No.

B2840621
________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE

THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, DIVISION OF
OIL, GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES; KENNETH HARRIS
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS
COMPANY; CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION;
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION,
Real Parties in Interest.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

GAS COMPANYS OPPOSITION TO IMMEDIATE RELIEF
REQUEST
From the Superior Court, County of Los Angeles
Case No. BS168381, JCCP No. 4861
The Honorable John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Judge, Department 311
Telephone: (213) 351-7511
*JAMES J. DRAGNA (SBN 91492)
DAVID L. SCHRADER (SBN 149638)
YARDENA R. ZWANG-WEISSMAN (SBN 247111)
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2200
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132
Telephone: (213) 612-2500
Facsimile: (213) 612-2501

Attorneys for Southern California Gas Company

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 5
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW ........................... 8
A. The Purpose and Importance of Aliso Canyon. .................... 8
B. Relevant Background on the SS-25 Gas Leak. ..................... 9
C. SB 380 Empowers DOGGR and the CPUC to Authorize
Injection. ............................................................................. 10
D. DOGGR Determined that It Is Safe to Resume Injections. 10
E. The CPUC Concurred and Directed SoCalGas to Inject. ... 11
F. The CPUC Issued a Separate Directive to Inject. ............... 12
G. The County Sought Preliminary Injunctive Relief. ............ 13
III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................... 14
A. The County Is Improperly Seeking to Interfere with the
CPUCs Findings and Directive while Evading the CPUCs
Jurisdiction and Procedures. ............................................... 14
1. The County Seeks to Interfere with the Exclusive
Authority of the CPUC............................................... 14
2. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because the County
Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. ............. 17
B. The County is not Entitled to any Relief. ........................... 18
1. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That It Lacked
Jurisdiction. ................................................................ 18
2. The Countys Underlying Claims for Injunctive Relief
are Legally Meritless. ................................................. 20
3. The County Will Suffer No Harm if Injections
Resume. ...................................................................... 22
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 24

2
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CALIFORNIA CASES

Comm. For a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Res. Control

Bd. (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 847 ........................................................... 22

East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Prot.
(1996) 43 Cal. App. 4th 1113 ................................................................ 22

Gilbert v. State of California (1990)

218 Cal. App. 3d 234 ....................................................................... 20, 21

PegaStaff v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Commn (2015)

236 Cal. App. 4th 374 ............................................................................ 19

Santa Barbara County Flower and Nursery Growers Assn,

Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 864 .............................................................................. 16

Sexton v. Atchison Topeka & S.F.R. Co. (1916) 173 Cal. 760 .................... 18

Sheet Metal Workers Internat. Assn., Local Union No. 104 v.

Rea (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1071 ......................................................... 17

Utility Consumers Action Network v. Public Utilities Comn

of State of California (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 688 ............................... 17

Western Mun. Water Dist. v. Sup. Ct. (1986)

187 Cal. App. 3d 1104 ........................................................................... 23

Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Sup. Ct. (2011)

9 Cal. 4th 559 ......................................................................................... 23

CALIFORNIA STATUTES

Code Civ. Proc. 1094.5(f)......................................................................... 20

Pub. Res. Code 3217 ........................................................................ passim

Pub. Util. Code 714 ........................................................................ 5, 19, 23

Pub. Util. Code 715 .................................................................. 5, 12, 15, 19

3
Pub. Util. Code 1702 ................................................................................ 17

Pub. Util. Code 1732 ............................................................................ 6, 17

Pub. Util. Code 1759(a) .................................................................... passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Decision Addressing Application of Southern California Gas

Company to Amend Its Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity for the Aliso Canyon Gas Storage Facility
(Cal. P.U.C. Nov. 14, 2013) No. 09-09-020, 2013 WL
6202918.................................................................................................... 9

4
I. INTRODUCTION
This dispute centers on findings of the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) and California Department of Conservation,
Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) pursuant to
state law SB 380 (Pub. Res. Code section 3217; Pub. Util. Code sections
714 and 715) that the Aliso Canyon Gas Storage Facility is safe and that
Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) may resume injecting gas
at the facility in limited amounts and according to constraints imposed by
the agencies. The law delegates to DOGGR the duty to determine the
criteria for the safety review and assess the facilitys safety in the first
instance, and gives the CPUC final authority to approve or disapprove
DOGGRs determination that the prohibition on injections should be lifted.
The agencies have properly exercised their broad discretion and
authorized injections to resume. To address energy reliability risks, the
CPUC also has ordered SoCalGas to begin injections as soon as possible
because there is a clear and immediate need to resume injections at the
Facility in order to ensure public safety and reliability in the Los Angeles
Basin. (Real Party in Interest Southern California Gas Companys
Request for Judicial Notice of Filings Before the Superior Court in Support
of Opposition to Immediate Relief Request (hereafter RJN), Ex. 8,
internal Ex. M at p. 4 (emphasis added).)1
The County of Los Angeles (County) opposes any resumption of
injection and moved the Superior Court (Wiley, J.), to prevent SoCalGas

1
Because the County filed its Request for Immediate Stay without
submitting the Record of the Superior Court, SoCalGas has submitted
concurrently with this Opposition a Request for Judicial Notice attaching
relevant portions of the Record.
5
from complying with the CPUCs directive. The Superior Court properly
held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the Countys motion under Public
Utilities Code section 1759(a) and SB 380, because [r]egulating Aliso
injections is the prerogative of the CPUC and any order preventing
injections would interfere with [the CPUC] in the performance of its
official duties (RJN, Ex. 14.)
The Countys attempt to challenge that decision and obtain
immediate injunctive relief in this Court is improper and should be rejected.
By omitting the CPUC as a party to this proceeding, the County improperly
seeks to interfere with the CPUCs safety findings and energy reliability
directive, while evading the CPUCs exclusive jurisdiction and
administrative review procedures. Among other things, granting such relief
in these circumstances would prejudice both the CPUC and SoCalGas,
which would face the risk of inconsistent orders.
Moreover, the County has failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies before the CPUC, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction. As
the CPUC explained in the proceedings below, if the County seeks to
prevent SoCalGas from injecting gas at Aliso Canyon according to the
CPUCs directive, the County must seek relief in the first instance from the
CPUC. Indeed, the CPUC is the only proper forum for the Countys
request because exhaustion of CPUC remedies is the only way to obtain a
judicially-reviewable Commission determination on petition for rehearing
(Pub. Util. Code section 1732) and the only way to generate a proper
administrative record for this Court to review. The CPUC informed the
Superior Court and the County that the County presently is a party to an
open proceeding in the CPUC, through which the County potentially could
obtain the relief it seeks. (RJN, Ex. 13 at 17:20-18:15). Nevertheless, the
6
County chose to proceed by writ petition in this Court, knowing that it had
failed to exhaust alternative remedies.
Setting aside the procedural and jurisdictional defects, there is no
basis to grant the Countys Immediate Stay/Injunction Request. As
DOGGR explained below, [f]ear-mongering and heated rhetoric aside, the
County fails to allege a legal or factual basis upon which relief, let alone
emergency relief, may be granted. (RJN, Ex. 4 at p. 8.) The County does
not contend that Aliso Canyons equipment is faulty or that resuming
injection will harm anyone or anything. DOGGR states that Aliso Canyon
has undergone more safety and regulatory scrutiny during this period than
any of Californias thirteen other underground natural gas storage facilities,
and likely more safety scrutiny from a regulatory agency than any other gas
storage facility in the United States. (RJN, Ex. 5 at 39.)
The Countys sole motivation is its purported fear that an earthquake
might strike Aliso Canyon sometime in the next 50 or more years.
According to the County, it [c]ould be tomorrow, could be next week,
could be in 40 years. Maybe it wont happen. (RJN, Ex. 13, 9:12-21.)
Speculation about a hypothetical future event is no basis for any sort of
relief, let alone the immediate relief the County seeks here.
The Countys efforts are an improper attempt to substitute its own
judgment on matters that the Legislature has placed within the discretion of
DOGGR and the CPUC. DOGGR has considered the Countys earthquake
concerns and concluded that, while the state law governing the
comprehensive safety reviewSB 380does not require a seismic
study, SoCalGas should undertake a risk assessment as a matter of
prudence. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. I at 26.) However, given that the
facility endured a previous seismic event without significant impacts to
7
public health and safety and now has more safety mitigations in place,
DOGGR found it not necessary to prohibit the resumption of injection
until the seismic studies are complete. (Id. at 30.) That is a reasonable
approach by an agency with jurisdiction and expertise, and the CPUC has
concurred. DOGGRs determination is entitled to substantial deference.
The Countys disagreement is immaterial, because the County has no
jurisdiction to regulate safety of underground gas storage facilities, no role
in the SB 380 approval process, and no relevant substantive expertise.
As SB 380 says nothing about earthquakes, the County can identify
no legal error in DOGGRs or the CPUCs decision-making. Nor can the
County demonstrate any immediate or imminent harm if an injunction does
not issue, because injecting gas at Aliso Canyon will not make an
earthquake any more likely to occur, nor materially increase the possible
harm if an earthquake did occur. While staying injection will not prevent
any potential harm to the public, it may cause harm by endangering energy
reliability to critical facilities like hospitals and power plants. As the
CPUC found, delaying the resumption of injections after DOGGR has
completed its safety determination may itself pose a continued public safety
and reliability risk to the Los Angeles Basin. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M
at p. 5 (emphasis added).)
For all these reasons, the Courts temporary stay should be lifted,
and the Countys Immediate Stay/Injunction Request should be rejected.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. The Purpose and Importance of Aliso Canyon.
SoCalGas owns and operates an integrated natural gas pipeline
system consisting of intrastate pipelines and storage facilities. The
SoCalGas system uses natural gas from storage and pipeline supplies to
8
meet customer demand. Aliso Canyon is SoCalGas largest and most
important storage facility, and the CPUC has consistently determined that
the Aliso Canyon Storage Facility plays a critical role in SoCalGas ability
to reliably serve approximately six million residential, commercial, and
industrial customers. (Decision Addressing Application of Southern
California Gas Company to Amend Its Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity for the Aliso Canyon Gas Storage Facility (Cal. P.U.C. Nov.
14, 2013) No. 09-09-020, 2013 WL 6202918 at *33.) The absence of Aliso
Canyon affects the reliability of supply for SoCalGas Los Angeles local
gas pipeline system, which serves 17 power plants, among other customers
including millions of residents and industrial and commercial customers.
B. Relevant Background on the SS-25 Gas Leak.
On October 23, 2015, SoCalGas discovered a gas leak emanating
from the area of the Standard Sesnon-25 (SS-25) well located at Aliso
Canyon. (See RJN, Ex. 1 at 37.) SoCalGas ceased all injection
operations as part of its response to the leak. On December 10, 2015,
DOGGR issued an emergency order directing SoCalGas to [c]ontinue to
not inject gas into the gas storage facility until injection is authorized by
[DOGGR]. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. A at p. 9.) On January 6, 2016,
Governor Brown issued an emergency proclamation directing DOGGR to
continue its prohibition against . . . injecting any gas into the Aliso Canyon
Storage Facility until a comprehensive review, utilizing independent
experts, of the safety of the storage wells . . . is completed. (RJN, Ex. 8,
internal Ex. B at 7.) On February 18, 2016, DOGGR officials confirmed
that the well was permanently sealed, and state officials thereafter
confirmed that air quality in Porter Ranch had returned to normal. (RJN,
Ex. 8, internal Ex. R.)
9
 C. SB 380 Empowers DOGGR and the CPUC to Authorize
Injection.
The Legislature then passed Public Resources Code section 3217
referred to as SB 380which governs the specific requirements for
injections to resume. SB 380 authorizes DOGGR and the CPUC to
implement the law and requires a comprehensive safety review before
injections may resume. SB 380 gives DOGGR discretion to determine
[t]he criteria for the . . . comprehensive safety review with input from
contracted independent experts. (Pub. Res. Code 3217(b)-(c).) The
underlying premise of SB 380much like that of Public Utility Code
section 1759is that the issues to be determined in the SB 380 approval
process are highly technical and require agency subject matter experts. The
CPUC and DOGGR have such expertise; the County does not.
Injections may not resume without the CPUCs final approval.
SB 380 expressly provides that after DOGGR determines that the
comprehensive safety review is complete, the prohibition must continue
until the CPUCs Executive Director has concurred via letter with the
supervisor regarding his or her determination of safety. (Id. 3217(a)(1).)
D. DOGGR Determined that It Is Safe to Resume Injections.
On January 17, 2017, DOGGR and the CPUC jointly found that the
comprehensive safety review was complete and imposed additional
requirements on SoCalGas before injection would be authorized. (RJN, Ex.
8, internal Ex. G at p. 2.) On July 19, 2017, DOGGR found that SoCalGas
had satisfied all outstanding requirements and has demonstrated the
integrity and safety of the wells . . . (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. K at p. 3.)
Based on its findings, site inspections, and public hearings and comments,
DOGGR determined that the comprehensive safety review demonstrates

10
the integrity of the wells at the Facility, that the risks of failures identified
during the review have been addressed, and that [DOGGR] has satisfied all
other statutory and regulatory requirements consistent with [SB 380].
(RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. L at 4.)
E. The CPUC Concurred and Directed SoCalGas to Inject.
As required by SB 380, the CPUC independently verified and
validated DOGGRs determination that it is safe to resume injections to
ensure that the findings regarding the safety of the wells at Aliso Canyon
are carefully considered and based on fulfilling the substantive mandates of
SB 380[.] (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M at 1.) The CPUC concurred in
DOGGRs safety findings and approved the resumption of injections at
Aliso Canyon. (Id. at p. 3.)
The CPUC independently concluded that DOGGRs well testing
plans provided a comprehensive framework to test the integrity of the
storage wells at the Facility. . . . (Id. at p. 2.) The CPUC further assured
the public that all reasonable actions have been taken to prevent another
well failure and to prepare the facility for injection and withdrawal of gas.
Commission staff continues working and coordinating with DOGGR to
ensure compliance with all the [public safety] measures[.] (Id. at pp. 23.)
Based on the safety findings, the CPUC determined that injections at
Aliso Canyon should resume as soon as possible because delaying the
resumption of injections after DOGGR has completed its safety
determination may itself pose a continued public safety and reliability risk
to the Los Angeles Basin. (Id. at 5 (emphasis added).) The CPUC
exercised its discretion to balance the publics interest in energy reliability
against any potential risk of harm from allowing injections to resume and
concluded that [a]t this time, public health and safety is best served by
11
ensuring that adequate supplies of gas, limited to a working gas level that
ensures reliability, are maintained at the [Aliso Canyon] Facility to serve
the Los Angeles Basins energy needs. (Id.)
F. The CPUC Issued a Separate Directive to Inject.
SB 380 also requires the CPUC to determine the range of working
gas needed at Aliso Canyon to ensure reliable electric and gas supplies.
(Pub. Util. Code 715; RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M at pp. 3-4.) On July 19,
2017, the CPUC issued its reliability directive and accompanying report.
(RJN, Ex. 8, internal Exs. N and O). The CPUCs section 715 report and
findings took into account recent studies of the natural gas system in
Southern California . . . comments on the [prior] January 2017 [section
715] report, the continuing success of mitigation measures, and the
increasing availability of wells at the Facility that had passed safety
review. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. N at p. 2.)
The CPUCs directive requires SoCalGas to maintain a target
working gas level of 23.6 billion cubic feet (Bcf) and a maintenance level
above 14.8 Bcf at all times in order to maintain safe and reliable service.
(RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M at p. 4 (italics added).) SoCalGas must begin
injecting gas at Aliso Canyon as soon as possible to bring inventory up to
the target and comply with the directive. (RJN, Ex. 7 at 4-5.) Absent
injection, any withdrawals needed to maintain reliability will cause total
inventory to fall below the CPUCs safe minimum. The CPUC has found
that this is a matter of public safety, because its section 715 reliability
report demonstrates a clear and immediate need to resume injections at the
Facility in order to ensure public safety and reliability in the Los Angeles
Basin. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M at 4 (italics added).)

12
 G. The County Sought Preliminary Injunctive Relief.
On July 24, 2017, the County filed an ex parte application in the Los
Angeles Superior Court seeking a stay pursuant to CCP section 1094.5(g)
of the agencies authorization to resume injections at Aliso Canyon (RJN,
Ex. 2 at p. 18.) Despite naming the CPUC and its Executive Director as
respondents to its petition, the County did not name either in its ex parte
application. The CPUC joined DOGGR and SoCalGas to defend its safety
findings and its order directing SoCalGas to inject. (RJN, Ex. 3.)
The CPUC argued that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction under
Public Utilities Code section 1759 because any order nullifying the CPUCs
injection directive would interfere with [CPUC] in the performance of its
official duties. (Pub. Util. Code 1759(a)). At the Superior Courts
request (RJN, Exs. 9 and 11), the County and CPUC submitted
supplemental briefs on July 27 and 28, respectively, further addressing
whether section 1759 divested the Court of jurisdiction to hear the Countys
application. (RJN, Exs. 10 and 12.) The CPUC argued that:

If this Court were to attempt to stay the reinjection of gas, it

would not be enforcing Commission standards and policies.
The Court would instead be rendering a determination that
reinjection of gas is not in the best interests of the public, is
not needed to ensure reliability of the gas and electrical
systems, and is not safe. Those are factual determinations
squarely within the Commissions authority, competence,
and expertise to make. Thus, any determination by the Court
affecting the amount of gas or the maintained pressure would
interfere with and prevent the Commission from addressing
the issue. It would also second-guess what conclusion the
Commission has reached based on the same facts.

(RJN, Ex. 3 at p. 11.)

On July 28, 2017, the Superior Court denied the Countys ex parte

13
application for lack of jurisdiction because: The Commissions order is
inject. The Countys demand is do not inject. Doing both is impossible.
The conflict is direct. (RJN, Ex. 14.) The County thereafter filed its
Request for Immediate Stay/Injunction before this Court without giving
notice to Respondents, and these proceedings commenced.
III. ARGUMENT
The Countys Immediate Stay/Injunction Request is procedurally
and jurisdictionally defective, and even if it were not, the County cannot
show that it is entitled to any sort of injunctive relief. The Countys request
for immediate relief should be denied.

A. The County Is Improperly Seeking to Interfere with the

CPUCs Findings and Directive while Evading the
CPUCs Jurisdiction and Procedures.

1. The County Seeks to Interfere with the Exclusive

Authority of the CPUC.
The County has failed to join the CPUC in this proceeding, even
though the CPUC was a full participant in the briefing and hearing below;
the CPUC and its Executive Director are respondents to the Countys
Administrative Petition for Writ of Mandate; the Superior Court based its
decision in large part on the CPUCs assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
over injection activities; the County seeks to collaterally attack the CPUCs
safety findings and concurrence in DOGGRs approval to resume
injections; and the relief the County seeks would interfere with a clear
directive from the CPUC requiring SoCalGas immediately to begin
injection to meet the CPUCs inventory target for the facility. Indeed, in
Count One of its Petition below, the County alleges that a writ of mandate
is necessary to direct [the CPUC Executive Director] to rescind his letter

14
concurrence and reevaluate the facility after DOGGR complies with the law
in full. (RJN, Ex. 1 at 149.) The County is estopped from denying its
own allegations.
Below the County strained to avoid, ignore, and obfuscate the
CPUCs role in the safety decisions the County challenges, but SB 380s
text is inescapable. While DOGGR makes the initial safety findings,
SB 380 entrusts the CPUC with final authority to validate that DOGGRs
determination of safety comports with SB 380 and to concur in DOGGRs
determination to permit injections: The supervisor may not lift the
prohibition on injection until the Executive Director of the Public Utilities
Commission has concurred via letter with the supervisor regarding his or
her determination of safety. (Pub. Res. Code 3217(a)(1).)
SB 380 also requires the CPUC to direct the operator to maintain
the specified range of working gas, subject to findings by the CPUC and
DOGGR that the comprehensive safety review is complete, among other
requirements. (Pub. Util. Code 715(d); Pub. Res. Code 3217(d)(1).)
The CPUC has complied with its official duties under SB 380. It
participated jointly with DOGGR in the comprehensive safety review (RJN,
Ex. 8, internal Ex. G), and has reviewed and independently validated
DOGGRs safety findings. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M.) Pursuant to
SB 380, the CPUCs Executive Director approved resuming injections at
Aliso Canyon because the Executive Director of the CPUC hereby concurs
with the determination of the State Oil & Gas Supervisor that all wells
ready to return to service have passed well integrity tests; and all wells that
have not passed DOGGRs integrity tests have either been temporarily
abandoned and isolated from the reservoir or fully plugged and abandoned
consistent with DOGGR regulations. (Id. at 5.)
15
 Thus, if anything, it is the CPUCs concurrence in DOGGRs safety
finding that the County truly seeks to challenge. The CPUCs concurrence
is a mandatory condition precedent to any injections going forward, without
which DOGGRs determination of safety has no immediate legal effect.
SB 380 does not require the CPUC to concur; it requires the CPUC to
exercise independent judgment to evaluate whether DOGGRs safety
findings comport with SB 380 and then, and only then, concur.
In an attempt to avoid the jurisdictional consequences of the CPUCs
role, the County protested below that it seeks only to challenge DOGGRs
preliminary finding of safety. But that ignores that DOGGRs safety
finding by itself is not a decision ripe for judicial review. In the context of
administrative proceedings, a controversy is not ripe for adjudication until
the administrative process is completed and the agency makes a final
decision that results in a direct and immediate impact on the parties.
(Santa Barbara County Flower and Nursery Growers Assn, Inc. v. County
of Santa Barbara (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 864, 875.) DOGGRs safety
determination is not such a decision, because it still must be approved by
the CPUC to be effective, and even then the concurrence of the CPUC is
not judicially reviewable until other administrative requirements are met.
For this reason, the relief the County seeks necessarily interferes
with the CPUCs exclusive authority. If the Countys relief is granted in
these circumstances, SoCalGas will face the risk of inconsistent
obligations because, as the Superior Court put it: The Commissions
order is inject. The Countys demand is do not inject. Doing both is
impossible. The conflict is direct. (RJN, Ex. 14.)

16
 2. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because the County
Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
The general rule is that a plaintiff must first exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking a judicial remedy. (Sheet Metal Workers Internat.
Assn., Local Union No. 104 v. Rea (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1085
[failure to exhaust administrative remedies usually precludes a judicial
action...].) The County could (and should) have sought the remedy it
seeks here from the CPUC in the first instance. (See Pub. Util. Code
1702 [Complaint may be made [to the CPUC] ... by written petition or
complaint, setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any
public utility, including any rule or charge heretofore established or fixed
by or for any public utility, in violation or claimed to be in violation, of any
provision of law or of any order or rule of the [CPUC]]; 1708.5(a) [the
CPUC shall permit interested persons to petition the commission to adopt,
amend, or repeal a regulation].) As the CPUC argued below, to the
extent that the County seeks immediate relief, the County could choose to
seek that relief from the Commission, which has power to do all things
necessary to further its jurisdiction. (RJN, Ex. 12 at p. 2 [citing Cal. Pub
Util. Code 701].)
There is nothing optional about exhausting administrative remedies
provided by the CPUC. An application for rehearing is a mandatory
condition precedent to any action for review of an order or directive of the
CPUC or its staff, because Public Utility Code 1732 explicitly states that
[n]o corporation or person shall in any court urge or rely on any ground
not so set forth in an application for rehearing before the CPUC.
Consequently, [a] party seeking judicial review of a Commissions
decision must first file an application for rehearing. Utility Consumers

17
Action Network v. Public Utilities Comn of State of California (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 688, 696. The County failed to do so here.
As the CPUC explained, the Commission continues to exercise its
jurisdiction with respect to all matters pertaining to the injection of gas at
Aliso Canyon. (RJN, Ex. 12 at p. 2.) During the hearing in the Superior
Court, counsel for the CPUC made clear that the only appropriate forum for
the County to pursue any claims for an immediate stay or injunctive relief
was the CPUC, which has full authority to issue . . . temporary restraining
orders or to stay [an] action. (RJN, Ex. 13 at 18:11-13.) The County
therefore could have readily sought a stay and or rehearing of the decision
to approve injection at Aliso Canyon in front of the CPUC, and was
instructed to do so if it wanted to pursue its claim for an immediate stay of
injection. The Countys failure to do so compels denial of the Immediate
Stay/Injunction Request and dismissal of its underlying petition.

B. The County is not Entitled to any Relief.

1. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That It

Lacked Jurisdiction.
The County has no likelihood of success on the merits of its writ
petition to this Court, because the Superior Court correctly concluded it has
no jurisdiction to interfere with [CPUC] in the performance of its official
duties[.] (Pub. Util. Code 1759(a.).) The clear intent of the provision
as a whole is to place the [CPUC], in so far as the state courts are
concerned, in a position where it may not be hampered in the performance
of any official act by any court, except to the extent and in the manner
specified in the act itself. (Sexton v. Atchison Topeka & S.F.R. Co. (1916)
173 Cal. 760, 764.) So long as a law was validly enacted by the
Legislature, any duties such statute imposes on the CPUC are official
18
duties within the meaning of section 1759, and the superior courts lack
jurisdiction to interfere with the duties it imposes. (PegaStaff v. Cal. Pub.
Utils. Commn (2015) 236 Cal. App. 4th 374, 383.)
As explained, SB 380 imposes duties on the CPUC with regard to
the safety assessment of Aliso Canyon and the decision to permit injections
to resume. And other requirements of SB 380, and Sections 714 and 715 of
the Public Utilities Code, place independent obligations on the CPUC to
review safety and operations at the Aliso Canyon facility. These include
the CPUCs duty to determine the range of working gas necessary at the
facility to ensure safety and reliability[.] (Pub. Util. Code 715(b)(1).)
In the exercise of these statutory responsibilities, the CPUC has
participated jointly with DOGGR in the comprehensive safety review (RJN,
Ex. 8, internal Ex. G) and has reviewed and independently validated
DOGGRs safety findings. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M.) The CPUCs
Executive Director issued a formal letter stating that injections may resume
at Aliso Canyon because the Executive Director of the CPUC hereby
concurs with the determination of the State Oil & Gas Supervisor that all
wells ready to return to service have passed well integrity tests; and all
wells that have not passed DOGGR's integrity tests have either been
temporarily abandoned and isolated from the reservoir or fully plugged and
abandoned consistent with DOGGR regulations. (Id. at p. 5.)
The CPUC has also directed SoCalGas to maintain a level of at least
14.8 Bcf of working gas and to target a working gas level of 23.6 Bcf.
(RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. N at p. 1.) The CPUC further determined that
SoCalGas must manage the facility to achieve these inventory targets
because public health and safety is best served by ensuring that adequate
supplies of gas, limited to a working gas level that ensures reliability, are
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maintained at the Facility to serve the Los Angeles Basins energy needs.
(RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. M at p. 5.)
As the Superior Court properly held, to comply with the CPUCs
directive SoCalGas must inject gas at Aliso Canyon, and it must begin as
soon as possible. (RJN, Ex. 7 at 4; RJN, Ex. 14.) Accordingly, any stay
or injunction by the Superior Court prohibiting SoCalGas from injecting
gas at Aliso Canyon would impermissibly interfere with the CPUCs
official duties under SB 380 and effectively annul the CPUCs reliability
directive. The Superior Court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to
even temporarily stay or enjoin injection at Aliso Canyon in light of the
CPUCs findings and directive.

2. The Countys Underlying Claims for Injunctive

Relief are Legally Meritless.
For the County to prevail on the merits, the Court would have to
overrule both DOGGR and the CPUC as to matters that are firmly within
those agencies expertise and discretion, based on a statute, SB 380, that
unambiguously grants those agencies sole authority to determine how to
implement the safety review at issue. Courts have long made clear while
mandamus may lie to compel agencies to exercise their discretion,
mandamus cannot be used to compel an agency with discretionary power
to act in any particular manner. (Gilbert v. State of California (1990) 218
Cal. App. 3d 234, 241, italics added; accord Code Civ. Proc. 1094.5(f) [in
mandamus proceedings, the judgment shall not limit or control in any way
the discretion legally vested in the [agency]].)
SB 380 specifically entrusts both the Division and CPUC with
discretion in conducting the safety review. (See Pub. Resources Code
3217, subd. (a), par. (1) [The supervisor shall continue the prohibition

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against ... injecti[on] ... until ... the supervisor determines that well integrity
has been ensured ... [and the] Executive Director of the Public Utilities
Commission has concurred via letter with the supervisor regarding his or
her determination of safety (emphasis added); see also id., subd. (b), par.
(1) The criteria for the gas storage well comprehensive safety review shall
be determined by the supervisor with input from contracted independent
experts" (emphasis added).]). The County does not claim they failed to
exercise that discretion. The County simply disagrees with how they
exercised their discretion. That is not a cause of action; it is yet another
attempt by the County to seize regulatory authority over Aliso Canyon from
DOGGR and the CPUC. (See Gilbert, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 241.)
The Countys underlying claims against DOGGR and the CPUC
narrowly focus on the Countys concern about earthquake risk. But the
County is simply wrong that SB 380 requires DOGGR to consider
earthquake risk specifically or imposes any particular requirements for a
risk management or emergency response plan for the site. SB 380 vests
DOGGR with discretion to determine the criteria for the comprehensive
safety review, and to determine whether those criteria have been satisfied.
(Pub. Res. Code 3217.) The CPUC is required to offer its independent,
discretionary concurrence with DOGGRs evaluation of the comprehensive
safety review before injection at Aliso may resume. (Id. at (a)(1).)
DOGGR and CPUC followed SB 380 to the letter. The deliberative
and data-driven nature of DOGGRs and the CPUCs decision is reflected
in their joint statement authorizing the resumption of injection (RJN, Ex. 8,
internal Ex. J), the enclosures attached to that joint statement (RJN, Ex. 8,
internal Exs. LM), and DOGGRs and CPUCs responses to public

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comments (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. I). The County identifies no fault with
any of these findings or the evidence that supports them.
The County is also wrong in claiming that environmental review
under CEQA was required before injections can resume. As DOGGR
explained in its response to comments, the resumption of injections after a
temporary hiatus is not a project under CEQA. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex.
I at p. 43.) SoCalGas has been operating the Aliso Canyon storage field for
decades and has remained in operation during the moratorium on injections.
Since the relevant activity has been ongoing for decades, there is nothing
new to evaluate. (See, e.g,. Comm. For a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water
Res. Control Bd. (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 847, 862-63.)

3. The County Will Suffer No Harm if Injections

Resume.
It is the Countys burden to show that an injury is impending and so
immediately likely as only to be avoided by issuance of the injunction.
(East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Prot. (1996) 43 Cal.
App. 4th 1113, 1126 [emphasis added].) The County has not, and cannot,
show that any injury is impending or immediately likely, because the
County fixates on the speculative harm of a hypothetical future earthquake.
Resuming injections at Aliso Canyon does not make the occurrence of an
earthquake any more or less likely, nor meaningfully increase the potential
for harm should the Countys prophesied earthquake come to pass.
At most, the Countys arguments would mean that the resumption of
gas injection at Aliso Canyon would pose the exact same risks that Aliso
Canyon has faced since the facility was converted for gas storage in the
mid-1970s. Now, however, any such risks are substantially reduced by new
safety measures at Aliso Canyon. As DOGGR notes, the purpose of the

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new operating requirements and safety review is to prevent leaks of natural
gas before they occur in order to avoid public health impacts in the first
place. (RJN, Ex. 8, internal Ex. I at 1718.)
The Countys allegations of imminent harm focus on the risk that an
earthquake may pose, arguing that there is a high probability (60% to
80%) of a large earthquake (greater than 6.3 magnitude) on or near Aliso
Canyon within the next 50 years. (RJN, Ex. 2 at p. 3). Speculation that an
earthquake may or may not occur [w]ithin the next fifty years is the polar
opposite of an imminent or immediately likely injury. (See Western
Mun. Water Dist. v. Sup. Ct. (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1115
[disapproved of on other grounds by Western States Petroleum Assn. v.
Sup. Ct. (2011) 9 Cal. 4th 559] [mere possibility of an earthquake does not
amount to substantial evidence of a clear and imminent danger, demanding
immediate action as required by CEQA exemption].)
In all events, the CPUC has concluded that the public interest
requires injections to resume, within certain limitations, to protect against
energy shortages. The County has no jurisdiction to contest the CPUCs
determination. Moreover, SB 380 requires the CPUC to open a proceeding
to consider the long term plan for use of Aliso Canyon and to evaluate
whether use of Aliso Canyon can be reduced or eliminated. (Pub. Util.
Code 714). That investigation is within the CPUCs exclusive
jurisdiction, and the County may not convert this proceeding into an
unauthorized evaluation of the need for Aliso Canyon going forward.

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