mimicry and membership: Africans and the New World Society.
Cultural Anthropology 17(4): 55169.
Finke, P. 2003. Does privatization mean commoditisation? Market exchange, barter
and gift giving in postsocialist Mongolia, in N. Dannhaeuser & C. Werner (eds.),
Anthropological Perspectives on Economic Development and Integration (Research in
Economic Anthropology 22): 199223. Bingley: Emerald.
Jargalsaikhan, D. 2013. The London Eye Looking at Mongolia. The ub Post, 29 April.
http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/?p=3826 (accessed 14 May 2013).

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251

Whose Land is It Anyway ? 251

Kohn, M. 2013. World Bank cuts growth forecast for Mongolia as exports slow. Bloomberg
30 April 2013. www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-30/world-bank-cuts-growth-
forecast-for-mongolia-as-exports-slow.html (accessed 1 May 2013).
MacKenzie, D., F. Muniesa & L. Siu (eds.). 2007. Do Economists Make Markets? On the
Performativity of Economics. Princeton (nj): Princeton University Press.
Miller, D. 2002. Turning Callon the right way up. Economy and Society 31(2): 21833.
Nassenbayer et al. (trs.). 1995. Mongol Oral Narratives. Bloomington (in): Mongolia
Society.
Sahlins, M. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago (il): Aldine-Atherton.
Sanchata, M. 2012. Mongolia aims to woo foreign investors. The Wall Street Journal
31 October 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702047129045780902
82738517610.html (accessed 14 May 2013).
Sneath, D. 2000. Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese
State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2006. Transacting and enacting: corruption, obligation and the use of monies
in Mongolia. Ethnos 71(1): 89112.
2004. Property regimes and sociotechnical systems: rights over land in
Mongolias Age of the Market, in K. Verdery & C. Humphrey (eds.), Property in
Question: Value Transformation in the Global Economy: 16184. Oxford: Berg.
The Economist, 2013. The World In 2013.
World Economic Forum: Scenarios for Mongolia. 2014. www.weforum.org/issues/
scenarios-mongolia (accessed 8 July 2014).
Zelizer, V.A. 1989. The social meaning of money: Special Monies. American Journal of
Sociology 95(2): 34277.

Official Documents
National Security Concept, adopted by Mongolian Parliament in July 2010.
Constitution of Mongolia, adopted 1992.

INNER ASIA 16 (2014) 231251